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Section 1

Vyākaraṇa and Its Many Espouses:
Linguistics, Philology, Philosophy = Proceedings
of a Thematic Panel from the 11th CBC Conference
(Rome, December 10-11, 2021)

Part 1

A Brief Introduction

Artemij Keidan

Sapienza Università di Roma, Italia

1 Some Words on the Coffee Break Project

The Coffee Break Project was founded in 2010 by a group of young scholars (PhD students and postdoc researchers) from the Oriental Faculty of the Sapienza University of Rome. The name of the project reflects the initial intuition on which the project is grounded. Indeed, it often happens that the coffee breaks become the most interesting, informative, and stimulating part of an average academic meeting or conference, in comparison to presentations proper. The monotony of reading and the pompousness of speakers' language often end up causing the audience to lose attention and interest, almost fall asleep. The discussion is discouraged, while the questions tend to become just formal and unchallenging side notes. Or, at least, this is what conferences in humanities often attest. On the other hand, one often takes part in the most challenging and fascinating debates while sipping a cup of coffee during the breaks. The same paper may sound thought-provoking and insightful during such informal discussions while being boring and uninspiring during the actual presentation.

The Coffee Break Conferences (CBC) are therefore based on the idea of capturing exactly this informal yet scientifically productive and intellectually stimulating atmosphere and transferring it to the conference itself. Such a decision entails a series of additional rules and constraints for the participants. Thus, the speakers are expected to present their research informally and off the cuff, while reading from a printed version is highly discouraged. A second requirement is that the authors prepare longer abstracts of their papers, which are made available to all the participants days before the conference

starts.¹ This way, all those who are interested have the time to prepare a fruitful discussion and meaningful questions on each paper, rather than making pointless formalistic remarks during the question time.

Our aim has always been that of focusing on methodology and comparisons, rather than on singular highly specialised topics. We promote a comparative approach that combines various fields of study, methodologies of different disciplines, and the concepts and vocabulary of different traditions of scholarship with the aim of giving participants the opportunity to critically discuss their work in an interdisciplinary setting.

The scholars who founded the project generally have a background in the studies of Asia, and especially of India, although from highly varied disciplinary approaches: from philology to philosophy and literature, from linguistics to anthropology, from sociology and economics to gender and sexuality studies. Nonetheless, CBC has and continues to welcome other geographical and linguistic areas and traditions.

Another goal of the CBC project is to give young scholars – who may sometimes experience difficulties in being admitted to major academic meetings – the opportunity to participate in a scholarly event, where they can learn the art of scientific debate and academic presentation.

We also aim at internationalising our conferences as much as possible. We have no fixed venue and often move from one hosting institution to another. So far, the venues of the CBC have been Sapienza University of Rome (six editions, one extra meeting); University of Turin (two editions); and one edition per each of the following institutions: University of Cagliari (Italy); University of Leiden (Netherlands); University of Tübingen (Germany); Wolfson College, Oxford (UK); Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna.

2 The 11th Edition of the CBC

The 11th edition of the CBC happened to be the first one upon the pandemics and was held in December 2021, jointly organised by Sapienza University of Rome and the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna. The decision was made for a double venue in order to include all the numerous applicants, who were starving for academic gatherings after almost two years of lockdown. The session of December 10-11 at Sapienza University of Rome was organised by Artemij Keidan, while the session of December 16-17 at the Austrian Academy of Sciences was co-organised by Marco Ferrante, Borayin Larios, and Nina Mirnig.

¹ The abstracts are freely available on our internet site <https://asiaticacoffeebreak.wordpress.com>, where one can also find all the information about the CBC project, the preceding and the ongoing editions of the CBC conferences.

The general theme of this edition of the CBC has been defined by its organisers rather playfully, as one can infer from the general title, *Arranged Marriages Between Disciplines*. The ‘marriage’ metaphor revealed to be quite versatile in defining all kinds of conceptual interconnections that are established during the analysis of a certain topic from a multi-disciplinary perspective.

Traditionally, CBC conferences are divided into several thematic panels. Such was the case for the 2021 edition as well. Five panels were included, one in the first session and four in the second, with numerous participants and attendees, both personally and online. Following is the list of the panels.

- “A Humanities’ Love Triangle: Anthropology, Literature and Gender Studies”, organised by Marco Lauri and Marta Scaglioni. The focus of this panel is on the gender roles and identities in the modern Arabic-speaking world.
- “Conceptuality in Perceptual Knowledge: Philosophical and Philological Perspectives”, organised by Marco Ferrante. The focus is on the analysis of traditional Indian philosophy of mind and cognition from a modern philosophical point of view.
- “The Language of Things: Materiality as a Fruitful Lens in the Humanities”, organised by Borayin Larios and Nina Mirnig. This panel explores the manyfold interconnections of language, ritual, and material culture in the traditional South Asian society.
- “Telling Stories, Interpreting Documents: The Interaction of Literary and Historical Practices”, organised by Naresh Keerthi and Elena Mucciarelli. This panel approaches the problem of the interconnections between historical reality and literature, with a special focus on South Asia.
- “*Vyākaraṇa* and its Many Espouses: Linguistics, Philology, Philosophy”, organised by Artemij Keidan. This panel was the only one held at Sapienza University of Rome. For further details see the section that follows.

The vastness and variety of topics taken in consideration in the present edition are a perfect representation of what the CBC has always tried to be, i.e. a general container (rather than a thematic guideline) that offers a methodological frame (rather than a precise theoretical approach) for confronting, discussing, and generating new ideas.

The total number of papers presented during this edition of CBC was so high (almost doubling the average figures of past editions) and the topics so varied, that it was almost impossible to publish the proceedings of all the panels together. The decision was therefore taken to publish the proceedings of specific panels separately. What follows is the proceedings of the panel devoted to the investigation of the traditional Indian *vyākaraṇa* ‘grammatical analysis’ from a contemporary perspective.

3 Proceedings of the Vyākaraṇa Panel

Some words on this panel are in order. The main assumption is that between the traditional Indian language disciplines (the grammar of Sanskrit, including morphology, phonology, lexicology, but also semantics and philosophy of language) and the contemporary language sciences (ranging from linguistics to philology, textual criticism, and philosophy) there are several connections, some of which rather evident, and others more hidden. These theoretical links go back to the very beginning of the western ‘discovery’ of Sanskrit with its traditional grammar, authored by Pāṇini, the greatest Indian grammarian, dating back to circa the 5th century BCE. But even today, after the western linguistics tradition matured enough to understand certain brilliant theoretical subtleties of Pāṇini’s grammar, surprising new links and parallelisms are still being discovered.

Thus, we know not only that the discovery of Sanskrit provoked the explosion of the Indo-European studies in Europe, but that many basic notions in Morphology and Phonology, in western linguistics, have been similarly shaped with substantial support from the Indian disciplines of *vyākaraṇa* and *śikṣā*. Conversely, some theoretical achievements of Pāṇini, or his successors, have been fully understood only recently, after the western linguistics have independently developed similar notions and categories.

Thus, only during the twentieth century did scholars finally understand and started to appreciate several theoretical highlights of the Indian tradition:

- Pāṇini’s syntactic theory (constructed as the interplay of *kāraṅkas* ‘semantic roles’ and *vibhaktis* ‘morphological endings’, which has been equaled in the west only after Lucien Tesnière and Charles Fillmore formulated the notion of semantic role);
- Bhartṛhari’s theory of *sphoṭa* (which prefigures functionalist phonology);
- the overall architecture of Pāṇini’s grammar organised in a set of concurrent ordered rules (as in many contemporary generative approaches to phonology, starting from the seminal ideas of Paul Kiparsky who himself is an appreciator of Pāṇini’s grammar);
- the notion of lexical meaning as negation defended by the Buddhist philosophers of language (which closely recalls Saussure’s semiotics).

The present panel had, therefore, the purpose of challenging the two sides of this bilateral relationship - the western and the Indian - favouring a compenetrative analysis of both.

Finally, I must express my sincere gratitude to *Bhāṣā. Journal of South Asian Linguistics, Philology and Grammatical Traditions*, and personally to its editor Andrea Drocco, who kindly agreed to host the proceedings of the *vyākaraṇa* panel as a thematic section of two issues of this journal. A first group of papers occupies a section of volume 2, issue 1 (2023); a second group of papers is planned for the issue 2 of the same volume.

Verbal Governing Compounds with an Accusative-Marked First Member of the Type *agnim-indhá-*: From Vedic to Pāṇini

Adam Alvah Catt
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Abstract The verbal governing compound type *agnim-indhá-* ‘kindling the fire’, with an accusative-marked first member and a second member built to the present stem with the suffix *-á-*, is attested since the Vedic period and continues to enjoy a certain degree of productivity in later periods. In addition to this type, there are also related verbal governing compounds in Vedic and later Sanskrit of the type *khajam-kará-* ‘making a battle-din’, in which the second member is not built to the present stem. After over-viewing the early Vedic evidence for these types, we will examine Pāṇini’s approach in deriving these compounds. Pāṇini generally derives such compounds built to a present stem with the *sārvadhātuka* affix *KHaś* and those which show some discrepancy with the present stem with the affix *KHaC*. The motivation for introducing these affixes is clear in the majority of cases but there remain some forms within the group of *KHaC*-derivatives for which Pāṇini’s choice of *KHaC* over *KHaś* is not completely clear. Importantly, some sūtras within the *KHaC* group explicitly provide for the derivation of names (*sañjñā*), suggesting that a link with the present stem may have been less intuitive in such cases.

Keywords Vedic. Sanskrit. Compounds. Pāṇini. Indian grammatical tradition.

Summary 1 Introduction and Problem. – 2 Some Preliminary Observations. – 3 Pāṇini’s Approach. – 3.1 The Affix *KHaś*. – 3.2 The Affix *KHaC*. – 4 Observations on the Above Survey. – 5 Summary.



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1 Introduction and Problem

In his paper on nominal compounds in Indo-European, Schindler (1997, 537-8) remarks that accusative case marking of the first member is obligatory in the *Ṛgveda* in certain verbal governing compounds with the suffix *-a-* whose final member is based not on the root but on the present stem, i.e. compounds of the type *agnim-indhá-* '(of a priest:) kindling the fire':¹

Obligatorisch ist im RV akkusativisches KA [= Kompositionsanfangsglied] bei bestimmten VRK [= verbale Rektionskomposita] mit Suffix *-a-*, deren Endglied nicht auf der Wurzel, sondern auf einem Verbalstamm basiert (Typus *agnim-indh-á-* 'das Feuer anzündend').

Such compounds are typically *nomina agentis* and are relatively frequently attested in the *Ṛgveda* and *Atharvaveda*, as the following list illustrates (some of the examples below are taken from Tucker 2012, 236, 241; examples are listed along with the relevant present stem):

<i>agnim-indhá-</i> 'kindling the fire'	<i>inddhé</i> 'kindle'
<i>viśvam-invá-</i> 'setting all in motion'	<i>invati</i> 'set in motion'
<i>vācam-īñkhayá-</i> 'setting speech in motion'	<i>īñkháyati</i> 'set in motion'
<i>samudram-īñkhayá-</i> 'setting the sea in motion'	
<i>viśvam-ejayá-</i> 'setting all in motion'	<i>ejayati</i> 'set in motion'
<i>ṛṇam-cayá-</i> PN 'debt-recovering'	<i>cáyate</i> 'punish, recover'
<i>vṛtam-cayá-</i> 'punishing the enemy'	
<i>dhanam-jayá-</i> 'winning wealth'	<i>jáyati</i> 'win'
<i>dhiyam-jinvá-</i> 'invigorating thought'	<i>jínvati</i> 'invigorate'
<i>druham-tará-</i> 'overcoming falsehood'	<i>táratī</i> 'overcome'
<i>ratham-tará-</i> 'overcoming chariots'	
<i>puram-dará-</i> 'attacking fortresses'	<i>daráyati</i> 'attack'
<i>ugram-pásyá-</i> 'fierce looking' (AVŚ)	<i>pásyati</i> 'see'
<i>mām-pásyá-</i> 'seeing me' (AVŚ)	
<i>puṣṭim-bhará-</i> 'bringing prosperity'	<i>bhárati</i> 'bear, bring'
<i>vājam-bhará-</i> 'bringing booty'	
<i>viśvam-bhará-</i> 'all-bearing' (AVŚ)	
<i>śakam-bhará-</i> 'dung-bearer' (AVŚ)	
<i>sahasram-bhará-</i> 'bringing a thousand(fold)'	
<i>sutam-bhará-</i> 'bringing the pressed drink'	
<i>harim-bhará-</i> 'bearer of the golden (mace)'	

¹ See also Scarlata and Widmer (2015, 41-3) for a recent discussion of this compound type.

<i>valaṃ-rujá-</i> ‘breaking the cave’	<i>rujáti</i> ‘break’
<i>cakram-āsajá-</i> ‘dragging its wheel’	<i>sájati</i> ‘hang, adhere to’
<i>janaṃ-sahá-</i> ‘conquering people’	<i>sáhate</i> ‘conquer’

In addition to the fact that forms like *-indhá-*, *-ejayá-*, *-paśyá-*, etc. are clearly based on the present stem, the consistent root vocalism *-a-* (< PIE **-e-*) in the second member of many of the above compounds (e.g. *vājam-bhará-*) corresponds with that of the thematic present (e.g. *bhárati*), indicating a synchronic deverbative character (AiG II.1, 178; Tucker 2012, 241).² Tucker (2012, 241) and others (e.g. Richter 1898) have observed that the deverbative character of these compounds is also evidenced by parallel non-compositional collocations of finite verb + object. For example, beside compositional *vājam-bhará-*, the verb phrase *vājam bhárati* ‘brings booty’ is attested at RV 4.16.16d, 4.17.9c.³ On the other hand, in compounds of a similar type like *khajam-kará-* ‘making a battle-din’ (RV) and *yudhiṃ-gamá-* ‘going to battle’ (AVŚ), the second member is not paralleled by the present stem. In this paper, I will examine how this type of compound is treated in Pāṇini’s grammar.

2 Some Preliminary Observations

Before turning to Pāṇini’s analysis, a few preliminary observations are in order. First, in compounds of this type, the accusative marking, while not obligatory, is overwhelmingly favoured; compare *dhiyaṃ-jinvá-* ‘invigorating thought’ (RV) vs. *viśva-jinvá-* ‘invigorating all’ (RV) (AiG II.1, 207). Second, as noted above, the accusative *-m* sometimes also appears in verbal governing compounds in which the second member is not built to the present stem (the following are from the *Ṛgveda*):⁴

² See Wackernagel (AiG II.1, 178-83) for a comprehensive list of verbal governing compounds with a second member built to the present stem. Note that a number of these compounds are also attested with a first member in accusative *-m*.

³ Richter (1898, 188-9) lists twenty examples of compounds of this type (and some with a second member *-kara-* or *-kāra-*) from Vedic and non-Vedic texts which are paralleled by corresponding verb phrases.

⁴ For a comprehensive categorization of the functions marked by a first member with accusative *-m*, see Wackernagel (AiG II.1, 201-9). Wackernagel remarks that in such cases the accusative: (1) marks the object of a transitive verb or the goal of a motion verb (e.g. *a-sūryam-paśya-* ‘not seeing the sun’, *śubham-yá-* ‘hastening to beauty’ [RV]); (2) has an adverbial function (e.g. *ugram-paśyá-* ‘fierce looking’ [AVŚ], *rātriṃ-cara-* ‘wandering at night’); (3) functions as a predicative accusative (e.g. *agadam-kāra-* ‘making-well, physician’); (4) functions as a predicative nominative (e.g. *pāmanam-bhāvuka-* ‘be-

Second member is *-kará-*

abhayaṃ-kará- ‘causing security’
khajaṃ-kará- ‘making a battle-din’
yataṃ-kará- ‘making constraint’

kṛṇóti ‘do, make’

Second member is a root noun⁵

śubhaṃ-yá- ‘hastening to beauty’ (cf. also *śubhaṃ-yávan-*, *śubhaṃ-yú-*)
dhiyaṃ-dhā- ‘producing insights’

Third, many of the compounds listed in the introduction are hapax legomena, indicating a certain degree of productivity for this compound type. Also, a number of the compounds show a remarkable semantic or formal similarity (e.g. *-invá-*, *īṅkhayá-*, *-ejayá-*, *-jinvá-*, all meaning ‘set in motion, invigorate’ and having either *-ayá-* or a cluster with a nasal), suggesting analogical influence. In some cases, the *-m* of the first member is likely phonologically motivated, serving to avoid vowel contraction and super heavy syllables, e.g. *viśvam-invá-*, *samudram-īṅkhayá-*, *viśvam-ejayá-*, *agnim-indhā-*, *cakram-āsajá-* (AiG II.1, 207). Metrical/rhythmic factors are also likely involved in the appearance of accusative *-m* (AiG II.1, 204-5; see also the discussion in Tucker 2012, 241-2, with previous literature). For example, *-m* appears in this compound type most frequently when the second member begins with a single consonant and has a short first syllable (e.g. the compounds from the *Ṛgveda* mentioned above with *-kará-*, *-cayá-*, *-jayá-*, *-bhará-*, *-rujá-*, etc.). When the second member is of another shape, the accusative marking typically does not appear; compare *khajaṃ-kará-* ‘making a battle-din’ (RV) vs. *khaja-kṛt-* ‘id.’ (RV) and *dhanaṃ-jayá-* ‘winning wealth’ (RV) vs. *dhana-jít-* ‘id.’. Note in this connection the complementary distribution between *kṣema-kāraḥ* vs.

coming liable to scabies’ [TS]); (5) is without function and introduced analogically (e.g. *maḥṣum-gamá-* ‘going quickly’ [RV]).

⁵ See Scarlata (1999, 743) for other possible examples of compounds involving an accusative-marked first member (in the singular, dual, and plural) and a second member which is a root noun. As acknowledged by Scarlata, the analysis of many of these forms is uncertain due to formal ambiguities. A parallel for this type in which the second member is generally a root noun is found in Old and Young Avestan (see AiG II.1, 209 for some of these examples), e.g. OAv. *vərəθrēm.jan-* ‘smashing obstructions’, YAv. *daēum.jan-* ‘slaying the Daēvas’ (AiW 662), YAv. *vīrəṅ.jan-* ‘slaying men’, YAv. *ašəm.mərənc-* ‘destroying Order’, *ašəm.stūt-* ‘praising Order’, YAv. *ahūm.stūt-* PN ‘praising existence’, OAv. *ahūm.biš-* ‘healing existence’, YAv. *nasūm.kərət-* ‘cutting corpses’, YAv. *šīiaoθnəm.vərəz-* ‘performing deeds’, YAv. *drujim.vana-* ‘conquering the Lie’, YAv. *pāraṅtara-* ‘crossing over to the other side, located away from’. YAv. *mąθrəm-pərəsa-* ‘investigating the formula’ (V. 9.2) is cited by Wackernagel, but this is more plausibly a non-compositional phrase of the present participle *pərəsō* + object.

kṣemaṃ-karaḥ ‘causing security’ etc., which are derived by Pāṇini by A 3.2.44 (*kṣemapriyamadre ṅ ca*). An exception to this pattern is seen in the compounds *satyaṃ-kāra-* ‘ratification’ and *agadaṃ-kāra-* ‘physician’ provided for by A 6.3.70 (*kāre satyāgadasya*); see also *bhakṣaṃ-kārá-* ‘furnishing food’ (MS), *a-krūraṃ-kārá-* ‘not injuring’ (TS), and *astuṃ-kāra-* ‘saying “astu”’ (vārttika 1 on 6.3.70). The pair *sahasram-bhará-* ‘bringing a thousand(fold)’ (RV 2.9.1d) and *sahásra-bhara-* ‘of thousandfold spoils’ (RV 6.20.1c) is also instructive. In the latter, since the second member *-bhara-* ‘spoils, booty’ does not govern the first, we do not find accusative marking on the first member.

A final point relates to Kiparsky’s (2010) discussion of “*devatā*” dvandvas such as *indrā-pūśāṇā* ‘Indra and Pūśan’, which display both non-compositional (i.e. phrasal) and compositional behaviour. Evidence for phrasal status comes from the separate case ending and accent on each member. Also, the fact that these dvandvas can span the caesura suggests that the link between the members of these compounds may have been somewhat looser:

śám na indrā//pūśāṇā vājasātau

‘[may] Indra and Pūśan [bring] us success in winning rewards’ (RV 7.35.1d)

ád id dyāvā//pṛthivī páryapaśyat

‘and he surveyed Heaven and Earth’ (RV 3.26.8d)

In the same vein, considering the attestation of non-compositional phrases such as *vājam bharati* ‘brings booty’ and the fact that the first member of *vājam-bhará-* retains its case marking, we may expect that compounds of this type could also span the caesura. This is in fact what we find: see *vājam//bharám* (RV 1.60.5c) and *viśvam//invám* (RV 1.61.4d). However, since a number of other types of compounds have a mid-word caesura (see Knobl 2009, 139-200 for a detailed discussion), it is unclear what to make of this evidence.

3 Pāṇini’s Approach

In chapters 3 and 6 of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Pāṇini treats a number of compounds in which the first member ends in *-m*. It is crucial to note that in Pāṇinian grammar *-m* is not regarded as the accusative case ending but as an augment *muM*.⁶ By 6.3.67 (*arurdviśadajantasya mum*),

⁶ 6.3.67-72 lists provisions regarding the augment *muM*. See especially 6.3.68-9 for the related augment *am* introduced after certain monosyllabic first members (e.g. *vāc-am-yamá-* ‘restraining one’s speech’ [Br+], *pur-am-dará-* ‘destroyer of fortresses’ [RV+]); note that this augment is said to function like the accusative case ending in certain respects (6.3.68: *pratyayavac ca*). For the irregular form *ātman-bhari-* ‘nourishing one’s

when deriving compounds with an affix marked with *KH*, this augment is introduced after the last vowel of *arus-* ‘adj. wounded; (n.) a wound’ (*aru-ṁ-tuda-* ‘striking a wound, i.e. rubbing salt into someone’s wound’), *dviṣat-* ‘enemy’ (*dviṣa-ṁ-tapa-* ‘tormenting one’s enemies’), and nominal stems ending in a vowel.⁷

Pāṇini’s grammar introduces two distinct affixes to derive compounds of the type we are concerned with in this paper: *KHaś* and *KHaC*.⁸ These affixes, termed *kṛt* by 3.1.93 (*kṛd atin*), are introduced after verbal bases (3.1.91 *dhātoḥ*) on the condition that they co-occur with a semantically and syntactically related subordinate term (*upapada*) denoting the object of the action (3.2.1 *karmaṇi*). By 2.2.19 (*upapadam atin* [17 *nityam*]), the verbal base provided with the relevant *kṛt* affix and the subordinate term obligatorily combine to form an *upapada-tatpuruṣa* compound. Like the final member *-kāra-* in the often discussed *upapada-tatpuruṣa* compound *kumbha-kāra-* ‘potter’ (see Scharf 2011; 2016), the derivatives in *KHaś* and *KHaC* (*-ejaya-*, *-gama-*, etc.) occur only as the final member of compounds and never in the simplex. Pāṇini accounts for such forms by having the subordinate term serve as a condition for introducing the affix on the verbal base and then requiring compounding. The analysis of compounds such as *aṅgam-ejaya-* ‘making the limbs tremble’ as *upapada-tatpuruṣas* also relates to Pāṇini’s treatment of the *-m* of the first member as an augment and not the accusative case ending. First, we should note that while Pāṇini (6.3.1-24) provides for *aluk* (‘absence of zero substitution’) for the third to seventh *sUP* triplets after the first member of a compound, he does not provide for *aluk* for the second triplet, i.e. the accusative. Second, as emphasised by Scharf (2011; 2016), in the derivation of an *upapada-tatpuruṣa* compound, it is on-

self, selfish’ with a first member in *-m* and a second member derived with the affix *iN*, see 3.2.26 (the commentaries on this sūtra also cite *kukṣim-bhari-* ‘belly-nourishing, gluttonous’ and *udaram-bhariḥ* ‘id.’). In *ātmam-bhari-*, the original compositional stem form of the first member, i.e. **ātmā-*, has been hypercharacterised by the addition of the accusative *-m* for *a*-stems. Other examples of this type are *śakam-bhará-* ‘dung-bearer’ (*AVS*), with *śakar-/śakn-*, and *pāmanam-bhaviṣṇú-* ‘becoming liable to scabies’ (*MS*), with *pāmán-*; see AiG II.1, 209 for more examples.

⁷ For evidence of a possible original *u*-stem **áru-* ‘wounded’, see *áruka-* ‘injuring’ (*TĀ*), *arū-kar-* ‘to wound’ (*Lex.*); perhaps one could propose an original pair **áru-* ‘wounded’ : *áruṣ-* ‘wounded; n. wound’, parallel to *tápu-* ‘hot’ : *tápuṣ-* ‘hot; n. heat’ *dviṣam-* can be explained historically as the accusative of the root noun *dviṣ-* *f./m.* ‘enmity; enemy’ (*PW s.v.* “*dviṣamtapa-*”; AiG II.1, 209; II.2, 10).

⁸ The other affixes marked with *KH* are: (1) *KHamuÑ* (3.4.25), to derive gerunds like *coraṁ-kāram* ‘making a thief, declaring to be a thief’; (2) *KHaL* (3.3.126-127), to derive forms like *svāḍhyaṁ-kāra-* ‘easily made rich’; (3) *KHiṣṇuC* and *KHukaÑ* (3.2.57), to derive forms like *āḍhyaṁ-bhaviṣṇu-*, *āḍhyaṁ-bhāvuka-* ‘becoming rich’ (for analogous Vedic examples, see *pāmanam-bhāvuka-* ‘becoming liable to scabies’ (*TS*) and *pāmanam-bhaviṣṇú-* ‘id.’ (*MS*); AiG II.1, 209); and (4) *KHyuN* (3.2.56), to derive forms like *āḍhyaṁ-karaṇa-* ‘(means of) making wealthy’, *subhagaṁ-karaṇa-* ‘(means of) making happy’.

ly after the *kṛt* affix has been provided after the verbal base that the relevant case ending can be provided for the *upapada* (though this later undergoes zero substitution by 2.4.71). Since the *kṛt* affixes *KHaŚ* and *KHaC* are introduced after verbal bases on the condition that they co-occur with an *upapada* denoting the object of the action (*karman*), by 2.3.65 (*kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti* [50 *ṣaṣṭhī*]: ‘The sixth *SUP* triplet is introduced after a nominal stem when it denotes the agent or the object of the action signified by a verbal stem ending in a *kṛt* affix’; transl. by the Author) we would actually expect the *upapada* to be provided with the genitive ending. Pāṇini is able to avoid these problems by treating *-m* as an augment and not a case ending.

The affix *KHaŚ* (3.2.28-37, 83) is a *sārvadhātuka* affix⁹ and, therefore, it is not introduced after the root itself but after the present stem, which consists of the root and the relevant stem-forming affixes (*vikaraṇa*). On the other hand, the affix *KHaC* (3.2.38-47) is not a *sārvadhātuka* affix and therefore is not regarded as being introduced after the present stem.¹⁰ In the following two sections, we will survey the provisions for the affixes *KHaŚ* and *KHaC* in Pāṇini’s grammar along with any examples provided in the commentaries (actually attested Vedic forms will be given with accent, if available, and with information about their periods of attestation).¹¹

3.1 The Affix *KHaŚ*

3.2.28 *ejeḥ khaś*

The affix *KHaŚ* is introduced after the causative stem of *ej-* ‘tremble’ co-occurring with an *upapada* denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *āṅgam-ejaya-* ‘making the limbs tremble’ and *janam-ejaya-* ‘making men tremble’ (ŚB+); for other Vedic examples of this type, see *viśvam-ejaya-* ‘(of soma:) making all tremble’ (RV) and *arim-ejaya-* PN ‘making foes tremble’ (Br). Vārttika 1, MBh II.102 on this sūtra add the following compounds: *vātam-aja-* ‘(of an antelope:) driving forth (like) the wind’, *śunim-dhaya-* ‘a bitch-sucker’, *tilam-tudaḥ* ‘a

⁹ The marker Ś facilitates assignment of the class name “*sārvadhātuka*”; by 3.4.113 (*tiṅśit sārvadhātukam*), “*sārvadhātuka*” refers to the personal endings (*tiṅ*) and other items marked with Ś, such as the affix *-a-* (*ŚaP*) in *bhav-a-ti* ‘is, becomes’ etc., present participle affixes (*SatR*, *ŚānaC*), infinitive affixes in *-adhyai* (*Sadhyai*, *SadhyaiN*), etc.

¹⁰ The marker *C* is said to be only for the purpose of distinguishing *KHaC* from *KHaŚ*; see KV ad 3.2.38 and Devasthali (1967, 94).

¹¹ The examples cited from the commentaries are intended to be exhaustive. The majority are taken from the KV, but this is not because I give this text special weight but simply because its coverage is the most comprehensive. It should also be noted that of the sūtras involved in this section, Kātyāyana and Patañjali comment only on 3.2.28-30, 38, and 83.

sesame grinder’, and *śardham-jaha-* ‘(of beans:) flatulence-releaser’.¹²

3.2.29 *nāsikāstanayor dhmādheṭoḥ*

The affix *KHaṢ* is introduced after the present stem of *dhmā-* ‘blow’ and *dheṭ-* ‘suck’ co-occurring with the *upapadas* *nāsikā-* ‘nose’ or *stana-* ‘breast’ denoting the object of the action.

The commentaries cite *stanam-dhaya-* ‘breast suckling, an infant’, *nāsikam-dhama-* ‘blowing through the nose’, and *nāsikam-dhaya-* ‘sucking through the nose’. See 6.3.66 (*khity anavyayasya*) for the short final vowel in *nāsikam*.¹³

3.2.30 *nāḍimūṣṭyoś ca*

The affix *KHaṢ* is also introduced after the present stem of *dhmā-* ‘blow’ and *dheṭ-* ‘suck’ co-occurring with the *upapadas* *nāḍi-* ‘tube, pipe, reed’ or *muṣṭi-* ‘fist’ denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *nāḍim-dhama-* ‘blowing through a tube/pipe/reed’, *muṣṭim-dhama-* ‘blowing into one’s fist’, *nāḍim-dhaya-* ‘sucking through a tube’, and *muṣṭim-dhaya-* ‘sucking through one’s fist’. Vārttika 2 on A 3.2.29, MBh II.102, and the KV add the following: *ghaṭim-dhama-* ‘a pot blower, potter’, *ghaṭim-dhaya-* ‘sucking a pitcherful’, *khāriṃ-dhama-* ‘?blowing a khārī (a unit of volume)’, *khāriṃ-dhaya-* ‘?sucking a khārī’¹⁴, *vātaṃ-dhama-* ‘wind-blowing, a mountain’, and *vātaṃ-dhaya-* ‘?wind-sucking’. See 6.3.66 (*khity anavyayasya*) for the short final vowel in *nāḍim*, *ghaṭim* (*ghaṭi-*, with a short stem vowel, is also cited in grammatical texts), and *khāriṃ*. Note that 3.2.30 was originally a vārttika that was promoted to the status of a sūtra by the KV (Vasu 1891, 420; Böhtlingk 1887, 96).

3.2.31 *udī kūle rujivahoḥ*

The affix *KHaṢ* is introduced after the present stem of *ruj-* ‘break’ and *vah-* ‘carry’ co-occurring with the preverb *ud* and the *upapada* *kūla-* ‘shore, bank’ denoting the object of the action.

¹² Note that the referents of many of the compounds cited here and below in the commentaries have idiosyncratic, highly conventionalized interpretations. Where available, I will give the referents provided by the commentaries in my glosses.

¹³ Wackernagel (AiG II.1, 208) suggests that the shortening of the feminine accusative *-ām* to *-am* in this type may be due to analogy with *iram-madā-* ‘delighting in drink’, in which the first member *iram*, originally the accusative of *ir-* = *īḍ-* f. ‘drink, libation’ (PW, s.v. “*iram-madā-*”), was reinterpreted as an underlying accusative **iram* of *irā-* ‘drink, libation’. The shortening of *-īm* to *-im* (see 3.2.30 for examples) in compounds of this type has been explained as a Prakritism (Richter 1898, 187).

¹⁴ The SK (2945) also lists *khārī-* ‘she-ass’, so that the compounds *khāriṃ-dhama-* ‘?’ and *khāriṃ-dhaya-* ‘?sucking the milk of a she-ass, Eselsmilch trinkend’ (see the PW, s.v. “*khāriṃ-dhama-*”) can be derived.

The KV cites *kūlam-udruja-* '(of a chariot, etc.): breaking the banks (= *kūlam udrujati*)'¹⁵ and *kūlam-udvaha-* '?bringing to/reaching/carrying away the banks'.

3.2.32 *vahābhre lihaḥ*

The affix *KHaś* is introduced after the present stem of *lih-* 'lick' co-occurring with the *upapadas vaha-* 'shoulder' or *abhra-* 'cloud' denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *vahaṃ-liha-* '(of a cow:) shoulder-licking (= *vahaṃ leḍhi*)' and *abhraṃ-liha-* '(of wind:) cloud-licking'.

3.2.33 *parimāṇe pacaḥ*

The affix *KHaś* is introduced after the present stem of *pac-* 'cook' co-occurring with a unit of measurement (the *upapada*) denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *prastham-pacā-* '(of a pot:) cooking the volume of a *prastha* (= *prastham pacati*)', *dronam-paca-* 'cooking the volume of a *drona*', and *khārim-paca-* '(of a caldron:) cooking the volume of a *khārī*'. These terms are apparently used to designate pots of different sizes.

3.2.34 *mitanakhe ca*

The affix *KHaś* is also introduced after the present stem of *pac-* 'cook' co-occurring with the *upapadas mita-* 'a (limited) portion' or *nakha-* 'fingernail' denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *mitam-pacā-* '(of a stingy *brāhmaṇī*:) cooking (only a) limited portion (= *mitam pacati*)' and *nakham-pacā-* '(of rice-gruel:) nail-scalding/hot enough to scald the nails'.

3.2.35 *vidhvaruṣos tudaḥ*

The affix *KHaś* is introduced after the present stem of *tud-* 'strike' co-occurring with the *upapadas vidhu-* 'the moon' or *aruṣ-* 'wound' denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *vidhuṃ-tuda-* '(of *Rāhu*:) striking/eclipsing the moon' and *aruṃ-tuda-* 'striking a wound, i.e. rubbing salt into someone's wound' (for the full derivation of the latter, see 6.3.67, 8.2.23; also see footnote 7 above).

¹⁵ When available, I will provide the non-compositional paraphrase (*vigrahavākya*) for the compound given in the commentaries.

3.2.36 *asūryalālāṭayor dṛśitapoḥ*

The affix *KHaś* is introduced after the present stem of *dṛś-* ‘see’ and *tap-* ‘scorch’ co-occurring with the *upapadas* *a-sūrya-* ‘NEGATION-sun’ or *lalāṭa-* ‘forehead’ denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *asūryam-paśyā-* ‘(of a king’s harem:) not seeing the sun’ and *lalāṭaṃ-tapa-* ‘(of the sun:) scorching the forehead’.

3.2.37 *ugrapaśyerrammadapāñindhamāś ca*

The irregular forms *ugram-paśyā-* ‘(of Apsarases or dice:) fierce-seeing, fierce-looking (= *ugram paśyati*)’ (AVŚ), *iram-madā-* ‘(of Agni:) delighting in drink (= *irayā mādyati*)’ (VS), and *pāñim-dhama-* ‘(of paths:) where the hands are blown/whistled(?) into (to ward off snakes, etc.) (= *pāñayo dhmayante eṣu*)’¹⁶ are also derived with the affix *KHaś*.

The three compounds listed here are treated as irregularly derived. According to the commentary on this section in the *Nyāsa*, *ugram-paśyā-* is irregular in that we would generally expect the affix *aṆ* and not *KHaś* by 3.2.1 (*karmaṇy aṇ*); *iram-madā-* in that the present-stem-forming affix *ŚyaN* (in *mādyati*) irregularly undergoes zero replacement;¹⁷ and *pāñim-dhama-* in that the compound denotes a locus (*adhikaraṇa*) and thus the affix *LyuT* would be expected by 3.3.117 (*karaṇādihikaraṇayoś ca*). Note that the first two compounds are attested in Vedic and that the first member in the first two compounds is difficult to interpret as denoting the object of the action.

3.2.83 *ātmamāne khaś ca*

The affixes *Ṇinḥ* and also *KHaś* are introduced after *man-* ‘consider, think’ co-occurring with an *upapada* X ending in a *sUP* triplet (3.2.4)¹⁸ when the sense is ‘considering oneself as X’.

The KV cites *darśanīyam-manyā-* ~ *darśanīyā-mānin-* ‘considering oneself attractive (= *darśanīyam ātmānam manyate*)’ and *pañḍitam-manyā-* ~ *pañḍita-mānin-* ‘considering oneself learned’. The KV ad 6.3.66 and SK (2993) also give *kālim-manyā-* ‘considering oneself to be Kālī’ and *hariṇim-manyā-* ‘considering oneself to be Hariṇī’.

¹⁶ See the commentary under this sūtra by the PM: *pāñindhamāḥ panthāna iti | te punar yeṣu gacchadbhiḥ sarpādyapanodanāya pāñayo dhmayante, śabdyante ||*.

¹⁷ Historically, *iram-madā-* can be straightforwardly derived from the older present *mādati* rather than the more recent semantically identical *mādyati* which becomes more common in Vedic prose and after.

¹⁸ The KV ad 3.2.83 explicitly reads *supi* from 3.2.4 (*supi sthah*) into this sūtra. In the KV ad 3.2.4, Jayāditya states that both *karmaṇi* from 3.2.1 and *supi* from 3.2.4 recur in subsequent sūtras and that the former is relevant for transitive verbs while the latter is relevant elsewhere (Scharf 2016, 304).

3.2 The Affix *KHaC*

3.2.38 *priyavaśe vadaḥ khac*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the root *vad-* ‘speak, utter’ co-occurring with the *upapadas* *priya-* ‘friendly’ or *vaśa-* ‘will, authority’ denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *priyaṃ-vada-* ‘speaking kindly (= *priyaṃ vadati*)’, *vaśaṃ-vada-* ‘obedient, submissive to the will of another’¹⁹. Vārttikas 1-4, MBh II.102 add the following under this sūtra: *mitaṃ-gama-* ‘(of an elephant:) going in measured steps’, *mitaṃ-gamā-* f. ‘id.’, *vihaṃ-gama-* (~ *vihaṃ-ga-* ~ *viha-ga-*)²⁰ ‘(of a bird:) moving through the sky (= *vihāyasā gacchati*)’. The SK (2953) also gives *bhujaṃ-gama-* (~ *bhujaṃ-ga-*) ‘(of a serpent:) moving in a crooked manner’.

3.2.39 *dviṣatparayos tāpeḥ*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the causative stem of *tap-* ‘scorch, torment’ co-occurring with the *upapadas* *dviṣat-* ‘enemy’ or *para-* ‘foreigner, enemy’ denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *dviṣaṃ-tapa-* ‘tormenting one’s enemies (= *dviṣantaṃ tāpayati*)’, *paraṃ-tapa-* ‘tormenting one’s foes’ (for the full derivation of the former, see 6.3.67, 8.2.23; also see footnote 7 above). See 6.4.94 (*khaci hrasvaḥ*) for the short vowel in *-tapa-*.

3.2.40 *vāci yamo vrate*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the root *yam-* ‘restrain’ co-occurring with the *upapada* *vāc-* ‘speech’ denoting the object of the action when the sense is maintaining a religious vow (*vrata*).

The KV cites *vācaṃ-yamā-* ‘restraining one’s speech (as a religious vow)’ (Br+). See 6.3.69 (*vācaṃyamapurandarau ca*) for the augment *am* in *vāc-aṃ-yamā-*.

3.2.41 *pūḥsarvayor dārisahoḥ*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the causative stem of *dḥ-* ‘split, destroy’ and the root *sah-* ‘endure, overcome’ co-occurring with the *upapadas* *pur-* ‘fortress’ or *sarva-* ‘all’ denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *paraṃ-darā-* ‘(of Indra:) destroyer of fortresses (= *paraṃ dārayati*)’ (RV+) and *sarvaṃ-saha-* ‘(of a king:) all-endur-

¹⁹ On the late-attested *vaśaṃ-kara-* ‘bringing under the control of, subjugating’, see AiG II.1, 203-4.

²⁰ See AiG II.1, 201-2 on these forms.

ing'; it also adds *bhagaṃ-dara-* 'lacerating the vulva'. See 6.3.69 (*vācamyamapurandarau ca*) for the augment *am* in *pur-aṃ-darā-* and 6.4.94 (*khaci hrasvaḥ*) for the short vowel in *-darā-*.

3.2.42 *sarvakūlābhrakarīṣeṣu kaṣaḥ*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the root *kaṣ-* 'scrape, erode, injure' co-occurring with the *upapadas* *sarva-* 'all', *kūla-* 'shore, bank', *abhra-* 'cloud', or *karīṣa-* 'cowdung' denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *sarvaṃ-kaṣa-* '(of a villain:) harming all (= *sarvaṃ kaṣati*)', *kūlaṃ-kaṣā-* '(of a river:) tearing away the bank', *abhraṃ-kaṣa-* '(of a mountain:) scraping the clouds', and *karīṣaṃ-kaṣā-* '(of a strong wind:) sweeping away dung'.

3.2.43 *meghartibhayeṣu kṛñāḥ*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the root *kṛñ-* 'make, produce' co-occurring with the *upapadas* *megha-* 'cloud', *ṛti-* 'assault, pain', or *bhaya-* 'fear' denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *meghaṃ-kara-* 'producing clouds', *ṛtiṃ-kara-* 'causing pain', and *bhayaṃ-kara-* 'causing fear'. The KV also adds *abhayaṃ-karā-* '(of Indra:) causing security' (RV).

3.2.44 *kṣemapriyamadre 'ṇ ca*

The affixes *KHaC* and *aṆ* are introduced after the root *kṛñ-* 'make, produce' co-occurring with the *upapadas* *kṣema-* 'security', *priya-* 'affection', or *madra-* 'joy' denoting the object of the action.

The KV cites *kṣema-kāra-* (with *aṆ*) ~ *kṣemaṃ-kara-* (with *KHaC*) 'causing security', *priya-kāra-* ~ *priyaṃ-kara-* (VS) 'showing affection', and *madra-kāra-* ~ *madraṃ-kara-* 'causing joy'.

3.2.45 *āsīte bhuvāḥ karaṇabhāvayoh*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the root *bhū-* 'become' co-occurring with the *upapada* *āsīta-* 'satiated, fed' when the sense is the means (of becoming satiated) or the state (of satiation)/event (of becoming satiated).

The KV cites *āsītam-bhava-* '(of porridge:) satisfying (in the sense of the porridge being the means that brings about a satiated state) (= *āsīto bhavati anena*)', and *āsītam-bhavaṃ vartate* '(the state of) being satisfied/(the event of) becoming satisfied (= *āsītasya bhavanam*)'. The KV states that the condition *supi* (3.2.4) for the *upapada* recurs here; since *bhū-* is intransitive, it cannot be subject to the condition *karmaṇi* (3.2.1) (see footnote 18 above).

3.2.46 *sañjñāyāṃ bhṛṭṭvṛjdhārisahitapidamaḥ*

The affix *KHaC* is introduced after the roots *bhṛ-* ‘carry’, *tṛ-* ‘cross’, *vr-* ‘choose’, *ji-* ‘conquer’, the causative stem of *dhṛ-* ‘hold’, the roots *sah-* ‘endure’, *tap-* ‘heat’, and *dam-* ‘tame’ co-occurring with an *upapada* denoting the object of the action or an *upapada* ending in a *sUP* triplet (3.2.4)²¹ when the sense is a name.

The KV cites *viśvam-bharā-* ‘(name of the earth:) supporting all’ (ŚB+), *rathaṃ-tarā-* n. ‘(name of a *sāman*:) ?crossing with/on a chariot’ (TS; the masculine ‘overcoming chariots’ is attested in the RV), *patiṃ-varā-* ‘(name of a weddable girl:) choosing a husband’, *śatruṃ-jaya-* ‘(name of an elephant:) conquering enemies’, *yugaṃ-dhara-* ‘(name of a mountain:) holding the yoke’, *śatruṃ-saha-* PN ‘withstanding enemies’, *śatruṃ-tapa-* PN ‘tormenting enemies’, and *arim-dama-* PN ‘taming enemies’. See 6.4.94 (*khaci hrasvaḥ*) for the short vowel in *-dhara-*.

3.2.47 *gamaś ca*

The affix *KHaC* is also introduced after the root *gam-* ‘go, move’ co-occurring with an *upapada* ending in a *sUP* triplet (3.2.4)²² when the sense is a name.

The KV cites *sutaṃ-gama-* PN ‘obtaining a son’. For compounds in *-gama-* that are not necessarily names, see *hṛdayam-gama-* ‘(of speech, etc.): going to the heart, affecting’ and *yudhiṃ-gamā-* ‘going to battle’ (AVŚ), etc.

4 Observations on the Above Survey

From the above survey, we see that of the actual Vedic examples of compounds of this type given in the beginning of this paper, only a small subset are provided for by Pāṇini.²³ These are as follows: *-ejayā-*, *ugram-ṣśyā-*, *iram-madā-*, *vācam-yamā-*, *puram-darā-*, *abhayaṃ-karā-*, *priyaṃ-kara-*, *viśvam-bharā-*, and *rathaṃ-tarā-*. The majority of provisions for the affixes *KHaś* and *KHaC* involve compounds that are

²¹ See the KV on this sūtra: *karmaṇi iti supi iti ca prakṛtaṃ sañjñāvaśād yathāsambhavaṃ sambadhyate* ‘Both the provisions *karmaṇi* (3.2.1) and *supi* (3.2.4) recur here and are to be applied in accordance with the name that is derived’ (transl. by the Author). According to the *Nyāsa*, reading *supi* from 3.2.4 (*supi sthaḥ*) into this sūtra is for the sake of deriving compounds denoting names in which the first member is not readily interpretable as denoting the object of the action. For example, the first member in the compound *rathaṃ-tarā-* n. ‘(name of a *sāman*:) ?crossing with/on a chariot’ is analysable as being in the instrumental case.

²² As in 3.2.45, the KV states that the condition *supi* (3.2.4) for the *upapada* recurs here. Presumably this is also for the sake of deriving compounds denoting names in which the first member is not readily interpretable as denoting the object of the action; however, the details are not clear.

²³ To be sure, Pāṇini’s lack of provisions for many Vedic compounds of this type does not imply that such forms were unknown to him.

not attested in Vedic. This is perhaps unsurprising since none of the sūtras we have cited explicitly concern the Vedic language. What is striking, however, is the considerable number of sūtras allocated to compounds of this type, which indicates that such forms continued to enjoy a relative productivity after the Vedic period.

As expected, all of the derivatives in the *KHaS* group (3.2.28-37, 83), except the irregular *iram-madá-* (3.2.37) that has a plausible historical explanation (see footnote 17), have a transparent relationship to the synchronic present stem:

ejayati : -*ejaya-* (3.2.28)
dhamati : -*dhama-* (3.2.29-30, 37)
dhayati : -*dhaya-* (3.2.29-30)
udrujati : -*udruja-* (3.2.31)
udvahati : -*udvaha-* (3.2.31)
leḍhi : -*liha-* (3.2.32)
pacati : -*paca-* (3.2.33-4)
tudati : -*tuda-* (3.2.35)
paśyati : -*paśya-* (3.2.36-7)
tapati : -*tapa-* (3.2.36)
manyate : -*manya-* (3.2.83)

On the other hand, the derivatives in the *KHaC* group (3.2.38-47) are a mixed bag in that some appear to have a clear relationship with the synchronic present stem while others do not. We summarise the forms in this group below along with the relevant present stems:

vadati : -*vada-* (3.2.38)
tāpayati : -*tapa-* (3.2.39)
yacchati : -*yama-* (3.2.40)
dārayati : -*dara-* (3.2.41)
sahate : -*saha-* (3.2.41)
kaṣati : -*kaṣa-* (3.2.42)
kṛṇoti : -*kara-* (3.2.43-4)
bhavati : -*bhava-* (3.2.45)
bharati : -*bhara-* (3.2.46)
tarati : -*tara-* (3.2.46)
jayati : -*jaya-* (3.2.46)
vṛṇīte : -*vara-* (3.2.46)
dhārayati : -*dhara-* (3.2.46)
sahate : -*saha-* (3.2.46)
tapati : -*tapa-* (3.2.46)
damayati : -*dama-* (3.2.46)
gacchati : -*gama-* (3.2.47)

Note that all of these forms are of the shape *-CaC-a-*. Three forms are explicitly derived from the causative stem: *tāpayati* : *-tapa-* (3.2.39), *dārayati* : *-dara-* (3.2.41), and *dhārayati* : *-dhara-* (3.2.46). The long vowel of the causative stem is shortened in the *KHaC*-derivative according to 6.4.94 *khaci hrasvaḥ* ‘A substitute short vowel replaces the penultimate vowel of a verbal stem before the causative affix *Ṇi* co-occurring with the affix *KHaC*’ (transl. by the Author). The short root vocalism and the lack of the stem formant *-aya-* (see 6.4.51) in these *KHaC*-derivatives explain why Pāṇini treats these forms as derived with *KHaC* and not *KHaŚ*. Note that at 3.2.36 Pāṇini derives *lalāṭam-tapaḥ* ‘(of the sun:) scorching the forehead’ (with *KHaŚ*) from the present stem *tapati* while at 3.2.39 *dviṣam-tapaḥ* ‘tormenting one’s enemies’ and *paraṃ-tapaḥ* ‘tormenting one’s foes’ (both with *KHaC*) are derived from the causative stem *tāpayati*. The semantic distinction between *tapati* ‘scorch, burn’ vs. *tāpayati* ‘torment, vex’ (see Jamison 1983, 147-8) is likely the reason for this different treatment. Nevertheless, in 3.2.46, which provides for the derivation of names such as *śatrum-tapa-* ‘tormenting enemies’, it is not completely clear why Pāṇini cites *tapi* and not the causative *tāpi* as he does in 3.2.29,²⁴ though this may have something to do with the fact that 3.2.46 concerns the derivation of names, which typically are morphologically and semantically less transparent (see below).

Other forms in the *KHaC* group that have no direct relationship with the synchronic present stem are *yacchati* : *-yama-* (3.2.40), *kṛṇoti* : *-kara-* (3.2.43-4), *vṛṇīte* : *-vara-* (3.2.46), *damayati* : *-dama-* (3.2.46), and *gacchati* : *-gama-* (3.2.47). Eliminating these forms from the above list of *KHaC*-derivatives leaves the following, which, as they correspond to the present stem, appear to be equally derivable with the affix *KHaŚ*:

- vadati* : *-vada-* (3.2.38)
- sahate* : *-saha-* (3.2.41, 46)
- kaṣati* : *-kaṣa-* (3.2.42)
- bhavati* : *-bhava-* (3.2.45)
- bharati* : *-bhara-* (3.2.46)
- tarati* : *-tara-* (3.2.46)
- jayati* : *-jaya-* (3.2.46)
- tapati* : *-tapa-* (3.2.46)

Examining the above list, we see that over half of the forms appear in 3.2.46, which provides for the derivation of names (*sañjñā*). Cross-

²⁴ See Böhtlingk’s (1887, 97) comment under this sūtra: “Warum nicht *tāpi* wie 3, 2, 39?”.

linguistically speaking, since proper names tend to be highly lexicalised and less transparent morphologically and semantically, it is possible that the relationship between the set of forms in 3.2.46 and the present stem may have been less intuitive. This may help explain why Pāṇini derives these forms with the affix *KHaC* rather than *KHaŚ*. Also, we should note that many forms with a first member in *-m* that we have seen in this paper function as epithets, so that this feature may have been to some degree conventionalised in forming names.²⁵

With regard to *-vada-*, the KV ad 3.2.38 in fact states that introducing a different affix (i.e. *KHaC* rather than *KHaŚ*) at 3.2.38 is so that this affix can be read into subsequent sūtras (*pratyayāntarakaraṇam uttarārtham*). If this is the case, the choice of *KHaC* over *KHaŚ* to derive *-vada-* may not be motivated by purely linguistic factors. As for *-saha-* in *sarvaṃ-saha-* ‘(of a king:) all-enduring’ (3.2.41) and the name *śatrum-saha-* PN ‘withstanding enemies’ (3.2.46), note that there are two stems for this root listed as semantically identical in the *Dhātupāṭha*: the causative stem *sāhayati* (DhP X.267: *śahA marṣane*) and the simple thematic present stem *sahate* (DhP I.905: *śahA marṣane*). However, since Pāṇini elsewhere in this section typically specifies the causative stem (*tāpi* 3.2.39, *dāri* 3.2.41, *dhāri* 3.2.46), it seems likely that if he had *sāhayati* in mind he would have made this explicit (see, for example, *sāhi* at 3.1.138). As for *-bhava-* in *āsitam-bhava-* ‘(of porridge:) satisfying, etc.’ (3.2.45), the fact that *bhū-* is intransitive and cannot be subject to the condition *karmaṇi* (3.2.1) may have motivated Pāṇini to derive it with the affix *KHaC* and not *KHaŚ*, but this remains unclear. In sum, while the majority of forms in the *KHaC* group are explainable, there remains a small group of forms for which Pāṇini’s choice of *KHaC* over *KHaŚ* is unclear.

5 Summary

In Vedic, the class of verbal governing compounds built to a present stem with the suffix *-á-* show a strong correlation with a first member with accusative marking, though such marking is not obligatory. We also find second members that are not built to the present stem such as *-kará-* and *-gamá-* already in early Vedic which have the accusative *-m*. After the period of the *Rgveda*, this type of compound, particularly that with a second member of the shape *-CaC-a-*, continues to remain relatively productive. Pāṇini generally derives such com-

²⁵ See also the remarks by Wackernagel (AiG II.1, 206): “Die mehrfache Beschränkung dieses Bildungstypus auf Samjnās (P. 3, 4, 46), d.h. auf Namen u. Termini technici, erweist dessen Altertümlichkeit; die betr. Kompp. müssen schon vorkl. mit etymologischer Bedeutung existiert haben. Beachtenswert ep. kl. *jala-dhara-* „Wolke“ eig. „wassertragend“ aber kl. *jalam-dhara-* n. pr”.

pounds built to a present stem with the *sārvadhātuka* affix *KHaŚ* and those which show some discrepancy with the present stem with the affix *KHaC*. The motivation for introducing these affixes is clear in the majority of cases but there remain some forms within the group of *KHaC*-derivatives for which Pāṇini's choice of *KHaC* over *KHaŚ* is not completely clear. As pointed out in § 4, the majority of sūtras concerning this remaining *KHaC* group of derivatives explicitly provide for the derivation of names (*sañjñā*), suggesting that a link with the present stem may have been less intuitive in such cases. Finally, Pāṇini's use of *KHaC* to derive compounds in *-vada-* and *-bhava-* may be motivated by non-linguistic or system-internal considerations.

Abbreviations

A = *Aṣṭādhyāyī*
 AVŚ = *Atharvaveda* (Śaunaka recension)
 Br = Brāhmaṇa
 DhP = *Dhātupāṭha*
 MS = *Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā*
 PM = *Padamañjarī*
 PN = proper name
 RV = *Ṛgveda*
 SK = *Siddhāntakaumudī*
 ŚB = *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*
 TĀ = *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*
 TS = *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā*

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The Evolution of Conflict-Resolution Tools in the Early Pāṇinian Tradition

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Abstract This paper explores certain early developments in the Indian grammatical tradition pertaining to rule conflict. In particular, it studies Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* dealing with conflict resolution and attempts to understand how they were integrated by Patañjali into his *bhāṣya*. It focuses specifically on the usage of the terms *nitya* and *antaraṅga* by Kātyāyana and their subsequent reception by Patañjali. It concludes that Patañjali has, for the first time in the tradition, with his own interpretations of these terms, presented and leveraged them as conflict resolution tools – which Kātyāyana never intended them to be.

Keywords Pāṇini. Vyākaraṇa. Sanskrit. Indian Grammatical Tradition. Intellectual History.

Summary 1 Summary of the Traditional Approach. – 2 Analysis of the Traditional Approach. – 2.1 Kātyāyana on 1.4.2. – 2.2 Kātyāyana on *nitya*. – 3 Kātyāyana on *antaraṅga-bahirāṅga*. – 4 Summary of Technical Developments. – 5 Style and Attitude. – 6 Concluding Remarks.



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1 Summary of the Traditional Approach

When deriving Sanskrit words using Pāṇini's rules, we are often faced with the following question: when two (or more) rules are simultaneously applicable, or put differently, applicable at the same step in a derivation, which of the two (or more) rules should be applied at that step? In other words, in the event of a 'conflict' between two or more rules, which rule wins? Pāṇini has taught us only one rule, which is a *paribhāṣā sūtra* 'metarule', to tackle this problem, namely 1.4.2 *vipratīṣedhe param kāryam*. The traditional interpretation of this rule is as follows: in the event of a conflict between two equally strong / powerful rules, the rule that comes later in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* wins, i.e. should be applied at that step. Let us consider the *Kāśikā*'s explication of 1.4.2:¹

virodho vipratīṣedhaḥ. yatra dvau prasaṅgāv anyārthāv ekasmin yugapat prāpnutaḥ sa tulyabalavirodho vipratīṣedhaḥ. tasmin vipratīṣedhe param kāryam bhavati. utsargāpavādānityānityāntaraṅgabahiraṅgeṣu tulyabalatā nāstīti nāyam asya yogasya viṣayaḥ, balavataiva tatra bhavitavyam. apravṛttau paryāyeṇa vā pravṛttau prāptāyām vacanam ārabhyate.

Here is my translation of this passage, which represents the traditional interpretation of 1.4.2:

The word *vipratīṣedha* means 'conflict'. When two operations which can be applied at other sites become simultaneously applicable at one [and the same site], this is called a conflict of equal strength or *vipratīṣedha*. In the event of *vipratīṣedha*, the operation that comes later [in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*] prevails. A general rule (*utsarga*) and its exception (*apavāda*), or a *nitya* rule and an *anitya* rule, or an *antaraṅga* and a *bahiraṅga* rule, are not rules of equal strength. These pairs do not fall under the jurisdiction of this rule. In these cases, the stronger rule should be applied. When both rules are unable to apply, or when they are only able to apply alternatively, this rule comes into play.²

Before moving further, it is important to explain in simple words the meanings of the pairs, *nitya-anitya* and *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*. Let us say that there is a conflict between rules A and B. A is called *nitya* with respect to B if A is applicable (both before and) after the ap-

¹ Where appropriate, I have based my *sūtra* translations in this paper on the translations provided by Katre, Sharma, and Vasu (see bibliography for details).

² Unless otherwise stated all translations are by the Author.

plication of B.³ B is called *anitya* with respect to A if B is applicable before, but not after the application of A. The *nitya* rule A is stronger than and defeats the *anitya* rule B. The *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* describes *antaraṅga* as follows: *antarmadhye bahiraṅgaśāstrīyanimittas amudāyamadhye' ntarbhūtāny aṅgāni nimittāni yasya tad antaraṅgam*. Kielhorn translates it as follows: “*antaraṅga* is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within (or before) the sum of the causes of a *bahiraṅga* rule”.⁴

The following *paribhāṣā* ‘metarule’, which is one of the hundreds of metarules composed by post-Pāṇinian scholars, and which has been popularised by the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, creates a hierarchy of importance between four tools of rule conflict resolution namely *paratva*, *nityatva*, *antaraṅgatva* and *apavādatva*.⁵ *pūrva-para-nitya-antaraṅga-apavādānām uttarottaraṁ baliyaḥ* (Pbh 38, *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*). It teaches that a *nitya sūtra* is stronger than a *para sūtra*; an *antaraṅga sūtra* is stronger than a *nitya sūtra*; and an *apavāda sūtra* is stronger than an *antaraṅga sūtra*. In practical terms this translates into the following procedure.

First try establishing the relationship taught in step *a*:

- a. *apavāda* > *utsarga*: an *apavāda* (exception) *sūtra* is more powerful than, and wins when competing with, an *utsarga* (general rule) *sūtra*.

If and only if this step does not yield the correct result, try establishing the relationship taught in step *b*:

- b. *antaraṅga* > *bahiraṅga*:⁶ an *antaraṅga sūtra* is more powerful than, and wins when competing with, a *bahiraṅga sūtra*.

If and only if this step does not yield the correct result, try establishing the relationship taught in step *c*:

- c. *nitya* > *anitya*: a *nitya* rule is more powerful than and wins when competing with an *anitya* rule.

If and only if this step does not yield the correct result, then we conclude that the two rules are equally strong and apply 1.4.2 *vipraṭiṣedhe paraṁ kāryam*, which we call step *d* here:


³ See *paribhāṣā* (henceforth Pbh) 117 *ṛtākṛtaprasaṅgī yo vidhiḥ sa nityaḥ, Vyāḍiparibhāṣāpāṭha*.

⁴ See Abhyankar’s reprint (second edition) of Kielhorn’s work (1960, 221-2).

⁵ It is not clear why the word *pūrva* has been mentioned in the *paribhāṣā*.

⁶ Patañjali and Nāgeśa hold the *antaraṅga paribhāṣā* true for both conflict and other situations. See the *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.4.2 (Mbh I.309.24 onwards) and *paribhāṣā* 50 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara, asiddham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge*.

- d. *para* > *pūrva*: a *para sūtra* (a later rule in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order) wins when competing with, a *pūrva sūtra* (which appears before the *para sūtra*).



2 Analysis of the Traditional Approach

Let us look at 1.4.2 *vipratishedhe param kāryam* again. Pāṇini does not explain the meaning of *vipratishedha* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The *Kāśikā* claims that *vipratishedha* means *tulyabalavirodha* ‘conflict between two equally powerful rules’. This is a plausible assumption because, in Sanskrit literature, the term has been used to mean the opposition of two courses of action which are equally important, the conflict of two even-matched interests.⁷ But which conflicts qualify as *tulyabala* ‘having equal strength’? The *Kāśikā* says that rule pairs which are not *nitya-anitya*, *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*, *apavāda-utsarga*, are *tulyabala* ‘having equal strength’.

Let us try to understand why the tradition felt the need to come up with these tools. According to the tradition, *para* in 1.4.2 means ‘the rule that appears after the other rule in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*’. Thus, in the case of a conflict (*vipratishedha*) between two rules, the operation prescribed by the later rule should prevail. However, if one assumes that any rule conflict can be called *vipratishedha*, and therefore applies 1.4.2 uniformly to every instance of such a conflict, in many cases, one gets a grammatically incorrect form at the end of the derivation.

Below, I present how I think the current method of solving rule conflict has gradually evolved. Having realised that treating all rule conflicts as *vipratishedha* and applying 1.4.2 uniformly to every instance of such a conflict gives the wrong answer in many cases, the Pāṇinīyas:

⁷ See the entry on *vipratishedha* in Apte’s Sanskrit dictionary.

1. claimed that they found *jñāpakas* ‘hints or clues’ in Pāṇini’s *sūtras* which authorised them to devise new tools like *nityatva*, *antaraṅgatva*, *anavakāśatva* etc., for the purpose of solving rule conflicts;
2. restricted the jurisdiction of rule 1.4.2 by declaring that *vipratīṣedha* implies only *tulyabala* conflicts, i.e. conflicts between equally powerful rules; and
3. declared that rule pairs like *nitya-anitya*, *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*, and *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* were to be called *atulyabala* ‘not equally powerful’.

This allowed them to exclude the *atulyabala* rule pairs, namely *nitya-anitya*, *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* etc., from the jurisdiction of 1.4.2, thereby containing the problems caused by their interpretation of 1.4.2 to a smaller number of cases. Gradually, the Pāṇinīyas also constructed the hierarchy taught in *paribhāṣā* 38 of *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* above to determine which tool takes precedence over which other tools.

However, these post-Pāṇinian tools are not without flaws, to compensate for which umpteen other *paribhāṣās* have been written by Pāṇinīyas. Many of these *paribhāṣās* address very specific cases⁸ or even single examples of conflict, thereby defeating the entire purpose of writing metarules, which is to arrive at broad generalisations that can govern the application of and interactions between the whole body of rules. And even after this, the Pāṇinīyas are not able to solve every case of conflict correctly: every time they falter, they find one tortuous explanation or the other to justify that ‘exception’.

Apart from these factors, the fact that Pāṇini has not taught us anything about what constitutes a *tulyabala* conflict, what *nitya*, *antaraṅga* etc. are suggests that Pāṇini did not intend for us to use these methods to deal with the challenges we face when deriving Sanskrit forms using his rules. However, here we will focus not on trying to solve these issues,⁹ but on understanding how those tools that are thought to have ‘always’ been a part of the traditional method for conflict resolution evolved with the passage of time.

⁸ For example, consider Pbh 52 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, *antaraṅgān api vidhīn bahiraṅgo lug bādhatē* ‘A *bahiraṅga* rule teaching LUK deletion defeats an *antaraṅga* rule [in case of conflict]’, which is an exception of Pbh 50 *antaraṅge bahiraṅgam asid-dham* ‘An *antaraṅga* rule treats a *bahiraṅga* rule as suspended’.

⁹ For more on this topic, please see my recently concluded dissertation on this topic (Rajpopat 2022).

2.1 Kātyāyana on 1.4.2

Since Kātyāyana is the first scholar to have commented on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we cannot study the evolution of conflict resolution tools without examining some of his *vārttikas*. To begin with, we know that Kātyāyana interprets the term *para* in 1.4.2 as the rule which comes later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order.

For example, consider 3.1.67 *sārvadhātuke yak* which teaches that affix *yaK* occurs after a verbal root when a *sārvadhātuka* affix which denotes *bhāva* or *karman* follows. Consider vt. 4 (Mbh II.59.1) on this rule: *vipratīṣedhād dhi śapo baliyastvam* 'Given the *vipratīṣedha* [between *yaK* (cf. 3.1.67 *sārvadhātuke yak*) and *ŚaP* (cf. 3.1.68 *kartari śap*)], *ŚaP* is more powerful [and wins, because it is *para*, i.e. taught later in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*]'.¹⁰

One key repercussion of Kātyāyana's belief that *para* in 1.4.2 stands for 'the rule that comes later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order' must have been that he likely got numerous incorrect forms at the end of derivations where he solved conflicts using his interpretation of 1.4.2. Perhaps it is to avoid these undesirable outcomes - wherever possible - that he decided to reduce the jurisdiction of 1.4.2. For example, in vt. 1 on 1.4.2, he defines *vipratīṣedha* in a way that allows him to exclude *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* pairs¹¹ from the jurisdiction of 1.4.2: *dvau prasaṅgāv anyārthāv ekasmin sa vipratīṣedhaḥ* (1)¹² '[When] two rules [which are] applicable elsewhere [become applicable] to the same place, this [is called] *vipratīṣedha*'. Thus, a conflict between two *sāvakāśa* rules (i.e. rules which are applicable elsewhere) is called *vipratīṣedha*.

In vt. 2 on 1.4.2, he says: *ekasmin yugapat asambhavāt pūrvaparaprāpter ubhayaprasaṅgaḥ* '[Given the] impossibility [of] co-application at one [i.e. the same step, there arises] the undesirable scenario of both *pūrvā* and *para* being applicable'. In vt. 5, Kātyāyana says: *apratipattir vobhayos tulyabalatvāt* 'Or [maybe this results in] the failure of both [rules] to apply because of [their] equal strength'. In vt. 6 he says: *tatra pratipattiyartham etad vacanam* 'So, this [*sūtra*] has been formulated in order to instruct us about this [i.e., the decision regarding which rule should apply]'. From vts. 1, 2, 5 and 6 on 1.4.2, we can conclude that, according to Kātyāyana, the conflict between two *sāvakāśa* rules is called *vipratīṣedha*, and that these two

¹⁰ Note that this *vārttika* (vt.) makes an incorrect statement. There is no conflict at all here: *yaK* is added to verbal roots followed by *sārvadhātuka* affixes denoting *bhāva* 'action' or *karman* 'object' whereas *ŚaP* is added when the *sārvadhātuka* affix denotes *kartṛ* 'agent'. In fact, we come across many such errors in Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*.

¹¹ An *anavakāśa* rule is one which is not applicable elsewhere whereas a *sāvakāśa* rule is one which is applicable elsewhere.

¹² Mbh I.304.10-305.3.

rules are treated as *tulyabala* ‘of equal strength’. Note that this is the only occasion on which Kātyāyana uses the term *tulyabala*. Patañjali too uses the word *tulyabala* only once - when commenting on vt. 5 on 1.4.2.¹³

Before proceeding, it is noteworthy that Kātyāyana considers *anavakāśa* rules to be *apavādas* ‘exceptions’ to *sāvakāśa* rules, which he treats as *utsargas* ‘general rules’. This becomes clear from the following *vārttika* on 4.3.156 *kṛitavat parimāṇāt* (which teaches the addition of the *taddhita* affix *aÑ* to different syntactically related nominal stems): vt. 5 *vānavakāśatvād apavādo mayat* ‘Or, by virtue of not applying elsewhere, *mayat* is an exception (and thus wins)’. So, we can safely conclude that he excludes *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* and therefore, *apavāda-utsarga* pairs from the ambit of *vipratīṣedha*. In the same vein, it would not be wrong to say that *anavakāśatva* and *apavādatva* are conflict resolution tools explicitly used by Kātyāyana.

2.2 Kātyāyana on *nitya*

The role of Kātyāyana in the evolution of the Pāṇinian tradition is paramount: Patañjali weaves his commentary around Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas*, not Pāṇini’s *sūtras*. And the rest of the tradition looks to Patañjali for topics to discuss, opinions on various issues and generally speaking, intellectual inspiration and guidance. So, if it had not been for Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas*, perhaps a broad spectrum of ideas that are now central to traditional literature would not have occurred to Patañjali, his successors, and for that matter, us. The tradition would have proceeded on an altogether different trajectory, for better or worse. Yet, for someone who has made such a valuable contribution, Kātyāyana today receives little recognition: the largest share of praise is apportioned to Patañjali, who is accredited with everything from shedding light on *sūtra* syntax (topics like *anuvṛtti* ‘continuation’ and *yogavibhāga* ‘splitting of Pāṇinian *sūtras* into two’) to demonstrating the workings of Pāṇini’s derivational mechanism. Patañjali’s work dominates the discourse to the extent that his interpretations of, and comments on, Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* are assumed to be tantamount to, and even allowed to eclipse, the actual meaning and import of those *vārttikas*.

To avoid making unjustified assumptions, when studying the evolution of the *nitya* tool, we must attempt to look at each occurrence of the term *nitya* in Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* without allowing Patañjali’s comments to influence this inquiry. The term *nitya* features many

¹³ It must be stated, though, that this passage is reproduced verbatim by Patañjali in his comments on vt. 3 on 6.1.85 *antādivac ca* (Mbh III.59.20-60.6).

times in Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* (see Pathak, Chitrao 1935), and so do words formed using it, such as *nityagrahaṇānarthakya*, *nityatva*, *nitya-nimittatva*, *nityapūrvārtha*, *nityapratyayatva*, *nityaprvṛtta*, *nityavacana*, *nityasādatva*, *nityasāmbandha*, *nityasamāsa*, *nityasamāsavacana*, *nityasamāsārtha*, *nityādiṣṭatva* and *nityārtha*. Of these, *nityasamāsa*, *nityasamāsavacana* and *nityasamāsārtha* deal with a type of compound which has nothing to do with *nitya* as a conflict resolution tool. We shall look at the rest to ascertain the contexts in which *nitya* is used.

Most occurrences of *nitya* in the *vārttikas*, both as a stand-alone stem and as a member of compounds, are those meant to indicate that something is not *vaikalpika* 'optional', but *nitya* 'always takes place'. On many of these occasions, *nitya* is used to prescribe the suspension of optionality, that is, to block the *anuvṛtti* 'continuation' of terms like *vā*, *vibhāṣā* and *anyatarasyām* – which instruct us to follow the given instruction optionally – into the present *vārttika*. Let us look at Kātyāyana's first two *vārttikas* on 3.1.11:

3.1.11 *kartuḥ kyañ salopaś ca (vā supaḥ upamānād ācāre)*

'Affix *Kyañ* optionally occurs to denote *ācāra* after a *pada* which ends in a *sUP* and denotes an agent serving as an *upamāna*; in addition, the final -s of the nominal stem (*prātipadika*) is replaced with *LOPA*'.

Vt. 1 *salopo vā*

'The replacement of -s with *LOPA* is optional [in the said situation]'.

Vt. 2 *ojo'psarasor nityam.*

'[But when -s is at the end of stems] *ojas* and *apsaras* [then the replacement of -s with *LOPA*] always [takes place]'.

Here the word *nitya* is used to disallow the optionality associated with -s deletion in the given situation for words *ojas* and *apsaras*. On most other occasions, in either philosophical or ordinary grammatical discussion, Kātyāyana simply uses *nitya* as it is used in common speech – as a noun/adjective or adverb – that is, to mean 'constant, permanent, permanently existent, always, everywhere, eternally etc'. And Patañjali too uses the word *nitya* in the same sense in his commentary on these *vārttikas*. Note that the meaning of *nitya* in all the cases mentioned so far is roughly the same, regardless of whether it is used to perform a specific technical function in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (i.e. suspend optionality) or as a word from everyday Sanskrit.

Now let us turn to the two specific instances of the use of the word *nitya* by Kātyāyana on which Patañjali glosses *nitya* as: *krte'pi*

*prāpnoty akṛte'pi prāpnoti*¹⁴ '[Even when the other rule] has been applied, [this rule] is applicable, [and even when the other rule] has not been applied, [this rule] is applicable'. This is what is conventionally called the *nitya* tool for rule conflict resolution by Patañjali and his successors in the tradition. Put differently, when two rules A and B are in conflict with each other, if A remains applicable at that place both before and after the application of B, but B is not applicable after the application of A, then A is called *nitya* and B *anitya*, and the *nitya* rule A defeats the *anitya* rule B. In modern theoretical linguistics, we call this unidirectional blocking. Since Patañjali interprets the word *nitya* used in these two *vārttikas* as a conflict resolution tool, we must study them.

Let us first look at vt. 4 on 1.3.60 *śadeḥ śitaḥ*¹⁵ in which Kātyāyana uses the term *nitya* and where Patañjali interprets this word *nitya* as a conflict resolution tool. Before we go to vt. 4, let us first look at vt. 3 to get some context. Vt. 3 does not discuss 1.3.60, but instead talks about another rule (1.3.17 *ner viśaḥ*) which also deals with *ātmanepada* suffixes:

Vt. 3 *upasargapūrvaniyame'dvyavāya upasamkhyānam*

'It should be added that if it is taught [that a root takes *ātmanepada* suffixes] when it is preceded by a preverb (1.3.17 *ner viśaḥ*), [this holds true also when the augment] *aṬ* is interposed [between *ni* and *viś*] (6.4.71 *luṅlanlṛṅṣv aḍ udāttah*).¹⁶

The rule that this *vārttika* refers to is:

1.3.17 *ner viśaḥ*

'An *ātmanepada* affix occurs after *viś* 'to enter' when it is preceded by the preverb *ni*'.

An example of what 1.3.17 teaches is *niviśate* (*LAṬ*, third person singular). An example of what vt. 3 teaches is *nyaviśata* (*LAN*, third person singular). Now, in vt. 4, Kātyāyana suggests that the derivation may not proceed as desired if vt. 3 is not stated:

Vt. 4 *nityatvāl lādeśasya ātmanepade'dāgama iti cedaṭo'pi nityanimittatvād ātmanepadābhāvaḥ*.

¹⁴ Patañjali's statements on both are very close paraphrases of this form.

¹⁵ 'An *ātmanepada* affix occurs after *śadLR* 'to cut' when it is to be used with an item marked with *Ś*'.

¹⁶ 'Augment *aṬ*, concurrently marked *udātta*, is introduced to an *aṅga* when affixes *LUN*, *LAN* and *LRṅ* follow'.

‘If [one argues that] the augment aT can be [introduced] when $\hat{a}tmanepada$ endings occur [after the $dh\hat{a}tu$] because the substitution of la suffixes is $nitya$ (i.e., it always takes place), [one can object to this saying that] $\hat{a}tmanepada$ endings cannot occur because the augment aT also has a $nityanimitta$ ‘permanent cause’.

On this $v\hat{a}rttika$, Patañjali remarks:

nityattv\hat{a}l l\hat{a}deśasy\hat{a}tmanepada ev\hat{a}d\hat{a}gama iti cedevamucyate. a\hat{d}api nityanimittah. kṛte’pi l\hat{a}deśe pr\hat{a}pnoty akṛte’pi pr\hat{a}pnoti. a\hat{t}o nityanimittatv\hat{a}d \hat{a}tmanepadasy\hat{a}bh\hat{a}vaḥ.

‘If it is said in this way that the augment aT can be [introduced] when $\hat{a}tmanepada$ endings occur [after the $dh\hat{a}tu$] because the substitution of la suffixes is $nitya$, [it is objected that] the augment aT also has a $nitya$ cause. [The augment aT] is [introduced] anyway, whether the substitution of la occurs or does not occur. Since the cause of aT is $nitya$, $\hat{a}tmanepada$ endings will not occur’.

Vt. 5 *tatra upasaṁkhyānam*

‘And so that addition (vt. 3) must be made’.

Kātyāyana, in vt. 5, concludes that vt. 3 must be formulated to deal with the issue raised in vt. 4. Note that, in his comments on vt. 4, Patañjali simply paraphrases everything Kātyāyana says, except he interprets $nitya$ as a conflict resolution tool: *a\hat{d} api nityanimittah. kṛte’pi l\hat{a}deśe pr\hat{a}pnoty akṛte’pi pr\hat{a}pnoti.*

Kātyāyana is aware that, in $nir + viś + LAN\check{N}$, the presence of $LAN\check{N}$ to the right of $viś$ will always trigger the application of the rule 6.4.71 *luṅlaṅlṛṅsv a\hat{d} ud\hat{a}ttah*, thereby introducing the augment aT . Thus, he calls the augment, $nityanimitta$ ‘having a regularly occurring cause’, i.e. $LAN\check{N}$.

Kātyāyana uses the word *a\hat{d}vyavāya* ‘the interposition aT ’ in vt. 3. This implies that Kātyāyana seems to assume that augment aT does not become an integral part of root $viś$, but instead occurs as an independent morpheme or a separate item between nir and $viś$.

In $nir + aT + viś + LAN\check{N}$, $viś$ is never immediately preceded by nir , and so 1.3.17 *nerviśaḥ*, which mandates the substitution of $lak\hat{a}ras$ with $\hat{a}tmanepada$ endings when $viś$ is preceded by nir , is unable to apply. Thus, Kātyāyana has composed vt. 3 allowing $nir + viś$ to take $\hat{a}tmanepada$ endings even when aT intervenes between nir and $viś$.¹⁷

¹⁷ However, in my opinion, augments become part of the morpheme they are attached to, unlike affixes which are separate items. And thus, $viś$ should still be considered to lie immediately after ni even when the augment aT has been attached to $viś$. So, Kātyāyana’s assumption, as stated in vt. 4, is unfounded and vt. 3 need not be stated. This is not central to the argument being made though.

And my contention is that, when Kātyāyana states that $a\bar{T}$ is *nitya-nimitta*, he simply means that whenever the cause of $a\bar{T}$, namely LAN , is present, the augment $a\bar{T}$ will also be present, but he does not use *nitya* here as a conflict resolution tool. This is simply because there is no evidence to be found in the aforementioned *vārttikas* to warrant Patañjali's interpretation of *nitya* as a conflict resolution tool.

Now let us consider the other *vārttika* wherein Kātyāyana uses the word *nitya* and while commenting on which Patañjali interprets this word as a conflict resolution tool, namely vt. 1 on 1.2.6:

1.2.6 *indhibhavatibhyām ca (liṭ kit)*

'A LIT affix which occurs after verbal roots *indh* 'to kindle' and *bhū* 'to be, become' also is treated as though marked with K '.

On this *sūtra*, Patañjali says:

kimartham idam ucyate. indheḥ samyogārtham vacanam bhavateḥ pidartham. ayam yogaḥ śakyo avaktum. katham.

'Why has this been said? [This] statement [has been made] because of the conjunct of *indh* [and those suffixes placed after] *bhu* which are marked by P . [This] may be left unsaid. How?'

Then he introduces Kātyāyana's *vārttika*:

Vt. 1 *indheś chandoviṣayatvād bhuvo vuko nityatvāt tābhyām kidvacanānarthakyam.*

'Because *indh* [belongs to] the domain of Veda [and because the augment] vUK added to *bhū* is *nitya*, [the statement that the suffix] after them [should be treated as if] marked with K is redundant'.

On this Patañjali says:

indheś chandoviṣayo liṭ. na hy antareṇa cchanda indher anantaro liḍ labhyaḥ. āmā bhāṣāyām bhavitavyam. bhuvo vuko nityatvāt. bhavater api nityo vuk. kṛte'pi prāpnoty akṛte'pi. tābhyām kidvacanānarthakyam. tābhyām indhibhavatibhyām kidvacanānarthakyam.

' LIT 'perfect affixes' [occur after the root] *indh* only in the Vedas. For, outside the Veda, we do not find LIT placed immediately after *indh*. In ordinary speech, *ām* should be affixed [to *indh*] (3.1.36 *ijādeś ca gurumatonṛcchaḥ*). Because of the *nitya* nature of vUK (6.4.88 *bhuvo vuk luṅ liṭoḥ*) after *bhū*, the augment vUK added after *bhū* is *nitya*. It occurs if [*guṇa*] (7.3.84 *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ*) / [*vṛddhi*] (7.2.115 *aco ṅṅiti*) is performed [and] also if [*guṇa* / *vṛddhi*] is not performed. [Thus,] pre-

scribing *kitva* [of the suffix] after them is redundant. Prescribing *kitva* [of the suffix] after *indh* / *bhū* is redundant’.

Indh ‘to kindle’ is a 7th class *ātmanepada* root. If one wishes to derive, for example, the third person singular Vedic *LIT* form of *indh*, *LIT* would be replaced by *ta*. Before introducing Kātyāyana’s *vārttika*, Patañjali says *indheḥ saṁyogārthaṁ vacanam*. He means that in *indh* + *ta*, given the *saṁyoga* ‘conjunct’ at the end of *indh*, the rule 1.2.5 cannot be used to make the suffix *ta*, *kidvad* ‘behaving as if it were marked with *K*’:

1.2.5 *asaṁyogāl liṭ kit (apit)*

‘A *LIT* affix not originally marked with *P* is treated as marked with *K* when it occurs after roots which do not terminate in a conjunct’.

Hence, the need for the *sūtra* 1.2.6. This *kitvadbhāva* ‘state of behaving as if marked with *K*’ is required for the replacement of the penultimate *n* of *indh* with *LOPA* by 6.4.24:

6.4.24 *aniditām hala upadhāyāḥ kṛiti (nalopaḥ)*.

‘The penultimate *n* of an *aṅga* which ends in a consonant and does not contain *I* as a marker is replaced with *LOPA* when an affix marked with *K* or *Ṇ* follows’.

This justifies the need for the presence of the verb *indh* in 1.2.6 *indhibhavatibhyām ca*. In his *vārttika*, Kātyāyana also says that, since the reduplicated perfect of *indh* is only found in the Veda, the *sūtra* enjoining of *kitvadbhāva* for *LIT* substitutes after *indh* is futile.¹⁸ In the case of the *laukika* ‘colloquial’ form, *ām*, prevailing over other operations (derivational details not discussed here), is introduced between *indh* and *LIT* from an early stage in the derivation, thereby disallowing the trigger of any operation on *indh* that could be caused by *LIT*:

3.1.36 *ijādeś ca guromatonṛcchaḥ. (ām amantrē liṭi)*

‘Affix *ām* occurs after a verbal root which begins with *iC* ‘any vowel except *a*’, and contains a *guru* vowel (1.4.11 *saṁyoge guru*, 1.4.12 *dīrgham ca*), except *ṛcch* ‘to go’, provided *LIT* follows, and the usage is not from the *mantra* part of the Vedic’.

18 But since Pāṇini accounts for both Vedic and non-Vedic usages, Kātyāyana’s dismissal of the need to write a *sūtra* that justifies a Vedic form is unacceptable. But this is beside the point here.

<i>bhū</i> - <i>LIT</i> forms	Singular	Dual	Plural
3rd	<i>Babhūva</i>	<i>Babhūvatuḥ</i>	<i>Babhūvuḥ</i>
2nd	<i>Babhūvitha</i>	<i>Babhūvathuḥ</i>	<i>Babhūva</i>
1st	<i>Babhūva</i>	<i>Babhūviva</i>	<i>Babhūvima</i>

Now, let us look at what Kātyāyana and Patañjali say about *bhū*. Patañjali, before quoting the *vārttika*, says: *bhavater pidartham vacanam*. He means that, while the *LIT* suffixes which are not marked with *P*, i.e. dual and plural suffixes, added to *bhū* ‘to be’ can be treated as *marked with K* thanks to 1.2.5 (see above), 1.2.5 is not applicable to suffixes marked with *P*, i.e. singular suffixes, and this rule has been composed so that suffixes marked with *P* can be treated as suffixes marked with *K*. This *kitva* is required to block the *vṛddhi* (7.2.115 *aco ṅṅiti*) or *guṇa* (7.3.84 *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ*) of the root vowel of *bhū* in all its perfect forms by 1.1.5 *kniti ca* (*na iko guṇavṛddhi*).

On the other hand, in his first *vārttika* on 1.2.6, Kātyāyana says that treating the *LIT* suffixes after *bhū* as marked with *K*, which is done to block *guṇa/vṛddhi*, is also redundant, because there arises no occasion to perform *guṇa/vṛddhi*, thanks to the *nityatva* of *vUK*. The rule that teaches the addition of augment *vUK* is:

6.4.88 *bhuvo vuk luṅliṭoḥ (aṅgasya aci)*

‘Augment *vUK* is introduced to an *aṅga*, namely *bhū*, when a *LUN* or *LIT* affix beginning with a vowel follows’.

Here, Patañjali comments: *bhavater api nityo vuk. kṛte’pi prāpnoty akṛte’pi*. He means that, since *vUK* can be attached both before and after *guṇa/vṛddhi*, and since vice-versa is not true, *vUK* is *nitya* and *guṇa/vṛddhi*, *anitya*. He interprets the word *nitya* as a tool for resolving conflict between the addition of augment *vUK* (6.4.88) and *guṇa/vṛddhi*. But is this conclusion warranted? Consider all nine forms (three persons and three numbers) of *bhū* + *LIT*. In each of them, we notice the presence of *vUK* taught by 6.4.88 *bhuvo vuk luṅ liṭoḥ (aci)*.

As I have shown above (cf. Kātyāyana’s use of the term *aḍvyavāya*), Kātyāyana thinks that augments are separate from the item to which they are added. Thus, he does not see *vUK* as a part of *bhū*. According to Kātyāyana, the step at which *vUK* is added looks like this: *bhū* + *vUK* (treated as a distinct morpheme) + *LIT*. To cause the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of the *ū* of *bhū*, *LIT* needs to be immediately after *bhū*. But *vUK*, which is an item unto itself, acts as an obstruction, thereby obstructing *LIT* from causing the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of *bhū*. Since *vUK* appears in each of the nine *LIT* forms of *bhū* - as can be corroborated by looking at the paradigm above - Kātyāyana says that *vUK* is *nitya* ‘always present’, and so it never allows *LIT* to cause the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of *bhū*. Therefore, he concludes that trying to block the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of *bhū*

by treating *LIT* as marked with *K* (cf. 1.1.5 *knīti ca*) in 1.2.6 is unnecessary because there never arises an occasion for such *guṇa/vrddhi* to occur in the first place. It is in this sense that he says: *bhuvo vuko nityatvāt kidvacanānarthakyaṃ*. Having studied these two crucial *vārttikas*, I have inferred that, contrary to Patañjali's interpretation, Kātyāyana does not use *nitya* in the sense of a rule conflict resolution tool, but simply as a word of day-to-day language, to mean 'always, always existent, permanent' etc. This leads us to the conclusion that the *nitya* tool for conflict resolution is effectively Patañjali's inadvertent invention resulting from a misinterpretation of Kātyāyana's words.

Before moving forward, let me discuss a *vārttika* that corroborates my conclusion. Consider vt. 11 on 7.1.96 *striyām ca*¹⁹ which reads:

numaciratṛjvadbhāvebhyo nuṭ (pūrvavipratīṣiddham)
'[in cases of conflict] the attachment of the augment *nUT*²⁰ (which is taught by a preceding rule in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*) takes precedence over (the following processes which are taught by rules that come later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order): 1) attachment of augment *nUM*,²¹ 2) replacement with *r* when followed by a vowel,²² or 3) *trC*-like treatment'.²³

Let us derive the genitive plural of the masculine stem *kroṣṭu* 'jackal' by adding suffix *ām* to it. Here, two competing rules become applicable to two different operands respectively at once:

7.1.97 *vibhāṣā tṛtīyādiṣv aci*
'The *aṅga*, *kroṣṭu*, is treated as if ending in affix *trC*, only optionally, when a vowel initial nominal ending of *tṛtīyā* triplet 'instrumental' or any of the following triplets namely dative, ablative, genitive or locative follows'.

7.1.54 *hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ*
'Augment *nUT* is introduced to affix *ām* when it occurs after an *aṅga* which ends in a short vowel (*hrasvānta*), or in a form which is termed *nadī* (*nadyanta*), or else, ends in the feminine affix *āP* (*ābanta*)'.


19 'The *aṅga*, *kroṣṭu* is also treated as if ending in affix *trC*, when the denotation is feminine'.

20 7.1.54 *hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ*.

21 7.1.73 *iko'ci vibhaktau*.

22 7.2.100 *aci ra rtaḥ*.

23 7.1.95 *tṛjvat kroṣṭuḥ* and the following *sūtras* such as 7.1.97 *vibhāṣā tṛtīyādiṣv aci*.



Following the traditional interpretation of 1.4.2 *vipratiṣedhe param kāryam*, if we chose 7.1.97, which comes later in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we get the wrong answer **kroṣṭṛnām*.²⁴ Thus, Kātyāyana has composed the above *vārttika* which states that 7.1.54, despite being the *pūrvā sūtra*, ought to win the conflict so as to give the correct answer *kroṣṭūnām* (6.4.3 *nāmi*).

There is no evidence to support the claim that *pūrvavipratiṣiddha* is a tool for rule conflict resolution. Instead, it seems to simply be a label given to all those cases of *vipratiṣedha* where the application of the Pāṇinian rule 1.4.2 – as understood by Kātyāyana – gives the wrong answer.

Note that 7.1.97 does not block 7.1.54, but 7.1.54 does block 7.1.97. Since this is a case of unidirectional blocking, this is the classic opportunity to use Patañjali’s conflict resolution tool, *nityatva*. The *nitya* rule, i.e. the rule that unidirectionally blocks the other rule, wins. This means that 7.1.54 applies and we get the correct answer *kroṣṭūnām*.

Now the question arises: if Kātyāyana had regarded *nityatva* as a conflict resolution tool, why would he include this example, which can be solved using the *nityatva* tool, in the *pūrvavipratiṣiddham vārttika* mentioned above? This only goes on to show yet again that Kātyāyana has uniformly and consistently used the term *nitya* just as it is used in ordinary speech, that is, to mean ‘always, permanent, constantly occurring’ etc., and not as a conflict resolution tool.

On this *vārttika*, Kaiyaṭa, in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* titled *Pradīpa*, tries to argue that 7.1.54 is not *nitya*,²⁵ thanks to the *sannipātaparibhāṣā* which is Pbh 85 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara: sannipātalakṣaṇo vidhir animittam tadvighātasya*. Kielhorn²⁶ translates it as follows: “(That which is taught in) a rule (the application of) which is occasioned by the combination (of two things), does not become the cause of the destruction of that (combination)”. Thus, according to this *paribhāṣā*, since *nUṬ* addition is occasioned by the combination of the *aṅga* ending in *r* and the affix beginning in a vowel, *nUṬ* addition cannot be allowed to disrupt this combination, so it

²⁴ By applying 7.1.97, 7.1.54 and finally, 6.4.3 *nāmi*, in that order.

²⁵ *Ṭṛjvadbhāvaḥ kṛte nuty anajāditvān na prāpnotīty anityo, nuḍāgamo’pi kṛte ṭṛjvadbhāve sannipātaparibhāṣayā na prāpnotīty anityaḥ* (see p. 91, part 6, Caukhambā’s publication (1987-88) of the *Mahābhāṣya* with Kaiyaṭa’s *Pradīpa* and Nāgeśa’s *Uddyota*).

²⁶ See Abhyankar 1960, 410.

cannot be treated as *nitya* and does not take place. But by this logic, the tradition should never use the *nitya* tool in the first place because it always disrupts such combinations. Hence, I think the *sannipāta* argument is unacceptable.

Therefore, our conclusion that Kātyāyana did not intend for *nitya* to be used as a conflict resolution tool still holds true, notwithstanding the so-called *sannipāta* argument of Kaiyaṭa. Note that what we looked at was only one of multiple *pūrvavipratīṣiddha vārttikas* written by Kātyāyana on different Pāṇinian rules. Patañjali's comments on all these *vārttikas* are mostly the same. Before moving forward, it would be instructive for us to inspect them. Consider what he says, for example about vt. 10 (which we need not discuss here) on the same rule, i.e. 7.1.96: *na vaktavyaḥ. iṣṭavācī paraśabdah. vipratīṣedhe param yaदिṣṭam tadbhavati* '[This] should not be said. The word *para* means desirable. In [the event of] *vipratīṣedha*, the *para*, i.e. desirable [rule] applies'. He implies that we should apply whichever rule we like as long as it helps us get the grammatically correct form at the end of the derivation. He makes similar comments on 1.4.2 as well, which we will not repeat here – to avoid being redundant.

On the one hand, by interpreting *para* as desirable, Patañjali implies that there is no need to worry about which rule should apply where, as long as we find a way to apply a certain permutation of 'desirable' rules that can help us derive the correct form. On the other hand, in complete contradiction with this suggestion, he invents new conflict resolution tools like *nitya*. What Patañjali wants to actually achieve, only he knows. But are we being too harsh to Patañjali when we criticise him for these reasons? Yes, we are. This is because, it is likely that, throughout the *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali is in dialogue with his pupils; so some of these statements might have been produced by one speaker and certain others by another. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the *Mahābhāṣya* does frequently confuse its reader, especially one looking for consistency in the logic employed to defend certain positions it takes.

3 Kātyāyana on *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*

Having examined how Kātyāyana uses the term *nitya*, now let us consider what he has to say about *antaraṅga* and/or *bahiraṅga*. Kātyāyana uses *antaraṅga* thrice as a stand-alone stem, twice as a part of the compound *antaraṅgabaliyastva*, and thrice as a part of the compound *antaraṅgalakṣaṇatva*. Its antonym *bahiraṅga* too is used on many occasions by Kātyāyana. However, he does not define the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga*.

Let us look at vt. 7 on 6.1.135 *suṭ kāt pūrvaḥ*:²⁷

Vt. 7 *avipratishedho hi bahiraṅgalakṣaṇatvāt*
'This cannot be a case of *vipratishedha*, because of the *bahiraṅga* nature (of *sUṬ*)'.

We do not need to look into the derivational context in which this has been stated. But this *vārttika* shows that Kātyāyana thinks that *vipratishedha*, whatever it means, cannot exist between an *antaraṅga* rule and a *bahiraṅga* rule, whatever the two terms mean. In principle, there are two possibilities. One, that the tradition is correct, and that by teaching such a *vārttika*, Kātyāyana is simply suggesting that *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* pairs are not of equal strength and thus are excluded from the domain of *vipratishedha* 'conflict between rule pairs of equal strength'. But the other possibility is that he simply means that there is no *vipratishedha* 'conflict' between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* rule pairs. We will explore this second possibility further below. For now, suffice it to say that for two reasons the second one is more plausible. One, because Occam's razor or the principle of parsimony. And two, because Kātyāyana does not say anything about *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* not being *tulyabala* 'of equal strength' in his *vārttikas*.

Now let us look at a *vārttika* where Kātyāyana uses the term *antaraṅga* to get some clarity on what he means by *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* and what, according to him, the relationship of these terms is, if any, with 1.4.2. On 1.4.2 *vipratishedhe param karyam*, Kātyāyana's vt. 8 says *antaraṅgam ca*. This *vārttika* does not seem to be directly related to any of the preceding *vārttikas* on 1.4.2, so we shall simply treat it as an independent *vārttika* on 1.4.2. Patañjali does not say anything new on it and simply paraphrases it as follows: *antaraṅgam ca balīyo bhavatīti vaktavyam*. Kātyāyana then illustrates the usefulness of stating *vārttika* 8 in the following *vārttika*:

Vt. 9 *prayojanam yaṅekādeṣettvottvāni guṇavrddhidvirvacanāḷlo pasvarebhyaḥ*

Note that Kātyāyana uses the ablative plural form for one set of operations, whereas he uses the nominative plural form for the other set. This is how he consistently suggests that one set (in the nominative) takes precedence over the other (in the ablative) in all his *vārttikas*. So, he means that those mentioned in the nominative are *antaraṅga* and they take precedence over the *bahiraṅga* ones mentioned in the ablative. We can translate the *vārttika* as follows:

²⁷ 'Augment *sUṬ* is introduced before *K*'.

‘The purpose (of the previous *vārttika* is:) [the *antaraṅga* operations] *yaN*, *ekādeśa*, *ittva* and *uttva* [prevail] over [each of the *bahiraṅga* operations] *guṇa*, *vṛddhi*, *dvirvacana*, *allopa* and *svara*’.

Let us consider some of Patañjali’s arguments on vt. 9 on 1.4.2:

guṇād yaṇādeśaḥ. syonaḥ syonā. guṇas ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca. paratvād guṇaḥ syāt. yaṇādeśo bhavaty antaraṅgataḥ.

‘The substitution [of vowels *iK*] with consonants *yaN* (*yaṇādeśa*) prevails over *guṇa*, (e.g.) *syonaḥ*, *syonā*. [The rule teaching] *guṇa* is applicable, and [the rule teaching] substitution [of *iK*] with *yaN* is also applicable. Because of the *para* [tool, that is, by applying 1.4.2], *guṇa* would prevail, but due to the *antaraṅga* [tool], *yaṇādeśa* occurs’.

The sentence *guṇas ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca*, and the mention of the *para* tool here indicate that Patañjali does indeed treat the interaction between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* as a conflict, and also uses *antaraṅga* as a tool to resolve such conflict. Consider another excerpt from Patañjali’s comments on vt. 9:

dvirvacanād yaṇādeśaḥ. dudyūṣati susyūṣati. dvirvacanaṁ ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca. nityatvāt dvirvacana syāt. yaṇādeśo bhavaty antaraṅgataḥ.

‘The substitution [of vowels *iK*] with consonants *yaN* (*yaṇādeśa*) prevails over reduplication, (e.g.) *dudyūṣati*, *susyūṣati*. [The rule teaching] reduplication is applicable, and [the rule teaching] substitution [of *iK*] with *yaN* is also applicable. Because of the *nitya* [tool], reduplication would prevail, but due to the *antaraṅga* [tool], *yaṇādeśa* occurs’.

Here too, the sentence *dvirvacanaṁ ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca* and the mention of the *nitya* tool show that Patañjali uses *antaraṅga* as a tool to solve rule conflict. In both these examples, Patañjali compares the outcomes from using *para*, *nitya* and *antaraṅga* as tools for rule conflict resolution, in order to demonstrate the superiority of *antaraṅga* as a conflict resolution tool.

But is Patañjali’s interpretation of vts. 8 and 9 on 1.4.2 correct? Let us discuss some of the derivations mentioned above to answer this question. Let us first follow Patañjali’s method to derive the form *dudyūṣati* ‘desires to shine’. We start by adding the desiderative affix *saN* to the root *div* ‘to shine’ by 3.1.7 *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ*

*saṁānakartṛkād icchāyām vā.*²⁸ Thereafter, by 6.4.19 *chvoḥ śūd anuṅāsike ca*,²⁹ we get *diū + saN*. Here, according to Patañjali, two rules are simultaneously applicable:

$$\{d \quad [i] \} \quad \bar{u} \quad + \quad saN$$

6.1.77 *iko yaṅ aci*³⁰ is applicable to *i* while 6.1.9 *sanyaṅoḥ*³¹ is applicable to *di*. Notice that the cause of application of 6.1.77 (i.e., \bar{u}) lies to the left of the cause of application of 6.1.9 (i.e., *saN*). Patañjali says that 6.1.77 is *antaraṅga* and thus wins, thereby giving: *dyū + saN*. Thereafter, 6.1.9 applies and we get *dyūdyū + saN*. After applying other rules, we get the correct form *dudyūṣati*.

Before going forward, let us use this example to speculate about how Kātyāyana might have defined *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga*. Note that the cause of application of 6.1.77, namely \bar{u} , lies inside (*antar*) the *aṅga diū*, while the cause of application of 6.1.9, namely *saN*, lies outside (*bahir*) it. Thus, the term *antaraṅga* could stand for *aṅgasya antaḥ* and the term *bahiraṅga* for *aṅgād bahiḥ*.

Now, here is what I think Kātyāyana actually meant. 6.1.9 *sanyaṅoḥ*³² teaches that a verbal base ending in *saN* or *yaN*, which has not undergone reduplication, is reduplicated.³³ Note that *diū + saN* is not a verbal base ending in *saN*, but instead two separate items, namely *diū* and *saN*. So, 6.1.9, the so-called *bahiraṅga* rule, is not yet applicable here. However, 6.1.77 is applicable here, and on applying it, we get *dyū + saN*. Now, since no other rules can be applied here, we can fuse the two items *dyū* and *saN* into a single item *dyūṣa*, which we can call a verbal base ending in *saN*. Therefore, 6.1.9 applies here and we get *dyūdyūṣa*. After applying other rules, we get the correct verbal base *dudyūṣa* (and the correct final form *dudyūṣati*).

In sum, I think Kātyāyana simply means that the *bahiraṅga* rule is not applicable, and thus cannot be applied, before the *antaraṅga*

²⁸ ‘The affix *saN* is optionally introduced after a verbal stem, the action denoted by which is the object of a verbal stem expressing desire and provided both actions have the same agent’.

²⁹ ‘*ch* and *v* are replaced with *ś* and *ūTH*, respectively, when an affix beginning with a nasal, or affix *KvI*, or one beginning with *jhaL*, i.e. a non-nasal stop or a fricative, and marked with *K* or *N̄*, follows’.

³⁰ ‘*iK* (*i, u, r, ḷ*) is replaced with *yaN* (*y, v, r, ḷ*) when *aC* (any vowel) follows’.


³¹ If we interpret *sanyaṅoḥ* as locative, as I think Patañjali does in this case, then this rule teaches that a verbal base which has not undergone reduplication is reduplicated when followed by *saN* or *yaN*. Note that the whole base does not undergo reduplication. Instead, only one syllable does. See 6.1.1 *ekāco dve prathamasya* and 6.1.2 *aḷāder dvitīyasya*.

³² I think Kātyāyana interprets *sanyaṅoḥ* as genitive.

³³ The whole base does not undergo reduplication. Instead, only one syllable does. See 6.1.1 *ekāco dve prathamasya* and 6.1.2 *aḷāder dvitīyasya*.

rule is applied. As a matter of fact, he prescribes a certain order of rule application at best. Consider another example.

Let us use Patañjali's method to derive the form *dyaukāmi* 'male offspring of *dyukāma*'. We start by adding the *taddhita* affix *iÑ* to the *bahuvrīhi* compound made up of *div* and *kāma* by 4.1.95 *ata iÑ* (which teaches that the *taddhita* affix *iÑ* occurs to denote an offspring after a syntactically related nominal stem which ends in *a*). After replacing the inflectional affixes inside the compound with *LUK* by 2.4.71 *supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ*,³⁴ we get *div + kāma + iÑ*. Here, by 6.1.131 *diva ut* (which teaches that the final sound of the *pada* *div* is replaced with *uT*), we get *diu + kāma + iÑ*. At this stage, according to Patañjali, two rules are simultaneously applicable:



Patañjali says that 6.1.77 is *antaraṅga* and thus wins. The derivation proceeds as follows: *diu + kāma + iÑ* → *dyu + kāma + iÑ* (6.1.77) → *dyau + kāma + iÑ* (7.2.117) → *dyaukāmi* (6.4.148 *yasyeti ca*).³⁵

But I think Kātyāyana views this derivation differently. His goal is to derive a word that means: *dyukāmasya apatyam pumān* 'male offspring of *dyukāma*'. Since we are talking about *dyukāma*'s offspring, and not (*div + kāma*)'s offspring, the derivation should start with *dyukāma* and not with *div + kāma*. Thus, we have: *dyukāma + Nas + iÑ*. *Nas* is replaced with *LUK* by 2.4.71 *supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ* and we get *dyukāma + iÑ*. After applying other rules, we get the correct answer, *dyaukāmi*. In sum, Kātyāyana is simply telling us: 7.2.117 is not applicable before 6.1.77 has applied. But this is not a case of conflict.

To conclude, when Kātyāyana says *antaraṅgam ca* in vt. 8 on 1.4.2, he simply means *antaraṅgam ca kāryam*. Thereafter, in the follow-

³⁴ 'A *suP* is replaced with *LUK* when it occurs inside a *dhātu* 'verbal base' or a *prātipadika* 'nominal base'.

³⁵ 'The final *i* or *a* of a *bha* item is replaced with *LOPA* when it is followed by *ī* or a *taddhita* affix'.

ing *vārttikas*, he lists the cases where *antaraṅga* rules need to be applied for their *bahiraṅga* counterparts to become applicable. I think that because he did not see the relationship between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* rules as one involving conflict, he did not see *antaraṅga* as a conflict resolution tool.

4 Summary of Technical Developments

Having studied Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* dealing with a number of terms that are now used as conflict resolution tools, let us summarise our findings. As stated earlier, while Kātyāyana does use *tulyabala* 'equal strength' in the context of *vipratīṣedha*, and while he excludes *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* pairs from the ambit of *vipratīṣedha* and thereby from the jurisdiction of 1.4.2, he does not explicitly discuss *nitya-anitya* and *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* in the context of *tulyabala*.

Most importantly, even though Kātyāyana does use *anavakāśa* 'without scope (to apply elsewhere)' and *apavāda* 'exception' as conflict resolution tools, he does not use *nitya* and *antaraṅga* as conflict resolution tools. We have seen that this changes in the *Mahābhāṣya* where both *nitya* and *antaraṅga* are explicitly interpreted as conflict resolution tools by Patañjali. Later scholars follow Patañjali's approach to these two terms.

What both Kātyāyana and Patañjali have in common is that they do not use the term *tulyabala* in the context of *nitya* and *antaraṅga*. This changes, as we have seen above, in the *Kāśikā*, wherein Jayāditya and Vāmana, writing in the seventh century AD, categorically classify *nitya-anitya* and *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* pairs as not *tulyabala*, in their comments on 1.4.2. However, they do not teach us a hierarchy of preference for these tools. A proper hierarchy becomes available in the twelfth century with the writing of the *paribhāṣā* text called *Paribhāṣāpāṭha* by *Puruṣottamadeva*. This very *paribhāṣā* reappears as Pbh 38 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, which we have discussed above: *pūrva-para-nitya-antaraṅga-apavādānām uttarottaram balīyaḥ* 'a *para sūtra* is stronger than a *pūrva sūtra*, a *nitya sūtra* is stronger than a *para sūtra*; an *antaraṅga sūtra* is stronger than a *nitya sūtra*; and an *apavāda sūtra* is stronger than an *antaraṅga sūtra*'.

In sum, the relationships between *tulyabala*, *vipratīṣedha*, *nitya*, *antaraṅga*, *para*, *apavāda* etc. were fully and concretely established by the twelfth century.

5 Style and Attitude

Finally, having discussed some of Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*, we must also consider his style and attitude towards Pāṇini's grammar. Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* are often a medium for him to share all kinds of thoughts with fellow grammarians - not just the 'correct' ones. Very often, we find him use *na vā* 'or rather not' and *ca* 'and' in a series of consecutive *vārttikas* to discuss alternative or even contradicting possibilities and explanations. Let me give an example relevant to the topic of rule conflict. Consider vts. 3, 4 and 5 on 7.1.6 *śīno ruṭ*³⁶ (Mbh III.243.12-21).

Vt. 3 *jhādeśād āḍ leṭi*

[It must be stated that, contrary to 1.4.2, the introduction of] *āṬ*, [which is taught by the *pūrva* rule 3.4.94 *leṭo'dātau*³⁷ wins against] the substitution of *jh* [which is taught by the *para* rule 7.1.5 *ātmanepadeṣv anataḥ*].³⁸

Vt. 4 *na vā nityatvād ātaḥ*

'Or rather [this does] not [need to be stated] because [the rule teaching] *āṬ* is *nitya* [and thus defeats the other rule which is *anitya*].

Vt. 5 *antaraṅgalakṣaṇatvāc ca*

'And [also] because [the rule teaching] *āṬ* is *antaraṅga* [and thus defeats the other rule which is *bahiraṅga*].

This style of discussing multiple possibilities without striving to always be correct, is very much akin to Patañjali's style, which also involves a discussion about the pros and cons of various perspectives. In both Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's work, we find no rigidity or urgency to establish the truth. Instead, their work is characterised by curiosity and a willingness to critically examine a motley of ideas.

Patañjali, who seems to be in conversation with other discussants, presumably his pupils, throughout the *Mahābhāṣya*, often takes the liberty to end the conversation without reaching any concrete conclusion or expressing his final opinion on the topic at hand. Consider, for example, his comments about 1.4.1 *ā kaḍārād ekā samjñā* 'up

³⁶ 'An *aṬ* which replaces a *jh* which is the initial sound of an affix preceded by *śīN*, takes the augment *rUṬ*'.

³⁷ 'Augments *aṬ* and *āṬ* are introduced, in turn (*pariyāyeṇa*), to affixes which replace *LEṬ*'.

³⁸ 'A *jh* which is the initial sound of an *ātmanepada* affix preceded by a verbal base that does not end in *a* is replaced with *at*'.

to 2.2.38 *kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*, each item can take only one *saṃjñā*, i.e. terminological designation'. He suggests that Pāṇini has taught two different versions of 1.4.1 to his pupils:

katham tv etat sūtram paḥitavyam. kim ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñeti. āhosvit prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam iti. kutah punar ayam sandehah. ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa śiṣyāḥ sūtram pratipādītāḥ. kecid ākaḍārād ekā saṃjñeti. kecid prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam iti. kaś cātra viśeṣah. tatraikasamjñādhikāre tadvacanam (vt. 2)

tatraikasamjñādhikāre tadvaktavyam. kim. ekā saṃjñā bhavātīti. nanu ca yasyāpi paramkāryatvam tenāpi paragrahaṇam kartavyam. parārtham mama bhaviṣyati. vipratīśedhe ca iti. mamāpi tarhy ekagrahaṇam parārtham bhaviṣyati. sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau iti.³⁹

“But how should this rule be read? Is it *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā*⁴⁰ or *prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam*?⁴¹ But how [does] this doubt [arise]? Because the students have been taught this rule in both ways by the teacher. Some [have been taught] *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā* [and] some *prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam*. And what is the difference [between these alternative readings] here?

In that section where one name applies, the statement of that [must be made]. (vt. 2)

In that section where one name applies, that should be stated. What [should be stated]? That only one *saṃjñā* applies [per item]. However, one who [believes that] the following rule [prevails] has to include the word *para* too. It will [serve] another [purpose] for me later [that is, by continuation, in] *vipratīśedhe ca*. For me too then, the mention of *eka* will [serve] another [purpose], in *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*.”⁴²

Note that there is no evidence that Kātyāyana was aware of these two versions. Vt. 2 *tatraikasamjñādhikāre tadvacanam* (Mbh I.296.15) has been written in context of the first *vārttika*, and not in the context of these supposedly different versions of 1.4.1 (and 1.4.2). The

³⁹ Mbh I.296.11-18.

⁴⁰ ‘Up to 2.2.38 *kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*, each item can take only one *saṃjñā*’.

⁴¹ ‘Up to 2.2.38 *kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*, the rule that comes later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*’s serial order prevails’.

⁴² In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*’s serial order, 1.2.64 *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau* comes before 1.4.1 *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā*. So, one may wonder how Patañjali would be able to continue *ekā* from 1.4.1 into 1.2.64 by *anuvṛtti*. I want to clarify here that Patañjali is proposing to reorder the rules such that *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā* comes before *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*, so that he may be able to continue *ekā* from the former into the latter by *anuvṛtti*. I do not see how doing this would be justified or useful.

first *vārttika* reads: *anyatra samjñāsamāveśān niyamārtham vacanam* ‘Because names co-apply elsewhere, the statement is for the sake of making a restriction’ (Mbh I.296.3). And so, the second *vārttika* continues to discuss this topic: *tatraikasamjñādikāre tadvacanam* ‘In that section where one name applies, the statement of that [must be made]’. As is peculiar of Patañjali, he skilfully weaves Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* into his own discourse. But it must be borne in mind that, as far as we know, the idea of two different versions of 1.4.1 (and 1.4.2) is Patañjali’s alone.

Throughout the rest of his comments on Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* on 1.4.1, Patañjali keeps discussing whether one should read 1.4.1 as *ā kaḍārād ekā samjñā* or as *prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam* using various *sūtras* discussed by Kātyāyana in his *vārttikas* – never mind the fact that, as I have stated above, Kātyāyana does not give us any reason to think that he was aware of these two supposed versions of 1.4.1. In the end, Patañjali characteristically ends the discussion abruptly without telling us which version one must finally accept.

In sum, even though there are differences – as I have shown above – in the perspectives of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, such open-ended discussion, speculation, and investigation are characteristic of the writings of both these scholars. This changed gradually as the tradition evolved, but this paper focuses only on the early tradition, and mainly on Kātyāyana. Thus, we will neither dwell on later developments nor review any primary or secondary literature on this subject. Nevertheless, I will briefly present how the tradition evolved in later years in my view.

As shown above, the *Kāśikā* presents a more concrete and established version of the conflict resolution mechanism, one which has a much narrower scope for disagreement and dialogue than did those of Kātyāyana and Patañjali. The *paribhāṣā* treatises written over many centuries thereafter too exhibit this behaviour. Not only do they contain highly focused *paribhāṣās* teaching conflict resolution tools such as *nitya*, *antarāṅga*, *apavāda* etc. discussed above, but they also contain dozens of *paribhāṣās* teaching exceptions to these tools.

The flexibility of ideas, free thinking, willingness to consider a wide variety of possibilities and alternatives, which, as stated earlier, are so characteristic of the early tradition, i.e. Kātyāyana’s and Patañjali’s work, came to be replaced by a willing acceptance of rigid, ossified, established, and widely-accepted ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ in the later tradition – in particular, in *paribhāṣā* literature. It is noteworthy that many of these *paribhāṣās* are *anitya* ‘not always applicable’ by the tradition’s own admission!

While the *Kaumudī* texts did revolutionize the way in which Pāṇini’s grammar is taught and learnt, they made the practice of performing Pāṇinian derivations more rigid. They did this by shifting the focus of the tradition from the comprehensive functioning of the

Pāṇinian machine to the many individual products of the machine, namely, individual derivations of various forms. Over time, students of the *Kaumudī* got so familiar with these derivations that now, they do not have to and, consequently, do not, stop at most steps of the derivation to ask themselves: which rules are applicable at this step? Which of these rules should I apply? And why? And if pupils do apply conflict resolution tools of their own accord and end up getting the wrong form, they are not encouraged by their teachers to ask why. Instead, they are advised to consult the *Kaumudī* texts to ‘correct’ themselves, i.e. to memorise the explanation offered by their authors.

Why this gradual loss of flexibility and open-endedness? I think that the tendency to worship Pāṇini-Kātyāyana-Patañjali as the *trimuni/munitraya* ‘three saints’ was in part responsible for this change. The tradition brims with verses such as: *vākyakāraṃ vararucim bhāṣyakāraṃ patañjalim pāṇinim sūtrakāraṃ ca praṇātosmi munitrayam* ‘I bow to the three saints, namely Pāṇini, who wrote the *sūtras*, Kātyāyana, who wrote the *vārttikas*, and Patañjali, who wrote the *bhāṣya*’. When one worships a scholar, it becomes difficult for one to disagree with that scholar.

Secondly, even amongst the three *munis*, Patañjali’s word superseded Kātyāyana’s and Kātyāyana’s word superseded Pāṇini’s, right from the time of Kaiyaṭa, who famously stated: *yathottaram hi munitrayasya prāmāṇyam*⁴³ ‘Among the three *munis*, the authority of later *muni* supersedes that of his predecessor(s)’.⁴⁴ Thus, Patañjali became the most important person in the tradition, surpassing Pāṇini himself, whose work he had set out to expound on. Subsequently, unlike Kātyāyana and Patañjali, who were willing to consider a wide variety of ideas and to occasionally disagree with Pāṇini himself, later scholars preferred to toe *Bhagavān* ‘Lord’ Patañjali’s line. This also kept them from developing new perspectives about Pāṇini’s *sūtras* without being unduly influenced by Patañjali’s writings. In effect, even though Patañjali wrote his commentary with a very open mind, without insisting of strict conventions, his ideas got codified into a systematic, established, and orthodox paradigm that came to be disproportionately respected and enthusiastically internalised by later scholars.

⁴³ Another popular version of this, also written by Kaiyaṭa is: *uttarottaram muninām prāmāṇyam*.

⁴⁴ See *Pradīpa* on *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.1.29.

6 Concluding Remarks

There is no evidence to support the idea that Pāṇini intended for or expected us to make interventions in the functioning of his grammar by adding new components or layers to it. Based on his style, one can only infer that he likely produced this grammar so that students of Sanskrit could better understand its structure and in order to present a unique theoretical framework of linguistic analysis. In fact, today's linguists have much to learn from Pāṇini's work.

But the tradition, starting with Kātyāyana, not only simplified Pāṇini's rules by rewording them and providing examples, but also added new ideas, opinions, tools, and metarules to Pāṇini's existing framework, often interfering with it in very significant ways. In other words, Kātyāyana, Patañjali etc. attempted to improve the grammar – to fix its supposed flaws and to foist on it their own understanding of it through their contributions.

It is hoped that this paper will provide a fillip to further investigation into what Pāṇini actual teaches, as opposed to what later scholars, especially Kātyāyana, the first to comment on his rules, would have us believe. The same can be done by treating Kātyāyana as an original author and Patañjali as an interpreter of his *vārttikas*. This will enable us to better understand not only how Pāṇini's grammar actually functions but also how the tradition has evolved intellectually over the centuries.

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Creating Tradition Through Interposition Exploring the Foundation of the *lakāra* in the *Tiṅanta* Section of the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī* and the *Prakriyākaumudī*

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Abstract As the progenitor of *Navya Vyākaraṇa*, the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī* by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita is known for its *prakriyā*-based approach to Pāṇinian grammar. However, the *Prakriyākaumudī* by Rāmacandra Śeṣa has already established a precedent for a creative presentation of *prakriyā*. The present study aims to assess the innovation, structural integrity, and cohesiveness of these texts using the initial four *sūtras* of the *tiṅanta* section which develop the concept of the *lakāra*. The commentaries by Viṭṭhala and Jñānendra Sarasvatī help to understand the progression of these concepts as the texts disseminated into the Sanskrit world.

Keywords Pāṇini. Aṣṭādhyāyī. *Navya Vyākaraṇa*. *Prakriyā*. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Rāmacandra Śeṣa. *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*. *Prakriyākaumudī*. Trimuni. Bhartṛhari. Contextualisation.

Summary 1 Introduction. – 1.1 Premise of the Study. – 2 Outline of the Study. – 2.1 The *Prakriyākaumudī*. – 2.2 The *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*. – 3 Conclusion.



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1 Introduction

The emergence of what is known as the Navya Vyākaraṇa school of Pāṇinian Sanskrit grammar was fuelled by the seventeenth-century CE text by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī* (SK). It utilises a thematic structure to organise the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (fifth century BCE) by rearranging the approximately 4,000 rules of Pāṇini into categories of grammatical processes such as the initial four sections on *sandhi*, the sections on the derivation of the *subanta* (those ending with the affixes *suP*),¹ the *kr̥danta* (those ending with the primary substitute affixes of the category *kr̥t*), the *samāsa* (compounds) etc. Historically, the SK has been considered a pioneer in the *prakriyā* method of grammar. However, the SK does not deserve exclusive credit for this creative structure. In a long line of what are known as *prakriyā* texts, the SK's structure offers only a standardisation, and nowhere is this more evident than when compared to its sixteenth-century predecessor, the *Prakriyākaumudī* by Rāmacandra Śeṣa (PK). The PK has a structure that is nearly identical to the SK as it utilises novel arrangements to order the rules in certain sections. The PK is frequently contradicted by the SK, especially in its commentaries, for improper usage of words. This categorical style rearrangement, however, functions within an ecosystem of hermeneutical ancillary texts which provide the supplementary material required to arguably reinforce the *śāstric*² value in understanding the rules of Pāṇini, albeit, out of their original textual sequence.³ These texts include works such as the *Dhātupāṭha* and the *Gaṇapāṭha*, the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa,⁴ the *Tattvabodhinī* of Jñānendra Sarasvatī, the *Bālamānoramā* of Hari Dikṣita, the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, the *Prauḍhamānoramā* of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita all claiming the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (MBh) as the ultimate authority for modern *vyākaraṇa* (Deshpande 2002). Over the centuries, various texts outside of the Pāṇinian tradition have also experimented with different techniques in attempting to reformulate Pāṇini's format into one that is more friendly to students. More

All translations of the Sanskrit text within this article are by the Author unless otherwise stated.

- ¹ The *anubandhas* (i.e. markers) are capitalised to distinguish the metalanguage from the language exclusively in the English translations and not in the Sanskrit citations.
- ² A rearrangement of the rules appears to be acceptable by Navya Vyākaraṇa as long as they are still Pāṇini's original rules.
- ³ These texts are also responsible for the development of the idea of the *trimuni* and the development of the historical authority of sages to determine the proper usage of grammar. For more on this see Deshpande 1985, 2005, and 2016.
- ⁴ More often than not, *paribhāṣās* from the *Vyāḍiparibhāṣāvṛtti* which have not been carried over by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his own work have also been referenced to explain phenomena.

importantly, a significant number of these scholars were considered to be outside the Pāṇinian tradition by those of the Navya Vyākaraṇa school due to their inclusion of colloquial grammatical examples or lack of deference to the *trimuni* system.⁵ The central idea in all these grammars was a re-interpretation of the rules given by Pāṇini to simplify Sanskrit grammar. For example, the *Haimaśabdānuśāsana* of Hemacandra Sūri utilised Pāṇini's style of *sūtra* organisation to derive words related to the Jaina canon. The textual study is conducted with the idea that the works will be taught in the exact sequence in which they are written due to the interconnected nature of the original text and with its commentary.

1.1 Premise of the Study

While the terms *prakriyā* and Navya Vyākaraṇa are used interchangeably today, historically, they have been somewhat separate where the term *prakriyā* referred to the derivation-oriented texts inspired by the *Kātantra* of Śārvarman from the ninth century. The *Kātantra* aimed to shorten the amount of effort required to form a word in the Pāṇinian system to make it more accessible to those who could not dedicate the extensive effort required to study Pāṇini's grammar in the traditional system. Thereafter, other scholars were similarly inspired to create a restructured version of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* using different methods of economisation within their grammar to aid in the process of linguistic derivations. Fruits of this effort to simplify the *śāstra* can be seen in texts such as the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* by Candragomin (fifth century CE) and the *Mugdhabodha* by Vopadeva (tenth century CE) which introduced new attempts at categorising the *prakriyā* of Sanskrit forms as an important part of their grammars. These texts also promoted Sanskrit education by making it relevant to contemporary Sanskrit, inspiring a revival in the form of the creation of new works more faithful to Pāṇini, such as the *Rūpavatāra* by Dharmakīrti (eleventh century CE), *Rūpamālā* by Vimalasarasvatī (fourteenth century CE) and the *Prakriyāsarvasva* by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (seventeenth century CE). Eventually, the SK brought the *prakriyā* method into the Pāṇinian school and standardised it by including all the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Since a significant portion of the SK's structure is similar to that of the PK, it suggests that the SK is most likely designed on the foundations of the PK and the earlier *prakriyā* texts of

⁵ Bali (1976, 24-6) states that the *Kātantra* system "deviated" from the traditional system of *utsarga* and *apavāda* in organising its *sūtras* and, in the following passages, repeatedly poses *Kātantra*, *Cāndra*, *Haima*, and *Mugdhabodha* in juxtaposition to the "prakriyā-works of the Pāṇinian school". Accordingly, the "prakriyā method" became the "prakriyā school" of grammarians who adhered to Pāṇini's rules and techniques.

Dharmakīrti and Vimalasarasvati. Whatever the case, the aim of the current study is a modest contribution to assess the primary goal of the SK by asking the question: is the SK a pedagogical text, as it is used today, or a commentarial text?

2 Outline of the Study

A comparative approach to analysis promises to offer an optimal understanding of the aim of the text in its proper context (Ganeri 2008, 553-4). Therefore, this study focuses on exploring the foundation of the *lakāra* as presented within the initial *sūtras* of the *tiñanta* section of the PK and the SK.⁶ Considering the structure of the texts, a few standard observations are necessary:

- there are two sequences of *sūtras* to remember, one from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and another from the *prakriyā* text.
- The *prakriyā* has been fragmented for gradual comprehension of the content.
- The connection between relevant rules relies on the instruction of the teacher.

Due to the break it creates in the interconnected understanding of the rules, these factors speak to the nature of the transmission and its subsequent effect on the holistic comprehension of Pāṇini's grammar and its mechanisms. To explore a dimension of this issue, the current study is limited to five rules read with the following three points of discussion:

1. innovation of the text in terms of its structure/content;
2. structural integrity according to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*;
3. the overall cohesiveness of the content in the two texts in terms of *prakriyā*.

Due to differences in the approach of the PK and the SK, the two sequences (given below) do not match with each other and, thus, present a slightly different view of *prakriyā*. The PK and the SK both explain Pāṇini's rules but the former aims to teach while the latter functions more as an assertion of grammatical principles on *prakriyā* despite the fact that it has been implemented as a pedagogical text in more recent times.

The rules in question comprise of the following five rules of the *tiñanta* section in the two texts:

⁶ The subject matter relates to my ongoing doctoral thesis where I am exploring the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*'s *tiñanta* section to understand Navya Vyākaraṇa's claims of staying true to the Pāṇinian idea of grammar.

- *dhātoḥ* (A 3.1.91);
- *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cā karmakebhyaḥ* (A 3.4.69);
- *vartamāne laḥ* (A 3.2.123);
- *lasya* (A 3.4.77);
- *tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mip-vas-mas ta-ātām-jha-thās-āthām-dhvam-
iḍ-vahi-mahiṅ* (A 3.4.78).

The difference in the sequence of the rules between the two texts heavily contributes to the tone that they set for the introduction of the derivational process of the verbal section. The *prakriyā* school, in general, promotes a slightly different sense of grammar than what can be understood by reading the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* itself, and, as such, has several shortcomings inherent in its sequence. Disregarding this for the moment, the tone of the two texts differs from each other as well despite both proclaiming to be part of *prakriyā*. To understand this sense, I have attempted a brief analysis of the rules in question by also taking in consideration the commentaries *Prasāda* of Viṭṭhala and *Tattvabodhinī* of Jñānendra Sarasvatī. The sequence of the presentation will follow the rule number in each text and is divided into two sections: the explanation with derivational examples and then the analysis.

2.1 The *Prakriyākaumudī*

The text of the PK begins with a verse establishing the premise of *prakriyā* as given by Rāmacandra Śeṣa:

*prakṛtiḥ sā jayaty ādyā yayā dhātvdīrūpayā |
vyajyante śabdārūpāni parapatryayasamnidheḥ ||
(Trivedi 1931, 2)⁷*

prakṛti is that which comes first, through whose form, such as a verbal base, the linguistic forms are derived due to proximity to the following affix.

The *Prasāda* commentary of Viṭṭhala clarifies that the verbal roots *bhū* etc. are to be considered the *prakṛti* while the affix is the one that holds the meaning of the final verbal form – “*kasmāt parapatryayasamnidheḥ | paraś cāsau pratyayas ca parapatryayaḥ pratyate'rtho'smād iti pratyayas tibādis tasya samnidhis tasmāt*”

⁷ The *sūtras* taken from the *Prakriyākaumudī* do not contain the sequence numbers of the rules according to the text but only the numbers of the *sūtras* according to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Therefore, the relevant page number of the text is provided as the point of reference.

(PK 1931, 2).⁸ The commentary continues with a more philosophical discussion on the interpretations of *prakṛti* according to the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vedānta schools. From a more *prakriyā*-related perspective, the *adhikāra* of the rule A 3.1.22 *dhātor ekāco halādeḥ kriyāsamabhihāre yañ* is acknowledged before the one presented by the following rule. However, the *Prasāda* clarifies that the rule will be explained in the section related to the affix *yañ*.

2.1.1.1 PK 1: *dhātoḥ* (A 3.1.91)

*ā trṭiyādhyāyāntam vaksyamāṇāḥ pratyayā dhātor jñeyāḥ.
teṣv ādau daśa lakārah pradarśyante. laṭ. liṭ. luṭ. lṛṭ. leṭ. loṭ. lañ. liñ.
luñ. lṛñ.* (Trivedi, Trivedi 1931, 4-5)

Affixes which are mentioned until the end of the third *adhyāya* [of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*] should be known [to apply] after a verbal base. Among these [affixes], first, the ten l-forms are presented: *laṬ. liṬ. luṬ. lṛṬ. leṬ. loṬ. laÑ. liÑ. luÑ. lṛÑ*.

Using simple language, the PK states a clear scope of its application. Naturally there is a discrepancy created by the re-arrangement of the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. This is further heightened by the *vṛtti*'s reference to the placement of this rule within the structure of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as one encompassing all affixes until the end of the third *adhyāya*. However, the premise presented by the PK partially justifies the restructuring within the framework of *prakriyā* as A 3.1.91 states that an affix is applied after a verbal base (*dhātoḥ*),⁹ creating the structure *dhātu + affix*. An interesting feature of the PK is that it introduces small notes as transitions into *prakriyā* such as the one available after the *vṛtti* of this rule which introduces the ten *lakāras* as the primary affixes to be used after a verbal base - 'Among these (affixes), first, the ten l-forms are presented' - forming *dhātu + [laṬ etc.]* as the preliminary derivational structure of a verbal form. The *lakāras* are introduced in the sequence of the vowels as they are introduced within the Māheśvara Sūtra, first with those marked with a Ṭ and then with those marked with a Ñ.¹⁰

⁸ 'Why due to the presence of the following affix (*parapratyaya-*)? *parapratyaya-* is that which is an affix and at the same time subsequent (i.e. this is a karmadhāraya compound). It is said that the meaning is understood from this, i.e. the affix is *tiP* etc.; the proximity is of this; it is due to the proximity of this'.

⁹ The term *dhātvādi* in the initial verse of the PK acknowledges the use of a verbal root also for the formation of word forms such as the *kṛdanta* where the final word may not be designated as a verbal form.

¹⁰ In the body of the text, however, the *lakāras* are introduced in a slightly modified sequence to the one presented - *laṬ, liṆ, loṬ, laÑ, luN, liṬ, luṬ, liN, lṛṬ, lṛN* - displaying

The *Prasāda* presents a comment on the relevance of the *adhikāra* *sūtra* in the context of *prakriyā* against the rule A 3.1.91:

‘dhātoḥ’ ity ārabhya ā tṛtīyādhyāyaparīsamāpti ity arthaḥ. dhātavo nāma kriyāvācino bhvādayaḥ. te ca dvividhāḥ sakarmakā akarmakāś ceti. (Trivedi, Trivedi 1931, 4)

It [the *adhikāra* rule A 3.1.91] is understood to begin with *dhātoḥ* [A 3.1.91] [and continue] until the end of the third *adhyāya*. Verbal bases are those [verbal roots beginning with] *bhū* etc. which denote an action. They are of two types, *sakarmaka* and *akarmaka* [loosely translated as ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’].

The beginning of the *adhikāra* is clearly stated as the rule A 3.1.91 *dhātoḥ* continuing until the end of the third *adhyāya* along with a basic definition of a verb (*dhātavo nāma kriyāvācinaḥ*). Naming the transitive and intransitive as two different characteristics of a verbal base, the commentary also presents a basic overview with examples of each category of verbs in clear, concise language. Viṭṭhala describes at least three different types of transitive and intransitive verb forms (Trivedi, Trivedi 1931, 4):

1a. *tatra karmasāpekṣām kriyām āhus te sakarmakāḥ.*

Where they say that the action requires an object, these are transitive (verbs).

- *yathā kaṭam karotītyādayaḥ*

Such as, *kaṭam karoti*

(‘he makes a mat’) etc.

2a. *athavā ye karmakarṭṛgatam vyāpāradvayam ācakṣate te sakarmakāḥ*

Otherwise, those (verbs) whose double function can refer to both the object and the agent are called transitive.

- *yathā pacaty ādayaḥ. yathā odanāḍigatam vikledādi karṭṛgatam adhiśrayaṇādi.*

For instance, when *pacati* is said, the action of getting wet refers to rice etc. and the action of putting (the rice in the pot) on the fire etc. refers to the agent.

1b. *akarmakāḥ punar ye karmanirapekṣām kriyām āhus...*

Moreover, intransitive are those whose action does not require an object.

- ...*āste śete tiṣṭhatītyādayaḥ.*

Such as *āste, śete, tiṣṭhati* (‘he sits/lies down/stands’)

2b. *ye tu karṭṛgatam eva te akarmakāḥ.*

Those [whose function] can only refer to the agent are intransitive.

- *yathāste śete ity ādayaḥ.*

Such as *aste* (he sits), *śete* (he lies down) etc.

a greater inconsistency than the one found in the SK.

3a. *athavā kriyārtho dhātuḥ sakarmakaḥ.*
Otherwise, a verbal base whose sense is an action is (designated as) transitive.
- *tatra sapariśpandasādhanasādhyā kriyā.*
Therein, that action which has to be accomplished by means of the accomplishment of a movement is (designated as) a *kriyā*.

3b. *bhāvārtho dhātur akarmakaḥ*
A verbal base whose sense is an eventuality is (designated as) intransitive.
- *aparīśpandasādhanasādhyo bhāvāḥ.*
That which does not have to be accomplished by means of the accomplishment of a movement is (designated as) a *bhāva*.

Despite these statements, the *Prasāda* clarifies that the transitive and the intransitive usages may overlap depending on the meaning that is to be conveyed in a given sentence, such as in the example *bhāraṃ vahati* which expresses the meaning of carrying something heavy despite not having an object stated and *nadī vahati* which expresses the flowing of a river. The *Prasāda* also elaborates on the role of the verbal root in containing the meaning of the object. This is substantiated with a verse from the *Vākyapadīya* to authorise the claim for instances where the difference in meaning versus usage allows the transitive and intransitive to apply outside of the bounds of its conventional uses that have been understood according to the present rule.¹¹

Following this description regarding the role of the rule A 3.1.91 *dhātoḥ*, the text of the PK continues with the *ṛtti* introducing the ten *lakāras* that are to be introduced after a verbal base. The *Prasāda* reiterates this organisation of *lakāras* and presents a transition to the next *sūtra* where the role of the transitive and the intransitive verbal bases will be explained with respect to the *lakāras*.

2.1.2 PK 2: *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cā karmakebhyaḥ* (A 3.4.69)

lakārāḥ sakarmakād dhātoḥ karmaṇi kartari cākarmakād bhāve kartari ca syuḥ.
'*pratyayaḥ*' '*paraś ca*' *ity anuvartate*

l-forms should apply to transitive verbal bases [A 3.1.91] when an agent [*kartṛ*] or a patient [*karman*] is signified and to intransitive verbal bases when an agent or the mere action is signified. The rules *pratyayaḥ* [A 3.1.1] and *paraś ca* [A 3.1.2] are carried over [to the next rule].

In this rule, the *ṛtti* of the PK clearly exhibits the role of the *lakāras* in conjunction with the verbal base that has been presented. Furthermore, the PK draws connections to the *anuvṛtti* of the rules A 3.1.1-3

¹¹ *dhātor arthāntare ṛtter dhātvarthenopasaṅgrahāt | prasiddher avivakṣātaḥ karmaṇokarmikā kriyā || 3.7.88 || (Rau 1977, 139).*

from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* which, in addition to providing a smooth connection to the following rule A 3.2.123, are also instrumental in deciding the position of the affixes with respect to the verbal bases. Mentioning these rules also reinforces the connection of the text to the sequence of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The *Prasāda* echoes the PK's structure and explains the *anuvṛtti* of A 3.4.67 to this rule as the inclusion of the *kṛt* affixes within the *tiñ* processes.

lakārā dvividhāḥ tiñbhāvino 'tiñbhāvinaś ca. tatra tiñbhāvinām kṛtsamjñāniṣedhāt 'kartari kṛt' ity asyānupasthānāt svārthe vidhiḥ syāt. atinbhāvinām tu 'kartari kṛt' iti kartary eva syād iti vacanam ārabhyate. "lakārāḥ". laḍādayo daśa karmaṇi kartur īpsitatame kartari kriyāyām svatantra bhāve dhātvarthe. (Trivedi, Trivedi 1931, 6)

l-form affixes are twofold, those intended to occur as *tiñ* and those which are not intended to occur as *tiñ*. Therein, due to the exclusion of the designation of *kṛt* for those which are intended to occur as *tiñ*, because of the absence of this, namely [the rule A 3.4.67] *kartari kṛt*, there should be an injunction in their own meaning [of *tiñ*]. On the other hand, the teaching that the affix which is not *tiñ* should only be used in the sense of the agent according to *kartari kṛt* is undertaken. "*lakārāḥ*". The [ten *lakāras*] *laṭ* etc. in the sense of the most desired object of an agent [*kartṛ*], in the sense of an agent, in the sense of an action, in the sense of an independent eventuality conveying the sense of the verbal base.

With the two types of *dhātu* having been introduced by the PK, the *Prasāda* introduces the two types of *lakāras* - *tiñ* and *atiñ*. Viṭṭhala also hints at the difference between the two by stating that A 3.4.67 does not appear in the *anuvṛtti* of the present rule and, thus, has no utility in *tiñ* processes. Furthermore, it can also be understood that the non-*tiñ* are only used in the *kartari* sense.

2.1.3 PK 3: *vartamāne laṭ* (A 3.2.123)

ārabdhāparisamāptakriyopalakṣite kale vācye dhātor laṭ pratyayaḥ syāt. aṭāv itau. ādeśavidhānasāmarthyān na lasyetsamjñā.

After a verbal base, the l-form affix *laṭ* should be introduced when the period of time to be expressed refers to an action which has begun but not finished.

a and *Ṭ* are markers. The *l* [of *laṭ*] does not obtain designation as a marker as it is entitled to take an affix by substitution.

The PK clearly defines the scope of the *vartamāna* in the *vṛtti* itself. As part of a detail for derivation, Rāmacandra has also specified that the *l* of the *l*-form affix would not obtain the designation of a marker since it is required for the purpose of substitution (i.e. the *tiP* etc. *l*-substitutes). The corresponding *Prasāda* commentary describes the scope of actions when they are expressed in the *vartamāna* within the confines of this rule:

atheha kumārāḥ krīḍantīti pravṛttasya virāme tiṣṭhanti parvatā itinyapravṛtteḥ ca katham laṭ vartamānatvābhāvāt.
(Trivedi, Trivedi 1931, 6)

However, how is [the introduction of] *laṭ* warranted in the case of a break of continuity in [the example] *kumārāḥ krīḍanti* [‘the young boys play’] and in the case of a permanent continuity in [the example] *tiṣṭhanti parvatāḥ* [‘the mountains stand’] as there is an absence of the characteristic of the present tense [mentioned before]?

Here, the commentary uses two examples, *kumārāḥ krīḍanti* (‘the young boys play’) and *tiṣṭhanti parvatāḥ* (‘the mountains stand’) to discuss the dimensions of the present tense as one of an ongoing action. The prospective end of the children playing is contrasted with the constant existence of the mountains (i.e. without an end or beginning) to argue that an action unable to be carried forward cannot be constituted within the present tense. The actions are meant to represent a paradigm of continuity which is an important part of the present tense according to the *vṛtti*. The argument presented by the *Prasāda* here is based on the verse 3.80 by Bhartṛhari¹² stating that, because mountains are stable fixtures on a landmark and are in a state of natural permanence (unless an external force disturbs that state), their state (i.e. *tiṣṭhanti*) is also described in the present tense in this case because they are viewed relative to the action of the young boys playing. Moreover, the act of playing can be interrupted by the children as they take breaks, but those acts would still be considered a part of their ongoing activity of playing – *antarālakriyās tu nāntariyakatvād avyavadhāyikās tadavayavabhūtā vā* – which is, again, a rephrasing of the verses 3.9.82-83 from the *Vākyapadīya*.¹³ The *vṛtti* specifies the *l* of *laṭ* is excluded as a marker for the pur-

¹² *parato bhidyate sarvam ātmā tu na *vikalpate | parvatādīsthitī tasmīn pararūpeṇa bhidyate || 3.9.80 ||* (Rau 1977, 162). Note on translation: Rau has used the word *vikalpyate* in his edition but mentions *vikapate* as an alternate usage found in some manuscripts and is the one used by the *Prasāda*.

¹³ *vyavadhānam ivopaitī *vicchinna iva dṛśyate | kriyāsamūho bhajyādir antarālapravṛttibhiḥ || na ca vicchinnaṅrūpo ‘pi so ‘virāmān nivartate | sarvaiva hī kriyānyena samkīrṇevopalabhyate || *tadantarāle dṛṣṭā vā sarvaivāvayavakriyā || 3.9.*

pose of subsequent substitutions to the l-form in *prakriyā* while also mentioning the derivational advantages of the markers *Ṭ* for rule A 3.4.79 *ṭita ātmanepadānām ṭere*¹⁴ and the significance of the *a* for A 3.4.83 *vido liṭo vā*.¹⁵

2.1.4 PK 4: *lasya* (A 3.4.77)

ity adhikṛtya.

The PK does not explain this *adhikāra* and neither does the *Prasāda* comment upon this *sūtra*, which minimises its importance in *prakriyā*. There has been a pattern in the later *prakriyā* texts, such as the *Kaumudī*s written after Dikṣita, of omitting the *adhikāra sūtras* from the main body of the text which indicates a growing simplification of the mechanism of grammar created by Pāṇini. This could be another example of such an instance.¹⁶

2.2 The *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*

Compared to the more philosophical verse that begins the *tiṅanta* section in the PK, the SK starts with a more traditional *maṅgalācaraṇa* verse¹⁷ praising the glory of the Vedas and the seers and begins the grammar with a presentation of the ten *lakāras*:

tatrādau daśa lakārāḥ pradarśyante. laṭ. liṭ. luṭ. lṛṭ. leṭ. loṭ. lañ. liñ. luñ. lṛñ. eṣu pañcamo lakāraś chandomātragocarah.

Here, we first present the ten *lakāras*: *laṭ. liṭ. luṭ. lṛṭ. leṭ. loṭ. lañ. liñ. luñ. lṛñ*. Of these, the fifth *lakāra* is only available in the Vedas.

82-83.5 || (Rau 1977, 163). Note on translation: similar to the previous note, Rau uses *nivṛtta*, *tadantarāla*, respectively for those marked with an asterisk.

¹⁴ The *ātmanepada* l-form affixes marked with a *Ṭ* obtain zero-replacement to the syllable with the final in a group of vowels (A 1.1.64).

¹⁵ The *parasmaipada* l-substitute affixes *ṇal*, *atus*, *us*, *thal*, *athus*, *a*, *ṇal*, *va*, and *ma* (A 3.4.82) of *liṭ* are optionally used for *laṭ* after the verbal base of *vid*.

¹⁶ An observation made by Valentina Ferrero and conveyed personally.

¹⁷ “1. The All-pervading is supremely glorious and though without attributes is constantly being praised, day by day, by the Great Seers, illustrious with the attributes of Vaidic Studentship and Worthiness, and who possess all praiseworthy qualities. 2. In the First Half have been treated the affixes which occur in the Fourth and the Fifth Adhyāyas of Pāṇini. Now are being taught the affixes that occur in the third Adhyāya” (Vasu 1906, 1).

This approach might be in keeping with the idea that the *pratyaya* is taught first by Pāṇini in the third *adhyāya* and, correspondingly, should be presented first in a text that deals primarily with the *prakriyā* aspect of the A. The *leṬ* is immediately relegated to the Vedic section and removed from consideration as part of any *prakriyā* dealing with the 'normal' *lakāra*.

2.2.1 SK 1: *vartamāne laṬ* (A 3.1.123)

vartamānakriyāvṛtter dhātor laṬ syāt. aṭāv itau.

The affix *laṬ* should be introduced after a verbal base [A 3.1.91] whose characteristic is an action performed in the present tense. *a* and *Ṭ* are designated as markers.

The SK presents the affix *laṬ* in its role as the placeholder for substitute affixes which express actions occurring in the present tense. The l-form *laṬ* then obtains the designation of *it* for its markers *a* and *Ṭ* using A 1.3.2-3.¹⁸ The extremely short *vṛtti* provides basic details relevant to derivation while the interpretative aspects are provided by the *Tattvabodhinī*:

*vartamāna ity etat prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam ity āha -
vartamānakriyāvṛtter dhātor iti. dhātor iti sūtram āṭṛṭiyādhyāyāntam
adhikriyata iti bhāvaḥ. - laṬ syād iti. tasya vācyatvam anupadam eva
sphuṭībhaviṣyati. vartamānakālas tu tadvācyah kim tu dyotyah eva.
lañādiṣv api bhūtādikālo yathāyatham dyotyā evety avagantavyam.
vastutas tu vācyatvābhyupagamo' pi sugama iti vidhyādisūtre
vakṣyāmaḥ. - aṭāvitāviti. akāra uccāraṇārtha iti tu noktam,
liḍādivailakṣṇyasampādanāt tasyāvāśyavaktavyatvāt. (Panshikar
2002, 332)*

[The *ācārya*] maintained that the word *vartamāna* qualifies the meaning of the *prakṛti* [i.e. verbal base] - *vartamānakriyāvṛtter dhātor iti*. It is to be understood that the aphorism *dhātoḥ* [A 3.1.91] is placed as the heading and extends until the end of the third *adhyāya* - *laṬ syād iti*. Its statement will only become evident step by step. However, the present tense expresses this, but it is only suggested. Besides, in the *laṆ* etc. [l-forms] the past tense has to be gradually understood as only suggested.

¹⁸ A 1.3.2 *upadeśe 'janunāsika it*, A 1.3.3 *halantyam*.

The commentary attempts to create a verb + affix setup to compensate for the SK's focus on the affix - *vartamāna ity etat prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam ity āha* - whereas the PK states it outright. Unlike the PK, the scope of the term *vartamāna* has not been defined but the indication of its relationship with *prakṛti* does furnish the meaning of the present tense to the verbal base. As a response to the use of the word *dhātu* in the *vṛtti*, the *Tattvabodhinī* presents its relevance to the *adhikāra* of rule A 3.1.91 spanning the remainder of the third *adhyāya*. It also ascribes the true scope of a verbal base as that conveyed by the subsequent affix *laṭ* - *tasya vācyaṭvam anupadam eva sphuṭībhaviṣyati*. A brief explanation of the present tense being a *dyotyā*, i.e. 'to be expressed, implicitly conveyed' and not *vācya* i.e. 'expressing a sense' presents the development of a meaning from the combination of verbal base + affix. The commentary notes that more examples supporting this idea will be provided in the *vidhi* etc. rules (i.e. A 3.3.161) presenting the context within which each *lakāra* is used. The *anuvṛtti* of the rule *dhātoḥ* is provided in the commentary with the note that its meaning is expressed by the term which follows it, making the *pratyaya* central to the derivational process. Another interesting fact is that the *anunāsika* in *laṭ* (A 1.3.2) is not commented upon which suggests that the intricacies of the *svara* do not hold much importance for the SK.¹⁹

2.2.2 SK 2: *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ* (A 3.4.69)

lakārāḥ sakarmakebhyaḥ karmaṇi kartari ca syur akarmakebhyo bhāve kartari ca.

l-forms should apply after transitive verbal bases [A 3.1.91] when an agent [*kartṛ*] or a patient [*karman*] has to be signified and after intransitive verbal bases when an agent or the mere action has to be signified.

The sequence of this rule is the same between the two texts but the approach to explanation is vastly different. The SK presents a very brief *vṛtti* which the *Tattvabodhinī* expands upon with the relevance of this rule with A 3.4.67 and 3.4.70. The commentary begins with the *anuvṛtti* of A 3.4.67 *kartari kṛt*:

¹⁹ This applies generally to the so-called 'regular' *prakriyā* as there are other rules where the *svara* has been mentioned by the SK later on in the *bhavadī* section but only when it is explicitly stated as part of a *sūtra*.

cakārāt 'kartari kṛt' ityataḥ kartarītyanukṛṣyate, sakarmakaviṣayam cedam. akarmakeṣu karmanīty amśasya bādhitvāt, bhāve cety uttaravākyena tatra viśeṣavidhānāc ca tad etad āha - sakarmakebhyaḥ iti - bhāve ceti. cakāreṇa kartaivānukṛṣyate na tu karma, asaṁbhavāt tadāha. - bhāve kartari ceti. (Panshikar 2002, 332)

'kartari' is drawn over from [the rule A 3.4.67] *kartari kṛt* by the use of *ca* and this [use] is intended as a characteristic of transitive verbs. In this manner, in the case of intransitive verbs and by the cancellation of the portion '*karmani*', he said this is valid because of the specific teaching of the following utterance '*bhāve ca*'. By the [use of] *ca* only the agent is drawn over, not the object, due to its impossibility. He said this. - *bhāve kartari ceti*.

As the *sūtra* leaves an understanding of the *sakarmaka* to the explicit mention of the *akarmaka*, the commentary presents a short explanation to understand this mechanism of exclusion to ensure that the scope of the transitive is also understood according to the rule. One aspect of the argument also relates to questions regarding the relevance of this rule - *nanu bhāvakarmanor ātmanepadavidhānāt 'śeṣāt kartari-' iti parasmaipadavidhānāc ca jñāpakāl lakāraṇām bhāvakarmakartāro 'rthā anumātum śakyanta iti kim anena sūtreṇa 'However, due to the teaching of the ātmandepada ending in the bhāva and karman and due to the teaching of the parasmaipada endings according to the rule śeṣāt kartari- (A 1.3.78) the meanings of bhāva, karman, and karṭṛ can be inferred through because of a clue, therefore, what is the purpose of this rule?' Answering this, the argument states that otherwise affixes such as *GHaÑ* etc. would become applicable to 1-forms attaching to transitive verbs in examples such as *ghaṭam kriyate devadattena*, where the transitive action of forming a pot would be inaccurately expressed by the affix *GHaÑ* instead of the accusative. The affix *GHaÑ* is only introduced in the *bhāva* (A 3.3.18), which is applicable only for the intransitive verbs according to A 3.4.69. A significant portion of the argument is taken from the MBh on this rule.²⁰ The main idea here is that the rules A 1.3.13 and A 1.3.78 designate the verbal forms to be used in the *ātmanepada* and the *parasmaipada* while A 3.4.67 and A 3.4.69 relate to the *lakāras*. Depending on a specification of the *lakāras* is a more desirable option since it has a wider scope of application to verbal forms rather than an attempt to directly introduce specific verbal endings. The proposed argument is also a more indirect approach to designating the *bhāva*, *karman*, and *karṭṛ* because after rejecting three possible re-formulations of this rule - 1) *akarmakebhyaḥ bhāve laḥ*, 2) *bhāve**

20 Mbh ad A 3.4.69, ll. 5-12 (Kielhorn 1965, 179-80).

cā karmakebhyaḥ, and 3) *laś ca bhāve cā karmakebhyaḥ* – the current form is accepted for the purpose of A 3.4.70 *tayor eva kṛtya-ktakhalarthāḥ*²¹ which also requires the *anuvṛtti* of *bhāve* and *karmaṇi*.

A major part of the residual commentary²² focuses on explicating the opinion of the grammarians against that of the Naiyāyikas regarding the function of the *lakāra* in understanding the meaning of the verb form. Ultimately, the idea of the verbal base + affix together creating the meaning of the word is highlighted as the most desirable and the meaning is not dependent exclusively on the affix. Considering the meanings that were introduced by the *Prasāda* in A 3.1.91, the *Tattvabodhinī* appears to refute them because they are not found in the MBh and, therefore, not acceptable to Patañjali. A variety of arguments considering the role of the *kartṛ*, *karman*, and *bhāva* in various rules are presented with the commentators Kaiyaṭa and Haradatta being accepted as reliable authorities on the resolution of any particular argument.

2.2.3 SK 3: *lasya* (A 3.4.77)

adhikāro 'yam.

'This is an *adhikāra* (rule)'.

varṇagrahane pratyayagrahaṇaparibhāṣā, arthavad grahaṇaparibhāṣā ca na pravartate iti lunāti, cūḍāla, ity ādau tibādy ādeśaḥ kuto na bhavatīti cet. atrāhuḥ. 'laḥ karmaṇi' iti sūtre nirdiṣṭānām kartrādyarthānām anuvṛtteḥ kartrādyarthe vihitasya lakārasya grahaṇam iti... yad vā dhātor ity adhikārād dhātor vihitasyaiva lasy eha grahaṇam iti noktātiprasaṅgaḥ. lasy etsañjñā tu na bhavati, phalābhāvāt. na ca litsvaraḥ phalam, ṇalo littvena tadabhāvasya jñāpanāt... (Panshikar 2002, 334)

'If the *paribhāṣā* '*varṇagrahane pratyayagrahaṇa-*' and the *paribhāṣā* '*arthavad grahaṇa-*' are not applicable then why is the substitution of *tiP* etc. affixes [in examples such as] *lunāti*²³ ['he cuts'], *cūḍāla*²⁴

21 A 3.4.70 *tayor eva kṛtyaktakhalarthāḥ* 'The affixes *kṛtya* and *кта* apply after a verbal base in the meanings of the affix *KHaL* (A 3.3.126) when it signifies those two (*bhāve* and *karmaṇi*) senses'.

22 The commentary for this rule spans two pages in the SK so only a few small portions have been reproduced here for the sake of brevity.

23 The *parasmaipada* present tense third person singular form for *lūṅ chedane* (DP 9.16) + *Śnā* + *tiP*. The *l* belongs to the verbal base here and, thus, does not obtain substitution with *tiṅ* affixes.

24 Masculine/neuter singular vocative of *cūḍāla* applies the affix *laC* and, so, also does not obtain substitution with *tiṅ* affixes.

[‘he who carries the wick’] not possible? They said. The *karṭṛ* etc. meanings taught in the rule *laḥ karmaṇi* from *anuvṛtti* obtains employment of an *l*-form supplied in the *karṭṛ* etc. meanings... Alternatively, there is only the introduction of a *lakāra* introduced after a verbal base taught in the domain of the rule *dhātoḥ* [A 3.1.91], in this way there is no automatic extra-extension. And there is no designation of *l* as a marker due to its futility [*phalābhāvāt*]. Nor is the purpose the accent of the marker *L*, as can be understood by the absence of it for *ṆaL* embodied by the marker *L*...’

In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, this rule governs the section for *l*-substitutes and, in conjunction with A 3.4.78 *tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mip-vas-mas ta-ātām-jha-thās-āthām-dhvam-iṭ-vahi-mahiṇ* presents the rules that are the foundational substitutes for the *lakāra* affixes. In contrast, the SK only states that this *sūtra* is an *adhikāra*. The *Tattvabodhinī* presents a small commentary on the significance of the substitution of *l* with the *tiP* etc. affixes to understand the implications of the single *l* that is leftover from the *lakāras* in *prakriyā*. The commentary also refutes the applicability of the *paribhāṣās varṇagrahaṇe pratyayagrahaṇa* (Nāgeśa Pbh 21)²⁵ and *arthavad grahaṇe* (Nāgeśa Pbh 14)²⁶ in carrying over the properties of a single phoneme of an affix to its substitute through *sthānivadbhāva*. The application of the *tiP* affixes in the meaning of the *karṭṛ*, *karman*, and *bhāva* is dependent upon *sūtras* which declare their affiliation with one of the three categories, such as A 3.1.68 *kartari śap* or A 3.3.18 *bhāve*.²⁷ Finally, the *Tattvabodhinī* declares that the *l* leftover after the zero-replacement of markers is not to be eliminated itself as it would make its existence futile. The commentary incorrectly equates the *l* with a marker *L* to help endorse its lack of accent with the absence of one in the affix *ṆaL*.²⁸

²⁵ A *paribhāṣā* with these exact words is unavailable in both the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* of Nāgeśa and the *Vyāḍiparibhāṣāvṛtti*, but the closest approximation that fits the meaning is *paribhāṣā* 21 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara - varṇāśraye nāsti pratyayalakṣaṇam* “(An operation) which is caused by an affix, does (in case the latter should disappear) not take place, if it depends on the letter or letters (of the affix and not on the affix as such)” (transl. Kielhorn, Abhyankar 1960, 111).

²⁶ “(A combination of letters capable of) expressing a meaning (denotes), whenever it is employed (in grammar, that combination of letters in so far as it possesses that meaning, but it) does not denote (the same combination of letters) void of a meaning” (transl. Kielhorn, Abhyankar 1960, 81-2).

²⁷ Of course, this point has a philosophical aspect dealing with the intention of the speaker but that has not been referred to by the sources in this section and, therefore, will not be included in the present analysis.

²⁸ On the other hand, this does indicate that the *Tattvabodhinī* does not believe the rule A 3.1.3-4 applies to a *lakāra*.

2.2.4 SK 4: *tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mip-vas-mas ta-ātām-jha-thās-āthām-dhvam-iṭ-vahi-mahiñ* (A 3.4.78)

ete 'ṣṭādaśa lādeśāḥ syuḥ.

'These eighteen [affixes]²⁹ should be substitutes of l-forms [A 3.4.77].'³⁰

samāhāre dvandvaḥ. iṭṣaṣṭakāra āgamaliṅgam na bhavati saptadaśabhir ādeśaiḥ samabhivyāhārāt. kiṃ tu 'ito 't' iti viśeṣaṅārthaḥ. er ad ity ucyamāne edhevahi edhemahity atrāpi syāt, varṇagrahaṇe pratyaya grahaṅārthavadgrahaṇaparibhāṣayor apravṛtteḥ. kecit tu 'iṭo 't' ity atra liñ ity anuvartanāl liñādeśasyevarṇasy eti samānādhikaraṅyena vyākhyāne edhevahi edhemahity ādāv atiprasaṅgo nāsty eva. na hi tatra ikāramātram ādeśo bhavati. tena 'iṭo 't' ity atra ṣṭakāraḥ spaṣṭapratipattyartha evety āhuḥ...mahiño nākāras tañ tiñ iti pratyāhārārthaḥ, sa ca samudāyānubandho na tv avayavānubandho vyākhyānāt. (Panshikar 2002, 334)

'[This rule uses a] *dvandva* in the sense of a *samāhāra* ['gathering/grouping']. The Ṭ of [the 1st p. sing. *ātmanepada* affix] *iṭ* is not an indication of an augment [i.e. by the rule A 1.1.146] but comes from mentioning together the seventeen [*tiñ*] substitutes. Furthermore, has the purpose of specifying *iṭo 't* [A 3.4.106]. When saying the substitution of *a* in the place of *i* [A 3.4.106], this [substitution] should also happen in the verbal forms *edhevahi* ['may you two prosper'] *edhemahi* ['may we prosper'] due to the inapplicability of the *paribhāṣā* of *varṇagrahaṇe pratyayagrahaṇam* [Nāgeśa Pbh 21] and the *paribhāṣā arthavad grahaṇa* [Nāgeśa Pbh 14].³¹ Some, however, maintain that by the *anuvṛtti* of *liñ* in the rule *iṭo 't*, the l-substitute of *liñ i* does not have an automatic extra-extension at all by co-occurrence in the exposition of *edhevahi*, *edhemahi* etc. Indeed, here only *i* becomes a substitute. It is said only for a clear understanding of the ṭ of the rule *iṭo 't*... the *ñ* of *mahiñ* is for [the formation] of the *pratyāhāra* [*tiñ* or *tañ*], therefore it is the marker of a group but not a marker of a component due to the exposition [of the affixes].

The SK only provides the basic definition of the rule in the *vṛtti* but the *Tattvabodhini* branches out into an analysis of the first person singular *ātmanepada* affix *iṭ* according to the rule A 3.4.106.³²

²⁹ *pratyayaḥ* A 3.1.1

³⁰ *lasya* A 3.4.77

³¹ See footnotes 25-6 for the meaning of the *paribhāṣās*.

³² Correspondingly, since the subject of this rule has been addressed here in A 3.4.78, the commentary for A 3.4.106 itself does not say much.

The marker \dot{N} is clarified as being used to create the *pratyāhāra* designation of $ta\dot{N}$ and $ti\dot{N}$ rather than influencing the process of *gaṇa* for examples such as *iṣeḥ* and *eṣiṣimahi*. Similarly, words such as *vṛṣcateḥ*, *prṣcateḥ*, *vavraścimahe*, and *papracchimahe* do not obtain *samprasāraṇa* through the rule A 6.1.16 either. There is definitely a variety of forms used, albeit with a degree of complexity that the SK does not prepare the student for. For example, the word form *eṣiṣimahi* is the *karman* form of the verbal root *iṣa* of the *kryādi gaṇa* in the *ātmanepada* augmented by $\dot{a}\dot{N}$ and using the *ṆiC* form of the benedictive mood ($\dot{a}\dot{N}$ + *iṣa ābhikṣṇye* + *ṆiC* + $li\dot{N}$). The verbal form *iṣe* is the second person singular *ātmanepada* form for *iṇ gatau* of the *adādi gaṇa*. Similarly, the forms *vavraścimahe* and *papracchimahe* are formed from *vraśca* originating from a *sūtra* A 8.2.36³³ and *praccha* which originates from *praccha jñīpsāyām* of the *tudādi gaṇa* and is in the *ātmanepada*. This *sūtra* does not contain a *bhāṣya* by Patañjali; however, the *Tattvabodhinī* is very similar to the *Nyāsa*'s commentary on this rule, suggesting a possible influence. The claim that the sole purpose of the marker \dot{N} of *mahi\dot{N}* is to form a *pratyāhāra* falls short of offering the explanation that its purpose to cancel the process of *gaṇa* is invalidated by the rule A 1.2.4 *sārvadhātukam apit*.³⁴ The *Nyāsa* on this rule is a little more detailed while the *Tattvabodhinī* has condensed a lot of the information and made the commentary a little more difficult to follow.

3 Conclusion

In terms of innovation, both the texts are clearly novel in their own way for the manner in which they present the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* but it is equally evident through their distinctive approaches that they appear to have different aims. The PK, as stated within its name, focuses on illuminating *prakriyā*, including only the immediately relevant considerations regarding the rules of Pāṇini within the sequence constructed by the text. The initial verse provides the context of *prakṛti* + *pratyaya* and this is the foundation of the subsequent rules to build the skeleton of a verbal form. The PK's approach to the establishment of the *lakāras* is heavily aided by the *Prasāda* which complements the main text with verses from the *Vākyapadīya* as well as the MBh to establish the authority of its arguments within the gram-

³³ A 8.2.36 *vyaśca-bhrasja-srja-mṛja-yaja-rāja-bhrāja-cchaṣām ṣaḥ* 'The last letter of the verbal form of *vraśc*, *bhrasj*, *srj*, *mṛj*, *yaj*, *rāj*, *bhrāj*, and those ending with the letter *ś* and *ccha* are substituted with *ṣ* when followed by affixes beginning with letters of *jHaL*.

³⁴ A 1.2.4 *sārvadhātukam apit* - A *sārvadhātuka* affix which is not marked with *P* is understood as though marked with *N*.

matical tradition. Some of these arguments, such as that of the transitive and intransitive verbs, are later refuted by the *Tattvabodhinī* due to their non-correspondence with the MBh. The SK, on the other hand, presents very short *vṛttis* with similarly short explanations by the *Tattvabodhinī*, excepting the rule A 3.4.69. The content of the *Tattvabodhinī* appears to focus more on a few technical details that need a grammatical reasoning. The PK-*Prasāda* approach conveys its arguments in the sense of a balanced formation of *prakṛti + pratyaya* while the SK-*Tattvabodhinī* approach orients itself around the formation of an affix which is later attached to a verbal base.³⁵

Both these texts are obviously not completely true to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and require much didactic material to be added so that they can be used as a pedagogical text. Considering the primarily oral nature of the Sanskrit tradition, it is understood that the texts may be read more creatively depending on the scholar. Despite this, the *prakriyā* and the inclination of the scholar to adhere to the structure of the text ensure a degree of predictability in their use. In terms of the *sūtras* studied here, the PK's approach provides a more systematic introduction to the foundation of the *lakāras* due to its introduction of the *anuvṛtti* and the presentation of examples. In contrast, the SK's method is more focused on maintaining correctness in the derivation with a view towards cultivating a reverence for the study of the *śāstras*. The SK, while claiming a more Pāṇinian approach, is a text that cannot be read on its own to develop an understanding of grammatical concepts whereas the PK manages to convey the main point decisively in these four rules. There are also references to topics and rules that have not yet been addressed in the text of SK at this point and are not particularly relevant to the stage of derivation. In this sense, the PK is more consistent about its content and seems to provide a progression into the subject matter. The Sanskrit used by the PK and the *Prasāda* is unrefined and basic compared to that of the SK and the *Tattvabodhinī*. However, the *Prasāda* is also a more student-friendly commentary than the TB which appears to use a mix of commentary from the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, *Nyāsa*, *Padamañjarī*, and the MBh. A more extensive study of the texts and their contexts may shed more light on the forthright wording of the PK or the elusive subtleties within the SK.

35 Deshpande (2016) explores the possible religious backgrounds of the scholars in the grammatical tradition and how their view is reflected in a dualistic vs non-dualistic view of meaning in a verbal form (i.e. *dhātu + affix*).

List of abbreviations

A = *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini
SK = *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita
PK = *Prakriyākaumudī* of Rāmacandra Śeṣa
MBh = *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali

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Phonographic Characters in the *Biography of Xuanzang* by Hui Li The Declension of *puruṣa* (*bùlùshā* 布路沙)

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Abstract The article discusses an interesting case of the use of Chinese characters as phonographic devices: the Sanskrit declension of *puruṣa* (*bùlùshā* 布路沙) 'man' as transcribed by the Chinese monk Hui Li in his *Biography of Xuanzang*. In particular, the analysis will focus on two aspects: the way Hui Li renders the different Sanskrit nominal endings; the evaluation of the general accuracy of these transcriptions. For the latter point, I will take as reference the phonetic reconstructions of Chinese characters proposed by Pulleyblank 1991 and Baxter, Sagart 2014.

Keywords Chinese historical phonology. Middle Chinese. Sino-Indian contact. Chinese rime tables. Chinese siddham studies.

Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 The Contact Between China and India. – 3 Chinese Rime Tables. – 4 Hui Li's Declension of *puruṣa*. – 5 Summary.



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1 Introduction

It is necessary to provide some background information about the text considered in this study. First of all, Hui Li's *Biography of Xuanzang* (Chinese title: *Dà Táng dàcí 'ēnsì Sānzàng fǎshī zhuàn* 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳) as we have it actually seems to be attributed to the monk Yancong, who expanded and elaborated an earlier text by Hui Li. While in the preface Yancong himself gives the 688 A.D. as the year of completion of his work, the date of Hui Li's *Biography* has not yet been established (Kotyk 2019, 516). It is therefore necessary to specify that I do not intend the *Biography of Xuanzang* as Hui Li's original work. This means that the specific contents analysed and commented on in this paper are only conventionally attributed to Hui Li, both as a matter of tradition and simplicity. The reference text is certainly different from Hui Li's own elaboration, and has probably gone through a complex history of transmission that cannot be considered here.

The *Biography of Xuanzang* is a remarkable repository of historical information concerning India, and constitutes one of the very few examples of ancient Chinese descriptions of a foreign language. In fact, while a rather small number of Chinese monks seem to have developed a good knowledge of Indian languages, Hui Li's text can be included in a corpus of three famous literary works from the seventh century A.D., all of which contain some annotations regarding Sanskrit and its basic morphology. The other two sources are the *Dà Táng Xīyù Jì* 大唐西域記 (The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions), written by monk Bianji (辯機 602-48 A.D.) on the basis of Xuanzang's (玄奘 600/602-64 A.D.) oral account in 646 A.D., and the *Nánhǎi jìguī nēifǎ zhuàn* 南海寄歸內法傳 (A Record of Buddhist Practices Sent Home from the Southern Sea) by monk Yi Jing (義淨 635-713 A.D.), probably completed in 691-92 A.D.

Hui Li's text was first translated into French by Stanislav Julien (1797-1873) in 1853, and then into English by Rev. Samuel Beal (1825-1889) in 1914. While these historical translations are still a valuable reference point for approaching Hui Li's text, some more recent translations are also available: notably those of Li Y.-H. (1959) and Li R. (1995). The text, as the title suggests, represents a later account of the enterprises performed by Xuanzang on his long pilgrimage to India in search of sacred texts and relics, drawn up by his disciple Hui Li. *The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions*, written by Xuanzang himself in 646 A.D., also saw as its first translation that into French by Julien in 1857-58. Two English translations followed: by Beal in 1884 and by Thomas Watters (1840-1901), this latter posthumously published in 1904. A more recent version is that of Li R. (1996). The *Record* by monk Yi Jing was translated into English by Japanese Buddhistologist and Sanskritist Junjirō Takakusu (1866-1945) in 1896, and traces Yi Jing's sea journey to India beginning in 671 A.D.

The grammatical descriptions contained in these works are not always easy to interpret, mainly due to their vagueness and unclear use of terminology. In some passages, interpretive uncertainty depends on the fact that the authors cite specific Indian treaties in Chinese transcription or translation, but it has not always been possible to identify the texts referred to. In addition, it is my opinion that some problems also emerge in other cases where the interpretation of the text would seem to have gone unchallenged. Most of the time these ancient texts have been simply translated for what they literally say instead of being analysed for what the authors really meant. It seems that the linguistic information described by these seventh-century Chinese monks was looked at only in the light of Sanskrit and its linguistic tradition, without being contextualised with respect to the Chinese linguistic knowledge of the time.

Among the grammatical contents of the *Biography of Xuanzang* (see Staal 1972), the declension of *purusa* 'man' takes on special importance. The monk's attempt to reproduce Indian sounds by means of Chinese characters deserves to be analysed for several respects: (1) determining which characters were selected for each Sanskrit termination; (2) noting whether alternations of multiple characters are present for the same syllable; (3) evaluating the overall phonetic correspondence between the Middle Chinese reconstructions of the characters used and the Indian sound they transcribe.

Note that the study proposed in this paper is based on the published version of the canon. In the absence of an original text and since it has not been possible to conduct a philological analysis of all available canons, the conclusions are to be considered partly hypothetical.

2 The Contact Between China and India

The focus on linguistic aspects in ancient China was mainly on the exegetical process applied to classical texts, with the intention of rediscovering their authentic meaning. This philological approach obviously could not ignore the analysis of the graphic forms through which the ancient texts had been handed down. The Chinese writing system itself, by virtue of the marked iconicity of some of its graphic elements with respect to the meaning of the word represented, has traditionally been a widely adopted tool for lexical analysis.

If we look at the structural composition of Chinese characters, we see that most of them are *xíngshēngzì* 形聲字 'phono-semantic compounds', i.e. characters made by means of two graphic units: a semantic determinative, which indicates the general thematic area of the word, and a phonetic determinative, which suggests its acoustic re-

alization.¹ For example, the character *xiàng* 像 ‘picture; resemble’ is made up of the semantic component *rén* 亻 ‘person; human being’ and the phonetic component *xiàng* 象, literally meaning ‘elephant’ (which, therefore, sounds exactly the same as the preceding word).² The phonetic content within the Chinese writing system has been recognised as far back as Ancient China: for example the *Shuōwén* 說文 dictionary (second century A.D.) correctly describes the category of ‘phono-semantic compounds’, and for a considerable number of these characters the *Shuōwén* correctly determines which graphic component is phonetic. However, apart from understanding the mechanism of ‘phono-semantic’ characters composition and identifying specific graphic units with phonetic value within characters, Chinese tradition for a long time did not delve into sound analysis. One reason is that the phonetic indication provided by such structural elements is indirect by nature, since there is no one-to-one correspondence between graphic symbol and phoneme as it generally happens in alphabetic writing systems.

The arrival of Buddhism in China from the first century A.D. (cf. Zürcher 1959; 2013) resulted in a large-scale phenomenon of cultural and linguistic exchange. In addition to the influence on the philosophical and artistic fields, the transmission of Buddhist texts and their translation into Chinese brought about important changes in the linguistic sphere as well. The Indian language translated into Chinese was not always Sanskrit. Edgerton (1953) identifies at least four languages underlying Buddhist religious texts: classical Sanskrit, Pali, Dharmapada Prakrit, and a variety called ‘Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit’, which is the result of the interaction of Sanskrit with several Middle Indo-Aryan (MIA) vernaculars. The so-called ‘Sino-Indian contact’ is particularly evident in lexical innovations (Zhu 2003), but it has also played a crucial role in Chinese phonological studies.

In fact, the same labels used by the Chinese to classify different types of initial consonants in the later Rime Tables (see § 3) bear a clear Indian imprint. The names given to these classes of Chinese phonemes are actually an adaptation of the Sanskrit ones, learnt by Chinese monks during the so-called ‘Siddham studies’, i.e. a course

Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by the Author.

1 Theoretically, there are four structural categories to which Chinese characters can belong: in addition to ‘phono-semantic compound’, there are the so-called ‘pictographs’ (actually very few), whose graphic form is directly inspired by the thing represented; the ‘indicative characters’ (also called ‘ideographs’), i.e. characters written in such a way as to symbolically suggest their meaning. The last category, whose status is still quite debated (Boodberg 1937; Boltz 1994; 2006; Handel 2016; Galambos 2011; 2014), is that of ‘semantic compounds’, so called because all the graphic components of the character convey semantic content.

2 For the process of formation and development of the Chinese writing system cf. Boltz 1994; De Francis 1989.

in Sanskrit writing and grammar (Siddham being an early derivative of the Brahmi script). For example, in the following passage³ we can read a description of Sanskrit consonants made by the Chinese Buddhist poet Xiè Língyùn 謝靈運 (385-433 A.D.), where the different sounds are grouped according to their place of articulation, consistently with the Indian phonological tradition (see also Chaudhuri 1998).

其迦佉等二十五字是其毘聲。迦佉等五是咽喉中聲。吒哞等五上腭中聲。多他等五是舌頭聲。遮車等五是齒中聲。波頗等五是脣中聲。隨其流類毘比一處。故曰毘聲。

The 25 characters *jiā* 迦, *qū* 佉 and so on are the consonants. The five characters *jiā* 迦, *qū* 佉 and the following are sounds coming from the throat. The five characters *zhà* 吒, *tuō* 哞 and the others are sounds made on the palate. The five characters *duō* 多, *tā* 他 and the following are sounds produced by the tip of the tongue. The five characters *zhē* 遮, *chē* 車 and so on are sounds made at the center of the teeth. The five characters *bō* 波, *pō* 頗 and the others are sounds realised at the centre of the lips. All these sounds are used in combination, so they are called consonants.⁴

The knowledge of Sanskrit sounds and their classification was not purely theoretical, as this kind of learning was mainly aimed at the correct reading of Indian writing. This is why Xiè Língyùn speaks about twenty-five *zì* 字, properly Chinese characters, emphasising that the first object of his description are the graphic symbols of India; these in turn transcribe different types of sounds (*shēng* 聲). The study of foreign language and grammar is inevitably approached from writing, the plane of graphic representation of words being traditionally invested with special importance in Chinese culture. However, the contact with India allowed the development of a technical terminology that could be applied to Chinese phonemes as well, with a focus on the description of the syllable-initial consonants.

³ SAT, vol. 84, no. 2702, 408.

⁴ I specify that the pinyin transcription given here for these characters refers to their modern Mandarin pronunciation, so it may not be consistent with the places of articulation described by the author.

3 Chinese Rime Tables

The discovery of the Indian model of phonological classification has also made possible a much deeper analysis of the ‘signifier’ conveyed by graphic forms in China. First of all, there is some debate as to whether the so-called *fǎnqiè* 反切 method can be considered Indian-inspired as well. This can be described as the first Chinese tool for breaking down a syllable into discrete components, albeit still quite indirectly. With the *fǎnqiè* method, the pronunciation of a certain character is given by the juxtaposition of two other characters: the former shares the same initial consonant with the glossed one, while the latter has the same set of sounds generically called ‘final’ or ‘rime’, including tone. The entire formula usually closes with the characters *fǎn* 反 or *qiè* 切, meaning ‘convert’ and ‘match’ respectively, explicitly signalling the presence of the phonetic gloss. Note that there are other interpretations of the same terms: for example, Branner (2000a, 38) translates *qiè* 切 as “to run together”. This character is also read in the first tone (*qiē*), with the meaning of ‘to cut’: it is translated in this way by Shen (2020, 18), and by Pulleyblank (1999, 105), who renders *qiē* as “cutting the sound into complementary parts”, while explaining *fǎn* 反 as “turning from the sound of the initial to the sound of the final”.

A classic example of *fǎnqiè* annotation is that of the character *dōng* 東 ‘east’. Its phonetic realisation is traditionally represented by means of the characters *dé* 德 and *hóng* 紅. The formula thus suggests that the correct reading of *dōng* 東 is obtained by combining the initial of the character *dé* 德 (d-) and the final of the character *hóng* 紅 (-óng).

Since the method assumes an awareness that the syllable – the basic unit of the Chinese language – can be internally analysed, many have speculated a direct influence of Indian phonology on the invention of *fǎnqiè* (Baxter 1992, 33). Mair (1991; 1992) supports the idea of an Indian origin of the method, suggesting that the term *fǎnqiè* may derive from the Sanskrit *varṇa-bheda-vidhi*, literally ‘letter cutting rules’. However, some very early examples of the application of *fǎnqiè*, and especially the irregularities of the method – which does not always assign the same character to a certain phonetic value – have caused the *fǎnqiè* to be reconsidered as a completely indigenous annotation system (Branner 2000a, 38; 2006, 1; Pulleyblank 1999, 106).

The *fǎnqiè* is an important source of information in traditional Chinese phonology, but the Rime Tables (*Děngyùntú* 等韻圖) produced starting from the Song dynasty time constitute an undeniable improvement in the annotation of character pronunciation. In the Rime Tables, character classification meets specific phonological criteria: each character is placed within a grid, at the point of intersection between a certain column (representing an initial consonant type) and a certain row (indicating a category of final or rime). In other words, the internal division of syllables remains the same as introduced by the *fǎnqiè*

method, but the Tables provide a more specific phonological description of Chinese syllables. Although there may be little variation among the different Rime Tables, such as in the number of initial consonants, their structure has gradually become uniform over time.

The *Yùnjìng* 韻鏡, which is the oldest extant Table, generally dated between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, distinguishes thirty-six initials.⁵ These are grouped into six broader categories, representing different places of articulation:⁶

- *chún yīn* 唇音 ‘labial sounds’. It is a group of eight consonants, divided in their turn into ‘heavy’ (*zhòng* 重) and ‘light’ (*qīng* 輕): these two specifications identify bilabial stops and labiodental fricatives, respectively.
- *Shé yīn* 舌音 ‘lingual sounds’. This class also contains eight consonants, which are further categorised into two subgroups: ‘sounds made with the tip of the tongue’ (*shétóu yīn* 舌頭音) and ‘sounds on the tongue’ (*shéshàng yīn* 舌上音). The former designation identifies dental or alveolar stops, while the latter indicates corresponding retroflex dentals.
- *Yá yīn* 牙音 ‘sounds with molar teeth’, i.e. velars.
- *Chǐ yīn* 齒音 ‘sounds with front teeth’, i.e. sibilants. This group consists of ten consonants, with an internal division into four types: the main distinction is that between ‘sounds produced with the tip of the tongue on the teeth’ (*chǐtóu yīn* 齒頭音) and ‘sounds produced on the palate’ (*zhèngchǐ yīn* 正齒音); within these two subcategories, some listed initials are further defined as ‘thin’ (*xì* 細). According to current interpretations, the term *xì* would specify that these are fricative consonants, while the other initials, reconstructed as affricates, are not introduced by special terminology.
- *Yóu yīn* 喉音 ‘throat sounds’. The series includes only four initials, reconstructed as laryngeal (Baxter 1992) or guttural (Norman 1988).
- *Shé yīn chǐ* 舌音齒 ‘lingual and dental sounds’. It is the last class of initials, involving only two palatal elements: a glide and a nasal.

As can be seen, the terms associated with each category of Chinese initials are directly taken from the traditional ones used in Indian phonology. An Indian inspiration has also been hypothesised regarding

⁵ The first list of initials applied to Chinese phonology in the Tables contained only thirty consonants; their number was later supplemented and stabilised at thirty-six consonantal distinctions (Ch’én 1964, 479).

⁶ For more details concerning initial consonants in the Rime Tables see Baxter 1992; Pulleyblank 1984; Branner 2000b; 2006; Norman 1988.

the classification of finals; these, however, are analysed only globally (as in the *fǎnqiè*) and not by individual phonemes. Each Table, called *zhuǎn* 轉, is assigned the label *nèizhuǎn* 內轉 ‘inner’ or *wàizhuǎn* 外轉 ‘outer’. While ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ would indicate the presence of a high or closed vowel in the case of the Inner Tables, and of a low or open vowel in the case of the Outer Tables, the two Chinese designations could represent a translation of the Indian terms *ābhyantara* ‘internal’ and *bāhya* ‘external’ (Branner 2000b). This fact also seems to be confirmed by looking at Allen (1953, 59), where the term *bāhya* is found in this technical application in the *Mahābhāṣya*, referring to the vowel *a*.

4 Hui Li’s Declension of *puruṣa*

After introducing the importance of the Chinese contact with the Indian tradition, particularly from a phonological point of view, my intent is to describe the declensional paradigm of the Sanskrit noun *puruṣa* ‘man’ as represented in Hui Li’s *Biography of Xuanzang*.⁷ It is well known that Chinese transcriptions of foreign terms play a crucial role in reconstructing how Chinese characters were pronounced at different chronological stages of the language. The fortunate circumstance of knowing the Sanskrit forms corresponding to each Hui Li’s transcription renders *puruṣa*’s declension particularly informative, and allows us to compare different systems of reconstruction. In this study I mainly take the systems of Pulleyblank (1991) and of Baxter and Sagart (2014) as a reference, observing whether one or the other provides a better reconstruction for the same characters, i.e. a reconstruction more similar to the intended pronunciation of the Sanskrit syllable.

With regard to Pulleyblank’s system, I have considered the reconstructed pronunciations of characters provided for the historical phase he calls Late Middle Chinese (LMC), rather than the corresponding Early Middle Chinese (EMC) ones. In particular, LMC is the designation Pulleyblank uses to define the new Chinese language developed in the Tang capital Chang’an during the seventh century, and which gradually spread to the rest of the Chinese empire. This idiom would be best represented by the Rime Tables of the Song period. LMC is particularly important to Pulleyblank because he considers this language to be a *koiné* of the period, the common ancestor of all modern Chinese dialects except the Min dialects.⁸

⁷ CBETA, vol. 50, no. 2053. On this topic see also D’Antonio, Keidan 2022. It should be pointed out that other (slightly different) transcriptions of the nominal declension of *puruṣa* have been transmitted in Chinese sources (see Sun 2005, 167-8; Lü 1923, 21-2; Zhang 2020, 250).

⁸ It should be noted, however, that some scholars are sceptical about the actual existence of a *koiné* in the Tang period. Against this theory see, for example, Branner 2006;

In table 1 *puruṣa*'s (*bùlùshā* 布路沙) declension is given in Chinese characters [table 1]. In order, each of Hui Li's transcriptions is followed by a line indicating:

- its pinyin annotation (corresponding to the modern pronunciation of Chinese characters);
- its phonetic reconstruction according to Pulleyblank's LMC system;
- the declined Sanskrit lexeme.

Note that in some cases Hui Li further accompanies his transcription with a *fǎnqiè* formula, whose function is to specify the correct pronunciation of a Sanskrit syllable. Table 1 features in parentheses *fǎnqiè* formulas used by Hui Li for the phonetic gloss, after the syllable they describe. Furthermore, an attempt was made to concretely apply the *fǎnqiè* rule (see § 3) directly in table 1, with the intention of giving a better representation of the pronunciation (presumably) intended by Hui Li for the glossed character. The *fǎnqiè* rule is applied to both the LMC reconstructions and the standard Mandarin transcriptions of the same characters. When the *fǎnqiè* resulted in a non-existing syllable in today's Mandarin, a sporadic usage of a non-canonical pinyin notation, again in parentheses, was required.

The ? symbol used in the Table corresponds to an illegible character in Hui Li's transcription. By 'illegible' I mean orthographic forms that do not correspond to any existing modern Chinese characters. As a result, these graphic variants could not be reported or analysed. Note that the changes or omissions of characters are probably due to the actions of later copyists and transmitters, reflecting the complex history of transmission of Hui Li's text.

Table 1 Phonetic representation of Hui Li's transcriptions.

	Singular	Dual	Plural
NOM	布路殺 Bùlùshā puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t puruʃaḥ	布路笱 Bùlùshāo puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:w puruʃau	布路沙 Bùlùshā puə̌ luə̌ ʃa: puruʃāḥ
ACC	布路笱 Bùlùshān puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:m puruʃam	布路笱 Bùlùshāo puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:w puruʃau	布路霜 Bùlùshuāng puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:ŋ puruʃān
INSTR	布路鑊擊 Bùlùshānà puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t nra: puruʃeṇa	布路* ? (音鞞僭反) Bùlù ? (biàn) puə̌ luə̌ ? (pīam`) puruʃābhyām	布路鑊鞞 (or 𪛗) Bùlùshābǐng (or xi) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t pjiājŋ` puruʃaiḥ
DAT	布路慶(沙詐反)耶 Bùlùshà (yé) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t (jia) puruʃāya	布路沙 ? (鞞僭反) Bùlùshā ? (biàn) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t ? (pīam`) puruʃābhyām	布路鑊鞞 (鞞約反) Bùlùshāyùn (bue/biao) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t (piak) puruʃebhyah
ABL	布路沙哆(他我反) Bùlùshāduō(tuō) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa: (t`a`) puruʃāt	布路鑊 ? (鞞僭反) Bùlùshā ? (biàn)puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t ? (pīam`) puruʃābhyām	布路鑊鞞 (鞞約反) Bùlùshāyùn (b-ue/biao) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t (piak) puruʃebhyah
GEN	布路鑊 ? (子耶反) Bùlùshā ? (zé) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t ? (tsia) puruʃasya	布路鑊 ? Bùlùshā ? puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t ? puruʃayoh	布路鑊誦 (安咸反) Bùlùshā `án (ān xiàn) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t (?ja:m) puruʃāṇām
LOC	布路 ? (所齊反) Bùlù ? (sí) puə̌ luə̌ ? (ʃiaj) puruʃe	布路殺論 Bùlùshāyù puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t jyā` puruʃayoh	布路鑊縵 (所芻反) Bùlùshā (sú) puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t (ʃuə̌ə̌) puruʃeʃu
VOC	布路殺 Bùlùshā puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t puruʃa	布路稍 Bùlùshāo puə̌ luə̌ ʃaw` puruʃau	布路沙 Bùlùshā puə̌ luə̌ ʃa: puruʃāḥ

* A syllable for ʃā is missing in Hui Li's transcription of the instrumental dual form.

First of all, it can be seen that the declension of *puruṣa* is characterised by a certain degree of inconsistency. For instance, the text renders homonymic elements differently, such as the stem *puruṣa-* (布路沙 LMC puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:; Mandarin *bùlùshā*) and the vocative singular form *puruṣa* (布路殺 LMC puə̌ luə̌ ʃa:t; Mandarin *bùlùshā*). The same happens for the dual vocative termination, which is written 稍 (LMC ʃaw`; Mandarin *shāo*) instead of 笱 (LMC ʃa:w; Mandarin *shāo*), as the identical dual nominative and accusative forms. Here Hui Li's choice could be explained by the intention to represent some intonational aspect of the vocative. Note that the two characters have the same phonetic realisation in Mandarin, while they differ only for vowel length

and tone in Pulleyblank's LMC reconstruction. There are also cases where the accuracy of Hui Li's transcription cannot be verified, because some syllables (typically the termination) are missing. For example, the Sanskrit dual locative *puruṣayoḥ* is fully rendered as 布路殺論 (LMC puǎ̃ luǎ̃ ʃa:t jyǎ̃; Mandarin *bùlùshāyù*), but the dual genitive, which is formally equal in Sanskrit, is incomplete. It is given as 布路鍛 (LMC puǎ̃ luǎ̃ ʃa:t; Mandarin *bùlùshā*), without the ending syllable.

Another interesting fact in Hui Li's character choice is that the text freely alternates four different graphemes (殺, 沙, 鍛, and 廈) for Sanskrit *ṣa* or *ṣā*. The character 鍛 (LMC ʃa:t; Mandarin *shā*) is further applied to the syllable *ṣe* of the instrumental singular and of the dative, ablative and locative plural forms, and it is used to represent the final syllable *ṣaiḥ* of the instrumental plural *puruṣaiḥ*. The instrumental plural inflection is especially interesting, because for its realisation Hui Li gives two options: 布路鍛鞞 (LMC puǎ̃ luǎ̃ ʃa:t pjiǎj̃; Mandarin *bùlùshābǐng*) or 布路鍛咽 (Mandarin *bùlùshāxì*). No reconstruction is provided by Pulleyblank for the character 咽 (Mandarin *xì*), while 鞞 (LMC pjiǎj̃; Mandarin *bǐng*) seems to suggest an alternative termination in *-bhis*. This would imply that Hui Li was aware of the existence of a dual option for the instrumental plural: one ending in *-aiḥ* and one in *-bhiḥ* (cf. Edgerton 1953, 52).

As regards Pulleyblank's phonetic reconstructions (1991), some discrepancies arise regarding final consonants. Sometimes his reconstructions for characters employed by Hui Li display final consonants where the Sanskrit syllables end in a vowel: in particular, this is the case of the above-mentioned characters 殺 and 鍛 (both LMC ʃa:t; Mandarin *shā*). In Pulleyblank's system, both characters are represented as LMC ʃa:t, while the Sanskrit form would not be closed by a dental consonant. In other words, the final *-t* – supposed to be present in the LMC version of the two characters 殺 and 鍛 – was not really necessary for the purposes of Hui Li's phonetic notation.

That being the case, it seems hard to explain why Hui Li adds the character 哆 (LMC tʰa; Mandarin *tō*, according to the *fǎnqiè* indication) after 沙 (LMC ʃa:; Mandarin *shā*) specifically to represent the final dental of the ablative singular *puruṣāt*. The fact that Hui Li already had two options for rendering the syllable *ʃa:t*, and that he used them even when there was no need, makes it strange to think that he had to resort to a different solution for the ablative singular. When we compare Pulleyblank's reconstructed forms with that of Baxter and Sagart (2014), we find two Middle Chinese (MC) realisations for the character 殺 (LMC ʃa:t; Mandarin *shā*), each corresponding to a later development. These are: MC *sreat* > Mandarin *shā*; MC *sreajH* > *shài*. While the first reconstruction is almost the same as that of Pulleyblank, the second reconstruction seems to provide a less problematic phonetic profile for this character. The absence of the final dental consonant would not only make Hui Li's transcription better

in all cases where *shā* 殺 is employed, but (more importantly) would give an explanation for his effort to find a way to signal the presence of a final *-t* at the ablative singular.

By contrast, Pulleyblank's reconstructions of final consonants seem to work well with nasals. Hui Li, for example, uses the characters 芟 (LMC ʂa:m; Mandarin *shān*) and 霜 (LMC ʂa:ŋ; Mandarin *shuāng*) for the accusative singular and accusative plural terminations respectively, where Pulleyblank's forms perfectly fit with the equivalent Sanskrit ones.

Some other comments can be made about the analysis of *fǎnqiè* formulas. In several cases, these indications appear crucial, as they suggest the reading of unknown characters or of a lacuna in the text. For example, the formula *bǐng jiàn fǎn* 鞞僭反 that follows the unreadable character employed for the dual instrumental, dative and ablative termination. 鞞 (LMC pjiəŋʹ; Mandarin *bǐng*) and 僭 (LMC tsi-amʹ; Mandarin *jiàn*) combination tell us that the character should be read in a way very close to *piamʹ*, which corresponds quite well to the Sanskrit termination *-bhyām*. When a *fǎnqiè* follows a still-existing or perfectly-readable character, sometimes it happens that the phonetic reconstruction of the *fǎnqiè* formula differs from the reconstruction of the glossed character alone. Interestingly, in almost all cases where this occurs, the pronunciation resulting from the *fǎnqiè* is more similar to the reference Sanskrit syllable. For example, the locative plural termination given by Hui Li is 縑 (LMC tʂəwʹ; Mandarin *zhòu*), which is glossed with a *fǎnqiè* as *suǒ chú fǎn* 所芻反. If we combine the initial consonant of 所 (LMC ʂəǎʹ or ʂuǎʹ; Mandarin *suǒ*) and the final of 芻 (LMC tʂʰuǎǎ; Mandarin *chú*) according to Pulleyblank's (1991) reconstruction, we will obtain *-ʂuǎ*. Thanks to *fǎnqiè*, the resulting syllable is closer to Sanskrit *-ʂu*.

The only case in which the formula seems to deviate is that of the genitive plural termination, where the character employed is 誦 (LMC nra:m; Mandarin *nán*). Here Pulleyblank's form fully corresponds to Sanskrit *-ṅām*, while his reconstruction of the graphemes 安 (LMC ʔan; Mandarin *ān*) and 咸 (LMC xɦja:m; Mandarin *xiàn*) appearing in the *fǎnqiè* does not match well to Sanskrit. In fact, the result of the combination would be *ʔja:m*. A corresponding reconstruction for the character 誦 is absent in Baxter and Sagart (2014), where it is only provided the Mandarin homophone character 南 (MC *nom*). The character 安 that opens the *fǎnqiè* formula is instead reconstructed as MC *'an* in Baxter and Sagart (2014), with an initial vowel.

5 Summary

All the characters (and *fǎnqiē* formulas) used by Hui Li to transcribe Sanskrit endings in the declension of *puruṣa* are listed below.

Skr.	Chinese ch.	Pulleyblank's LMC	pinyin (Standard Mandarin)
ṣā	沙	ṣa:	shā
	廈(沙詐)	ṣa: (ṣa: + tṣa: `)	shà (shā + zhà)
	鍛	ṣa:t	shā
ṣa	鍛	ṣa:t	shā
	殺	ṣa:t	shā
ṣaḥ	殺	ṣa:t	shā
ṣāḥ	沙	ṣa:	shā
ṣau	筍	ṣa:w	shāo
	稍	ṣaw`	shāo
ṣam	芰	ṣa:m	shān
ṣān	霜	ṣa:ŋ	shuāng
ṣaiḥ	鍛鞞	ṣa:t pjiājŋ´	shā bǐng
	鍛咽	ṣa:t /	shā yè
ṣāt	沙哆 (他我)	ṣa: t ^h a´ (t ^h a + ŋa´)	tǒ (tā + wǒ)
ṣe	鍛	ṣa:t	shā
	? (所齊)	ṣiaj (ṣəǎ´ + tṣhiaj)	sí (suǒ + qí)
ṣu	綯(所綯)	ṣuəǎ (ṣəǎ´ + tṣ ^h uəǎ)	sú (suǒ + chú)
sya	? (子耶)	tsia (tsz´ + jia)	zé (zǐ + yé)
ṇa	拏	nra:	ná
ṇām	訥 (安咸)	?ja:m (?an + xhja:m)	ān (ān + xiàn)
ya	耶	jia	yé
yoh	論	jyǎ`	yù
bhyām	? (鞞替)	piam` (pjiājŋ´ + tsiam`)	biàn (bǐng + jiàn)
bhyah	韵 (鞞約)	piak (pjiājŋ´ + ?iak)	b-ue/biao (bǐng + yuē/yāo)

In this paper I proposed an analysis of the declension of *puruṣa* (布路沙) in the *Biography of Xuanzang* from a phonological point of view. Although the representation of Indian grammatical cases by Hui Li (or by later copyists) has been previously reported in other studies concerning Chinese descriptions of Sanskrit, specific attention to how Chinese characters were used phonographically has been lacking. Studied from this perspective, the declension of *puruṣa* is extremely interesting. The characters selected for transcription reveal some inconsistencies: in particular, Sanskrit isomorphic elements are treated with graphic alternations in Chinese; similarly, the same character can be associated with different syllables. The Chinese transcriptions from Indian languages generally constitute an important source of information for reconstructing the pronunciation of Middle Chinese, and the declension of *puruṣa* can certainly

ly contribute in this direction. In the present study, the declension of *puruṣa* was used to evaluate the level of correspondence between the transcribed Sanskrit sound and the reconstructed pronunciation of the same characters proposed by Pulleyblank (1991) and by Baxter and Sagart (2014); the analysis showed that the presumed Middle Chinese pronunciation of the vast majority of Chinese forms seems to be valid with respect to the corresponding Sanskrit syllable.

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Section 2

An Ethnolinguistic Remark on the *fēiyī* 飛衣

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Abstract This paper inquires the relationship between two Trans-Himalayan languages, namely Lohorong (Eastern Kiranti) and Old Chinese (Sinitic) by comparing their ‘soul’-related vocabulary. Several identified etymological cognates and rather unexpected parallels between the Lohorong *maŋsuʔ* ‘household shrine’ and the *fēiyī* 飛衣 ‘flying garment’ (i.e. T-shaped silk banner) excavated at the Mǎwángduī 馬王堆 site may in turn just add another perspective in understanding the function and meaning of this controversially discussed archaeological find.

Keywords Mǎwángduī. T-shaped Silk Banner. Kiranti. Old Chinese. Etymological cognates. Maŋsuʔ.

Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 *Lawa*. – 3 *Saya*. – 4 *Nùŋwa*. – 5 *Same*.



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1 Introduction

Ever since its excavation in mid-January 1972, the discovery of ‘Marquise of Dài 軼’, buried in Western Hàn (2nd century BCE) tomb no. 1 at Mǎwángdūī 馬王堆 near Chángshā 長沙 (Húnán 湖南, China), has continuously sparked the fields of Archaeology, East Asian Art History and Sinology. And certainly, the findings at Mǎwángdūī were equally extraordinary, spectacular and unique to mention but a few of the more frequently encountered superlatives in the relevant literature. Among the myriad of studies one object has particularly enjoyed the focus of scholarly attention while remaining a controversial issue, namely the function and meaning of the so called *fēiyī* 飛衣 ‘flying garment’, i.e. the sophisticated T-shaped silk banner found on top of the innermost coffin of its female tomb occupant. Various interpretations (from luminaries such as Yü Ying-shih, Michael Loewe etc.) were heavily based upon the *textus receptus*, and early on Silbergeld has drawn a cautionary note calling this practice into question:

Can we really believe that a painting so carefully crafted and integrally conceived was based on literary sources so widely scattered, one figure drawn from this text, another figure from that? Were its sources necessarily literary at all, or exclusively literary, without *the contribution of oral traditions and unwritten practices*, artistic convention and inspiration? (Silbergeld 1982-83, 83; italics added)

Silbergeld also observes that “much of this literature was prescriptive rather than descriptive” (1982-83, 86) which suggests a big question mark concerning the nature of Old Chinese [OC] texts (cf. 1982-83, 92 fn. 55) let alone their role as sources of e.g. art historical interpretation. Yet, Silbergeld 1982-83 had hardly any lasting effect. Perhaps representative in this regard is Wu’s seminal paper challenging his predecessors in a (to this day) highly influential alternative reading, of course, based on early written material, ironically acknowledging and at the same time essentially ignoring Silbergeld 1982-83 (cf. Wu 1992).¹ Without going into this any further, Guo in retrospect refers to the two camps as the dominant ‘journey model’ seriously challenged by the ‘tomb model’ (cf. 2011, 88, 107 fn. 28) both based

I am grateful to George van Driem for equally critical and helpful comments as well as to two anonymous reviewers whose diametrically opposed evaluations gave me reasons for clarifying certain points.

¹ At least Wang 2011, 77 fn. 7 and Waring 2019, 38 fn. 107, 472 incl. fn. 1140 both do mention Silbergeld 1982-83 and its core message. Conversely, a professor emeritus (from Peking University) basically presents the narrative of Wu 1992 in a vacuum (cf. Gāo 2019), completely disregarding any non-Chinese source (incl. Wu 1992).

on received Old Chinese texts. Only a decade before Guo or rather after Wu, Kern initiates the (self-admittedly) overdue “discussion of the nexus between the oral and the written” (2002, 164 fn. 27) and thereby perhaps echoing Silbergeld 1982-83 puts a deeply ingrained bundle of preconceptions back on the map:

The Chinese tradition [...], and with it the modern scholarly exploration of Chinese antiquity, has always privileged text [...] as the primary medium of early Chinese cultural self-expression and self-representation. [...] No doubt, the newly available manuscripts confirm the [...] prestige of texts in early China; yet at the same time, they allow us to ask some fundamental questions about the ancient textual culture that have barely been considered: What exactly is a text in early China? [...] What are the specific functions of the written text? How should we imagine *the relation and balance between oral and written textual practices*? What are the social contexts of texts? Such questions do (...) alert us to a host of problematic assumptions about [...] what has mostly been taken for granted as a more or less secure corpus of writings and ideas. (Kern 2005, VIII-IX; italics added)

Unlike Silbergeld’s *vox clamantis in deserto*, Kern has marked a turning point on the modality of how to explore and ultimately think about early China. Thinking along the same lines as those two and many others (cf. e.g. Sanft 2019; Waring 2019), it seems obvious enough to consider *living* artifacts as well. Through the lens of – *mirabile dictu* – today’s Lohorong,² the unearthed centerpiece of the Mǎwángduī complex together with the relevant literature might appear in a new light:

After one’s death, there is no *lawa*, just as a man casts no more shadow after his death. At a Lohorong burial, the participants cry *Lawa empoke!* ‘Soul, return!’ at the moment of interment, but the Lohorong say that this utterance merely gives voice to an idle hope. There is no *lawa* after death, nor has one ever been observed to return. (van Driem, unpublished; italics in original)

Of course this immediately recalls *Zhāo hún* 招魂 ‘Summoning the soul’ (i.e. a chapter of the *Chǔ cí* 楚辭 [Verses of Chǔ], cf. Wu 1992, 112-13). Yet, except for some *prima facie* accidental or (depending on the vantage point) maybe even expected cultural similarities, what would a small Kiranti tribe in Eastern Nepal have in common with

² The envisaged *A grammar of Lohorong* (cf. van Driem, unpublished) based on field work in the late 1980s remains to be completed and is quoted here from the latest circulating draft manuscript (February 21st, 2017).

great pre-Hàn China or rather and more specifically the state of Chǔ 楚? Well, first and foremost it is widely accepted that their languages, namely Lohorong (Eastern Kiranti) and Old Chinese (Sinitic), both belong to the same Trans-Himalayan language family:

<p>(1) <i>lawə ɛm-pok-ɛ!</i> soul return-ASP-IMP 'Soul, return!' (van Driem, unpublished)</p>	<p>(2) 魂兮 歸來 *q^{wf}ən-gə *k^wəj-r^ʔək soul-SFP return-come 'O soul, come back!' (Yü 1987, 363)</p>	<p>(3) ɛn- -ta:- khar-ɛ! return- come- go-IMP 'Return quickly / hurry back!'</p>
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Although this is hardly evidence in favor of the occasionally suggested age-old linkage between the Kirātas (i.e. Kiranti) and the Chinese (cf. e.g. Chatterji 1974, 32; Northey, Morris 1928, 214),³ Lohorong *lawə* 'soul, spirit' clearly corresponds to OC **m.q^{wf}ən* 魂 'spiritual soul'.⁴ And a slightly modified reconstruction⁵ suggesting a loose preinitial for OC **mə.q^{wf}ən* 魂 not only made the Old Chinese form virtually disyllabic (or rather sesquisyllabic), but also looked deceptively similar to *maʔla* 'spirit' in Jero (Western Kiranti) where the syllable final glottal stop (as a pendant to uvular initial <q-> in OC) remained (cf. Opgenort 2005, 64-5 and the there suggested link to Wambule implosives). Suppose that such a correspondence at some point existed in all of Kiranti which would then still be signified, for instance, by the lengthened vowel in Dumi (Western Kiranti) *la:wo* 'spirit, soul' as well as the hiatus glottal stop between vowels in Lohorong (cf. van Driem, unpublished) indicating hiatus-filling approximants elsewhere, e.g. *lawə* (< **laʔa*), this all of a sudden gave us perhaps unexpected food for thought.⁶

Nevertheless, these shared features by Kirantis and Early Chinese (up to here), i.e. shamanism in general and the soul-summoning ritual in particular, are certainly not specific enough to convinc-

3 There is, for instance, reason to believe that OC **r^ʔək* 來 in (2) Lohorong or rather -*ta:* in (3) and -*pok* in (1) do have a quite similar aspectivising [ASP] function (cf. van Driem, unpublished; Wiedenhof 2015, 228).

4 Note that the Lohorong term *lawə* equally means 'shadow, silhouette' (cf. van Driem, unpublished) and corroborates the suggested cognacy OC **m.q^{wf}ən* 魂 = **ɣ^wən* 雲 'cloud' by Schuessler (cf. 2007, 290). In short, contrary to Williams (cf. 2020, 163 fn. 86), "Schuessler's etymological speculations" (see also below fn. 19) are actually quite unproblematic.

5 Following Baxter, Sagart 2014 in general including their working assumption that any etymon has up to three different forms (cf. 2014, 43, but see Hill 2019, 126), minor deviations due to e.g. alternative Middle Chinese [MC] reconstructions remain possible.

6 The reality is slightly more complex (see below table 1), yet the recently challenged sound change from Proto-Kiranti **kw* > Proto-Western Kiranti **ʔw* (cf. Gerber, Grollmann 2018, 109-12) perhaps merits another look.

ingly connecting the dots.⁷ And, yet, the regarding Lohorung ritual involves a *yaṭappa* ‘household priest’ mediating between the spiritual and the human world (cf. Hardman 2000, 50) which has duties similar to its (exclusively in the *Chǔ cí* occurring) Old Chinese compound cognate **kə.taŋʔ-məŋ* 掌夢 ‘master of dreams’ (cf. Wang 2011, 42).⁸ Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the *yaṭappa* does acquire knowledge directly from his ancestors, namely through *səmmaŋ* ‘dream’ (cf. van Driem, unpublished) and this again brings another Old Chinese text (i.e. *Liè zǐ* 列子 [Master Liè], cf. Ho 1996, 18)⁹ into focus:

夢有六候。[...] 奚謂六候? 一曰正夢, 二曰噩夢, 三曰思夢, 四曰寤夢, 五曰喜夢, 六曰懼夢。

Dreams have six settings. [...] How are the six settings named? The first is called *teŋ-məŋ* [ordinary dream], the second *ŋʰak-məŋ* [shock dream], the third *sə-məŋ* [longing dream], the fourth *ŋʰa-məŋ* [waking dream], the fifth *qʰəʔ-məŋ* [happy dream] and the sixth is called *gʷak-məŋ* [anxiety dream]. (Author’s translation)¹⁰

⁷ Cf. van Driem 2001, 605; Hardman 2000, 187 incl. fn. 22; Major 1999, 135 f.; Wu 1992, 114 incl. fn. 9.

⁸ The cognacy between the *yaṭappa* and the **kə.taŋʔ-məŋ* 掌夢 ‘being in charge of dreams’ (cf. Loewe 1993, 24-5) becomes evident with regards to Pāñcthare Limbu *maŋde:mba* respectively *maŋ-kede:mba* ~ *maŋ-kede:mba* ‘shaman’ (cf. Weidert, Subba 1985, 286-7). Furthermore, Mewahang *selemi* ‘special category of shaman’ (cf. Gaenszle 1999, 49) as well as Dumi *selemi* ‘shaman’ (cf. Rai 2017, 245) correspond to OC **sə.lən-ma* 神巫 ‘spirit magician’. Conversely, in the Māwángduì text *Shí wèn* 十問 [Ten questions] we do find the unidentified spirit-being **ma-dəŋ-daw* 巫成招 (cf. Harper 1998, 125) for which, for instance, Limbu *pʰe:daŋma* ‘priest, wizard, reduced man, shaman’ (cf. van Driem 1987: 496) offers a feasible equivalent, whereas reduced by the gender suffix *-ma* Limbu *pʰe:daŋ* is plausibly cognate with OC **paŋ-dzrəʔ* 方士 ‘ritual specialist’ (cf. Puett 2002, 242-5, 304-7). An overview of the current state of research on the controversial issue ‘Shamanism in early China’ among others shows that the pros and cons do essentially rely on a specific (and actually ambiguous) passage in the *Guó yǔ* 國語 (Discourses of the states) (cf. Michael 2015, 674-5. incl. notes 54-7, 679, 682-4 incl. fn. 71) and thereby on an intra-Chinese perspective. From a more inclusive vantage point (e.g. Sidky 2010; Williams 2020), Michael’s plaidoyer in favour was arguably beyond reasonable doubt.

⁹ The dating of the *Liè zǐ* is controversial, however, particularly the parallel in the *x Lǐ jì* 禮記 (Records of Ritual) (with a clear link to the *Chǔ cí*, cf. Schmitt, unpublished, 90v, 105v) of the following passage suggest pre-Hàn origin (cf. Loewe 1993, 29).

¹⁰ Screening at least half a dozen translations, except for a surprisingly accurate German version obviously attempting to translate the ‘modifier + modified collocations’ as compounds, for instance rendering **sə-məŋ* as ‘Sehnsuchtstraum’ and **ŋʰa-məŋ* as ‘Wachtraum’ (cf. Wilhelm 1911, 32), the most feasible account of this passage I am aware of is in French (cf. Mathieu 2012, 159). A.C. Graham, author of the “best translation into a Western language” (cf. Loewe 1993, 307), although exemplifying a “language-sensitive approach to translation” (Li 2015, 115) considers five out of six *categories* (i.e. the concerning asyndetic noun clusters) consisting each of a first noun being causally (of what actually is no more than attributively) subordinated to a second noun as if we

Beyond the correspondence between *semmaŋ* ~ *semmaŋ* ‘dream’ (< **si-* ‘to think/wish’ + **maŋ* ‘dream’) and **sə-məŋ* 思夢 ‘longing dream’, Lohorung has a corresponding form to **ŋ^fa-məŋ* 寤夢 ‘waking dream’, namely *lemmaŋ* ‘waking state’ (< *le-* ‘to know’ + *maŋ* ‘dream’, cf. van Driem, unpublished) as well.¹¹ Both *semmaŋ* and *lemmaŋ* are not only integral parts but also contrastive entities in Lohorung culture, the latter pointing at ordinary reality being perceivable while consciously awake and the former pointing to the extraordinary reality being accessible only (during spiritual journeys) in dreams and/or trance (cf. Hardman 2000, xii, xiv, 110, 176). And in the very next paragraph (only a few lines below, cf. Ho 1996, 18) we find the following passage:

西極之南隅有國焉，不知境界之所接，名古莽之國。陰陽之氣所不交，故寒暑亡辨；日月之光所不照，故晝夜亡辨。其民不食不衣而多眠。五旬一覺，以夢中所為者實，覺之所見者妄。

At the South corner of the far West there is a country, I do not know where its frontiers lie: it is named the country of Ku-mang. The Yin and Yang breaths do not meet there, so there is no distinction between cold and heat. The light of the sun and moon does not shine there, so there is no distinction between day and night. Its people do not eat or wear clothes and sleep most of the time, waking once in fifty days. *They think that what they do in dreams is real, and what they see waking is unreal.* (Graham 1960, 67; italics added; cf. Mathieu 2012, 161)

This quotation, on the one hand, reads (in part) as if it was penned by Hardman in her ethnographic study describing the Lohorung:

One *yatangpa* explained that the power of ‘seeing’ lies deep in the belly, *bok*. [...] What we can see when awake – in waking vision (*lemmaŋ*) is limited. In another vision (*semmaŋ*) restrictions of time and space and the divisions of the world disappear. It is explored, I was told, by everyone in their dreams and by *mangpa* and *yatangpa* who have been chosen to ‘see’ that aspect of the world. Other human beings have lost this ability to ‘see’ and talk to this world. They were not talking about *another* reality, *another* world, since the realms are understood as co-existing and bringing each

were rather dealing with dream *causes* here (e.g. **sə-məŋ* as ‘dreams due to thinking’, cf. Graham 1960, 66) and thereby hampers any comparative linguistic account per se.

11 Dumi offers a third correspondence (cf. van Driem 1993, 391), namely *lemmaŋ* ‘day-dream, imagination’ (< **len-* ‘day’ + **maŋ* ‘dream’) to OC **teŋ-məŋ* 正夢 ‘everyday/ordinary dream’, whereas Bahing (Western Kiranti) even suggests a fourth correspondence (cf. Hodgson 1857, 487; Opgenort 2005, 356, 360), to wit, *gná'mo* ~ *gnámung* ‘dream’ (< *(*g*)*nima* ‘fear’ + **maŋ* ‘dream’) to **g^wak-məŋ* 懼夢 ‘anxiety dream’.

other problems. The ability to ‘see’ is accepted as a valuable and authoritative way of knowing the world. (Hardman 2000, 50; italics in original)

On the other hand, the *Liè zǐ* passage to all appearances pictures a land of ascetics (such as meditating monks), so one might feel the urge to investigate Ku-mang’s whereabouts. Needless to say, the Lohorung apparently drop out from the very outset since they do know the “conceptual division into male and female areas” (Hardman 2000, 140). However, according to Mathieu: “This region is [...] obviously not localized [and] thus fictional” (2012, 161 fn. 55). Regardless, Mathieu tries to narrow down the choices by (in view of its Chinese reference) coming up with the verbatim rendering “ancient immensity” (2012, 161 fn. 56) and subsequently (with regards to content) conjecturing a “possible allusion to the almost undressed populations of the southernmost part of Asia” (2012, 161 fn. 58). In a more serious attempt, Sāng relying on local chronicles identifies the region in question as ancient Diān 滇 territory and more specifically has in mind a living Khmer speaking ethnicity (i.e. in nowadays Yúnnán 雲南 Province, China) (cf. 2006, 85). From an entirely different (and mere linguistic) angle again, namely based on the simple observation that 古莽 was also in use as a *fǎnqiē* 反切 gloss for **kʰaŋʔ* 航 ‘border[land]’ (i.e. MC *k-* 古 + MC *-aŋX* 莽 = MC *kangX* 航, cf. Chén et al. n.d., 6 [v. 3, seq. 55]), there is reason to believe that we actually are dealing with a lento form **kʰaʔ-mʰaŋʔ* here which in allegro speech obviously might designate *khams* ཁམས་ [kʰam] (in modern-day Chinese still pronounced *kāng* 康 (< **kʰaŋʔ*), in other words, Tibetan territory (slightly overlapping with Yúnnán). With regards to our context Kham ought to fit well, could bridge the *Night Train to Lisbon* distance between the Lohorung and Chángshā and would confirm the first Kirantologist *avant la lettre*, British orientalist B.H. Hodgson (1800-1894) who was convinced “that the Kirantis came from Eastern Tibet or Kham” (cf. van Driem 2001, 602).

Picking up our ‘soul’ related beginnings again, we are confronted with a complex scenario according to which in Kiranti languages exist various terms for ‘soul’ (that essentially amount to a concept of personhood), in fact virtually a handful in each language (at times intermingled with Nepali) thus constituting a nearly inextricable soul-knot which makes the comparison of this shamanistic / semireligious vocabulary challenging within Kiranti itself and even more demanding beyond. However, thanks to the meticulous ethnographic studies by Gaenszle (1991; 1999; 2002; 2021) and Hardman (1996; 2000; 2002; 2004) alongside some painstaking descriptive grammars it is feasible to get these constituents of personhood disentangled and, nota bene, to find plausible Old Chinese cognates for all of them focusing (the Upper Aruṇ branch of) Eastern Kiranti (cf. van Driem 2001, 617).

2 Lawa

We have already come across this term: *lawa* is prevalent beyond Eastern Kiranti and evidently cognate to the sesquisyllabic OC **m.q^{wf}ən* 魂 ‘spiritual soul’ – at least in part. Actually, disyllabic *maʔla* ‘spirit’ in Jero and even more so the metathetic *wala* ‘ghost, spirit’ in Sunwar (Western Kiranti) strongly suggest disyllabic Old Chinese correspondences.¹² And in view of another apparent metathesis, namely Sunwar *yabre* ‘ancestor spirit’ (also *yābre* ‘god, creator’, cf. Rapacha 2022, 393), we have reason to assume that the corresponding Jero *maʔla* at some point had medial *-r-* (< **mraʔla*) which gives us the following situation: *lawa* (= OC **r^fəŋ-q^{wf}ən* 靈魂) versus *wala* (= OC **q^{wf}ən-r^fəŋ* 魂靈) and either still *maʔla* (= OC **m.r^fəŋ-q^{wf}ən* 靈魂) or already *maʔla* (= OC **mə.q^{wf}ən* 魂). Among others the scope in Dumi [table 1] clarifies that we are not dealing with either/or (i.e. monosyllabic vs. disyllabic) but with both/and in Kiranti as well (cf. van Driem 1993, 391, 395; Opgenort 2005, 384). And again, all of this presents itself as an illustrative example for the *monosyllabification* process in Old Chinese suggested below (see fn. 19).

Table 1 *Lawa*

E→UA	Lohorung	<i>lawa</i>	soul; shadow	van Driem, unpublished;
	Mewahang	<i>lawa</i>	free-soul	Gaenszle 2002, 130;
	Yamphu	<i>lawa</i>	spirit, soul; shadow	Rutgers 1998, 552
E→GY	Chulwŋ	<i>rawa</i>	soul	Rai 2019, text 64;
	Yakkha	<i>lawa</i>	spirit, soul	Schackow 2015, 278
W→CH	Jero	<i>maʔla</i>	spirit	Opgenort 2005, 250
W→N	Sunwar	<i>wala</i> <i>yabre</i>	ghost, spirit ancestor spirit	Bieri, Schulze 1971, 11; Borchers 2008, 309
W→UD	Dumi	<i>lu: ~ la:so ~ la:wo</i> <i>lwā ~ lawa ~ so</i>	awareness, mind, soul, spirit (presence of) soul, spirit	van Driem 1993, 39; Rai 2017, 213, 216, 245
	Old Chinese	魂 <i>*m.q^{wf}ən</i>	spiritual soul	<i>passim</i>
		靈 <i>*m.r^fəŋ</i>	spirit	<i>passim</i>
		靈魂 <i>*r^fəŋ-q^{wf}ən</i>	soul	Bender 2019, 15
		魂靈 <i>*q^{wf}ən-r^fəŋ</i>	soul	Brashier 1996, 150-1

The Mewahang perceive *lawa* very similar to the Lohorung (and perhaps the Kirantis in general) as a life-force and consciousness giving small substance. The potentially free-moving *lawa* leaves the body for various causes (e.g. dream, fright, shock, surprise, illness, death etc.), in others words, although *lawa* leaving the body keeps the involved

¹² The OC equivalent for Jero *maʔla* is expected to be different from the one for Sunwar *wala*, as the latter’s supposed earlier forms *gɪwəʔ* ‘soul’ (cf. Rapacha 2022, 332) and/or Chepang *gwa.lamʔ* ‘spirit’ (cf. Caughley 2000, 453) suggest.

individual in an equally vulnerable and dangerous state, it does not imply death. In case of death though, the *lawa* wanders around as *ca:p* ‘spirit’ [table 2].

Table 2 *Cap?*

E→UA	Lohorong	<i>cap?</i>	disincarnate spirit	van Driem, unpublished;
	Mewahang	<i>ca:p</i>	(roaming) spirit, ghost	Gaenzle 2002, 131;
	Yamphu	<i>cap</i>	spirit of an ancestor	Rutgers 1998, 529
E→GY	Athpahariya	<i>cyarj</i>	soul of dead person	Ebert 1997, 240
	Yakkha	<i>cyarj</i>	spirit, soul	Schackow 2015, 30
C→KH	Kulung	<i>cap</i>	ghost, spirit of deceased	Tolsma 2006, 232
	Old Chinese 精	* <i>tseŋ</i>	(refined) essence	Sterckx 2002, 213

Yet, and this cannot be overemphasised, even the roaming *ca:p* or rather the ultimate leaving of the *lawa* is (supposed to be) temporary in nature “until it is properly integrated into the ancestral shrine” (Gaenzle 2002, 131). Everything just said (cf. van Driem 1993, 44; Gaenzle 2002, 130-1; Hardman 2000, XII, 52, 73) essentially applies to early China as well (cf. Brashier 1996, 138-46; Guo 2011, 90; Puett 2002, ch. 1; Yü 1987, 373-5).

3 *Saya*

Mewahang *saya* ‘head-soul’ is well established all over Kiranti [table 3].

Table 3 *Saya*

-	Limbu	<i>sam</i>	consciousness, spirit	van Driem 1987, 505
E→UA	Lohorong	<i>saya</i>	ancestral power, vital soul	Hardman 2004, 329;
	Mewahang	<i>saya</i>	head-soul, life-force	Gaenzle 2002, 130
E→GY	Yakkha	<i>saya</i>	head-soul	Schackow 2015, 270
C→KH	Kulung	<i>so:m</i>	breath, steam, eternal soul	Tolsma 2006, 270
W→N	Sunwar	<i>sāyā</i>	dead soul	Rapacha 2022, 417
W→UD	Dumi	<i>sa:yi</i>	life force, vital force, spirit	van Driem 1993, 416; Rai
		<i>sai ~ sayi ~ saya</i>	(presence of) soul	2017, 233, 237;
		<i>sam</i>	spirit, soul, mood	van Driem 1993, 414
-	Old Chinese 心力	* <i>səm-rək</i>	heart spirit	Liu 2020, 496

Unlike *lawa*, the invisible *saya* has special significance to prosperity (i.e. personal strength, well-being etc.) and is in close association with *tobu* ‘long life’ (= OC **tu?* 壽 ‘longevity’), *rùrù* ~ *riri* ‘life-soul’ (= OC **k-r̥u?* 考 ‘long life’ ~ OC **m-riŋ-s* 命 ‘life, fate’) and the Mewahang ritual language term *ŋalùŋ* ‘prestige, honour’ (= OC **r.ŋ̊ar-s.rək*

顏色 ‘dignity, honour’ < **r.ŋ^far* 顏 ‘face, forehead’ + **s.rək* 色 ‘color; countenance’).¹³ Depending on the ancestral satisfaction *saya* can be accumulated: it can be ‘high’ (i.e. accordance with one’s ancestors) and has to be ritually raised (*saya po:kma*) to increase or preserve its status quo. Otherwise *saya* can deteriorate and ultimately be ‘low’ (i.e. negligence of one’s ancestral obligations).¹⁴ Conceptually, *saya* reveals a high degree of similarity with (but is not limited to) OC **tseŋ-s.lən* 精神 ‘essential spirit’ which “makes a human being into a human being” (Sterckx 2002, 73), namely by the possession of intellectual awareness or rather consciousness (cf. Porkert 1974, 193-6; Roth 1991, 643-6). Anyhow, *saya* is cognate to OC **səm-rək* 心力 ‘heart spirit’ which is (covering a cognitive as well as a bodily component typically rendered ‘mind and body’, cf. Knoblock 1994, 180) again corresponding and structurally similar to Dumi *sa:yi* ‘life/vital force, spirit’ (< ‘life, body’ + ‘force’). Moreover, *saya* goes hand in hand not only with OC **səm-ʔək-s* 心意 ‘bosom’ (< ‘heart’ + ‘thought’) structurally similar to Dumi *sa:go*: ‘body; mind’ (> ‘life, body’ + ‘thought’) but also with OC **səm-ɣ^wəjʔ* 心氣 ‘heart qi’ (< ‘heart’ + ‘vapors’) which is well reflected in both Dumi *sikla* ‘the spirit of ancestors’ and Limbu *sango*: ‘life force’ and presumably linked to Limbu *səkma*, Yamphu *so:ʔma*, Athpahariya *səkma*, Chintang (Central Kiranti) *səkma:*, Bantawa (Central Kiranti) *sakma* ‘breath; life, soul’ as well as Lohorong *səkma* ‘breath’ (= OC **sək* 息 ‘breathe; breathing’), *sa:ma*, *sa:ʔe* ‘to breath’ (= OC **sə.q^həp* 吸 ‘inhale’) and so forth.¹⁵

13 OC **r.ŋ^far* 顏 (vs. **C.ŋ^frar*, cf. Baxter, Sagart 2014, 370) follows Zhang, Jacques, Lai (2019) who reconstruct preinitial **r-* instead of medial **r-* in cases with comparative evidence from Gyalrongic (cf. 2019, 77). This cognacy, well reflected in Bantawa *ŋaliŋ* ‘face, forehead’ (cf. Doornenbal 2009, 452) and most definitely in Limbu *nara* ‘face, countenance, visage’ (< *na* ‘face’ + *raŋ* ‘colour’, van Driem 1987, 473, 475, 503), provides evidence that the (repeatedly rejected) sound change from Proto-Trans-Himalayan **sr* to *s* in non-Sinitic languages (i.e. Handel’s suggested innovation, cf. Hill 2019, 198-200; Jacques 2015, 219) actually cannot be confirmed for Proto-Kiranti either (but see Jacques 2015, 220).

14 See Gaenszle 2002, 132-5; Hardman 1996, 1-2; 2000, e.g. 15 f., 141, 214, 255-60; 2002, 105-6; 2004, 336; and Schackow 2015, 30, 270 fn. 4, 278 fn. 12.

15 Cf. Doornenbal 2009, 459; van Driem 1987, 506, 514; 1993, 415; van Driem n.d.; Ebert 1997, 257; Rai et al. 2011, 150; Rai 2017, 235; Rutgers 1998, 579; Unschuld, Tesenow 2011, 94 (bosom), *passim* (heart qi). By the way, **səm* 心 arguably more often than not represents soul-related vocabulary in early China (but see Williams 2020, 158) and thereby hampers the so called ‘soul duality’ and any arguments relying on it (e.g. Williams 2020, 161-3).

4 Nùŋwa

Mewahang *nùŋwa* ‘ego-soul’, ‘mind’ or rather Lohorung *niŋwa* ‘mind, spirit’ is deep-rooted in Greater Eastern Kiranti [table 4].

Table 4 *Niŋwa*

-	Limbu	<i>niŋwa</i>	mind, memory, desire, satisfaction, intent	van Driem 1987, 480
E→UA	Lohorung	<i>niŋwa ~ nĩwa</i>	mind, spirit	van Driem n.d.
	Mewahang	<i>nùŋwa</i>	ego-soul, mind	Gaenzle 2002, 135
	Yamphu	<i>niŋa</i>	mind, heart, faculty of (...) feeling	Rutgers 1998, 552
E→GY	Athpahariya	<i>niŋwa ~ niŋgwa</i>	mind	Ebert 1997, 251
	Yakkha	<i>niŋwa</i>	mind	Schackow 2015, 281
C→KH	Kulung	<i>niwa</i>	mind	Tolsma 2006, 260
W→UD	Dumi	<i>nugo</i>	mind	Rai 2017, 431
-	Old Chinese	血氣 *ŋ ^ʰ ik-ɣ ^w əjʔ	configurational energy	<i>passim</i>

The Lohorung stress the importance of *niŋwa* development in early childhood nourishing their children to become social beings and “fully acceptable as members of the community” (Hardman 2000, 16, 183-4). Conversely, *niŋwa* serves as source of knowledge (van Driem 2001, 694) and that beyond cognition: The expression *niŋwa yamu?* (lit. the mind speaks) refers to one’s inner voice (cf. van Driem n.d.) or rather one’s gut feeling (see above for the power to ‘see’ lying in the *bək* ‘belly’), so *niŋwa* moreover constitutes a bundle of emotions and accounts for its self-control (cf. Hardman 2000, 81, 187, 211 etc.). Likewise, the corresponding Mewahang *nùŋwa* is tantamount to “the mental and emotional aspect of an individual” and responsible for a person’s “character and self-control” (Gaenzle 2002, 135-6). The concept in question shares a striking resemblance (see *niŋgwa* in Athpahariya still being nearly homophonous) to its Old Chinese cognate *ŋ^ʰik-ɣ^wəjʔ 血氣 (lit. ‘blood + vapors’) which is clearly to be considered a noun-noun compound most likely depicting an approximation of ‘configurational energy’ (cf. Harper 1998, 77 fn. 2; Porkert 1974, 186; Sterckx 2002, 73-4). Since the latter is characteristic of animated beings in general, what makes all the difference is the (e.g. animalistic, human) conduct or rather the ability to regulate/control one’s *ŋ^ʰik-ɣ^wəjʔ. Accordingly *ŋ^ʰik-ɣ^wəjʔ has great significance to sacrificial practice/religion and apart from providing the “seat of one’s *jin-gshen*” (see ‘3 saya’ above) also functions as “seat of emotions” (cf. Sterckx 2002, 73-6). Speaking of emotions, Lohorung has

no abstract word for ‘love’ or the Nepali *maya*. [...] Within the Lohorung’s own indigenous concepts all the terms near to our notion

‘love’ have components of ‘compassion’, ‘pity’, and ‘affection’ or ‘nostalgia’ rather than the sexual attachment and passion that the terms ‘love’ and *maya* evoke. (Hardman 2000, 251; italics in original)¹⁶

Instead, Lohorung does (just as other Kiranti languages do) frequently express emotions periphrastically and/or metaphorically using idiomatic expressions including the liver, lung etc. (cf. Hardman 2000, 251) and this apparent preference for embodied emotions (cf. Hardman 2004, 327, 342, 345) might be a general trait in (significant parts of) the Trans-Himalayan language family. Given that my finding with regards to OC **q'əp-s* 愛 still holds and perhaps was instrumental (cf. Riegel 2015, 39 fn. 6, 42 fn. 15), Behr’s tantalising glimpses in search of its elusive etymology elaborating on connections to **q'həp-s* 氣 ‘breath, vapors’, **niŋ* 仁 ‘to show affection for others’ and **səm* 心 ‘heart’ (cf. 2016) fit in neatly here, a fortiori in view of several Kiranti languages showing a strikingly similar interlock: e.g. Limbu *luŋma* ‘liver, heart’, Lohorung / Yakkha *luŋma* ‘liver’ = OC **lraŋ* 腸 ‘intestines’, Bantawa *som* ‘lung’, Dumi *so:m ~ somu*, Kulung *so:m* (Central Kiranti), Sunwar *soŋ* ‘breath’ = OC **səm* 心 ‘heart’, Limbu *bhəkso*: ‘lungs’ = OC **p'ot-səm* 肺心 ‘lung heart’,¹⁷ Lohorung *samluŋma* ‘heart’ = OC **səm-lraŋ* 心腸 ‘heart+intestines’¹⁸ and many more:

亟、憐、憊、惓、愛也。東齊海岱之間曰亟，自關而西秦晉之間凡相敬愛謂之亟，陳楚江淮之間曰憐，宋衛邠陶之間曰憊，或曰惓。

jí, lián, wǔ and *yān* all mean *ài* ‘to care about’. In Eastern Qí and the Hǎi-Dài regions, they say *jí*. In the Qín and Jìn regions west of the Pass, *jí* generally means ‘to mutually respect and care’. In (...) Chén-Chǔ and Jiāng-Huái, they say *lián*. In Sòng, Wèi, Bīn and Táo, they say *wǔ*, sometimes also *yān*. (Park 2017, 146-7)

Whereas these regional variants in its modern-day Mandarin Chinese pronunciation have hardly anything in common, their OC reconstructions paint a more insightful picture: the word field in question is cognate either with a vital substance, namely **q'əp-s* 愛 / **k'hək-s* 亟 = **q'həp-s* 氣 ‘breath, vapors’ or with internal organs, i.e. **m.r'ij* 憐

16 Evidence in the same vein was provided for OC **q'əp-s* 愛 ‘have / show / inspire sympathy’ (oscillating between empathy and partiality) in my MA thesis (2012). For its proof of existence, I am much obliged to Wolfgang Behr (cf. 2015, 215 fn. 57). See also Jackson et al. 2019 where Austronesian probably comes rather close to Trans-Himalayan.

17 As for Limbu *bhəkso*: ‘lungs’ and its structurally similar OC compound cognate **p'ot-səm* 肺心 ‘heart [associated with the] lung’ (Unschuld 2016, 296), consider also Nep. *p'ok-so* फोकसो ‘lungs’ (Skt. *klóman-* < PIE **pleu-mon-* ‘lung(s)’, cf. Kölligan 2018, 2232, 2266).

18 Cf. Doornenbal 2009, 462; van Driem 1987, 350; 1993, 419; Rai 2017, 361; Rapacha 2022, 423; Schackow 2015, 13; Tolsma 2006, 270.

/ *mraʔ 樵 ~ *mroʔ (>MC *mjuX*) / *ʔromʔ 惓 (> MC *'jemX*) = *lraŋ 腸 'intestines'.¹⁹ Although both unmentioned here, *mru 牟 (> MC *mjuw*) and, more importantly, *niŋ 仁 belong to the latter category. With regards to the archaic forms of 仁, (the probably largely homophonous) 懸, 忞 and even 忞 inherently suggest to be somehow embodied (see also Behr 2015, 207 fn. 28) and thus it is more than sheer speculation to consider *niŋ 仁 being cognate to *ŋ^hik 血. To all appearances, we are (in the middle of a transition period?) dealing with a lexical / regional split or rather (confirming Behr's conjecture, i.e. the substitution of *niŋ 仁 with *q^həp-s 愛, cf. 2015, 215) with the semantic shift and eventually extension from a body based, concrete, specific (intrafamily) to a substance based, abstract, nonspecific (interfamily) concept.²⁰

19 OC *p^hrak 魄 'bodily soul' (that is the counterpart to *m.q^wən 魂) = *p^hrak 霸 'new moon' = *b^hrak 白 'white' was to be located here, corresponding to metathetic *la:b* 'moon' and *p^hɔ* 'white' in Limbu (cf. van Driem 1987, 453, 500; Schuessler 2007, 417). With regards to our context (i.e. *C.q^wəp-s 氣 = *m.q^wən 魂), it suggests itself to consider *p^hrak 魄 = *ŋ^hik 血 being cognate (see also Lai 2015, 44-5; Porkert 1974, 186), all the more so in view of their homorganic initials. Circumstantial evidence from Kiranti supports this: Limbu *ma:k^hi* ~ *makk^hi* 'blood' (cf. van Driem 1987, 464; Weidert, Subba 1985, 285) = *ŋ^hik-q^həp-s 血氣 most likely underwent semantic narrowing and - considering the most frequent form in Central Kiranti as well as parts of Western Kiranti (i.e. Upper Dudhkosi) being *hi* ~ *hi*: ~ *hū* ~ *hi* 'blood' - if not semantic shifting (i.e. *ŋ^hik 血 (> MC *xwet*) = *q^həp-s 氣) then - according to the most common rime books - phonetic contraction (i.e. *cwfit 血 (> MC *hwet*)), a fortiori since e.g. in Dumi *hi*: [hi:] 'blood' the voiced glottal fricative [ɦ] is articulated virtually the same as a voiced aspirated velar stop [g^h] (cf. van Driem 1993, 55 fn. 16). Conversely, perhaps something quite similar happened from the opposite direction: The apparent metatheses in Chintang *miciniŋ* 'mind, thought, attention' (presumably revealing a preserved loose preinitial) as well as Chintang *ha:li*, Yamphu *hali*, Athpahariya *helik*, Yakkha *hali*, Lohorong *hali* 'blood' and its derivative *hara:pa* 'red' (cf. van Driem n.d.; Ebert 1997, 243; Rai et al. 2011, 118, 163; Rutgers 1998, 536; Schackow 2015, *passim*) perhaps went through even more straightforward developments since their Old Chinese compound cognate *mə.q^həps-ŋ^hik 氣血 is also (though less frequently) attested in the *textus receptus*. These scenarios perhaps both indicate an Old Chinese transition from disyllabic *ŋ^hik-q^həp-s 血氣 to sesquyllabic *mə.q^həp-s 氣 and ultimately monosyllabic *q^həp-s 氣 while leading to co-existing variants: Tilung (Central Kiranti) still preserves both *hi* and *rək^hti* 'blood' (cf. Opgenort 2014, 381, 387). By consequence, while the proposed (voiceless bilabial) nasal initial for *ŋ^hik 血 (> MC *xwet*) proves to be correct (cf. Sagart 1999, 173), the comparative data from Kiranti made the reconstruction of a medial -r- plausible (thereby corroborating the suggested cognacy OC *ŋ^hik 血 'blood' = *C.m^hrik 脈 'vein' by Sagart, cf. 1999, 178 fn. 5) as well as an initial n- conceivable.

20 Was the well-known attack in *Mèng zǐ* 孟子 3B9 against two other schools of thought (cf. Riegel 2015, 53) ultimately a fierce polemic against the unstoppable language (and culture) change by an equally foxy and conservative politician?

5 Same

Last, but not least, the fourth constituent *same* is widespread all over Eastern Kiranti territory and beyond [table 5].

Table 5 *Same*

	Limbu	<i>sammaŋ</i>	household deity	van Driem 1987, 506
E→UA	Lohorung	<i>same?</i>	clan	van Driem n.d.
	Mewahang	<i>same</i>	ancestral identity	Gaenzle 2002, 136-7
	Yamphu	<i>samet</i>	together with	Rutgers 1998, 529
E→GY	Athpahariya	<i>sammaŋ</i>	ancestor deity	Ebert 1997, 129
	Yakkha	<i>sametliŋ</i>	spiritual clan	Schackow 2015, 30
		<i>sameʔc^hoŋ</i>	proto-clan	Schackow 2015, 61
W→CH	Jero	<i>sama_m</i>	deity, god, supernatural being	Opgenort 2005, 265
W→UD	Dumi	<i>sa:me</i>	clan	van Driem 1993, 415
		<i>same(t)</i>	lineages	Rai 2017, ii
	Old Chinese 先民	*s ^ʰ ər-miŋ	ancestors	<i>passim</i>

The inevitably gender-specific *same* ‘ancestral identity’ collectivizes the members of a certain kinship group and provides them an all-around social identity (implying a proto-clan) which is even retained in case of a clan split and the communication with the ancestors (cf. Gaenzle 2002, 136-7; Hardman 2000, 121-5). *Same* is cognate with *s^ʰər-miŋ* 先民 ‘ancestors’ and conceptually linked to *k^hiŋ-dz^ʰok 宗族 (> MC *khowng-dzuwk*) ‘ancestral clan’ (< ‘lineage’ + ‘sib’), perhaps best preserved in Limbu *hɔŋsa* ‘spirit of the deceased’ and Dumi *hoŋsa* ‘immortal soul’ (cf. van Driem 1987, 426; 1993, 380). In some Kiranti languages the concept underwent semantic bleaching, extension or even shift to the point of being virtually no longer recognizable: for instance, Yamphu *samet* ‘together with’ very likely is an outgrowth of **samet* ‘spiritual clan’ or similar, possibly owing to the Nepali loan *ja:t* जात ‘caste, tribe’.

It goes without saying that what we have seen so far is actually just the tip of the iceberg,²¹ providing the necessary context in order to briefly zoom in on the gist of this paper which manifests itself most clearly in the Upper Arun branch and is in evidence in (at least to some degree mutually intelligible) Lohorung and Yamphu (cf. van Driem 2001, 689 ff.), namely the *maŋsu?* ‘household shrine’:²²

²¹ The coherence among ‘Kiranti’ languages has been challenged from ‘within’ recently (cf. Gerber, Grollmann 2018), to do so from ‘without’ (by reconsidering Old Chinese) arguably is a desideratum and was part of my MA thesis (2022).

²² Whereas the possibly related Korean *mansin* 萬神 ‘shaman’ (cf. Kendall 1984, 216) apparently is of post-Hàn origin, interestingly enough, Old Chinese **mraŋ-s.lən* 明神 ‘ancestral spirits’ is virtually homophonous to the both rarely attested OC **mraŋ-tseŋ* 明旌 ‘ancestral banner’ (see Wu 1992, 116-17 fn. 23; 121 fn. 29) also known as **m^ʰeŋ-tseŋ*

Table 6 *Maŋsu?*

E→UA	Lohorung	<i>maŋsu?</i>	household shrine/deities	van Driem n.d.
	Mewahan	<i>maŋsewa</i>	<i>maŋsewa</i> -deity	Gaenszle 1991, 299
	Yamphu	<i>maŋsuk</i>	ancestor shrine	Rutgers 1998, 555, <i>passim</i>
	Old Chinese 明神	* <i>mraŋ-s.ləŋ</i>	ancestral spirits	<i>passim</i>

This particular shrine is (just as its Mewahang equivalent, cf. Gaenszle 2002, 120) not only situated in the “most sacred section of domestic space”, i.e. in the inner chamber (*bεŋto?wa*) of a Lohorung house, but also “regarded as the seat of the ancestors”, unsurprisingly then, *maŋsu?* may also refer to the ibidem worshipped household deities (cf. van Driem n.d.). Considering how the term *maŋsu?* is composed (namely of *maŋ* ‘spirit’ and *su:ʔma* ‘shinny up (a tree or pole)’, cf. van Driem, unpublished) Hardman suggests the gloss ‘soul ladder’ which “is related to the idea that the *lawā* [...] of a dead person climbs the *mangasuk* and from there ascends to the residence of dead ancestors” (2000, 141-2). Thus, the *maŋsu?* plays a significant part in defining a Lohorung house or rather its inhabitants’ identity as well as in acknowledging the bond with one’s ancestors. Accordingly, the description of constructing a *maŋsu?* chimes in perfectly with building a house (cf. 2000, 143). And yet:

the shrine is more than just a structural *replica of the house*. In performance both the shrine and the house clearly become *microcosms* of the universe, both of them independently representing the *three cosmic zones*, the subterranean world, the world of the living (the earth), and the sky. (Hardman 2000, 145; italics added)

Naming all the key words (see above in italics)²³ apart from its (ladder rungs) bamboo fronds and, most notably, its T-shape (cf. Hardman 2000, 142 ff.), one might actually take the *maŋsu?* (not only linguistically but also visually) for the T-shaped silk banner from Mǎwángdūi with its “remains of a bamboo frame” (Hay 1973, 98) [figs 1-2].²⁴

According to Hardman (cf. 1990, 236 fig. 3; 2000, 94-6, 144-6, 168) the upper section of the *maŋsu?* is divided into three compartments, namely in the following order (from left to right).

銘旌 ‘name banner’, as well as OC **mraŋ-s.ləŋ* 明祀 ‘ancestral sacrifices/shrine’ and the latter’s even structurally similar pendant in Sunwar *mul laga*: ‘main shrine’ also known as *yabre laga*: ‘ancestor shrine’ (< ‘ancestor’ + ‘shrine’) indicates a prevalent Kiranti phenomenon (cf. Borchers 2008, 289, 309; Egli 2014, 195 incl. fn. 1).

²³ Cf. Guo 2011, 93; Wu 1992, 138; Wang 2011, 38 (house setting), 57-8 (microcosm); Wu 1992, 125; Hay 1973, 98; Wu 1992, 124-5 (three cosmic zones).

²⁴ Figures 1 and 2 are reproduced with kind permission of Dr. Charlotte E. Hardman (Durham University) and Prof. Dr. Eugene Y. Wang (Harvard University), respectively.




Figure 1 Sketch of a Lohorong *magsu*? (cf. Hardman 1990, 236 fig. 3)



Figure 2 T-shaped banner from Mǎwángdūi (cf. Wang 2011, 40 fig. 3)

Table 7.1 *Yimi*

	Limbu	<i>yuma</i>	household goddess	van Driem 1987, 548
E→UA	Lohorung	<i>yimi ~ yi-/yumaŋ</i>	house ancestor	Hardman 2001, 140
W→UD	Dumi	<i>ya'ri:</i>	devine oracle, prophecy	van Driem 1993, 30, 189
	Old Chinese	神明 <i>*s.lən-mraŋ</i>	spiritual illumination	Wang 2011, 54, 61

Table 7.2 *k^ham(m)aŋ*

	Limbu	<i>k^hamma</i>	dwelling place in the hereafter	van Driem 1987, 548
E→UA	Lohorung	<i>k^hammaŋ</i>	house ancestor	Hardman 2001, 140
	Mewahang	<i>k^hamaŋ</i>	household shrine/deity	Gaenzle 2002, 55, 120
	Old Chinese	祖廟 <i>*k^haŋ-mraw-s</i>	ancestral shrine/temple	passim

Table 7.3 *Boŋbi*

E→UA	Lohorung	<i>boŋbi</i> <i>baŋbi</i>	water serpents; primeval snake ancestors	Hardman 2001, 140 van Driem n.d.
	Old Chinese	雄虺 <i>*ɕ^wəŋ-ŋəiʔ</i> 王虺 <i>*ɕ^waŋ-ŋəiʔ</i>	great (nine-headed) serpent python	Hawkes 1985, 128, 224 Hawkes 1985, 233

The Old Chinese pendants do consider that Lohorung *yimi* and *k^hammaŋ* “are almost entirely represented in abstract terms, with few human characteristics” (Hardman 2000, 94). Speaking of the latter, the Mewahang *khaman* ‘household deity/shrine’ itself remarkably similar to the *maŋsu?* in function (cf. Gaenzle 2002, 120-1, 237) yet rather different in appearance (cf. 2002, 238, fig. 10) and wording, eventually turned out to be a core element within the *maŋsu?*. Conversely, the Lohorung *boŋbi* ‘primeval snake’ (aka *nāgi* in Mewahang) in an outer compartment of the *maŋsu?* is “considered to be very significant in the creation of the world” (Hardman 2000, 134). Whether the half-human, half-serpent figure placed top-center in the T-shaped silk banner, arguably right above the (in Kiranti nomenclature) *k^ham(m)aŋ* actually depicts **nra-graj* 女岐 ‘Mother Star’ (cf. Wang 2011, 58) or **nra-k^wra* 女媧 ‘Mother goddess’ (cf. Silbergeld 1982-83, 81) is linguistically speaking all the same since in any case the link to the pan-Kiranti *na:ɡ^hi* ‘ceremony, rituals; rainbow’ (cf. van Driem 1993, 41) is a given. By the way, whereas the preference for among others snakes in Chǔ religious iconography is well known (cf. Major 1999, 129), all three of these half-serpent figures are referred to in the same chapter of the *Verses of Chu* (cf. Hawkes 1985, 127 [Mother Star], 128 [great (nine-headed) serpent], 130 [Nü wa]), not to mention that the creation myths in Kiranti and early China do significantly overlap each other (cf. Gaenzle 1991, 252-7; 2002, 51-2; Hardman 2000, 171 fn. 7).

Moreover, the *maŋsu?* is attached to the wall (cf. Hardman 2000, 142-3 including fig. 10) whereas the T-shaped silk banner’s “stick hanger at the top” indicates that it “had been lofted or hung somewhere” (Wang 2011, 45). In short, we have reasonable cause to dwell a little bit more on this in terms of a *Gedankenexperiment* (i.e. thought experiment): given that the structural similarity between the *maŋsu?* and the T-shaped silk banner from Mǎwángduī ties (concepts of or rather practices for the otherworld of) Upper Aruñ Kiranti and early Chǔ Chinese undeniably together, and following Guo’s conclusion (neatly summarising the state of research) according to which in the light of coexisting multilayered beliefs during Hàn China, the scholarly suggested (prima facie contradicting) narratives are not mutually exclusive (cf. 2011, 95; see also Wu 1992, 142), we might highlight the add-on that this unexpectedly holds even within essentially one and the same otherworldly belief system. In other words, from a less black-or-white or rather a more syncretistic perspective, (many of) the suggested outlines for or in conjunction with the **pəj-ʔrəj* 非衣 (aka **pər-ʔrəj* 飛衣) ‘flying garment’ did – mutatis mutandis – provide valuable pieces en route to complete the complex jigsaw puzzle: What if the T-shaped silk banner is not either-or,²⁵ but both a “name banner” (Wu 1992, 116-17 fn. 23; 121 fn. 29) and a “soul-summoning garment” (Wang 2011, 45)²⁶ perhaps while symbolically evoking the idea of a “burial shroud” (Yü 1987, 368; cf. Wang 2011, 78 fn. 18) symbolising a portable *maŋsuk* ‘ancestor shrine’ (Rutgers 1998, 555)? What if the Mǎwángduī tomb was indeed aimed at being the suggested “happy home” (Wu 1992, 125, 138-9), however, due to its nonpermanent nature in fact functioning as a “waystation” (Lai 2005, 33 fn. 120, 42; 2015, 1, 76, 186),²⁷ the very first in the supposed bureaucracy machinery (cf. Guo 2011, 90-1, 96-8, 101-3) or so to speak the

25 Likewise, Chǔ 楚 culture might be (in part) distinctly southern and still essentially Chinese (but see Hunter 2019, 114-15), considering that the former shows population intermingling (cf. Flad, Chen 2013, 277; Peters 1999, 108-9) and the latter is an amalgam (cf. van Driem 2021, 81) that hardly meets the *Reinheitsgebot* (i.e. purity order) of a German beer. See also Williams 2020, 148 (incl. fn. 2) for a similar train of thought in favour of “Chu’s dual identity”.

26 Comparing **pəj-ʔrəj* 非衣 and **m’eŋ-tseŋ* 銘旌, the initials/finals of the involved syllables are all (nearly) homorganic. The name banner was perhaps intended less for the identification of the deceased by others (cf. Wu 1992, 117) but rather in lieu of a *place card* for the wandering *lawā* aka *cap?*. Note that the evidence contra the *fěiyī* 飛衣 [...], for instance, suggested by Wu (reading Silbergeld 1982-83 against the grain) in favor of his own commentary-based interpretation is razor thin (cf. 1992, 116 fn. 18, 117-18) and elsewhere virtually nonexistent (see Gāo 2019, 65-6).

27 Conversely, Lai questions the “happy home” scenario per se (cf. 2005, 4-5). Regardless, the deceased actually resembles a ‘tourist’ (sociotype), i.e. a traveler who (as a local at heart) hopes for the familiar in the distance (cf. Merz-Benz, Wagner 2002, 20-1, 35).

only legal access point to the final destinations?²⁸ And so on and so forth. A showcase in this respect was, for instance, Gerhard Schmitt (1933-2017), erudite scholar and aficionado of the *Chǔ cí* 楚辭 (cf. Behr 2018, 18-19) who in his curiosity-driven research already decades ago left no doubt that the T-shaped silk banner from Mǎwángdūi is to be seen in the soul summoning context functioning as an attractant to lure the **m.q^{wf}ən* 魂, to beckon it by presenting its cloth (i.e. **pər-ʔrəj* 飛衣) and to protect it (by means of the **pəj-ʔrəj* 非衣 deceiving the demons) mediating its returning home (cf. Schmitt, unpublished, e.g. 4r-v, 14r, 17v, 117r) and ultimately becoming a “good ancestor” supporting the bereaved (cf. Gaenszle 1999, 50-1; Lai 2015, 165; Puett 2011, 226, 246).²⁹ Schmitt’s magic touch to anticipate much of the regarding discussion to this day was thinking outside the box (cf. Behr 2018, 18). Yet, current trends (if at all) casually draw comparisons between accounts of religious characteristics in Hàn China and contemporary Taiwan (cf. Brashier 1996, 135 fn. 42; Guo 2011, 102), and although any possible insight out of that:

derives from studies of modern Chinese religious practices, it might also be relevant to our discussion of their forerunner in the Han. (Guo 2011, 102)

Granted that *that* or even the tempting Sino-Iranian hypothesis (cf. Williams 2020, 161-3) is not comparing incommensurables, the culturally and linguistically less remote Kiranti heartland should be qualified to search for and eventually find some missing links, *nota bene* not to give (more convincing) new answers, but (considering the more plausible old one’s) to facilitate better questions.³⁰

28 In Eastern Kiranti (Upper Aruṅ) these are associated with “heaven” (Gaenszle 2021, 451-2; Hardmann 2000, 142-3) which is eligible for early China as well (cf. Lai 2015, 165) or rather cannot be ruled out for being “a dangerous place” (Guo 2011, 94; Wu 1992, 125) since all the dangers (mentioned in the regarding *Chǔ cí* 楚辭 passage) are not lurking in but merely *on the way* to heaven (cf. Schmitt, unpublished, 189r).

29 Arguably that and not the lifesaving attempt is the primary goal (see Puett 2011, 226; Wang 2011, 42, 45). Yet, this core function of the soul-summoning ritual remains largely unidentified (cf. Hunter 2019, 136; Williams 2020, 159; Wu 1992, 114-15)

30 Given the “absolute absence of ethnographic possibility” (Michael 2015, 656 fn. 14) to study early China, this paper attempts to approach a blind spot by, on the one hand, connecting independently operating fields of study (as a *Prospektion* [i.e. field survey] towards a further stage of research) and, on the other hand, initiating the proper revisit of Sino-Kiranti (i.e. the ‘default’ structure of Trans-Himalayan as such). Both goals or rather pillars of the ladder do lead to an intrinsically tied ethnolinguistic view.

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The Meaning and Etymology of *ārya*

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Abstract The present paper considers the issue of the Sanskrit term *ārya*, starting from the use of *ārya* and *arya* as ‘freeman’ and ‘owner’ in opposition to *dāsa* ‘servant’ (or *śūdra*), from the Vedas to the *Arthaśāstra* and Pāli texts (in the form *ayya*). The original meaning is here interpreted as based on social classes rather than ethnic differences, although foreign populations could be considered as belonging to the *dāsa* or *śūdra* class. This social meaning can be found also in the Irish cognate *aire* ‘freeman, noble’, and in Iranic cognates like Middle Persian *ērīh* ‘nobility’. Derived terms from *arya/ārya* often have an honorific use, and from the social meaning, also a moral and spiritual meaning could be developed, which is more easily explained from the concept of ‘noble’ and ‘freeman’ than from that of an ethnic identity or kinship. If the original meaning of Indo-European **aryos* was ‘freeman, noble’, it can be compared with the Afro-Asiatic root **har-* ‘(vb.) to be superior, to be higher in status or rank, to be above or over; (n.) nobleman, master, chief, superior; (adj.) free-born, noble’. We can have thus to do with concepts of nobility and freedom developed in the common cultural frame of a society where slavery and social stratification were evolving.

Keywords Sanskrit Lexicology. Vedas. Buddhist Studies. Jainism. Indo-European Historical Linguistics. Afro-asiatic Linguistics.



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The Sanskrit term *ārya* is one of the most important in the history of Indo-European studies. Anquetil-Duperron in 1771 published a translation of the Avesta and used the term *arien* for the Avestan ethnic name *airya*. The same term and the Sanskrit *ārya* were then rendered in German with *Arier*, which Friedrich Schlegel in 1819 applied to define the original people from where not only Indians and Iranians, but also Germans descended, as he allegedly proved by the German word *Ehre* 'honour' and ancient Germanic names with *Ari-* or *Ario-* (Schlegel 1819, 458-62). In 1830, Lassen proposed to use the term *Arier*, being a real self-definition and not an artificial label, for the Indo-Europeans in general.¹ Eugène Burnouf, in his *Commentaire sur le Yaçna*,² accepted Lassen's proposal through the French form *arien*, which was used also by Adolphe Pictet in this sense.³ Max Müller promoted the same use of the term in the English form *Aryan* from the first volume of his *Lectures on the Science of Language* (1861).⁴ The linguistic concept was naturally connected with the idea of an original people of speakers of the Aryan language, called *Aryas* by Pictet and 'ancestors of the Aryan race' by Max Müller, and placed, following the Avesta, in Bactria or more vaguely on the highlands of Central Asia. The idea of a special Aryan race whose self-definition meant 'honourable' (Gobineau 1853-55, 2: 309) fascinated the theorist of racism Arthur de Gobineau, who in his *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* promoted the idea of a superior white and blonde race of conquerors, called *Arians*, which in Europe was most purely represented by the Germanic race. Müller later criticised the racial notion of Aryan:

I have declared again and again that if I say Aryas, I mean neither blood nor bones, nor hair nor skull; I mean simply those who speak an Aryan language. [...] To me an ethnologist who speaks of Aryan race, Aryan blood, Aryan eyes and hair, is as great a sinner as a linguist who speaks of a dolichocephalic dictionary or a brachycephalic grammar. (Müller 1888, 120)⁵

1 Lassen 1930, 70-1 fn.*. He wrongly connected with the same name the Germanic tribe of the *Arii* (a more correct variant is *Harii*) mentioned by Tacitus.

2 See Burnouf (1833, LIV, 460-2 fn. 525), where he proposes that *arya* was an adjective meaning *excellent*, *supérieur* (as the Indian lexicographers say), and that it was used as a title by the Aryan peoples (*peuples ariens*) to distinguish themselves from their neighbours as 'the best ones' (*les meilleurs*) or 'the brave ones' (*les braves*).

3 Pictet 1837, 170-5; 1857, 60; 1859, 3-6, 27-34. In the last work he also uses the term *Arya* itself to indicate the proto-Indo-Europeans, and he justifies this use with Irish terms that in his opinion were related to *arya*.

4 Cf. Müller 1866, 266-80.

5 Müller (1888, 90) explains his use of these terms: "if we speak of Aryan race at all, we should know that it means no more than x+Aryan speech".

In spite of Max Müller, this sin apparently became more and more popular at that time: in 1899, the French anthropologist Vacher de Lapouge titled a work *L'Aryen*, identifying the Aryan man with a racial type (blonde and dolichocephalic) called *Homo europaeus*, not because he was convinced about this use of the term, but because it was so popular at his time (Vacher de Lapouge 1899, 1-5, 22-3). Then, it became part of a political agenda through Nazism and Fascism in the following century, so that in the West the concept of Aryan is still naturally associated with those ideologies, while in the scientific field it has survived mainly in the notion of Indo-Aryan languages.

About the etymology of the term, many hypotheses have been made,⁶ the most detailed being that of Paul Thieme, who derived the term from *arí* interpreted as 'stranger', being the source of *aryá* 'related to strangers, hospitable master of the household', which finally gives *ārya* as a self-definition of a civilised people that is kind with guests. I find this interpretation too speculative and artificial, starting from the translation of *arí* as 'stranger, foreigner' (*Fremder, Fremdling*), that is imposed on the Rigvedic passages, but it is not supported by the Indian tradition. The meaning of this term has been very much debated, and according to the interpretations of several scholars,⁷ it has sometimes a positive and sometimes a negative meaning: only this

6 Cf. KEWA 1: 49, 52, 79, where Mayrhofer follows Thieme and, about *aríh*, Specht, who derived it from **al-i-* (lat. *alius*). However, the term corresponding to lat. *alius* 'other' in Sanskrit is *anya*, in Avestan *aniia*, in Old Persian *aniya*. In EWA 1: 111-12, 174-5, he still accepts the connection of *arí*, *āryalaryá* and *ārya*, but he also cites Brereton's interpretation of *aryá* as 'one who shares in the Vedic culture', therefore he compares it with Hittite *ara* 'belonging to one's own social group' and mentions also Szemerényi and his derivation of these terms from Ugaritic *āry* 'relative, family member, companion'. The idea that Aryans could take this Ugaritic loanword and bring it to India is quite impossible to accept, and of course goes against the existence of an Indo-European root **aryo-*. According to Ward (1961, 32), Ugaritic *āry* (parallel to 'son' or 'brother') has no Semitic etymology and can be borrowed from Egyptian *īry* 'companion'.

For another etymology of *arí*, *aryá* and *ārya*, see also Pooth (2015, 106-10), who criticises Thieme and sees as primary meaning of *arí* "Vortrefflicher; Edelmann" ('excellent; noble'), from a nominal stem **h1ari-* "trefflich; etw./j. treffend" 'excellent, meeting sth./sb.'. So, *ārya* would have the meaning "die Wahrhaft-Vortrefflichen, (gemäß Ritus) Vortrefflichen" ('the really excellent ones, (according to rite) excellent ones').

7 Cf. MW, 87, where the first meaning of *arí* is "attached to, faithful; a faithful or devoted or pious man", the second one 'not liberal, envious, hostile; an enemy'. Grassmann (1955, 105; italics added) based his interpretation on the meaning: "regsam, strebsam" ('active, industrious') from the root *ar*, especially in the sense "sich erregen, sich regen" ('to get excited, to move'). From this common concept he proposed an evolution towards three different meanings: "*den Göttern zustrebend, fromm*" ('striving towards the gods, pious'), "*den Schätzen zustrebend, habsüchtig, geizig*" ('striving towards treasures, greedy, avaricious') and "*widerstrebend, feindlich*" ('striving against, hostile'), from the meaning of *ar* "gegen jemand andringen, ihn treffen, verletzen, verwunden" ('to rush against someone, meeting, hurting, injuring him'). BR, 101 also distinguished two meanings, but the first one, from the root *ar*, is not especially positive: "*aufstrebend verlangend, begierig, anhänglich*" ('(aspiring) demanding, eager, attached'), and the second one is derived from *a-rá* 'not giving', giving the sense "*knickerig, karg, miss-*

one has been preserved in Classical Sanskrit, where *ari* means ‘enemy’ (not ‘stranger’) and is used in numerous compounds.

Yāska in Nir 5.7 says: *arir amitra⁸ ṛcchater īśvaras apy arir etasmād eva* (*ari* is an enemy, from the root of *ṛcchati* (‘to go against, attack, hurt’); a master (or lord) is also *ari*, from the same root (in the sense ‘to reach, obtain?’).⁹

Geldner (Pischel, Geldner 1901, 72-97) accepted this explanation and proposed as first meaning “‘reich’ und ‘der Reich, Mächtiger, der vornehme Herr, Patron, Gebieter’” (‘rich; the rich, mighty, the distinguished lord, patron, master’). He also remarked an opposition of *arí* and *vísva* ‘all’, interpreted as an opposition between the rich and the mass of the poor people.¹⁰ Then, he distinguished a special use of this meaning for the *maghāvan*, the patron or lord of the sacrifice (*Opferherr*), in some cases as an epithet of the god Indra. The negative meaning, in his interpretation, developed from a negative view of the rich as greedy and miser, and from the rivalry between rich *yajamānas*, that brought to the meaning of ‘patron of the opposite party’ and ‘rival’, finally ‘enemy’ (*Feind*).¹¹ In his translation of the *Ṛgveda* (Geldner 1951), he generally used for the negative sense *Nebenbuhler* (‘rival’), and *der hohe Herr* (‘the high lord’) for the first sense, thus stressing the social rank rather than economic wealth. Bloomfield (1925, 160-8) criticised Geldner’s proposal of semantic evolution towards the negative meaning, asking why terms with a similar meaning of ‘lord, patron of sacrifices’ like *sūri* and *maghāvan* have not followed the same evolution. In his view, the word *arí* started with the meaning of ‘noble’ or ‘gentleman’, and it was used for the patron (*yajamāna*), but also for the ‘noble priest’, ‘high or supervising priest’ (Purohita or Brahman) and arrived to mean ‘rival’ in the rivalry of priests at the sacrifice.

günstig; (gegen die Götter) unfrohm” (‘niggardly, stingy, jealous; (against the gods) impious’) and “*feindselig, subst. Feind*” (‘hostile, enemy’).

8 For the correspondence of *ari* and *amitra* cf. RV 7.60.11 (*manyúm... aryāḥ*), 6.25.2 and 10.125.3 (*amitrasya... manyúm*), where *manyú* can be translated ‘fury, wrath’ of the enemy.

9 Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by the Author.

10 Cf. RV 6.45.33; 8.94.3, where we find the phrase *vísve aryá á*, translated by Geldner (1951, 2: 142, 420) “*alle, auch die hohen Herren*”; 8.1.22, where we find *viśvágūrto ariṣṭutāh*, translated by Geldner (280) as “*der von aller Welt Gelobte, von dem hohen Herrn Gepriesene*”, with the note “*dem Opferherrn*” (‘by the lord of the sacrifice’).

11 A similar view is that of Palihawadana (2018, 33): “if the word carries the meanings ‘foe’ and ‘lord’, the latter could well have been the original sense. If the chief (lord) turns out to be hostile for some reason or other, then in the very position of chief he may become the object of one’s displeasure and opposition. The one sense (‘lord’) would be the word’s denotation, while the other (‘foe’) would be one of its significant connotations”. Palihawadana, however, justifies the negative view of the *arí* because he belonged to a social and ideological category of Aryan chiefs opposed to that of the *sūri*, the patron of the *Ṛgvedic* poets, but if the negative meaning of *arí* does not derive from the meaning ‘lord’, and simply indicates any enemy or rival as in later Sanskrit, this interpretation is not justified.

Now, instead of imposing a dubious semantic evolution, I am inclined to consider the possibility of two different senses from two different roots¹² of this short term: on one hand, ‘enemy, hostile’, that can be connected with *ḥti* ‘assault, attack’, *ṛti* ‘painful occurrence, pain, injury, mischief’, *ṛta* ‘pained, injured’, *sam-ará* ‘hostile encounter, conflict, struggle, war, battle’, and is present also in Old Persian *arika* ‘treacherous, evil, hostile’, and probably in Greek ἔρις ‘strife, quarrel, contention’,¹³ on the other hand, a sense connected with a social status of master or lord,¹⁴ possibly connected, as Geldner (Pischel, Geldner 1901, 94) proposed, with the same root of *āritá* (‘praised’) and *āryanti* (‘they praise’, in RV 8.16.6; 10.48.3), which Sāyaṇa glosses *īśvaram kurvanti* (‘they render lord’). We can suppose that originally there were two words with two different initial laryngeals, and, when the laryngeals were lost and the meaning ‘enemy’ became more frequent, in order to avoid ambiguity, for the second sense *arí* was replaced by the derived or parallel term (with *-ya* instead of *-i* suffix) *arya*. In fact, the meaning *īśvara* ‘master, lord’ is given also to *arya* by Yāska in Nir 5.9 and 13.4. This meaning is confirmed also by Pāṇini, who identifies *arya* with *svāmin* ‘master, owner, lord’ and with *vaiśya*,¹⁵

12 Bailey (1959, 85, 92-3, 106-7) sees *arí* as ‘owner’ from a root **ar-* ‘to get; possess, own’, that is however hypothetical for Indo-Iranian, and *arí* (Atharvavedic *ari*) as ‘foe’ from a root *ar-* ‘to attack’, connected with *ṛti* ‘attack’. Pooth (2015, 94, 108-9) sees a single root **h1er/*h1ar-* ‘[an x] *geraten*, [zu, in x] *gelangen*’ (‘to come across/by x; to reach, to get x’) giving the nominal stem **h1,ari-* ‘*trefflich; etw./j. treffend; der/das getroffen wird*’ (‘excellent, meeting sth./sb.; who/that is met’, from which both *arí* ‘nobleman’ and *arí* ‘guest; enemy’ are derived. However, it seems very unlikely that the same root could give these two different meanings.

13 The terms *ṛti*, *ṛti*, *sam-ara* and ἔρις were referred by Pokorny (1959, 326-30) to the same root 3.*er-/or-/r-* ‘to start moving, excite (also mentally, annoy, irritate); to raise (elevation, to grow tall)’. He also derived from that root Old Church Slavonic *ratb* ‘conflict’ (329). EWA 1, 196 connects ἔρις with *irin* ‘powerful, violent’ and *irya* ‘active, powerful’. Both terms were derived by Pokorny (1959, 327) from the same root. Pooth (2015, 99) sees ἔρις as derived from **h1eri-*, a *nomen actionis* with the meaning “*Treffen, Aufeinandertreffen, Aneinandergeraten, Zusammenstoßen, Zusammenkommen*” (‘meeting, clash, coming to blows, colliding, coming together’).

14 As remarked by Palihawadana (1970, 2): “The one thing that is quite certain about the word *ari* in the RV is that it consistently refers to a rich and powerful person, a chief of one sort or another. In this capacity, the ‘*ari*’ appears in many hymns as a devout and generous employer or benefactor of Vedic priest-magicians, the *ṛṣi-s*”. Cf. Aguilar i Matas (1991, 25-6) and Pooth (2015, 107-8), the latter considers the meaning ‘nobleman’ much better than ‘stranger’ for some passages of the R̥gveda.

15 Pāṇ 3.1.103: *aryaḥ svāmi-vaiśyayoḥ* (the word *arya* is irregularly formed when meaning ‘lord’ and a ‘Vaiśya’). According to the commentary (Vasu 1894, 387), the irregularity is in the use of *arya* instead of *ārya* from the root *r*. Moreover, the *udāta* accent falls on the last syllable instead of the first one. It is also said that, when we refer not to a lord or a Vaiśya (*aryaḥ svāmi* ‘honoured lord’, *aryo vaiśyaḥ* ‘honoured Vaiśya’), we use *ārya*, like *āryo brāhmaṇaḥ* ‘the respectable Brahmin’. The epithet *ārya* was so typically applied to Brahmins that in MBh 3.186.33 we read that at the end of this degenerate age Śūdras will say *bho* (like Brahmins) while Brahmins will say *ārya* (to the other castes): *yugānte samanuprāpte... bhovādinas tathā śūdrā brāhmaṇās cāryavādinaḥ*.

and it is admitted also by Thieme for the late Vedic form *ārya*, which is also found in opposition with *sūdrá* in VS 20.17 and 23.30-1.¹⁶ An analogous opposition is found in the Atharvaveda (possibly with *ārya*,¹⁷ see AV 4.20.4; 4.20.8; 19.62.1). According to Thieme (1938, 90-5), this opposition is between ‘master’ (*Herr*) and ‘servant, slave’ (*Magd/Knecht*) and not between Aryan (*Arier*) and member of the *sūdra* caste. However, *sūdra* is a technical term for the members of a social class distinct from the *Āryas*, and if we interpret *ārya* like Debrunner (1939b, 147) as indicating the race of the master¹⁸ (*ārya*), there is not a neat distinction between *arya* and *ārya*. Yāska in Nir 6.26 defined *ārya* as *īśvara-putraḥ* ‘son of a lord’: *ārya* can be both an adjective that means ‘belonging to a master or freeman’ and a noun that means ‘son of a master’, and not of a slave, therefore the member of the class of freemen and owners. In JB 2.405 we have: *āryaṃ ca varṇam śaudraṃ ca*. Thus, the opposition is between the two adjectives *ārya* and *śaudra*, which can imply that the opposed nouns are *arya* and *sūdra*.

In other passages of the Atharvaveda and in the *Ṛgveda*, instead, the opposition is between *ārya* and *dāsá*, that, in Classical Sanskrit and in Prakrit languages, but already in the *Ṛgveda*,¹⁹ means ‘slave, servant’. In RV 2.12.4 (= AV 20.34.4) we also find a *dāsam varṇam*, which makes stronger the correspondence with the later *sūdra*.²⁰ The

16 VS 20.17: *yác chūdré yád árye yád énaś cakṛmá vayám... táśyāvayájanam asi* (Each sin that we have done to a servant or freeman [...] of that [sin] you are the expiation). The corresponding formula in TS 1.8.3.1 has *arya*: *yác chūdré yád arya énaś cakṛmá vayám*. In VS 23.30-1 we find the feminine *sūdrá* as *áryajārā* ‘female lover of a lord’, and the masculine *sūdró* as *áryāyai jāró* ‘male lover of a lady’.

17 Thieme (1938, 90) remarks that in AV the *sandhi* does not allow to determine the quantity of the first vowel (*arya* or *ārya*), and actually all the passages where there is opposition with *sūdra* are in *sandhi*. AV 4.20.4cd: *táyāhám sárvaṃ paśyāmi yás ca sūdrá utáryaḥ* (Through this (magical plant) I see everyone, servant or freeman.) AV 4.20.8cd: *ténāhám sárvaṃ paśyāmy utá sūdrám utáryam*. AV 19.62.1: *priyám mā kṛṇu devéśu priyám rájasu mā kṛṇu / priyám sárvasya páśyata utá sūdrá utárye* (Make me dear among the gods, dear among the kings, make me dear to everyone who sees, to the servant as well as to the freeman).

18 “die Rasse des Hausherrn”. Cf. Debrunner 1939a, 73-4, where he interprets *arya* as ‘noble’ (*edel*), *ārya* as ‘the noble, Aryan’ (*der Edle, Arier*), *ārya* as an adjective ‘belonging to the nobles, the Aryans; aryan’ (*zu den Edlen, Ariern gehöriq; arisch*) and then as a noun ‘Aryan’ (*Arier*).

19 See RV 1.92.8 (*dāsá-pravarga* ‘(wealth) provided with a multitude of servants’), 7.86.7, 8.56.3, 10.62.10. We can also remark that cognates with this meaning are found in Iranian languages: Persian *dāh* ‘servant’; Buddhist Sogdian *d’yh*, Christian Sogdian *d’y* ‘slave woman’; Turfan Parthian *dāhīft* ‘slavery’ (Vogelsang 1993; Bailey 1987; Bailey 1959, 108, 111).

20 RV 2.12.4c: *yó dāsam varṇam ádharam gúhākaḥ* ((Indra) made the class of *Dāsas* low and concealed). The term *varṇa* should refer to other humans rather than demons, that is, low-class people or barbarians, unless we admit that *varṇa* could be used also for a wide category of various beings including demons. In JB 2.196 we find *sūdrāya dāsāya* apparently as synonyms. Cf. also MBh 12.60.27cd: *prajāpatir hi varṇānām dāsam sūdrām akalpayat* (Prajāpati established the *Sūdra* as servant of the (other) classes); Mn 8.410-18, where the function of the *Sūdra* is *dāsya* ‘servitude’ of the other castes.

opposition is especially with the adjectives *ārya* and *dāsa* applied to *vṛtra* ‘obstacle, enemy’, but it is also found between the corresponding nouns, showing that those terms, like *arya* and *sūdra*, include the whole humanity (or even all beings) in two different categories. Also Indra, as the divine archetype of the Ārya warrior and leader, can be styled as *ārya*, and his enemies as *dāsa*, as in RV 5.34.6cd:

īndro vísvasya damitā vibhīṣaṇo yathāvaśaṃ nayati dāsam āryaḥ

Indra is the dominator of all, spreading fear; the Ārya leads the Dāsa as he wishes.

In this image, there is the clear idea that the *dāsa* is a slave of the *ārya*.

We know that *dāsa* often refers to demons, like the serpent *Vṛtra* (see RV 1.32.11, 2.11.2, 4.18.9). So, if *ārya* and *dāsa* describe two universal categories of beings, they cannot primarily refer to ethnicities but to specific positions in the universal order: that of the civilised lords, following the noble customs, who can be gods and humans, and that of the slaves, villains, barbarians, who can also be demons. Since non-Aryan strangers do not belong to the class of the civilised lords, they can be styled *dāsa* as in later language foreign peoples were considered *sūdra* or *vṛṣala*.²¹

The opposition of *ārya/arya* and *dāsa* continued also in post-Vedic times, for instance according to Kauṭilya’s *Arthaśāstra* 3.13.4, there is no condition of *dāsa* (slave) for an Ārya (*na tv evāryasya dāsabhāvah*).

In the *Assalāyana Sutta* of the Buddhist Pāli Canon, we read that among Yonas (Greeks) and Kambojas and in other peripheral regions there are only two classes, masters or freemen (*ayya*) and slaves (*dāsa*), and that a freeman can become slave and a slave freeman.²² Another variant of this term in Pāli is *ayira*, also indicating a master in opposition to *dāsa* ‘slave’ in *Jātakas*.²³

21 MBh 13.33.19-20: *śakā yavanakāmbojās tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ / vṛṣalatvaṃ parigatā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt // dramīlās ca kaliṅgās ca pulindās cāpy uśīnarāḥ / kaulāḥ sarpā māhiśakās tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ // vṛṣalatvaṃ parigatā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt* (Śakas, Yavanas, Kambojas, various Kṣatriya tribes, have reached the status of Sūdra because of the absence of Brahmins. Dramīlas, Kaliṅgas, Pulindas and Uśīnaras, Kolisarapas, Māhiśakas, various Kṣatriya tribes, have reached the status of Sūdra because of the absence of Brahmins). Cf. Mn. 10.43-4.

22 MN II 149,8-10: *yona-kambojesu aññesu ca paccantimesu janapadesu dveva vaṇṇā, ayyo c’ eva dāso ca; ayyo hutvā dāso hoti, dāso hutvā ayyo hotīti* (Among Greeks and Kamboja and in other peripheral countries there are two classes, freeman and slave: having been freeman one becomes slave, having been slave one becomes freeman.)

23 See Ja V 257,18: *dāso ayirassa santike ti* ([like] a slave in the presence of [his] master); Ja VI 300,2: *ayiro hi dāsassa [...] issaro* (a master indeed is the lord of a slave). In the following commentaries, *ayira* is glossed with *sāmika* or *sāmi* ‘owner, master’ (Skt. *svāmin*). In Ja V 138,19-20, *ayire* (referred as a respectful title to ascetics) is glossed with *ayye*, evidently more common out of the *Jātakas*.

The term *ayya* is considered an evolution of Vedic *arya* and is translated ‘a worthy or venerable person, lord, master’ (CPD, 412). This would be in harmony with the opposition between *arya* and *śūdra* that we have found in the Yajurveda. We can also cite the fact that in the R̥gveda we find the two parallel compounds *aryá-patnī* and *dāsá-patnī*, which can be interpreted as Bahuvr̥hi compounds meaning ‘having a lord as husband’ and ‘having a slave as husband’. There is nothing ethnic here, since the *aryas* can belong also to foreign populations like Greeks and Kambojas, classified as *śūdra* by Brahmins. So, if *arya* > *ayya* was a social category, we can hypothesise that this was the primary meaning from which the other derived, but do we have in the Indo-European domain other cognates to support this hypothesis?

It is interesting that in Old Irish we have a term *aire* that has been derived from **aryo*.²⁴ and has the following meaning according to the Royal Irish Academy’s *Dictionary*:

In Laws used to describe every freeman, ‘commoner’ as well as noble, who possesses an independent legal status... Occasionally, however, *aire* is used in the more restricted sense of ‘noble’ (as oppd. to ‘commoner’), which is its usual meaning in the literature. (See Szemerényi 1977, 12)

It is possible that the same term is found in Gaulish names like *Ariomanus*, *Ario-vistus*, *Ario*, *Ariios* (Billy 1993, 14-15; cf. Holder 1896). According to Matasović (2009, 43) in his etymological dictionary of Proto-Celtic, **aryo*- meant ‘free man’ and “the word was originally a yo-stem.²⁵ [...] The old comparison with Skt. *aryá*- [...] still offers the most plausible etymology”. If this is the case, we would have at the opposite ends of the Indo-European world the survivals of a concept of freeman or noble based on a root **(H)ar-* with a **yo/ya* suffix (possibly derived from *-i* in Indo-Aryan). Also in the Iranian domain, where the Young Avestan²⁶ *airiia* and the Old Persian *ariya* typically have an ethnic meaning (which nonetheless does not exclude the meaning ‘noble’), in Pahlavi the derived term *ēr* means ‘noble, hero’, *ērīh* is ‘nobility, good conduct’ and *anērīh* ‘evil conduct’.²⁷

²⁴ Another etymology is from **prh₃*, ‘first’, but according to Matasović (2009, 43; italics added), “this is less convincing because there are no traces of the laryngeal in the purported Celtic reflexes (**prh₃yo*- would have probably given PCelt. **frayo-*). Moreover, semantically ‘lord, master’ corresponds better than ‘first’ to the meaning of the Celtic word, that concerns a vast category of freemen.

²⁵ In fact, *aire*, gen. *airech*, comes from a secondary k-stem, according to Shaffner (2021, 387) from PCelt. **ariākw-* < **h₂ari_o-h₃okw-/h₃kw-* ‘having a noble appearance’.

²⁶ The term *airiia* is not found in the *Gāthās*, but it appears in the *Yašts*.

²⁷ See MacKenzie 1971, 30; Bailey 1959, 96; Bailey 1987, who also observes how in the *Dēnkard* *ērīh ut dahyupatīh* ‘nobility and lordship’ are contrasted with *arg ut bār*

In Anatolian languages we can compare Hittite *arawa-* ‘free (from)’; *arawan(n)i-* ‘free man (not slave)’; Lycian *arawa-* ‘free (from taxes), freedman’; *arus-* ‘citizens’ (see Puhvel 1984, 119-21). Here the main concept is the condition of freedom, which can involve also that of citizenship that is comparable with the concept of **arya* in the Indo-Iranian world as that of a freeman who belongs to the ethnic community. However, these terms lack the concept of superiority, and according to Kloekhorst (2008, 198), they are connected with *āra* ‘right, properly’, and *arā* ‘friend’, from Proto-Anatolian **Por-* and PIE **h2or-o-*, from the root **h2er-* ‘to join together’. According to Puhvel (1984, 121) *arawa* has a suffix **-wo* and a meaning ‘free’ < ‘properly belonging’.

The concept of superiority is instead central in comparable terms in ancient Greek: ἀρείων “*better, stouter, braver, in Hom. of all advantages of body, birth, and fortune*”, ἄριστος “*best in birth and rank, noblest: hence, like ἀριστεύς, a chief; best in any way, bravest*”, ἀρετή “*goodness, excellence, of any kind*” (Liddell, Scott 1940, s.v.). We can also add the prefix ἀρι-, an amplifier meaning ‘very, most’ (e.g. ἀριδείκετος ‘most famous’, ἀρί-δηλος ‘clear, distinct’, ἀρι-πρεπής ‘very distinguished’).²⁸ All these terms convey an idea of excellence or superiority that conforms to the Indo-Aryan semantic domain of *arya/ārya*. According to Schaffner (2021, 390-1),²⁹ the origin of ἄριστος is **h2ār-isto-* “*der erste (dem Range nach), der beste*” (“the first (by rank), the best”) from a root **h2ar-* “*der Reihenfolge und dem Rang nach der erste sein*” (“to be the first (in order and in rank)”), which gives also ἄρχω ‘to begin, to rule’ < **h2r-ské/ó-* and Armenian *ark-cay* ‘king’ < **h2ar-s-kah2-ti-* “*der zum Vorrang, zur Herrschaft Gehörige*” (“the one belonging to pre-eminence, to lordship”).

The connotation of superiority is clear also in Pāli, where *ariya* (= Skt. *ārya*) is someone ‘of noble birth (and education), high-caste, eminent; noble, sublime’ (CPD I, 425), *ayya* ‘a worthy or venerable person, lord, master, often used in vocative’ (CPD I, 412), *ayyaka* (= Skt. *āryaka*) ‘(an honourable man) a grandfather; a master’, *ayyakā* ‘a grandmother’ (CPD I, 412), *ayya-putta* (= *ārya-putra*) ‘a young master; a husband; a venerable person; a prince’, *ayira* ‘a noble man, sir; master (opp. *dāsa*)’ (CPD I, 409), in Ardhamaḡadhī we have *āriya* ‘sinless, holy, pure; born in an Ārya country, high in civilisation’ (IAMD II, 82), *ajja* ‘pure, civilised, noble, refined, cultured; maternal grandfather, paternal grandfather’ (IAMD I, 104) and *ajjaga, ajjaya* ‘paternal grandfather’ (IAMD I, 105-6). The use of terms derived from *arya* also for grandparents confirms that it is an honorific title that

hač škōhišn ‘labor and burdens from poverty’.

²⁸ Liddell, Scott 1940, s.v.; Beekes 2010, 130.

²⁹ Following Klingenschmitt 1974, 274 fn. 1.

conveys the idea of superiority,³⁰ like the Greek terms. Also the use in the Buddhist, Jaina and Brahmanical domains of the adjective or noun *ārya* is often not ethnic but indicates a moral or spiritual superiority, as in the Buddhist concept of *ārya-pudgala/ariya-puggala* 'noble person' (who understands the four *āryasatyāni/ariyasaccāni* 'sublime truths/truths of the Noble ones')³¹ in opposition to *prthagjana/puthujjana* 'ordinary person'. Or in compounds like *ārya-mārga/ariya-magga* 'path of the noble ones; noble path'; *ariya-citta* 'holy-minded'; *ariya-paññā* 'the insight of the noble ones'; *ariya-vihāra* 'the behaviour of the noble ones'; *ariya-vohāra* 'noble or proper mode of speech'; *ariyācāra* 'noble conduct', *ācāraariya* 'noble in conduct'.³²

In the Jaina *Paṇṇavaṇāsutta* we find numerous kinds of *āriya*, including *kammāriya* 'noble for work'; *sippāriya* 'noble for art'; *ñāṇāriya* 'noble for knowledge'; *daṃsaṇāriya* 'noble for realisation'; *carittāriya* 'noble for conduct' (Deshpande 1993, 9-13).

In Ardhamāgadhī we also have *ajja-diṭṭhi* 'pure-sighted, noble-sighted'; *ajja-pañña* 'endowed with great wisdom'; *ajja-maṇa* 'pure-minded, noble-minded'; *ajja-sīlāyāra* 'of noble and refined conduct' (IAMD I, 104-5).

But also several Brahmanical derived terms and compounds have an ethical rather than ethnic connotation: *āryatā*, *āryatva* 'honourable character or behaviour'; *ārya-bhāva* 'honourable character or behaviour'; *ārya-cetas* 'noble-minded'; *ārya-miśra* 'distinguished, respectable; an honourable person, a gentleman'; *ārya-sīla* 'having an honest character' (MW, s.v.).

Basham (1979, 5), following the Western concept of Aryan, has written that:

30 Cf. also the use in Dravidian languages, like Tamil '*ayyan*, *aiyan* father, sage, priest, teacher, brahman, superior person, master, king; *ayyā* father, respectable man; *aiyar* men worthy of respect, sages, brahmans, title of smārta brahmans, etc.'; Kannada '*ayya*, *aya* father, grandfather, master, lord, teacher' (Burrow, Emeneau 1984, 19). Turner (1962-66, 61) gives these terms in connection with Sanskrit *āryaka*: Bengali *ājī* 'grandmother'; Oriya *ājā* 'mother's father'; Hindi *ājā*, *ājā* m., *ājī*, *ājī* f.; Gujarati *ājō* m. 'mother's father'. In relation to *ārya*, we find Sindhi *ājō* 'free' (unless it is derived from Persian *āzād*), Sinhalese *aya* 'person' and *ari-* 'excellent' (in compounds).

31 According to the Buddhist tradition, there are eight *ariya-puggala* or *ārya-pudgala*, from the one realising the path of 'Stream-winning' through the penetration of the four 'noble' truths (about suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path leading to deliverance) to the *arhat*, who has reached the spiritual deliverance in this life. Of course, also a perfect *buddha* or a *pratyekabuddha/paccekabuddha* ('awakened by himself or for himself alone') is an *ariya/ārya*, as we read e.g. in Ja II 281,11-12: *ariyā vuccanti buddhā ca paccekabuddhā ca sāvakā cā ti* ('Noble ones' are called the Buddhas, the solitary Buddhas and the Disciples.)

32 See CPD I, 426-30; CPD II, 35. I have in some cases changed 'Aryan' used by CPD with 'noble', in order to avoid ambiguity with an ethnic meaning that is clearly absent.

by the time of the Pāli canon the term *ārya* had, in common speech, come to mean something sharing the characteristics of a number of English words such as ‘good’, ‘moral’, ‘gentlemanly’, and ‘well-bred’, and seems to have lost nearly all the sense of race which went with it in the time of the *Ṛgveda*.

However, if we admit, instead, that the sense of race is secondary and that of socially and morally superior is primary, the perspective would be inverted. The ethnic sense of *ārya* was present in Sanskrit (as well as in Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī), also in a linguistic sense, but it retained an ambiguity that reveals the original social connotation. Also the *Manusmṛti*, which describes the confines of Āryāvarta, considers *dasyu*, that is, non-Ārya, all those who are out of the four Varṇas, even if they speak the language of the Āryas:

Mn 10.45: *mukha-bāhūru-paj-jānām yā loke jātayo bahiḥ / mlecchavācaś cārya-vācaḥ sarve te dasyavaḥ smṛtāḥ //*

All those castes in this world, which are excluded from (the community of) those born from the mouth, the arms, the thighs, and the feet (of Brahmā), are considered *dasyus*, whether they speak the language of the barbarians or that of the Āryas.³³

So, we can suppose that the idea of an *ārya* people with a special language developed in opposition to people who did not belong to the community of those who used the term *arya* to indicate themselves as masters, nobles or freemen opposed to slaves. This evolution apparently happened only in the Indo-Iranian domain, and it was stronger on the Iranian side, which developed a special sense of national identity through terms related to **arya*, which was known also by the Greeks in the geographical concept of Ἀριανί³⁴ and survives until

³³ Cf. Pāli *ariyaka* ‘of Aryan race; Aryan language’ (CPD I, 426); *ariyavohāra* ‘Aryan language’ (CPD I, 429). *Pārājikakaṇḍa-aṭṭhakathā* 54 (ChS): *Tattha ariyakaṃ nāma ariyavohāro, māgadha-bhāsā. Milakkhakaṃ nāma yo koci anariyako andha-damiḷādi* (Here, *ariyaka* is the Aryan language, the language of Magadha. *Milakkhaka* is any [language] that is non-Aryan: Andhra, Tamil, etc.); MSV I 258: *dasyu-vāc* ‘language of the barbarians’ opposed to *āryā vāc* ‘Aryan language’ (this second definition is not a compound, since *āryā* is used as a separate adjective of *vāc*); AKBh 170: *sarve devā ārya-bhāṣā-bhāṣiṇaḥ* (All gods [are] speakers of the Aryan language.)

³⁴ See Strab. *Geogr.* 15.2, where Ἀριανί is placed from the Indus on the east to a part of Persia and Media on the west, and included also Bactria and Sogdia on the north, because the inhabitants of these regions spoke approximately the same language (εἰςὶ γάρ πως καὶ ὁμόγλωττοι παρὰ μικρόν). It is noteworthy that India was not associated with a similar term by the Greeks; instead, India was regularly distinguished from Ἀριανί, the river Indus being the boundary between the two regions, although some Iranian provinces of Afghanistan and Baluchistan to the west of the Indus were sometimes included into India. Cf. Plin. *NH* 6.29: “The greater part of the geographers, in fact, do not

now in the name of Irān. In the Celtic domain, although there was an analogous term (**aryo-*) for freeman or noble, there was not the same evolution, but the root apparently is very ancient.

According to Mallory and Adams (1997, 213), the Indo-European root is **h4erós* **h4erjos* ‘members of one’s own (ethnic) group, peer, freeman’, giving also Hittite *arā-* ‘member of one’s own group, peer, companion, friend’, of which *arāwa-* ‘free from’ would be a derivative.³⁵ The proposed verbal root is **h4er-* ‘to put together’ (corresponding to **h2er-* mentioned above). They add:

Clearly supposed in the original meaning is an emphasis on in-group status as distinguished from the status of the outsider, particularly those outsiders forcibly incorporated into the group as slaves. In Anatolian the base word has come to emphasize the personal relationship between individuals while the derivatives continue the more general focus on social status, as remains the case in Old Irish. In Indo-Iranian, presumably because the unfree were typically captives taken from other (ethnic) groups, the word has taken on a more purely ethnic meaning. (213)

What I propose is rather that the division between *arya* and non-*arya* was more on a vertical level of master/slave or noble/vulgar than simply on the horizontal level of in-group and outsider, and I do not find convincing that Hittite *arā* ‘peer, friend’ must be connected with *arya*. Mallory and Adams in the same entry cite the comparison made by Bomhard and Kern (1994, 533-4, entry no. 387)³⁶ with the Afro-Asiatic root **ħar/*ħer* ‘to be superior, to be higher in status or rank, to be above or over’. In a more recent volume, Bomhard (2018, 849-50, entry no. 723) adds: “**ħar-a* (n.) nobleman, master, chief, superior; (adj.) free-born, noble”.

The same root was already noticed and compared with **arya* by Hermann Möller (1911, 16) in his comparative dictionary of Indo-European and Semitic, as **ar-* in Indo-European and **Ĥ-r-* in Semitic, with a reduplication **Ĥ-r-r-*. He cited Arabic *ħarra* ‘he was free; he

look upon India as bounded by the river Indus, but add to it the four satrapies of Gedrosia, Arachosia, Aria, and Paropamisus, the river Cophes thus forming the extreme boundary of India. All these territories, however, according to other writers, belong to the Arii (*omnia Ariorum esse aliis placet*)”. Moreover, Ἀριῶι is the ancient names of the Medes according to Hdt. 7.62.

35 Also Hittite *arāwahh-* ‘set free from’, *arawanni-* ‘free; freeman’, Lycian *arawa-* ‘free (from)’ are cited as derivatives. In Mallory, Adams 2006 (266), instead, in the discussion of the same reconstructed term (in the form **h4erós* **h4eryós*), *arāwa* and related terms are not cited.

36 Bomhard and Kern in the same entry reconstruct as Proto-Indo-European form *ħher-yo-* [**ħhar-yo-*] with the meaning ‘a superior, a person higher in status or rank’.

freed (a slave); (a slave) became free'; *ḥurrun* 'free, genuine, the best (of anything); f. *ḥurratun* 'free, pure, noble' (woman or she-camel); *ḥurriyatun* 'the state of freedom', coll. 'free persons, the eminent, noble persons (of a people)'; Hebrew pl. *hōrīm* 'the nobles, freeborn'; *ben-hōrīm* 'freeborn'; Syr. *hērā* 'free'; Judeo-Aramaic *hārā* 'id.'

Bomhard (2018, 849-50) instead gives: Hebrew *hōr* 'noble'; Arabic *ḥurr*³⁷ 'noble, free-born; free, independent', *ḥarra* 'to liberate, to free, to set free, to release, to emancipate', *ḥurrīya* 'freedom, liberty'; Aramaic *ḥarar* 'to be or become free'; Ugaritic *hrr* 'free'; Sabaeen *hrr* 'freemen, free-born men'; Geez *ḥarāwi* 'free-born, nobleman', *ḥarāwənnā* 'freedom', *ḥarənnat* 'freedom'; Tigrinya *hara* 'free', *ḥarənnāt* 'freedom'; Tigre *hara* 'free; freedom'; Amharic *hurr* 'free'; Gurage *hurru bālā* 'to become free, to set free'. We can also add from Semitic languages North-west Semitic *ḥr* 'person of note, noble', *br ḥry* 'freedman' and Amharic *arənnāt* 'freedom', *ara* 'free' (Hoftijzer, Jongeling 1995, 401-2; De Blois 1985, 8-10).

Bomhard also compares, from other Afro-Asiatic languages, Egyptian *ḥry* 'chief, master, overseer, superior', *ḥr* 'on, upon, over', *ḥrw* 'upper part, top'; Coptic *hi-* (< **ḥaryaw*) 'on, in, at', *ḥray* [xrai] 'upper part' (cf. Černý 1976, 291-2). Bomhard (2014, 320) added North Omotic (Yemsa/Janjero) *herašo* 'chief, ruler; chieftainship, rule'.

The root of the Semitic terms is not clear, but, if they are related to the Egyptian terms, these suggest a root connected with the idea of 'being over, superior'. In Indo-European, we have in Pokorny the root 3.*er-/or-/r-* 'to start moving, excite (also mentally, annoy, irritate); to raise (elevation, to grow tall)'³⁸ that gives Skt. *ṛṇōti ṛṇvāti* 'he rises, he moves' (Gr. ὄρνυμι); Skt. *ṛṣvā-* 'high'; Gr. ὄρος n. 'mountain'; Lat. *orior, oriri* 'to rise, to ascend, to arise, to spring, to be born'; Hitt. *a-ra-a-i (arāi)* 'he rises'; Arm. *ari* 'stand up!'.³⁹

In the laryngeal theory, this root is **h3er-/h3r-*, which, according to Kloekhorst (2007, 234-5, 239-40, 253), is also the origin of Hitt. *ar-(tta)* 'to stand (by), to be stationed, to remain standing' (<*h3r-*); *arai-/ari-* 'to (a)rise, to lift; to raise'; CLuw. *ari(ya)* 'to raise' (<**h3r-oi-/h3r-i-*); *aru-/arau-* 'high' (<**h3(o)r-u-*?).

Rix (2001, 252, 299-301) distinguishes two different roots, one *h₃er-* 'to start moving (forward)' ('*sich in (Fort-)Bewegung setzen*'), which however he connects with some verbs meaning 'to rise' ('*sich*

37 In Morocco, the plural *ahṛār* indicates a class of free cultivators, landowners, who subjected the local population that constituted the *haratin* class, with the role of tenants and labourers of the *ahṛār* (Ensel 1999, 45-6).

38 Pokorny 1959, 326: "*sich in Bewegung setzen, erregen (auch seelisch, ärgern, reizen); in die Höhe bringen (Erhebung, hochwachsen)*".

39 Pokorny 1959, 327-30: "*ṛṇōti ṛṇvāti 'erhebt sich, bewegt sich' (ὄρνυμι); ai. ṛṣvā- 'hoch'; gr. ὄρος n. 'Berg'; lat. orior, oriri 'sich erheben, aufsteigen, entstehen, entspringen, geboren werden'; Hitt. a-ra-a-i (arāi) 'erhebt sich'; arm. ari 'stehe auf!'*".

erheben'), and another root **h1rei-* '*sich erheben*', which he connects with the Hittite verbs cited above, although, as Kloekhorst (2008, 200) remarks, the participle of the verb is *arant-* instead of the expected ***arijant-*. The presence of the final *-i*, as a part of the root in Rix and as a suffix in Kloekhorst is however interesting, because it is found also in Vedic *arí* and in *arya*, if we interpret the last one as derivative of *arí* itself, and in the Greek *ἀρι-* used in compounds. The vowel is not present in Semitic, but there is in Egyptian *ħry* and Coptic *hry*.⁴⁰ As for the initial sound, in Semitic it is mostly a voiceless pharyngeal, a sound that has been identified with *h2* because it can cause *a*-colouring in Semitic languages.⁴¹ Of course, because of the vocalism, Greek *ἀρι-* has been derived from **h2er-* (Beekees 2010, 130), which is normally identified with the meaning 'to fit, to put together', the same that is given to *h4er-* by Mallory and Adams,⁴² a meaning however that does not fit with that of Greek *ἀρι-* 'very'. Differently, *h3* is considered the *o*-colouring laryngeal, reconstructed on the basis of Lat. *orior*, Gr. ὄρνυμι, etc. However, I think we should

40 This would be one of the cases where non-Semitic Afro-Asiatic parallels of Indo-European terms are closer than Semitic possible parallels. According to Takács (1998, 159-61) these cases suggest the existence in the Near East of an ancient Afro-Asiatic branch different from Semitic, otherwise not attested but by loans in the surrounding languages such as Sumerian, Proto-North-Caucasian, Elamite, Proto-Dravidian, and Proto-Indo-European itself, that would be placed therefore in the Near East.

41 Cf. Bomhard 2018, 67-73; Quiles 2009, 484; Byrd 2015, 12-13, 232; Kloekhorst 2018, 70. Bomhard (1998, 29) remarks: "there is no evidence from the other Nostratic languages to support positing **H3* distinct from **H2* in Indo-European. Note that both of these two laryngeals have the same reflex in Hittite, namely *h-* (initially) and *-h(h)-* (medially)". Kloekhorst (2018, 71) observes that in Luwian the outcomes of **h2* and **h3* are rendered with *h* (in cuneiform) and *h* (in hieroglyphic). He also reports (2018, 69-70) that there is a consensus that these graphemes represent uvular fricatives, because of the way in which Hittite and Luwian lexemes containing these sounds (especially personal names) are rendered in other languages of the Ancient Near East. His theory is that originally these sounds were uvular stops, still preserved in Lycian and Carian, and then became uvular fricatives in Hittite and Luwian, and pharyngeal fricatives in Proto-Indo-European. Klein and Joseph (2018, 2065), also reporting that Anatolian reflexes of **h2* and **h3* were uvulars, observe that uvulars more easily develop into pharyngeals, therefore they consider likely that **h2/3* were originally uvular in Proto-Indo-European. However, Afro-Asiatic or Semitic terms with initial pharyngeal *h-* correspond to Hittite terms with initial *h-* (e.g. Hebrew *ħāraš* 'to plow', Hitt. *ħārš-* 'to till (the soil)'), therefore, if the Anatolian sound was really uvular in historical times, it should be an evolution of a pharyngeal and not the other way round. Cf. Bomhard 2018, 824, 850-1.

42 The existence of **h4* is not generally accepted: it is considered similar to **h2*, being *a*-colouring, with the peculiarity that it disappeared in Anatolian languages, while it would have survived in Albanian /h/ in initial position (Mallory, Adams 2006, 55; cf. Quiles 2009, 473; De Decker 2014, 48; Klein, Joseph 2018, 1807). According to Bomhard (1998, 29), the correspondences between Afro-Asiatic and Indo-European show that **h4* was a voiceless laryngeal fricative /h/ as originally suggested by Sapir, Sturtevant and Lehmann. Bomhard (2018, 822) derives Anatolian terms such as *arawa* 'free' from Proto-Indo-European **her-* [**har-*]/**hor-*/**hr-* '(vb.) to liberate, to set free; (adj.) free', corresponding to Proto-Afro-Asiatic **her-*, **hor-* 'to escape, to flee, to run away', giving e.g. Arabic *haraba* 'to flee, to escape', etc.

question the reliability of these reconstructions based on vocalism: we have seen how also in Semitic there are different vowels in different languages (*hōr*, *hurr*, *hara*, etc.) although they follow the same pharyngeal consonant, and Pokorny derived from the same root also Greek ἔρνος ‘sprout, offshoot’ and ἐρέθω ‘to stir, provoke’, which are not attributed to *h3er-* by Beekes only because of the vocalism itself.⁴³ Nonetheless, the difference in vocalism between Greek ἀρετή, ἀρείων, ἄριστος, ἀρι- on one hand and verbs like ὀρνῦμι and ἐρέθω and a noun like ἔρις (see above), on the other hand, can suggest two different Proto-Indo-European roots with different laryngeals and vocalism, one with a pharyngeal that helped to preserve the *a* vocalism (**har-*) for the idea of ‘superiority, excellence’ (similarly to the root **h2ar-* proposed by Klingenschmitt and Schaffner),⁴⁴ and the other with a different initial laryngeal and originally no vowel (as in Skt. *ṛṇoti*) for the upward movement and excitement (possibly **ʔr-*),⁴⁵ that can also be the source of Skt. *ari* ‘enemy’, with the sense of hostile movement and anger.

In any case, it seems possible to recognise a root **har-/hr-*⁴⁶ to indicate a noble and free man or a master, that was shared by Semitic (or Afro-Asiatic) and Indo-European,⁴⁷ giving Indo-Iranian *arya* and Celtic **aryo-*, and the Greek noun and adjectives just cited. We can

43 See Beekes (2010, 463, 1107), where he proposes to derive ἐρέθω and related terms from **h1er-*, or to assume a secondary ablaut in Greek. Rix (2001, 238, fn. 1) instead, observed that some Greek forms with **er-* like ἔρνος are semantically closer to **h3er-* ‘to start moving’ (*sich in (Fort)-Bewegung setzen*) than to **h1er-* ‘to reach’ (*wohin gelangen, geraten*). Mayrhofer (EWA 1, 106) observed that it remains open whether the root of movement **er-* reconstructed by Pokorny has two different IE sources **h1er-* and **h3er-*.

44 Schaffner (2021, 397) derives also Sanskrit *aryá* from that root, refuting Thieme’s theory: “Das gravierende Problem bei der Erklärung von Thieme ist, dass das Etymon von ved. *arí-* nach wie vor unklar bleibt. Auszugehen ist m.E. von einer im Sinn eines Part. Präs. Akt. verwendeten primären adjektivischen Bildung uridg. **h2ár-jo-* ‘dem Rang nach der erste, den ersten Rang einnehmend’, die im Indoiranischen – mit oppositivem Akzent substantiviert – als Appellativum iir. **arjá-* m. ‘Herr’ (> ved. *aryá-* ‘Herr’ [RV.+]; mit ursprünglichem Akzent des Adjektivs ved. *ár(i)ya-* ‘Hausherr, Herr’ [AV.+]) und als endogene Eigenbezeichnung der Indoiranier iir. **arjá-* m. ‘Arier’ (jav. *airiia-*, ap. /ariya-/) fortlebt. Mittels Vṛddhierung und Kontrastakzent ist von iir. **arjá-* m. ‘Arier’ abgeleitet ved. *ár(i)ya-* m. ‘Arier, Angehöriger der drei Großkasten’, Adj. ‘zu den Ariern gehörig’ (RV.+).”

45 Bomhard (2018, 793-6) reconstructs a Proto-Nostratic root **ʔor-* ‘to move rapidly, quickly, hastily; to set in motion’ and **ʔory-* ‘to rise (up)’, both giving Proto-Indo-European **ʔor-/ʔr-* ‘to move, to set in motion; to arise, to rise; to raise’.

46 A term with the root *hr-* can be *sūrī*, if it derives from *(H)su-hri-* (cf. EWA 3, 741; KEWA 3, 495), in the sense of ‘good lord’, like *su-devá* ‘good or real god’ (MW, 1225; Grassmann 1955, 1536). This compound can also be a way of avoiding the ambiguity of *arí* in Vedic.

47 The direction of borrowing is not sure, although the fact that Semitic has not the *-i* or *-yo/ya* suffix suggests that it did not receive the term from an Indo-European language. The comparison with Egyptian *hry* ‘chief, master’, instead, could suggest that an Afro-Asiatic language (present in West Asia) with a term similar to the Egyptian one was in contact with Proto-Indo-European speakers, who adopted the term (cf. above fn. 40).

have thus to do with concepts of nobility, freedom and ownership developed in the common cultural frame of a society where slavery and social stratification were evolving: this was possible especially with the Neolithic revolution, which for agriculture required hard labour and produced a surplus that allowed to maintain slaves, and that was also associated with conflicts and trade, which made possible the acquisition of slaves. The Semitic and the Indo-European cultural worlds could be parallel developments of the Neolithic of the Fertile Crescent: in this cultural tree, the Indo-Iranian branch (differently from the other Indo-Europeans) chose to name itself with the adjective or noun connected with that root. As if they did not admit that, members of their own people could be slaves (and normally slaves were foreigners), and/or because they considered their customs especially noble.

Thus, the social concept evident in the Semitic, Irish, and Indian use became ethnic, especially in Iranic speakers, while in India it could be used to distinguish speakers of Indo-Aryan languages from Dravidian, Munda and Tibeto-Burman speakers, thus becoming more linguistic than ethnic, besides the traditional association of *ārya* with the higher castes and ethical behaviour.

All this has nothing to do with the disastrous and artificial concept of a Nordic 'Aryan race' that we have mentioned at the beginning. It is time to deepen the ancient relation of the Semites or Afro-Asiatic speakers with the 'Aryans', evident in many other terms and roots:⁴⁸ the results can question some stereotypical oppositions that may still be present in our received picture of humanity and its history.

48 Cf. Möller 1911; Takács 1998; Bomhard, Kerns 1994; Bomhard 2014; 2018. Takács (1998, 141) observes: "It has long been known and accepted that certain words in the cultural terminology (such as fauna, flora, agriculture and so forth) of Proto-Indo-European and Proto-Semitic coincide due to mutual borrowing. The considerable number of borrowings between Proto-Semitic and Proto-Indo-European can be explained only if we suppose that some time, for a certain period, speakers of these two proto-languages were in areal contact, i.e. were neighbours". Citing Dolgopolsky (1987), he maintains that generally Proto-Semitic was the donor of loanwords, and that the presence of the same terms in Afro-Asiatic confirms this viewpoint.

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A New Interpretation of the Vedic Particle *aṅgá*

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Abstract The aim of this article is to provide a unified account for all attestations of the particle *aṅgá* in the Rigveda. Based on its distribution in different clause types, I argue that previous analyses of this particle, which treat it as a focus particle or a marker of the speaker's attitude or certainty are incorrect. Instead, I propose that the particle is used to indicate shared (lack of) knowledge between speaker and addressee. This proposal is based on the observation that when the particle occurs in questions these are not information-seeking. By adducing typological parallels, I argue that this function accounts for its presence in other clause types as well. Moreover, I will attempt to show that while *aṅgá* has an intersubjective function it is not to be regarded as an evidential or a marker of epistemic authority or epistemic modality.

Keywords Discourse Particles. Modal Particles. Intersubjectivity. Shared Knowledge. Evidentiality. Epistemic Authority. Enimatives.

Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Preliminaries. – 2.1 Focus Particles and Discourse Particles. – 2.2 The Corpus. – 3 Analysis. – 3.1 The Particle *aṅgá* in Questions. – 3.2 The Particle *aṅgá* in Declarative Main Clauses and *hí* Clauses. – 3.3 The Particle *aṅgá* with Imperatives. – 3.4 The Particle *aṅgá* in Subordinate Clauses. – 3.5 Possible Caveats. – 4 Vedic *aṅgá* and Other Complex Perspective Markers. – 5 Conclusion.



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1 Introduction

This article is concerned with the analysis of the particle *aṅgá* in the *Rigveda*, the oldest attested text in Vedic Sanskrit. Since the 19th century, the particle has been assigned two major functions. On the one hand, it has been regarded as an emphatic particle which emphasises the preceding word. On the other hand, it has been analysed as a particle which marks the speaker's attitude or certainty or has a reassuring function. Both views are still found in Vedic grammars and dictionaries, as well as translations of the *Rigveda*, from the 20th and 21st centuries. However, in the literature there seems to be disagreement on whether the particle can fulfil only one or both of these functions. Moreover, it is not clear which function is present in which Rigvedic passage. As a result, a detailed analysis of all attestations of the particle is necessary in order to evaluate the two approaches and to decide which of them is correct. Such an endeavour is complicated by the fact that the function of particles is often severely difficult to determine (cf. Goldstein 2019, 269-71) and in many cases, both interpretations of *aṅgá* appear to be plausible in the given context. As a result, I will base my analysis not merely on the evaluation of individual text passages, because this might lead to subjective judgements and my analysis would have only small additional value to the traditional descriptions of the particle. Instead, I will attempt to identify distributional patterns in the data which point to a certain interpretation and also consider typological parallels, which will allow for a more objective approach to the data. Based on my findings, I will propose an analysis which differs from both of the aforementioned ones, namely that *aṅgá* has an intersubjective function. More precisely, it is a discourse particle which marks shared knowledge, or lack of knowledge, between the speaker and the addressee.

The aims of my study are twofold: First, I aim to increase the knowledge about Vedic particles and therefore contribute to a bet-

ter understanding of the Rigvedic hymns in general. Second, I want to present the Rigvedic data in a way that they are eligible for typological studies of discourse particles, which only in a small number of languages have been examined thoroughly (cf. Forker 2020, 340-1; Panov 2020, 37-8).

The structure of this article is as follows: Section 2 will present the theoretical background and the relevant information about the corpus, respectively. Section 3 constitutes the core of this paper. After giving a brief overview about previous analyses of *aṅgá* as well as its syntactic behavior, I will begin my own analysis by investigating its occurrences in questions (Section 3.1). Subsequently, I will examine all other clause types in which it occurs, viz. declarative main and *hí* clauses (Section 3.2), imperative clauses (Section 3.3) and subordinate clauses (Section 3.4). I will then go on to discuss potential caveats against my analysis (Section 3.5). Having completed the analysis of the Vedic data, I will then provide a short comparison of *aṅgá* with other complex perspective markers in the languages of the world in Section 4. In Section 5, I will give concluding remarks.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Focus Particles and Discourse Particles

In order to be able to compare my new analysis of *aṅgá* with previous ones, it is first necessary to outline the theoretical background and to introduce the relevant terminology. The first important term is FOCUS PARTICLE, which refers to elements like English *also*, *even* or *only* (König 1991, 1). Such elements are sensitive to the partition of a sentence into focus and background (König 1993, 978). For the term FOCUS, I use the definition by Krifka (2008, 247): “Focus indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant for the interpretation of linguistic expressions”. The part of a sentence which is not focused is in the BACKGROUND (Krifka 2008, 260). One major group among focus particles that König (1991, 98-124) identifies are exclusive particles. As examples, he (1991, 98) gives English *only* and German *nur* and illustrates their semantics with the following example:

Example 1

- a. **Only** JOHN came.
- b. John came (presupposition)
- c. $\neg (\exists x) [(x \neq \text{John}) \text{ and came } (x)]$ (entailment)*

* In c., I have added one ‘(’, which is missing in the original: $\neg (\exists x) [x \neq \text{John}) \text{ and came } (x)]$ (entailment).

In this sentence, *John* is the focus. Alternatives to this focus are other people, for instance *Bill* or *Mary*. As the sentence with *only* presupposes that John came and entails that no-one else came, one can say that *only* excludes all possible alternatives to the focus *John*.

Another function which some focus particles have and which is relevant for my current investigation is EMPHATIC ASSERTION OF IDENTITY (König 1986; 1991, 125-38). Such particles “are primarily used emphatically to assert the identity of one argument in a proposition with an argument in a different, contextually given proposition”, as in the following German example by König (1991, 127-8):

Example 2

Völler war vier Monate verletzt, und gerade/eben dieser Völler hat den Ausgleichstreffer geschossen.

‘Völler was injured for four months and it was **precisely** this Völler who scored the equaliser’.

Here, the particles *gerade* or *eben* are used to emphasise that the subject of the second clause is identical to the one of the first clause. Emphatic assertion of identity often, but not always, triggers an implicature that two propositions are not compatible with each other (König 1986, 60-3; 1991, 131-5). Thus, in [ex. 2] it is unlikely that the player who was injured for a long time is the one who scores the important goal. Like Ricca (2017), I will refer to particles that emphasise the identity of elements as IDENTIFIERS.

A further group of focus particles are PARTICULARISERS, the use of which can be illustrated by means of the following example from König (1991, 96):

Example 3

Especially the girls objected to his manners.

Sentences with particularisers presuppose that the proposition holds true not only for the focus but also for (some of) its alternatives; moreover the alternatives are ranked on a scale in that “[t]he alternatives under consideration do not manifest the relevant property as clearly” (König 1991, 96-7). Thus, in [ex. 3] a possible alternative to *the girls* may be *the boys*, in which case this sentence expresses that both girls and boys objected but the girls did so more clearly than the boys. Note that in certain contexts, identifiers like *gerade* evoke a reading similar to particularisers (König 1991, 127-8).

With respect to focus particles and related items, not only is the notion of focus important but also the one of scope. I define SCOPE as “the semantic counterpart of that part of a sentence that is relevant for

spelling out [the] contribution” of a particle (König 1991, 31). A particle can scope over the whole sentence or clause or only over smaller parts. Compare the following examples from Taglicht (1984, 153):¹

Example 4

\$-For **only** £100-\$ he acquired the drawing
(They didn’t know its real value)

Example 5

\$-**Only** for £100 did he acquire the drawing-\$
(They drove a hard bargain)

Even though in both cases the focus of the particle is £100, [ex. 4] and [ex. 5] have different meanings, which is due to the different scope the particle has in these examples. In [ex. 5], *only* excludes lower amounts of money for which he might have acquired the drawing, i.e. the rest of the clause is within the scope of the particle. In [ex. 4], by contrast, it does not do so but instead marks the amount of money as low (cf. Sudhoff 2010, 152).²

A second type of particle that is relevant for my investigation is the group of DISCOURSE PARTICLES. In the literature, these elements are also frequently called MODAL PARTICLES, but I will only use the former term. Discourse particles “are used in order to organise the discourse by expressing the speaker’s epistemic attitude towards the propositional content of an utterance, or to express a speaker’s assumptions about the epistemic states of his or her interlocutors concerning a particular proposition” (Zimmermann 2011, 2013). This means that discourse particles may have an intersubjective function. As examples for the employment of different discourse particles consider the following examples from German (Thurmair 1989, 148) and from Finnish (Abraham, Wuite 1984, 175):

Example 6

Eva: *Du hättest eben niemals das ganze Geld auf einmal überweisen dürfen.*

Ute: *Ja, da hast du **schon** recht; aber ich hab geglaubt, es wäre alles okay.*

‘Eva: You should never have transferred all of the money at once.

Ute: Yeah, you’re right; but I believed that everything was okay*^{*}

* The English translation is by the Author.

¹ I use \$- ... -\$ to indicate the scope of the particle. Taglicht speaks of DOMAIN here, but like Nevalainen 1991, 72, who also gives these examples, I use the term SCOPE.

² On such scalar uses of exclusive particles see König 1991, 99-107.

Example 7

<i>Saan-han</i>	<i>minā</i>	<i>tulla</i>	<i>m u k a a n?</i>
may-PRT	I	come	along
‘I may come a l o n g, right?’*			

* The Author translated the glosses and free translation from German into English.

The particle *schon* is used to signal the speaker’s partial agreement with something. In [ex. 6], Ute partially agrees with Eva but she delimits the implicated rebuke by providing a reason for transferring the money (Thurmair 1989, 148). Discourse particles occur not only with assertions but also with other types of speech acts. In [ex. 7], the particle occurs with a question and signals that the speaker assumes to receive a positive response (Abraham, Wuite 1984, 174-5). An important property of discourse particles is that their presence or absence does not affect the truth conditions of a proposition but it can make an utterance felicitous or infelicitous in certain contexts (Zimmermann 2011, 2013). At least in German, discourse particles are often polyfunctional, i.e. they can also function for instance as adverbs or as focus particles (Thurmair 1989, 20-1; 2013, 630). As for German, this language possesses a remarkable number of discourse particles and a large amount of research has been conducted on them for several decades. For an overview of the history of research on discourse particles see Bayer, Struckmeier (2017, 3-8). Due to this large amount of research that has been conducted, German discourse particles will play an important role in my analysis. With respect to the intersubjective function of some discourse particles, which will be particularly important for my analysis, it is necessary to introduce the notion of COMMON GROUND here. I will make use of the traditional assumption that the Common Ground consists of knowledge that is assumed to be shared by speaker and addressees (cf. Stalnaker 1978). In other words, it consists of “propositions that the interlocutors mutually assume to be true” (Döring, Repp 2019, 20). There have been several modifications and refinements of this conception (see e.g. Gunlogson 2001, 39-50; Krifka 2008, 245-6; Farkas, Bruce 2010, 84-90; Repp 2013, 235-6), but for the sake of my study, I will not discuss this any further.³

In addition to the different types of particles, I would like to introduce here another notion which is important to be able to compare my analysis of the Vedic data with the traditional ones. This is the no-

³ Döring, Repp 2019, 20, assume that the Common Ground consists not only of background knowledge that is shared but also of the interlocutors’ discourse commitments (Farkas, Bruce 2010). However, since in my data the addressees are mostly (but not always) divine beings that do not actually respond, I will mainly refer to shared knowledge.

tion of EPISTEMIC MODALITY, which roughly refers to the degree of the speaker's certainty, but I will follow Boye (2012, 20-2), who speaks of EPISTEMIC SUPPORT instead of degree of certainty. He (2012, 22-7) distinguishes between FULL SUPPORT, PARTIAL SUPPORT and NEUTRAL SUPPORT, the first of which is the strongest and the last of which is the weakest notion on the epistemic scale. Consider the following examples from the Sino-Tibetan language Limbu (van Driem 1987, 244):⁴

Example 8

<i>yaʔl</i>	<i>li-ya.</i>
groan	EPMOD
'He's perhaps groaning'.	

Example 9

<i>yaʔl</i>	<i>laʔba.</i>
groan	EPMOD
'He's probably groaning'.	

In these examples, the adverb *li-ya* encodes neutral epistemic support, i.e. it signals that the speaker is not committed to the truth of the proposition; the adverb *laʔba* encodes partial epistemic support and signals that the speaker considers the truth of the proposition probable (van Driem 1987, 243; Boye 2012, 106).

2.2 The Corpus

Vedic Sanskrit is the oldest attested language in the Indo-Aryan branch of Indo-European. Even though the particle *aiṅá* is also attested in younger texts (Macdonell 1916, 213-14), I will restrict my investigation to the *Rigveda*, the oldest Vedic text. For a recent detailed overview of the *Rigveda* see Brereton, Jamison (2020). The exact age of the *Rigveda* is unknown but it was probably composed between 1500 and 1000 BCE (Brereton, Jamison 2020, 14). It is a compilation of religious poetry, i.e. hymns that are mostly dedicated to certain deities, but there are also hymns that contain for instance dialogues. The *Rigveda* is divided into ten books, the oldest of which are books 2-7, the so-called Family Books. Each Rigvedic hymn consists of several stanzas. In most cases, these consist of three or four pādas, which themselves consist of a certain number of syllables. In stanzas with three or four pādas, there is a hemistich boundary af-

⁴ I have adopted the glosses from Boye 2012, 106.

ter the second pāda (Brereton, Jamison 2020, 188). On the Vedic meter see Oldenberg (1888) and Arnold (1905). Importantly, syntactic boundaries are not marked in the *Rigveda*, but there is a tendency that metrical boundaries coincide with syntactic ones. As a rule of thumb, one may say that larger metrical boundaries, like stanza or hemistich boundaries, are more likely to coincide with syntactic ones than pāda boundaries (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 74 f.). With respect to their content, subsequent stanzas, or even clauses within one stanza, may be unrelated to each other or exhibit only a loose connection (de Macedo 2007, 104). Moreover, even though huge progress has been made since the beginning of Vedic research, the general interpretation of numerous passages has remained elusive to this day, even to the most distinguished experts on Vedic. This might further complicate the analysis of particles, which is a difficult task in itself, but past research has shown that it does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle (cf. e.g. Klein 2016, Mumm 2004).

In all *Rigvedic* examples that I will give, the Vedic text will be adopted from van Nooten, Holland (1994), but I will indicate metrical-ly restored vowels by lower case letters; accent on a restored vowel will be indicated by a gravis on the following vowel. Moreover, I will use *r̄* instead of *r* to represent a vocalic *r*. I will indicate the forms that are most important for my analysis by boldface type. I will use ‘|’ to indicate pāda boundaries and ‘||’ to indicate stanza boundaries. In the *Rigveda*, external sandhi, i.e. phonological rules that may affect segments at the beginning or the end of words, is ubiquitous. In the examples that I give, I will resolve sandhi forms only when I consider it necessary for the understanding of my analysis. In the glosses, I will use + to separate the meanings of two contracted forms. Whenever I quote Vedic forms in my text, I will give the underlying forms. In all Vedic examples, I will provide glosses. However, when it is necessary to give longer text passages I will only gloss those clauses that are the most relevant to my analysis for reasons of space. With finite verbs, I regard indicative active as the default and will only gloss forms for mood and diathesis if they deviate from this.⁵ The source of the English or German free translation will be given in each example. In most cases, I will only quote published translations and leave them unchanged even though they reflect an interpretation of *āṅgá* that is different from mine. It would be possible to provide approximate translations in English, and languages like German do possess particles which, in certain contexts, fulfil parallel functions. None-

⁵ An anonymous reviewer suggested that I indicate gender for adjectives but not for nouns in the glosses because it is a lexical feature of the latter. However, due to the weak distinction between nouns and adjectives in Vedic (cf. Reinöhl 2016, 40-2), this is sometimes problematic, so that I will always indicate gender.

theless, I want to avoid the impression that fine-grained analyses of particles should be presented by means of providing translations for them (see Goldstein 2019, 269-71 on this matter).

3 Analysis

The particle *aṅgá* is attested forty times in the *Rigveda* (Lubotsky 1997, 23, RIVELEX 1: 52, VedaWeb). This means that it is quite rare compared to several other particles. For instance, the particles *íd* and *cíd* occur 809 and 691 times, respectively (cf. Coenen 2021). As for its function, Grassmann (1873, 13) states that it emphasises the word it follows, expressing that the proposition holds true in particular for this word or only for this word, and he translates it as ‘gerade’ or ‘nur’; he translates the sequence *kím aṅgá* as ‘warum sonst’ (cf. Macdonell 1916, 213). Gotō (2013, 152), who also translates *aṅgá* as ‘just, only’, subsumes it under the category of interjections in younger Vedic, but with respect to the *Rigveda*, he does not seem to consider such a categorisation adequate. More appropriate is the view by Lühr (2010, 136-7; 2017, 286-7), who subsumes it under the category of stressed focus particles. More precisely, one might say that according to Grassmann’s view, *aṅgá* is an exclusive focus particle or a particulariser. This presumed function can be illustrated by the following text passage:

Example 10

<i>utá</i>	<i>tyá</i>	<i>me</i>	<i>hávam</i>
and	DEM:NOM.DU.M	1SG.GEN	call:ACC.SG.N
<i>á</i>	<i> jagmyātam </i>	<i>násatyā</i>	<i>dhībhír</i>
LP	go:PERF.OPT.2DU	Nāsatya:VOC.DU.M	thought:INS.PL.F
<i>yuvám</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>viprā</i>	
2DU.NOM	PRT	inspired:VOC.DU.M	

“Auch ihr Nāsatya’s möget auf meinen Ruf kommen, **gerade** ihr seid redebegabt mit (guten) Gedanken” (Geldner 1951-57, 2: 152-3)

“And you Nāsatyas should come here to my summons with your insightful thoughts – you **certainly** are inspired poets.” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 845) RV 6.50.10ab*

* On the predicative vocative see Jamison, Brereton (comm.VI.2, *ad loc.*).

According to Geldner’s translation, *aṅgá* evokes the reading that the Nāsatyas, who are referred to by a pronoun of the second person, manifest the property of being ‘reddebegabt’ more clearly than other beings. However, as the second translation that I have given in the example suggests, this is not the only function that has been proposed for the particle in the literature. Unlike Grassmann, Ben-

fey (1866, 6) regards *aṅgá* as a “particle: **1.** Of asseveration, Indeed, to be sure. **2.** Of solicitation, invocation, [...] **3.** Of interrogation, [...] **4.** Again, further”. Similarly, Monier-Williams (1899, 7) describes it as “a particle implying attention, assent or desire, and sometimes impatience; it may be rendered by well; indeed; true; please; rather; quick”.⁶ Accordingly, one might analyse *aṅgá* not as a focus particle but as some kind of discourse particle, or perhaps as marking epistemic stance or speaker’s attitude. A similar view is also upheld in modern literature, for instance by Mayrhofer (1992-2001, I, 48) and RIVELEX (1: 52), according to whom the particle is used for reassurance.⁷ Kozińska (2000, 224-5) states that *aṅgá* can function both as a focus particle and as a reassuring sentential particle. However, in her brief treatment of the particle it does not become clear how she obtains the respective analyses for individual instances and at least a comparison of different translations of the *Rigveda* shows that this matter is by no means obvious. For instance, Jamison, Brereton (2014) translate *aṅgá* as a focus particle only once whereas Geldner (1951-57) does so several times. With respect to [ex. 10] above, both interpretations seem to be plausible and based on individual passages like this it seems difficult to decide which of the interpretations is preferable. I will therefore conduct a comprehensive investigation of all forty attestations of the particle. Not only will I base my analysis on the interpretation of individual text passages but I will also try to determine whether there are patterns in the data which allow for conclusions with respect to the function of the particle. Based on this and on typological parallels, I will propose that a unified function can be assigned to the particle in all passages where it occurs.

Before entering the discussion regarding its function, a remark regarding the syntactic behavior of the particle is due. As the many examples in the following subsections will show, *aṅgá* occurs in the second position of the clause, i.e. after the first stressed word, so that it is regarded as a Wackernagel element. Wackernagel elements are enclitic pronouns and particles, but also some stressed particles can be subsumed under this group. Among these elements, the literature distinguishes between three types (e.g. Hale 1987, 15-20; Lühr 2010, 128-31; Keydana 2011, 107-9): 1) Those that occur in absolute second position but may also occur later if an element is, in generative terms, topicalised and moved to the first position, i.e. before the host of the clitic. 2) Those that always occur in absolute second position. 3) Particles that actually follow the word they emphasise; since emphasised words regularly occur in the first position of a clause, the

6 For interpretations of *aṅgá* by the Indian lexicographers see Böhtlingk, Roth 1855-75, 1: 49-50.

7 Mayrhofer also gives ‘gerade’ as a possible translation in addition to ‘doch’ and ‘gewiß’.

particle regularly, but not necessarily, occurs in the second position.⁸ As for *aṅgá*, Lühr (2010, 136-8) claims that it is of the third type, because she finds cases where it occurs later in the clause. However, I find only two passages where *aṅgá* appears to occur later. In both passages, it is at least possible to assume a clause boundary before the word that precedes it. The first one is [ex. 10] above, where Geldner does not assume a clause boundary before *yuvám* whereas Jamison, Brereton (2014, 845; comm.VI.2, *ad loc.*) do. The second one is [ex. 30] in Section 3.2, where *índras aṅgá* is repeated three times, each time at the end of the stanza. Contrary to Lühr (2010, 138), who presents this as a case where *aṅgá* does not occupy the second position, Jamison, Brereton (2014, 213) regard *índras aṅgá* as a separate syntactic unit. Thus, in all passages it is possible to assume that *aṅgá* occupies the second position of its clause (cf. Delbrück 1888, 22).⁹

3.1 The Particle *aṅgá* in Questions

Considering the overall distribution of the particle *aṅgá*, the first important observation is that it occurs in different clause types, namely in questions, in declarative main clauses and *hí* clauses, in commands and in subordinate clauses. Most conspicuous is the particle's occurrence in questions. Throughout the *Rigveda*, there are fourteen passages in which *aṅgá* occurs in a question. These passages can be subdivided into two groups: The first group consists of questions that begin with *kím aṅgá* (eight cases) and the second group consists of questions that begin with *kuvíd aṅgá* (six cases). I will begin with discussing the first group. The form *kím* can fulfil two functions. First, it is used as the NOM./ACC.SG.N of the interrogative pronoun *kí-* 'what?'; second, it functions as an interrogative particle that marks polar questions (Etter 1985, 23-5, 54-6). Compare the following examples:

Example 11

<i>kím</i>	<i>mám</i>	<i>anindráh</i>	<i>kṛṇavann</i>
Q:ACC.SG.N	1SG.ACC	without.Indra:NOM.PL.M	do:PRS.SBJV.3PL
<i>anuktháh</i>			
without.recitation:NOM.PL.M			

“What can those without Indra, without recitations, do to me?” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 663) RV 5.2.3d

⁸ Following Krisch 1990, 65, these are not genuine Wackernagel elements.

⁹ As second position I also count those cases in which *aṅgá* occurs in a chain with other Wackernagel elements like *hí* ‘for’ or the enclitic pronoun *im*. Moreover, initial vocatives are to be regarded as clause-external (Delbrück 1888, 36).

Example 12

māndāmahe dāsatayasya dhāsér | dvír yát páñca bíbhtrato yánt, ánnā |

<i>kím</i>	<i>iṣṭāśva</i>
PRT	providing.desirable.horses:NOM.SG.M
<i>iṣṭáraśmir</i>	<i>etá </i>
providing.desirable.reins:NOM.SG.M	DEM:NOM.PL.M
<i>īśānāśas</i>	<i>tāruṣa</i>
rule:PTCP.PERF.ACT.NOM.PL.M	superiority:DAT.SG.M
<i>ṛñjate</i>	<i>nñ</i>
stretch.towards:PRS.MID.3PL	man:ACC.PL.M

“Let us find elation in the ten-part gush (of soma?), when the twice five [=fingers?] come, carrying foods. The one providing desirable horses, the one providing desirable reins, and these masters (of goods) – are they stretching straight toward the men to surpass (them)?” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 285; adapted)* RV 1.122.13

* An anonymous reviewer suggested changing ‘bringing foods’ to ‘carrying foods’ since *bíbh-* is atelic, and ‘heading [...] toward’ to ‘stretching [...] toward’.

[ex. 11] shows a constituent question in which *kím* functions as an interrogative pronoun whereas I regard *kím* in [ex. 12] as a marker of a polar question. Note that the status of *kím* as such a marker is not indisputable. For instance, Griffith (1896-97, 1: 169) regards it as an interrogative pronoun in [ex. 12] and translates pāda c as ‘What can he do whose steeds and reins are choicest?’. However, such an interpretation makes it difficult to construe *kím* as the object of *ṛñjate* ‘they go toward’ in pāda d because another accusative, *nñ* ‘the men’ is present. Griffith’s solution is to assume a clause boundary before pāda d, which forces him to supply a predicate in pāda c, but it is unclear which.¹⁰ Thus, Geldner (1901, 33-4; 1951-57, 1: 169-70), Renou (1955-69, 5: 7) Etter (1985, 125), Witzel, Gotō (2007, 225) and Jamison, Brereton (2014, 285) regard pādas cd as a polar question and I follow this view.

All cases where *kím* is followed by *aṅgá* are comparable to [ex. 12] in that they can be regarded as polar questions. Moreover, there is a second striking property that these cases have in common, namely that they are rhetorical questions (Etter 1985, 129-30). Consider the following passages:

¹⁰ Cf. Grassmann’s (1876-77, 2: 449) translation: ‘was hat der vor, der erwünschte Rosse und Zügel hat?’.

Example 13

<i>kím</i> PRT	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	<i>tvā</i> 2SG.ACC	<i>maghavan</i> bounteous:VOC.SG.M
<i>bhojám</i> benefactor:ACC.SG.M	<i>āhuḥ</i> say:PERF.3PL	<i>śíśhí</i> sharpen:IMP.2SG	<i>mā</i> 1SG.ACC
<i>śísáyam</i> sharpen:PRS.IMP.2SG	<i>tvā</i> 2SG.ACC	<i>śṛṇomi</i> hear:PRS.1SG	
<i>āpnasvatī</i> profitable:NOM.SG.F	<i>māma</i> 1SG.GEN	<i>dhír</i> thought:NOM.SG.F	<i>astu</i> be:PRS.IMP.3SG
<i>śakra</i> strong:VOC.SG.M	<i>vasuvídama</i> finding.goods:ACC.SG.M	<i>bhágama</i> Bhaga:ACC.SG.M	<i>indrā</i> Indra:VOC.SG.M+LP
<i>bharā</i> carry:PRS.IMP.2SG	<i>naḥ</i> 1PL.ACC		

“Do they **not** call you the benefactor, bounteous one? Sharpen me: I hear that you are the sharpening. Let my insight be profitable, able one. Bring Bhaga, the goods-finder, here to us, Indra” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1446) RV 10.42.3

Example 14

<i>kím</i> PRT	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	<i>tvā</i> 2SG.ACC	
<i>bráhmanaḥ</i> sacred.formula:GEN.SG.N	<i>soma</i> Soma:VOC.SG.M		
<i>gopám</i> herdsman:ACC.SG.M	<i>kím</i> PRT	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	
<i>tvāhur</i> 2SG.ACC+say:PERF.3PL	<i>abhiśastipám</i> protecting.from.taunt:ACC.SG.M	<i>naḥ</i> 1PL.GEN	
<i>kím</i> PRT	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	<i>naḥ</i> 1PL.ACC	
<i>paśyasi</i> see:PRS.2SG	<i>nidyámānān</i> scorn:PTCP.PRS.PASS.ACC.PL.M		
<i>brahmadvíše</i> hater.of.sacred.formula:DAT.SG.M	<i>tápuṣim</i> scorching:ACC.SG.F		
<i>hetím</i> lance:ACC.SG.F	<i>asya</i> throw:PRS.IMP.2SG		

“Do they **not** (call) you, o Soma, the herdsman of the sacred formulation? Do they **not** call you our protector from taunt? Do you **not** see us being scorned? Hurl your scorching lance at the hater of the formulation!” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 848) RV 6.52.3

In the first example, the poet wants Indra to be generous and wants to receive profit from him. An important pragmatic function of rhetorical questions is the synchronisation of the speaker's and the hearer's beliefs (Rohde 2006, 135, 149, 161). The rhetorical question in pāda signals that both the poet and Indra believe that Indra is called the benefactor. Thus, the poet asks this rhetorical question to make clear that he can actually expect profit from Indra. The second example is similar. There, the poet wants Soma to protect him and his associates. Before his actual request, he utters three rhetorical questions. He and Soma share the answers to these questions, which all indicate that Soma is bound to help him (cf. Jamison, Brereton comm.VI.2, *ad loc.*). It is noteworthy that *kím aiṅá* questions are not regarded as polar questions unequivocally in the literature. For instance, Griffith (1896-97, 2: 441) translates pāda a of [ex. 13] as 'Why, Maghavan, do they call thee Bounteous Giver?' (cf. also Geldner 1951-57, 3: 196). This means that he assigns the neuter *kím* an adverbial interpretation (cf. Grassmann 1873, 325). With respect to [ex. 14], Ludwig (1876-88, 4: 221) explicitly remarks that *kím aiṅá* may be interpreted in different ways. Here, too, several translators opt for an adverbial interpretation.¹¹ Following such an interpretation, it would be possible to interpret *aiṅá* as a focus particle whose focus is the interrogative proform ('why exactly ...?').¹² However, I follow Jamison, Brereton (comm.VI.2, *ad loc.*), who argue that in [ex. 14] an interpretation as 'why?' would make the questions rather offensive, which seems inappropriate in the given context. I believe that the same holds true for the question in [ex. 13], so that in both cases, as well as in the remaining passages that contain *kím aiṅá*, I follow Etter's interpretation as rhetorical polar questions. Notice that even if one rejects the assumption that *kím* marks polar questions and considers [ex. 13] and [ex. 14] to be constituent questions, these are probably rhetorical nevertheless.¹³ In the *Rigveda*, there are several passages that address Indra's generosity (cf. Bloomfield 1916, 596), so that in [ex. 13], it is highly unlikely that the poet sincerely asks Indra to give a reason for having this reputation. This is similar for Soma in [ex. 14]. The function of the rhetorical questions would be the same as when they are interpreted as polar questions, namely to signal that Indra and Soma, respectively, should support the poet. The other Rigvedic passages containing the sequence *kím aiṅá*, which in all cases I consider to mark rhetorical questions, are RV 1.118.3, 3.58.3, 6.44.10 and 8.80.3.

11 In [ex. 14], Renou 1955-69, 5: 37 assigns *kím* a nominal function in pādas ab and an adverbial one in pāda c: 'Que t'ont-ils donc dit de nous, ô soma, toi qui es le gardien de la Formule, oui, quoi donc, toi qui protèges contre la calomnie ? | Pourquoi donc nous regardes-tu (avec indifférence) pendant qu'on nous blâme ?'.

12 Thanks to Simon Fries for pointing this out to me.

13 For examples of rhetorical constituent questions in English see Rohde 2006.

Assuming that clauses beginning with *kím aṅgá* are all rhetorical polar questions, one may now wonder what this means for the interpretation of *aṅgá*. In order for a question to be rhetorical, the answer has to be in the Common Ground of the speaker and the hearer (Rohde 2006; Caponigro, Sprouse 2007; Bhadra 2020, 408). Thus, the questions in [ex. 13] and [ex. 14] are clearly to be answered in the affirmative and Indra and Soma, respectively, know this. For information-seeking polar questions like [ex. 12], this is not the case. Accordingly, one may assume that *aṅgá* is used to explicitly mark that the answer to a question is already stored in the Common Ground of speaker and hearer, or in other words that the knowledge about the answer is shared by them. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, the questions beginning with *kuvíd aṅgá* need to be examined as well, especially in light of the fact that an interpretation of *aṅgá* as a focus particle following *kím* cannot be excluded with absolute certainty.

Unfortunately, these passages are even more difficult to interpret than the ones with *kím aṅgá*. This is especially due to the fact that the interpretation of *kuvíd* clauses in general is not unproblematic. An example of a *kuvíd* clause can be seen in the following passage:

Example 15

<i>tám</i>	<i>indra</i>	<i>mádama</i>
DEM:ACC.SG.M	Indra:VOC.SG.M	exhilarating.drink:ACC.SG.M
<i>á</i>	<i>gahi</i>	
LP	go:AOR.IMP.2SG	
<i>barhiṣṭhám</i>	<i>grávbhiḥ</i>	<i>sutám</i>
standing.on.ritual.grass:ACC.SG.M	stone:INS.PL.M	press:PPP.ACC.SG.M
<i>kuvín [= kuvíd]</i>	<i>n_u</i>	<i>ásya</i>
PRT	now	DEM:GEN.SG.M
<i>tṛṇávaḥ</i>		
become.satiated:SBJV.2SG		

“Come, Indra, to th[at] exhilarating drink, stationed on the ritual grass, pressed by stones. Will you now **indeed** sate yourself on it?” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 526) RV 3.42.2

The first problem regards the accentuation of finite verbs in *kuvíd* clauses. Usually, finite verbs in subordinate clauses are accented whereas those in main clauses are unaccented (Delbrück 1888, 35). This can be seen in the following example:

Example 16

<i>táṁ</i>	<i>uśató</i>	<i>ví</i>	<i>bodhaya</i>
DEM:ACC.PL.M	desire:PTCP.PRS.ACT.ACC.PL.M	LP	awaken:PRS.IMP.2SG
<i>yád</i>	<i>agne</i>	<i>yási</i>	<i>dūt,yàṁ</i>
when	Agni:VOC.SG.M	drive:PRS.2SG	duty:ACC.SG.N

“Awaken the eager ones, when you **travel** on your mission, o Agni” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 104) RV 1.12.4ab

Contrary to this rule, finite verbs in *kuvíd* clauses are almost always accented (Etter 1985, 221) and different explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon. Etter (1985, 221-3) suggests that *kuvíd* alone has the status of a main clause and that the part that follows it is a subordinate clause which depends on it. Hettrich (1988, 145-51) classifies *kuvíd* clauses as “Ergänzungssätze” because they semantically supplement other clauses and have an accented verb, like subordinate clauses, but they have an illocutionary force, i.e. they constitute separate speech acts, like main clauses. Viti (2007, 38-40) assumes that *kuvíd* clauses are comparable to purpose clauses, in that they express what the speaker wants to achieve by the action in the preceding main clause, which also accounts for the verbal accent.¹⁴ She assumes that the interrogative illocutionary force of these clauses expresses the uncertainty of the result. In contrast, Etter (1985, 224-5) and Hettrich (1988, 144-5) regard *kuvíd* clauses as questions. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss the functions of *kuvíd* clauses in detail here. For my analysis, I follow Etter (1985, 224-5) in assuming that *kuvíd* clauses are questions which are biased towards a positive answer. Thus, in [ex. 15] above the poet has prepared *Soma* for *Indra*. He is not certain whether the god will really come but I assume that he is rather confident because this is why he performs the ritual in the first place. Even though *kuvíd an̄gá* clauses appear to be more difficult to interpret than *kím an̄gá* clauses, they are clearer in one respect: Unlike *kím*, *kuvíd* cannot function as a proform, so that in these questions it is relatively clear that *an̄gá* does not function as a focus particle whose focus is the preceding word. In light of this, I will now analyse the passages in which *an̄gá* follows *kuvíd*.

In the first group of cases, *kuvíd an̄gá* occurs in the repeated refrain of three subsequent stanzas, which form a unit (*tr̄ca*):

¹⁴ For other analyses of (at least some) *kuvíd* clauses as non-interrogative see Geldner 1907-09, 1: 46 and Hauschild 1954, 252-4.

Example 17

*mahá ugráya tavāse suvṛktīm | pr_ar_iraya śívátamāya paśváh | gírvāhase gíra índrāya
pūrvír | dhehí tan_vvè*

kuvíd	aṅgá	<i>védāt</i>
PRT	PRT	understand:PERF.SBJV.3SG

*ukthāvāhase vibh_vvè maniṣám | drúṇā ná pārám īrayā nadínām | ní spṛśa dhiyá
tan_vvì śrutásya | júṣṭatarasya*

kuvíd	aṅgá	<i>védāt</i>
PRT	PRT	understand:PERF.SBJV.3SG

*tád viviḍḍhi yát ta índro jújoṣat | stuhí suṣṭutīm námasá vivāsa | úpa bhūṣa jaritar má
ruvaṅyah | śrāváyā vācam*

kuvíd	aṅgá	<i>védāt</i>
prt	prt	understand:PERF.SBJV.3SG

“10. For the great, strong, powerful one, for the one most propitious to cattle send forth a well-twisted (hymn). Produce many hymns for Indra whose vehicle is songs, for his body. **Surely** he will take cognizance (of them)?

11. To him whose vehicle is hymns, to the far-ranging one send an inspired thought like (a boat) to the far shore of rivers with a wooden (paddle). Stroke the body of the famous, very enjoyable one with a visionary thought. **Surely** he will take cognizance (of it)?

12. Labor at what Indra will enjoy from you. Give as praise a good praise hymn. Seek to entice him here with reverence. Be attentive, singer. Don’t screech, but make your speech heard. **Surely** he will take cognizance (of it)?” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1201) RV 8.96.10-12

Following the interpretation by Jamison, Brereton (2014, 1199), the poet addresses himself (cf. Geldner 1907-09, 2: 134, 1951-57, II, 422) and he “nervously hopes” that Indra will heed his words. This hope is expressed by the repeated question at the end of pāda d. This context resembles the one in [ex. 13] and [ex. 14] above, for self-directed questions are similar to rhetorical questions in that they are not information-seeking (Bhadra 2020, 408). However, as a crucial factor that distinguishes them Bhadra (2020, 408) mentions that in the case of self-directed questions, the answer is not necessarily in the Common Ground of speaker and addressee. According to her, a common property of the two types of questions is that they do not “put any issues on the Table”.¹⁵ I believe that for the analysis of *aṅgá*, another common property of the two types is crucial: With both ques-

¹⁵ In the discourse model that she applies, “the Table” refers to “an ordered stack of issues (sets of propositions) to be resolved (the top issue first)” (Bhadra 2020, 386). I will not discuss this any further.

tion types, the knowledge with respect to the answer is symmetrical between speaker and addressee. With a rhetorical question both speaker and addressee know the answer; with self-directed questions, both speaker and addressee (=speaker) either know the answer or do not know the answer. For if speaker and addressee are identical, they necessarily have the same knowledge about the answer, irrespectively of whether they know the answer or not. In [ex. 17], the speaker asks the question because he is not certain whether Indra will heed his words, i.e. he does not know the answer for certain. As he addresses the question to himself, he knows that the addressee is not certain as well.

Example 18

<i>kuvíd</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>námasā</i>	<i>yé</i>
PRT	PRT	reverence:INS.SG.N	REL:NOM.PL.M
<i>vṛdhásah</i>	<i>purá</i>	<i>devá</i>	
growing.strong:NOM.PL.M	before	god:NOM.PL.M	
<i>anavadyása</i>	<i>ásan </i>		<i>té</i>
faultless:NOM.PL.M	be:PST.3PL		DEM:NOM.PL.M
<i>vāyáve</i>	<i>mánave</i>	<i>bādhitáyo </i>	
Vāyu:DAT.SG.M	Manu:DAT.SG.M	press:PPP.DAT.SG.M	
<i>vāsayann</i>	<i>uśásam</i>	<i>súrjyena</i>	
shine:CAUS.PST.3PL	dawn:ACC.SG.F	sun:INS.SG.M	

“**Surely** the faultless gods, who (now) grow strong through reverence, existed previously? (Yes, because) for Vāyu, for hard-pressed Manu they made the dawn shine, along with the sun” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 998-9) RV 7.91.1

There are several different translations for this stanza but I follow the interpretation by Velankar (1963, 198-9) and Jamison, Brereton (2014, 998-9; comm.VII, *ad loc.*). According to this interpretation, the poet asks a question and immediately answers it himself.¹⁶ This suggests that he himself is the addressee of this question, even though the stanza is actually addressed to Vāyu. This makes this passage comparable to [ex. 17] above. Moreover, due to the fact that the poet asks himself a question even though he already knows the answer, this example is even more reminiscent of the rhetorical questions marked by *kím aṅgá*. The next example is a little more difficult:

¹⁶ Cf. also Klein 2018, 151. A similar interpretation is also found in Oldenberg 1909-12, 2: 62-3, although he suggests an alternative as well.

Example 19

yám me dhíyam māruta índra dévā | ádadāta varuṇa mitra yūyám | tám pípayata páyaseva dhenúm |

kuvíd	<i>gíro</i>	<i>ádhi</i>	<i>ráthe</i>
PRT	hymn:ACC.PL.F	LP	chariot:LOC.SG.M
<i>váhātha </i>	kuvíd	aṅgá	<i>práti</i>
convey:PRS.SBJV.2PL	PRT	PRT	LP
<i>yáthā</i>	<i>cid</i>	<i>asyá</i>	<i>naḥ </i>
like	PRT	DEM:GEN.SG.N	1PL.GEN
<i>sajātyàsya</i>	<i>maruto</i>	<i>búbodhatha </i>	<i>nábhā</i>
common.birth:GEN.SG.N	Marut:VOC.PL.M	be.aware:PERF.SBJV.2PL	navel:LOC.SG.F
<i>yátra</i>	<i>prathamám</i>	<i>samṇásāmahe </i>	<i>tátra</i>
where	first:ACC.SG.N	LP.approach:PRS.MID.1PL	there
<i>jāmitvám</i>	<i>áditir</i>	<i>dadhātu</i>	<i>naḥ</i>
relationship:ACC.SG.N	Aditi:NOM.SG.F	put:PRS.IMP.3SG	1PL.GEN

“12. The insight that you gave me – you gods, Maruts, Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra – make it swell like a milk-cow with milk. Surely you will convey the hymns on your chariot?

13. Surely in some way you will take notice of this common birth of ours, Maruts? At the navel where we first come together, there let Aditi establish our relationship” RV 10.64.12-13

Stanza 13 begins with a question marked by *kuvíd aṅgá*. Unlike in the previous examples, the poet does not address himself, but the addressees are clearly the Maruts. Yet, similarly to [ex. 18], the clause that follows the question marked by *kuvíd aṅgá* may provide a clue with respect to the interpretation of the particle, even though this time it is not a direct answer to the question. In pāda c, ‘the navel’ has a twofold reference. On the one hand, it refers to the sacrificial ground, where the hymn is recited; on the other hand, it refers to the common provenance of gods and men (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 237; Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1482; comm.X.3, *ad loc.*). Assuming that the relative clause in pāda c refers to the place of the common origin of the Maruts and the humans, this context suggests that the poet expects a positive answer to the question in pādas ab. For in order to understand what pāda c refers to, viz. the place of their common birth, they must be aware of the fact that there is a common birth. Thus, if the Maruts remained unaware of their common birth with the humans, the second hemistich would be infelicitous. Against this analysis, there may be some objections. First, one might object that ‘the navel’ also refers to the sacrificial ground and that in order to identify this referent, the Maruts need not know about anybody’s birth. However, if one accepts the interpretation that ‘the navel’ refers to

both things, both have to be felicitous in the given context. A second objection is that the predicate of the main clause in pāda d is actually an imperative in the third person singular, the addressee of which is Aditi and not the Maruts. Indeed, it is quite possible that two subsequent clauses are unrelated to each other in the *Rigveda*. Yet, since the topic of the common birth is present in the entire stanza, I assume that there is a close connection between the two hemistiches. Therefore, even though the Maruts are not the actual addressees of the imperative, I believe that the second hemistich is nonetheless directed towards them as well. It would make no sense to ask the Maruts a question about the common birth and then ask Aditi to do something at the place of this birth, ignoring the Maruts. This may also explain why the imperative is in the third and not the second person. I therefore conclude that the context requires a positive answer and hence that the poet expects the Maruts to know about their common birth just like he does. Notice that another instance of *kuvíd*, which is not followed by *aṅgá*, is present in the preceding pāda. What I have just outlined here suggests what the difference between the questions in pāda 12d and 13ab is. In pāda 12d, the poet asks whether Maruts, Indra, Varuṇa and Mitra will convey his hymns on their chariot, i.e. whether they will heed his calls. He uses *kuvíd* because he is biased towards a positive answer, since he has composed this hymn in order to be heard by the gods in the first place. Nevertheless, he cannot be entirely sure. In contrast, he uses *kuvíd aṅgá* in pāda 13a in order to express that he is not only biased towards a positive answer but that he actually expects such an answer.

The next passage containing *kuvíd aṅgá*, which is addressed to Indra, is syntactically ambiguous. There, “the poet compares the threshing of the grain, which gets rid of the chaff and keeps only the wholesome grain, to decisions Indra should make about how to distribute goods he has acquired” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1611):

Example 20

<i>kuvíd</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>yávamanto</i>
PRT	PRT	barley.grower:NOM.PL.M
<i>yávam̐</i>	<i>cid </i>	<i>yáthā</i>
barley:ACC.SG.M	PRT	like
<i>dánt̐,</i>	<i>anupūrvám̐</i>	<i>viyúya </i>
cut:PRS.3PL	as.previously	LP.hold:CVB
<i>ihéhaiṣām̐</i>	<i>kṛṇuhi</i>	<i>bhójanāni </i>
here+here+DEM:GEN.PL.M	do:PRS.IMP.2SG	goodie:ACC.PL.N
<i>yé</i>	<i>barhíṣo</i>	
REL:NOM.PL.M	sacred.grass:GEN.SG.N	

<i>námovṛkṭim</i>	<i>ná</i>	<i>jagmúḥ</i>
reverent.twisting:ACC.SG.F	not	GO:PERF.3PL

“**Surely** it is like barley-growers and their barley – how they cut it, threshing it according to the old ways – (so), here, just here (with us [=grain]) put the goodies of those [= chaff] who have not come for the reverent twisting of the sacred grass” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1612)

“**Sicher** (weißt du) doch, wie die Getreidebauer das Getreide schneiden, indem sie es reihenweise weglegen. (So) bring hier- und dorthin deren Besitztümer, die nicht zur ehrfürchtigen Umlegung des Barhis gekommen sind!” (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 362) RV 10.131.2

Especially for the first hemistich, there are several different syntactic interpretations. Some scholars suggest supplying a verb in *pāda* a, but it is unclear which (see Oldenberg 1909-12, 2: 348, Geldner 1951-57, 3: 362, Velankar 1954, 9).¹⁷ In contrast, Jamison, Brereton (2014, 1612) regard *yávamantas yávam* ‘barley-growers and their barley’ as the predicate and seem to interpret it as an unmarked simile.¹⁸ I will discuss Geldner’s and Jamison and Brereton’s translation here. As for Geldner’s translation, I would replace the period after the first sentence by a question mark in order to indicate the interrogative nature of the *kuvíd* clause. If one accepts this modified interpretation, [ex. 20] is comparable to [ex. 19] above. In the first hemistich, the poet asks Indra whether he knows how barley-growers cut their barley. In the second hemistich, he requests that Indra distribute the property of those that have not sacrificed properly in the same way. Hence, in order for the request to be felicitous, the poet must assume that the question is answered positively. Unlike in the previous examples, Jamison and Brereton do not translate the *kuvíd āṅgá* clause as a question.¹⁹ Perhaps, in order to render the interrogative value of *kuvíd* one might change their translation of *pāda* a to ‘Isn’t it like barley-growers and their barley’. Such a question is most probably not information-seeking. Rather, by uttering it the poet wants Indra to image working barley-growers. In the second hemistich, the poet immediately requests that Indra act like these barley-growers, so that one may conclude that he assumes Indra to accept the comparison, i.e. to answer the question in the affirmative. Thus, both Geld-

¹⁷ I do not follow the view that is held e.g. by Griffith 1896-97, 2: 577, according to which a new clause begins after *kuvíd āṅgá*.

¹⁸ Contrary to several claims, the particle *cid* does not function as a comparative particle ‘like’ in the *Rigveda*; the function of *cid* in this passage remains unclear (Coenen 2021).

¹⁹ Maybe the question mark is only missing in their translation because the clause is followed by a dash.

ner's and Jamison and Brereton's (slightly adapted) interpretations are in accordance with my analysis that *aṅgá* marks shared knowledge or lack of knowledge.

As the examples that I have discussed in this section show, the particle *aṅgá* occurs only in questions that are not information-seeking. Moreover, although it is possible to interpret *aṅgá* as a focus particle the focus of which is the preceding word in questions marked by *kím*, this is not the case in those marked by *kuvíd*. I therefore assume that *aṅgá* is used to mark questions as not information-seeking. In other words, the function of *aṅgá* is to indicate that the speaker assumes the addressee to share his/her knowledge or lack of knowledge with respect to the answer. Importantly, however, the presence of *aṅgá* is not obligatory whenever a question does not seek for information. Actually, rhetorical questions are fairly common in the *Rigveda* (Etter 1985, 9, 64-5) whereas there are only fourteen attestations of *aṅgá* in a question. Consider the following instance of a rhetorical constituent question (Etter 1985, 9):

Example 21

<i>átyo</i>	<i>ná ájman</i>	<i>sárgaprataктаḥ </i>
steed:NOM.SG.M	like course:LOC.SG.N	launched.in.surge:NOM.SG.M
<i>síndhur</i>	<i>ná kṣódaḥ</i>	<i>ká</i>
river:NOM.SG.F	like gush:ACC.SG.N	Q:NOM.SG.M
<i>īṃ</i>	<i>varāte</i>	
3SG.ACC	obstruct:AOR.SBJV.MID.3SG	

“Like a steed on its course, launched in a surge, like a river (sending) its gush: **who** can obstruct him?” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 187) RV 1.65.6

This does not speak against my analysis because optional markers in rhetorical questions are also attested outside of Vedic Sanskrit. Consider the following questions in German (Bayer, Struckmeier 2017, 2):²⁰

Example 22

- a. *Wer wird gerne kritisiert?*
‘Who likes being criticised?’
- b. *Wer wird **schon** gerne kritisiert?*
‘Who likes being criticised?’

The question in a. is formally identical to an information-seeking question and it is due to world knowledge that it is most likely to be interpreted as a rhetorical question; in contrast, when the discourse

²⁰ Unless otherwise stated, all English translations are by the Author.

particle *schon* is added, as in b., the question must be interpreted as rhetorical (Bayer, Struckmeier 2017, 2). The question arises whether in Vedic there is a functional difference between rhetorical questions which are marked by *aṅá* and those which are not. Conspicuously, all instances of *kím aṅá* questions occur in the proximity of imperative or prohibitive clauses, which suggests that these questions are used to provide reasons for uttering a request and to motivate the addressee.²¹ However, giving a statement about their particular function would require a thorough investigation of all rhetorical questions in the *Rigveda*, so that I am not able to answer this question here.

3.2 The Particle *aṅá* in Declarative Main Clauses and *hí* Clauses

In this section, I will discuss the function of the particle *aṅá* in declarative clauses. More precisely, I will discuss main clauses as well as clauses that are marked by the particle *hí* ‘for, because’.²² Like *kuvíd* clauses, Hettrich (1988, 179-83) classifies causal *hí* clauses as “Ergänzungssätze”, which means that even though they are supplementary and exhibit accented finite predicates, they have an illocutionary force, like main clauses. I will therefore treat these two clause-types equally with respect to my analysis. In Section 3.4, I will show why this criterion is relevant.²³ Throughout the *Rigveda*, *aṅá* occurs nineteen times in declarative main or *hí* clauses.

In Section 3.1, I discussed the function of *aṅá* in questions, assigning it an intersubjective function. The aim of my investigation is to provide a unified account of all instances of the particle, so that my analysis of questions should also be compatible with the use in declarative clauses. As an interesting point of comparison, evidentials may be adduced. Evidentials encode the source of the information that is provided by a speaker (Aikhenvald 2006, 1-3) and may have an intersubjective component (Bergqvist 2017, 6-9).²⁴ They can have the same function in questions as in declarative clauses. San Roque et al. (2017, 129) give the following example from Littell et al. (2010, 102), which shows the use of the reportative evidential =*kat* in Gitksan (Tsimshianic):

21 See Lühr 2004 on this matter in general. Another formal property with respect to which Vedic rhetorical questions may differ from each other is the mood of the predicate. On this matter see Lühr 2019, 169-72.

22 Under the latter clause type, I also subsume negative clauses which are marked by *nahí* ‘for not, because not’.

23 Note that Hettrich 1988, 112-13; 127-41 classifies subordinate clauses in general as “nicht-illokutiv”, but I will argue in Section 3.4 that not all types of subordinate clauses are to be treated alike in this respect.

24 According to Bergqvist 2016, 31, this is not a key function of evidentials.

Example 23

a. *taxgwi=kat tim bakw-m'*
when=REP FUT arrive.PL-1PL

‘When is it (did they say/did you hear) we’ll get there?’

b. *silkw sax t’aahlakw=kat*
noon tomorrow=REP

‘(I heard/They said) at noon tomorrow’.

The marker =*kat* signals that the source of the information is hearsay. Accordingly, in the question in a., the marker signals that the addressee’s expected evidence for the answer is hearsay. In the answer in b., the speaker then signals that the evidence for his/her utterance is hearsay.²⁵ Such a behavior is not only attested for proper evidentials.²⁶ I have argued that questions in which the particle *aṅgá* occurs are not information-seeking. If *aṅgá* behaves like the Gitksan evidential =*kat*, its function in declarative clauses will be predictable from the one in questions: In the latter, it marks that speaker and hearer share the knowledge regarding the answer of the question; thus, in the former, it marks that speaker and hearer share the knowledge regarding the propositional content of the clause. In other words, just as *aṅgá* marks questions as not seeking for new information, it marks declarative clauses as not giving new information. Thus, I formulate the following working hypothesis:

The particle *aṅgá* is used in declarative clauses to signal that the proposition over which it scopes is already stored in the Common Ground of speaker and hearer.

If this hypothesis is correct, *aṅgá* in declarative clauses has a function that is comparable to the one of the German discourse particle (unstressed) *ja*. Since a large amount of research has been conducted on this German particle, I believe that taking into account *ja* can provide valuable insights for my analysis of Vedic *aṅgá*. Waltereit (2001, 1398) and Döring, Repp (2019, 18) describe the function of *ja* in the following way: Normally, when a speaker asserts a proposition *p*, “[i]t is not obvious to both *S[peaker]* and *H[earer]* that *H[earer]* knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.) *p*” (Searle 1969, 66), i.e. *p* normally provides some new information. The function of *ja* is basically to cancel this “preparatory condition” and to indicate that the information provided

25 In this case, the perspective switches from speaker to addressee when the evidential is used in a question. In other languages, this is not necessarily the case (San Roque et al. 2017; Bhadra 2020).

26 A similar case is the clitic =*ngarndi* in the Australian language(s) Jaminjung/Ngal-iwurru from the Mirndi family, which in declarative clauses marks epistemic primacy of the speaker but epistemic primacy of the hearer in questions (Schultze-Berndt 2017, 178-9; 189).

by *p* is not new but part of the Common Ground of speaker and hearer. Döring, Repp (2019, 18-19) illustrate this with the following example:

Example 24

Peter hat ja seine Geburtstagsfeier abgesagt. Da können wir am Sonntag einen Ausflug machen.

‘**As you know**, Peter has cancelled his birthday party. So we can go on a trip on Sunday’.

They explain that under the assumption that the first proposition is already in the Common Ground, the first sentence would be odd without the particle and the hearer might complain that s/he already knows this. The particle signals that the old information is actually given intentionally. Comparable cases are also attested in the Rigvedic data. Consider the following passage from a hymn dedicated to Indra:

Example 25

<i>catvāri</i>	<i>te</i>	<i>asuryāni</i>	<i>nām_o</i>	
four:NOM.PL.N	2SG.DAT	lordly:NOM.PL.N	name:NOM.PL.N	
<i>ḍābhyāni</i>	<i>mahiśasya</i>	<i>santi</i>	<i>t_yvām</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>
unfalsifiable:NOM.PL.N	buffalo:GEN.SG.M	PRS.3PL	2SG.NOM	PRT
<i>tāni</i>	<i>vīśvāni</i>	<i>vitse</i>	<i>yébhiḥ</i>	
DEM.ACC.PL.N	all:ACC.PL.N	KNOW:PERF.MID.2SG	REL:INS.PL.N	
<i>kārmāṇi</i>	<i>maghavañ</i>	<i>cakārtha</i>		
deed:ACC.PL.N	bounteous:VOC.SG.M	do:PERF.2SG		

“There exist four lordly names for you, the unfalsifiable names of the buffalo. You **surely** know all these, through which you have done your deeds, o bounteous one” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1463) RV 10.54.4

In this passage, Geldner (1951-57, 3: 217) translates *aṅgá* as an exclusive particle: ‘Du allein kennst alle diese, unter denen du Gabenreicher deine Taten getan hast’. However, even though Jamison, Brereton (comm.X.2, *ad loc.*) are not certain which names the poet has in mind, they (2014, 1463) surmise that he refers to Indra’s “famous epithets” (cf. also Geldner’s own comment) so that it seems implausible to assume that Indra is the only one who knows them all. The particle’s interpretation by Jamison and Brereton is questionable too. It seems odd to even question that Indra knows his own names. Hence, it should not be necessary for the poet to explicitly mark his full epistemic support regarding the truth of the proposition. Instead, it seems fairly clear that what is said in pāda c is already stored in the Common Ground of the speaker and the hearer and the poet probably does not

actually inform Indra that Indra knows his own names. On the contrary, the poet already knows that Indra knows his names and I believe that he overtly signals this by using *aṅgá*. In this way, he conveys that it is clearly unnecessary to mention them. This assumption is further supported by the presence of the non-restrictive relative clause in pāda d. The names correspond to the deeds which Indra has done (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1463; comm.X.2, *ad loc.*) and Indra was necessarily present when he performed them. I therefore consider my interpretation more advantageous than the traditional ones. A similar case is the following passage, which is addressed to Indra and Soma:

Example 26

<i>índrāsomā</i>	<i>yuvám</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>
Indra:VOC.DU.M.Soma:VOC.DU.M	2DU.NOM	PRT
<i>tárutram</i>	<i>apatyasácam</i>	
surpassing:ACC.SG.M	bringing.descendants:ACC.SG.M	
<i>śrútyam</i>	<i>raráthe</i>	
famous:ACC.SG.M	bestow:PERF.MID.2DU	

“Indra and Soma, it is you, **certainly**, who bestowed surpassing (wealth), bringing descendants in its train, worthy of fame” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 874) RV 6.72.5ab

This example describes a past event in which the addressees, i.e. Indra and Soma, were involved as the agents.²⁷ Again, it is implausible to assume that the poet thinks that Indra and Soma did not know before that they bestowed surpassing wealth. On the contrary, the poet probably expects this event to be in the Common Ground of him and them, so that he marks this with the particle *aṅgá*. The assumption that *aṅgá* functions as a discourse particle is generally also in accordance with its syntactic behavior. In the beginning of Section 3, I outlined, contrary to Lühr (2010, 136-8), that probably all attestations of *aṅgá* occur in Wackernagel position. According to Schäufele (1991, 156-7), sentential particles regularly occur in Wackernagel position and when they occur later in the clause (preceded by more than two words), their scope seems to be smaller than the entire clause. As a discourse particle, *aṅgá* should scope over the whole proposition of the clause in which it occurs (Zimmermann 2011, 2029). Its occurrence in Wackernagel position alone does not suffice to determine the scope of the particle, but at least

²⁷ Actually, soma is understood here as the exhilarating drink which enabled Indra to perform his deeds (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 874). Nonetheless, soma is addressed here and therefore personified and probably aware of what happened too.

there are no clear attestations that speak against such an assumption.²⁸

In [ex. 25] and [ex. 26], the predicate of the clause in which *aṅgá* occurs is in the indicative mood. The following example shows that it can also be in the subjunctive:

Example 27

<i>eṣá</i> DEM:NOM.SG.M	<i>stómo</i> praise:NOM.SG.M	<i>acikradad</i> bellow:AOR.3SG	<i>vṛṣā</i> bull:NOM.SG.M	
<i>ta</i> 2SG.DAT	<i>utá</i> and	<i>stāmúr</i> thieving:NOM.SG.M	<i>maghavann</i> bounteous:VOC.SG.M	
<i>akrapīṣṭa</i> screech:AOR.MID.3SG	<i>rāyás</i> wealth:GEN.SG.M	<i>kámo</i> desire:NOM.SG.M	<i>jaritáram</i> singer:ACC.SG.M	
<i>ta</i> 2SG.GEN	<i>ágan</i> LP.GO:AOR.3SG	<i>tvám</i> 2SG.NOM	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	
<i>śakra</i> strong:VOC.SG.M	<i>vásva</i> good:GEN.SG.N	<i>á</i> LP	<i>śako</i> be.able:AOR.SBJV.2SG	<i>naḥ</i> 1PL.DAT

“This praise has bellowed (like) a bull to you, and (like) a thieving [?] (monkey?) has screeched, o bounteous one. Desire for wealth has come over your singer. (For) you will be able to provide goods for us, powerful one” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 908; adapted)* RV 7.20.9

* The translation of pāda d deviates from Jamison and Brereton.

The subjunctive in Vedic is used to express that something will probably happen (Dahl 2010, 220-2, 302-3), which, I believe, is also the case in this passage. In pāda c, the poet says that desire for wealth has come over Indra’s singer. In pāda d, he gives the reason for this, namely that he expects Indra to provide goods for him and his people (see also my discussion of [ex. 31] below). To make this relation between the two pādas more clear, I have added the causal connector ‘for’ to Jamison and Brereton’s translation. It is a well-known characteristic of Indra, who is the addressee here, that he is generous towards humans (cf. [ex. 13] in Section 3.1). Therefore, the poet assumes that Indra already knows about this expectation. The occurrence of *aṅgá* in such causal relations is not too surprising. Döring, Repp (2019), investigate the occurrence of the German discourse particles *ja* and *doch* with respect to different discourse relations. They (2019, 38-9) find that *ja* occurs surprisingly often in clauses which provide evidence and they assume that in these cases, “the speaker exploits the meaning of *ja* to strengthen his/her argument: the propo-

²⁸ Note as well that at least with respect to focus particles, even a late position in the clause is not necessarily indicative of a smaller scope (Coenen 2021, 188-204).

sition *ja* scopes over is signaled to be already in the common ground and thus uncontroversial and unassailable”.²⁹

[Ex. 64] in Section 3.5 shows that *aṅgá* can occur with predicates not only in the indicative and subjunctive but also in the injunctive. A predicate in the optative is not attested (but see [ex. 45] in Section 3.4).

With respect to the function that I propose for *aṅgá* it is also interesting to consider with which kinds of subjects it occurs. In seven of the nineteen instances of the particle in a main or *hí* clause, the subject of the clause is the second person singular or dual, in other words the addressee. In such cases, it is in general more likely that the addressee already know the content of the proposition that the poet utters. I have already discussed three of these cases in this section. The other four passages with a second person subject are [ex. 10] in the beginning of Section 3 and [ex. 37], [ex. 63] and [ex. 64] below. There, I find an interpretation of *aṅgá* as a marker of shared knowledge plausible. Only [ex. 37] poses some problems but this is probably due to a general lack of understanding regarding this passage (see my detailed discussion below).

In the remaining passages, the subject of the clause in which *aṅgá* occurs is not the second person. However, it is not unusual in the *Rigveda* that the addressee of the hymn is referred to in the third person and the reference may change in subsequent clauses. Consider the following passage from a hymn addressed to Indra:

Example 28

<i>ánu</i>	<i>dvā́</i>	<i>jahitá</i>	<i>nayo</i>
LP	two:ACC.DU.M	abandon:PPP.ACC.DU.M	lead:PRS.INJ.2SG
<i>ṁndháṃ</i>	<i>śronáṃ</i>	<i>ca</i>	<i>vṛtrahan</i>
blind:ACC.SG.M	lame:ACC.SG.M	and	Vṛtra.smasher:VOC.SG.M
<i>ná</i>	<i>tát</i>	<i>te</i>	
not	DEM:NOM.SG.N	2SG.GEN	
<i>sumnám</i>	<i>áṣṭave</i>	<i>śatám</i>	<i>aśmanmáyinām</i>
favor:NOM.SG.N	reach:INF.DAT	hundred:ACC.SG.N	made.of.stone:ACC.PL.F
<i>purám</i>	<i>índro</i>	<i>v_i</i>	<i>ásyat</i>
fortress:ACC.PL.F	Indra:NOM.SG.M	LP	throw:PST.3SG
<i>dívodāsāya</i>	<i>dāśúṣe</i>		
Divodāsa:DAT.SG.M	pious:DAT.SG.M		

²⁹ Panov 2020 even assumes that this is the actual function of German *ja* and comparable elements.

“19. You led along the two that had been abandoned, the blind man and the lame, o Vṛtra-smasher: that favour of yours is not to be equaled.

20. Indra threw open the hundred fortresses made of stone for the pious Divodāsa”
(Jamison, Brereton 2014, 605) RV 4.30.19-20

Both of these stanzas describe deeds by Indra. The first clause of stanza 19 contains a predicate in the second person singular and the vocative *vṛtrahan* ‘o Vṛtra-smasher’, which addresses Indra; in the second clause, he is referred to by the second person enclitic *te*. In contrast, the predicate of stanza 20 is in the third person singular and the god is referred to by the personal name *índras*. As for the distribution of *aṅgá*, in six cases, the subject is a third person but nonetheless he is the addressee of the hymn, or at least the stanza, in which the respective clause occurs. As such changes from second to third person are fairly common, I propose that cases in which the subject of the clause is a third person but nevertheless the addressee of the hymn or the stanza be treated equally to those in which the subject is the second person. I therefore note that in thirteen out of nineteen instances, the subject of the clause in which *aṅgá* occurs is the addressee. Consider for instance the following stanza from a hymn that addresses diverse gods:

Example 29

<i>índro</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>mahád</i>	<i>bhayám</i>	<i>abhí</i>
Indra:NOM.SG.M	PRT	great:ACC.SG.N	fear:ACC.SG.N	LP
<i>śád</i>	<i>ápa</i>	<i>cucyavat</i>	<i>sá</i>	<i>hí</i>
be:PTCP.PRS.ACT.	LP	drive:AOR.SBJV.3SG	DEM:NOM.SG.M	for
ACC.SG.N				
<i>sthíró</i>	<i>vícaraṣaṇiḥ</i>			
steadfast:NOM.SG.M	boundless:NOM.SG.M			

“Indra, **certainly**, will drive away great fear as it looms, for he is steadfast, boundless”
(Jamison, Brereton 2014, 461) RV 2.41.10

In this hymn, stanzas 10-12 are dedicated to Indra. The preceding three stanzas address the Aśvins and the following three address all the gods (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 460). Again, the predicate is an aorist subjunctive by which the poet expresses his expectation that Indra will help the humans. I therefore consider this passage to be comparable to [ex. 27] above. In the next example, which is extracted from a hymn to Indra, the syntactic boundaries are not exactly clear:

Example 30

<i>yá</i>	<i>éka</i>	<i>íd</i>	
REL:NOM.SG.M	one:NOM.SG.M	PRT	
<i>vidáyate </i>	<i>vásu</i>	<i>mártāya</i>	<i>dāsúṣe </i>
LP.distribute:PRS.MID.3SG	good:ACC.SG.N	mortal:DAT.SG.M	pious:DAT.SG.M
<i>íśāno</i>	<i>ápratiṣkuta</i>	<i>índro</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>
rule.PTCP.PRS.MID.NOM.SG.M	unrepulsable:NOM.SG.M	Indra:NOM.SG.M	PRT
<i>kadā́</i>	<i>mártam</i>	<i>arādhásam </i>	<i>padā́</i>
when	mortal:ACC.SG.M	ungenerous:ACC.SG.M	foot:INS.SG.M
<i>kṣúmpam</i>	<i>iva</i>	<i>sphurat </i>	
mushroom:ACC.SG.M	like	kick:PERF.SBJV.3SG	
<i>kadā́</i>	<i>naḥ</i>	<i>śúśravad</i>	<i>gíra</i>
when	1PL.GEN	hear:PERF.SBJV.3SG	hymn:ACC.PL.F
<i>índro</i>	<i>aṅgá</i> 	<i>yás</i>	<i>cid</i>
Indra:NOM.SG.M	PRT	REL:NOM.SG.M	PRT
<i>dhí</i>	<i>tvā</i>	<i>bahúbhya</i>	<i>á </i>
for	2SG:ACC	many:ABL.PL.M	LP
<i>sutāvāṁ</i>	<i>āvívāsati </i>	<i>ugráṁ</i>	<i>tát</i>
with.pressed:NOM.SG.M	LP.gain:DES.3SG	powerful:ACC.SG.N	DEM:ACC.SG.N
<i>patyate</i>	<i>śáva</i>	<i>índro</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>
possess:PRS.MID.3SG	strength:ACC.SG.N	Indra:NOM.SG.M	PRT

“7. He who alone apportions the goods to the pious mortal, the unrepulsable master – (that’s) Indra **indeed!**

8. When will he kick the ungenerous mortal with his foot like a mushroom? When will he listen to our hymns? – Indra **indeed!**

9. For whoever wishes to win you over, away from many, holding the pressed (soma), he has control of powerful strength – Indra **indeed!**” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 213) RV 1.84.7-9

* The translation of pādas 9ab deviates from Jamison, Brereton 2014, 213. It roughly follows Witzel, Gotō 2007, 149. I intend the ‘he’ in pāda c to refer to Indra (cf. Jamison, Brereton comm.I.1, *ad loc.*).

The main problem here regards the syntactic status of *índras aṅgá* at the end of each stanza. Some translators, like Jamison, Brereton (2014, 213), regard it as a separate clause, or clausette (cf. Bloomfield 1916, 36; Jamison, Brereton comm.I.1, *ad loc.*). Others assume that it is part of the same clause as the rest of pāda c. For instance, Witzel, Gotō (2007, 148-9) translate pāda c of stanza 7 as ‘der unbehinderte Herrscher ist eigentlich Indra’, ‘Wann wird er eigentlich unsere Willkommenslieder hören, Indra?’ and ‘über diese gewaltige Macht herrscht eigentlich Indra’, respectively. Due to the fact

that apart from this passage *aṅgá* always occurs in the second position of its clause (in [ex. 10] such an interpretation is at least possible) and it never occurs in the last position of a longer clause, I prefer the interpretation by Jamison, Brereton (2014, 213; comm.I.1, *ad loc.*) and assume that *índras aṅgá* constitutes a clause(tte) of its own.³⁰ Although it seems somewhat odd to say that *índras* is the subject of these clause(tte)s, I consider them to be comparable to [ex. 29] above. The relative clause in stanza 7 characterises Indra and the main clause expresses that this characterisation refers to Indra. The particle *aṅgá* signals that the poet already expects Indra to be aware that this is a characterisation of him, especially because all previous stanzas of the hymn have addressed him as well. A similar analysis is applicable to stanza 9, and perhaps also to stanza 8, where the background portion of the questions refers to things that Indra typically does. The remaining two cases in which the third-person subject is the addressee of the hymn are [ex. 62] below and RV 10.79.4.

Thus far, I have discussed those cases in which the subject of the clause in which *aṅgá* occurs is a pronoun of the second person or the addressee of the hymn. In the *Rigveda*, there are six main or *hí* clauses in which neither is the case. In one case the subject is the first person and in five cases it is a third person. One of the passages in which the subject of the clause is a third person is the following example:

Example 31

<i>úpo háriṅām pátiṃ dákṣam pṛñcántam abravam nūnám śrudhi stuvató aśv'yásya </i>					
<i>naḥ_i</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>purá</i>	<i>caná </i>	<i>jajñé</i>	<i>vīrátaras</i>
for.not	PRT	before	PRT	create:PERF.MID.3SG	hero:COMP.NOM.SG.M
<i>t_vvát </i>	<i>nákī</i>	<i>rāyá</i>	<i>n_a</i>	<i>e_eváthā</i>	<i>ná</i>
2SG.ABL	nobody	wealth:INS.SG.M	not	so	not

bhandānā

favor:INS.SG.F

“14. I have addressed the lord of the fallow bays as he engorges his skill. Now listen to the son of Aśva as he praises.

15. For **surely** never before has a greater hero than you been born, neither in wealth – not in just such a way (as you are) – nor in favor” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1079) RV 8.24.14-15

30 Note, however, that unlike van Nooten, Holland 1994, 49, Lubotsky 1997, 23 assumes a pāda boundary before *índras aṅgá*. In fact, Wackernagel elements may also occur in the second position after pāda boundaries even if the latter do not coincide with a clause boundary (see e.g. Hock 1996, 246-7). Therefore, I do not fully exclude the alternative interpretation of the c pādas.

With respect to the clause in which *aṅgá* occurs, it is conspicuous that it contains a pronoun of the second person, namely the ablative *tvát*, which refers to Indra. Furthermore, as I interpret this clause, it does not provide information about *vīrátaraḥ* ‘a greater hero’ but about Indra. It may be rephrased as ‘You are the greatest hero that has ever been born’. Hence, one may conclude that *tvát* is the topic of this clause, i.e. “the thing which the proposition expressed by the sentence IS ABOUT” (Lambrecht 1994, 118). This may be the case even though it is not the subject of the clause (cf. Lambrecht 1994, 146-50). Therefore, I consider this passage to be comparable to the previous examples where the second person is the subject. In Vedic mythology, Indra stands out as a mighty warrior with great strength (cf. e.g. Oldenberg 1894, 134; Brereton, Jamison 2020, 69). Thus, the fact that there is no one like him can be regarded as general knowledge and the poet can assume that especially Indra himself knows about this fact. The presence of *aṅgá* in this example is also plausible from a pragmatic perspective. Stanza 15 justifies the utterance of the request in pāda 14c (cf. Lühr 2004, 136-40). The particle signals that what is given as a reason is unassailable, which makes the addressee feel more obliged to heed the request. The next example, which is from the same hymn, exhibits a predicate in the first person. I surmise that it may be interpreted similarly:

Example 32

nú anyātrā cid adrivas | t_vván no jagmur āśásah | mághavañ chagdhí táva tán na ūtíbhīḥ ||

<i>nah_i</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>nṛto</i>	<i>t_vvád</i>
for.not	PRT	dancer:VOC.SG.M	2SG.ABL
<i>anyám</i>	<i>vindāmi</i>	<i>rādhasē</i>	<i>rāyé</i>
other:ACC.SG.M	find:PRS.1SG	generosity:DAT.SG.N	wealth:DAT.SG.M
<i>dymnāya</i>	<i>śávase</i>	<i>ca</i>	<i>girvaṇaḥ</i>
brilliance:DAT.SG.N	strength:DAT.SG.N	and	longing.for.songs:VOC.SG.M

“11. Never have our hopes gone to any other place than you, o master of the stones. Bounteous one, exert your ability for us with your help.

12. For **surely** I do not find any other than you, for generosity, o dancer, for wealth, for brilliance, and for swelling might, o you who long for songs” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1079) RV 8.24. 11-12.

This example exhibits a similar structure to [ex. 31] in that *aṅgá* follows the particle *nahí*. Moreover, the predicate of the previous pāda is likewise an imperative and stanza 12 serves to justify the request expressed by it. In fact, [ex. 31] and [ex. 32] occur in subsequent *tṛcas*,

i.e. three-stanza units, whose final stanza begins with *nahí aṅgá*.³¹ Here, the subject of the clause that contains *aṅgá* refers to the poet. It is a null subject whereas the addressee, Indra, is referred to by a stressed pronoun in the ablative. This actually suggests that the speaker is the topic of the clause rather than the addressee. However, even though he speaks in the first person, I do not think that the poet specifically wants to provide information about himself. Rather, the second hemistich of stanza 12 is intended as a characterisation of Indra, saying that he is the only one who can provide wealth at the moment. In any case, it should be known to Indra that he is the one whom the poet has chosen as a potential provider of wealth, because it is him whom the poet has addressed in the previous stanzas of this hymn. The next case is fairly unproblematic:

Example 33

<i>paścédám</i> after+DEM:ACC.SG.N	<i>anyád</i> other:NOM.SG.N	<i>abhavad</i> become:PST.3SG	
<i>yájatram </i> deserving.sacrifice:NOM.SG.N	<i>ámartyasya</i> immortal:GEN.SG.N	<i>bhúvanasya</i> creation:GEN.SG.N	
<i>bhūná </i> fill:INS.SG.M	<i>suparṇó</i> fine.feathered:NOM.SG.M	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	<i>savitúr</i> Savitar:GEN.SG.M
<i>garútmān </i> Garutmant:NOM.SG.M	<i>púrvo</i> erlier:NOM.SG.M	<i>jātáḥ</i> create:PPP.NOM.SG.M	
<i>sá</i> DEM:NOM.SG.M	<i>u</i> PRT	<i>asyánu</i> DEM:GEN.SG.M+LP	<i>dhárma</i> support:ACC.SG.N

“3. After this (world) here there came into being the other one [=heaven], deserving the sacrifice, with its fill of immortal creation. **Certainly** the fine-feathered Garutmant(-bird) of Savitar [=sun] was born earlier, and it (was born) in accordance with his support” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1634) RV 10.149.3

The addressee of the hymn from which this stanza is taken is the god Savitar. The subject of the clause in which *aṅgá* occurs is Savitar’s bird, which is identified with the sun (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 382; Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1634).³² It does not seem plausible to assume that the poet has superior knowledge about Savitar’s bird than the god himself. Hence, I consider it plausible to assume that *aṅgá* is used here to mark the proposition as in the Common Ground of the poet and Savitar.

³¹ [Ex. 32] actually precedes [ex. 31].

³² Sāyaṇa identifies it with Tārksya, who stole Soma (Ludwig 1876-88, 4: 144; Geldner 1951-57, 3: 382), but I do not follow this view.

This means that there are only three instances of *aṅgá* in main clauses left to discuss. These remaining passages are in general not easy to interpret so that several suggestions have been proposed in the literature. In the following, I will discuss these passages and argue that they are compatible with my analysis of the particle as well. I will begin with the last stanza of a hymn dedicated to creation:

Example 34

*kó addhá veda ká ihá prá vocat | kúta ájātā kúta iyám víśṛṣṭiḥ | arváḡ devá asyá visárjanen_a |
áthā kó veda yáta ābabhúva ||*

<i>iyám</i> DEM:NOM.SG.F	<i>víśṛṣṭir</i> creation:NOM.SG.F	<i>yáta</i> from.where	<i>ābabhúva </i> LP.become:PERF.3SG
<i>yádi</i> if	<i>vā</i> or	<i>dadhé</i> put:PERF.MID.3SG	<i>yádi</i> if
<i>vā</i> or	<i>ná </i> not	<i>yó</i> REL:NOM.SG.M	
<i>asyádyakṣaḥ</i> DEM:GEN.SG.N+overseer:NOM.SG.M	<i>paramé</i> furthest:LOC.SG.N	<i>vṛòman </i> heaven:LOC.SG.N	
<i>só</i> DEM:NOM.SG.M	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	<i>veda</i> know:PERF.3SG	<i>yádi</i> if
<i>vā</i> or	<i>ná</i> not	<i>véda</i> know:PERF.3SG	

“6. Who really knows? Who shall here proclaim it? – from where was it born, from where this creation? The gods are on this side of the creation of this (world). So then who does know from where it came to be?

7. This creation – from where it came to be, if it was produced or if not – he who is the overseer of this (world) in the furthest heaven, he **surely** knows. Or if he does not know...?” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1609)

“... der der Aufseher dieser (Welt) im höchsten Himmel ist, der **allein** weiß es, es sei denn, daß auch er es nicht weiß” (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 361) RV 10.129. 6-7.

Here, the interpretation of the entire hymn is problematic, but the main problem for identifying the function of *aṅgá* is the interpretation of the last *yádi vā*, whose literal meaning should be ‘or if’. Since this seems problematic in the given context, some scholars simply assign it a meaning ‘or’ and thereby treat it as though it connected to main clauses (cf. e.g. Maurer 1975, 233; 1986, 284). This may fit the given context but it is problematic because the predicate of the *yádi vā* clause is accented. As a result, it clearly is a subordinate clause

(cf. Oldenberg 1909-12, 2: 347).³³ Geldner (1907-09, 1: 141; 2: 214; 1951-57, 3: 361) regards *yádi vā* as subordinating but assigns a special meaning ‘es sei denn, dass’ to the collocation, so that his translation can be paraphrased as ‘He knows unless he does not know’. This is a trivial, quasi-tautological statement that cannot be false. This speaks in favor of the assumption that *aṅgá* here functions as a marker of shared knowledge as well because both speaker and addressee, whoever the latter may be, know that it must be true.³⁴ Unlike the previously mentioned scholars, Brereton (1999, 258) and Jamison, Brereton (2014, 1609) assign *yádi vā* its literal meaning ‘or if’.³⁵ This forces them to assume that the stanza, and therefore the hymn, ends with a syntactically incomplete structure, i.e. a subordinate clause that lacks a main clause. However, this might be in fact the intention of the poet, because the lack of a clause in pāda 7d is paralleled by a lack of two syllables in the meter of pāda 7b (Brereton 1999, 249-50; Knobl 2008; Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1607). Applying this syntactic analysis, the presence of *aṅgá* seems somewhat more difficult to explain. Even though pādas 7cd generally seem to convey a sense of tautology (cf. Jamison, Brereton’s 2014, 1608 introduction), the *yádi vā* clause is part of a different (incomplete) sentence, so that *aṅgá* does not scope over a tautological statement. Perhaps, the particle is instead used here to underline the elusiveness of the apparent knowledge regarding the origin of the world. If even the gods are ignorant regarding this origin, the only one who might possess such knowledge is the overseer of the world (cf. Geldner 1908, 23). At first, the poet is even sure that the overseer knows, which is also reflected in the translation by Jamison and Brereton, according to which *aṅgá* marks full epistemic support. However, this certainty dissipates in an instant and the poet starts to question what he believed to know for certain just a moment ago. With my interpretation of *aṅgá*, this effect becomes even stronger, because, as mentioned above, when a proposition is marked as in the Common Ground of speaker and hearer, whoever this might be in this stanza, it is also marked as uncontroversial (Döring, Repp 2019, 39). In other words,

33 Some scholars assign it a meaning like ‘however’ (cf. Macdonell 1893, 241; Monier-Williams 1899, 845). Saňko 2019 even suggests emending the text, but I do not follow this view. Hettrich 1988, 229 mentions this passage as an unclear case of *yádi* constructions. What might speak in favour of an interpretation as ‘or’ is that the Old Persian *yadi=vā* appears to function as a disjunction ‘or’ rather than ‘or if’ too (Herzfeld 1938, 359; Schmitt 2014, 289).

34 Interpreting *yádi vā* as ‘or’ yields a tautological statement as well: «der gewiß weiß es oder er weiß es nicht» (Hillebrandt 1913, 134). Renou 1956, 126, whose translation is similar to Geldner’s, regards the final subclause as an afterthought. In this case, it would not be within the scope of the particle.

35 Similarly Thieme 1964, 67: «oder ob er es nicht weiß?».

the poet at first believes that the truth of the proposition is so obvious that the hearer must have come to the same conclusion, but right after that, serious doubts arise. Accordingly, I believe that my interpretation of *aṅgá* is compatible not only with Geldner's but also with Jamison and Brereton's interpretation.³⁶

The second and third case that need to be discussed here occur in subsequent *pādas* in a hymn dedicated to Aranyāni, the Lady of the Forest. There, *aṅgá* occurs in two subsequent clauses whose subject is neither the second person nor the addressee of the hymn:

Example 35

utá gáva ivādant | utá véśmeva dṛśyate | utó aranyāniḥ sāyám | śakaṭīr iva sarjati ||

<i>gām</i>	<i>aṅgaśá [= aṅgá eśás]</i>	<i>á</i>
COW:ACC.SG.F	PRT+DEM:NOM.SG.M	LP
<i>hvayati </i>	<i>dārv</i>	<i>aṅgaśó [= aṅgá eśás]</i>
call:PRS.3SG	WOOD:ACC.SG.N	PRT+DEM:NOM.SG.M
<i>ápāvadhī </i>	<i>vásann</i>	<i>aranyānyám</i>
LP+hit:AOR.3SG	stay:PTCP.PRS.ACT.NOM.SG.M	Lady.of.Wilderness:LOC.SG.F
<i>sāyám </i>	<i>ákrukṣad</i>	<i>íti</i>
in.the.evening	shriek:AOR.3SG	QUOT
<i>manyate</i>		
think:PRS.MID.3SG		

“3. And it's as if cows are eating and as if a settlement is seen, and the Lady of the Wilderness at evening – it's as if there's a cart creaking.

4. **Surely** it's someone calling his cow; **surely** another has been splitting wood. But staying by the Lady of the Wilderness at evening, one imagines ‘(Something) has shrieked!’” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1632) RV 10.146.3-4

This is one of the passages where an interpretation of *aṅgá* as a focus particle appears to be inadequate. It does not express that someone calls nothing but the cow and has chopped nothing but wood. Nor does it emphasise the identity of the preceding word with a previously mentioned referent. The word *gāvas* ‘cows (NOM.PL.F)’ occurs in the previous stanza but in stanza 4, the lexeme is used in the singular. An interpretation as a particulariser does not fit the context either.³⁷ I be-

³⁶ In one of the interpretations contemplated by Müller 1860, 563, he also surmises that “the poet [is] startling perhaps after the firm assertion of his belief in this one overseer and creator”.

³⁷ Renou 1955-69, 16: 172 ascribes the occurrence of *aṅgá* after non-pronominal forms to the younger age of this passage, but I do not think that this is the decisive factor.

lieve that a clue to the function of the particle lies in what is described in this stanza. According to Geldner (1951-57, 3: 380) stanzas 3 and 4 describe illusions that one has in the forest (cf. also Griffith 1896-97, 2: 589; Renou 1956, 257 and the translation by Doniger O’Flaherty 1981, 242). Somewhat differently, Maurer (1986, 217-18) assumes that the poet only imagines things in stanza 3 but stanza 4ab reveals that these imaginations are in fact real. This context resembles the following German example by Gutzmann (2010, 132; 2017, 145-6):

Example 36

A: *David riecht wie ein Zombie.*

‘David smells like a zombie.’

B: *David ist **JA** ein Zombie.*

‘David is a Zombie, **you should have known that!**’*

* I must admit that to me as a native speaker of German the answer by B, with stressed JA in a declarative main clause, sounds completely odd. However, similar examples are given by other German-speaking authors as well (cf. Meibauer 1994, 130; Abraham 2017, 255-7). To me, the most natural response to A would be *David ist ja auch ein Zombie.*

In this example, speaker B wants A to know that David is a zombie, signals that A could have known this before and also signals that B is sure that the fact that David is a zombie should become Common Ground (Gutzmann 2010, 135). In order to do so, B uses the stressed particle *ja*. Similarly, in the Vedic [ex. 35], the poet first thinks that he imagines sounds that resemble cows and working people and then realises that they are actually real and probably also realises that he might have realised this before, especially because the sounds described in 4ab are probably rather commonly heard in a forest, near the forest border. The problem is, however, that, at least in German, this function of *ja* requires a special intonation pattern, for which there is no evidence in the Vedic example. Abraham (2017, 256) assumes that sentences like B’s answer in [ex. 36] equal the use of unstressed *ja* with verum focus.³⁸ If the Vedic [ex. 35] exhibited a verum focus one would expect the finite verb or its preverb of the clauses that contain *aṅgá* to be fronted (cf. Gunkel 2017), but in both cases they occur at the end of the clause. Therefore, it is uncertain whether *aṅgá* in [ex. 35] has a function that is comparable to *ja* in [ex. 36] although the contexts, at least according to Maurer’s (1986, 217-18) interpretation, are similar. Yet a different interpretation is provided by Jamison, Brereton (2014, 1631). They believe that in these stan-

38 Following Gutzmann 2010, stressed *ja* equals unstressed *ja* + verum. I will not discuss the notions of verum and verum focus here in more detail.

zas the poet himself is in the forest at nightfall and is talking himself into believing that the scary sounds caused by the Lady of the Forest and the animals are sounds of everyday-life, but he fails to do so in 4cd. As a result, similarly to Maurer's interpretation, one may regard stanzas 3 and 4 as speech that the poet addresses to himself. This makes this passage comparable to the self-directed questions involving *kuvíd aṅgá* discussed in Section 3.1: If the poet addresses himself, both speaker and hearer see and hear the same things and therefore have the same knowledge of whether what is said is true or not. Hence, the presence of *aṅgá* is not surprising here. Yet, one may wonder why in Jamison and Brereton's interpretation the particle is present only in the first two clauses of stanza 4 and not in the preceding stanza as well. I surmise that the particle might be used to express that in stanza 4ab, the poet has become more successful in making himself believe that he is near a settlement. Cows have been mentioned in *pāda* 3a and the wagon that has been mentioned in 3d possibly carries away chopped wood (cf. Maurer 1986, 218). This means that the poet there already imagines the same or similar things as in stanza 4ab. However, in stanza 3 the particle *iva* 'like' is used ('it is as if there were cows etc'). This indicates that the poet is not yet convinced that he really sees and hears these things. This changes in stanza 4ab. He is now almost convinced that he hears cows and their herder and people working in the forest. To reinforce his conviction linguistically, he not only stops using the particle *iva* but instead he uses a particle that is used to indicate that the proposition is unassailable. This makes the abrupt change that Jamison, Brereton perceive in *pādas* cd, where the poet fails to uphold the domestic image, even more abrupt. As a result, I uphold the assumption that *aṅgá* is used as a marker of shared knowledge in the *Rigveda*. Even though both [ex. 34] and [ex. 35] are exceedingly difficult to interpret in general, there are interpretations in which the presence of the particle is explicable based on this analysis.

In all previous passages, I have argued that it is plausible to assign *aṅgá* the function of marking shared knowledge, even if other analyses have been proposed. There is, however, one passage which is particularly problematic with respect to my analysis:

Example 37

<i>t_vvám</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>prá</i>	<i>śaṃsiṣo</i>
2SG.NOM	PRT	LP	pronounce:AOR.SBJV.2SG
<i>deváh</i>	<i>śaviṣṭha</i>	<i>márt_{yam}</i>	<i>ná</i>
god:NOM.SG.M	strong:SUP.VOC.SG.M	mortal:ACC.SG.M	not
<i>tvád</i>	<i>anyó</i>	<i>maghavann</i>	<i>asti</i>
2SG.ABL	other:NOM.SG.M	bounteous:VOC.SG.M	be:PRS.3SG
<i>mardit_ḡ</i>	<i>ndra</i>	<i>brá_vimi</i>	
comforter:NOM.SG.M	Indra:VOC.SG.M	say:PRS.1SG	
<i>te</i>	<i>vácaḥ</i>		
2SG.DAT	speech:ACC.SG.N		

“**Surely** you, (though) a god, will solemnly praise the mortal, o strongest one. There is no other dispenser of mercy than you, bounteous one. Indra, I say this speech to you:” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 214)

“Du **allein**, der Gott, wirst den Sterblichen beloben, du Mächtigster...” (Geldner 1951-57, 1: 109) RV 1.84.19

Jamison, Brereton (comm.I.1, *ad loc.*) remark that it is not clear why it is Indra who will praise the mortal and not the other way around. Accordingly, one may argue that this example constitutes counter-evidence to the analysis that I have hitherto proposed. The predicate is in the subjunctive, which expresses that the poet expects Indra to praise the mortal. According to my analysis, *aṅgá* encodes that the poet believes that Indra is aware of this expectation and thereby marks the proposition as uncontroversial. However, if it is unusual for Indra to praise the mortal, why should the poet believe that Indra knows that the poet expects him to do so? Nonetheless, I do not believe that this passage constitutes actual counter-evidence to my hypothesis. First, it is important to note that the traditional interpretations of the particle do not fit the context either. Given that such a behavior is unusual for Indra, I do not expect the poet to express certainty with respect to his expectations. Hence, it seems odd to interpret *aṅgá* as ‘reassuring’ particle or a marker of full support, as is the case in Jamison and Brereton’s translation. Similarly odd is Geldner’s interpretation as an exclusive particle. It is not clear to me why Indra of all sentient beings should be the only one who praises the mortal if this is actually untypical for him. A possible argument in favor of an exclusive interpretation would be that in the next clause all additional alternatives to Indra are explicitly excluded (Geldner 1907-09, 1: 2). However, there the predicate is different, which invalidates this argument because the next clause does not say that nobody else will praise the mortal. An interpretation as a particulariser ‘especially’ is inadequate too for similar reasons.

Hence, my analysis is at least not inferior to the traditional ones. As a second point, one may adduce that even regardless of the particle, the interpretation of this text passage is unclear. For as Jamison and Brereton remark themselves, it is not clear why Indra should praise the humans in the first place. Thus, one may wonder whether their interpretation is correct, or more precisely whether the predicate *prá śams-* should be interpreted differently. Velankar (1949, 16) translates the verb as ‘admire’, but this interpretation is equally problematic. Böhtlingk, Roth (1855-75, 7: 5) assign it the meaning ‘aufmuntern’ (cf. Grassmann 1873, 1365-6).³⁹ This would be compatible with my analysis of *an̄gá*, given that in the following clause Indra is portrayed as giving mercy. On the other hand, this is the only Rigvedic passage where Böhtlingk and Roth assign this meaning to *prá śams-*, which raises the suspicion that this is an ad hoc solution. More promising is the approach by Witzel, Gotō (2007, 150), who translate it as ‘verkünden’: ‘Eigentlich wirst du (es) verkünden, als Gott dem Sterblichen, du Gewaltigster’.⁴⁰ This meaning of the verb is also attested in other passages, e.g. in the following:

Example 38

<i>prá</i>	<i>tát</i>	<i>te</i>	<i>adyá</i>
LP	DEM:ACC.SG.N	2SG.GEN	today
<i>Śipiviṣṭa</i>	<i>nám_o </i>	<i>ryáḥ</i>	<i>śamsāmi</i>
Śipiviṣṭa: VOC.SG.M	name:ACC.SG.N	stranger:GEN.SG.M	pronounce:PRS.1SG
<i>vayúnāni</i>	<i>vidván</i>		
pattern:ACC.PL.N	know:PTCP.PERF.ACT.NOM.SG.M		

“This name of yours, o Śipiviṣṭa, of you the stranger **do I proclaim** today, I who know the (hidden) patterns” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1010) RV 7.100.5ab

Yet, Witzel and Gotō’s interpretation is not unproblematic either because it has to assume that the perceiver *mártyam* ‘the mortal’ occurs in the accusative.⁴¹ What can be concluded from the above discussion is that there appears to be in general a lack of understanding regarding [ex. 37]. Due to this and to the fact that the traditional interpretations of *an̄gá* are, in my opinion, just as problematic as mine, I propose that this passage be regarded as unclear and therefore not as counter-evidence to my hypothesis.

³⁹ Cf. also Griffith’s 1896-97, 1: 109 translation: ‘Thou as a God, O Mightiest, verily blissest mortal man’.

⁴⁰ I do not follow Witzel and Gotō’s rendering ‘eigentlich’ of *an̄gá*.

⁴¹ Cf. *prá ah-* ‘proclaim’, where the perceiver is in the dative (Grassmann 1873, 161-2).

This concludes my discussion of *aṅgá* in main and *hí* clauses. I have argued that, with the exception of [ex. 37], in all passages it is plausible to assume that the particle marks shared knowledge, i.e. it signals that the proposition (or propositions) which is in its scope is already in the Common Ground of speaker and addressee, whereas the traditional interpretations are not always adequate. The apparent incompatibility with [ex. 37] is probably due to a general lack of understanding regarding this passage, especially because the traditional interpretations if the particle do not seem to be compatible either.

3.3 The Particle *aṅgá* with Imperatives

In the previous section, I examined the cases in which *aṅgá* occurs in main and *hí* clauses. There, the verbal predicates are either in the indicative, in the subjunctive or, as I will show in Section 3.5, in the injunctive. In one case, *aṅgá* occurs in a main clause whose predicate is an imperative:

Example 39

<i>t_vvám</i> 2SG.NOM	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT	<i>jaritāraṃ</i> singer:ACC.SG.M
<i>yaviṣṭha</i> young:SUP.VOC.SG.M	<i>vísṽān_i</i> all:ACC.SG.N	<i>agne</i> Agni:VOC.SG.M
<i>duritāti</i> difficulty:ACC.PL.N	<i>parṣi</i> carry.over:IMP.2SG	<i>stená</i> thief:NOM.PL.M
<i>adṛśran</i> appear:AOR.MID.3PL	<i>ripávo</i> cheating:NOM.PL.M	<i>jánāso</i> people:NOM.PL.M
<i>jñātaketā</i> with.unknown.intentions:NOM.PL.M	<i>vṛjiná</i> crooked:NOM.PL.M	<i>abhūvan</i> become:AOR.3PL

“**Certainly**, o youngest Agni, carry the singer beyond all difficulties. Thieves have appeared and cheating peoples. Devious ones of unknown intention have come” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 665) RV 5.3.11

The predicate *parṣi* has not been analysed as an imperative unequivocally in the literature. Grassmann (1873, 778) regards it as an aorist subjunctive. This analysis is reflected in the translation by Geldner (1951-57, 2: 6): ‘Du allein wirst dem Sänger über alle Fährlichkeiten hinweghelfen, o jüngster Agni’. However, according to Renou (1955-69, 13: 107), the verb is “nécessairement impératif (comme ailleurs)”. I follow the latter view, which is also held by Lubotsky (1997, 908) and reflected in the translation by Jamison, Brereton (2014, 665). Even though there is no other Rigvedic passage in which

aṅgá occurs with an imperative, such contexts are attested in younger Texts. Böhtlingk, Roth (1855-75, 1: 49-50) give the following example from the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*:

Example 40

<i>āsām</i>	<i>aṅgaikāṃ</i> [= <i>aṅga</i> <i>ekām</i>]	<i>bhindhīti</i>
DEM:GEN.PL.F	PRT+ONE:ACC.SG.F	break:PRS.IMP.2SG+QUOT

“Break one of these!” ChUp 6.12.1*

* The Vedic text is based on TITUS. The English translation is by the Author.

Given that the predicate of the clause in [ex. 39] is an imperative, the question is then what the function of *aṅgá* is in this passage. In the literature, *aṅgá* has been interpreted as exhortative when it occurs with imperatives (Macdonell 1893, 4).⁴² However, such a description is rather imprecise, especially because other particles like *sú*, *tú* and *íd* have been assigned similar functions with imperatives too (cf. Klein 1982; Coenen 2021, 304-8). Compare the following example that Coenen (2021, 305) gives:

Example 41

<i>sunótā</i>	<i>somaṇāve</i>	<i>sómam</i>	<i>índrāya</i>
press:PRS.IMP.2PL	drinking.soma:DAT.SG.M	soma:ACC.SG.M	Indra:DAT.SG.M
<i>vajrīṇe</i>	<i>pácatā</i>	<i>paktír</i>	
with.mace:DAT.SG.M	cook:PRS.IMP.2PL	cooked.food:ACC.PL.F	
<i>ávase</i>	<i>kṛṇudhvám</i>	<i>ít</i>	
help:DAT.SG.N	do:PRS.IMP.MID.2PL	PRT	

“Press soma for soma-drinking Indra who holds the mace. Cook cooked dishes. **Just** cause (him) to help” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 921) RV 7.32.8a-c

This raises the question as to how the employment of *aṅgá* differs from these particles. Moreover, it needs to be shown whether the function of *aṅgá* in [ex. 39] is compatible with the one that I have proposed in the previous sections, i.e. as a marker of shared knowledge. With respect to this, it has first to be noted that discourse particles with such functions do not necessarily occur with imperatives (cf. Forker 2020, 349). Thus, German does not exhibit an exact parallel to the Vedic data. The particle *ja* does occur with imperatives but it

⁴² Macdonell 1916, 213-14 notes an adhortative function specifically in younger texts, where *aṅgá* exhibits different syntactic behavior than in the *Rigveda* in that it occurs in the initial position of the clause and causes the imperative to be accented.

needs to be stressed in order to do so (Thurmair 1989, 103). Consider the following examples from Kwon (2005, 39):

Example 42

Also, ich will nicht ohne Satire leben. Hört JA nicht auf damit! Versprochen?

‘Well, I don’t want to live without satire. Don’t you stop it! Will you promise?’ (TAZ, 07.09.1995, 14)*

* The English translation is by the Author.

Kwon (2005, 39) explains that stressed *ja* expresses the strong will of the speaker and signals that the duty to heed the command is indisputable, which means that there probably is a relationship with the unstressed use in declarative clauses. A German particle that is similar to *ja* is *doch*, but it not only marks a proposition as in the Common Ground but also “as being in the common ground against the evidence that the speaker has just received” (Döring, Repp 2019, 23), which I do not find for *aṅá*. This particle also occurs with imperatives. Consider the following examples from Thurmair (1989, 112, 118):

Example 43

Asterix hat Geld in der Hand: Riech mal!

*Obelix: Riechen? Aber Geld riecht **doch** nicht!*

‘Asterix has money in his hand: Smell!

Obelix: Smell? But money doesn’t smell!’ (A XIII, 44)

Example 44

*Mach **doch** das Licht an! Du verdirbst dir ja die Augen.*

‘Turn on the light! You’re ruining your eyes’.*

* The English translations of the two examples are by the Author.

Thurmair (1989, 118-19) assumes that with imperatives, *doch* expresses that the hearer already might have known what to do and that it emphasises that the hearer has not acted accordingly, i.e. contrary to what the speaker requests. Thus, its employment with imperatives is comparable to the one in declarative clauses, which suggests that the function of *aṅá* with imperatives might be comparable to the

one in declarative clauses too.⁴³ Consider again [ex. 39]. In the clause that follows the imperative, the poet gives the reason for uttering his request, namely that dangerous, hostile people have approached. I surmise that the poet assumes that Agni is aware of their presence too. Agni is regularly asked to defend humans against their enemies (Brereton, Jamison 2020, 75), so that it is plausible to assume that the poet believes that Agni already knows that the poet wants him to help. This makes *aṅgá* comparable to the use of *doch* in [ex. 44] above in that in both cases the hearer might have known what the speaker wants before. Monier-Williams (1899, 7) assumes that *aṅgá* can mark impatience, and indeed this is a typical function of such particles with imperatives (Panov 2020, 17). Nonetheless, I surmise that unlike *doch*, *aṅgá* does not emphasise the fact that the addressee did not act accordingly before the request was uttered, since it lacks this conflicting component in declarative clauses. The assumption that in [ex. 39] the poet expects Agni to already know what to do is furthermore supported by the fact that *viśvā(ni) duriṭā(ni) ati pṛ-* ‘carry beyond all difficulties’ is a formulaic expression which is used with Agni in other passages as well.⁴⁴ Although I consider the analysis of *aṅgá* with imperatives that I have just proposed plausible, it nevertheless remains uncertain because [ex. 39] is the only example of this kind.⁴⁵

3.4 The Particle *aṅgá* in Subordinate Clauses

After having discussed the occurrences of the particle *aṅgá* in questions, in declarative main/*hí* clauses and with imperatives, one group of passages is left, namely subordinate clauses. There are six instances of *aṅgá* in such clauses in the *Rigveda*, all of which I will discuss in this section. I will begin my discussion with a passage that is taken from a dialogue between Viśvāmitra and the rivers Vipāś and Śutudrī:

⁴³ For another similar case compare the Jaminjung/Ngaliwurru marker of primary epistemic authority, =*ngarndi*, which appears to fulfill parallel functions in declarative clauses, in questions and with imperatives (Schultze-Berndt 2017, 179, 189, 194-5).

⁴⁴ See RV 1.99.1, 3.20.4, 5.4.9 and cp. also the similar passages RV 6.2.11, 6.14.6, 6.15.15, which Bloomfield 1916, 591 gives. For this formula, in slightly varied forms, used with other gods see RV 4.39.1, 8.18.17, 8.97.15, 10.96.8. Many thanks to Riccardo Ginevra for pointing this out to me!

⁴⁵ I will argue that in [ex. 54] of Section 3.4, *aṅgá* fulfills the same function as in [ex. 39]. However, the context there provides no further clues regarding the function of the particle.

Example 45

*ó śú svasāraḥ kāráve śṛṅṇota | yayaú vo dūrād ánasā ráthena | ní śú namadhvam bhávataḥ
supārā | adhoakṣāḥ sindhavaḥ srot.yābbhiḥ || á te káro śṛṅṇavāmā vácāṃsi | yayátha dūrād
ánasā ráthena | ní te naṃsai pīp.yānéva yósā | máryāyeva kan.yāśáśvacá te ||*

<i>yád</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>tvā</i>
when	PRT	2SG.ACC
<i>bharatāḥ</i>	<i>saṃtáreyur </i>	
Bharata:NOM.PL.M	LP.CROSS:OPT.3PL	
<i>gavyán</i>	<i>grāma</i>	<i>iṣitá</i>
seek.cattle:PTCP.PRS.ACT.NOM.SG.M	horde:NOM.SG.M	propel:PPP.NOM.SG.M
<i>índrajūtaḥ </i>	<i>árṣād</i>	<i>áha</i>
sped.by.Indra:NOM.SG.M	surge:PRS.SBJV.3SG	PRT
<i>prasaváḥ</i>	<i>sárgataкта </i>	<i>á</i>
forward.thrust:NOM.SG.M	launched.in.surge:NOM.SG.M LP	
<i>vo</i>	<i>vṛṇe</i>	
2PL.GEN	choose:PRS.MID.1SG	
<i>sumatīm</i>	<i>yajñíyānām </i>	
favor:ACC.SG.F	deserving.sacrifice:ACC.PL.F	

*átāriṣur bharatā gavyávaḥ sám | ábhakta vípraḥ sumatīm nadínām | prá pinvadhvam
iśáyantīḥ surādhā | á vakṣāṇāḥ pṛṇádharmaṃ yātá śíbham*

“9. [Viśvāmitra:] Listen well to the bard, sisters. He has driven to you from afar with his wagon and chariot. Bow down; become easy to cross, staying below his axle(s) with your currents, you rivers.

10. [Rivers:] We will listen to your words, bard. You have driven from afar with wagon and chariot. I [=one river] will bow down to you like a young woman swollen (with milk, to her infant), (while) I [=other river] will bend to you like a maiden to her cavalier.

11. [Viśvāmitra:] When the Bharatas should **really** have crossed you entirely – the horde seeking cattle, propelled, sped by Indra – then certainly your forward thrust, launched in a surge, will rush (again). I wish for the favor of you who deserve the sacrifice.

12. [Viśvāmitra:] The cattle-seeking Bharatas have entirely crossed; the poet has shared in the favor of the rivers. Swell forth, nurturing, very generous; fill your bellies; drive quickly.” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 514-15) RV 3.33.9-12

In this hymn, Viśvāmitra tries to persuade the rivers to let the Bharatas cross them (von Schroeder 1908, 226; Geldner 1951-57, 1: 372; Jamison, Brereton 2014, 513). In stanza 10, the rivers agree and stanza 12 shows that the Bharatas have successfully crossed one of the rivers (Schnaus 2008, 104). In stanza 11, i.e. in Viśvāmitra’s response after the rivers agreed to let the Bharatas cross, the particle *aṅgá* occurs in a subordinate clause introduced by *yád* ‘when’. Even though the general interpretation of this passage is less problematic than in several ones that I have discussed in the previous sections, the func-

tion of the particle seems rather difficult to determine. It seems odd to assume that the proposition in the temporal subclause is marked as in the Common Ground of Viśvāmitra and the rivers. In order to account for this impression, it is again useful to consider the distribution of the German discourse particle *ja*. For this particle, like German discourse particles in general, is not allowed in all types of subclauses (Thurmair 1989, 73-82; 2013, 644-5). Based on Thurmair (1989, 73-82) and Haegeman (2002; 2004a; 2004b; 2006), Coniglio (2009; 2012) assumes that this is due to the fact that not all types of subclauses have an independent illocutionary force, i.e. some constitute separate speech acts whereas do not. Coniglio concludes that German discourse particles are only allowed in those subclauses which have an independent illocutionary force. Coniglio (2012, 266-7) illustrates the difference between the two types of subclauses by means of the following two examples, which also Haegeman (2002, 117-18) discusses:

Example 46

If it rains we will all get terribly wet and miserable.

Example 47

If [as you say] it is going to rain this afternoon, why don't we just stay at home and watch a video?

In [ex. 46], the connection between the two clauses is close in that there is actually a sequence of two events, where one event leads to the other. Haegeman (2002; 2004a; 2004b; 2006) calls this type of subclause **CENTRAL ADVERBIALS**. These do not constitute separate speech acts. In contrast, there is no such relation between the clauses in [ex. 47]. Instead, the conditional clause is a separate speech act which serves to justify the speech act in the main clause. Haegeman calls such clauses **PERIPHERAL ADVERBIALS**. Coniglio (2009; 2012) even argues that the presence of modal particles in a clause can be used as a diagnostic for its status as having its own illocutionary force. I will base my following analysis merely on the observation that the clause types which Haegeman (2002; 2004a; 2004b; 2006) analyses as not having independent illocutionary force do not appear to allow for discourse particles in German. In the Vedic [ex. 45], *aṅgá* occurs in a temporal adverbial clause and based on Haegeman (2002), this clause should be a central adverbial, because similarly to the conditional clause in [ex. 46] subordinate and main clause describe a sequence of events. Indeed, Coniglio (2009, 207-9) finds that German discourse particles generally do not occur in such clauses, as he il-

illustrates with the following example from Kratzer (1999, 5), where two states of affairs temporally overlap:

Example 48

*Als ich (*ja) in Syracuse gewohnt habe, war ich oft in Ithaca.*

‘When I lived in Syracuse (as you know), I was in Ithaca a lot’.

Hettrich (1988, 127-41) regards Vedic *yád* clauses as not having illocutionary force as well, which raises the fundamental question of why *aṅgá* can occur in such clauses if it has a function that is comparable to German *ja*. The solution I suggest is that even though *aṅgá* is functionally comparable to *ja*, its syntactic behavior is different. More precisely, I propose that when *aṅgá* occurs in the second position of a subordinate clause without independent illocutionary force, its scope comprises both the subordinate clause and the matrix clause. That a particle in this position can scope over both subordinate and matrix clause is paralleled for instance by the additive particle *cid* in concessive conditionals. See the following example (Coenen 2021, 141):

Example 49

yác	cid	dhí	śásvatā
if	PRT	for	perpetual:INS.SG.F
<i>tánā</i>	<i>devám-devaṃ</i>	<i>yájāmahe</i>	<i>t_vvé</i>
succession:INS.SG.F	god:ACC.SG.M-god:ACC.SG.M	sacrifice:PRS.MID.1PL	2SG.LOC
<i>íd</i>	<i>dhūyate</i>	<i>havíḥ</i>	
PRT	pour:PRS.PASS.3SG	oblation:NOM.SG.N	

“For **even when** we sacrifice to god after god in unbroken succession, it is just in you that the oblation is poured” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 125) RV 1.26.6

Compare also the following Latin example, where the particle *enim* is used to mark shared knowledge between author and addressee (Kroon 1995, 185):⁴⁶

Example 50

Cum	enim	<i>mecum</i>	<i>in</i>
when	PRT	with.me	in
<i>Tusculano</i>	<i>esses</i>	...,	<i>incidisti in</i>
Tusculanum:ABL.SG.N	be:PST.SBJV.2SG	when	cut:PERF.2SG in
<i>Aristotelis</i>	<i>Topica</i>	<i>quaedam,</i>	<i>quae</i>

⁴⁶ The glosses are by the Author.

Aristotle:GEN.SG.M	topic:ACC.PL.N	certain:ACC.PL.N	REL:NOM.PL.N
<i>sunt</i>	<i>ab</i>	<i>illo</i>	
be:PRS.3PL	by	DEM:ABL.SG.M	
<i>pluribus</i>	<i>libris</i>	<i>explicata.</i>	
many:ABL.PL.M	book:ABL.PL.M	unfold:PPP.NOM.PL.N	

“You will remember that (*enim*) when we were together in my Tusculan villa ... you hit upon certain Topics of Aristotle which were expounded by him in several books” (Cicero, Topica 1)

In this passage, *enim* occurs in the second position of the subordinate clause introduced by *cum* ‘when’ but its scope contains the following main clause as well (Panov 2020, 6). For [ex. 45], this means that the scope of *anigá* comprises pādas 11a-c. In my opinion, this fits the context of the example very well. In principle, I agree with Schnaus (2008, 104) that in stanza 11 Viśvāmitra wants to assure the river that after the Bharatas cross it, it will surge again as usual. Importantly, the river does not actually need such an assurance because there is nothing that would prevent it from surging on and it is certainly not in the power of the poet or the Bharatas to influence the course of the mighty river. On the contrary, the dependence of the poet on the river becomes especially clear by his utterance in pāda d. Accordingly, I conclude that the purpose of pādas a-c is mainly to remind the river, which has just granted the poet’s request, that it will have no disadvantage due to this, a fact that is uncontroversial. This supports the interpretation of *anigá* as a marker of shared knowledge. The poet expects the river to know what will happen at the time when the Bharatas have crossed the river, which means that both clauses are in the scope of the particle.⁴⁷ One additional remark regarding the verb forms is due, for this is the only case in the *Rigveda* in which *anigá* occurs in a clause whose predicate is an optative. In general, the function of this optative is not quite clear. According to Delbrück (1888, 341), this is the only instance of a temporally used optative in the *Rigveda*. Schnaus (2008, 101) mentions this but does not comment further on it. Jamison, Brereton (comm.III, *ad loc.*) remark the conspicuous sequence of an optative in the subclause and a present subjunctive in the main clause. What is important here is that the matrix predicate is a subjunctive and that the whole sentence expresses the po-

⁴⁷ Notice also the presence of the particle *áha* in the main clause. Following Hejib 1984, 103, it primarily seems to emphasise the temporal relationship between the two clauses, so that *anigá* probably takes wide scope. I do not follow Hejib’s second assumption that *áha* might indicate a causal relation.

et's expectation and refers to the future.⁴⁸ I therefore treat this case like [ex. 27] in Section 3.2, where the particle occurs in a clause whose predicate is a subjunctive. The following passage from the first hymn of the Rigveda, which is dedicated to Agni, possibly constitutes a further case in which *aṅgá* occurs in a temporal subclause:

Example 51

<i>yád</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>dāśúṣe</i>	<i>t_vvám</i>	<i>ágne</i>
when	PRT	pious:DAT.SG.M	2SG.NOM	Agni:VOC.SG.M
 <i>bhadráṃ</i>	 <i>kariṣyáṣi</i>	 <i>távét</i>	 <i>tát</i>	 <i>satyám</i>
good:ACC.SG.N	do:FUT.2SG	2SG.GEN+PRT	DEM:NOM.SG.N	true:NOM.SG.N
 <i>aṅgiráḥ</i>				
Aṅgiras:VOC.SG.M				

“When **truly** you will do good for the pious man, o Agni, just that of yours is real, o Aṅgiras” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 89)

“Whatever good you wish to do for the one who worships you, Agni, through you, O Angiras, that comes true” (Doniger O’Flaherty 1981, 99) RV 1.1.6

Before analysing the function of the particle, it has to be noted that probably its presence here is primarily due to stylistic reasons. Jamison, Brereton (2014, 89) interpret *aṅgá*, as well as the name *aṅgiras*, which refers to Agni, as a “phonological scrambling” of the name *agní-*, which appears in the vocative here (cf. also Elizarenkova 1995, 133; Brereton, Jamison 2020, 145-6). Nonetheless, I am convinced that even if the presence of a particle primarily serves stylistic goals, the context has to be compatible with its function. Hence, its presence here has to be accounted for in order to uphold the analysis that I have proposed in the previous sections and I believe that it can. Jamison, Brereton (2014, 89) consider *yád* to be a temporal conjunction ‘when’ (similarly Geldner 1951-57, 1: 2 and Witzel, Gotō 2007, 11). This means that this passage is comparable to [ex. 45] above. By using *aṅgá* in the second position of the temporal subclause, the poet signals that he believes Agni to know that when he will do good for the pious man, just that of his is real.⁴⁹ As this utterance is about Agni’s own capabilities, this assumption is plausible and Agni probably also knows that he is the only one. In contrast to these translators, Doniger O’Flaherty (1981, 99), as well as several others (e.g. Oldenberg 1897, 1 and Maurer 1986, 12), regard *yád* as the ACC.SG.N of the

⁴⁸ Schnaus 2008, 101-2 regards the subjunctive in the main clause as a request that the rivers continue their surge after they have been crossed. I do not follow this view.

⁴⁹ For different interpretations of the main clause see Geldner 1951-57, 1: 2 and Witzel, Gotō 2007.

relative pronoun. The latter group of translators renders the relative pronoun as ‘whatever’ vel sim., which means that the relative clause would be a universal/free-choice concessive conditional clause (König 1985, 3-5). In accordance with Klein (2018, 158-9), I assume that this ‘generalising value’ is not conveyed by *aṅgá* but by the relative pronoun itself (if it is indeed a relative pronoun), so that the particle must have a different function. I think that the appearance of *aṅgá* in the relative clause can be explained in the same way as in the temporal clause, because the relative clause in [ex. 51] is restrictive. Following Coniglio (2009, 210-13; 2012, 280-1), non-restrictive relative clauses constitute separate speech acts and therefore allow for the presence of discourse particles in German. In contrast, restrictive relative clauses do not. He (2012, 280-1) gives the following examples:

Example 52

*Sie hat den einzigen Roman von Eco gekauft, den ich (*ja) nicht zu Ende lesen konnte.*

‘She bought the only novel by Eco that I could not finish reading’.

Example 53

Sie hat den Roman „Der Name der Rose“ gekauft, den ich (ja) nicht zu Ende lesen konnte.

‘She bought the novel “The Name of the Rose”, which I could not finish reading’.

Accordingly, it should not be possible for *aṅgá* to scope over the relative clause alone in [ex. 51]. I therefore assume that just like in the temporal interpretation, its scope comprises both clauses. It signals that the poet believes Agni to know that the good which he wishes to do for the one who worships him comes true through him.

Whereas in [ex. 51] it remains uncertain whether *aṅgá* occurs in a temporal or a relative clause, the following stanza from a riddle hymn contains a clear case of *aṅgá* in a relative clause:

Example 54

<i>ihá</i>	<i>bravītu</i>	<i>yá</i>	<i>īm</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>
here	speak:PRS.IMP.3SG	REL:NOM.SG.M	3SG.ACC	PRT
<i>véd_o</i>	<i>syá</i>	<i>vāmásya</i>	<i>níhitam</i>	
know:PERF.3SG	DEM.GEN.SG.M	treasured:GEN.SG.M	LP.put:PPP.ACC.SG.N	
<i>padám</i>	<i>véḥ</i>			
track:ACC.SG.N	bird:GEN.SG.M			

śīrṣṇáh kṣīrám duhrate gávo asya | vavírím vásānā udakám padápuḥ

“Let him speak here, who knows the imprinted track of this treasured bird [=the Sun]. The cows [=rain clouds] yield milk [=rain] from his head [=the Sun]. Clothing themselves in a cloak, they have drunk water with the foot [=the Sun’s rays]” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 355) RV 1.164.7

Even if [ex. 51] should contain a relative clause, [ex. 51] and [ex. 54] would differ from each other. For in the latter, the particle occurs in a free relative clause (cf. Haspelmath, König 1998, 577). There is no correlative element in the main clause. Interestingly, some translators have interpreted *aṅgá* here differently than in the other passages. Geldner (1951-57, 1: 228-9) translates it as ‘gewiß’: ‘Hier soll sie sagen, wer sie gewiß kennt, die hinterlassene Spur dieses liebwerten Vogels’ (similarly Witzel, Gotō 2007, 296). At first sight, this seems to be in accordance with the interpretation of *aṅgá* as an epistemic modal marker that can be found in the translations of other passages. Yet, a closer look reveals that Geldner uses ‘gewiß’ not as an epistemic modal marker, as he does elsewhere, but as a modal adverb modifying the predicate *véda* ‘he knows’.⁵⁰ Contrary to this view, I assume that *aṅgá* had better be interpreted parallel to the attestations that I have discussed. Similarly to restrictive relative clauses, German discourse particles generally do not occur in free relative clauses (Kwon 2005, 184).⁵¹ Accordingly, I consider *aṅgá* to scope over the entire first hemistich. What deserves special attention here is, however, the function of the particle. For unlike in the previous cases, the matrix predicate is an imperative. This means that according to my analysis, the function of *aṅgá* should be the same as in [ex. 39] in Section 3.3. Since [ex. 54] is from a riddle hymn, the exact function of the particle is even more difficult to determine than in [ex. 39].

The example that I would like to discuss next seems to differ from the previous cases. It is the following stanza from a hymn to the Maruts:

50 Similarly, Grassmann 1876-77, 2: 456 uses ‘recht’ to render the particle: ‘Hier möge der, welcher es recht weiss, dieses schönen Vogels [der Sonne] niedergesetzten Fuss nennen’. Cf. also Houben’s 2000, 534 ‘who knows it properly’. Renou 1952, 374 glosses the combination of *aṅgá* and *vid-* as ‘connaitre en fait’. An adverbial interpretation is also endorsed by Sāyaṇa, who glosses *aṅgá* as *kṣipram* ‘quickly, immediately’ and *avicāreṇa* ‘prompt’ (Geldner 1907-09, 1: 2). In contrast, Lüders 1951, 305 assigns it an exclusive interpretation: ‘Hier soll nur der sprechen, der die niedergesetzte Stätte dieses teuren Vogels kennt’.

51 Contrary to Kwon, Coniglio 2009, 213 does find German discourse particles in free relative clauses. However, as an example he gives *Was ja so erstaunlich ist, ist die Schönheit seiner Gedichte*, which is actually a pseudo-cleft construction and therefore differs from cases like [ex. 54].

Example 55

<i>yád</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>taviṣṭyavo </i>	
when	PRT	displaying.power:VOC.PL.M	
<i>yámaṃ</i>	<i>śubhrā</i>	<i>ácidh_vyam </i>	<i>ní</i>
course:ACC.SG.M	resplendent:VOC.PL.M	see:AOR.MID.2PL	LP
<i>párvatā</i>	<i>ahāsata</i>		
mountain:NOM.PL.M	move:AOR.MID.3PL		

“In that you have **certainly** set your attention on your course, you resplendent ones displaying your power, the mountains have bent down” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1042)

“**Aye**, when, O bright Maruts, growing in strength, you have seen your way, then the mountains (clouds) have gone down” (Müller 1891, 390) RV 8.7.2

Jamison, Brereton (2014, 1042) interpret the subclause in which *aṅgá* occurs as modal. According to this interpretation, this case would differ from the ones that I have discussed thus far, because modal clauses do allow for the presence of discourse particles in German. Coniglio (2009, 206-7) quotes the following example from Hentschel (1986, 203), which contains the particle *eben*:⁵²

Example 56

Schließlich befreite sie sich von seiner Tyrannei, indem sie ihn eben vergiftete.

‘Eventually, she freed herself from his tyranny by poisoning him’.

If in the Vedic [ex. 55] both the subclause and the main clause had their own illocutionary force, the scope of *aṅgá* would be different than in the previous examples although its position is identical. It would either scope only over the subclause or it would scope over two different speech acts. I do not want to fully exclude one of these possibilities, but I believe there is a simpler solution. As can be seen in the example, Müller (1891, 390) assumes that the conjunction *yád* introduces not a modal but a temporal subclause, which it regularly does.⁵³ Therefore, this example does not compel me to adapt my

⁵² The English translation is by the Author. Note, however, that Taglicht 1984, 122 subsumes adverbials of manner under the group of ‘nuclear’ adverbials because they always are in the scope of the negation. Interestingly, Kwon 2005, 47, 65, 184 finds that modal clauses introduced by *indem* allow neither *ja* noch *eben*.

⁵³ A question one might ask is how the tense form of the predicates of the subordinate and main clause, both of which are in the aorist, are to be interpreted. In his translation, Müller assumes that the aorist refers to a repeated event. See also his (1891, 394-5) remark on using the present perfect in his English translation. This might be possible but such use of the aorist is in fact very rare in the *Rigveda* (Dahl 2010, 299-301).

analysis of *aṅgá* in subordinate clauses. Moreover, this stanza describes an event at which the addressees were present, so that this passage is also in accordance with my functional analysis of *aṅgá*. In the next passage, the subclause in which *aṅgá* occurs is probably temporal as well. Nonetheless, there is a problem regarding the scope of the particle:

Example 57

<i>abhí</i> LP	<i>vrajám</i> cow.pen:ACC.SG.M	<i>ná</i> like
<i>tatniṣe</i> extend:PERF.MID.2SG	<i>súra</i> sun:GEN.SG.N	<i>upākácakṣasam</i> with.eyes.near:ACC.SG.M
<i>yád</i> when	<i>índra</i> Indra:VOC.SG.M	<i>mṛláyāsi</i> be.gracious:PRS.SBJV.2SG
<i>naḥ</i> 1PL.DAT	<i>yád</i> when	<i>aṅgá</i> PRT
<i>taviṣyása</i> show.power:PRS.MID.2SG	<i>índra</i> Indra:VOC.SG.M	<i>prarájasi</i> LP.rule:PRS.2SG
<i>kṣitíḥ</i> people:ACC.PL.F	<i>mahám</i> great:NOM.SG.M	<i>apārá</i> unbounded:NOM.SG.M
<i>ójasā</i> might:INS.SG.N	<i>tám</i> DEM:ACC.SG.M	<i>tvā</i> 2SG.ACC
<i>haviṣmatīr</i> with.oblations:NOM.PL.F	<i>vísa</i> clan:NOM.PL.F	<i>úpa</i> LP
<i>bruvata</i> speak:PRS.MID.3PL	<i>ūtáye</i> help:DAT.SG.F	
<i>urujráyasam</i> with.broad.expand:ACC.SG.M	<i>índubhiḥ</i> drop:INS.PL.M	

“25. You extend your control over the one whose eye is near to the sun [=Agni? gold?], as if over a cattle-pen. When, Indra, you will be gracious to us,
26. When, **indeed**, you display your power and rule over the settled peoples, o Indra, great and unbounded in your might,
27. Upon you the clans, offering oblations, call for help, (you who are) of broad expanse through the drops” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1039-40) RV 8.6.25-27

As a second alternative, Müller 1891, 394 interprets this stanza as “describing an historical fact” and suggests a translation along the lines of ‘When you saw your way, or, as soon as you had seen your way, the clouds fell’. This would in general be in accordance with the use of the aorist in other temporal and main clauses (Dahl 2010, 275 f.).

Following the translation by Jamison and Brereton (2014, 1039-40), stanza 26 constitutes two coordinated temporal subclauses which depend on stanza 27. This is perfectly in accordance with my hypothesis. It means that the poet expects Indra to already know that when he displays his power and rules over the settled people the clans call for help. As I have just mentioned, there is more than one temporal clause that depends on the main clause in stanza 27, which means that the whole speech act consists of more than two clauses, so that *aṅgá* scopes over all of them. What is problematic is that Jamison and Brereton (2014, 1039 f.; comm.VIII.1, *ad loc.*) assume that not only the temporal clauses that comprise stanza 26 but also the one in pāda 25c depends on the main clause in stanza 27. They argue that the subjunctive in 25c is easier to construe with the present indicatives in the following clauses than with the perfect in 25ab. If this were the case, one would have to wonder why *aṅgá* occurs in the second of the two subclauses. With respect to this, I am not certain what the exact relation between pāda 25c and stanzas 26 and 27 is, i.e. whether the temporal clauses are simply coordinated. One argument against this is that stanza boundaries usually, albeit not necessarily, coincide with boundaries of larger syntactic units than boundaries of pādas or hemistichs (cf. Brereton, Jamison 2020, 189). Thus, the assumption that a subclause in pāda 25c is coordinated with the subclauses in stanza 26 at least raises suspicion, especially because pādas 25ab constitute a main clause.⁵⁴ Second, the verb form in pāda 25c is different than in the following clauses: It is a subjunctive whereas stanzas 26 and 27 only contain indicatives. As a third observation I would like to adduce that the subclause in pāda 25c and the one in pāda 26a are introduced by *yád* ‘when’ whereas it is omitted in the one in pādas 26bc. This also indicates that the connection between the clauses in stanza 26 is closer than the connection with the clause in pāda 25c. Thus, even though I am still not sure about the exact interpretation of this passage, I assume that the connection of the subclauses in stanza 26 to each other but also to the main clause in stanza 27 is closer than between pāda 25c these clauses. This may explain why *aṅgá* occurs only in the second of three subclauses and why perhaps its scope does not contain the first clause.

The last passage in which *aṅgá* occurs in a subordinate clause is rather difficult. It is part of a dialogue between Indra, Indra’s wife Indrāṇī and the monkey Vṛṣākapi and it is characterised by vulgar language (cf. Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1525-6):

⁵⁴ Following Geldner 1951-57, 2: 297, pāda 25c depends on the main clause which precedes it. Accordingly, he translates stanza 25 as ‘Du hast einen (Schatz), der auch an der Sonne sein Ansehen behält, wie einen Pferch eingehegt, wenn du, Indra, mildtätig sein willst’.

Example 58

priyā taṣṭāni me kapír v₁āktā v₁ àdūduṣat | śíro n_v àsya rāviṣam | ná sugám duṣkríte bhuvam | víśvasmād índra úttaraḥ || ná māt strí subhasáttarā | ná suyāśutarā bhuvat | ná māt práticavyayasī | ná sákthi, údyamiyasī | víśvasmād índra úttaraḥ ||

<i>uvé</i>	<i>amba</i>	<i>sulābhike </i>
see:PRS.MID.1SG	mama:VOC.SG.F	easy.to.win:VOC.SG.F
<i>yáthevāṅgá [= yáthā iva aṅgá]</i>	<i>bhaviṣyáti </i>	<i>bhasán</i>
like+like+PRT	become:FUT.3SG	bottom:NOM.SG.F
<i>me</i>	<i>amba</i>	<i>sákthi</i>
1SG.GEN	mama:VOC.SG.F	thigh:NOM.SG.N
<i>me </i>	<i>śíro</i>	<i>me</i>
1SG.GEN	head:NOM.SG.N	1SG.GEN
<i>víva</i>	<i>hṛṣyati </i>	<i>víśvasmād</i>
LP+like	be.excited:PRS.3SG	all:ABL.SG.N
<i>índra</i>	<i>úttaraḥ</i>	
Indra:NOM.SG.M	higher:NOM.SG.M	

“5. [Indrāṅī:] ‘The monkey has spoiled my dear (well-)fashioned and decorated (private parts).I will break his head. I will not be easy-going for a bad actor’. – Above all Indra!

6. [Indrāṅī:] ‘No woman has a better bottom than me or gives better sex. None is better at thrusting back than me, nor raises her thighs higher’. – Above all Indra!

7. [Vṛṣākapī:] ‘Hey mama, you easy little lay, I get how it’s, like, **really** gonna be. **My** bottom, mama, **my** thigh, **my** ‘head’ are gettin’, like, excited’. – Above all Indra!” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1527) RV 10.86.5-7

For a detailed discussion of the hymn see Jamison (1996, 74-88). One of the main problems for my analysis is that it is unclear how to interpret the hapax *uvé* in pāda 7a. For instance, Geldner (1951-57, 3: 275) interprets it as an interjection and translates pādas 7a-c as ‘O weh, Mütterchen, du leicht zu kriegendes Weibchen, wie es wohl sicher kommen wird, meine Scham, meine Schenkel, mein Kopf jucken mir schier darnach, Mütterchen’. In doing so, he probably follows Sāyaṇa (cf. Geldner 1897, 38). Others analyse it as the middle first person singular of a verb. Schnaus (2008, 306-8) opts for a verbal interpretation and based on Oettinger (1979, 408), who sees a connection with Hittite verb *au-/u-* ‘see’, she assigns it the meaning ‘sehen’, which yields the translation ‘Ich sehe schon, Weibsstück, leicht zu habendes, wie es wohl irgendwie sein wird’ of pādas 7ab.⁵⁵ Schmid

⁵⁵ Other meanings that have assigned to it are ‘to call to, hail ; to roar, bellow’ (Monier-Williams 1899, 171) or ‘ermuntern, auffordern’ (Böhtlingk, Roth 1855-75, 1: 861).

(1958) not only points to some problems with respect to an interpretation of *uvé* as an interjection but also argues that the form is related to the Prākṛit form *uaha* ‘see!’, and Jamison, Brereton (comm.X.3, *ad loc.*) agree with this.⁵⁶ Accordingly, I assign the form *uvé* a meaning ‘I see’ and interpret pāda 7b as the complement of *uvé*. Under this assumption, [ex. 58] is comparable to the other occurrences of *aṅgá* that I have discussed in this section. Based on Haegeman (2006, 1663-6), Coniglio (2009, 199-201; 2012, 276-8) assumes that complement clauses of non-factive verbs have their own illocutionary force whereas those of factive verbs do not. He concludes that only complements of non-factive verbs allow for the presence of German discourse particles. He (2009, 199-201) illustrates this with the following examples from Meibauer (1994, 135) and Thurmair (1989, 109), respectively:

Example 59

Mir ist eingefallen, daß Nastassja ja verheiratet ist.

‘It occurred to me that (as you and I actually know) Nastassja is married’.

Example 60

**Er leugnete, daß er die Zeugin ja unter Druck gesetzt habe.*

‘He denied that (as you and I know) he had put the witness under pressure’.

Following the interpretation by Schnaus and Jamison and Brereton, Vedic *uvé* is a factive verb, so that *aṅgá* should not be allowed to scope only over the complement clause. I therefore conclude that as in the temporal and relative clauses, the scope of the particle comprises both subordinate and matrix clause. The function of the particle is somewhat difficult to determine because it is not clear what exactly stanza 7 refers to. Geldner (1907-09, 2: 185) assumes that *Ṛṣākapi* expects to be beaten up by *Indrāṇī*, but Oldenberg (1909-12, 2: 291) believes that it has a sexual meaning instead.⁵⁷ The latter assumption is shared by Jamison, Brereton (2014, 1526). Doniger O’Flaherty (1981, 262) considers two possibilities. *Ṛṣākapi* “may be bragging that he will soon have her again, or accepting either of the alternatives suggested by *Indrāṇī*: that she will kill him (v. 5) or allow him to have her (v. 6, in which *Ṛṣākapi* may misunderstand her implication that she

⁵⁶ Interestingly, Jamison, Brereton’s (2014, 1527) translation also contains an interjection. Their translation ‘I get’ is probably a more colloquial rendition of ‘I see’.

⁵⁷ The body parts mentioned in pādas c/d can be understood as those that will be beaten or those that are sexually aroused, or both (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 275). Geldner 1897, 23-4 assumes that pādas 7cd are a persiflage of *Indrāṇī*’s words.

is too good for him) [...]. He accepts her threat, and he lusts for her". In both interpretations, the presence of *aṅgá* can be accounted for. Under the assumption that Vṛṣākapi accepts all of what Indrāṇī says, the subclause *yáthā iva aṅgá bhaviṣyáti* 'how it's, like, gonna be' refers to both possibilities, getting beaten up or having sex. The first hemistich may then be paraphrased as 'I see that you will do to me what you want'. The particle *aṅgá* underlines the inevitability that Vṛṣākapi perceives. By expressing that he already knows that she knows that he understands what is going to happen, he signals that there is obviously no way in which he can resist her. In the other interpretation, where Vṛṣākapi expects to have sex, *aṅgá* might be used to convey his certainty that Indrāṇī wants to have sex with him too. Vṛṣākapi believes that from her words her desire for him has become so obvious that she must know that Vṛṣākapi knows what she means. I therefore conclude that [ex. 58] is compatible with my hypothesis too.

In this section, I have discussed all cases in which *aṅgá* occurs in a subordinate clause and I have argued that in these cases its scope comprises both the subordinate and the main clause. Note, however, that there are two cases in which *aṅgá* occurs in a main clause on which a subordinate clause depends. This raises the question whether a difference between the two positions can be determined. The first possible solution that comes to mind is that in these cases, the subclause constitutes an independent speech act, unlike in the examples discussed in this section. In fact, in [ex. 25] in Section 3.2 it is a non-restrictive relative clause which depends on the main clause, which means that the two clauses constitute different speech acts. The second example of this kind is [ex. 34] from Section 3.2. I will repeat the last two pādas of this example here as [ex. 61]:

Example 61

<i>yó</i>	<i>asyáḍhyakṣaḥ</i>	<i>paramé</i>	
REL:NOM.SG.M	DEM:GEN.SG.N+overseer:NOM.SG.M	furthest:LOC.SG.N	
<i>vṛòman </i>	<i>só</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>veda</i>
heaven:LOC.SG.N	DEM:NOM.SG.M	PRT	KNOW:PERF.3SG
<i>yádi</i>	<i>vā</i>	<i>ná</i>	<i>véda</i>
if	or	not	KNOW:PERF.3SG

"he who is the overseer of this (world) in the furthest heaven, he **surely** knows. Or if he does not know...?" (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1609)

"der der Aufseher dieser (Welt) im höchsten Himmel ist, der **allein** weiß es, es sei denn, daß auch er es nicht weiß" (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 361) RV 10.129.7cd

Here, the relative clause that depends on the main clause is restrictive, which suggests that the type of subclause is not the decisive factor. Notice, however, that according to the interpretation by Geldner not only the relative clause but also the *yádi vā* clause depends on the main clause. The German particle *ja* does not occur in conditional clauses introduced by *es sei denn, dass* (Kwon 2005, 47, 184).⁵⁸ This suggests that in the Vedic example, *aṅgá* scopes not only over two but over three clauses, which might explain the different position. With respect to Jamison and Brereton’s interpretation, I am not able to account for the position of the particle. Perhaps both positions are allowed but the one in the subordinate clause is simply more frequent in the *Rigveda*.

3.5 Possible Caveats

In the previous sections, I have examined all clause types in which *aṅgá* occurs and argued that in all these clause types it can be analysed as a marker of shared knowledge or lack of knowledge. Nonetheless, there are a few potential caveats which may speak against my analysis. In this section, I would like to address them. First of all, one may wonder whether the function that I have proposed here is the only one that this particle can fulfill. As I outlined in the beginning of Section 3, previous literature has also assigned it, among others, the function of an exclusive focus particle. Other Vedic particles like *íd* have multiple functions too (cf. Coenen 2021) and also discourse particles in German may function as focus particles (Thurmair 1989, 20-1, 2013, 630). Indeed, I find three passages in which it is especially tempting to assume an exclusive function for the particle. The first one is the following stanza from a hymn dedicated to the Maruts:

Example 62

<i>nákir</i>	<i>h_i</i>	<i>èṣāṃ</i>	<i>janúṃṣi</i>	<i>véda</i>
nobody	for	DEM:GEN.SG.M	birth:ACC.PL.N	know:PERF.3SG
<i>té</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>vidre</i>	<i>mithó</i>	<i>janíttram</i>
DEM:NOM.PL.M	PRT	know:PERF.MID.3PL	mutually	birthplace:ACC.SG.N

“No one indeed knows their births, they **alone** know each other’s birthplace” (Müller 1891, 373)

“For no one knows their (separate) births. But **certainly they** know, mutually, each his own separate means of begetting” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 949) RV 7.56.2

⁵⁸ Curiously, Taglicht 1984, 122 subsumes conditional clauses marked by *unless* under the group of peripheral adverbials because they never are in the scope of matrix negation.

In this stanza, the context supports the analysis of *aṅgá* as an exclusive particle because in pāda a, all alternatives to *té* ‘they’, which refers to the Maruts, are explicitly excluded, assuming that if no one knows their births (*janúṃṣi*) then no one knows their birthplace/means of begetting (*janíttram*) either. As a result, several translations (e.g. Müller 1891, 373 and Geldner 1951-57, 2: 230) render *aṅgá* as an exclusive particle. If this interpretation is correct, [ex. 62] is comparable to an English sentence like *No one was at the meeting, only Peter was there*. In spite of its plausibility, this is not the only interpretation that is found. Jamison, Brereton (2014, 949), like Velankar (1963, 126), do not interpret *aṅgá* as an exclusive particle but instead as a marker of full epistemic support. This suggests that an exclusive interpretation is not compelling. Moreover, as in [ex. 25], it is plausible to assume that *aṅgá* marks the proposition as being in the Common Ground because it is unlikely that the Maruts did not know before that they knew each other’s birthplace/means of begetting. Notice as well that it is not clear how exactly *nákis* ‘no one’ is to be understood. In Müller’s interpretation, I understand it as meaning ‘nobody else’, like in the comparable English sentence that I have just given. This would mean that there is no other being, human or god, who knows the Maruts’ birth. Alternatively, *nákis* may also be understood as ‘no one among humans’. This would mean that there may be other divine beings in addition to the Maruts that know their births. Then, *aṅgá* could not be exclusive anymore. One requirement for my interpretation of *aṅgá* as a marker of shared knowledge is that *té* be focused even though it is not marked by a particle. This is not all too problematic. For even though the clause-initial position is unmarked for subjects (Delbrück 1888, 15-17), Lühr (2015, 209) finds that contrastive topics, as which *té* might be analysed here, may occur there as well.⁵⁹ Such an analysis is also reflected in the translation by Jamison and Brereton, who write ‘they’ in italics, and I therefore believe that my analysis of *aṅgá* is compatible with this passage. A case that is comparable to [ex. 62] is the following one:

Example 63

<i>mūrā́</i>	<i>amūra</i>	<i>ná</i>	<i>vayám</i>	<i>cikitvo</i>
fool:NOM.PL.M	not.fool:VOC.SG.M	not	1PL.NOM	observant:VOC.SG.M
<i>mahitvám</i>	<i>agne</i>	<i>t_vvám</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>	<i>vitse</i>
greatness:ACC.SG.N	Agni:VOC.SG.M	2SG.NOM	PRT	know:PERF.MID.2SG

“Wir Toren (verstehen) nicht deine Größe, du kluger verständiger Agni; du **allein** verstehst sie” (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 125)

“We fools do not (know) your greatness, o you who are no fool; but, observant Agni, you **surely** know it” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1372) RV 10.4.4ab

⁵⁹ Contrastive topics “represent a combination of topic and focus” (Krifka 2008, 267).

As in [ex. 62], it is possible to analyse *tvám* ‘you’ as a contrastive topic, here contrasted with *vayám* ‘we’,⁶⁰ and to assume that *aṅgá* signals that the poet assumes Agni to already know that he understands his greatness. The assumption that the poet does not intend to exclude all alternatives to *tvám* but that instead ‘we’ and ‘you’ that are contrasted here is also supported by the antonyms *mūrās* ‘fools’ and *amūra* ‘o not-fool’, which are used for the respective referents. The third passage, RV 10.79.4, is of a similar structure.⁶¹

A second possible caveat against my analysis is that Vedic possesses a grammatical form which fulfills a function that resembles the one I propose for *aṅgá*, namely the injunctive mood. When this mood occurs in declarative clauses it has a memorative function, i.e. it is used when an event or fact is merely mentioned but not reported as new information (Hoffmann 1967).⁶² As a result, one might argue that my analysis implies some redundancy because it assumes that Vedic possesses two different formal means that fulfill the same function. However, I surmise that the use of *aṅgá* does not exactly match that of the injunctive. The Vedic injunctive does not explicitly refer to a certain time, i.e. it has to be inferred from the context whether the predicate denotes a past or present event (Hoffmann 1967, 265-6). Unlike the injunctive, the use of *aṅgá* with indicative allows the speaker to mark a proposition as stored in the Common Ground while also explicitly marking a certain reference time. The former is expressed by the particle and the latter is expressed by the tense form of the verb in the indicative. Notice in addition that with *aṅgá* it is also possible to mark propositions as in the Common Ground even if the clause does not have a finite predicate, as in [ex. 33] of Section 3.2. Interestingly, there is one passage in which *aṅgá* co-occurs with the injunctive:

Example 64

<i>t_vvám</i>	<i>h_i</i>	<i>aṅgá</i>
2SG.NOM	for	PRT
<i>daívyaḥ</i>	<i>pávamāna</i>	<i>jánimāni</i>
heavenly:ACC.PL.N	purify:PTCP.PRS.MID.VOC.SG.M	race:ACC.PL.N
<i>dyumáttamaḥ</i>	<i>amṛtatváya</i>	<i>ghoṣáyah</i>
brilliant:SUP.NOM.SG.M	immortality:DAT.SG.N	cry:CAUS.INJ.2SG

⁶⁰ Cf. also the translation by Velankar 1958, 5: ‘Foolish as we are, oh clever and wise Agni, not we, but you, indeed, know of your own greatness’.

⁶¹ Cf. the introduction to this hymn by Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1511. For a different interpretation of this stanza, which also speaks against the assumption that *aṅgá* is an exclusive particle that follows its focus, see Velankar’s (1958, 26) comment.

⁶² Mumm 1995 even compares the use of the Vedic injunctive to the German particle *ja*, which I do with *aṅgá* as well.

“Denn **nur** du, o Pavamāna, der Glanzvollste, rufst die göttlichen Geschlechter an zur Unsterblichkeit” (Geldner 1951-57, 3: 113) RV 9.108.3

Hoffmann (1967, 119-24) assumes that the injunctive is used here because this stanza describes an action that the god Soma typically performs.⁶³ Hence, the proposition can be regarded as common knowledge, which also accounts for the presence of *aṅgá*. The presence of both the injunctive mood and the particle may seem redundant here, but such redundancies occur in other languages as well.

Compare the following German sentence from a post in an internet forum:

Example 65

Wie Du weißt, sind ja bis zur Verbreitung des Internets nicht einmal 1% aller Urteile überhaupt veröffentlicht worden.

‘As you know, until the spread of the internet not even 1% of all verdicts were published (as you know).’^{*}

* <https://www.zroadster.com/forum/threads/gerichtsurteile-zu-unerlaubten-leds.113380>.

Here, the assumption that this is not new information to the reader is overtly marked by the phrase *wie Du weißt*. The particle *ja* is used in addition to this phrase even though it basically fulfills the same function.

A similar redundancy seems to be present when *aṅgá* occurs in causal clauses that are marked by the particle *hí* ‘for’ or *nahí* ‘for not’. For these particles tend to occur with propositions that are in the Common Ground of speaker and addressee too, which suggests that they mark them as such (Grassmann 1873, 720-1; 1664; Lühr 2009, 176-7). Yet, as Section 3.2 shows, *aṅgá* is found in such clauses. I argue here that even though *hí* and *nahí* appear to occur regularly with propositions that are in the Common Ground, they do not do so exclusively. Consider the following example, which is about the Vala myth:

63 According to Jamison, Brereton 2014, 1357, the present injunctive has a past reference here: ‘O self-purifying one, it was certainly you as the most brilliant who made the heavenly races heed for the sake of immortality’.

Example 66

*abhinákṣanto abhíyé tám ānaśúr | nidhím paṇinām paramam̐ gúhā hitám | té vidvámsaḥ
praticákṣyāñṛtā púnar | yáta u áyan tát úd íyur āvísam || ṛtāvānaḥ praticákṣyāñṛtā
púnar | āta ā tashuḥ kaváyo mahás patháḥ | té bāhúbhyām dhamitám agnīm áśmani |*

<i>nákiḥ</i>	<i>śó</i>	<i>ast,</i>	<i>áraṇo</i>
nobody	DEM:NOM.SG.M	be:PRS.3SG	foreign:NOM.SG.M
<i>jahúr</i>	<i>hí</i>	<i>tám</i>	
abandon:PERF.3PL for		DEM:ACC.SG.M	

“6. These knowing (poets), who, upon reaching (there), reached the Paṇis’ most distant treasury, hidden away, after observing the (Paṇis’) untruths again, went up to enter there from where they came.

7. The truth-possessing poets, after observing the (Paṇis’) untruths again, from there mounted the great paths. They (mounted) the fire, fanned by arms, within the stone. It [=the fire] is not one foreign (to them), **for** they left it behind” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 436) RV 2.24.6-7.

I do not see why in this passage the fact that the poets left the fire behind should be more prone to be in the Common Ground of the poet and the audience than everything else that has been told in the previous two stanzas. In fact, at least for modern scholars *pāda* 7d seems rather difficult to interpret (see Strauß 1905, 33, Geldner 1951-57, 1: 307, Schmidt 1968, 233). As causal *hí* and *nahí* clauses are not marked explicitly as in the Common Ground, I conclude that in passages like [ex. 62] and [ex. 31] and [ex. 32] in Section 3.2, *aṅgá* is used for this purpose, i.e. to signal unambiguously that the proposition of the clause is in the Common Ground.

The last point on which I would like to comment here is the frequency of *aṅgá*. As I mentioned in the beginning of Section 3, it is attested only forty times. The low number of attestations clearly indicates that the particle is not obligatory (cf. Schultze-Berndt 2017, 179, 196-8, 203-6). Among the plethora of cases in which the particle *aṅgá* is not present is the following passage, which is addressed to Indra:

Example 67

<i>ví</i>	<i>śú</i>	<i>m̐dho</i>
LP	PRT	negligent:ACC.PL.F
<i>janúṣā</i>	<i>dānam</i>	
nature:INS.SG.N	gift:ACC.SG.N	
<i>ínvann </i>	<i>áhan</i>	<i>gávā</i>
stimulate:PTCP.PRS.ACT.NOM.SG.M	hit:PST.2SG	COW:INS.SG.F

<i>maghavan</i> bounteous:VOC.SG.M	<i>saṃcakānāḥ</i> LP.enjoy:PTCP.PERF.MID.NOM.SG.M	<i>átrā</i> then
<i>dāsásya</i> Dāsa:GEN.SG.M	<i>námuceḥ</i> Namuci:GEN.SG.M	<i>śíro</i> head:ACC.SG.N
<i>yád</i> when	<i>ávartayo</i> roll:CAUS.PST.2SG	<i>mánave</i> Manu:DAT.SG.M
<i>gātúm</i> way:ACC.SG.M	<i>ichán</i> seek:PTCP.PRS.ACT.NOM.SG.M	

“You hewed apart those negligent by nature, stimulating giving, o bounteous one, taking pleasure along with the cow, at the time when you caused the head of the Dāsa Namuci to roll, seeking an (open) way for Manu –” (Jamison, Brereton 2014, 693) RV 5.30.7

Here, the poet speaks about one of Indra’s heroic deeds. Since Indra knows about this deed from first-hand experience, it must be in the Common Ground of speaker and addressee. As a result, one would expect the presence of the particle *aṅgá* to signal that the utterance of this stanza is not redundant (cf. Döring, Repp 2019, 19). In light of the abundance of passages like [ex. 67], one might wonder why the particle is in fact so rare. I surmise that the main reason for this is the genre of the Rigvedic texts. Although the *Rigveda* does contain several dialogue hymns (see Schnaus 2008), the vast majority of hymns do not contain actual conversation. Large portions of the *Rigveda* are praises of different divinities, which means that describing their characters or heroic deeds is not redundant even though the addressed divinities are already aware of them. On the contrary, it serves as a means of glorification. In actual conversations of speakers of Vedic, the particle may have occurred far more often but from the attested texts this is impossible to tell.

4 Vedic *aṅgá* and Other Complex Perspective Markers

In Section 3, I conducted an extensive investigation of the particle *aṅgá* and examined all of its attestations in the *Rigveda*. In this investigation, I argued for an interpretation as a marker of shared (lack of) knowledge in all cases. This means that the particle can be subsumed in the larger group of complex perspective markers, so that it might be interesting to compare it with other, similar markers in the languages of the world. Schultze-Berndt (2017, 207-13) compares the Jaminjung/Ngaliwurru clitics =*ngarndi* and =*mirndi* with other such markers, taking into account, among others, the categories evidentiality, epistemic authority and epistemic modality (see also the discussion by Evans et al. 2018, 150-8). Based on Schultze-Berndt’s

typological survey, I will now attempt to provide a more precise characterisation of Vedic *aṅgá* from a typological point of view.

First, I would like to discuss whether *aṅgá* should be analysed not only as a complex perspective marker but also as an evidential. Thus, in their analysis of certain markers in Quechua Hintz, Hintz (2017) argue that mutual knowledge is an evidential category. Consider their (2017, 92) examples from South Conchucos Quechua:

Example 68

<i>Tsay-pa-mi</i>	<i>qati-ya-ra-n</i>	<i>mama-yki-kuna.</i>
that-GEN-DIR	follow-PL-PST-3	mother-2-PL

‘By that route your ancestors pastured animals (**I affirm**)’.

Example 69

<i>Tsay-pa-cha:</i>	<i>qati-ya-ra-n</i>	<i>mama-yki-kuna.</i>
that-GEN-MUT	follow-PL-PST-3	mother-2-PL

‘By that route your ancestors pastured animals (**as we all know**)’.

The markers *-mi* and *-cha* encode that the information source is individual or mutual knowledge, respectively. Further intersubjective evidentials in this language are *-chi*, which is used for individual conjectures and *-cher*, which is used for mutual conjectures or appeal for consensus (Hintz, Hintz 2017, 91). Similarly, König (1997, 70) assumes that the German discourse particle *ja* indicates shared knowledge as information source. In my opinion, the Rigvedic data speak against such an analysis of *aṅgá*. For although I have argued that in the passages where *aṅgá* is used, the knowledge between speaker and addressee is shared, the source of this knowledge may be quite different. Consider for instance [ex. 26] in Section 3.2, where the poet says that Indra and Soma bestowed wealth. He knows this because according to Vedic mythology this is what Indra does when he is exhilarated by Soma. It may therefore be considered as general knowledge. In contrast, Indra and Soma were present whenever they did so, which means that their knowledge is based on first-hand experience. Another observation that speaks against the analysis as an evidential is that in the different passages, the information source of the speaker himself may be different. As I have just mentioned, the information source in [ex. 26] is the knowledge about Vedic mythology. If one follows Jamison, Brereton’s (2014, 1631-2) interpretation of [ex. 35], the poet’s information source is only his own imagination, i.e. there is no actual evidence at all; if one follows Maurer (1986, 217-18), the information source is the poet’s perception. As a result, I do not regard *aṅgá* as an evidential. This is in accordance with Zim-

mermann (2011, 2034-5), who in general does not regard discourse particles as evidentials. Cf. on this matter also the analysis of complex epistemic markers in the Arwako-Chibchan language Kogi by Bergqvist (2016, 29).⁶⁴

The observations that I have presented here with respect to evidentiality have implications for other categories too. Thus, *aṅgá* is probably not to be analysed as a marker of primary or secondary epistemic authority either. Epistemic authority is determined by the access to information that speaker and addressee have and by their “right to know”, both of which may be symmetrical or asymmetrical (Schultze-Berndt 2017, 179-81).⁶⁵ In [ex. 26], the knowledge of Indra and Soma, who were themselves involved in the action is probably deeper and more detailed than the poet’s, which means that he does not possess primary epistemic authority. Yet, *aṅgá* does not appear to mark secondary epistemic authority either because [ex. 35] is probably self-addressed and the poet cannot have epistemic authority over himself. This also becomes clear in the self-directed questions formed by *kuvíd aṅgá*, which I discussed in Section 3.1. This means that even though *aṅgá* marks shared knowledge, the access to this knowledge can but need not be exactly symmetrical. A further conclusion for which the observations made here allow is that *aṅgá* seems to be employed irrespectively of whether the shared knowledge is new information or has been known for a longer time. [ex. 26] contains information that was established long ago whereas in [ex. 35] the poet obtained the (imagined) knowledge just before uttering the two propositions.

As for the category of epistemic modality, this is in many cases difficult to distinguish from the function that I assume for *aṅgá*. For similarly to the German discourse particle *ja* (Döring, Repp 2019, 39), I assume that *aṅgá* has the effect of marking a proposition as unassailable. With respect to such a proposition, the speaker might therefore also express his/her full epistemic support. Moreover, such an interpretation probably underlies the translations of many passages for instance by Jamison, Brereton (2014). However, in light of my assumption that *aṅgá* in declarative clauses occurs only with proposition the content of which is already known by speaker and hearer, it seems odd and redundant to assume that the speaker would explicitly mark his/her full epistemic support because the hearer is aware of the proposition’s truth anyway. This becomes especially clear in passages like [ex. 25].

⁶⁴ Even with respect to the South Conchucos Quechua markers, Evans et al. 2018, 155 remark that “there is a focus on the end state of shared awareness, rather than on the way this knowledge was acquired”.

⁶⁵ Schultze-Berndt 2017, 208 gives German *ja* as an example of a marker of shared epistemic access.

In sum, I conclude that *aṅgá* is an intersubjective marker that signals shared knowledge or lack of knowledge between speaker and addressee but it is neither an evidential nor a marker of epistemic authority nor a marker of epistemic modality. Panov (2020) labels elements like Finnish *-han* and German *ja* (see my [ex. 7] and [ex. 24]), as ENIMITIVES and conducts a typological survey of such elements in languages of Europe and beyond.⁶⁶ As Vedic *aṅgá* can be subsumed under this label as well, I will compare my analysis to his findings. Note, however, that unlike me, Panov does not assume that such elements are used to mark shared knowledge of speaker and hearer. Instead, he believes that “[t]he functional core of the category may be best defined as *marking the proposition as uncontroversial*” (Panov 2020, 3). For the languages in his sample, Panov (2020, 23-8) establishes semantic maps and five implicational hierarchies. Two of these hierarchies are of special interest with respect to *aṅgá*:

(C) If an enimitive marker in the core enimitive domain is only used in ENIM function and is not used in CTR.ENIM function, this marker does not occur in IMP and WH-Q constructions.

(D) If a marker which occurs in IMP and WH-Q contexts also occurs in the domain of core enimitive, it necessarily occurs in CTR.ENIM contexts.

According to Panov’s definition, *aṅgá* would be a simple enimitive (EN-IM) because it occurs in declarative clauses but unlike German *doch* does not express contrast (CTR.ENIM), which Panov considers the second function in the core domain. Yet, contrary to hierarchy (C), *aṅgá* occurs with imperatives (IMP), and also in questions (WH-Q), although the latter are probably polar questions rather than WH-questions. Hierarchy (D) does not hold either, as *aṅgá* occurs with imperatives and questions but does not express contrast in declarative clauses.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I have proposed a new interpretation of the particle *aṅgá* in the *Rigveda*, the oldest attested text in Vedic Sanskrit. Earlier proposals have described it as a focus particle or a ‘reassuring’ particle, but based on individual text passages it is often difficult to decide which interpretation is correct. In order to make the analysis more objective, I have therefore examined all attestations of the particle and attempted to find patterns in the data which point to one particular interpretation. Needless to say, this does not mean that

⁶⁶ This term is based on the Latin particle *enim*, which in some cases has a function similar to *-han* and *ja* (Panov 2020, 3). See [ex. 50] in Section 3.4.

my analysis is free of subjective judgements. The overall interpretation of several passages that I have discussed here is debatable and not all of the interpretations are compatible with my analysis. Nonetheless, I consider a systematic approach to the data preferable to a mere evaluation of individual text passages.

The most conspicuous observation I have made was that when *aṅgá* occurs in questions these are not information-seeking but are rhetorical, self-directed or fulfill other purposes (Section 3.1). Hence, I assumed that *aṅgá* is used to explicitly mark them as such. Considering the behavior of evidentials and similar markers in other languages, I proposed that *aṅgá* has a parallel function in declarative clauses, in that it marks a proposition as not giving new information, just like it marks a question in its scope as not seeking for new information (Section 3.2). In other words, it indicates that the proposition (or propositions) in its scope is already stored in the Common Ground of speaker and addressee. Not only does this allow for a unified account of *aṅgá* in both clause types, but I have also argued that in passages like [ex. 25], this interpretation is more plausible than the traditional ones. What also speaks in favor of my analysis is that in thirteen out of nineteen declarative clauses, the subject of the clause is the addressee (addressed in the second or third person), and the addressee is probably not provided with new information about himself. In fact, with one exception, it can be assumed that the information provided to the addressee is already in the Common Ground. In two further cases the addressee is probably the topic of the clause, in one case the subject is the animal of the addressee and in one case the poet probably addresses himself. The one exception I have just mentioned ([ex. 37]) is just as problematic for the traditional interpretations as it is for mine, as well as for the overall interpretation of the stanza, so that I do not regard it as clear counter-evidence.

Even though *aṅgá* is attested in a clause whose predicate is in the imperative only once, I have argued that its function there is probably compatible with the one in questions and declarative clauses as well (Section 3.3). It seems that the particle signals that the addressee should already know by himself what to do. I surmise that unlike German *doch*, *aṅgá* does not emphasise that the hearer has not acted accordingly, but due to the scanty evidence I am not certain of this.

When *aṅgá* occurs in subordinate clauses, these clauses probably do not have an own illocutionary force but are part of the same speech act as their matrix clause (Section 3.4). Discourse particles actually should not occur in such clauses but I proposed that in these passages the particle scopes not only over the clause in which it occurs but over the entire speech act. This means that in these passages it has exactly the same function as in main clauses. Again due to the scanty evidence, I have not been able to determine clearly which factors cause the appearance of the particle in the subordinate or main clause.

After discussing the different clause types in which the particle occurs, I addressed several potential caveats against my analysis of *aṅgá* (Section 3.5). I argued that even in those passages in which an interpretation as a focus particle is the most tempting one at first sight, an interpretation as a marker of shared knowledge is nonetheless plausible. I furthermore addressed the rare co-occurrence of *aṅgá* with the injunctive, which I consider to be redundant. In contrast, with the particles *hí* ‘for’ and *nahí* ‘for not’, which regularly but not necessarily occur with propositions that are in the Common Ground, *aṅgá* serves to make the status of the proposition as in the Common Ground explicit. The fact that *aṅgá* is attested only forty times clearly indicates that it is optional. I tentatively assume that its rare occurrence is due to the genre of the *Rigveda*.

Subsequently to the detailed investigation of the Rigvedic data, I compared *aṅgá* to other complex perspective markers in the languages of the world. I concluded that it is neither a marker of evidentiality nor of epistemic authority nor of epistemic modality. Moreover, given that my analysis of the particle is correct, I have been able to contribute to the typology of what Panov (2020) calls enimitives by showing that *aṅgá* occurs with questions (which are probably polar) and imperatives even though it (presumably) does not express contrast in declarative clauses.

As a final point, it is important to mention that even though in some passages my interpretation of *aṅgá* seems to be more plausible than the traditional ones, in no Rigvedic passage is it compelling but other interpretations are always possible as well. This may cause the reader to object to my analysis. Nonetheless, I hope to have shown that my analysis is more advantageous than the competing traditional ones. Firstly, it is not merely based on subjective evaluations of isolated passages but has been obtained by considering the entire dataset as well as typological parallels. Moreover, the traditional interpretations are not applicable to all passages. Thus, it seems odd to interpret *aṅgá* as ‘reassuring’ in [ex. 54] of Section 3.4. Likewise, it is difficult to interpret it as a focus particle in [ex. 35] of Section 3.2 and this interpretation also seems to be problematic when *aṅgá* occurs in *kuvid* questions. In contrast, my interpretation allows to assume a unified function for all attestations of the particle except the abovementioned [ex. 37], where there seems to be a general lack of understanding of the passage.

Appendix: The Attestations of *anigá* in Different Clause Types

Questions (*kím anigá*)

1.118.3	6.44.10	6.52.3	8.80.3
3.58.3	6.52.3	6.52.3	10.42.3

Questions (*kuvíd anigá*)

7.91.1	8.96.11	10.64.13
8.96.10	8.96.12	10.131.2

Declarative main and *hí* clauses

1.84.7	6.50.10	8.24.15	10.129.7
1.84.8	6.72.5	9.108.3	10.146.4
1.84.9	7.20.9	10.4.4	10.146.4
1.84.19	7.56.2	10.54.4	10.149.3
2.41.10	8.24.12	10.79.4	

Imperative clauses

5.3.11

Subordinate clauses

1.1.6	3.33.1	8.7.2
1.164.7	8.6.26	10.86.7

Abbreviations

Literature

RIVELEX	Krisch, T. (2012). <i>RIVELEX. Rigveda-Lexikon</i> . Graz: Leykam.
TITUS	Gippert, J.; Martinez, J.; Korn, A. (eds). <i>Thesaurus Indogermanischer Text- und Sprachmaterialien</i> . https://titus.uni-frankfurt.de/indexd.htm .
VedaWeb	Kölligan, D.; Reinöhl, U. (eds) (2018). <i>VedaWeb. Online Research Platform for Old Indic Texts</i> . University of Cologne. http://vedaweb.uni-koeln.de .

Glosses

1	1st person	MID	middle
2	2nd person	MIR	mirative
3	3rd person	MOD	modal particle
ABL	ablative	MUT	assert/confirm mutual knowledge
ACC	accusative	N	neuter
ACT	active	NEG	negation
AOR	aorist	NF	non-feminine
AUX	auxiliary	NOM	nominative
CAUS	causative	NONVIS	non-visual
COM	comitative	OBJ	object
COMP	comparative	OPT	optative
CVB	converb	PASS	passive
DAT	dative	PERF	perfect
DEM	demonstrative pronoun	PL	plural
DES	desiderative	PPP	perfect passive participle
DIR	direct evidential	PRET	preterite
DRCTN	direction	PRS	present
DU	dual	PRT	particle
EGO	primary epistemic authority	PST	past
EGO+TU	shared epistemic authority	PTCP	participle
EPMOD	epistemic modal	PV	possessive verbaliser
ERG	ergative	Q	interrogative pronoun
F	feminine	QUOT	quotative
FUT	future	REL	relative pronoun
GEN	genitive	REC.P	recent past
IMP	imperative	REP	reportative
INF	infinitive	RESTR	restrictive marker
INFR	inferential evidence	SBJ	subject
INJ	injunctive	SBJV	subjunctive
INS	instrumental	SEQ	sequential marker
INTJ	interjection	SG	singular
IPFV	(past) imperfective	SP	Spanish
LOC	locative	SUP	superlative
LP	local particle	VIS	visual
M	masculine	VOC	vocative

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Section 3

Reviews

Comrie, Zamponi *A Grammar of Akajeru*

Maria Elena Cantù Degani

Independent researcher

Review of Comrie, B.; Zamponi, R. (2021). *A Grammar of Akajeru: Fragments of a Traditional North Andamanese Dialect*. London: UCL Press, xi + 171 pp.

1 Introduction: Why Do We Talk About an Endangered Language?

The book I am reviewing is the grammar of a language that is nowadays practically extinct, surviving essentially in some grammatical forms of another language spoken by only a few people today. The language I am talking about is called Akajeru, one of the ten Great Andamanese language varieties that, prior to the British settlement on the islands in the mid-nineteenth century, were widely spoken along the territories of the Andaman Islands, from north to south, by the numerous communities living there [map 1].

Before I get into the heart of the review, I would like to spend a few lines describing the particularly endangered status of the Akajeru language. It is essential to do so because the study conducted by Comrie and Zamponi has focused on a language that is practically, but not entirely, extinct. In fact, their work lies somewhere between reconstructing the grammar of a language that is no longer spoken and observing what forms of this language are, instead, present in another language that is still known today, albeit by only three people. Their research is indeed of immense value and interest to scholars in this field.



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
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Map 1 Location of the Andaman Islands. Source: Abbi 2013, 4

The study of the Akajeru language is not isolated but stands within a broader interest towards Great Andamanese languages, but it also goes further. As we shall see, Comrie and Zamponi speak of the presence of typological phenomena such as somatic prefixes, thus broadening the interest in the study of Great Andamanese language family to the field of linguistic typology, which is an area of research in which Comrie in particular is engaged, but also to the broader reflection on languages as human means of communication.

To understand why Comrie and Zamponi felt the need to write a grammar on this language, let us briefly look at what happened to


the Akajeru language and its neighbouring languages over the past 150 years. The story of how these languages became so threatened is mainly related to the history of British rule over the islands and the measures they took against the Andaman peoples. Since the mid-nineteenth century, when the British managed to finally settle permanently on the islands, the irreversible phase of demographic, cultural and linguistic decline of the islands' native peoples began.

The colonisation of the islands by the British caused a massive demographic pressure due to the establishment of a penal settlement on the islands, the spread of diseases among the Andamanese and the creation of 'Andaman Homes' where Andamanese inhabitants were housed for the purpose of studying and 'civilising' them, according to the standards of nineteenth-century British society. Both during the movements for Indian independence from British rule and after the independence and Partition of India in 1947, large numbers of people were transported to the Andaman Islands. While the presence of inhabitants arriving from outside expanded, the number of local Andamanese inhabitants decreased and, with it, the large cultural and linguistic diversity present on the islands also began to disappear. The Andaman Islands and its native inhabitants were the most affected of the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, and this was because it was here that the largest number of convicts and new settlers arrived.¹

As we mentioned in the opening paragraph, before the arrival of the British, the Andaman Islands were a very linguistically flourishing territory. Anvita Abbi, who has been devoting her research and fieldwork to the Great Andamanese language family for years, has indicated the presence of two different language families in the Andamanese archipelago, i.e. Great Andamanese and Angan (2006). To this latter language family belong the Önge, Jarawa and the extinct Jangil language, but we will not deal with them here. Abbi firstly classified the Great Andamanese language family as the sixth language family of India and the Akajeru language belongs to it. Today, the term 'Great Andamanese' is used as a cover term (Abbi 2009, 792; 2013, 9) to refer to all the language varieties that were once spoken on the territory of Great Andaman, which is the largest island of the Andamanese archipelago. These varieties are counted as ten and were originally distributed over the territory from north to south, and known as North Andamanese, Middle Andamanese and South Andamanese. The Akajeru language belongs to the group of northern language varieties, together with the Akabo, Akachari (or Sare)

1 In this regard, there are many scholars who have devoted themselves to analysing this historical period and the relations between the British and the native inhabitants of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The main scholars who have dealt with this subject are: Sen 2010; 2011; Vaidik 2010; Zehmisch 2012; 2017; Anderson, Mazumdar, Pandya 2016; Mathur 1985.

and Akakhora languages, and they together make up what is known today as Present Great Andamanese (PGA) [map 2].



Map 2 Andamanese indigenous people on the Islands in the early 1800s vs. in 2004. Source: Abbi 2013, 5

Today, the linguistic diversity and variety once present in the Andaman Islands no longer exists. The languages mainly affected by this serious endangered condition are the Great Andamanese languages that are known in the form of PGA by only three members of the Great Andamanese community living on Strait Island.

It is important to recognise the value of Comrie and Zamponi's work also in the light of the context just described. From that, we learn that the process of endangerment affects both the Great Andamanese languages as well as the physical community of native speakers who, today, also choose not to give these languages the prestige of being the primary means of communication within the community but choosing Hindi instead.

In the next section, I will go into more detail about their work on the Akajeru language, the sources they used and the structure of the volume, as well as the most interesting points of their research.

2 Comrie and Zamponi's Project and the Sources They Used

In the history of linguistic studies of the Andaman Islands, Bernard Comrie and Raoul Zamponi are fairly recent scholars. The *Grammar of the Akajeru* is not an isolated volume but belongs to a larger project that the two authors have in mind, of which they themselves talk about in the preface to the volume. Here, the authors claim that it is part of an “ongoing effort to analyse all the extant material on the now-extinct traditional Great Andamanese languages, as they were documented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (2021, xi). Prior to this volume, the authors had published the article “Typological Profile of the Great Andamanese Family” in 2017 and their first grammar of a Great Andamanese language, the Akabea of the southern Great Andamanese language group, was released in 2020. For this grammar of Akabea language, they drew on sources from the British period, such as the scholar-administrators Edward Horace Man and Maurice Vidal Portman, and focused heavily on particularly interesting typological linguistic elements, that are peculiar to the Akabea language, such as the somatic prefixes.

The *Grammar of Akajeru*, unlike the *Grammar of Akabea*, is published as part of a recent series of publications born in 2020, of which this volume is the second publication. The series is called *Grammars of World and Minority Languages* and is edited by Lily Kahn and Riitta-Liisa Valijärvi.² It has been created with the aim of promoting and supporting the study, teaching and revitalisation, where possible, of minority and endangered languages in the world. The Akajeru language is certainly very interesting to study because the fact that it is not completely extinct, but survives in a certain sense within another language, makes Comrie's and Zamponi's research even more interesting from the point of view of methodology and the use of multiple sources. The work of the two scholars lies in between; on the one hand, they rely on sources from the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth-century British period to reconstruct the Akajeru grammar, and on the other hand, they make use of contemporary PGA research to establish how much Akajeru is present in it. For while it is true that no one now speaks Akajeru as a native language, it is equally true that this language is still present in the grammatical structure of the PGA, even though only three people know this language, which is a *koinè* (Manoharan 1989).³

² Lily Kahn is Professor of Hebrew and Jewish languages at University College London. Riitta-Liisa Valijärvi is Associate Professor of Finnish and minority languages at University College London and senior lecturer in Finno-Ugric languages at Uppsala University.

³ As we mentioned in the concluding lines of the first section, it is worth keeping in mind that these three Great Andamanese people who know PGA do not use it as their native language. They understand and speak PGA if necessary or if requested - for ex-

Thus, the main objectives of this grammar are as follows: first, to reconstruct the grammar of the Akajeru language and second, to establish the consistency of the Akajeru language in the PGA. Comrie and Zamponi also give a lot of importance to the other North Andamanese co-dialects and the position of Akajeru in relation to them, but also to the position of the four main Northern Andamanese language varieties (Akajeru, Akachari, Akakhora, Akabo) in relation to PGA. In order to achieve their objectives, the authors have at their disposal a whole series of primary and secondary sources, resulting from the numerous studies conducted on these languages over time since the mid-1800s. With regard to the second point on the PGA language, they rely on researches from the mid-1900s to the present day and in particular on the material carefully collected, analysed and published by Abbi (2006; 2009; 2012; 2013; 2020) over the past ten years. Other important scholars they rely on include Basu (1952), Manoharan (1989; 1997), Gnanasundaram and Manoharan (2007), Avtans (2006), Choudhary (2006), Som (2006) and Narang (2008).

On the first point, their research was based on British sources from the late 1800s and early 1900s. Their two main sources are those published by the social anthropologist Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown and the administrator and anthropologist Edward Horace Man. Both of them were British and they collected linguistic material first-hand from native speakers. However, neither of them were on the islands to exclusively conduct linguistic studies. Man was on the islands for reasons related to his position as an administrator and it was here that he became interested in the anthropological study of the islands' indigenous communities. The study of languages was part of his anthropological interest, he devoted much fieldwork to it and published several works in collaboration with another scholar-administrator, Richard Carnac Temple, and a linguist of the time, Alexander John Ellis. Man collected material on the traditional speech of Akajeru in a dictionary of the Akabea language, which he published between 1919 and 1923 as a series of supplements within the journal *Indian Antiquary*, and then in 1923 in a comprehensive monograph.

Radcliffe-Brown, on the other hand, was by training a social anthropologist and conducted fieldwork in the Andaman Islands from 1906 to 1909, in which he focused primarily on the anthropological study of indigenous communities. His linguistic interest merged with his anthropological one, and it is thus that in his publications we find much material on the languages of Great Andaman and Lit-

ample, during Anvita Abbi's fieldwork they spoke PGA as it was requested for research purposes. However, normally, the preferred language of communication is Andamanese Hindi even among themselves and with other members of the Great Andamanese community (Abbi 2013, 7).

tle Andaman, although his primary merit lies not in the accuracy of the linguistic analyses but in the consistency of the data collected.

Indeed, an important point that Comrie and Zamponi highlight is their intention to re-evaluate the relevance of the data collected by Radcliffe-Brown in his early twentieth-century fieldwork, while acknowledging its limitations in terms of its analysis. The British anthropologist is, in fact, the main source from which Comrie and Zamponi draw fragments of the Akajeru language to write the present grammar. In particular, they use the material contained in the work *The Andaman Islanders*, which was first published in 1922 and then republished in an expanded version eleven years later, in 1933.

In the 1922 version, we find an appendix entitled “The Spelling of Andamanese words” (Radcliffe-Brown 1922, 495-7) containing information on the Great Andamanese and Little Andaman languages, while in the 1933 work, we find a small essay on the sounds and grammar of the Andamanese languages, “The Andamanese Languages” (Radcliffe-Brown 1933, 495-504), where he specifies that he included primary material on the Akajeru and Önge languages, as well as material on the Aka-Bea language retrieved from the publications of another British scholar, Maurice Vidal Portman.

3 The Structure of the Grammar: A Parallel Between Late Nineteenth-Early Twentieth-Century British Sources and Recent Fieldwork

In the introduction, in addition to discussing the sources used, the authors give some background on the Akajeru language and its genealogical position in relation to its Great Andamanese co-dialects. To do so, they make extensive use of the research material of Radcliffe-Brown, Man, Temple and Portman and compile comparative tables between the dialects. Right from the start, we notice that Comrie and Zamponi analyse the sources at their disposal in a parallel manner, engaging in an in-depth comparison between them. This is a strong point of their work, which introduces the reader to the state of knowledge of Akajeru, including other North Andamanese co-dialects, by comparing it with the material recently collected by the scholar Abbi on PGA. In the book, we can find numerous comparative tables between Akajeru, its other North Andamanese co-dialects and PGA, accompanied by careful analysis and references to the sources available to them.

After the introduction, Comrie and Zamponi devote the heart of the volume to analysing the grammar of the Akajeru language. From the second to the sixth chapter, they deal with phonology, stems, words, noun phrases and clauses.

In chapter 2 on phonology, the two authors focus on the different transcription systems of the consonant and vowel phonemes of the Akajeru and other North Andamanese dialects used by Radcliffe-Brown and Man, comparing them with each other and with PGA transcriptions by Abbi. There are several tables confronting the different transcriptions of particular phonemes. In addition, aided by the transcriptions at their disposal, they compile two tables (tables 2.3 and 2.5) - which they refer to as 'tentative' and 'plausible' - in which they attempt to reconstruct the framework of the consonantal and vowel system in the Akajeru language.

Another aspect they point out is the non-attestation of accents in the Great Andamanese language family in general, in both Radcliffe-Brown's and Man's sources. After spending a brief section on the syllabic structure in Akajeru, they inform us about the transcription system they chose to adopt for this volume, which, however, is not free of difficulties and phonetic limitations due to the scarce documentation available, as well as the fact that PGA cannot be completely relied upon as there is not always any certainty as to whether Akajeru is equivalent or not.⁴

The third chapter is dedicated to stems, which are very important for Great Andamanese languages since their morphology is agglutinative and therefore certain elements such as prefixes and suffixes are very important. The two scholars point out that in the case of these languages, the prefixes and suffixes are predominantly monosyllabic, only a few are disyllabic, whereas the roots can be di- or trisyllabic. In this chapter, they first analyse roots and then the types of affixes, presenting numerous examples drawn from their sources. As far as roots are concerned, they recognise that from a morphological and syntactic point of view they mostly have an invariable word class. They go into detail about some particular roots, for example the root *kimil*, which has a multi-categorical lexical base, or some roots that have an etymological doublet with relatable meaning. Interestingly, they note that there are four separate roots that in Radcliffe-Brown's Akajeru documentation would share the same source.

In the section on affixes, the two authors highlight how the Akajeru language possesses a complex and rich derivational morphology, with 10 documented prefixes and 2 suffixes. It is here that they highlight one of the most interesting aspects not only of the Akajeru language, but of Great Andamanese languages in general: somatic prefixes, i.e. those prefixes that are related to body parts. The authors point out that at least about one third of the Akajeru/North Andamanese words collected by Radcliffe-Brown and Man have a somatic

⁴ "PGA is not simply the linear descendant of Akajeru and there is no guarantee that such values would be correct" (Comrie, Zamponi 2021, 23).

prefix. They report them as follows: *aka-* / *a-* (mouth), *ara-* / *arai-* / *εra-* (abdomen, back), *e-* (body), *εr-* (face, arms), *oŋ* / *om-* (hands, feet), *ot-* (head). In the course of the chapter, they dedicate a separate section to analyse each of these somatic prefixes by making an extensive use of sources but still highlighting the paucity of data available to them.

Comrie and Zamponi had already discussed the presence of somatic prefixes in the Great Andamanese languages in their 2017 article in which they outlined the typological profile of these languages, and later, they elaborated on it in their 2020 *Grammar of Akabea* and in an article published the following year, in 2021, in the open access journal *Cadernos de Linguística*. They define somatic prefixes as a ‘cross-linguistically rare phenomenon’ since they are not only found in the Great Andamanese languages but can also be found in other language families located in two separate geographical areas of the American continent: one in the Pacific Northwest of North America and the other in Mesoamerica (2017, 68; 2021, 10). This is a really interesting phenomenon as it shows us a strong link, expressed at a linguistic level, between the body and its environment, thus offering us an interesting opportunity to reflect on the relationship between humans and the environment in the Great Andamanese community, and more widely in our contemporary communities as well.

In Chapter 4, the authors turn to the description of words in Akajeru. They devote the first section to analysing various word classes in Akajeru, which they identify as major – such as nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs – and minor – pronouns, definite article, postpositions and particles. First of all, they note the consistent presence of clitics that from a morpho-syntactic point of view are considered words – since they occupy their own space in the syntax of the sentence – but from a phonological point of view they do not, and for this reason they are bound to phonological words that host them. They can be bound to be either proclitically – when they are placed before phonological host words – or enclitically – when they are placed after them. Each of the word classes analysed is richly accompanied by examples of words and phrases taken from the sources and which Comrie and Zamponi committed to paralleling with material on the other North Andamanese languages and the PGA.

In the same chapter, the authors show the formation of compound words, consisting in two elements of which one is necessarily a noun, and they provide examples taken from Radcliffe-Brown. Lastly, they address the issue of Akajeru word inflections by making an interesting parallel with the attestations recorded by Abbi in the PGA.

There follows the fifth chapter, which is a short chapter on noun phrases in which Comrie and Zamponi observe that the construction of noun phrases in Akajeru is similar to that of other Great Andamanese languages, where possessive pronouns and nominal possessors are placed before the main noun while the definite article and ad-

jectives follow it. They note that Akajeru behaves differently in the case of noun phrases with a full nominal possessor and indicate two different types of possessive constructions.

Finally, in Chapter 6, Comrie and Zamponi show very briefly how clauses are formed in Akajeru, distinguishing between copular and verbal clauses. Copular clauses may or may not have the enclitic copula (=bi) and they express ties of identity, attribution and existence whereas for verbal clauses they distinguish between those with transitive verbs and those with intransitive verbs. In the first ones, the order is subject-object-verb, in the second ones it is subject-verb. Moreover, in the sources they trace the presence of only one interrogative clause determined by the initial presence of an interrogative pronoun (*atfiu*, who).

4 Results and Conclusions of the Grammatical Analysis: To What Extent is Akajeru Present in PGA?

Following these five central chapters, the chapter that follows is very interesting and somewhat pulls together all the observations and analyses made by the two authors in the course of their study of the older British sources alongside, in parallel to the more recent ones especially by Abbi but also by some other scholars. They point out that in that process of cultural and linguistic endangerment that began in the mid-1800s, with the establishment of the British on the islands, the Great Andamanese communities present on the islands began to intermix with each other and the main slice of them was Akajeru. Recalling the main claims made by scholars over the past 50-70 years about the Great Andamanese languages and about Akajeru being the main constituent of PGA, Comrie and Zamponi seek to understand if the results of their research tell us anything more, if and what they confirm or deny about these claims to some extent.

Firstly, they point out that the presence of the fricatives [ʃ] or [s] in PGA is an innovation in this language as they do not find them documented in any of the North Andamanese dialects and suggest that they may be a post-contact result, such as the influence of Hindi. They also remark on the fact that often words that are similar in the various North Andamanese dialects – specifying that they mainly refer to Akajeru and Akachari, since they are the best documented – differ in vowel correspondence. The PGA sometimes shows the Akajeru form, sometimes the Akachari form, but most of the times it follows neither one nor the other and is likely to be an Akabo or Akakhora form.

Instead, with regard to the pronunciation of consonants, they state that there are rarely differences in pronunciation between PGA and the Akajeru and Akachari forms. They give only two examples: the word for ‘imperial pigeon’ (*merit* in PGA, *mirid* both in Akajeru and

Akachari) and for the tree of the species *Dipterocarpus laevis* (*kəɔɔij* in PGA, *kəɔɔin* in Akajeru and Akachari). Interestingly, we learn that in those few cases where the words Akajeru and Akachari do not correspond at all, PGA prefers the form either the same or more similar to Akajeru. The only exception they find is in the word for ‘moon’, which for PGA and Akachari is very similar (*dulɔ* in PGA, <*dolāū*> in Akachari as reported by Portman 1887, 51) whereas in Akajeru it differs a lot (*firikli*).

From a morphological point of view, the only difference they find between Akajeru and PGA is in their different use of the somatic prefix *-ot* with words that indicate the possession of human beings (understood as, for example, ‘my sister/my brother’). Regarding syntax, they detect no differences between PGA and Akajeru, but they also point out that it could be due to the insufficiency of sources on the Akajeru language.

The conclusion reached by Comrie and Zamponi confirms the hypotheses advanced by other authors on PGA and the Great Andamanese languages of which it is composed and which they presented and observed at the beginning of this chapter. In fact, the two authors state that the linguistic data they analysed confirm that Akajeru represents the main grammatical basis of PGA. They point out that the other North Andamanese language varieties have certainly contributed as well. In addition to Akajeru, which is the focus of the volume, their comparison could mainly concentrate on Akachari, since it is better documented than Akakhora and Akabo. Akachari contributed with numerous words, and they assume that Akabo and Akakhora also contributed to some extent, probably more from a lexical point of view, but they cannot state this with certainty as there is very little information on this.

A particularly interesting result from Comrie and Zamponi’s research concerns PGA and certain lexical forms that would probably show signs of post-contact development, namely the deaffrication/depalatalisation of [tʃ] / [c] in [ʃ] / [s] and the lowering of [i] in [e].

5 Akajeru Words

In the eighth and final chapter, Comrie and Zamponi bring together all the Akajeru words documented in the sources they studied, with the exception of personal names and toponyms. They organise the words into two lists - Akajeru word list and English-Akajeru finder list - also including words that Radcliffe-Brown had listed as North Andamanese but which they think are most likely words used in Akajeru.

The first is not a simple list presenting an Akajeru term and its English translation, but the two authors want to go more specific and

add all the information they have gathered on that term. In this way, the reader is also guided to understand the entire analysis behind each individual term presented. For each headword in the list, a series of information is given concerning, on the one hand, its grammatical analysis and meaning, and on the other hand, its occurrence in historical sources and its cognate words in PGA and/or Akachari. It is very interesting that for each lemma, they tell us whether in the historical sources it was reported as Akajeru, North Andamanese or both, drawing attestations from Radcliffe-Brown and Man's material. It is equally interesting that, as in the body of the entire book, but here doing it lemma by lemma, they make comparisons with PGA and Akachari by drawing from Abbi and Portman's materials.

In the second list, they include a series of words in English next to their corresponding term or terms in Akajeru and/or North Andamanese. Here again, what is curious is to see that often for some terms that in English are translated by a single word, for Akajeru or the other North Andamanese languages there can be many more terms.

6 Final Considerations on the Book: Why It Is Worth Reading

In a first instance, the greatness of Comrie and Zamponi's work can be surely attributed to their effort to reconstruct the grammar of a practically extinct language by adopting an interesting approach. In fact, considering the condition of Akajeru language and the impossibility to conduct a fieldwork with native speakers of the language (as we saw, the last three speakers of PGA, not specifically Akajeru, are actually 'rememberers') leads the authors to conduct a multiple approach to linguistic documentation. Their study is mainly conducted on the previously collected and analysed material on Akajeru, which they study in parallel with the most recent studies on the field by Abbi on PGA.

Another interesting aspect of Comrie and Zamponi's work lies in the continuous parallel between the Akajeru language and its North Andamanese co-dialects. In addition to recognising that the choice was also born out of necessity, given the scarcity of sources available to the authors, their effort to study Akajeru not from an isolated perspective, but well aware of its position within a linguistic 'whole' should also be noted. The study of the Akajeru language and the present reconstruction of its grammar, in fact, has also been made possible thanks to a continuous and fruitful side-by-side comparison with the other North Andamanese languages that are today part of the PGA.

We have seen that the mixing process of Great Andamanese languages, over a period of only about 150 years, has caused a serious loss of linguistic variety on the islands, resulting in a gradual and increasing adoption by Great Andamanese communities of the lan-

guages brought by new settlers from mainland India, such as Hindi or Bengali. A work totally free of doubt and uncertainty on these languages is not possible because what we are left with are some historical sources and no native speakers who regularly use this language in everyday life. The same work on PGA by the scholar Abbi was not without its difficulties because those who speak and understand this language are not only few, but they are also middle-aged people who neither normally use this language among themselves nor pass it on to younger generations.

I believe that Comrie and Zamponi's work is truly excellent and curious not only for those involved in language studies of South Asia and Southeast Asia, but also for those who are more generally interested in linguistic phenomena in the world. Many languages have been lost in the course of human history, or perhaps they have simply blended into the languages that have succeeded them and still survive in some minimal, imperceptible form.

The beauty of the world's languages is also this, that is the richness and history they tell us through their grammar, their vocabulary, their sounds. If we read a few words from the list of Akajeru terms in Comrie and Zamponi, we can immediately detect the unicity and the peculiarity of this language. Its uniqueness is traceable, for instance, in the strong link between the native speaker and his or her surrounding ambience, a feature that is clearly visible in the presence of somatic prefixes for at least a third of the approximately 320 Akajeru/North Andamanese words documented by British scholars. Somatic prefixes are an indicator of how in these Great Andamanese communities the link between body and environment is indispensable in human communication. At the linguistic level, humans act in a precise environmental context, and the language features, such as a vocabulary enriched with somatic prefixes, sanction this link.

In conclusion, Comrie and Zamponi have put together a volume that is truly valuable for language studies, but that actually goes far beyond this and gives us the opportunity to reflect on many linguistic topics and expand future studies, giving importance to the study of languages - extinct and/or not - spoken by communities that still maintain a close relationship with their environment. Therefore, while waiting for the two authors to publish future articles and their forthcoming volume on the grammar of the Akachari language, I highly recommend that you take a look at their volume and let your curiosity and confrontation with our worlds and languages revive in you the beauty of linguistic variety in the world, which is richness for us human beings.

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