JoLMA The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts

Rivista | JoLMA
Fascicolo monografico | 2 | 2 | 2021
Articolo | Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’

Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’

Abstract

This paper discusses Leibniz’s treatment of the term ‘nihil’ that appears in some logical papers about the notion of Real Addition. First, the paper argues that the term should be understood as an empty (singular) term and that sentences with empty terms can be true (§2). Second, it sketches a positive free logic to describe the logical behaviour of empty terms (§3). After explaining how this approach avoids a contradiction that threatens the introduction of the term ‘nihil’ in the Real Addition calculus (§4), and how this approach should be understood within Leibniz’s philosophy (§5), the paper assesses the prospects of such an approach with regard to two fundamental issues in Leibniz’s thought: the fictional nature of infinitesimals (§6), and the occurrence of the term ‘nothing’ in the proof of the existence of God that we find in the New Essays (§7).


Open access | Peer reviewed

Presentato: 12 Luglio 2021 | Accettato: 31 Agosto 2021 | Pubblicato 15 Dicembre 2021 | Lingua: en

Keywords Positive Free LogicMereologyEmpty termsNothingnessReal AdditionLeibniz


Leggi questo articolo