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Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional

Alberto Voltolini    Università degli Studi di Torino, Italia    



In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.

30 Giugno 2020
01 Aprile 2020
02 Marzo 2020

Keywords: Possible nonexistenceAspectual shape(Reference) intentionalityDirectednessDispositionsIntentional objectPossible apparent aspectuality

Copyright: © 2020 Alberto Voltolini. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.