Rivista | JoLMA
Fascicolo monografico | Special issue
Articolo | Wittgenstein on use, meaning and the experience of meaning
Wittgenstein on use, meaning and the experience of meaning
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the relationship between the notion of ‘experience of meaning’, introduced by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, and the idea of meaning as use, central to much of his thought. In particular, I ask whether the former is to be seen as a development, an integration and a specification of the latter, or whether its emergence in Wittgenstein’s work indicates a change in his attitude to meaning. My answer is that the notion of ‘experience of meaning’ does not bring back some form of psychologism, but rather it develops, integrates and specifies that of ‘use’.
Presentato: 17 Ottobre 2024 | Accettato: 29 Ottobre 2024 | Pubblicato 19 Novembre 2024 | Lingua: en
Keywords Rules • Wittgenstein • Anti-psychologism • Experience of Meaning • Use
Copyright © 2024 Elena Valeri. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2024/03/005
