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Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms

Andrea Guardo    Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia    

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abstract

Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.

Pubblicato
30 Giugno 2020
Accettato
01 Aprile 2020
Presentato
24 Febbraio 2020
Lingua
EN

Keywords: Psychology of meaningMetaphysics of meaningRule-following paradoxSemantic dispositionalismNormativity argumentKripkenstein’s paradox

Copyright: © 2020 Andrea Guardo. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.