Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’

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Campo DC	Valore
dc.identifier	ECF_article_6191
dc.title	Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’
dc.contributor.author	Costantini Filippo
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing, Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari
dc.type	Articolo
dc.language.iso	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/it/edizioni4/riviste/the-journal-for-the-philosophy-of-language-mind-an/2021/2/leibniz-on-the-empty-term-nothing/
dc.description.abstract	This paper discusses Leibniz’s treatment of the term ‘nihil’ that appears in some logical papers about the notion of Real Addition. First, the paper argues that the term should be understood as an empty (singular) term and that sentences with empty terms can be true (§2). Second, it sketches a positive free logic to describe the logical behaviour of empty terms (§3). After explaining how this approach avoids a contradiction that threatens the introduction of the term ‘nihil’ in the Real Addition calculus (§4), and how this approach should be understood within Leibniz’s philosophy (§5), the paper assesses the prospects of such an approach with regard to two fundamental issues in Leibniz’s thought: the fictional nature of infinitesimals (§6), and the occurrence of the term ‘nothing’ in the proof of the existence of God that we find in the New Essays (§7).
dc.relation.ispartof	JoLMA
dc.relation.ispartof	Vol. 2 \| Num. 2 \| Dicembre 2021
dc.issued	2021-12-15
dc.dateAccepted	2021-08-31
dc.dateSubmitted	2021-07-12
dc.identifier.issn
dc.identifier.eissn	2723-9640
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/001
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Empty terms
dc.subject	Empty terms
dc.subject	Leibniz
dc.subject	Leibniz
dc.subject	Mereology
dc.subject	Mereology
dc.subject	Nothingness
dc.subject	Nothingness
dc.subject	Positive Free Logic
dc.subject	Positive Free Logic
dc.subject	Real Addition
dc.subject	Real Addition

Articolo
open access peer reviewed

Filippo Costantini Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia

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abstract

This paper discusses Leibniz’s treatment of the term ‘nihil’ that appears in some logical papers about the notion of Real Addition. First, the paper argues that the term should be understood as an empty (singular) term and that sentences with empty terms can be true (§2). Second, it sketches a positive free logic to describe the logical behaviour of empty terms (§3). After explaining how this approach avoids a contradiction that threatens the introduction of the term ‘nihil’ in the Real Addition calculus (§4), and how this approach should be understood within Leibniz’s philosophy (§5), the paper assesses the prospects of such an approach with regard to two fundamental issues in Leibniz’s thought: the fictional nature of infinitesimals (§6), and the occurrence of the term ‘nothing’ in the proof of the existence of God that we find in the New Essays (§7).

Pubblicato

15 Dicembre 2021

Accettato

31 Agosto 2021

Presentato

12 Luglio 2021

Lingua

Keywords: Real Addition • Mereology • Empty terms • Nothingness • Positive Free Logic • Leibniz

permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/001

Copyright: © 2021 Filippo Costantini. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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