Fear as a Destructive Pain

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Campo DC	Valore
dc.identifier	ECF_chapter_2600
dc.contributor.author	Bagnati Gaia
dc.title	Fear as a Destructive Pain. Human Nature and Violent Affections in the Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle
dc.type	Capitolo
dc.language.iso	en
dc.description.abstract	In the discussion on bravery in Eth. Eud., III, 1 Aristotle determines the objects that are absolutely dreadful by means of an explicit reference to ‘human nature’. This reference has not received much consideration from scholars in the field. The present paper argues that the reference under discussion entails a notion of ‘human nature’ that corresponds to a human being’s psychological disposition to endure fearful emotions – that is to say, painful emotions that imply the representation of a pain capable of destroying a human being – up to a certain degree of intensity. Furthermore, this article claims that the same notion of ‘human nature’ is implied in Eth. Eud., II, 8 in the discussion of involuntariness concerning the cases of mixed actions where Aristotle refers to the ‘nature’ of the agent as a criterion to determine the involuntariness of an action.
dc.relation.ispartof	Philosophica
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing
dc.issued	2019-07-27
dc.dateAccepted	2019-02-25
dc.dateSubmitted	2019-02-05
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/it/edizioni4/libri/978-88-6969-325-0/fear-as-a-destructive-pain/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/003
dc.identifier.issn	2610-8933
dc.identifier.eissn	2610-8925
dc.identifier.isbn	978-88-6969-326-7
dc.identifier.eisbn	978-88-6969-325-0
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
item.fulltext	with fulltext
item.grantfulltext	open
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Aristotle
dc.subject	Aristotle
dc.subject	Disposition
dc.subject	Disposition
dc.subject	Fear
dc.subject	Fear
dc.subject	Human nature
dc.subject	Human nature
dc.subject	Physical pains
dc.subject	Physical pains
dc.subject	Sensible affections
dc.subject	Sensible affections
dc.subject	Sou
dc.subject	Sou

Capitolo
open access peer reviewed

Fear as a Destructive Pain

Human Nature and Violent Affections in the Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle

Gaia Bagnati Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia

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abstract

In the discussion on bravery in Eth. Eud., III, 1 Aristotle determines the objects that are absolutely dreadful by means of an explicit reference to ‘human nature’. This reference has not received much consideration from scholars in the field. The present paper argues that the reference under discussion entails a notion of ‘human nature’ that corresponds to a human being’s psychological disposition to endure fearful emotions – that is to say, painful emotions that imply the representation of a pain capable of destroying a human being – up to a certain degree of intensity. Furthermore, this article claims that the same notion of ‘human nature’ is implied in Eth. Eud., II, 8 in the discussion of involuntariness concerning the cases of mixed actions where Aristotle refers to the ‘nature’ of the agent as a criterion to determine the involuntariness of an action.

Pubblicato

27 Luglio 2019

Accettato

25 Febbraio 2019

Presentato

05 Febbraio 2019

Lingua

ISBN (PRINT)

978-88-6969-326-7

ISBN (EBOOK)

978-88-6969-325-0

Keywords: Human nature • Sou • Fear • Disposition • Aristotle • Physical pains • Sensible affections

permalink: http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/003

Copyright: © 2019 Gaia Bagnati. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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