Rethinking the Simulation Theory
Abstract
This paper revisits the Simulation Theory (ST) as a framework for understanding human social cognition, challenging traditional ‘theory of mind’ or ‘folk psychology’ approaches. While these theory-based models posit that humans use an implicit body of knowledge to interpret and predict others’ behavior, ST emphasizes the use of mental simulation, leveraging the brain’s existing mechanisms for planning and prediction. By employing a predictive coding strategy, the brain minimizes cognitive load, interpreting others' actions through ‘inverse planning’ – a process that reuses one’s own action planning system to hypothesize the goals and intentions of others. The concept of agent-neutral coding is introduced, proposing that inputs for self and others are initially shared, reducing the need for explicit mental state attributions. This approach not only economizes cognitive resources but aligns with evolutionary perspectives on human social interaction in small, cohesive groups. In addition, the paper explores the role of perspective-taking and error correction in adapting shared mental representation. This reevaluation of ST underscores its efficiency and adaptability, offering a streamlined alternative to theory-based accounts of social cognition.
Presentato: 18 Gennaio 2025 | Accettato: 09 Giugno 2025 | Pubblicato 01 Settembre 2025 | Lingua: en
Keywords Primate evolution • Theory theory • Social cognition • Simulation theory • Other minds
Copyright © 2025 Robert M Gordon Gordon. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2025/01/003