Rivista | JoLMA
Fascicolo monografico | 1 | 1 | 2020
Articolo | Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms
Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms
Abstract
Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.
Presentato: 24 Febbraio 2020 | Accettato: 01 Aprile 2020 | Pubblicato 30 Giugno 2020 | Lingua: en
Keywords Normativity argument • Psychology of meaning • Metaphysics of meaning • Kripkenstein’s paradox • Rule-following paradox • Semantic dispositionalism
Copyright © 2020 Andrea Guardo. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma//2020/01/001
