La natura e gli stati abituali nell’Etica Nicomachea

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Campo DC	Valore
dc.identifier	ECF_chapter_2602
dc.contributor.author	Farina Flavia
dc.title	La natura e gli stati abituali nell’Etica Nicomachea. Analogie e differenze
dc.type	Capitolo
dc.language.iso	it
dc.description.abstract	According to Aristotle, virtue does not arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature. ‘Virtue naturalism’, as the possibility to ‘reduce’ virtue and virtues of character to physical or physiological entities and relations, seems consequently impossible. Nature and virtue differ mostly in respect of their relation with contraries. A moral agent can become either virtuous or vicious, while a stone can only move downwards. However moral habits, once acquired by the agent, seem to come close to nature’s uni-directionality.
dc.relation.ispartof	Philosophica
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing
dc.issued	2019-07-27
dc.dateAccepted	2019-03-11
dc.dateSubmitted	2019-02-05
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/it/edizioni4/libri/978-88-6969-325-0/la-natura-e-gli-stati-abituali-nelletica-nicomache/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/002
dc.identifier.issn	2610-8933
dc.identifier.eissn	2610-8925
dc.identifier.isbn	978-88-6969-326-7
dc.identifier.eisbn	978-88-6969-325-0
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
item.fulltext	with fulltext
item.grantfulltext	open
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Aristotle
dc.subject	Aristotle
dc.subject	Habits
dc.subject	Habits
dc.subject	Naturalism
dc.subject	Naturalism
dc.subject	Nature
dc.subject	Nature
dc.subject	Nicomachean Ethics
dc.subject	Nicomachean Ethics
dc.subject	Uni-directionality
dc.subject	Uni-directionality
dc.subject	Virtue
dc.subject	Virtue

Capitolo
open access peer reviewed

La natura e gli stati abituali nell’Etica Nicomachea

Analogie e differenze

Flavia Farina Università degli Studi Roma Tre – Tor Vergata, Italia; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France

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abstract

According to Aristotle, virtue does not arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature. ‘Virtue naturalism’, as the possibility to ‘reduce’ virtue and virtues of character to physical or physiological entities and relations, seems consequently impossible. Nature and virtue differ mostly in respect of their relation with contraries. A moral agent can become either virtuous or vicious, while a stone can only move downwards. However moral habits, once acquired by the agent, seem to come close to nature’s uni-directionality.

Pubblicato

27 Luglio 2019

Accettato

11 Marzo 2019

Presentato

05 Febbraio 2019

Lingua

ISBN (PRINT)

978-88-6969-326-7

ISBN (EBOOK)

978-88-6969-325-0

Keywords: Virtue • Nicomachean Ethics • Habits • Aristotle • Uni-directionality • Nature • Naturalism

permalink: http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/002

Copyright: © 2019 Flavia Farina. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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