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Series | Lexis Supplements
Volume 17 | Edited book | Paradeigmata voluntatis 2

Paradeigmata voluntatis 2

L’esperienza dell’Occidente

open access | peer reviewed
    edited by
  • Elisabetta Cattanei - Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italia - email
  • Stefano Maso - Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia - email

Abstract
The volume contains eleven contributions that were presented at the second conference dedicated to voluntas, held at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice in 2023. The focus of this collection is the Western conception of voluntas, which, in its paradigmatic value, had been established in the Greco-Roman world. The authors proceed to explore the history of the concept in medieval and modern philosophy, highlighting the contributions of prominent figures such as Augustine, Duns Scotus, Descartes, and twentieth-century German philosophy. Important advances in this area can be attributed, at least in part, to efforts to delineate the dynamism and mutation of the paradigm adopted. The concept of voluntas, originally introduced by Cicero and subsequently elaborated by Augustine inside a Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic tradition, encapsulates the fundamental principle of subjective action and the desire unequivocally present in all human beings. Later, in the Romance languages and finally in modern contexts, voluntas underwent a process of recalibration, redefinition, and reshaping. In the nineteenth century, voluntas began to take on the character and force of a non-rational metaphysical foundation of the whole of reality. This transformation is evident in the depersonalization of voluntas, as evidenced by Schopenhauer’s representation of the ‘World’ and Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘Dionysian character’ and ‘Will to power’. These philosophers argue that voluntas functions as an all-encompassing horizon of vital occurrence in constant becoming, aspiring to unceasingly empower itself. Today, the problematic radical distinction between ‘will’ and ‘free-will’ on the one hand; the meaning of ‘intentionality’ and the concept of ‘agent-causality’ on the other appear to predominate. The dichotomy between will and reason can indeed be theorized; nevertheless, when considered collectively, it can be reasonably contested.

Keywords Noluntas • Absence-of-Will • De beneficiis • Bios • Marcus Aurelius • Duns Scotus • Zôè • Will • General • Rational will • Determinism • Epistemology • Calcidius • Faculty • Gaudium (Joy) • Humanism • Divination • Egology • Voluntas • βούλησις • Assent (<i>sunkatathesis</i>) • Error • Plato’s Timaeus • Voluntas Hêgemonikon • Contingency • Conceptuality • Spontaneity • Aristotle • Coerenza • Transhumanism • Representation • Imago Dei • Natural Necessity • Life • Predicates • Decisionism • Decision • Assent (sunkatathesis) • Free will • Providence Middle Platonism • Seneca • Arbitrariness • Descartes • Demiurge • What is up to us (to eph’ hêmin) • Ancient Stoicism • Action • Impulse • Spirito • ὄρεξις • What is up to us (<i>to eph’ hêmin</i>) • Voluntas (Will) • Arbitrium • Stupidity • Indeterminacy • Stoicism • Plutarch • Intrinsic goodness • Divine will • Grundlosigkeit • Wille zur Macht • Lack-of-intelligence • Antispeciesism • Arcesilaus • Free Will • Infinity • Thomas Aquinas • Plato • Power • Beneficium (Benefit) • Madness

Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-902-3 | e-ISBN 978-88-6969-902-3 | ISBN (PRINT) 978-88-6969-903-0 | Published March 17, 2025 | Language it, en, fr

Copyright © 2025 Elisabetta Cattanei, Stefano Maso. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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