Rivista | JoLMA
Fascicolo monografico | Special issue
Articolo | Frege and Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy
Frege and Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy
Abstract
Interpreters have tended to focus on the relation between Frege and the early Wittgenstein, but Frege also posed problems for the later Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's concept of a language-game was inspired byHilbert's alleged formalism, as criticised by Frege, and it points to an important dialogue that Wittgenstein engages in with Frege. Wittgenstein expresses formalist views and invokes Frege's critique of formalism at the beginning of the Big Typescript and The Blue Book. He engages more deeply with the problems posed by Frege and formalism in the remarks collected in Philosophical Grammar,where the issues raised set the agenda for the first §§242 of the Philosophical Investigations. The radical transformation in our understanding of meaning and understanding that takes place enables Wittgenstein to escape the problems which P.T. Geach believes were posed for him by Frege's paper "Thought", concerning first-person thoughts about sensations.
Presentato: 12 Febbraio 2024 | Pubblicato 21 Ottobre 2024 | Lingua: en
Keywords </p> • Formalism • Meaning • Language-games • Wittgenstein • <p>Wittgenstein • Frege
Copyright © 2024 Marie McGinn. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2024/03/007
