Le varietà del naturalismo

Le varietà del naturalismo

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ISBN (print)
978-88-6969-326-7

ISBN (ebook)
978-88-6969-325-0

ISSN
chevron_right2610-8933

e-ISSN
chevron_right2610-8925

Date of publication
27 Jul 2019

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Philosophica

Fear as a Destructive Pain
Human Nature and Violent Affections in the Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle

Gaia Bagnati
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia
gaiabagnati@gmail.com

DOI 10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/003

Submitted 05 Feb 2019
Accepted 25 Feb 2019

Abstract

In the discussion on bravery in Eth. Eud., III, 1 Aristotle determines the objects that are absolutely dreadful by means of an explicit reference to ‘human nature’. This reference has not received much consideration from scholars in the field. The present paper argues that the reference under discussion entails a notion of ‘human nature’ that corresponds to a human being’s psychological disposition to endure fearful emotions – that is to say, painful emotions that imply the representation of a pain capable of destroying a human being – up to a certain degree of intensity. Furthermore, this article claims that the same notion of ‘human nature’ is implied in Eth. Eud., II, 8 in the discussion of involuntariness concerning the cases of mixed actions where Aristotle refers to the ‘nature’ of the agent as a criterion to determine the involuntariness of an action.

Keywords
Aristotle. Human nature. Sou. Disposition. Fear. Sensible affections. Physical pains.


Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 

Table of contents
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Campo DC Valore

dc.contributor.author

Bagnati Gaia

dc.title

Fear as a Destructive Pain

dc.type

Book Chapter

dc.language.iso

en

dc.description.abstract

In the discussion on bravery in Eth. Eud., III, 1 Aristotle determines the objects that are absolutely dreadful by means of an explicit reference to ‘human nature’. This reference has not received much consideration from scholars in the field. The present paper argues that the reference under discussion entails a notion of ‘human nature’ that corresponds to a human being’s psychological disposition to endure fearful emotions – that is to say, painful emotions that imply the representation of a pain capable of destroying a human being – up to a certain degree of intensity. Furthermore, this article claims that the same notion of ‘human nature’ is implied in Eth. Eud., II, 8 in the discussion of involuntariness concerning the cases of mixed actions where Aristotle refers to the ‘nature’ of the agent as a criterion to determine the involuntariness of an action.

dc.relation.ispartof

Philosophica

dc.publisher

Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing

dc.date.issued

2019-07-27

dc.dateAccepted

2019-02-05

dc.dateSubmitted

2019-02-25

dc.identifier.uri

http://doi.org/10.14277/978-88-6969-325-0/003

dc.identifier.issn

2610-8933

dc.identifier.eissn

2610-8925

dc.identifier.isbn

978-88-6969-326-7

dc.identifier.eisbn

978-88-6969-325-0

dc.rights

Creative Commons 4.0 Attribution alone

dc.rights.uri

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

item.fulltext

with fulltext

item.grantfulltext

open

dc.subject

Aristotle

dc.subject

Human nature

dc.subject

Sou

dc.subject

Disposition

dc.subject

Fear

dc.subject

Sensible affections

dc.subject

Physical pains

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