4E’s Are Too Many

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Campo DC	Valore
dc.identifier	ECF_article_3411
dc.title	4E’s Are Too Many. Why Enactive World-Making Does Not Need The Extended Mind Thesis
dc.contributor.author	Scarinzi Alfonsina
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing, Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari
dc.type	Articolo
dc.language.iso	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/it/edizioni4/riviste/the-journal-for-the-philosophy-of-language-mind-an/2020/2/4es-are-too-many/
dc.description.abstract	4E’s cognition – embodied, embedded, enacted, extended – replaces the cognitivist notion of world-mirroring with an active process of world-making: cognition needs no mental representation and is distributed over body, brain and environment. In recent years, the remark that extended cognition is not enactive and that the embodied approach to cognition fails to provide a definition of body raise the question of whether a postcognitivist approach to experience needs 4E’s. This contribution suggests that it does not. The enactive body as a moving sense-making-system informed by phenomenology and pragmatism and its role in the constitution of the distinctive quality of an experience are discussed.
dc.relation.ispartof	JoLMA
dc.relation.ispartof	Vol. 1 \| Num. 2 \| Dicembre 2020
dc.issued	2020-12-09
dc.dateAccepted	2020-09-08
dc.dateSubmitted	2020-07-13
dc.identifier.issn
dc.identifier.eissn	2723-9640
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2020/02/005
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Embodied Mind
dc.subject	Embodied Mind
dc.subject	Enactivism
dc.subject	Enactivism
dc.subject	Non-Duality
dc.subject	Non-Duality
dc.subject	Sense-Making
dc.subject	Sense-Making
dc.subject	Varela
dc.subject	Varela

Articolo
open access peer reviewed

4E’s Are Too Many

Why Enactive World-Making Does Not Need The Extended Mind Thesis

Alfonsina Scarinzi Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Deutschland

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abstract

4E’s cognition – embodied, embedded, enacted, extended – replaces the cognitivist notion of world-mirroring with an active process of world-making: cognition needs no mental representation and is distributed over body, brain and environment. In recent years, the remark that extended cognition is not enactive and that the embodied approach to cognition fails to provide a definition of body raise the question of whether a postcognitivist approach to experience needs 4E’s. This contribution suggests that it does not. The enactive body as a moving sense-making-system informed by phenomenology and pragmatism and its role in the constitution of the distinctive quality of an experience are discussed.

Pubblicato

09 Dicembre 2020

Accettato

08 Settembre 2020

Presentato

13 Luglio 2020

Lingua

Keywords: Enactivism • Varela • Non-Duality • Embodied Mind • Sense-Making

permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2020/02/005

Copyright: © 2020 Alfonsina Scarinzi. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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