Series | Lexis Supplements
Edited book | Paradeigmata voluntatis
Chapter | Une volonté sous condition ? Un commentaire d’Epictète, Entretiens 1.12.7-19
Une volonté sous condition ? Un commentaire d’Epictète, Entretiens 1.12.7-19
Abstract
Through a commentary on a text by Epictetus (Diat. 1.12.7-19), I would like to study the Greek (and Stoic) concepts that allow us to speak and think about the freedom of a will that is grappling with the thought (and reality) of fate. My thesis could be expressed as follows: even if destiny gives a framework to the will and to actions, and to the conditions of these, the will is still configured by a prior, almost prejudicial choice, a first choice which is also the choice of oneself. This is witnessed by the prohairesis in Epictetus, which is in each person the instance of this choice, an instance to the completion of which all apprentice philosophers work: this is their project – to become free by discovering the freedom of this faculty of choice. Therefore, if he cannot change the context of the will, the framework of his action, every apprentice philosopher is called upon, in contrast, to modify 1) his internal disposition towards events; 2) the consequences of his actions.
Submitted: April 26, 2021 | Accepted: Nov. 23, 2021 | Published Dec. 13, 2021 | Language: fr
Keywords Fate • Epibole • Prohairesis • Events • Choice
Copyright © 2021 Valéry Laurand. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
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