Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark…

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DC Field	Value
dc.identifier	ECF_article_3005
dc.title	Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional
dc.contributor.author	Voltolini Alberto
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing, Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari
dc.type	Research Article
dc.language.iso	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/en/edizioni4/riviste/the-journal-for-the-philosophy-of-language-mind-an/2020/1/why-the-mark-of-the-dispositional-is-not-the-mark/
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.
dc.relation.ispartof	JoLMA
dc.relation.ispartof	Vol. 1 \| Issue 1 \| June 2020
dc.issued	2020-06-30
dc.dateAccepted	2020-04-01
dc.dateSubmitted	2020-03-02
dc.identifier.issn
dc.identifier.eissn	2723-9640
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/Jolma//2020/01/002
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	(Reference) intentionality
dc.subject	(Reference) intentionality
dc.subject	Aspectual shape
dc.subject	Aspectual shape
dc.subject	Directedness
dc.subject	Directedness
dc.subject	Dispositions
dc.subject	Dispositions
dc.subject	Intentional object
dc.subject	Intentional object
dc.subject	Possible apparent aspectuality
dc.subject	Possible apparent aspectuality
dc.subject	Possible nonexistence
dc.subject	Possible nonexistence

Research Article
open access peer reviewed

Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional

Alberto Voltolini Università degli Studi di Torino, Italia

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abstract

In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.

Published

June 30, 2020

Accepted

April 1, 2020

Submitted

March 2, 2020

Language

Keywords: Possible nonexistence • Directedness • Dispositions • Aspectual shape • Possible apparent aspectuality • (Reference) intentionality • Intentional object

permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma//2020/01/002

Copyright: © 2020 Alberto Voltolini. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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