Leibniz’s Theodicy can and should be read otherwise than a naive statement of metaphysical optimism. To make this point, the Author revives some suggestions by Deleuze and contrasts them with Heidegger’s critical reading of Leibniz’s rationalism. Leibniz neither defends God simply by asserting his innocence, nor affirms that bad events are merely an unpleasant, human dream. Just as in Bach’s Art of Fugue every chord is repeated in multiple tonalities, in Leibniz’s universe each event is a moment of an infinite rational web. The best of all possible worlds is not ‘perfect’, as its harmony and order are not free from dissonances; but each dissonant chord of reality is ‘well-tempered’ through its infinite relations to all the other chords and tonalities. Two conclusions follow: that Leibniz’s view is a powerful antidote for any childish humanistic anthropomorphism; and that his teleology is in no need of progress. The best of all possible worlds is actually the world in which we live.