Il naturalismo oggi

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DC Field	Value
dc.identifier	ECF_chapter_2606
dc.contributor.author	Perissinotto Luigi
dc.title	Il naturalismo oggi. Abbozzo di una mappa e alcune riflessioni
dc.type	Chapter
dc.language.iso	it
dc.description.abstract	This paper tries to draw a map of the various versions of naturalism to which the current philosophical debate aims – from the most radical, or ‘hard’ ones, to the mildest, or liberal ones – and of the different projects of naturalization that are associated to them. In particular, in the first paragraphs, the present article will consider Timothy Williamson’s and Penelope Maddy’s attempts to inherit the demands of naturalism without declaring to be a naturalist (Williamson), or without making naturalism an empty slogan or a kind of masked first philosophy (Maddy). In the second part, the connections between epistemological naturalism and ontological or metaphysical naturalism will be analysed. The questions will be: (1) is it possible to be naturalist with regard to epistemology without being naturalist with regard to ontology?; (2) is it possible to be ontologically naturalist without being epistemologically naturalist?
dc.relation.ispartof	Philosophica
dc.publisher	Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing
dc.issued	2019-07-27
dc.dateAccepted	2019-02-25
dc.dateSubmitted	2019-02-05
dc.identifier.uri	http://edizionicafoscari.it/en/edizioni4/libri/978-88-6969-325-0/il-naturalismo-oggi/
dc.identifier.doi	10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/001
dc.identifier.issn	2610-8933
dc.identifier.eissn	2610-8925
dc.identifier.isbn	978-88-6969-326-7
dc.identifier.eisbn	978-88-6969-325-0
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
item.fulltext	with fulltext
item.grantfulltext	open
dc.peer-review	yes
dc.subject	Epistemological naturalism
dc.subject	Epistemological naturalism
dc.subject	Metaphilosophy
dc.subject	Metaphilosophy
dc.subject	Naturalism
dc.subject	Naturalism
dc.subject	Ontological naturalism
dc.subject	Ontological naturalism
dc.subject	Second philosophy
dc.subject	Second philosophy

Chapter
open access peer reviewed

Il naturalismo oggi

Abbozzo di una mappa e alcune riflessioni

Luigi Perissinotto Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia

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abstract

This paper tries to draw a map of the various versions of naturalism to which the current philosophical debate aims – from the most radical, or ‘hard’ ones, to the mildest, or liberal ones – and of the different projects of naturalization that are associated to them. In particular, in the first paragraphs, the present article will consider Timothy Williamson’s and Penelope Maddy’s attempts to inherit the demands of naturalism without declaring to be a naturalist (Williamson), or without making naturalism an empty slogan or a kind of masked first philosophy (Maddy). In the second part, the connections between epistemological naturalism and ontological or metaphysical naturalism will be analysed. The questions will be: (1) is it possible to be naturalist with regard to epistemology without being naturalist with regard to ontology?; (2) is it possible to be ontologically naturalist without being epistemologically naturalist?

Published

July 27, 2019

Accepted

Feb. 25, 2019

Submitted

Feb. 5, 2019

Language

ISBN (PRINT)

978-88-6969-326-7

ISBN (EBOOK)

978-88-6969-325-0

Keywords: Epistemological naturalism • Ontological naturalism • Second philosophy • Naturalism • Metaphilosophy

permalink: http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/001

Copyright: © 2019 Luigi Perissinotto. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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