Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms

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Campo DC	Valore
dc.identifier	ECF_article_2993
dc.title	Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms
dc.contributor.author	Guardo Andrea
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing, Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari
dc.type	Articolo
dc.language.iso	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/it/edizioni4/riviste/the-journal-for-the-philosophy-of-language-mind-an/2020/1/two-epistemological-arguments-against-two-semantic/
dc.description.abstract	Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.
dc.relation.ispartof	JoLMA
dc.relation.ispartof	Vol. 1 \| Num. 1 \| Giugno 2020
dc.issued	2020-06-30
dc.dateAccepted	2020-04-01
dc.dateSubmitted	2020-02-24
dc.identifier.issn
dc.identifier.eissn	2723-9640
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/Jolma//2020/01/001
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Kripkenstein’s paradox
dc.subject	Kripkenstein’s paradox
dc.subject	Metaphysics of meaning
dc.subject	Metaphysics of meaning
dc.subject	Normativity argument
dc.subject	Normativity argument
dc.subject	Psychology of meaning
dc.subject	Psychology of meaning
dc.subject	Rule-following paradox
dc.subject	Rule-following paradox
dc.subject	Semantic dispositionalism
dc.subject	Semantic dispositionalism

Articolo
open access peer reviewed

Andrea Guardo Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia

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abstract

Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.

Pubblicato

30 Giugno 2020

Accettato

01 Aprile 2020

Presentato

24 Febbraio 2020

Lingua

Keywords: Kripkenstein’s paradox • Normativity argument • Metaphysics of meaning • Psychology of meaning • Semantic dispositionalism • Rule-following paradox

permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma//2020/01/001

Copyright: © 2020 Andrea Guardo. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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