Rivista | JoLMA
Fascicolo monografico | 2 | 2 | 2021
Articolo | Conceivability Errors and the Role of Imagination in Symbolization
Conceivability Errors and the Role of Imagination in Symbolization
Abstract
n the years 1675-84, Leibniz sought to disprove Descartes’s account of clear and distinct perception by implementing a three-step argumentative strategy. The first part of the paper reconstructs the argument and highlights what aspects of Descartes’s epistemology it addresses. The reconstruction shows that the argument is based on conceivability errors. These are a kind of symbolic cognition that prove Descartes’s clear and distinct perception as introspectively indistinguishable from Leibniz’s symbolic cognition. The second part of the paper explores the epistemic implication of the indistinguishability between clear and distinct perception and symbolic cognition: the mind constitutively depends on products of the imagination. My conclusion addresses the role of the imagination in symbolization. Symbolization does not exceed imagination; it rather is an idealized use of cognitive surrogates, like characters, to submit to the imagination what is not subject to it.
Presentato: 12 Luglio 2021 | Accettato: 05 Ottobre 2021 | Pubblicato 15 Dicembre 2021 | Lingua: en
Keywords Descartes • Symbolization • Imagination • Leibniz • Symbolic cognition
Copyright © 2021 Lucia Oliveri. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/002
