Naturalisme et scepticisme

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Campo DC	Valore
dc.identifier	ECF_chapter_2596
dc.contributor.author	Douzant Iris
dc.title	Naturalisme et scepticisme. Le problème de l’identité personnelle chez David Hume
dc.type	Capitolo
dc.language.iso	fr
dc.description.abstract	Hume is qualified as a naturalist in two respects: on the one hand, because he sets himself to observe natural phenomena and more precisely those relating to human nature; on the other hand, because nature refers to a mental activity that eludes the grasp of the thought that tries to seize it. Hume’s dealing with the issue of personal identity creates a tension between these two meanings of naturalism – the power of nature seems to escape the understanding of the philosopher who tries to give reasons for it and both sides of Humian naturalism dissociate themselves. If this tension is not positively resolved, in the opinion of Hume himself, it is reduced through the use of a radical scepticism.
dc.relation.ispartof	Philosophica
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing
dc.issued	2019-07-27
dc.dateAccepted	2019-03-21
dc.dateSubmitted	2019-02-05
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/it/edizioni4/libri/978-88-6969-325-0/naturalisme-et-scepticisme/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/009
dc.identifier.issn	2610-8933
dc.identifier.eissn	2610-8925
dc.identifier.isbn	978-88-6969-326-7
dc.identifier.eisbn	978-88-6969-325-0
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
item.fulltext	with fulltext
item.grantfulltext	open
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Consciousness
dc.subject	Consciousness
dc.subject	David Hume
dc.subject	David Hume
dc.subject	Naturalism
dc.subject	Naturalism
dc.subject	Personal identity
dc.subject	Personal identity
dc.subject	Scepticism
dc.subject	Scepticism
dc.subject	Self
dc.subject	Self

Capitolo
open access peer reviewed

Naturalisme et scepticisme

Le problème de l’identité personnelle chez David Hume

Iris Douzant Université Paris 1 Panthéon - Sorbonne, France; Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia

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abstract

Hume is qualified as a naturalist in two respects: on the one hand, because he sets himself to observe natural phenomena and more precisely those relating to human nature; on the other hand, because nature refers to a mental activity that eludes the grasp of the thought that tries to seize it. Hume’s dealing with the issue of personal identity creates a tension between these two meanings of naturalism – the power of nature seems to escape the understanding of the philosopher who tries to give reasons for it and both sides of Humian naturalism dissociate themselves. If this tension is not positively resolved, in the opinion of Hume himself, it is reduced through the use of a radical scepticism.

Pubblicato

27 Luglio 2019

Accettato

21 Marzo 2019

Presentato

05 Febbraio 2019

Lingua

ISBN (PRINT)

978-88-6969-326-7

ISBN (EBOOK)

978-88-6969-325-0

Keywords: Scepticism • Personal identity • Naturalism • Consciousness • Self • David Hume

permalink: http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/009

Copyright: © 2019 Iris Douzant. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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