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La natura e gli stati abituali nell’Etica Nicomachea

Analogie e differenze

Flavia Farina    Università degli Studi Roma Tre – Tor Vergata, Italia; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France    

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abstract

According to Aristotle, virtue does not arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature. ‘Virtue naturalism’, as the possibility to ‘reduce’ virtue and virtues of character to physical or physiological entities and relations, seems consequently impossible. Nature and virtue differ mostly in respect of their relation with contraries. A moral agent can become either virtuous or vicious, while a stone can only move downwards. However moral habits, once acquired by the agent, seem to come close to nature’s uni-directionality.

Pubblicato
27 Luglio 2019
Accettato
11 Marzo 2019
Presentato
05 Febbraio 2019
Lingua
IT
ISBN (PRINT)
978-88-6969-326-7
ISBN (EBOOK)
978-88-6969-325-0

Keywords: Nicomachean EthicsAristotleUni-directionalityNatureHabitsVirtueNaturalism

Copyright: © 2019 Flavia Farina. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.