Journal | JoLMA
Monographic journal issue | Special issue
Research Article | Wittgenstein’s Methodology of Gestalt Psychology
Wittgenstein’s Methodology of Gestalt Psychology
Abstract
This article proposes a methodological understanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks about Gestaltpsychology. Wittgenstein is not so much concerned with Gestaltpsychology proper but rather with its understanding of the nature of the problem of seeing (and seeing-as) as dealt with by British empiricism. Gestaltpsychology offers a more sophisticated physiological explanation of seeing and seeing-as than empiricism has done, yet also this explanation bypasses the (conceptual) problem. Physiological explanations are not eschewed by Wittgenstein, he even gives himself interesting physiological hypotheses. The problem with physiological explanations is that they focus on particular items in the brain as underpinning our use of concepts like seeing and seeing as, whereas they are constituted by our reactions and responses to what we see. Such reactions are embedded in language games and acquire their meaning by our ‘forms of life’ rather than the human brain. This interpretation is finally applied to Wittgenstein’s and Köhler’s explanation of social understanding
Submitted: Feb. 12, 2024 | Published Oct. 29, 2024 | Language: en
Keywords Transitive use • Social understanding • Intransitive use • <p>Physiological explanation • </p> • Organization • Physiological explanation
Copyright © 2024 Michel Ter Hark. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2024/03/011
