Aristotle and Inner Awareness

« articolo precedente | articolo successivo »

Campo DC	Valore
dc.identifier	ECF_article_8801
dc.title	Aristotle and Inner Awareness
dc.contributor.author	García Carpintero Manuel
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Venice University Press, Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari
dc.type	Articolo
dc.language.iso	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/it/edizioni4/riviste/the-journal-for-the-philosophy-of-language-mind-an/2022/1/aristotle-and-inner-awareness/
dc.description.abstract	Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have focused on the idea that conscious experience includes an experience of the self, whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an experience as of a pink cube, she is not just aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a pinkish, cubic way in this case); she is also aware of the fact that it is presented to her. According to Victor Caston, Aristotle defended an interesting version of this view in De Anima, later developed in different directions by many other philosophers – outside current research in the Analytic tradition, particularly in Phenomenology and the Heidelberg school. My goal in this paper is to locate Aristotle’s views, as interpreted by Caston, in the context of the current debate, and to offer some considerations in favor of a view like Aristotle’s, also following Caston.
dc.relation.ispartof	JoLMA
dc.relation.ispartof	Vol. 3 \| Num. 1 \| Giugno 2022
dc.issued	2022-06-30
dc.dateAccepted	2022-05-11
dc.dateSubmitted	2022-04-02
dc.identifier.issn
dc.identifier.eissn	2723-9640
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2022/01/007
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Phenomenal consciousness
dc.subject	Self-experience
dc.subject	Self-knowledge
dc.subject	Subjective character

Articolo
open access peer reviewed

Manuel García Carpintero Universitat de Barcelona, Espanya

VIEW PDF DOWNLOAD PDF

abstract

Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have focused on the idea that conscious experience includes an experience of the self, whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an experience as of a pink cube, she is not just aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a pinkish, cubic way in this case); she is also aware of the fact that it is presented to her. According to Victor Caston, Aristotle defended an interesting version of this view in De Anima, later developed in different directions by many other philosophers – outside current research in the Analytic tradition, particularly in Phenomenology and the Heidelberg school. My goal in this paper is to locate Aristotle’s views, as interpreted by Caston, in the context of the current debate, and to offer some considerations in favor of a view like Aristotle’s, also following Caston.

Pubblicato

prossimamente

Accettato

11 Maggio 2022

Presentato

02 Aprile 2022

Lingua

Keywords: Self-knowledge • Subjective character • Phenomenal consciousness • Self-experience

permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2022/01/007

Copyright: © 2022 Manuel García Carpintero. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

Citazioni verso questo capitolo

How to cite