JoLMA The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts

Rivista | JoLMA
Fascicolo monografico | 1 | 1 | 2020
Articolo | Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms

Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms

Abstract

Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.


Open access | Peer reviewed

Presentato: 24 Febbraio 2020 | Accettato: 01 Aprile 2020 | Pubblicato 30 Giugno 2020 | Lingua: en

Keywords Psychology of meaningSemantic dispositionalismNormativity argumentMetaphysics of meaningKripkenstein’s paradoxRule-following paradox


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