Sens et place de la volonté dans les Meditationes de Descartes
Abstract
After noting the ambiguity surrounding the finite/infinite relationship and that of the ordo rationum, we hypothesize that it is Meditatio IV’s task to resolve them (§ 1). This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the will only appears late in the Cartesian corpus, in fact neither in the Regulae nor in the Discourse on Method (§ 2); to which we must add an internal delay in the Meditationes, since the will only imposes itself there through the late addition of Meditatio IV, and not to respond to the problem of error (§ 3), but to continue the progressive egology of the Meditationes and clarify the finite/infinite relationships (§ 4). These relationships can then be thought of under the scriptural motif of the Imago Dei, the meaning of which must be questioned afresh (§ 5).
Presentato: 10 Settembre 2024 | Accettato: 01 Ottobre 2024 | Pubblicato 13 Marzo 2025 | Lingua: fr
Keywords Infinity • Will • Error • Imago Dei • Egology • Descartes
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