

The Subtle Meaning

An Outline of Persian *'ilm-i ma'ānī*

Alessia Dal Bianco



Edizioni
Ca' Foscari

The Subtle Meaning

Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia

Studi filologici e letterari sull'Asia e sull'Africa

Serie diretta da
Daniela Meneghini

1



Edizioni
Ca' Foscari

Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia

Philological and Literary Studies on Asia and Africa

Tres bibliothecas habeo, unam Graecam, alteram Latinam. Thus, in the *Satyricon*, Trimalchio addresses the rhetorician Agamemnon, without mentioning the language(s) of the works contained in his third library. According to the possible interpretation of this passage, this library might have been 'oriental', but Trimalchio – who came from the Eastern part of the Empire – avoided mentioning it because of his inferiority complex towards the dominant Greco-Roman culture of his time.

In line with this memory, the *Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia* is meant to valorise non-Western cultural and literary traditions, collecting studies that will be innovative not only in terms of content but also in their contribution to elaborating a critical-textual methodology in constructive dialogue with that of the classical philological tradition. The series will host critical editions of texts, from antiquity to the beginning of the modern era, and historical-literary and linguistic studies in the form of monographs and collective volumes, concerning Arabic, Aramaic, Armenian, Chinese, Coptic, Hebrew, Georgian, Japanese, Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-Persian, Persian, Semitic languages of Ethiopia, Syriac and Turkish.

Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia

Studi filologici e letterari sull'Asia e sull'Africa

Tres bibliothecas habeo, unam Graecam, alteram Latinam. Così, nel *Satyricon*, Trimalcione si rivolge al retore Agamennone, senza menzionare la lingua o le lingue delle opere contenute nella sua terza biblioteca. Secondo una delle possibili interpretazioni del passo, questa biblioteca sarebbe stata 'orientale' ma Trimalcione – egli pure orientale – avrebbe evitato di menzionarla per un complesso di inferiorità nei confronti della cultura dominante greco-romana dell'epoca.

La *Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia*, in linea con tale memoria, intende valorizzare tradizioni 'altre' rispetto a quella occidentale, raccogliendo studi innovativi non solo nei contenuti ma anche nella capacità di concorrere all'elaborazione di una metodologia critico-testuale che si ponga in un dialogo costruttivo con quella della tradizione filologica classica.

La collana è dedicata alla pubblicazione di edizioni critiche di testi, prodotti dall'antichità fino al principio dell'epoca moderna, in arabo, aramaico, armeno, cinese, copto, ebraico, georgiano, giapponese, giudeo-arabo e giudeo-persiano, lingue semitiche dell'Etiopia, persiano, siriano e turco, e di studi storico-letterari e linguistici, nella forma di monografie e di volumi collettanei, relativi alle aree linguistiche sopra citate.

Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia

Studi filologici e letterari sull'Asia e sull'Africa

Direzione scientifica

Daniela Meneghini (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia)

Comitato direttivo

Attilio Andreini (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia)

Piero Capelli (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia)

Emiliano Fiori (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia)

Edoardo Gerlini (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia)

Antonella Ghersetti (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia)

Paolo Lucca (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia)

Comitato scientifico

Ikuko Sagiyama (Università degli Studi di Firenze, Italia)

Philip Forness (KU Leuven, Belgium)

Jan Just Witkam (Emeritus Professor of Paleography and Codicology of the Islamic world in Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands)

Mahmood Fotoohi Rudmajani (Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran)

Johannes Thomann (Gastforscher: Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies, University of Zurich)

Redazione

Dipartimento di Studi sull'Asia e sull'Africa Mediterranea

Ca' Cappello

San Polo 2035,

30125 Venezia

e-ISSN 3034-9095



<https://edizionicafoscarì.unive.it/it/edizioni/collane/bibliotheca-trimalchionis-tertia/>

The Subtle Meaning

An Outline of Persian *‘ilm-i ma‘ānī*

Alessia Dal Bianco

Venezia

Edizioni Ca' Foscari - Venice University Press

2024

The Subtle Meaning. An Outline of Persian *'ilm-i ma'ānī*
Alessia Dal Bianco

© 2024 Alessia Dal Bianco for the text
© 2024 Edizioni Ca' Foscari for the present edition



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Quest'opera è distribuita con Licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale



Any part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission provided that the source is fully credited.

Qualunque parte di questa pubblicazione può essere riprodotta, memorizzata in un sistema di recupero dati o trasmessa in qualsiasi forma o con qualsiasi mezzo, elettronico o meccanico, senza autorizzazione, a condizione che se ne citi la fonte.



Scientific certification of the works published by Edizioni Ca' Foscari: the volume preliminarily underwent a non-anonymous review (open peer review), by subject-matter experts, indicated below, and received their positive evaluation. The evaluations were conducted in adherence to the scientific and editorial criteria established by Edizioni Ca' Foscari.

Certificazione scientifica delle Opere pubblicate da Edizioni Ca' Foscari: il volume è stato preliminarmente sottoposto a una valutazione non anonima (*open peer review*), da parte di studiosi specialiste della materia, qui sotto indicate, e ha ricevuto la loro valutazione positiva. Le valutazioni sono state condotte in aderenza ai criteri scientifici ed editoriali di Edizioni Ca' Foscari.

The reviewers are | Le reviewer sono:

- Justine Landau (Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, France)
- Paola Orsatti (Sapienza Università di Roma, Italia)

Edizioni Ca' Foscari

Fondazione Università Ca' Foscari | Dorsoduro 3246, 30123 Venezia
edizionicafoscari.unive.it | ecf@unive.it

1st edition February 2024

ISBN 978-88-6969-781-4 [ebook]

ISBN 978-88-6969-782-1 [print]

Cover design: Lorenzo Toso

This book has been published with the support of Sapienza University of Rome, Dipartimento Istituto Italiano di Studi Orientali ISO. (Project: *Languages, texts and philologies of the Iranian world: contacts, influences and interactions between languages and cultures*. Principal Investigator: Prof. Paola Orsatti).

La pubblicazione è stata realizzata con il contributo dell'Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza, Dipartimento Istituto Italiano di Studi Orientali ISO. (Progetto: *Lingue, testi e filologie del mondo iranico: contatti, influenze, interazioni tra lingue e culture*. Responsabile della ricerca: Prof. Paola Orsatti).

The Subtle Meaning. An Outline of Persian *'ilm-i ma'ānī* / Alessia Dal Bianco — 1st ed. — Venice: Edizioni Ca' Foscari, 2024. — x + 130 p.; 23 cm. — (Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia; 1). — ISBN 978-88-6969-782-1.

URL <https://edizionicafoscari.unive.it/it/edizioni/libri/978-88-6969-782-1/>

DOI <http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-781-4>

The Subtle Meaning

An Outline of Persian *'ilm-i ma'ānī*

Alessia Dal Bianco

Abstract

How does syntax interact with context to convey subtle meanings beyond expectations? A branch of the Arabic-Islamic study of rhetoric (*balāḡat*) known as 'the science of meanings' (*'ilm-i ma'ānī*) discusses this point. This discipline studies the appropriateness of an utterance and its parts to the speaker's intent and the context in which the utterance is used. Although some of its findings are similar to those of pragmatics and semantics, its domain does not fully overlap with any Western categories.

This book examines the Persian science of meanings as expressed in a selection of textbooks published in Iran over the last hundred years. It consists of 11 chapters and a bibliography. Chapter 1 provides a historical background, a review of sources and secondary literature, and the aims and scope of the study. Chapter 2 introduces and clarifies the meanings of certain notable terms commonly used in Persian textbooks. The general organisation of the discipline, which is traditionally divided into eight parts, is also discussed. Chapters 3 to 10 each address one of these eight domains. Chapter 11 draws some conclusions, includes a tentative evaluation of the merits and limits of *ma'ānī* in analysing classical Persian poetry, and discusses the relation of the Persian discipline with the Arabic model. It offers insights into how the Arabic model was adapted to Persian and eventually transformed into a literary theory of how Persian poets made the best use of syntactical possibilities.

With its comprehensive account of the contents of the Persian science of meanings, a clarification of this field's jargon, and comments on dozens of examples taken mainly from classical Persian poetry, this monograph will interest graduate students and researchers working on Persian poetry, Arabic-Islamic rhetoric, and literary theory.

Keywords Iranian studies. Middle East studies. Persian language. Persian poetry. Literary theory. Comparative world rhetoric. History of linguistics.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction	3
2 Notable Terms	13
3 The Predicative Relationship (<i>isnād-i ḥabārī</i>)	25
4 The States of the Predicand (<i>aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh</i>)	35
5 The States of the Predicate (<i>aḥwāl-i musnad</i>)	63
6 The States of the Complements of the Verb (<i>aḥwāl-i muta'alliqāt-i fi'l</i>)	71
7 Restriction and Delimitation (<i>qaṣr wa ḥaṣr</i>)	79
8 The Performative Utterance (<i>inšā</i>)	87
9 Disjunction and Conjunction (<i>faṣl wa waṣl</i>)	99
10 Brevity, Verbosity and Balance (<i>iğāz, iṭnāb, musāwāt</i>)	107
11 Conclusion	117
Bibliography	123

The Subtle Meaning

An Outline of Persian *'ilm-i ma'ānī*

1 Introduction

Summary 1.1 Overview. – 1.2 Historical Background. – 1.3 Aims and Scope of the Study.

1.1 Overview

The ‘science of meanings’, *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* in Arabic and *‘ilm-i ma‘ānī* or simply *ma‘ānī* in Persian, is a branch of the study of eloquence (*balāġat*). As a discipline, it has a long history in the traditional knowledge system of many Islamic societies. It is the study of the appropriateness of an utterance and its parts with the speaker’s intent, and the context in which it is used. One of its basic assumptions is that the skilful use of syntax imparts subtle meanings beyond the literal value of a sentence. Tools such as ellipsis, word order shifts, or emphasis are critical in this regard. The speaker’s intended meaning should be recovered based on clues provided by the context, beyond the actual wording. The science of meanings, then, is broadly concerned with how ideas are effectively expressed through grammatical structures. Although some of its findings are similar to those of pragmatics and semantics, it has no precise equivalent in English.

The Persian science of meanings owes terminology, approach, and much of its content to its Arabic parent. However, it gradually distanced itself from its origins and developed independently. While drawing illustrative examples from literary texts, mostly poetry, scholars show how linguistic efficiency works in Persian. Nowadays, the science of meanings in Iran, besides being a set of knowl-

edge taught at university level, has increasingly become a tool for researchers to analyse Persian literature. The corpus of classical Persian poetry provides a treasure of eloquence that scholars fruitfully explore through the discipline's lenses.

This book examines the Persian science of meanings as it is reflected in a selection of textbooks published in Iran over the last hundred years. It consists of eleven chapters. Chapter 1 provides historical background and a review of the secondary literature. It also outlines the aims and scope of the study. Chapter 2 explains a number of notable terms in use in Persian textbooks of the science of meanings. Each of the chapters 3 to 10 deals with a traditional unit of the discipline. Chapter 11 draws some conclusions, including a tentative evaluation of the merits and limits of *ma'ānī* in analysing Persian classical poetry.

Limited research on the Persian science of meanings has been published outside Iran. Benedikt Reinert reports that the Persian scholars engaged in the Arabic science of meanings had no interest in adopting the *ma'ānī* conceptual framework to the analysis of Persian language and literature (Bonebakker, Reinert, *EL*², s.v. "*al-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān*"). Natalia Chalisova (2009, 161) and Geert J. van Gelder (2009, 134-5) express similar remarks. Paul E. Losensky (1997) reveals some fascinating insights on how Persian *ġazals* are possibly informed by *ma'ānī* vocabulary and concepts.

Larger studies have appeared in European languages on the Arabic science of meanings, the ancestor of the current Persian science. The rigorous Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli (1990, 118-36) is arguably the best general presentation. Udo Gerald Simon (1993) provides a detailed translation and study of the *ma'ānī* section of *Miftāḥ al-'ulūm* by al-Sakkākī, while Herbjørn Jenssen (1998) offers some preliminary explorations on al-Qazwīnī's works on *ma'ānī*. Kees Versteegh (1997, 115-26) contextualises the role of the science of meanings within the larger framework of the Arabic linguistic tradition. Further substantial linguistic remarks appear in Firanescu 2009 and Larcher 2013. Meanwhile, Lara Harb (2020, 233-51) approaches the science of meanings in terms of aesthetic experience. An account of Arabic rhetoric with examples in Modern Standard Arabic is offered by Hussein Abdul-Raof (2006, 97-195). Finally, Basil Hatim (1997) and Khalid Yahya Blankinship (2019) draw in part on *ma'ānī* principles when discussing contrastive text linguistics and problems of translation, respectively. In general, however, as Jenssen (1998, 1-13) observes, Western scholarship has understudied the science of meanings as compared to the other branches of the study of eloquence.

Among the many comprehensive Persian textbooks available, notable works on which I conducted my study include Āhanī 1978 (a revised edition based on Āhanī 1960); Aḥmadniẓād 2003; Āq-Iwlī n.d.; Humāyī 1991 (a reprint of his 1966 lecture notes on *ma'ānī*); Kazzāzī

1991; Rağā'ī 1961; Riḍānizād 1988; Šamīsā 1994; Zāhidī 1967. The works mentioned above are the main source of the illustrations I give in this monograph. In addition, I have also benefitted from Aḥmad Sulṭānī 2005; 'Alawī Muqaddam, Ašrafzāda 1997; Ğāhidğāh, Riḍā'ī 2012; Murādī, Yūsufī, Ni'matī 2016; Raṅğbar 2006; Şādiqiyān 2003; Şafā 1952; Tāğidīnī 2012; Tağlīl 1983; Taqawī 1939.

This monograph, as far as I can ascertain, may be one of the first attempts from outside Iran to consider the Persian science of meanings in its own right. It is a preliminary study and will not exhaust all the possible grounds for investigation. Nevertheless, I hope it can improve understanding of a Persian literary practice that has received little attention in Western scholarship. Before entering into the details of this study, it will be helpful to discuss the history of the science of meanings. This will help to understand how the discipline has evolved from the study of Arabic linguistic expressions to its current shape.

1.2 Historical Background

In the rich intellectual environment that emerged in the Islamic world, reflection on the concept of *balāğat* 'linguistic efficiency, eloquence' occupies a prominent place. As the tenth-century philologist Abū Aḥmad al-'Askarī had argued in his *Risāla fī l-tafḍīl bayna balāğatay al-'arab wa-l-'ağam* (Epistle on the Assessment of the Relative Merits of Arabic and Persian Eloquence), eloquence was not limited to one language over another (al-'Askarī 2006, 76-7). Nevertheless, while the study of the Arabic language and its means of eloquence was a priority for many scholars, Persian works on rhetoric remained sparse. The study of Arabic *balāğat* gradually developed into three canonical branches, each with its own specificities. When it reached its final form, the study of Arabic eloquence included the science of meanings ('*ilm al-ma'ānī*), and the two sciences called '*ilm al-bayān*' and '*ilm al-badī'*'. While '*ilm al-bayān*' studied figurative language (including metaphor, simile, analogy, metonymy, and allusion), '*ilm al-badī'*' enumerated various figures of speech intended for embellishment (such as paronomasia, antithesis, and so on).

Many scholars contributed to the development of the Arabic science of meanings. The forerunner of many ideas that later shaped the discipline was a Persian grammarian, 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ğurğānī (d. 1078), whose Arabic work *Dalā'il al-i'ğāz* (Proofs of the Inimitability) is considered a landmark in Arabic linguistics. Since it was common for non-Arabs to be involved in Arabic language studies, many of the later authors who elaborated on al-Ğurğānī's findings had Iranian or Turkish backgrounds. Moreover, it is probably the Persian theologian and grammarian al-Zamağşarī (d. 1144) who is the first to

provide written evidence for the identification of *ma'ānī* and *bayān* as two distinct disciplines (*'ilm*) in rhetorical studies (Smyth 1993, 109).

The most seminal contribution, however, is attributed to the Khorezmian scholar al-Sakkākī (d. 1229). He gave the Arabic science of meanings a near-final arrangement. His encyclopaedia of language and literary sciences, *Miftāḥ al-'ulūm* (The Key to the Sciences), marked the beginning of the tradition. Al-Qazwīnī (d. 1338) condensed the third part of al-Sakkākī's work into an eight-part summary entitled *Talḥīṣ al-Miftāḥ* (The Résumé of the *Miftāḥ*) and a larger version called *al-Īdāḥ* (The Clarification). The abridgement eventually was better received than its source and became a standard textbook (Smyth 1993). It was at this point that the science of meanings reached its definitive taxonomy. In addition, al-Qazwīnī's work was the basis for many commentaries and glosses. Particularly influential are the commentaries by al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390), *al-Muḥtaṣar* (The Short Commentary) and *al-Muṭawwal* (The Long Commentary), and the *Hāṣiya* (Marginal Glosses) by al-Sayyid al-Šarīf al-Ġurġānī (d. 1413).¹

Over the course of time, the works building on Sakkākī's and al-Qazwīnī's legacy entered the *syllabus* of Islamic higher education held in the *madrasas*. It is not surprising to find the science of meanings, a discipline connected to language and the production and reception of utterances, in the context of Islamic education. The works mentioned above were all drawing illustrative examples from the Qur'ān and, in addition, from Arabic poetry. Larcher (2013, 188) notes that:

the Arabic linguistic tradition has two aspects: one literary and the other hermeneutic. On its hermeneutical side, it thus intersects with the religious (i.e., theologico-juridical) sciences.

In this respect, it seems that people from different backgrounds could approach the science of meanings in different ways. While al-Sakkākī was concerned mainly with literary aspects, later scholars also had a professional interest in law. The understanding of the speaker's intention was essential to legal theorists (Yunis Ali 2000, 1) as much as for Arabic rhetoricians.

As many scholars suggest, Iranians initially seemed uninterested in writing in Persian on the subject, let alone applying the science of meanings to the Persian language.² The process by which *ma'ānī*

¹ Several papers and monographs recount the origins and developments of the Arabic science of meanings. In addition to those already mentioned in § 1.1, see Smyth 1993 and 1995.

² See Bonebakker, Reinert, *EP*², s.v. "*al-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān*"; Chalisova 2009, 161; van Gelder 2009, 134-5.

came to be applied to the Persian language was not linear. The first works written in Persian were the result of a process of translation from Arabic to Persian. They were bilingual works based on the long tradition of Arabic sciences of eloquence. Treatises such *Anwār al-balāġa* (The Lights of Eloquence) by Muḥammad Hādī Māzandarānī (d. 1721) showed shifts in the language: the theoretical part was written in Persian, but the illustrative examples were still in Arabic (cf. Māzandarānī 1997). According to our present knowledge we should assume that educated Iranians studied the science of meanings primarily in connection to the Arabic language.

A few exceptions exist in the periphery of Persianate societies. In India, some Persian-writing authors have left valuable evidence of their interest in *ma'ānī*. In a Persian manual of letter-writing, *Manāẓir al-inšā'* (The Aspects of Composition), the Deccan vizier Maḥmūd Gāwān (d. 1481) regrets that:

spreading the dress of the principles of 'ilm al-*ma'ānī* is too large for the small stature of this treatise.³

Although he missed the opportunity to display his mastery in the science of meanings, his words seem to suggest that he could at least imagine writing in Persian about the subject. A few centuries later, the Indian philologist Sirāġ al-Dīn 'Alī Ḥān Ārzū (d. 1756) was the first to accomplish this task. His treatise *Mawhibat-i 'uẓmā* (The Great Gift) is a comprehensive exposition of the *ma'ānī* methods applied to Persian poetry. Judging from the known copies of the work, the treatise had a limited circulation but as the first Persian work in this field it has gained relevance recently (cf. Šamisā's preface to Ārzū 2002, 18).

The science of meanings has undergone a renewal in Iran over the last hundred years. With the secular reform of education and the establishment of universities, Persian textbook production improved. The newly established Persian language and literature courses also forced Iranian academics to rethink the scope of their teaching, including how to teach the science of meanings. They replaced the old Arabic masterpieces with new, specially designed, Persian textbooks. The need to provide textbooks suitable for the new situation was a significant driver of change (Šamisā 1994, 21-2). For the first time, scholars added Persian examples alongside Arabic ones.⁴ In addition to these bilingual works, also monolingual manuals began to appear. In 1952, Ḍabīḥullāh Šafā (d. 1999) had dispensed entirely with Arabic examples in a short textbook. A few years later, Ġalāl al-Dīn Humāyī (d. 1980) felt the urgency of rethinking the Persian

³ Flatt 2019, 183 fn. 62 (English translation). See also Gāwān 2002, 61 (Persian text).

⁴ For example, Āq-Iwlī n.d.; Taqawī 1939; Āhanī 1960; Raġā'ī 1961; Zāhidī 1967.

science of meanings on its own terms. He designed a bilingual textbook in which the theory is given in Persian and the examples are both in Arabic and Persian. In addition, he added separate sections to discuss specific features of the Persian language that had no parallels in Arabic (Humāyī 1991, 15-16).

Iranian scholars claim that the development of a Persian science of meanings resulted from the separation of Arabic and Persian *curricula* and the decline of Arabic proficiency among students (cf. Āhanī 1978, *alif*; Šamīsā 1994, 21-2). Whatever the cause, the promotion of Persian examples opened up new ways of writing about the subtleties of the Persian language. Today, a tendency to focus on Persian poetry prevails. This was the result of pioneering efforts in the past. Aesthetic evaluation (*zībāšīnāhtī*, or *zībāšīnāsī*) goes hand in hand with linguistics (*zabānšīnāsī*) in the contemporary framework of the Persian science of meanings (Kazzāzī 1991, 9-11; Rañjbar 2006, 7).

The Persian science of meanings is still evolving. On the one hand, the consideration of specific Persian features is growing. On the other hand, more papers analyse the literary production of Persian poets in *maʿānī* terms (for example, Ğamālī 2009; Kārdgar 2016). Moreover, the attention to linguistics and pragmatics is partly reshaping the discipline in Iran. In the last thirty years, it has not been uncommon for Persian studies to mix traditional terminology with references to the theories of John Langshaw Austin (Šamīsā 1994, 40-3) or Roman Jakobson (Šamīsā 1994, 43; Ğihād 2008; Šāliḫī, Dākīrī 2015).⁵

1.3 Aims and Scope of the Study

Based on my examination of a number of Persian textbooks, I have attempted to provide an outline of the Persian science of meanings. My aim is to sketch the contents, clarify the jargon, and give a preliminary assessment of how the Persian science of meanings works. I will also explore the relationship of the discipline to the Arabic model and to the poetic heritage as a repertory of linguistic facts.

I will limit my presentation to what is inside the perimeter of the Persian science of meanings proper. I do not specifically cover aspects historically intertwined with the Arabic science of meanings, such as logic, Qurʾānic exegesis, or legal aspects.⁶ Intersections between the science of meanings and other branches of rhetoric are

⁵ On a similar eclectic approach in modern Arabic rhetorical manuals, see Scholz 2019.

⁶ On pragmatics in the wider realm of medieval Islamic law and theology, see Yunis Ali 2000.

not covered.⁷ Also, I will not evaluate contemporary attempts to situate the science of meanings within a broader framework. Neither will I suggest how the science of meanings provides helpful insights into issues in modern linguistics and pragmatics.

The research I undertook had three aims. First, I tried to clarify the sense of the original taxonomies and to facilitate the understanding of the rich terminology of the discipline. Second, I tried to identify some of the critical points that scholars have had to face in order to adapt the Arabic science of meanings to Persian. In this regard, I limited the comparison to selected controversial issues and highlighted some opposing viewpoints among Iranian scholars. Third, I selected a number of Persian illustrative examples from the textbooks. This provided material for reflection on how Iranian scholars understand the subtle meanings conveyed by the Persian language.

One of my concerns is understanding how the Persian science of meanings correlates with or differentiates from the Arabic model. Superimposing Arabic schemes onto Persian has often proved problematic. Some critical points also exist in the case of the science of meanings. The structural difference between Arabic and Persian prevents a perfect overlap of theories. To appropriately fix the terms of comparison, it would be helpful to clarify that, by Arabic model, I intend the traditional Arabic science of meanings, whose main protagonists and works I briefly mentioned in the historical overview. The intended comparison opposes a body of knowledge almost fixed by the fourteenth century to more recent speculations. Although I occasionally have found contemporary Arabic works cited in Persian manuals,⁸ their impact on Iranian scholars seems limited. For drawing comparisons to the Arabic science of meanings, my main reference is then the fourteenth-century commentary *al-Muṭawwal* by al-Taftāzānī. In addition, to better understand the Arabic discipline, I considered Persian manuals dealing with Arabic and Persian and examined secondary studies published in European languages.

References to the ‘Arabic linguistic tradition’ (elsewhere, ‘linguistic tradition’) should be understood as the linguistic thinking of Arabic-writing individuals who lived in the vast areas of the Islamic societies. In this multilingual milieu, one of the issues scholars had to tackle was whether language sciences would fit languages outside Arabic. Traditional linguistic studies conducted in Arabic in Iranian areas could be understood as part of a language acquisition pro-

⁷ On interactions with *bayān*, see Šamīsā 1994, 14-16. For an interesting account of terminology common to *ma‘ānī* and earlier Persian works on *badī‘*, see Isfandiārpur 2004, 267-80.

⁸ For example, Raṅṅbar (2006, 142), who designed a textbook aimed at students of Arabic language, Persian language, and theologico-juridical studies, declares he had quoted many Arabic examples from al-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ḥāsimī’s *Ġawāhir al-balāġa*.

gram or, perhaps, as study of literary or hermeneutical theories of language. Even though al-Qazwīnī explicitly maintained that the science of meanings pertained to the Arabic language,⁹ Persian was only one of the languages that have been studied and described according to the principles of *ma'ānī*. Twentieth-century scholars sometimes expressed dissatisfaction with the panorama of Persian textbooks, which they claimed were often Persian translations of Arabic content (Āhanī 1960, n.p., *pīšguftār*; Humāyī 1991, 15-16, 21), with Persian examples added sporadically (Šamīsā 1994, 22). Scholarly criticism shows the eagerness for the independent development of the discipline: the methods and basic tenets could apply to both Arabic and Persian language, but the results should be calibrated to the language under study.

Many terms in the science of meanings are derived from a long tradition of Arabic grammatical thought, while others are related to stylistics. Since the jargon is largely based on Arabic loanwords, there is a great deal of overlap between Persian and Arabic terminology. Persian scholars themselves tend to preserve the original Arabic vocabulary. An exception is Mīr Ġalāl al-Dīn Kazzāzī, who systematically translated the Arabic terminology into Persian, sometimes leaving the Arabic technical term in brackets (cf. Kazzāzī 1991).

I have selected some illustrative examples given in the manuals and reproduced them in this monograph for three key reasons. First, examples reproduce a typical feature of how Persian textbooks explore the topics. Manuals, in fact, alternate conceptual frameworks and illustrative examples. Second, only through examples do Persian manuals show exactly where eloquence lies in a literary text. Definitions are generally short, and are only clarified by the examples of lines taken from the premodern Persian poetry that occupies much of the textbooks. Third, the absence of poetic examples in some places in the manuals clearly shows how challenging it was for scholars to reconfigure an Arabic science into Persian. Purpose-built sentences replace poetry where necessary.

Since poetry may violate the rules of syntax, the reader will probably find it striking how lines from premodern Persian poetry appear to illustrate the pragmatics and semantics of the Persian language. Another paradox is that the terminology of the science of meanings suggests the idea that utterances are snippets of actual speech in an authentic setting. But a phrase in the poetry of the ancient past may no longer be conversational today. Moreover, when it comes to

⁹ In *Talḥīṣ al-Miftāḥ*, al-Qazwīnī defines the science of meanings as “the science through which one knows the various existing patterns [(*aḥwāl* ‘states’)] of Arabic speech [(*al-laḥẓ al-‘arabī*)] by means of which it meets the requirements of each situation” (Bonebakker, Reinert, *EL*², s.v. “*al-ma’ānī wa-l-bayān*”. See also Jenssen 1998, 61). This definition was later adopted by al-Taftāzānī 1911, 33-4.

lines of poetry, the context in which the poet places his poetic persona is largely fictitious. In what sense, then, is classical Persian poetry still perceived as immersed in a context? Some final remarks on these questions will be made in the conclusion.

In this outline, examples are given in transcription and translation. In correspondence with the examples, I have included a footnote with three references: the Persian textbook offering the quotation, the original work from which the quotation was taken, and the adopted English translation if not my own. The translation of poetry is a delicate and demanding craft. For this reason, in many cases, I have relied on previous English translations rather than providing my own. Sometimes, however, the English rendering deviates from the Persian syntax to such an extent that the translation shows no evidence of the intended point. In these cases, I have preferred to adapt the published translation or to translate the text into my own words.

Finally, a note on transcription is appropriate. The romanisation system adopted here for Persian and Arabic does not necessarily represent modern Persian pronunciation. This system is better suited to premodern Persian poetry. I have also opted for a system that makes Arabic loanwords as transparent as possible. Arabists who do not know Persian, but are interested in *ma'ānī* in general, will face fewer obstacles in this regard.

2 Notable Terms

Summary 2.1 The Science of Meanings (*'ilm-i ma'ānī*). – 2.2 Participants (*mutakallim, muḥāṭab, sāmi'*). – 2.3 Utterance (*kalām, ḥabar, inšā, aṣl*). – 2.4 Speaker's Intention (*ma'nā, ḡaraḍ, murād, qaṣd*). – 2.5 Communicative Situation (*maqām, ḥāl*). – 2.6 Contextual References (*qarīna, dalīl*). – 2.7 Taxonomy and General Organisation.

2.1 The Science of Meanings (*'ilm-i ma'ānī*)

How to refer to Persian *'ilm-i ma'ānī* in English? Studies dealing with Arabic *'ilm al-ma'ānī* have offered various solutions. Notable efforts include 'semantics of syntax' (Bonebakker, Reinert, *EI*², s.v. "*al-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān*"), 'Lehre von den Bedeutungen (der syntaktischen Muster)' (Simon 1993, 395), 'the stylistics of syntax' or 'syntactical semantics' (van Gelder 2001, 124), 'semantic syntax' (Abdul-Raof 2006, 2).¹ Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli (1990, 118-19) consider it 'grammatical semantics' but also employ the word-for-word translation 'the science of meanings'. The latter seems to be the preferred choice in recent times (Versteegh 1997, 124; Halldén 2005, 21; Giolfo, Hodges 2017, 42; Harb 2020, 233) and is used here.

The science of meanings studies how the speaker manipulates the utterance by making variations at the syntactic level to adapt

¹ I have not included Abdul-Raof's translation 'word order' (Abdul-Raof 2006, 2) since critical reviews have considered it misleading (see Dickins 2009, 910; Ghersetti 2007, 252).

it to express what he (or she) intends to convey. As such, its domain does not fully overlap with any Western categories. As a branch of the study of *balāġat* ‘eloquence, linguistic efficiency’, it is generally associated with literary rhetoric. Scholars with a linguistics background emphasise that it is instead a language science. Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli (1990, 119) state that “questions related to grammatical semantics and pragmatics” fall within its domain. Larcher (2013, 189) calls it “a contextual semantics” and “a pragmatics” (192). Harb (2020, 237-9) argues that the realm of the science of meanings transcends the narrow path of linguistics proper since its main concerns involve an aesthetic perspective. As we have seen above, both linguistics and the aesthetics of poetry are particularly relevant to contemporary Iranian scholars’ conceptions of the Persian science of meanings.

The science of meanings takes syntactical features into account in its analysis. However, it differs substantially from *ṣarf* ‘morphology’, *naḥw* ‘syntax’, or *dastūr-i zabān* ‘rules of grammar’. Normative grammarians assume that acceptability depends on whether the sentence follows certain rules that are valid regardless of the moment, the circumstance, or the person pronouncing the sentence. The science of meanings, on the other hand, examines the utterances in the context in which they occur. Consequently, a well-formed grammatical construction which may be appropriate in some contexts may be semantically ineffective in others.² Also, an expression may undergo semantic shifts in different contexts.

Manuals define the science of meanings as the discipline that studies how linguistic expressions adapt (*muṭābaqat*) to what the communicative situation requires (*muqtaḍā-yi ḥāl*). The concept of adequacy is one of the cornerstones of the whole study of eloquence (*balāġat*). Eloquence, a desirable property of the speaker and the utterance, entails at least two requirements: fulfilment of the needs and *faṣāḥat* ‘purity, intelligibility, absence of speech impediment’. The term *faṣāḥat* encompasses grammatical accurateness and the smooth flow of sounds. In other words, the skilled speaker says the right thing at the right time in the most correct and pleasant-to-hear phrasing. Two aspects are relevant. First, eloquence deals with contingent situations (i.e. utterances set in their context). Second, the definition implies that there should always be some utterances that meet the requirements in each communicative situation.

Recurring terms play a significant role in the science of meanings. Many are widely used but rarely defined. Since their meaning is not always transparent to a non-specialist audience, this prelimi-

² On the distinction between *naḥw* ‘grammar, syntax’ and *ma’ānī* in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Smyth 1995, 11-15.

nary overview will tackle the notable terms whose knowledge is necessary to approach the topics of the science of meanings. In the following pages, readers will find a selection of the most frequent terms and a brief guide to how to interpret them. The appropriate chapters of the monograph will then discuss the technical terms in more detail and cover the terms not included in this chapter.

2.2 Participants (*mutakallim, muḥāṭab, sāmi'*)

The science of meanings envisages a theory of the efficient use of language. Efficiency, here, means the ability to transmit the intended message including subtle nuances. The model holds that delivering a message involves at least two participants: the speaker (*mutakallim, ḥwānanda* or *gūyanda*) and the addressee (*muḥāṭab*). The addressee, the person to whom the speaker targets the utterance (*kalām*), is also referred to as 'hearer' (*sāmi'* or *šinawanda*). The words for 'hearer' also apply to a listener not directly engaged in the conversation. The science of meanings does not have a collective term for the speaker, the addressee and the hearer(s) as a group. Here I will use 'participants', a term borrowed from communication studies to refer to the sender and receiver(s) of a message in a communication encounter. These include interlocutors and listeners.

The terms that define the roles of the participants hint at a spoken exchange. However, most exemplifying quotes in the Persian handbooks come from poetry collections. In addition, manuals do not generally make a clear distinction between oral and written texts.³ The labels speaker and addressee, then, should be understood broadly to encompass authors and readers. In this book, I will adopt 'speaker' and 'addressee' as conventional translations of *mutakallim* and *muḥāṭab* to intend the main participants involved in any utterance production.

Participants influence the course of communication in various and substantial ways. According to the science of meanings, the speaker should carefully prepare the utterance for a specific addressee. Awareness of the addressee's attitude, role, and knowledge of the world is then essential for effective formulation. Also, the presence of casual observers influences the discourse. The speaker should then consider the listeners as well as the addressee. Dynamics among these actors influence the strategy of utterance formulation. Typical examples include artful utterances that inform the addressee while excluding other listeners, or that tell the addressee what was meant for another person, so that the latter indirectly receives the message.

³ Some authors, however, like Taḡlīl (1983, 15) mention *gūyanda* 'speaker' and *niwisanda* 'writer' in addition.

2.3 Utterance (*kalām*, *ḥabar*, *inšā*, *aṣl*)

The utterance (*kalām* or *guftār*) is the central unit under examination in the science of meanings. Manuals use the term in the light of the earlier linguistic tradition which distinguishes the utterance from the sentence (*ḡumla*).⁴ The sentence is an organised chain of words and the object of the study of syntax. The utterance, which the science of meanings investigates, is a sentence expressed in a communicative situation (*maqām*). While the former is an abstraction, the latter is intended as an actual piece of communication. Sequences of utterances also form larger units. Manuals do not coin new terms for these macro-units. However, they have technical names to describe the connected and disconnected discourse (see chapter 9) and the various techniques for enlarging utterances (see chapter 10).

The science of meanings offers a preliminary taxonomy of utterances, distinguishing two types: *ḥabar* (literally ‘information, news, account’) ‘informative, constative utterance’ and *inšā* (literally ‘creation, composition’) ‘performative utterance’.⁵ According to the general definition, the difference between the two categories lies in the applicability of a truth-criterion. A *ḥabar* is any utterance that can be true or false. An example of *ḥabar* is an assertion such as *paranda-yī rūy-i dirāht ast* ‘A bird is on the tree’, whereas *čirā āmadī?* ‘Why did you come?’ or *āftāb rā bibīn* ‘Look at the sun!’ are examples of *inšā*.⁶ Utterances of the *inšā* type thus include commands, questions, wishes, and the like. Another definition, which appears in the context of the *inšā* discussion, considers how utterances act in the world. Whereas *ḥabar*-type utterances declare something about an event or a state of affairs that exists independently of speech, *inšā*-type utterances, on the contrary, produce a speech act (see also § 8.1).

Informative utterances (*ḥabar*) are, by definition, truth-evaluable statements. One may wonder, however, how to understand truth (*šidq*) and falsehood (*kaḏīb*). How does the science of meanings assess a true or false utterance? In answer to this question, scholars recall how thinkers in the past have approached the problem. I will briefly summarise the main theories of truth based on the information provided by Humāyī (1991, 93-5). Historically, three theories of truth have gained popularity in the Arabic-Islamic framework of sciences: the standard theory, the theory of al-Nazzām (d. ca. 835-845),

⁴ On *kalām* and *ḡumla* in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Jenssen 1998, 48-50.

⁵ On *ḥabar* and *inšā* in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Larcher 1990; Larcher 1991; Moutaouakil 1982; Ghersetti 2002.

⁶ The examples are quoted in, respectively, Aḥmadnižād 2003, 90 and Šamisā 1994, 112 and 134.

and the theory of al-Ġāhiz (d. 868).⁷ The standard theory defines truth as the perfect correspondence between what the utterance expresses and reality. According to al-Nazzām, the truth is instead the perfect correspondence between what the utterance expresses and the speaker's belief. A person is telling the truth if he believes so, regardless of the facts. Al-Ġāhiz, on the contrary, problematises the issue by combining the two positions. In his opinion, correspondence to reality and the speaker's convictions makes an utterance true. An utterance is false if its content does not correspond to reality and the speaker is aware of its falsehood. Between truth and falsehood, there are intermediate cases which are neither true nor false. Persian manuals do not discuss the evaluation of truth further. Nor do the different views contribute to what the manuals generally explore. The criterion of truth somehow appears as a cursory subject with loose connections to what follows.

In order to pursue its analysis, the science of meanings breaks down the utterances under study into smaller units. The main constituents of the utterance are the *musnad ilayh* 'predicand' and the *musnad* 'predicate'. The predicand is the topic being talked about, the conceptual starting point. The predicate, on the other hand, is what the speaker has to say about that. In utterances like *Bahrām mīniwīsad* 'Bahrām writes' or *Bahrām niwīsanda ast* 'Bahrām is a writer' the personal name Bahrām functions as *musnad ilayh*, whereas *mīniwīsad* 'write' and *niwīsanda ast* 'is a writer' are *musnad*:

<i>Bahrām</i>	<i>mīniwīsad</i>	<i>Bahrām</i>	<i>niwīsanda ast</i>
Bahrām	writes.	Bahrām	is a writer.
↓	↓	↓	↓
<i>musnad ilayh</i>	<i>musnad</i>	<i>musnad ilayh</i>	<i>musnad</i>

A third key term, *isnād* 'predication', is also introduced. The term *isnād* refers to the predicative relationship that links a predicand to its predicate. As the examples above show, the distinction between *musnad ilayh* and *musnad* applies regardless of the type of predicate, whether verbal or nominal. The concept of *isnād* is assumed to justify the fact that the combination of a predicand and a predicate, whether nominal or verbal, into an utterance conveys a piece of information. Usually, such information is new.

The three terms *musnad ilayh*, *musnad*, and *isnād* derive from the same Arabic root meaning 'leaning, supporting'. Literally, *musnad ilayh* means 'that on which something leans' or 'the support', *mus-*

⁷ On the criterion of truth in Arabic, see al-Taftāzānī 1911, 38-43; see also Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 128-9; Simon 1993, 70-2 fn. 24.

nad means ‘that which is leaned, the supported’ (Larcher 2013, 189), and *isnād* means ‘the act of leaning’. Some Persian scholars, for example Kazzāzī (1991, 44) and Šamīsā (1994, 65), also pair *musnad ilayh* and *musnad* with the terms *nahād* ‘subject’ and *guzāra* ‘predicate’. In principle, they generally overlap in Persian. In this monograph, however, I preferably translate *musnad ilayh*, *musnad* and *isnād* as predicand, predicate and predication, much as Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli did earlier (1990, 122-3). This preserves the semantic connection between the three original terms in the specific framework in which they appear.

A blanket term with many usages in the science of meanings, the word *aṣl* ‘base, principle, default expression’ covers a range of senses in relation to utterances. Looking at how the manuals employ the term, several concepts may approximate its meaning in English. Below I will discuss three possible highly relevant notions in this regard: underlying structure, unmarked utterance, and pre-established form. I am not suggesting that the word *aṣl* bears various senses in the original, my point is that it could be helpful to approach this all-encompassing term from different angles in English.

In the science of meanings, whatever form the utterance takes, an underlying level called *aṣl* is theorised. In other words, it seems that every utterance associates tacitly with an underlying structure at some abstract level. This idea allows for justifying linguistic gaps such as ellipsis.⁸ In addition, the term *aṣl* makes sense of unmarked forms. Wherever a variation in the sentence’s syntactic structure adds an element of meaning, and the two forms differ only in syntax, the most basic form, which is unmarked in comparison with the other, is called *aṣl*. For instance, manuals discuss changes in word order in terms close to the concepts of markedness and unmarkedness. A non-typical word order, like placing the object before the subject, takes, in addition, a semantic component that is generally absent from the standard word order.⁹ The standard word order is thus considered *aṣl* in the science of meanings. Also, a pre-established form is called *aṣl*. The science of meanings, it seems, searches for a privileged, two-way relationship between a given meaning (*maʿnā*) and the linguistic form that best expresses it. Thus, *aṣl-i maʿnā* ‘the basic meaning’ indicates the conventional form that expresses a given function. For example, the imperative in commands is *aṣl*, which means that it is the pre-established linguistic form that expresses orders.

⁸ On underlying levels according to the Arabic grammatical tradition, see Versteegh 1994.

⁹ I will observe the position assumed in *maʿānī* manuals that the sequence predicand/predicate is the standard word order in Persian and any change adds a nuance of meaning. To my knowledge, the theory of scrambling (Karimi 2005), which has been applied to modern Persian, has not yet entered the manuals of *maʿānī*.

Defining what *ašl* is in a given situation is one of the chief concerns of the discipline. Although speakers innately distinguish a basic meaning from that which requires more thought, a function of the manuals is to clarify the *ašl* of many linguistic forms. The science of meanings endeavours to account for the variety of the Persian language. Utterances take many forms, and literality is taken as the benchmark for measuring eccentricities. The *ašl* is the starting point for discussing deviations from the norm as will be shown.

2.4 Speaker's Intention (*ma'ānā, ġaraḍ, murād, qašd*)

The translation 'the science of meanings' seems relatively obscure unless we clarify what *ma'ānī* 'meanings' means. The word *ma'ānā* (plural *ma'ānī*), a multipurpose term whose assessment poses many troubles to Western scholars,¹⁰ in a broader sense, means 'communicative intentions' or 'what (the speaker) intends (to say)'. The science of meanings identifies two orders of *ma'ānī*: the *ma'ānī-yi awwalī* 'primary meanings' and the *ma'ānī-yi t̄ānawī* 'secondary meanings' (also called *ma'ānī-yi maġāzī* 'transferred meanings'). Primary meanings here mean that there is a correspondence between what the speaker says and what he communicates. Secondary meanings, on the contrary, imply that the meaning of an utterance undergoes a context-sensitive shift to the point that the utterance tells more and/or something different from what words say. I use the word 'secondary', though these secondary meanings are no less important than the primary ones.

I will give an example to illustrate the difference between primary and secondary meaning. According to the science of meanings, the primary meaning of the interrogative clause is to ask for information, just as the primary meaning of an imperative clause is to give an order. In Persian, as in English, commands are sometimes rephrased as questions. For example, 'Open the window' becomes 'Would you mind opening the window?'. Assuming this is the case, how do we evaluate commands that differ in form, one interrogative and the other imperative? In both cases, the speaker's goal is to give an order. However, whereas the imperative is the established form (*ašl-i ma'ānā*), the interrogative takes this sense only indirectly. Command is one of the secondary meanings of this kind of question. More of

¹⁰ The word *ma'ānā* is an Arabic loanword in Persian. Concerns about the meaning and origin of the term are expressed by Bonebakker, Reinert, *EL²*, s.v. "*al-ma'ānī wa-l-bayān*". On the meanings of the term *ma'ānī* in Arabic philological disciplines, see Kouloughli 1983 and Key 2018. See also Versteegh 1997, 118-19 and Al-Azmeh 2013, 114-23. Key 2018 challenges that 'meaning' is too vague and suggests 'mental content' as a more accurate translation of *ma'ānā*.

ten than not, the choice of the indirect form also adds an additional semantic or pragmatic element. Politeness, as in the example above, is one. The analysis of secondary meanings takes up a lot of space in the manuals. It is probably the most substantial part of the discipline and is what really distinguishes the science of meanings from normative grammar.

The word *ma'nā* is not the only word that qualifies the speaker's intention. Other terms appear in Persian manuals: *ğarađ*, *murād*, and *qaşđ*. The term *ğarađ* 'purpose, goal, intention' is most often used to designate the effects that the speaker intends to evoke in the mind of the addressee, the 'perlocutionary force'. Thus, as a possible *ğarađ*, the utterance may express praise or blame, provoke joy or threaten, glorify or demean someone. The term *murād* 'intended will, what one wanted (to say but did not say)' is often used to indicate the form of the sentence under ordinary conditions. For instance, the *murād* of an elliptical utterance is the form the sentence would have had if the ellipsis had not occurred. The term *murād* comes very close to *aşl* in the sense of underlying form. Depending on the case, the meaning of the word *qaşđ* 'intentional meaning' in the manuals shifts between effect and basic form. Šamisā (1994, 67) considers 'illocutionary act' as a possible English translation for *qaşđ*. However, fluctuations in the use of these terms suggest that, at least in Persian manuals, they serve broad scopes. In addition to technical usage, they are general words that cover whatever the speaker intends with his speech.¹¹

2.5 Communicative Situation (*maqām*, *ḥāl*)

By its very definition, the science of meanings is the study of how utterances conform to the requirements of the situation (*muqtađā-yi ḥāl*). This description testifies to the paramount importance of the situational context. The manuals employ different terms to refer to the setting and background of the utterance. The different terms seem very close in meaning but appear in different circumstances to convey slightly different ideas of what context is. Here I will make a tentative distinction between two of them: *maqām* and *ḥāl*, while leaving *qarīna* for a separate section (see § 2.6).

The word *maqām* 'context, situation, position' indicates the communicative situation in which the utterance occurs. It broadly encom-

¹¹ On *murād* in al-Sakkākī, see Firanescu 2011, 227. On the difference between *ğarađ* and *qaşđ* in Arabic, see Firanescu 2009, 333. Firanescu argues that, for the Arabic grammarian al-Qarṭāğannī (d. 1285), the following distinction applies: "the 'intentional meaning' (*qaşđ*) is subordinated to the scope, indicated by the term *ğarađ* (pl. 'agrād'), which designates both 'internal psychical act', achieved in the soul of the poet, and the 'perlocutionary effect on the receiver', which is supposed to be similar" (333).

passes all factors that influence the communicative effort, including the participants, the spoken (or written) text that had preceded, and the shared knowledge of the world. Consider, for example, different communicative situations in which the speaker has to mention a particular individual. Depending on the speaker's and addressee's knowledge of this person, the speaker will mention the referent in a more or less definite way. If both know the person, a definite noun will identify the referent (for example, a personal name as *Zayd* 'Zayd'). On the contrary, if the referent is unknown, the speaker should rather use an indefinite noun (for example, *maḍ-ī* 'a man'). In one case, the communicative situation requires a definite reference (*maqām-i ta'rīf* 'situation of definiteness'), in the other an indefinite one (*maqām-i tankīr* 'situation of indefiniteness').

'Communicative situation' is also one of the meanings of *ḥāl* 'state, circumstance'. However, *ḥāl* takes a narrower sense than that given by *maqām*. While *maqām* evokes a more stable condition, *ḥāl* emphasises a sense of transience and change.¹² In this sense, the word *ḥāl* appears in the syntagma *muqtaḍā-yi ḥāl*, which is part of the definition of the science of meanings. The discipline is concerned with ways of adapting the sentence to what the particular communicative situation requires. Manuals display linguistic formulations that meet specific needs in different contexts. Mastering these variations is a major concern of the science of meanings.

However, things are even more complex than that. There are countless deviations from the standard. The science of meanings defines some of these circumstances as being in contrast to the outward requirements (*bar ḥilāf-i muqtaḍā-yi ḡāḥir* 'in opposition to the requirement of the outward (meaning)'). Here *ḡāḥir* 'outward', hence 'manifest, apparent, noticeable', refers to what appears appropriate by default in contrast to other less obvious potential requirements.¹³ Manipulations that go against what one would typically predict in a given situation are often meant to gain more subtle meanings. Thus, breaking the 'rule' of expectation proves eloquent in many cases and an unexpected wording may better fit the overall situation.

The word *ḥāl* also occurs in the manuals in another sense. The plural form *aḥwāl* 'states, modes, patterns' appears in the title of three of the eight units that traditionally form the set of topics of the science of meanings: *aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh* 'states of the predicand' (see chapter 4), *aḥwāl-i musnad* 'states of the predicate' (see chapter 5),

¹² On *ḥāl* and *maqām* in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Ghersetti 1998, 64-8.

¹³ See also the meaning of the term *ḡāḥir* in the realm of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). As Hallaq summarises: "*ḡāḥir* [...] lit. the outward meaning of a word, language or event [...]. It is the meaning first comprehended by the mind upon hearing a particular term or expression that potentially has two or more meanings" (Hallaq, *E²*, s.v. "*ḡāḥir*").

and *aḥwāl-i muta‘alliqāt-i fi’l* ‘states of the complements of the verb’ (see chapter 6). What *aḥwāl* means here is the range of linguistic operations that affect the constituents of the utterance.¹⁴ A prominent part of the science of meanings is concerned with context and purpose. Of particular importance are the linguistic operations themselves, the communicative situations that require such operations, and how those features determine a change in meaning.

2.6 Contextual References (*qarīna, dalīl*)

Interpreting the meaning of an utterance is a process that goes beyond understanding words and grammar. The utterance often tells more than the words in the sentence literally say. The question is, what justifies the recovery of the intended meaning? The science of meanings indirectly answers this question by considering the context as an essential interpretative guide.

The term *qarīna* (literally ‘connection, binding’) ‘context, frame of reference, associative indicator’ indicates those elements and connections that build contextual references. In general, manuals confine the use of the term to those situations where they need to justify the recovery of words or ideas not directly stated in the utterance. The concept helps to explain, for example, the effective use of the omission of parts of speech or the use of anaphoric and cataphoric pronouns or phrases. It also contributes to the understanding of figurative language.

The manuals distinguish between verbal and non-verbal contexts. Consequently, the *qarīna* is either lexical (*qarīna-yi lafẓi/laẓẓiyya*) or logical (*qarīna-yi ma‘nawī/ma‘nawīyya*). The first points to the knowledge of the co-text, while the second searches for factors outside it. Lexical connections refer to something previously stated in the discourse. In general, the existence of a backward or forward reference depends on the lexical *qarīna*. However, words do not always support the decoding of the utterance. Whenever there is a lack of lexical context, or the lexical context is too weak, the science of meanings considers that a logical connection may supply the lexical *qarīna*.

Another taxonomy distinguishes *qarīna* as overt (*qarīna-yi zāhir* ‘outward connection’) or covert (*qarīna-yi mahfī* ‘hidden connection’). The former consists in the frame of reference shared by all actors in the communicative exchange. Conversely, covert connections pre-

¹⁴ Versteegh (1997, 82) reports that *aḥwāl* in Arabic also stands for declensional endings. More studies exploring how *aḥwāl* and the system of Arabic declensional endings converse in the Arabic science of meanings are a desideratum. Persian language does not feature a declensional ending system comparable to the Arabic *i’rāb* system, therefore in the Persian science of meanings *aḥwāl* takes a broader sense.

suppose knowledge that is open to some but unknown to others. In conversation, covert connections are functional to establish ‘power’ relations. The speaker may exploit his knowledge of hidden facts to exclude some listeners from understanding the speech. Similarly, he may deliberately refer to covert connections in order to weigh someone else’s knowledge of facts.

Effective navigation of the network of connections is essential. The *qarīna* provides evidence (*dalīl* ‘sign, clue’) for the correct interpretation of the utterance. The scope of the term *dalīl* and of the related term *dalālat* ‘signification, emergence of evidence, the fact of indicating’ is not defined in the Persian manuals. It seems that the word *dalīl* ‘clue’ applies to two processes. Similar to the distinction of *qarīna* into lexical or logical, also for *dalīl* two orders of evidence are recognised: *dalīl-i lafẓī* ‘lexical, verbal clue’ and *dalīl-i ‘aqlī* ‘rational, intellectual clue’. The first applies to words that have been clearly uttered by the speaker and that help to grasp the meaning of the following references. The second implies that innate reasoning has to cope with the absence of previously uttered lexical references but eventually arrives at the correct understanding of an utterance. The clues are thus keys to interpretation that allow the addressee to complete the understanding of the meaning of the utterance.¹⁵

2.7 Taxonomy and General Organisation

The science of meanings traditionally divides its topics into eight parts: predicative relationship (*isnād-i ḥabarī*); states of the predicand (*aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh*); states of the predicate (*aḥwāl-i musnad*); states of the complements of the verb (*aḥwāl-i muta‘alliqāt-i fi‘l*); restriction and delimitation (*qaṣr wa ḥaṣr*); performative utterance (*inṣā*); disjunction and conjunction (*faṣl wa waṣl*); brevity, verbosity, and balance (*iğāz, iṭnāb wa musāwāt*).

The eight-fold arrangement displays a specific programme of study. In the beginning, five parts consider the characteristics of informative utterances. Some general notions on the role of the speaker and the addressee appear in the first part. The following three sections scrutinise the constituents of informative utterances. This sequence of topics makes it possible to comment on operations relevant to nominals, verbs, and complements. The next part considers how specific devices limit the scope of predication. An examination of performatives concludes the analysis of single utterances. The last two units look at how sentences follow one another. One addresses

¹⁵ On a similar use of the terms *qarīna* and *dalīl* in the Islamic legal discourse, see Hallaq 1988 and Yunis Ali 2000.

how sentences join together, while the other considers lengthening or shortening techniques. Each unit provides a taxonomy of primary and secondary meanings with illustrative examples.

Many Persian manuals systematically arrange the topics in the order of the traditional Arabic eight-part plan. However, some propose innovative arrangements. For example, Šamīsā 1994 and his fellow follower Tāḡidīnī 2012 reorganise the contents of the first six parts into four chapters named after the four sentence types (*ǧumalāt*): declarative (*ḥabarī*), interrogative (*pursišī*), imperative (*amrī*), and exclamative (*‘ātīfī*). In other words, they follow a classification by sentence purpose similar to that used in twentieth-century grammar textbooks for high-school students such as Ḥānlarī 1964. As for the remaining topics, the length of discourse occupies an autonomous chapter in accordance with the general framework, while conjunction and disjunction form a final unit together with some Western notions alien to the traditional plan.

Less radical changes of arrangement have occurred elsewhere. While generally respecting the sequence of topics, minor changes consist of combining separate matters or omitting what seemed inappropriate to Persian. The more traditional manuals provide side-by-side examples in Arabic and Persian, whereas other works focus exclusively on the Persian language. The jargon, however, is mainly based on Arabic loanwords. Since the science of meanings is considered only one part of a broader study of eloquence, most Persian manuals treat it in combination with other branches of rhetoric. It is common to find textbooks that couple *ma‘ānī* with *bayān* or treat *ma‘ānī* as part of a three-volume set that includes two other volumes on *bayān* and *badī‘*. Preliminary chapters on the concepts of *faṣāḥat* and *balāḡat*, or the historical development of the discipline are also common features of many Persian manuals. In brief, the general organisation may vary. Nonetheless, whatever the presentation plan, there is a consistent agreement on what the science of meanings should investigate and how. In the next chapters, I will follow the eight-part convention to outline the contents of the Persian science of meanings in more detail.

3 **The Predicative Relationship** **(*isnād-i ḥabarī*)**

Summary 3.1 Predication. – 3.2 Informative Content (*fāyida*). – 3.3 Attitude of the Addressee. – 3.4 Outward Requirements (*muqtaḍā-yi zāhir*). – 3.5 Literal (*ḥaqīqī*) and Figurative (*mağāzī*) Predication.

3.1 Predication

The study of the science of meanings begins by setting the basic tenets that guide the production of informative utterances (*ḥabar*). Information rests on the combination of two non-optional interdependent constituents. In this regard, the basic notions of *ḥabar*, *musnad ilayh*, *musnad* and *isnād* have been introduced before (see § 2.3). Here, I will consider some additional points.

While predicand and predicate are speech elements, the predicative relationship (*isnād-i ḥabarī*) does not correspond to spoken elements in the sentence. The idea of *isnād* is an abstract notion. Its existence is theoretically assumed to justify how information is provided by combining two elements, a predicand (*musnad ilayh*) and a predicate (*musnad*). The two, *musnad ilayh* and *musnad*, maintain a special status: if one of them does not appear in the utterance, it should occur elsewhere at some underlying level (see also § 4.2 and § 5.2). Each of them is essential. Additional elements, if any, are optional.

The origins of the terminology on predication can be traced back to the early Arabic linguistic tradition. The theory of *isnād* ‘predica-

tion' coined by the Arabic grammarians made it possible to simplify the analysis of the proposition. By implementing the categories of *musnad ilayh* and *musnad*, grammarians invented a binary model to describe the predicative structure of the Arabic sentence. In this way, they could account for the different formulations of Arabic nominal clauses (topic/comment) and verbal clauses (predicate/subject). The Arabic science of meanings reconceptualised the original notion of *isnād*, emphasising that the speaker plays a central role in establishing the relation between the predicand and the predicate.¹

The predicative relationship, according to the science of meanings, reflects the judgement (*ḥukm*) expressed by the speaker when he declares something. It establishes a relation between the predicand and the predicate in terms of affirmation (*itbāt*) or denial (*nafy*). Two examples of affirmation were given in § 2.3. In addition to those positive examples, the corresponding negative examples below are also utterances of the *ḥabar*-type that may be analysed in terms of *musnad ilayh* and *musnad*:

<i>Bahrām</i>	<i>namīniwīsad</i>	<i>Bahrām</i>	<i>niwīsanda nīst</i>
Bahrām	does not write.	Bahrām	is not a writer.
↓	↓	↓	↓
<i>musnad ilayh</i>	<i>musnad</i>	<i>musnad ilayh</i>	<i>musnad</i>

The binary model could easily be adapted to the Persian science of meanings. The existence of the copula in Persian, in addition, simplifies many of the problems that Arabic linguistics has had to tackle in order to account for the difference between nominal and verbal predicates. In Persian, the copula is generally expressed as in *Bahrām niwīsanda ast* 'Bahrām-noun' + 'writer-noun' + 'is-copula', 'Bahrām is a writer'. In Arabic, on the contrary, the nominal predicate has no copula; for example, *Zayd kātib*, that is 'Zayd-noun' + 'a writer-noun', means 'Zayd is a writer'. The fact that in Arabic the juxtaposition of two nominal elements resulted in a well-formed utterance had to be justified in some way.

¹ On the concept of *isnād* in the Arabic grammatical tradition, see Levin 1981 and Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 123.

3.2 Informative Content (*fāyida*)

The science of meanings supplies an idea of good speech in which the speaker tends to be as informative as possible. Informativity, at the most basic level, means conveying new information. Thus, a *ḥabar* utterance is generally the expression of a piece of information that the addressee does not already possess. Consequently, an essential factor influencing the formulation of an utterance is the level of awareness that the speaker attributes to the addressee. The state of the addressee, informed (*‘ālim*) or uninformed (*‘ajāhil*) about a fact, plays a role in the formulation and decoding of the utterance. The speaker generally notifies new facts to someone uninformed. However, it also happens that the speaker deliberately expresses content that the addressee already knows. Below I will clarify how manuals justify these redundancies on the grounds of the possibility of expressing additional meanings beyond a sentence’s literal value.

The science of meanings recognises two outcomes of any informative utterance. The first is to state some fact and the second, which occurs simultaneously, is to show that the speaker is informed about that fact. The discipline has special terms to describe the two levels. The elementary level is called *fāyida-yi ḥabar* ‘statement’s information, import, what one gains in terms of information’. The secondary level, which necessarily follows the first, is called *lāzim-i fāyida* ‘the necessary consequence of the information’. Which of the two is the actual communicative goal of the speaker depends on the context. Consider the example *tu dīrūz az Šīrāz āmada ī* ‘You have arrived from Shiraz yesterday’.² Obviously, the addressee is already informed about his own journey and schedule. The speaker here wants to show that he is informed about it as well. Assuming that an informative utterance should add new information, for an uninformed addressee the new information will generally be the *fāyida-yi ḥabar*, while for an informed one it might be the *lāzim-i fāyida*.

In addition, the speaker may have other goals (*ḡaraḍ*, plural *agrād*) in mind, including expressing one’s feelings or provoking an emotional response in the addressee. These are the very essence of certain utterances. Aḥmadnižād (2003, 91-5) gives dozens of lines of poetry whose aim, he writes, is to show *ḡasrat* ‘grief, regret’, *andūh* ‘sadness’, *šādī* ‘joy’, *ḡa’f* ‘weakness’, *bīčāraqī* ‘helpless state’, *istirḡām* ‘plea, entreaty, urgent serious or emotional request’, *mufāḡhara* ‘boasting’, *madḡ* ‘praise’ and the like. Yet the suggestive power of language, and of poetry in particular, seems to have been barely touched on by the authors of the manuals. And what exactly makes a statement evoke one emotion instead of another, or one effect instead of another, is not clearly stated in the manuals.

² Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 49.

The idea of feelings in relation to language is rather explored in terms of secondary meanings. In this respect, expressions of emotion may emerge in the context of a statement with a low level of information. When the information given is neither new nor intended to show the speaker's factual knowledge, the purpose of the utterance may be to express or evoke feelings. For example, an utterance such as *Ḥasan murd* 'Hasan died!'³ in response to someone who has already been informed of the sad news is typically a way of expressing sadness. There are also side effects, ranging from humour to harsh reproach, when a speaker reports widely known facts and thus behaves towards an informed addressee as if the addressee did not know the facts. In summary, playing on the 'mismatch' between the assumed and the actual level of awareness of the addressee helps to express subtle additional meanings.

3.3 Attitude of the Addressee

In addition to the level of awareness of the addressee, which has been mentioned before, the speaker should also consider the attitude of the addressee. In fact, different addressees will be more or less receptive towards the information given in the utterance. Some of them will willingly accept it. Others will have doubts or be openly opposed to it. In order to achieve a desired effect, the speaker should apply more or less emphasis (*ta'kid*).

The science of meanings recommends that the speaker should anticipate the disposition of the addressee, and adjust the phrasing accordingly. The manuals suggest the existence of three possible mindsets in the addressee, corresponding to three different ways of formulating statements. The addressee is, thus, either *ḥālī-yi dihn* 'neutral, open-minded', *mutaraddid* 'uncertain' or *munkir* 'denying', while the utterance best suited to each attitude is called *ibtidā'ī* 'initial, opening (speech)', *ṭalabī* 'requestive' or *inkārī* 'denying'. A non-emphatic utterance is best suited to a well-disposed interlocutor. Mild emphasis is appropriate to answer the possible doubts of a hesitant counterpart. Finally, stronger emphasis responds to someone who supports the opposite opinion.

Utterances differ in the degree of emphasis applied. Examples of devices of emphasis found in the Persian manuals include repetition (*tikrār*), oaths (*qasam*, *sawgand*), and specialised function words and phrases such as *albatta* 'certainly', *ba-durustī ki* 'sure that', *ba-taḥqīq* 'in truth', *har āyina* 'at all events', *hamānā* 'surely', *ḥwad* 'itself, indeed', *musallaman* 'certainly', *rāstī rā ki* 'surely that', *āgāh bāš* 'be-

³ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 67.

ware!'. In terms of the device of emphasis in use, oaths and *hamānā* seem to pertain almost exclusively to statements in response to a denial. Other devices better suit requestive and denying utterances.

The requestive utterance (*ṭalabī*) is so named because it responds to a possible request (*ṭalab*) for clarification, be it explicit or implicit. In both cases, the manuals recommend gentle emphasis.⁴ An example is how the poet Awḥadī adds the emphasis marker *ḥwad* in response to the implicit question, 'Is the world loyal or not?':

*ḥwad wafā nīst dar nihād-i ḡahān*⁵

Indeed, loyalty is not in this world's habit!

The speaker adopts more robust devices of emphasis when he intends to assert his view while refuting a contrary opinion. For example, Niẓāmī's oath *ba Yazdān* '(I swear) by God!' refutes 'rumours' about his morality in:

ba Yazdān ki tā dar ḡahān būda am
*ba may dāman-i lab nayālūda am*⁶

I swear by God that, as long as I have been in this world,
I have never stained my lips with wine.

In Persian, the choice between different emphatic devices seems to depend on the speaker's preference. On this point, a comparison between Persian and Arabic approaches is appropriate. According to an interesting anecdote narrated by 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, the philosopher al-Kindī complained to the grammarian al-Mubarrad about redundancies in Arabic. By redundancies, al-Kindī meant three examples of nominal head sentences that he felt were almost synonymous: one unmarked, one with *inna* 'indeed', and one with *inna* and *la* 'actually'. The grammarian replied that the three sentences were not equivalent because a change in form corresponded to a change in meaning.⁷ This narrative was not necessarily part of the later established Arabic science of meanings, but it fits ideally in it. The scanty Arabic examples given in the manuals by al-Sakkākī, al-Qazwīnī, and

⁴ However, Šamīsā (1994, 74) observes that in Persian also a lack of emphasis markers would fit this case.

⁵ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 56. Awḥadī 1961, 587, *Ġām-i ḡam*, v. 12707.

⁶ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 59. Niẓāmī 1956, 855, *Šarafnāma*.

⁷ The same anecdote is discussed by Aḥmadniẓād 2003, 97 and Harb 2020, 230-2 among the others.

al-Taftāzānī⁸ are consistent with those given in the anecdote. The examples may implicitly suggest that no device indicates neutrality, one (either *inna* or *la*) indicates uncertainty, and two (*inna* and *la*) indicate denial. While in Arabic there seems to be a clear choice of formula according to the situation, in Persian the choice is not so clear.

3.4 Outward Requirements (*muqtaḍā-yi zāhir*)

A fascinating aspect of the science of meanings is its capability to lay down general rules and at the same time be open to their contradiction. As we have seen, the speaker must first identify the level of awareness and the attitude of the addressee. Then, he should adapt his utterance accordingly. Some basic rules will guide the speaker to an appropriate formulation. However, the speaker must distinguish between the most evident requirements and the eventual more subtle aims he may wish to pursue. Has the speaker correctly guessed the addressee's disposition but deliberately chosen not to follow the basic phrasing? A mismatched utterance, though not conforming to what would be obvious, is not necessarily imperfect. On the contrary, eloquence depends in large part on the effects that unusual phrasing can convey. As already mentioned in § 2.5, the science of meanings labels many of these cases as *bar ḥilāf-i muqtaḍā-yi zāhir* 'in opposition to the requirement of the outward (meaning)'. The speaker chooses between the obvious and the non-obvious as different responses to the requirements of the situation.

Manuals offer various examples of felicitous mismatches. I will mention just two. Consider a man who agrees that prayer is obligatory but does not pray. The speaker might remind him *namāz wājib ast* 'Prayer is compulsory'. Since the speaker and the addressee already have this information, the utterance does not add any new data. What is also striking is that the speaker treats the addressee as if he were unaware of the fact that prayer is mandatory. This mismatch is used to rebuke the addressee and censure his behaviour. The second example is the use of emphasis where it is not necessary. With this technique, the speaker makes a neutral addressee look like a denier. The possible intended effects are to refresh the information, to highlight its importance, or to catch the addressee's attention. Notice how Sa'dī adds emphasis with the word *albatta* 'certainly' in:

*īn sarāy-i-st ki albatta ḥilāl ḥwāhad yāft
ḥunuk ān qawm ki dar band-i sarāy-i digar-and⁹*

⁸ See Simon 1993, 79-80, Jenssen 1998, 67-8, and al-Taftāzānī 1911, 47-8.

⁹ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 73. Sa'dī 1941, 123, 19f, [v. 5].

This is the house that will certainly go to ruin.
Blessed are those who prepare their home for the next world!

Those who neglect their spiritual life in this world, claims the poet, seem to deny that there is an afterlife. Hence the need for emphasis. The believers already know the information, but the effect of the utterance is to refresh their memory. As the two examples show, there are often good reasons for going against expectations. At the same time, a good reason is generally required whenever one wishes to speak out of the ordinary.

3.5 Literal (*ḥaqīqī*) and Figurative (*maǧāzī*) Predication

At this point, the science of meanings generally introduces a distinction between *ḥaqīqī* ‘literal, used in proper sense’ and *maǧāzī* ‘figurative, used in a non-literal sense’. The same dichotomy dominates the *‘ilm-i bayān*, the branch of rhetoric concerned with metaphor, simile, comparisons, and metonymy, among other devices.¹⁰ However, the focus of the two disciplines is not the same. Where *bayān* discusses the figurative use of words, *ma‘ānī* explores the figurative use of informative predication.

The predicative relationship (*isnād-i ḥabari*) is discussed here in terms of the relation between the verbal predicate (*fi’l*) and its agent (*fā’il*). It all relates to the question of whether the predicand is the real agent or not. Does the utterance credit the action to the one who performs it? If not, then the predicand is not the actual doer but is somehow related to the action. On this basis, manuals distinguish between literal (*isnād-i ḥaqīqī*) and figurative predicative relationships (*isnād-i maǧāzī*).

The identification of figurative language requires an intellectual effort. Since there is not always agreement on the actual agent of an action, the distinction between *ḥaqīqī* and *maǧāzī* depends largely on the speaker’s convictions. Utterances such as ‘God makes the meadows bloom’ or ‘Spring makes the meadows bloom’ will be assessed differently depending on whether the speaker believes in God.¹¹ The choice of how to interpret the statement depends on the ability of someone’s mental faculties to discern the difference in the speaker’s mind. Then, in parallel to the terms *isnād-i ḥaqīqī* and *isnād-i maǧāzī*, also *ḥaqīqa-yi ‘aqliyya* (or *ḥaqīqat-i ‘aqlī*) ‘rational literality’ and *maǧāz-i ‘aqlī* ‘rational figurativeness’ occur in the manuals.

¹⁰ On *ḥaqīqa* and *maǧāz*, see Heinrichs 1984.

¹¹ Kazzāzī (1991, 60) and many other Iranian scholars quote similar examples in Persian.

Such terms refer to literal or figurative expressions that are intellectually based.

Expressions of time (*zamān*), place (*makān*), or cause (*sabab*) replacing the actual agent are examples of a figurative predicative relationship (*isnād-i maḡāzī*). The cause instead of the actual agent appears in examples such as *Šāh ‘Abbās masǧid-i šāh-i Iṣfahān rā sāht*¹² ‘Shah ‘Abbās built the mosque of the Shah of Isfahan’. The expression indicates that Shah ‘Abbās ordered the construction of the mosque, although a very literal interpretation might suggest that he built it with his own hands. Similarly, the poet Niẓāmī attributes the action of flowing to the streams. However, it is not water that flows but the blood from the battlefield:

*zi ḥūn čandān rawān šud ġūy dar ġūy*¹³

Streams upon streams of blood began to flow...

Inevitably, some contextual evidence should make it clear that literality is inconsistent in these cases. In other words, to be properly understood, the utterance should rely on a *qarīna* ‘contextual reference’. Three circumstances may reveal that the expression has a more imaginative meaning than its ordinary one: absurdity, customariness, or unsuitability to the co-text.

The first, the more elementary circumstance, is absurdity. It implies that the mental faculties (*‘aql* ‘reason, intellect, intelligence’, here probably meant as sound practical thinking or common sense) recognise that the relation between predicand and predicate, if taken literally, has no basis in physical reality. An example of absurdity is traced in *mahabbat-i man ba tu ma-rā piš-i tu āward*¹⁴ ‘It is the love I have for you that has brought me to you’. Reason cannot imagine how an abstract entity like love could physically transport someone from one place to another. The relationship between ‘love’ and ‘bringing’ is illogical and can only make sense in a figurative way.

Sometimes the relationship between predicand and predicate is not patently absurd, but it is the custom (*‘ādat*) to intend it in a figurative sense. The intellect can accept at face value statements like *amīr laškar rā šikast* ‘The commander defeated the army’. However, the defeat of an entire army by a single exceptional warrior is a rare occurrence. It is customary to use this expression to mean that the army led by the commander defeated the enemy’s army. Literal interpretation could not be excluded *a priori*, but it is usually rejected because it is uncommon.

¹² Quoted in Humāyī 1991, 96.

¹³ Quoted in Raġā’ī 1961, 36. Niẓāmī 1956, 229, *Ḥusraw wa Šīrīn*.

¹⁴ Quoted in Raġā’ī 1961, 38.

Finally, the co-text (i.e. the surrounding words) is a significant force that enables the detection of figurative meanings. An example appears in *pīr kard ḥurdsāl rā wa nābūd kard kuhansāl rā bar gaštan-i šubḥ wa guḍaštan-i šām*¹⁵ ‘The breaking of the dawn and the passing of the evening have made the young man grow old and the old man die’. It is the reference to the young man and the old man that makes it clear that the dawn and the evening metaphorically represent the beginning and the end of life. Given what the speaker is saying, a literal use would be inaccurate.

Furthermore, the single components of a predicative relationship (i.e. predicand and predicate) can be used literally or non-literally. The combination then becomes increasingly entangled and, it seems, requires considerable decoding effort. As the following chapters will further confirm, evaluating the import of the utterance requires breaking it down into smaller parts for analysis. Each single linguistic element is a driver of meaning in its own right.

¹⁵ Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 38.

4 **The States of the Predicand** **(*aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh*)**

Summary 4.1 Operations on the Predicand. – 4.2 Occurrence (*dīkr*) and Ellipsis (*ḥadḥ*). – 4.3 Definite Reference (*ta'rīf*). – 4.3.1 Names and Epithets (*'alam*). – 4.3.2 Personal Pronoun (*ḍamīr*). – 4.3.3 Relative Construction (*mawṣūliyya, mawṣūl*). – 4.3.4 Persian Zero-Article (Ar. *alif-lām*). – 4.3.5 Demonstrative (*iṣāra*). – 4.3.6 Possessive Construction (*iḍāfa*). – 4.4 Indefinite Reference (*tankīr*). – 4.5 Emphasis (*ta'kīd*). – 4.6 Attribute (*ṣīfat, waṣf*). – 4.7 Permutative (*badal*). – 4.8 Explanatory Apposition (*'aṭf-i bayān*). – 4.9 Linkers (*'aṭf*). – 4.10 Preposing (*taqdīm*) and Postposing (*ta'hīr*). – 4.11 Reference Switching (*iltifāt*).

4.1 **Operations on the Predicand**

The chapter on the states of the predicand (*aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh*) discusses how the predicand can be manipulated to produce a range of effects. So far, this exploration of the science of meanings has examined how predicand and predicate combine in a statement. From here, it moves on to examine the syntactical semantics of each constituent of the informative utterance. The processes by which the predicand takes on the most basic sense or more subtle secondary meanings are explored in this section. General operations on nominals are also introduced.¹

¹ The term 'general operations on nominals' is borrowed from Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 127.

The taxonomy of the operations on the predicand occupies most of this chapter. Some of the operations count as pairs of opposites: occurrence (*dīkr*) vs ellipsis (*ḥaḍf*), definite reference (*ta'rif*) vs indefinite reference (*tankīr*), preposing (*taqdīm*) vs postposing (*ta'hīr*). In addition, some Persian manuals mention that the predicand undergoes variations of meaning also in the case of emphasis (*ta'kid*), attribute (*waṣf*), linker (*'atf*), permutative (*badal*), and explanatory apposition (*'atf-i bayān*). A special case, seldom mentioned, is the stylistic feature called *iltifāt* 'reference switching'. The following paragraphs will discuss each of them.

4.2 Occurrence (*dīkr*) and Ellipsis (*ḥaḍf*)

The informative utterance generally envisages mentioning the predicand and the predicate (see also § 5.2). The two constituents, though always extant, may appear or not at the surface level. On this basis, the science of meanings individuates a binary distinction that opposes occurrence (*dīkr*, literally 'mention') to ellipsis (*ḥaḍf*, literally 'cutting off'). Compare *imrūz rūz-i 'ayd ast* 'Today is a festive day' to *rūz-i 'ayd ast* '(It) is a festive day'.² In both cases *imrūz* 'today' is the predicand. But in the first case the predicand occurs, whereas it is elided in the second. Occurrence of the predicand (*dīkr-i musnad ilayh*) is the standard way (*aṣl*) of formulating the utterance. That is, a speaker should generally mention the predicand to produce an adequate utterance. Ellipsis of the predicand (*ḥaḍf-i musnad ilayh*), on the other hand, should satisfy some specific conditions.

Ellipsis is only allowed if it is possible to recover the missing element. The existence of a *qarīna* 'contextual reference' is crucial in this regard. There are two means to understand what the elided predicand is: the addressee can rely on verbal (*qarīna-yi lafẓī*) or logical evidence (*qarīna-yi ma'nawī*). In one case, the speaker omits a predicand that has been stated before. In the latter case, the speaker omits an element whose clues the cognitive faculties can retrieve in world knowledge.

In principle, the speaker should avoid useless repetitions, and ellipsis is a good strategy to do so. As a consequence, the ellipsis of the predicand is not only possible, but often strongly encouraged. Typically, it is compulsory whenever it does not result in a lack of informativity. The need for ellipsis, which is considered a means to avoid banalities (*iḥtirāz az 'abat* 'avoid being pointless') in the science of meanings, happens almost automatically when a predicand has occurred earlier at a short distance. Wherever the verbal con-

² Example adapted from Aḥmadniżād 2003, 118.

text (*qarīna-yi lafẓī*) provides sufficient clues to identify the predicand, the predicand would be better omitted.

Even if the predicand has never been stated, but solid logical clues point to it, the ellipsis is still a viable strategy. In those instances, the predicand is not recalled on a lexical basis but stands out thanks to the logical connection (*qarīna-yi ma'nawī*). The ellipsis characterises occasions where the speaker and his audience share the same world knowledge. In classical Persian poems, one example occurs whenever the poet omits the name of God, the beloved, or the praised patron. From a *ma'ānī* perspective, omitting the name of God rests on the fact that the actions or qualities that appear in the utterance's predicate pertain to God exclusively. In such a case, the predicate sufficiently clarifies who the intended predicand is. Similarly, a subjectless third-person singular verb will generally refer to the beloved in a love poem or to the praised patron in an encomiastic ode. Of particular interest in such reflections is that the shared knowledge, and ultimately the *qarīna-yi ma'nawī*, may depend on literary conventions.³

The notion of covert *qarīna* is also essential in utterances that omit the predicand. As mentioned before, the covert *qarīna* refers to the framework of references that have not been directly recalled in the communicative exchange and are not necessarily part of the shared knowledge. The speaker can draw on a range of knowledge known to him but not necessarily to others. By eliding the predicand, the speaker possibly takes advantage of his knowledge to exclude some of his listeners from understanding. Also, the ellipsis can provide an excellent test to check the level of understanding and awareness of information available only in the covert *qarīna*. Only those who know the covert *qarīna* will understand the message.

Ellipsis is also used to cover additional pragmatic purposes and effects (*aḡrād*). The speaker may feel unworthy of pronouncing the predicand out of reverence or modesty or, conversely, he may judge the predicand so unfavourably that he prefers not to mention it. In such cases, the ellipsis can express respect or contempt. It is possible to use ellipsis for opportunistic reasons when silence about the predicand allows the speaker to later retract what has been said. Sometimes the situation limits the speaker's options because of a lack of time or a fear of missing an opportunity.

The tacit principle of avoiding redundancy finds some exceptions. Different reasons motivate the occurrence of a non-necessary predicand. These include reasons of clarity, respect or irony. For example, if the speaker believes that the extant *qarīna* may not be sufficiently clear, he may, as a precaution, consider mentioning the predicand to avoid any possible misunderstanding. This precautionary approach

³ On this topic, see Taḡlīl 1983, 13 and Šamīsā 1994, 76.

is called *iḥtiyāṭ kardan-i qarīna-yi wāḍiḥ* ‘to disregard clear contextual evidence for the sake of caution’. Another reason for mentioning a redundant predicand is that the statement gets more explicit and incisive (*ziyādat-i taqrīr wa iḍāḥ*). Also, the occurrence of epithets, from honorific titles to harsh sobriquets, works even in those contexts where ellipsis would fit as well. Since such nouns have positive or negative connotations, expressing them allows one to convey respect (*taʿzīm* ‘glorification’) or contempt (*ihānat*). The same applies whenever mentioning the predicand is deemed pleasant (*istildād*) or a blessing (*tabarruk*). Examples include the occurrence of the beloved’s or the Prophet’s name. Implicatures of a different kind are also possible. For instance, a non-necessary occurrence of the predicand allows ridiculing the addressee. The speaker treats the addressee as if he were such a fool that he could not infer the predicand from the context. This technique, which resembles irony, is called *tanbih bar jabāwat-i sāmī* ‘admonishing the stupidity of the listener’.

Ellipsis and occurrence may affect any element of the utterance. However, in this section, only the predicand has been considered. The plan, which organises the contents according to the constituents of the utterance, forces us to rediscuss the same operations at different points of our outline. Therefore, further considerations on ellipsis will appear elsewhere (see §§ 5.2, 6.2, 6.3, 10.2).⁴

4.3 Definite Reference (*taʿrīf*)

A definite (*maʿrifa*) predicand refers to some individual or entity both the speaker and the addressee know. Several lexical strategies enable the identification of a specific, unique or familiar referent. Adopting the taxonomy inherited from the model laid out by the Arabic grammarians, the science of meanings recognises six types of definite predicands: personal name (*ism-i ʿalam*), personal pronoun (*ḍamīr*), relative construction (*mawṣūliyya/mawṣūl*), definite article (Arabic *alif-lām*), demonstrative (*iṣāra*), and possessive construction (*iḍāfa*).⁵ Whatever type is employed, the operation on the nominal

⁴ Šamīsā notes the structural lack of a predicand in some Persian constructions of the type: *āwarda and ki* (literally ‘[they] reported that’) ‘it has been said that’, *ū rā ustād midānand* (‘He-OBJECT master they know’) ‘He is known as a master’, *pīrmard-ī rā guftand* (‘To an elderly man [they] said’) ‘An old man was asked’ (Šamīsā 1994, 77). See also chapter 6.

⁵ I adopt here ‘definite’ as a broad equivalent of *maʿrifa*. See also Marogy who argues: “I should like to add a terminological note concerning the confusion of the term *maʿrifa* and *nakira* with the syntactic categories of definite and indefinite. For the reader’s benefit the terms will further be used as equivalents but only in the broadest sense of the term. The view of definiteness advanced here rests upon the consideration that it is a morphosyntactic category that imperfectly grammaticalises the pragmatic cat-

leading to definiteness is called the state (*ḥāl*) of ‘making the predicand known, defining the predicand’ (*ta’rīf-i musnad ilayh*).

4.3.1 Names and Epithets (*‘alam*)

Designating the predicand by his name or epithet (*‘alam*) is a privileged way to refer to somebody in a definite manner. A personal name (*ism-i ḥāṣṣ* ‘distinctive name’) is a name that brings one specific person to mind. The first time the predicand occurs in the utterance, use of a name is an apt strategy. Subject to conditions, a pronoun may replace it in later occurrences. One example of a definite predicand and a personal name is Bahrām in the examples given in §§ 2.3 and 3.1.

Further goals motivate the occurrence of a personal name. They mainly have to do with emotions, feelings or psychological attitudes towards the person given that name and the effect that verbalisation conveys. An honorific title implies respect, while a sobriquet shows contempt. A name is pleasant or gives a chance for a blessing. On the other hand, it also happens that the speaker prefers not to mention an unpleasant name. As the reader will probably notice, the effects of mentioning the predicate and those of mentioning names and epithets largely overlap (see § 4.2).

4.3.2 Personal Pronoun (*ḍamīr*)

Personal pronouns, such as *man* ‘I’, *tu* ‘you (singular)’, *ū* ‘he/she/it’, *mā* ‘we’, *šumā* ‘you (plural)’ and *ānhā* ‘they’, usually refer to specific individuals. As mentioned in § 4.3.1, they may replace a personal name after the first occurrence. Manuals consider the essential condition for a personal pronoun to occur is that there is a lexical antecedent or a logical referent for which the pronoun stands. Clarity reasons would generally recommend mentioning the antecedent (*muraḡḡa’*) (i.e. the referred thing or person) before the first occurrence of a pronoun. However, some techniques allow one to do the opposite and employ the pronoun before clarifying its antecedent. When the antecedent is entirely missing from the verbal context, the acceptability of the pronoun in the utterance depends on the non-verbal frame of reference (*qarīna-yi ma’nawī*). In those instances, the speaker evokes knowledge commonly shared with the addressee. For example, Per-

egory of identifiability” (Marogy 2010, 95). On the Arabic grammar taxonomy of definite and indefinite nouns, see also Kouloughli 2007, 106-7. On the interplay between definite vs indefinite and specific vs non-specific in Persian, on nouns with an individuated reference, and on the ways in which Persian grammaticalises the reference of a noun to a *denotatum*, see Orsatti 2011.

sian poetry accepts a reference to God or the beloved to appear in the third-person pronoun without any previous antecedent. The reason is that the pronoun identifies a single highly salient referent in that context. The speaker and the addressee clearly identify the predicand in view of the *qarīna*.⁶ Such considerations mainly apply to third-person personal pronouns, while a more limited level of ambiguity characterises first- and second-person pronouns.⁷

Manuals give a taxonomy of first-, second-, and third-person pronouns and their purpose. Their primary functions are called *takallum* ‘speaking about oneself’, *muḥāṭabat* ‘addressing someone’ and *ġāyibat* ‘talking about somebody absent’. The first-person pronoun (*ḍamīr-i mutakallim*) generally refers to the speaker himself, the second person (*ḍamīr-i muḥāṭab*) to the addressee, and the third person (*ḍamīr-i ġāyib*) to someone not directly involved in the communicative exchange. Plural personal pronouns (*ḍamāyir-i ġam*) generally refer to a group of individuals, although they can also refer to an individual in limited cases (for example, *mā* ‘we’ refers to the first-person singular in many examples of Persian classical poetry).

In some instances, the first- and second-person pronouns can denote a generic persona (*āmm*) instead of a specific one. In the example below, the person speaking in the first-person is not referring to himself but embodies an unidentified self:

man malak būdam u firdaws-i barīn ġāy-am būd
*Ādam āward bad-īn dayr-i ḥarābābād-am*⁸

I was an angel and my home was the highest Paradise.
 Adam brought me into this temple of the abode of desolation.

The second-person pronoun also fits universally valid statements. Claims directed to a generic addressee also exist. This occurs particularly in warnings and advice as in:

tu k-az miḥnat-i dīgarān bīgam-ī
*našāyad ki nām-at nihand ādamī*⁹

You who are unsympathetic to the troubles of others,
 It is not fitting to call you human.

⁶ Similar considerations applied to *ḡikr*; see above § 4.2.

⁷ Humāyī suggests that the highest definiteness belongs to the first- and second-person personal pronouns. He claims that they identify a unique referent and cannot be used figuratively (Humāyī 1991, 119).

⁸ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 121. Ḥāfiż 1983, 636-7, *ġazal* 310, v. 3. Avery 2007, 386.

⁹ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 122. Sa’dī 1937b, 25. Thackston 2008, 22.

A universal value is sometimes assumed when first- and second-person pronouns come in pairs. In mottos and general statements, *man u tu* stands for ‘everyone, no one excluded’. According to Humāyī (1991, 120-1), such a use stresses universality (*‘umūmiyyat*). The following line provides one example:

man u tu dar miyān kār-i nadārīm
*ba-ğuz bihūda pandār-i nadārīm*¹⁰

You and I [and everyone] have nothing to do with it.
We have nothing but vain thinking and no proper understanding.

Some manuals note that the use of personal pronouns in Persian is limited. Since Persian inflectional endings express person and number, subject pronouns are sometimes redundant or irrelevant.¹¹

4.3.3 Relative Construction (*mawṣūliyya, mawṣūl*)

At this point, the science of meanings turns its attention to predicands defined by means of a relative construction (*ta’rif-i musnad ilayh ba mawṣūliyya*, or *ba mawṣūl*). For example, *ān kas ki...* ‘the/that person who...’ + relative phrase. Older manuals describe relative constructions in terms of three components: *mawṣūl* (literally, ‘connected element’) ‘referent, antecedent, head (of the relative clause)’, *ism-i mawṣūl* ‘relative marker, connective’, and *šila* ‘relative phrase, content of the relative clause’ (Āq-Iwlī n.d., 69; Rağā’ī 1961, 59-60). This description reflects traditional grammar usage. More recent manuals use simplified terminology and, in line with contemporary usage, use the term *mawṣūl* to refer to the relative marker *ki* ‘who, whom, that (animate)’ (for example, Šamīsā 1994, 84) or *či* ‘that (inanimate objects)’.

The examples given in the manuals illustrate utterances in which the relative marker follows or is fused with an antecedent. The typical Persian device is a group of words introduced by a complex relative pronoun such as *ānki* ‘the one who..., he/she whom...’ or *ānči* ‘that which...’ followed by essential information relevant to identifying the referent.¹² Thus, this section mainly considers a specific class of relative constructions that combine the antecedent *ān* and the relative marker *ki* or *či*. Other markers include *ān kas-i ki* ‘that person who...’

¹⁰ Quoted in Humāyī 1991, 121. Ğāmi 1999, 2: 36, *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā*, v. 342.

¹¹ A similar point is also claimed valid in Arabic, see Jenssen 1998, 85.

¹² I will not address the question of whether *ki* should be interpreted as a relative pronoun or a conjunction.

and *ān kasān-ī ki* ‘those persons who...’. Comparatively little attention is paid to relative constructions in which a noun phrase is followed by the suffix *-ī + ki*, as in the following example: *dānišāmūzān-ī ki dars namīḥwānand bidānand ki...* ‘The students who do not study should know that...’ (Šamīsā 1994, 85). Furthermore, constructions like *Sa’dī ast ki guft...* ‘It was Sa’dī who said...’ (84) are even much rarer.

Relative constructions are intended to be another strategy for marking definiteness (*ta’rīf*). The devices in this class are generally used in cases where it is impossible to use a proper name or a personal pronoun – this their primary function. Imagine a situation in which there are many people at a gathering, and the speaker does not know the name of one of the participants. Hence, the speaker cannot use a personal name to identify that person. Furthermore, using a third-person pronoun would be unclear because there are too many people to whom the pronoun could refer. Thus, a different strategy is needed. In such situations, a clause introduced by *ānki* would be appropriate. The content of the clause specifies a state, action or quality that uniquely identifies the predicand.

A relative construction is also helpful in various other situations, such as, for example, preventing awkwardness. A noun phrase used as the head of a relative construction is a good substitute for a proper name that is unpleasant or difficult to pronounce. In the latter case, a relative construction prevents cacophony, one of the faults that hinders linguistic purity (*faṣāḥat*). A relative construction also helps the speaker to fix the utterance more incisively (*ziyādat-i taqrīr*) or express glorification (*ta’zīm*). For example, to exalt God’s majesty, the typical tool used by poets is to refer to God’s unique features using a relative construction, as in:

*ānki haft iqlīm ‘ālam rā nihād
har kas-ī rā ānči lāyiq būd dād*¹³

The one who endowed the world with the seven climates,
Gave to each one what was appropriate.

One more use of the relative construction occurs when the speaker wants to distance himself from what he imagines to be a false belief of the addressee (*tanbīh bar ḥaṭā-yi muḥāṭab*) as in:

*ānki ū rā bar ‘Alī-yi Murtaḍā ḥwānī amīr
bi-llah ar bar mīṭawānād kafš-i qanbar dāštan*¹⁴

¹³ Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 63. Sa’dī 1941, 210.

¹⁴ Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 63. Sanā’ī 1996, 245.

He whom you call Prince instead of ‘Ali the Beloved of God,
God take me if he can even aspire to Qanbar’s shoes!

4.3.4 Persian Zero-Article (Ar. *alif-lām*)

In adopting the Arabic scheme, Persian scholars had to tackle the typological differences between Persian and Arabic grammar. One controversial point is the treatment of the definite article (*alif-lām*) of Arabic. The Arabic science of meanings considers at length the definite article *al-* as a tool to achieve specific goals.¹⁵ A definite article does not exist in Persian, which only has an indefinite article *-ī* (*yā-yi tankīr* ‘*-ī* of indefiniteness’; see § 4.4). However, a zero-article noun in Persian may feature pragmatic functions similar to those of a noun with the definite article in Arabic, under certain conditions. A question arises. Does a section on the definite article fit a Persian manual of the science of meanings?

Persian scholars have variedly assessed the issue. In the passage from one language to another, theorists have had to choose between respecting formal or functional parameters. Some have avoided any section on the definite article. Others have offered Persian examples fulfilling pragmatic functions similar to those expressed by the *alif-lām* article in Arabic. The latter group of scholars individuated a bare noun, devoid of any markers, as equivalent to the definite value the Arabic article gives to a noun. These scholars assumed that a zero-marking common noun may be definite in Persian and designed their manuals accordingly. Thus, the correspondent in Persian is the absence of overt marking on the noun (see Aḥmadniżād 2003, 128).

A summary of their view follows with a selection of Persian examples taken from the manuals. The question concerns the referent of a common noun with a zero-determiner, which can be specific or not. Some distinctions apply. A bare noun may refer to an individual (for example, *šāh* ‘king’, and thus ‘the king’), or to a concept or idea (for example, *pārsā’ī* ‘abstinence’ or ‘the abstinence’). Also, the number of referents identified by a noun intended to be definite may vary. For instance, the word *gurg* ‘(the) wolf’ may refer to one wolf or to the whole class of wolves, every wolf in general.

As for the specific referent, since the same common noun may indicate many referents, there should be a sort of agreement (*‘ahd*)¹⁶ between the speaker and the addressee on which one is intended. The two actors must know the referent and agree on what is ‘mutually

¹⁵ See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 79-87; Simon 1993, 108-11; Jenssen 1998, 88-9.

¹⁶ On a similar use of the term *‘ahd* ‘mutual knowledge’ by Muslim legal theorists, see Yunis Ali 2000, 57.

agreed' (*ma'hūd*) under that common noun. What prevents misunderstandings is a matter of mutual agreement, which may exist on different premises: co-textual, spatial, or knowledge-based. In other words, an intended definite noun is understood to refer to a particular individual on the basis of what was earlier stated, on the physical presence of the referent, or in view of previous knowledge all the actors involved are aware of. I will give one example of each of the three below.

An agreement on the basis of the co-text is assumed when the referent has been mentioned earlier in the discourse. Manuals call it '*aḥd-i ḡikrī* 'mutual agreement based on (earlier) mention'. This case is exemplified by the recurrence of the same common noun in two forms, once indefinite and once definite. In the second occurrence the bare noun assumes a definite meaning because it has already been mentioned. In the following example, the word *uštūr* 'camel' occurs twice: *uštūr-ī* 'a camel' with the indefinite suffix *-ī* and *uštūr* 'the camel' with zero-article:

ablah-ī dīd uštūr-ī ba-čārā
guft naqš-at hama kaž ast čirā?
guft uštūr ki andar īn paykār
'ayb-i naqqāš mikunī huš dār¹⁷

A fool saw a grazing camel.
 He said: "Your shape is quite crooked. Why?"
 The camel said: "In this dispute,
 You blame the sculptor. Have a care!"

On the contrary, '*aḥd-i ḥuḍūrī* 'mutual agreement based on the presence (in a place)' is the tag given to converging on a referent that is physically there. Physical availability allows the introduction of a definite noun without a previous indefinite occurrence. The word *šāh* '(the) king' assumes a definite reference in the following line because there is only one king in front of the servant:

banda čūn mulk u 'adl-i šāh bidīd¹⁸

When the servant saw the King's power and justice...

Finally, shared knowledge or experience may be enough to agree upon the specificity of the noun when the referent has not been expressed beforehand or is not present. The notion of '*aḥd-i 'ilmī* 'knowledge-

¹⁷ Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 67. Sanā'ī 1950, 83, vv. 8-9. Adapted from de Bruijn 1983, 223, who relied on a different reading.

¹⁸ Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 68. Sanā'ī 1950, 705, v. 6.

based mutual agreement' assumes that world knowledge enables effective communication. For instance, the word *šāh* below is not specified by previous mention or physical presence, but the speaker and the addressee tacitly agree that only one king ruled that area. Therefore, *šāh* means one specific king here, the city of Bukhara's king:

*šāh māh ast u buḥārā āsmān
māh sūy-i āsmān āyad hamī¹⁹*

The King is the moon, and Bukhara is the sky.
The moon stands out in the sky.

Beside identifying a specific referent, the unmarked noun can also refer to a concept or to a whole class. In this case, the science of meanings considers the bare noun to represent the genus (*ta'rīf-i ġins*) or the nature of something. That is, the bare noun does not refer to one specific individual or thing as in the examples above. What should be understood by 'genus' in this case is threefold: either it is the inherent nature behind this noun, or it is a whole class of similar persons (or things) by extension (*istiġrāq*), or it is one unidentified person (or thing) under this genus. All three have a definite meaning. I will give some examples below to describe the difference among the three.

In the first instance, a bare noun indicates the true nature (*ta'rīf-i ḥaqīqat*) of something. The idea is that the bare noun can hint at the fundamental essence of that entity. This is better illustrated by abstract nouns. For example, *pārsā'ī* 'Abstinence' below means the quintessence of abstinence:

*tark-i dunyā wu šahwat ast u hawas
pārsā'ī na tark-i ġāma wu bas²⁰*

Abandoning the world, desires, and lust
Is Abstinence, not just abandoning the robe.

Also, non-abstract nouns are sometimes used to convey concepts. For example, *gūsfand* '(the) sheep' in the example below is used to speak in general about all the animals under the same class. The utterance thus formulated states something about all the elements subsumed under the category. In this case, the word is used by way of extension and the science of meanings calls it a case of *istiġrāq* 'extension, extended coverage'. Since the literal value of the utterance is valid for

¹⁹ Quoted in Raġā'ī 1961, 68. The verse is given with the word *mīr* 'prince' instead of *šāh* 'king' in Rūdakī 1994, 113, v. 538.

²⁰ Quoted in Raġā'ī 1961, 68. Sa'dī 1937b, 56 fn. 4.

all the elements of the same category, this is more precisely a case of *istiḡrāq-i ḥaqīqī* ‘true extension’. In fact, *gūsfand* ‘(the) sheep’ and *čūpān* ‘(the) shepherd’ in the following line stand for all the animals and men of the same genus:

gūsfand az barāy-i čūpān nīst
*balki čūpān barāy-i ḥidmat-i ū-st*²¹

Sheep do not exist for the shepherd.
Instead, it is the shepherd who exists for serving them.

A different kind of *istiḡrāq*, the so-called *istiḡrāq-i ‘urfī* ‘conventional extension’, applies when a bare noun refers to a limited number of individuals or things. Formally, it resembles a true *istiḡrāq* but has a narrower scope. For example, *bāzārān* ‘(the) merchants’ may conventionally refer to the merchants of a specific market or place, and not necessarily to all the merchants in general. Although vast in scope, a true *istiḡrāq* means exactly what it says. On the contrary, the face value of a conventional *istiḡrāq* indicates more elements than those intended. The exact limit to the number of elements to consider depends on conventional usage.

At times, the bare noun has a value at odds with what one would expect. Though definite, and predominantly leading to a specific referent, a zero-article noun is sometimes non-specific. For example, in the following verse *bulbul* ‘(the) nightingale’ takes the unmarked form of a definite noun but stands for one non-specific nightingale, whatever that may be:

bulbul zi šāḥ-i sarw ba gulbāng-i pahlawī
*mīḥwānd dūš dars-i maqāmāt-i ma‘nawī*²²

Last night the nightingale, warbling in Pahlavi from the cypress branch,
Was reciting the lesson of the Stages on the Way of Spiritual Meaning.

When this ‘mismatch’ occurs, the speaker and the addressee should mutually agree that the referent is non-specific, although definite. How do they? They reach this awareness through reasoning and intellectual effort (*aḥd-i dīhnī* ‘intellectual mutual agreement’). Interestingly, reasoning is the last resource to be activated in decoding the utterance.

²¹ Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 68. Sa’dī 1937b, 46. Adapted from Thackston 2008, 38.

²² Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 68. Ḥāfīz 1983, 970, *ḡazal* 477, v. 1. Avery 2007, 577.

4.3.5 Demonstrative (*išāra*)

Demonstratives (*išāra*) define the predicand with the utmost clarity provided that the referent is available in the setting of utterance. Persian distinguishes two demonstratives: the distal demonstrative *ān* ‘that’ and the proximal demonstrative *īn* ‘this’. The primary function of the demonstrative is to identify a unique referent from many in the physical setting. The standard (*aṣl*) entails indicating the referent by ‘pointing’. ‘Pointing’, in fact, is the etymological meaning of *išāra*.

If there is not a set of many referents to disambiguate among, the role of demonstratives assumes different purposes. Thus, in addition to the most basic usage, demonstratives may also have secondary meanings. One is to mention the referent in terms of distance from the speaker. Others concern feelings of various kinds. I will give two examples below: one expresses someone’s attitude towards the referent in terms of contempt, and another reveals the addressee’s foolishness (*muta’riḍ šudan ba ġabāwat*).

Sometimes the distal demonstrative is a sign of respect and high esteem, while the proximal shows contempt and low value. Sometimes the reverse is also valid. Manifestations of respect (*ta’ẓīm*) and contempt (*taḥqīr*) are not bound to one demonstrative only and both may acquire different values in this regard. Below I report an example where *īn* ‘these’ expresses contempt:

īn daġaldūstān ki mībīnī
*magasān-and ġird-i šīrīnī*²³

These alleged friends you see
Are flies buzzing around something sweet.

In another example, which has already been mentioned in § 3.4, the poet jokes with his audience. He pretends the addressee is such a fool as not to be able to distinguish between the earthly and everlasting worlds. Assuming that the addressee needs such clarification, the poet adopts the demonstrative *īn* ‘this’ to refresh the concept that our world is ephemeral:

īn sarāy-i-st ki albatta ḥīlal ḥwāhad yāft
*ḥunuk ān qawm ki dar band-i sarāy-i diġar-and*²⁴

This is the house that will certainly go to ruin.
Blessed are those who prepare their home for the next world!

²³ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 125. Sa’dī 1941, 207.

²⁴ Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 67. Sa’dī 1941, 123, 19f, [v. 5].

4.3.6 Possessive Construction (*iḍāfa*)

According to the terminology used in the science of meanings, the term *iḍāfa* ‘annexation’ refers to the construction that interrelates two nouns in a possessed-possessor construction (for example, *ḥāna-yi mu‘allim* ‘the house of the teacher’). The marker that links the head noun to the possessor is an enclitic *-(y)i* commonly referred to as *kasra-yi iḍāfa* ‘the *iḍāfa* particle’. The possessive construction here intended should not be confused with the other functions of the *iḍāfa* particle. For example, the *iḍāfa* particle that binds a noun to an adjective (as in, for example, *ḥāna-yi buzurg* ‘the big house’) is excluded here. Manuals deal with the noun-adjective construction elsewhere in an appropriate section (see § 4.6).

The possessive *iḍāfa* as a technique for defining the predicand (*ta‘rīf-i musnad ilayh ba iḍāfa*) provides a device for an economically composed utterance. It is the most succinct way to talk about several persons or things, all of which share the same possessed-possessor relationship. For example, *dānišgūyān-i dānišgāh-i Tih-rān* ‘the students of the University of Tehran’ is a very short way of referring to a large group of individuals. It would be inappropriate to list the names of all these students, if possible at all. A long list of predicands bores the audience and forces the speaker to rank the items in some order of importance. One of the main functions of the possessive construction is then to shorten (*iḥtišār*) a long list by making all the items equal.

In addition, the possessive construction has other effects. When the possessor or the possessed have positive or negative connotations, the whole *iḍāfa*-construction may convey a sense of respect or contempt. Such an effect is a consequence of combining two nouns. That is, respect or contempt does not spring from the grammatical particle itself but arises from the meaning of the two nouns juxtaposed. If one of the two has a highly positive or negative rate, the same extends to the other. For instance, in *farzand-i rasūl* ‘the Prophet’s offspring’ below, the respect for the possessor *rasūl* ‘Prophet’ extends to the possessed ‘offspring’:

*farzand-i rasūl ast bar īn bāg nigahbān*²⁵

The Prophet’s offspring guards this garden.

Conversely, the negative qualities of *ālūdaḡī* ‘stain, filth’ extend from the possessed to the possessor to convey a sense of contempt in:

²⁵ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 115. Nāṣir-i Ḥusraw 1928, 352, v. 2.

ālūdagi-y-i ḥirqa ḥarābī-yi ḡahān ast
*kū rāhraw-ī ahl-i dil-ī pāksirišt-ī*²⁶

The stain of the Dervish gown is the pollution of the world.
 Where is a follower of the Path, a man of the heart, of pure disposition?

4.4 Indefinite Reference (*tankīr*)

The section on *tankīr-i musnad ilayh* ‘making the predicand unknown’ discusses non-identified predicands and the value the indefinite takes in different situations. In the Arabic science of meanings, the section on *tankīr* almost exclusively offers examples of nominals with the *tanwīn*, the morphological *-n* added to Arabic nouns after the vowel case mark.²⁷ In Persian one can identify several markers of indefiniteness, but it is the suffix *-ī* of indefiniteness (*yā-yi tankīr*) that best corresponds to the uses of the Arabic *tanwīn*. For this reason, the core of this section considers the semantic and pragmatic import of nouns followed by the suffixed marker *-ī*. Persian manuals leave little space for different indefiniteness markers, which in Persian include *čand* ‘some’, *harki*, *har kas-ī ki* ‘all those who, everyone who, who’ and other words built on *har* ‘every’.

Sometimes the speaker is unable to refer to the predicand in a definite manner. All the strategies and constructions for definiteness (the use of a proper name, of a demonstrative, of a possessive construction...) are out of the speaker’s power or would not fit. The same happens if the addressee does not know (*‘adam-i ‘ilm*) who (or what) precisely the referent is. Also, the speaker may avoid a definite predicand because he does not want the addressee to identify the referent. In brief, different conditions force the speaker to resort to indefiniteness.

The import of the indefinite noun varies, as the following examples from the manuals will show. First, the indefinite noun can refer to a single unidentified person or thing (*fard-i ḡayr-i mu‘ayyan*). The situation in which a noun is followed by the suffix *-ī* to refer to one unidentified referent is called *ifrād* ‘isolation of a single item, singling someone or something out’. For example, in the utterance below, the predicand *bulbul-ī* ‘a nightingale’ refers to one single nightingale whose identity is not known:

²⁶ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 117. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 870, *ḡazal* 427, v. 8. Adapted from Avery 2007, 516.

²⁷ See the examples discussed in al-Taftāzānī 1911, 88-90; Simon 1993, 123-7; Blankinship 2019, 67-71.

*bulbul-i barg-i gul-i ḥwašrang dar minqār dāšt*²⁸

A nightingale had in its beak a rose-petal of beautiful colour.

Second, indefiniteness can indicate a type, a category or a species (*naw'iyyat*, *bayān-i ifrād-i naw'*). Unlike the previous example, not a single item within a group but a particular class is meant. According to Zāhidī, this occurs, for example, in the indefinite reference in the saying *har dard-ī dawā'-ī dārad*, which translates the Arabic *li-kulli dā'in dawā'un*²⁹ 'Every disease has a cure' or 'For each type of disease, there is a type of medicine'. Another example Zāhidī gives is *ta'ammul-ī* '(a) careful consideration' in:

*tīr az kamān ču raft nayāyad ba šast bāz
pas wāğib-ast dar hama kār-ī ta'ammul-ī*³⁰

When the arrow is shot from the bow, it will never return to the thumb ring.

Therefore, careful consideration is required in every task.

Third, an indefinite predicand may also express respect (*ta'zīm*) or contempt (*taḥqīr*, *ḥwārdāšt*). For example, *mard-ī* 'a man' expresses high esteem as it takes the sense of 'a great man, a unique man, a real man' in the line:

*mard-ī az ḥwiš birūn āyad u kār-ī bikunad*³¹

A man comes out from himself, and into action.

In contrast, the indefinite marker below adds a sense of contempt in *ḥām-ī* 'an immature (person or thing)':

*agar ān šarāb ḥām ast u gar in ḥarīf puḥta
ba hazār bār bihtar zi hazār puḥta ḥām-ī*³²

²⁸ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 79. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 174, *ğazal* 79, v. 1. Avery 2007, 119.

²⁹ Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 72.

³⁰ Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 72. Sa'dī 1941, 79. In this line both *ta'ammul-ī* '(a) careful consideration' and *dar hama kār-ī* 'in every task' are indefinite. The first is also the predicand of the utterance and appears here as an example of *tankīr-i musnad ilayh*.

³¹ Quoted in Ārzū 2002, 111 (though with a slightly different reading). Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 384, *ğazal* 184, v. 7. Avery 2007, 244. I preferred here to exceptionally quote an example taken from the eighteenth-century treatise by Ārzū instead of those given by authors of the last century.

³² Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 128. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 934-5, *ğazal* 459, v. 2. Adapted from Avery 2007, 553.

If that wine is immature, but this comrade mature,
One immature is a thousand times better than a thousand mature!

Fourth, indefiniteness possibly hints at the amount of something. The *-ī* suffix indicates that the quantity or the number of things is either small (*taqlīl*) or large (*takṭīr*). It is stated, therefore, that the same marker can convey opposite meanings, such as ‘any, a few of’ and ‘many, a multitude of’. According to Āq-Iwlī, an example of indefiniteness to mean a small quantity is *ġam-ī* ‘a grief, any grief’ in:

*rūz-ī agar ġam-ī rasad-at tangdil ma bāš*³³

If one day any grief hits you, do not pine away!

Conversely, the word *qaṭra-yī* ‘a drop, many a drop, many drops’ exemplifies plenitude in:

*zi abr afkanad qaṭra-yī sūy-i yamm*³⁴

From the cloud, He casts a drop towards the ocean.

Consider also *sayl-ī* ‘a flood’ in:

*tu guftī k-az sitīġ-i kūh sayl-ī
furūd ārad hamī aḥġār-i ṣad mann*³⁵

You would have said that from the crest of the mountain a flood
Carried down a hundred *mann* of stones.

This line is given in different manuals to exemplify distinct categories. Āhanī (1978, 49) holds that the indefiniteness of *sayl-ī* applies to type (‘a sort of flood’), while Kazzāzī (1991, 129) considers the indefiniteness to give a sense of plenitude (‘an entire flood’). Here, as elsewhere, Persian scholars have different viewpoints.

33 Quoted in Āq-Iwlī n.d., 77.

34 Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 75. Sa’dī 1937a, 3. Clarke 1879, 5.

35 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 129. Manūčihri 1947, 58, *qaṣīda* 30, v. 18.

4.5 Emphasis (*ta'kīd*)

Operations on the predicand include tools for *ta'kīd* 'emphasis, reinforcement'. Relevant markers are repetition (*tikrār*) and words such as *hama* 'all', *har* 'every, each', *ḥwad* 'self' or the like. Their primary goal is to make a firm statement (*taqrīr wa taṭbīt*). Repetitions are particularly effective in serving this purpose. In the example *ḥudā ḥudā birahānad tu-rā z-andūhān*³⁶ 'God, God frees you from afflictions', the recurrence of the word *ḥudā* 'God' aims at reinforcing the statement. Repetition in this case nearly acquires the sense of 'indeed'.

Emphasis markers are also in use in afterthoughts and repair mechanisms. They serve to avoid possible misunderstandings or to react to an incorrect opinion of the addressee. In particular, emphasis is significant in preventing a figurative misinterpretation of a literal expression. The science of meanings has a label for this situation and calls it *daf'-i tawahhum-i maḡāz* 'to discard the hypothesis of figurative expression'. Idioms and metaphors are so pervading in language that sometimes the speaker needs to clarify how to intend his words. In the following line, the expression *man u tu* 'you and I' should be taken literally (and not idiomatically 'all of us, everyone'). To suggest the intended meaning, Sa'dī adds *har du* 'both, the two (of us)':

man u tu har du ḥwāḡatāšān-īm
*banda-yi bārgāh-i sulṭān-īm*³⁷

You and I are both slaves,
Servants at the sultan's court.

Emphasis also serves to rebuke those who believe that the utterance has been negligently formulated (*raf'-i tawahhum-i sahw*). It may also suggest that the statement does not contain any hyperbole. For instance, assuming that the predicand is a collective noun or a plural, one may wonder whether the predicand is used appropriately. For this purpose, a dedicated syntagma with a quantifier is in use. For example, in *gulhā-yi bāḡ hama šikufta and*³⁸ 'The roses of the garden, all, are in bloom' the quantifier *hama* follows the predicand. Emphasis clarifies that the predicand comprehends the whole elements subsumed under the predicand *gulhā-yi bāḡ* 'the roses of the garden'. The emphasis marker clarifies that the predicative relationship is literally valid, and that the utterance contains no lapses or exaggeration.

³⁶ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 134.

³⁷ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 134. Sa'dī 1937b, 82. Thackston 2008, 70.

³⁸ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 135.

4.6 Attribute (*ṣifat, waṣf*)

The operation of adding a qualification is called *waṣf* ‘description’. An attribute (*ṣifat*) qualifies the predicand, but its value may vary. The science of meanings identifies three. First, by describing one of its intrinsic qualities, the attribute reveals the predicand’s true nature (*kaṣf-i ḥaqīqat*) and places emphasis (*ta’kīd*) on it. For example, *sūzān* ‘burning’ in *ātaš-i sūzān* ‘burning fire’³⁹ expresses an inherent quality of fire. The same happens in the following line with the qualities Ḥāfiẓ attributes to gypsies (*lūliyān*):

fiḡān k-īn lūliyān-i šūḥ-i šīrīnkār-i šahrāšūb
*čūnān burdand ṣabr az dil ki turkān ḥwān-i yaḡmā rā*⁴⁰

Alas that these saucy, jesting, city-ravishing gypsies
 Should, as Turks do [on] the spoil’s feast, pillage patience from
 the heart.

Second, the attribute specifies the scope of the predicand. It allows for a kind of contrastive focus called *taḥṣīṣ* ‘particularisation, specialisation, exclusive assignment’ in the science of meanings. In other words, the attribute delineates the referent to which the judgement expressed in the utterance applies and excludes the others. The attribute for *taḥṣīṣ* is mainly in use after an indefinite noun. See, for example, how *dānā* ‘wise’ modifies the indefinite noun *lāḡar-ī* ‘a skinny man’ to restrict the number of persons to which the predicand *lāḡar-ī* could apply:

ān šanīdī ki lāḡar-ī dānā
*guft rūz-ī ba ablah-ī farbih*⁴¹

Haven’t you heard that a skinny wise man
 Once said to a fat fool...

Finally, qualities with positive semantic orientation may express praise (*madḥ*), while negative ones may express blame (*ḡamm*). The following line features an attribute, *farruḥsirišt* ‘of happy nature’, in praise of one of the mythical kings of Iran:

³⁹ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 132.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 133. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 22, *ḡazal* 3, v. 3. Adapted from Avery 2007, 21.

⁴¹ Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 75 and Aḥmadniżād 2003, 132. Sa’dī 1937b, 15. Adapted from Thackston 2008, 13.

šanīdam ki Ğamšīd-i farruḥsirišt
ba sarčašma-ī bar ba sang-ī nibišt⁴²

I heard that King Jamshīd of happy nature
Wrote on a stone, at a fountain head...

4.7 Permutative (*badal*)

The *badal* ‘permutative, interchange, substitution’ is a particular kind of apposition. According to the science of meanings, there is *badal* when the speaker adds one or more words to restore the proper sense of the predicand. In those instances, the utterance is affected by *ibdāl-i musnad ilayh* ‘permutation of the predicand’ or *āwardan-i badal bar musnad ilayh* ‘placing a permutative on the predicand’. The purpose of having a *badal* in apposition is to utter a more incisive affirmation (*ziyādat-i taqrīr*) of the judgement expressed.

There are different kinds of *badal* according to traditional grammar, but the most frequent in the Persian science of meanings is the *badal-i kull az kull* (also called *badal al-kull min al-kull*) ‘permutative of the whole for the whole, full substitution’. It is a situation in which a noun and the following apposition refer to the same person or thing. Both identify a unique referent whose identity, it seems, was clear since the beginning. For example, in *Ḥāfiẓ šā‘ir-i bulandpāya-yi irānī* ‘Ḥāfiẓ, the great Iranian poet...’ the apposition immediately following the name of Ḥāfiẓ is a *badal*.⁴³ One more example occurs in the following line, where the apposition *duḥt-i Afrāsiyāb* ‘Afrasyab’s daughter’ follows at short distance *Manīẓa* ‘Manizheh’:

*Manīẓa man-am duḥt-i Afrāsiyāb*⁴⁴

I am Manizheh, Afrasyab’s daughter...

Though Persian manuals generally consider only the permutative of the whole for the whole, Arabic grammarians had identified four types of *badal*. The difference among the four types depends on the relation between the predicand and its permutative.⁴⁵ The *badal-i ġuz az kull* ‘permutative of the part for the whole’ refers to synecdoche and the

⁴² Quoted in Aḥmadniẓād 2003, 133. Sa’dī 1937a, 29. Clarke 1897, 57

⁴³ The example is taken from the Sokhan dictionary (Anwarī 2003, 2: 866, s.v. “*badal*”).

⁴⁴ Quoted in Raġā‘ī 1961, 79. Firdawsī 1988-2008, 3: 373, v. 940. Davis 2016, 359. In this example, however, the *badal* follows a nominal element in the utterance, and not specifically the predicand.

⁴⁵ On the Arabic taxonomy of *badal*, see Kouloughli 2007, 81 and Simon 1993, 120-1.

badal-i ištīmāl ‘permutative of something complementary’ refers to metonymy. There is also the permutative to correct a slip of the tongue (*badal-i ḡalaṭ*), but it is deemed inappropriate in the science of meanings. A few Persian scholars, among them Raḡā’ī (1961, 78-9) and Āhanī (1978, 54-5), have tried to find Persian examples corresponding to each of the four types of Arabic permutative. Seemingly, their effort was not entirely rewarding as it is generally not followed by later scholars.

4.8 Explanatory Apposition (*‘atf-i bayān*)

In the same way as the category of *badal*, also the notion of *‘atf-i bayān* (literally, ‘explicative coordinating’) derives from the Arabic grammatical tradition. In the science of meanings, it defines a particular kind of apposition that helps to better identify the predicand. Such explanatory apposition consists in the addition of a noun to the predicand to restrict and better elucidate who (or what) the intended referent is. Persian manuals provide few instances of *‘atf-i bayān*. The purpose of *‘atf-i bayān*, they say, is to clarify (*iḏāḥ*) the predicand. One example is the personal name Nu‘mān in:

*Šāh Nu‘mān az ān miyān bar ḥāst*⁴⁶

King Nu‘mān rose from among...

The predicand *šāh* ‘King’ in this context, it seems, was too vague and possibly could have had multiple references. So, the apposition Nu‘mān answers the question, which King among the many kings is intended here? The predicand and the explanatory apposition are two different ways to refer to the same person or thing, but the noun in apposition that follows is better known than what it followed. In most cases, explanatory apposition means a proper noun in close apposition, which suggests that possibly intonation and suprasegmental features also play a part in the distinction.⁴⁷

4.9 Linkers (*‘atf*)

The section on the use of linkers after the predicand (*‘atf-i musnad ilayh*) mainly deals with conjunctive and adverbial linkers that connect nouns or noun phrases. Several goals justify joining together

⁴⁶ Quoted in Āhanī 1960, 101. Niẓāmi 1956, 682, *Haft paykar*.

⁴⁷ For a comparison between Arabic *badal* and *‘atf-i bayān* in terms of loose and close apposition and the role of suprasegmental criteria, see Sartori 2022.

two predicands, and the linking word is responsible for the nuance of meaning the utterance takes. Manuals review a list of linkers and offer specialised meanings for each, which I will summarise below.

Coordination by *wa* ‘and’ (also pronounced *w-*, *u* or *wu*) helps create a detailed list of predicands in a concise manner (*tafṣīl-i musnad ilayh ba iḥtiṣār*). In other words, the conjunction helps enumerate several persons or things in connection with the same predicate. For example, a sequence of sentences like *Bahrām ba bāzār raft* ‘Bahrām went to the market’ and *Zayd ba bāzār raft* ‘Zayd went to the market’ is shortened into *Bahrām wa Zayd ba bāzār raftand* ‘Bahrām and Zayd went to the market’. While shortening the utterance, coordination often requires a series of adjustments for the grammar rules to be respected.⁴⁸ Thus, the use of conjunctive linkers in Persian is not only a matter of conciseness (*iḥtiṣār* ‘shortening, using a few words’) but also of changing the sentence structure. In the line below, a chain of four coordinated animate subjects linked by *u* requires a third-person plural verb (i.e. *tazwīr mīkunand* ‘(they) practice deceit’):

*may dih ki šayḥ u Ḥāfiẓ u muftiyy u muḥtasib
čūn nīk bingarī hama tazwīr mīkunand*⁴⁹

Give wine because the Shaikh and Hāfiẓ and the Mufti and the
Censor of Morals,
When you look closely, all practice deceit.

Manuals briefly discuss the effect of adverbial linkers like *pas* ‘so, then’ and *ba’d az ān* ‘after that’. Those connectives provide valuable elements to place the actions in chronological order. In addition to brevity and detail, they attribute the same action to different predicands at different times (*tafṣīl-i musnad ba iḥtiṣār*).

Adverbial linkers may also contradict an alleged error of judgement of the listener (*ištibāh bar gardāndan-i šinawanda*). Negative and adversative adverbs in Persian suitable for the purpose are *na* ‘not’ in positive sentences and *walī* ‘but’ in negative sentences. For example, compare *na* in both lines below:

⁴⁸ Subject-verb agreement in Persian is quite complex. When the subject denotes a plurality, the agreement depends on many factors including the distinction between animate and inanimate plurals. On the effect of number and animacy on subject-verb agreement in Persian, see Lazard 1963, 455-60 and Lazard 1992, 178-9.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 136 (with slight variation). Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 406-7, *ġazal* 195, v. 9. Adapted from Avery 2007, 255.

īnki tu dārī qiyāmat ast na qāmat
*w-īn na tabassum ki mu'ǧiz ast u karāmat*⁵⁰

What you have is the Day of Resurrection, not a tall figure!
 Also, this is not a smile, for it is a prodigy and a miracle!

Linkers may also underline that the speaker had diverted from the utterance's original judgement (*šarf-i ḥukm*). Among the adverbs that can mark afterthoughts, *balki* (also, *ki*) 'but, instead, on the contrary' occurs to correct a tongue slip or to signal a change of communicative strategy. The speaker uses it to alter and take distance from the judgement he had previously uttered. For example, in the line above, *ki mu'ǧiz ast* 'for it is a prodigy' is used in the same sense as *balki mu'ǧiz ast* 'instead, it is a prodigy'.⁵¹

The last linker to be examined is *yā* 'or'. It has different goals: it offers mutually exclusive options where one excludes the other (*taḥyīr* 'option', as in *yā nikūgūy bāš yā abkam*⁵² 'either speak a good word or remain silent'), it presents options where one does not exclude the other (*ibāḥa* 'permissibility', as in *šigār yā kibār* 'whether young or old'),⁵³ or it delineates exhaustive subdivisions (*taqsim* 'division', as in *har lafz-i mufrad yā kullī buwad yā ǧuz*)⁵⁴ 'Every simple expression is either universal or particular'). When the speaker is uncertain about the identity of the predicand (*šakk-i mutakallim* 'speaker's doubt') or intends to create doubts in the addressee's mind (*taškīk*), he will use the dedicated Persian conjunctive linker *yā*. For example, *Nāšir rā dīdam yā Maṣūr rā*⁵⁵ 'Did I see Nāšir, or did I see Maṣūr?'. Compare:

*yak laḥza būd ān yā šab-ī k-az 'umr-i mā tārāǧ šud*⁵⁶

Was it a moment or a night that was stolen from our lives?

50 Quoted in Zāhidi 1967, 82. Sa'dī 1939, 77, *ǧazal* 143t, [v. 1]. Apparently, the example considers the predicate and not the predicand. I argue that the example was introduced here because the linker connects two nominals, and nominals are mainly addressed in the chapter on the states of the predicand. The same can be said for some of the examples that will follow in this section.

51 On *balki*, see also the examples in §§ 4.3.4 and 7.5.

52 Quoted in Riḏānižād 1988, 144. Sanā'ī 1950, 311.

53 The word *ibāḥa* is also a legal term. It stands for the principle according to which something is permissible unless otherwise explicitly prohibited. That is, more than one option is lawful. The term is in use if, for instance, the verdict admits to or not to commit an act. See Schacht, *EP*², s.v. "*ibāḥa*".

54 Quoted in Riḏānižād 1988, 144 and credited to Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna).

55 Quoted in Riḏānižād 1988, 143.

56 Quoted in Riḏānižād 1988, 144. Sa'dī 1939, 9, *ǧazal* 14t, [v. 2].

4.10 Preposing (*taqdīm*) and Postposing (*ta'ḥīr*)

The section on *taqdīm* ‘preposing, giving precedence, placing something before something else’ and *ta'ḥīr* ‘postposing, delaying (something), placing something after something else’ deals with word order, with a special focus on the place of the predicand with respect to the predicate.⁵⁷ The unmarked word order in Persian is subject-object-verb (SOV). In the majority of instances, then, the predicand precedes the predicate, while in others it follows. Utterances in the standard word order such as *Bahrām mīniwīsad* ‘Bahrām writes’ are examples of preposing the predicand to the predicate (*taqdīm-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*), while inversions of the kind *dānā-st kas-ī ki* ‘Wise is he who...’ are examples of postposing the predicand to the predicate (*ta'ḥīr-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*).

The predicand generally precedes the predicate in what constitutes the standard (*aṣl*) word order of the utterance. The reason why the predicand should precede the predicate, Persian manuals report, is that the most important thing is to mention (*dīkr*) the predicand. And, usually, there is no reason to deviate (*muqtaḍā-yi 'udūl*) from such a standard. Manuals agree that the standard flow of information dictates that the topic should precede what is going to be said about the topic. However, where a change in word order occurs, postposing the predicand (*ta'ḥīr-i musnad ilayh*) may add emphasis (*ta'kīd*), drive focus on something important (*ihtimām*), or catch somebody’s attention (*ǧalb-i tawaǧǧuh*). Examples of postposing the predicand to the predicate, however, are often considered under a separate section about preposing the predicate to the predicand (see § 5.2). The two operations are actually the same in Persian, as will be shown below.

Knowledge of the Arabic model explains the approach of the Persian manuals and the reasons for this unnecessary duplication. The operations of *taqdīm* and *ta'ḥīr* in Arabic refer to different ways of placing the predicand before or after the predicate. Since different standards apply to Arabic nominal (noun-initial) and verbal (verb-initial) sentences, Arabic knows two typical orders: predicand + nominal predicate (e.g. *Zayd kātīb* ‘Zayd (is) a writer’) and verbal predicate + predicand (e.g. *kataba Zayd* ‘Zayd wrote’). In addition, it is possible to invert the place of the predicand and the predicate with-

⁵⁷ An alternative translation for the word *taqdīm* in relation to word order is ‘anteposition’ (see, for example, Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 128). I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention. I borrow ‘preposing’ and ‘postposing’ from Yishai Peled’s study of word order patterns in written Arabic (Peled 2009). Other possible translations of *taqdīm* and *ta'ḥīr* include ‘pre-position’ and ‘post-position’, ‘forward placement’ and ‘backward placement’ (van Gelder 2008, 649-50), ‘pre-positioning’ and ‘post-positioning’ (Harb 2020, 219-23), or even ‘fronting’ and ‘backing’ (‘fronted’ and ‘backed’ in Dickins 2009, 911). The original terms *taqdīm* and *ta'ḥīr*, however, do not necessarily imply a movement transformation (on this point, see Peled 2009).

in the clause to obtain two different non-typical word orders. Secondary studies on the Arabic linguistic tradition variously describe *taqdīm* and *ta'hīr* as 'displacement' (Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 127), 'option of inversion' (Peled 2010, 170), 'change of word order' (Versteegh 1997, 16). The core of the Arabic discussion is posed in terms of how certain sequences do or do not distance the utterance from the standard (*aṣl*), and why should they be used. Taking all possible shifts into account, the Arabic science of meanings identifies four situations of preposing and postposing the predicand and the predicate with one another, two of which are unmarked whereas the other two are marked.⁵⁸

Persian knows only two options, the unmarked preposing of the predicand to the predicate (*taqdīm-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*, identical to the *ta'hīr-i musnad bar musnad ilayh*) or the marked preposing of the predicate to the predicand (*taqdīm-i musnad bar musnad ilayh*, or *ta'hīr-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*). Due to the shift in the number of possibilities, from four in Arabic to two in Persian, operations labelled with the same name in the two languages may identify different conditions in terms of markedness.

Persian authors are aware of the typological differences between Arabic and Persian. However, the difference can cause some difficulties in designing manuals. Some authors put all the discussion of the different ways of preposing and postposing in one place. Others keep separate sections. An interesting example is how Kazzāzī (1991, 141-5) discusses the preposing of the predicand (*taqdīm-i musnad ilayh*) in his manual. As expected, he suggests that preposing the predicand is *hanḡār* 'the standard', which I assume to be the equivalent of *aṣl* in Kazzāzī's terminology. In addition, he claims that preposing the predicand also fits aesthetic merits. He then goes on to list effects that ultimately correspond to those that the Arabic model attribute to marked word order.⁵⁹ So there is an interesting shift, because an unmarked word order in Persian is given secondary meanings similar to those obtained by a marked order in another language. I will give below some examples this author offers, though I will follow the Arabic terminology given in the bilingual manuals rather than reporting Kazzāzī's peculiar terminology.

According to Kazzāzī, one of the goals of preposing the predicand is to communicate the comment (*ḡabar*) with a better outcome in the mind of the hearer (*tamakkun dar ḡihn-i sāmi'*). The more ap-

⁵⁸ The unmarked preposing the predicand to the predicate and the marked postposing the predicand to the predicate are treated at this point in the Arabic model, whereas the remaining two, that is the unmarked preposing the predicate to the predicand and the marked postposing the predicate to the predicand, are matters of the chapter on the states of the predicate. See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 106-27, 183-90.

⁵⁹ See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 106-7. See also Simon 1993, 128-33 and 175-86.

peeling the topic is, the more the utterance sticks in the listener's mind. In this case, an interesting topic draws attention to the comment which follows and ensures the addressee's attention. Such an example occurs in the following line, which begins with the predicand and *māh-i ḥwaršīdnumāy-aš* 'his sun-revealing moon, his moon-like face shining like the sun':

*māh-i ḥwaršīdnumāy-aš zi pas-i pardā-yi zulf
āftāb-ī-st ki dar pīš saḥāb-ī dārad*⁶⁰

His sun-revealing moon from behind the veil of the curling lock
Is a sun that has a cloud in front.

Another example is wishing and eliciting joy (*ta'ḡīl-i masarrat*) or misfortune (*masā'a*) in the form of a good omen (*tafā'ul*) or a bad one (*taṭayyur*):

*ḡamāl-i baḥt zi rūy-i zafar niqāb andāḥt
kamāl-i 'adl ba faryād-i dādḥwāh rasīd*⁶¹

The bounty of luck has thrown the veil off the face of victory.
The acme of justice has answered the army of seekers of redress.

The third goal appears when one pretends that the predicand is always at the forefront of one's thoughts or finds it particularly pleasing. For instance, when the predicand is the beloved, the poet cherishes that name and always places it before the predicate.

Finally, the speaker wants to express respect (*ta'ẓīm*), contempt (*taḥqīr*) or blessing (*tabarruk*) towards the predicand by way of preposing it. For example, the name of God should occupy a prominent position at the beginning of the utterance and never be postposed. This is due to reasons of respect. Moreover, a predicand whose semantic orientation is negative is placed to the front to debase it further, and this may turn the whole utterance into a reproach. An example of this is the syntagma *zāhid-i ḥām* 'the raw ascetic' in:

*zāhid-i ḥām ki inkār-i may u ḡām kunad
puḥta gardad ču nazar bar may-i ḥām andāzad*⁶²

⁶⁰ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 142. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 256, *ḡazal* 120, v. 3. Adapted from Avery 2007, 166.

⁶¹ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 144. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 490, *ḡazal* 237, v. 2. Avery 2007, 302.

⁶² Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 144. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 308, *ḡazal* 146, v. 6. Adapted from Avery 2007, 199.

The raw ascetic who disallows cup and wine
Gets cooked when on new wine he casts an eye.

In the examples above, the alleged nuances of meaning do not strictly depend on word order. It is not the order of elements that expresses respect, blame or any other effects. Rather, if the aim is to induce one of these feelings, it is desirable to open the utterance with something that connotes it, which is usually the predicand.

Examples of postposing the predicand (*ta'ḥīr-i musnad ilayh*), as mentioned above, will be considered in § 5.2.

4.11 Reference Switching (*iltifāt*)

The section on the predicand ends with some final considerations on features unified by being departures from the norm. One of the tacit assumptions of the science of meanings that has emerged so far is that a basic meaning sets the standard for measuring deviations. We have also seen how the distance between the expected pattern and the uttered expression in one context allows for additional meaning. There are many ways in which the speaker departs from what is expected, or, to say it with the *ma'ānī* terminology, goes 'against the outward requirements of the situation' (*ḥilāf-i muqtadā-yi ḥāl*). The science of meanings distinguishes then faulty deviations from meaning-enhancing deviations.

In addition, some sorts of deviations are perceived to be eloquent by themselves. One peculiar example is the so-called *iltifāt* 'turning towards another, reference switching', which consists of a sudden grammatical shift or apostrophe. Usually, *iltifāt* occurs when the speaker switches from the first, second, or third person to another while the referent remains the same.⁶³ It is a change in person while referring to the same entity. For example, in the following line, the poet Sa'dī speaks about himself in the first person in the beginning. Then, he turns to the third person towards the end, while still referring to himself:

*čūnān bigiryam az īn pas ki mard bitwānād
dar āb-i dīda-yi Sa'dī šināwarī āmūḥt*⁶⁴

I cry so much henceforth that man can
Learn how to swim in the tears of Sa'dī's eyes.

⁶³ On *iltifāt* in Arabic, see Abdel Haleem 1992; Blankinship 2019, 41-61; Harb 2020, 241-3. On *iltifāt* in Persian, see Gladwin 1801, 56-8.

⁶⁴ Quoted in Āhanī 1978, 65 (with some variation). Sa'dī 1939, 18, *ğazal* 32**tb**, [v. 13].

The *iltifāt* seems to be an exception in the science of meanings. Unlike the other examples of deviations from the norm seen so far, this grammatical shift, apparently, does not relate to a particular context-sensitive need. Manuals that mention the device do not list additional meanings for it. Devices like this conveying nuance may be considered poetic licence. These entered the science of meanings and fall under stylistics rather than pragmatics.

5 **The States of the Predicate** **(*aḥwāl-i musnad*)**

Summary 5.1 Types of Predicates (*musnad*). – 5.2 Ellipsis, Definiteness and Preposing.
– 5.3 Predicate Constraints (*taqyīd-i musnad*).

5.1 Types of Predicates (*musnad*)

The chapter on the states of the predicate (*aḥwāl-i musnad*) considers the values of the *musnad* ‘predicate’ in an informative utterance. It also considers how various operations affect the predicate and how particular optional elements (*quyūd*) can restrict its scope. As shown in §§ 2.3 and 3.1, the term *musnad* in the science of meanings applies indifferently to nominal and verbal, positive and negative predicates. Although in Persian grammar *musnad* as a term generally refers to the nominal part of a nominal predicate, the science of meanings uses the term in a broader way to encompass both nominal and verbal predicates (Šamīsā 1994, 93). Accordingly, this unit deals with nouns (insofar as they form nominal predicates) and with verbs. The elements associated with the verb will be considered more closely in chapter 6.

The science of meanings considers and classifies predicates from different perspectives. On the one hand, it accepts the syntactic distinction between *ism* ‘nominal (predicate)’ and *fiʿl* ‘verbal (predicate)’. On the other hand, a distinction is made between the possible values of the predicate. The predicate expresses either a state, the beginning of an action or the continuation of an action. In *ma'ānī* terms, the

predicate is considered to mark either *ṭubūt* ‘stability’, *tağaddud* ‘renewal, beginning of a new action’ or *istimrār* ‘continuation, duration, repetition (of a state or an activity)’. The first one, *ṭubūt*, is the typical function of nominal predicates: the predicate merely records an inherent state or a condition of the predicand. The predicate *niwīsanda ast* ‘is a writer’ in *Bahrām niwīsanda ast* ‘Bahrām is a writer’ is an example. In *Bahrām niwišt* ‘Bahrām wrote’, on the other hand, the function of the predicate *niwišt* ‘wrote’ is to indicate that the action began at a certain point in time. Since the action described by the predicate has replaced a previous one, and the action is new compared to the previous one, it is called *tağaddud*. Meanwhile, *istimrār* concerns those cases where the verbal predicate records the continuation of the action expressed, as in *Bahrām miḥandīd* ‘Bahrām was laughing, Bahrām used to laugh, Bahrām habitually laughed’. The difference between the three values of the predicates is assumed in the manuals without explicit reference to the role of grammar: morphological features, verb modes and tense are not considered in the description of the values of the predicates.

5.2 Ellipsis, Definiteness and Preposing

In chapter 4, we introduced several linguistic operations in relation to the predicand. Many of them may also affect the predicate. In this chapter, attention is given to whether or not a predicate occurs, to the definiteness of the reference, and to the position relative to the predicand. The principal operations considered are, thus, *ḍikr-i musnad* ‘occurrence of the predicate’, *ḥaḍf-i musnad* ‘ellipsis of the predicate’ (also called *tark-i musnad* ‘omission of the predicate’), *ta’rif-i musnad* ‘definite reference in (the nominal part of) the predicate’, *tankīr-i musnad* ‘indefinite reference in (the nominal part of) the predicate’, *taqdīm-i musnad* ‘preposing the predicate’ and *ta’ḥīr-i musnad* ‘postposing the predicate’. These operations are often granted separate sections in the manuals, though they generally have less space than do the operations on the predicand.

As for the occurrence (*ḍikr*) and ellipsis (*ḥaḍf* or *tark*) of the predicate, the former is considered the standard. The need for intelligibility generally involves mentioning the predicate. Ellipsis of the predicate is allowed when there is a frame of lexical or non-lexical references that help the addressee to recover the omitted element. In these cases, ellipsis of the predicate is allowed or, in some cases, even preferred. Below I will list situations in which the ellipsis of the predicate is preferred.

The predicate is omitted to avoid saying banalities (*iḥtirāz az ‘abaṭ* ‘avoid being pointless’) or, to put it in more modern terms, to not lack informativeness. This happens especially when the predicate is identical to a previous one. In this case, the lexical context (*qarīna-yi lafẓī*)

is specific enough to suggest what the predicate is. Ellipsis is also suitable in cases that do not allow expressing the predicate at length. The following line is often quoted as illustrating both:

*dīda-yi ahl-i ṭama' ba ni'mat-i dunyā
pur našawad hamčunānki čāh zi šabnam¹*

The eye of the greedy, with the wealth of the world,
Is not filled. Likewise the well with the dew of the night.

An intended predicate *pur našawad* 'is not filled' is omitted after the predicand *čāh* 'the well'. There are two reasons for this ellipsis. First, an identical predicate had previously occurred in the first part of the line in connection to the predicand *dīda-yi ahl-i ṭama'* 'the eye of the greedy'. Since it is possible to retrieve the predicate earlier in the discourse there is no need to repeat it. Second, the poetic meter was completed with the word *šabnam* 'dew of the night', and no space was left to insert more words. This latter case is referred to as *ḡayq-i maqām* 'situational narrowness', that is, a lack of space.

Ellipsis of the predicate is possible even in cases in which the predicate changes in person or number. If two successive predicates are two different inflected forms of the same verb, the second one can be omitted. For example, the following line shows two different instances of a null copula after the copula *-st* 'is':

*'išq durrđāna-st u man ḡawwāš u daryā maykada
sar furū kardam dar ānḡā tā kuḡā sar bar kunam²*

Love is the pearl-grain, I [am] the diver, and the sea [is] the tavern.
I have plunged in there. Let us see where I bob up.

In addition, one can omit the predicate in the answer to a question. If the question contains the predicate, the answer can omit it. For example, in the second half-line below, the predicate *mīrawad* '(he) will be going' has been deleted because it had already appeared in the question before:

*guftam ki ḡwāḡa kay ba sar-i ḡiḡla mīrawad
guft ān zamān ki muštariy u mah qirān kunand³*

¹ Quoted in Āq-Iwlī n.d., 84, Riḡānižād 1988, 184, and Šamīsā 1994, 93. Sa'dī 1937b, 172.

² Quoted in Kazzāzi 1991, 150. Ḥāfiž 1983, 692-3, *ḡazal* 338, v. 5. Adapted from Avery 2007, 417.

³ Quoted in Āq-Iwlī n.d., 84. Ḥāfiž 1983, 402, *ḡazal* 193, v. 8. Avery 2007, 253.

I asked: “When will the master be going to the bridal chamber?”
He answered: “The time when Jupiter and the moon are in conjunction.”

Up to this point, cases have been listed where ellipsis is preferred to occurrence. The opposite can also happen. Sometimes the conditions for the ellipsis are met, but the speaker prefers to express the predicate. Such redundancies are allowed only in case the choice of mentioning the predicate allows for further refinement. In an example, Kazzāzī (1991, 155) suggests how a superfluous predicate can subtly underline the obtuseness of the listener (*ḡabāwat-i sāmi‘* or *kundfahmī-yi šinawanda*). He considers the following question-and-answer exchange: [Speaker-A] *pidar-i tu kī-st?* ‘Who is your father?’ | [Speaker-B] *Siyāwaš pidar-i man ast* ‘Siyāwaš is my father’. In this case it would have been sufficient to answer the question by saying ‘Siyāwaš’, as the ellipsis of the predicate is acceptable in the case of a question and an answer. However, the speaker’s preference is for a full statement: ‘Siyāwaš is my father’. The speaker, by this choice, probably assumes that the addressee is not very clever, or he wants to make him look like a fool. A redundant repetition, thus, can cast some doubts on the cleverness of the addressee.

Sections on definite and indefinite predicate (*ta’rīf-i musnad* and *tankīr-i musnad*) only discuss nominal predicates. In fact, only the nominal part of the predicate can be definite or indefinite. A definite predicate generally identifies (*ta’yīn*) a specific entity. An indefinite predicate, on the other hand, occurs where the conditions for its definition are lacking. Indefinite reference may also express respect (*tafḥīm*) or contempt (*taḥqīr*) as a secondary meaning as we have already mentioned with regard to the predicand (see § 4.4).

Word order is discussed in relation to the predicate too. The predicate may come after the predicand (*ta’ḥīr-i musnad*), which is the expected standard word order in Persian, or before the predicand (*taqdīm-i musnad*). And since these are, from the reverse side, the same as ‘preposing the predicand’ (*taqdīm-i musnad ilayh*) and ‘postposing the predicand’ (*ta’ḥīr-i musnad ilayh*), the reader can refer to what was discussed earlier in § 4.10. However, preposing the predicate is sometimes considered a separate topic. Under this heading, some manuals introduce Persian syntactic structures in which the nominal predicate is placed before the nominal predicand by inversion. Examples of this kind are common in forms such as:

dānā-st kas-ī ki rūy az īn ġādū
*dar parda-yi dīn-i ḥaq bipūšānad*⁴

Wise is he who shelters himself from this sorcery
 Covering his face with the veil of God's religion.

*ḥuğastarūz kas-ī k-az dar-aš tu bāz ā'ī*⁵

Fortunate is he whose door you enter.

*bīčāra ān kas-ī ki giriftār-i 'aql šud*⁶

Hopeless is he who became a prisoner of reason.

Such use violates the norm of putting the thing about which the judgement is made first. Iranian scholars have different ideas on how to interpret the expressions above. Kazzāzī (1991, 171-2) considers it a form of preposing the predicate to the predicand with a value of delimitation (*ḥaṣr*) of the judgement expressed. The aim would therefore be to specify for whom the state expressed by the predicates *dānā* 'wise', *ḥuğastarūz* 'fortunate', and *bīčāra* 'hopeless, remediless' is valid and for whom it is not. Thus, the function of such a construction approximates that of a restriction marker ('Wise is *only* who...'). On the contrary, Šamīsā's idea is that these utterances add emphasis (*ta'kīd*) in expressing good news (*bašārat*) or repulse (*inziğār*) (1994, 94). Alternative translations could then be 'indeed wise is he who...' and 'indeed fortunate is he who...'. Remarkably enough, a typically Persian syntactic feature finds specialists at odds when it is time to integrate it into the science of meanings framework.

5.3 Predicate Constraints (*taqyīd-i musnad*)

Among the *aḥwāl* 'states' specific to the predicate, one is called *taqyīd* 'constraining, adding a constraint'. It consists of adding adjuncts, subordinates, and similar elements to narrow the scope of the predicate. In other words, the constraints (*qayd*, plural *quyūd*) are the limits within which the predicate of the main clause operates. More specifically, constraints encompass varied optional elements whose function is to limit the *when*, *where*, *why*, *with whom*, *how* and *under*

⁴ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 172. Nāṣir-i Ḥusraw 1928, 126, v. 2.

⁵ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 94. Sa'dī 1939, 48, *ğazal* 84ṭ, [v. 5].

⁶ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 94. Adīb al-Mamālik 1933, 123, *qit'a*.

what condition of the predicate.⁷ Thus, the term *qayd* in the science of meanings assumes a broader meaning than the narrower sense of ‘adverb’ that the term generally assumes in a Persian grammar textbook (see, for example, Ḥānlārī 1964, 69).

The greater the number of constraints expressed, the more the scope of the predicate shrinks. Therefore, as Raḡā’ī (1961, 107) and Zāhidī (1967, 109) observe, the speaker leaves constraints out (*tark-i taqyīd*) under certain conditions. Examples include situations where the speaker ignores the existence of a constraint, does not need to express it to reach his communicative goal, or wishes to conceal such details from others. Finally, a *qayd* may be dropped for fear of missing an opportunity by dwelling on details.

The protasis of the conditional statement (*ṣarṭ*) is the most important, and sometimes the only, *qayd* to be discussed in the manuals. Here some problems arise in adapting the Arabic model to Persian. In their analysis of the protasis, Arabic scholars considered how to distinguish between real and unreal conditionals. They saw the difference as a matter of the choice of the if-word from among *in*, *iqā* and *law*. Each of the three specialises in a different context: *iqā* introduces a condition that is very likely to be fulfilled (*kaṭīr al-wuqū’*); *in* marks a condition that can only happen under certain circumstances (*muḥtamal al-wuqū’*); and *law* refers to an impossible condition in the past (*mumtani’ al-wuqū’*). It was primarily the conjunction introducing the protasis that expressed the degree of plausibility of the hypothesis in Arabic.⁸ In Persian, there is only one if-word (*agar* ‘if’, also given in the contracted forms *gar* or *ar*) which introduces conditionals of various kinds. As a result, Persian scholars could not fully benefit from the Arabic model in this case.

In the Persian science of meanings, a different approach, logical rather than lexical, guides the distinctions among real, possible, and impossible conditions. The question to be assessed is: what degree of possibility does the speaker see for the fulfilment of the condition expressed by the protasis? One speaks of *kaṭīr al-wuqū’* when the condition will undoubtedly occur, of *muḥtamal al-wuqū’* when there is a fifty per cent chance, and of *mumtani’ al-wuqū’* when there is no possibility of realisation. The Persian science of meanings evaluates conditional statements by whether the speaker and the addressee believe the condition to be true or not. Below are three Persian examples that differ in the degree of plausibility. The first line illustrates a real condition, the second a condition possible to fulfil and the third an unreal condition:

⁷ On constraints in the Arabic science of meanings and earlier Arabic linguistic tradition, see Simon 1993, 155-7.

⁸ On conditionals in the Arabic science of meanings, see al-Taftāzānī 1911, 152-73.

*dar īn bāzār agar sūd-ī-st bā darwīš-i ḥursand ast
ḥudāy-ā mun'im-am gardān ba darwīšīyy u ḥursandī⁹*

If in this market place there is any profit, it is to the contented dervish.

O God make me the beneficiary of dervishism and blessed contentment!

*gar bibīnam ḥam-i abrūy-i ču miḥrāb-aš bāz
saḡda-yi šukr kunam w-az pay-i šukrāna rawam¹⁰*

If again I see the curve of his prayer-niche-like eyebrow,
I will kneel in gratitude and proceed in acknowledgement of favour.

*gar musalmānī az īn ast ki Ḥāfiẓ dārad
wāy agar az pas-i imrūz buwad fardā-yī¹¹*

If this is to be a Muslim, that Hāfiẓ professes,
Alas if on the heel of today there is any tomorrow!

It should be noted that manuals make no attempt to correlate the logical criterion to morphological features such as verbal mode or tense in connection to the various types of Persian conditionals. Morphology proper is outside the scope of the science of meanings and the same morphological pattern may be evaluated differently in different contexts. In addition to the primary conditional value, also secondary meanings are sometimes discussed. An if-clause could then appear to express blame or to feign ignorance. It may also place different persons or things on the same level as equivalents, as in:

*agar pādšāh ast wa-gar pīnadūz
čū ḥuftand gardad šab-i har du rūz¹²*

Whether (*agar* 'if') one is a king or another a cobbler,
When they have fallen asleep, the night of both becomes day.

The conditional section shows how Arabic and Persian manuals differ in selected topics. In Arabic, the section distinguishes between the uses of different conditional conjunctions and mainly clarifies the contexts in which they occur. Also, it extensively deals with cases

9 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 157. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 878, *ḡazal* 431, v. 7. Avery 2007, 520.

10 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 157. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 720, *ḡazal* 352, v. 6. Avery 2007, 432.

11 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 157. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 978-9, *ḡazal* 481, v. 10. Avery 2007, 583.

12 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 161. Sa'dī 1937a, 173.

where one of the three if-words appears out of the proper context. Indeed, one sometimes occurs in a context where the other would generally be more appropriate.¹³ Such reflections could not find parallels in Persian. Perhaps because of this seeming impossibility of finding Persian records like the Arabic, some manuals (Humāyī 1991; Šamīsā 1994; Āq-Iwlī n.d.) avoid entirely dealing with the protasis in Persian.

13 See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 152-73; Jenssen 1998, 94-5.

6 **The States of the Complements of the Verb (*aḥwāl-i muta'alliqāt-i fi'l*)**

Summary 6.1 Verb, Agent, Patient. – 6.2 Ellipsis of the Patient (*ḥadf-i maf'ūl*). – 6.3 Ellipsis of the Agent (*ḥadf-i fā'il*). – 6.4 Preposing the Patient (*taqdīm-i maf'ūl*).

6.1 **Verb, Agent, Patient**

Having explored nominal and verbal predicates, the science of meanings completes the discussion by considering two semantic elements whose existence depends on the verbal predicate (*fi'l*): the agent (*fā'il*) and the patient (*maf'ūl*). In the science of meanings, the two as a whole are called *muta'alliqāt-i fi'l*, or *muta'allaqāt-i fi'l* 'complements of the verb, verb annexes, elements related to the verb'. The various operations concerning them are considered in a section called *aḥwāl-i muta'alliqāt-i fi'l* 'the states of the complements of the verb' which covers topics related to what linguistics would call valency.

In terms of semantics, the agent is the one who performs the action expressed by the verb and the patient is the one who undergoes the action. In most cases, the agent occupies the syntactic subject position, while the patient is syntactically the object. But semantic and syntactic properties do not always match, and the distinction between *fā'il* and *maf'ūl* operates regardless of syntactic position and grammatical function as will be shown.

6.2 Ellipsis of the Patient (*ḥaḍf-i maf'ūl*)

The standard form of the utterance requires mentioning the patient (*ḍikr-i maf'ūl*) whenever it is governed by a transitive verb. Deviations from the basic structure are allowed provided they align with specific purposes and contexts. A first distinction to be considered is whether identifying the patient is relevant or not for a proper understanding of the utterance. If it is irrelevant, the patient should not occur. If it is relevant, it may occur or not. The ellipsis of the patient (*ḥaḍf-i maf'ūl*) is possible upon the same conditions that generally allow the omission of any part of speech. In the following paragraphs, a description of the different stylistic techniques connected with the absence of an overtly mentioned patient is given.

One of the main benefits of ellipsis is that it allows the use of fewer words. Concision (*iḥtiṣār*, or *iḡāz* 'brevity'), as a technique, is favourably encouraged. The speaker may drop a patient because it has been mentioned before, or because its referent is clear from the context. In the following line, the patient is omitted for the sake of brevity. The words *banda im* '(we) are (your) servants' help to establish that *mā rā* 'us' is the omitted patient of the verbs *nawāzī* '(you) caress' and *kuṣī* '(you) kill':

*gar nawāzī w-ar kuṣī farmān tu-rā-st
banda im inak sar u tiḡ u kafan¹*

Whether you caress or kill [us], the command is yours.

We are [your] servants. Here are the head, the sword, and the shroud!

In the manuals, many examples of this kind have the verb *āmūḥtan* 'to learn'. Although this verb can be either transitive ('to learn [something]') or intransitive ('to engage in learning'), the manuals of the science of meanings consider it to be primarily transitive. Therefore, it should have a patient, either expressed or omitted. Kazzāzī then suggests that the patient of the verb *biyāmūz* 'learn!' in the following line should be *dāniš* 'knowledge, science, wisdom':

*biyāmūz agar pārsā būd ḥwāhī
makun dīw rā ḡān-i ḥwiš āšiyāna²*

Learn if you desire a pious existence.

Do not make your soul a nest for the devil.

1 Quoted in Riḍānizād 1988, 251. Sa'dī 1939, 245, 444t, [v. 7].

2 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 177. Nāṣir-i Ḥusraw 1928, 382, v. 3.

Manuals call *bayān ba'd az ibhām* or *tawḍīḥ pas az ibhām* 'elucidation after ambiguity' the technique of omitting parts of the discourse and later clarifying what was missing. As a way of capturing the addressee's attention, this technique includes situations where the patient is left out and later clarified. One example is:

az 'Alī āmūz iḥlāṣ-i 'amal
*šīr-i ḥaq rā dān munazzah az dağal*³

Learn from 'Alī...sincerity in one's deeds.
Know that the Lion of God is purified of hypocrisy!

The patient of the verb *āmūz* 'learn!', that is *iḥlāṣ-i 'amal* 'sincerity in one's deeds', appears in an unexpected position, after the verb. As a result, the identification of the patient is a little uncertain at the beginning and is clarified at a later stage.

In a general statement, the patient of a primarily transitive verb may undergo an ellipsis. This happens to highlight that any object would fit. This technique is referred to as *ta'mīm-i maf'ūl* 'generalisation of the patient'. In the line below, the verb *ğam' nakardand* '(they) did not accumulate' applies in general to any material possession. Thus, as anything would fit in the patient position, the ellipsis of the patient does not affect the efficiency of the utterance:

ānkas az duzd bitarsad ki matā'-ī dārad
*'ārifān ġam' nakardand parišānī nīst*⁴

Only he who possesses a fortune fears the thief.
The wise men did not accumulate. [So] no worries.

Also, the rules of courtesy (*ri'āyat-i adab*) may justify sentence reformulation. In *ğustīm u kas nabūd tu rā hamtā*⁵ 'We sought, but there was no equal to you', the patient of the verb *ğustīm* 'we sought' is omitted. The contextual evidence suggests it was supposed to be the word *hamtā* 'an equal, someone like (you)'. Confessing to a beloved person that you have sought 'someone like him' may be very rude. Although the omitted element *hamtā* is later clarified, thus somehow resembling an instance of elucidation after ambiguity, the two circumstances differ in purpose. The ellipsis of the patient in this case is necessary so as not to be insensitive or offensive.

³ Quoted in Riḍāniżād 1988, 255. Mawlawī [Rūmī] 1996, 1: 164, *daftar 1*, v. 3727.

⁴ Quoted in Riḍāniżād 1988, 250. Sa'dī 1941, 11.

⁵ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 178.

Wherever the patient is irrelevant, its absence requires no pre-conditions. If the patient is not the point, the speaker should not add one even if the verb is primarily transitive. In this way, the absence of the patient maximises the focus on the action of the verb, as happens in the following line where the poet does not mention the patient of the otherwise transitive verbs *dād* 'gave' and *biḥward* 'took':

nīkbaḥt ān kas-i ki dād u biḥward
*šūrbaḥt ānki ū naḥwurd u nadād*⁶

Fortunate is he who has given and taken.

Unfortunate is he who has not taken nor given.

This case stands apart from ellipsis proper and foreshadows the use of a transitive verb in an intransitive way. Since the primary intention behind such a technique is to emphasise the action, it slightly differs from the general statements valid for many patients which were called *ta'mīm-i maf'ūl*.

6.3 Ellipsis of the Agent (*ḥaḍf-i fā'il*)

Every time the logical agent of the verbal predicate does not appear in the utterance, the Persian manuals describe that situation as a case of *ḥaḍf-i fā'il* 'ellipsis/absence of the agent'. Several cases are subsumed under this heading. In some cases, it is impossible to identify the agent while in others the agent's name is simply not mentioned. According to the science of meanings, an important difference is whether the omitted agent is *ma'lūm* 'known' or *maḡhūl* 'unknown'. A 'known' agent exists and can be indicated. An 'unknown' agent, on the other hand, is unnamed or cannot be specified.

The dichotomy between *ma'lūm* and *maḡhūl* has a long history in traditional grammar vocabulary. In a very general way, the two categories may resemble active and passive diathesis, although some differences apply. The idea of *maḡhūl* 'unknown' mainly covers the use of two different verbal forms in Persian. One is the so-called passive in the form of the past participle + auxiliary verb *šudan* 'to become' (e.g. *kušta šud*, literally '(he/she/it) became killed', thus '(he/she/it) was killed'), which often, though not always, conceals the agent's identity. The other is the agentless third-person plural transitive verb (e.g. *mīgūyand*, literally '(they) say', with the sense of 'it is said'). The latter takes an active form but has a passive meaning. In addition, the manuals of the science of meanings also give examples of compound

⁶ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 176. Rūdakī 1994, 74, v. 106.

verbs in which the verb *šudan* or *gaštan* 'to become' is combined with an adjective and the agent is unknown (e.g. *tuhī šud* '(it) became empty', thus '(it) was emptied'). In this sense, active and passive only imperfectly approximate Persian terminology of *ma'lūm* and *maǧhūl* and will be used henceforth in the broadest sense.

An unknown agent may be a specific person or thing whose identity the speaker ignores or deliberately conceals. In the passive statement *Bahrām kušta šud* 'Bahrām was killed',⁷ the killer is undoubtedly a specific person. The speaker, however, cannot identify the murderer and recurs to the ellipsis of the agent. The manuals also consider in the same category examples of utterances in which God, whose name is somehow self-evident, is the agent but not the subject of the sentence. In the following example, the transitive verb *mībaḥšand* (literally 'they bestow') '(it) is bestowed' appears in the agentless third-person plural. The action of 'bestowing the Palace of Paradise' belongs to God only. Consequently, there is no need to mention the agent further:

qaṣr-i firdaws ba pādāš-i 'amal mībaḥšand
*mā ki rind-īm u gadā dayr-i muǧān mā rā bas*⁸

The Palace of Paradise is bestowed as a reward for works;
For us, who are reprobates and beggars, the Temple of the Magi-an is enough.

On the other hand, an unknown agent could also be generic. In the following line, the agent of the verbs *šud tuhī* '(it) was emptied, (it) got empty' and *pur gardad* '(may it) become full' is not a specific individual. The action fits any generic agent able to empty or fill the cup:

gar māl namānd sar bimānād ba ġāy
*paymāna ču šud tuhī digar pur gardad*⁹

If wealth cannot endure, let the head at least endure.
If the cup was emptied, may it become full again.

Examples of third-person plurals to express a generic agent are, for instance, *mīdihand*, literally '(they) serve', and hence 'is served', and *tawāngar mīkunand*, literally '(they) fortify' and hence 'are fortified', in:

⁷ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 180.

⁸ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 181. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 540, *ǧazal* 262, v. 3. Avery 2007, 331.

⁹ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 182. Ḥayyām 1959, 2: 81, *rubā'ī* 281, NF 9 (F 61).

*ay gadā-yi ḥānaqah bar ḡah ki dar dayr-i muġān
mādihand āb-ī u dilhā rā tawāngar mīkunand*¹⁰

O beggar of the sufi lodge, leap up! For in the convent of the Magi,
A Water is served and hearts are fortified.

When the agent of an action is known, there are few issues with ellipsis. The agent of an active verb is generally the subject of the clause. As such, the ellipsis of the agent is a subcategory of the ellipsis of the predicand. In this case, the ellipsis works in the same way as we have seen earlier in this outline: mentioning the agent is inappropriate to the utterance if the occurrence repeats a piece of known information unless there is a specific reason to do so.

6.4 Preposing the Patient (*taqdīm-i maf'ūl*)

In Persian, the direct object generally precedes the verb. Since Persian and Arabic word orders are radically different, preposing the patient to the verb (*taqdīm-i maf'ūl bar fi'l*) is standard in Persian while marked in Arabic. Consequently, Persian authors are bound to rethink the section on preposing the patient to the verb in order to distance themselves from the model given by the Arabic science of meanings. Some of them¹¹ avoid it altogether. Others¹² keep this section in their manuals but mainly provide examples of a patient occurring at the beginning of the sentence, often before the agent is mentioned.

Preposing the patient may achieve at least two kinds of effects: *ihimām* 'importance, focus' or *taḥṣīṣ* 'particularisation, specialisation'. I will provide an example of each. In the following line, placing the patient at the beginning of the utterance allows for focusing on the object. The utterances open with the patients *ḥirqa-yi zuhd-i ma-rā* 'my ascetic's cloak' and *ḥāna-yi 'aql-i ma-rā* 'the abode of my reason':

*ḥirqa-yi zuhd-i ma-rā āb-i ḥarābāt biburd
ḥāna-yi 'aql-i ma-rā ātaš-i ḥumḥāna bisūht*¹³

My ascetic's cloak, the 'water' of the tavern stole [it].
The abode of my reason, the fire of the wine vault burnt [it].

¹⁰ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 182. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 404, *ġazal* 194, v. 8.

¹¹ Āq-Iwlī n.d.; Humāyī 1991; Šamīsā 1994.

¹² Raġā'ī 1961, 118-19; Zāhidī 1967, 127-8; Āhanī 1978, 81-2; Riḍānizād 1988, 255-67.

¹³ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 178. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 52, *ġazal* 18, v. 6. Adapted from Avery 2007, 45.

In other cases, the anteposition of the patient creates an exclusive link between the verb and the direct object. That the verb can have any other patient is then excluded. An example of this type of particularisation occurs in *čašma-yi čašm-i ma-rā* 'the fountain of my eye', the direct object of the verb *dar yāb* 'seek out' in:

*čašma-yi čašm-i ma-rā ay gul-i ḥandān dar yāb
ki ba ummīd-i tu ḥwaš āb-i rawān-ī dārad*¹⁴

Seek out, O laughing rose, the fountain of my eye [and nothing else];
In hope of you, it has a full flowing stream.

The notion of *taḥṣīṣ* has been introduced at two points of our outline as the result of two distinct operations: adding an attribute (*waṣf*) (see § 4.6) and preposing the patient. In addition, more devices have a central role in producing particularisation. The next chapter will specifically discuss the means of restricting the scope of the utterance.

¹⁴ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 180. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 258, *ġazal* 121, v. 3. Adapted from Avery 2007, 167.

7 **Restriction and Delimitation** **(*qaṣr wa ḥaṣr*)**

Summary 7.1 Restriction of the Scope of Predication. – 7.2 The Elements of Restriction. – 7.3 Restriction Accuracy. – 7.4 Restriction in Dialogue. – 7.5 Restriction Markers.

7.1 **Restriction of the Scope of Predication**

The chapter on *qaṣr* ‘restriction’ and *ḥaṣr* ‘delimitation’ considers the utterances in which the scope of predication is limited. We have seen that the predicative relationship consists of the speaker’s judgement on the relationship between predicand and predicate (see § 3.1). If you use a restriction technique, you mean that this relationship is exclusive, and you deny the possibility of associating a different predicand to the predicate or vice versa. For example, *šā'ir ǧuz 'Alī nīst* ‘There is no poet except ‘Alī’¹ affirms that the predicate ‘is no poet’ pertains to one person only and no one else. The utterance *'Alī faqaṭ niwīsanda ast* ‘Alī is only a writer’² states that only one predicate is valid and no other. The examples show that we have to do with contrastive focus mechanisms.

The title of this unit mentions two terms very close in meaning. It seems that *qaṣr* is a hypernym of *ḥaṣr*. The term *qaṣr* denotes all forms of contrastive focus in general. The term *ḥaṣr* seems to occur

¹ Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 144.

² Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 141.

more specifically to refer to the use of words whose semantic value is ‘only’. Hereafter, I will adopt the word *qaṣr* as a working term throughout.

Manuals offer insights into the many ways in which *qaṣr* occurs. In particular, it considers the elements of restriction, the validity of restriction in a literal sense, and the contexts of restriction according to the addressee’s beliefs. Based on such concerns, manuals recognise three different types of *qaṣr*. The following paragraphs will illustrate each with terminology and examples. The last section of the chapter considers restriction markers and techniques. These may be adverbial, as in the examples above, or based on other, usually non-prosodic, marking strategies.

7.2 The Elements of Restriction

Manuals define *qaṣr* as the particularisation (*taḥṣīṣ* ‘specialisation’) that binds in an exclusive relationship something (*čīz-ī, amr-ī*) with something else. What is meant by ‘something’ and ‘something else’ are two elements of the utterance. One is the restricted, and the other the restricted-to. Since forms of focalisation may occur at any level of the utterance (predicand, predicate, patient, or any other complement), the two terms define the elements of restriction regardless of their syntactic function in the sentence.

Depending on their role in the restriction, whether they represent a quality or a qualified element, the restricted and the restricted-to are described as *ṣifat* or as *mawṣūf*. The word *ṣifat*, which had a long linguistic and philosophical employment, is quite challenging to render in English here. Since a *ṣifat* may be an action, a state, or a characteristic, the dominant translation ‘adjective’ is reductive here. I will translate it as ‘quality’ or ‘attribute’. The *mawṣūf*, that is the ‘qualified element’, is anything described by that quality.

A first subdivision of the types of *qaṣr* considers how *ṣifat* and *mawṣūf* interrelate. There are two possibilities. The type *qaṣr-i ṣifat bar mawṣūf* ‘restriction of the quality to the qualified element’ relates the attribute exclusively to one person or thing (e.g. *nīwīsanda faqaṭ Zayd ast*³ ‘Only Zayd is a writer’, ‘There is no writer other than Zayd’). Conversely, the type *qaṣr-i mawṣūf bar ṣifat* ‘restriction of the qualified element to the quality’ describes the qualified element by one attribute, as opposed to all other attributes (e.g. *Zayd faqaṭ nīwīsanda ast*⁴ ‘Zayd is only a writer’, ‘Zayd is but a writer’).

³ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 100.

⁴ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 100.

7.3 Restriction Accuracy

A different taxonomy considers restriction from another perspective. Between the quality and the qualified element exists an exclusive relationship which can be valid in absolute or relative terms. This dichotomy offers the base for distinguishing between *qaṣr-i ḥaqīqī* ‘literal restriction’ and *qaṣr-i idāfī* ‘exceeding restriction’ (otherwise called *qaṣr-i ġayr-i ḥaqīqī* ‘non-literal restriction’).

The *qaṣr-i ḥaqīqī* establishes a restriction believed to be accurate in all situations. This type of *qaṣr* is frequent in the form of *qaṣr-i ṣīfat bar mawṣūf* to refer to the exclusive attributes of God. For example, a monotheist would say *Āfarīnanda-yi ‘ālam ġuz ḥudā nīst*⁵ ‘There is no Creator of the world except God’ because he firmly believes in this assumption. It is rare to find examples of literal expressions in the form of *qaṣr-i mawṣūf bar ṣīfat* because it is unlikely for a qualified element to have only one attribute.

A restriction of the type *qaṣr-i idāfī* only makes sense in relative terms. That is, literally taken, it exceeds the extent of accuracy. However, it is acceptable once we have determined the set under consideration. For example, *niwīsanda faqaṭ Zayd ast* ‘Only Zayd is a writer’ holds valid only within a specific (and finite) number of individuals. In that group, Zayd is the only writer. Similarly, *Zayd faqaṭ niwīsanda ast* ‘Zayd is only a writer’ means that, among the many possible occupations, writing is Zayd’s exclusive profession.

Another type of *qaṣr*, called *qaṣr-i iddi‘ā‘ī* ‘restriction based on a pretence or a false display’, consists in the improper use of the restriction of the *ḥaqīqī* type. The speaker pretends that someone (or something) is the only one who has a certain quality (or, conversely, that someone or something has only one quality). He knows, however, that his claim does not correspond to reality. Since such a restriction is not limited to a specific group, it exceeds the definition of a *qaṣr-i idāfī*. What is subtly meant here is that the quality is so pronounced in this individual that all other qualities seem irrelevant in comparison. Phenomena of this kind involve hyperbole (*mubālaġa*) or exaggeration (*iġrāq*) and are particularly relevant to poetic language.

⁵ Quoted in Ārzū 2002, 150.

7.4 Restriction in Dialogue

The speaker may employ restriction strategies to rectify the addressee's opinions. Consequently, understanding the scope and meaning of a restriction depends on knowing what the addressee believes to be true. Three types of restriction are identified, depending on which inaccurate opinion the speaker is trying to correct. To illustrate them, I will consider the sample utterance *Zayd āmad na 'Amr* 'Zayd came, not 'Amr'. As shown below, the same sentence, according to situation, can take on one of three different enunciative meanings.

First, *qaṣr-i ifrād* (also called *ḥaṣr-i ifrād*) 'separating restriction, restriction denoting only one item' reestablishes that the quality applies only to one single person (or thing) and no more. In our example, the addressee believes that the two people have the same quality. The speaker knows that the quality is only found in one of them and aims to inform that 'Only Zayd came, and not also 'Amr'. An example from poetry is:

mardum-i dīda-yi mā ġuz ba ruḥ-at nāzir nīst
*dil-i sargašta-yi mā ġayr-i tu-rā dākir nīst*⁶

The pupil of our eye looks only at your cheek.
 Our bewildered heart says the litany for no one but you.

Second, *qaṣr-i ta'yīn* 'determining restriction' is a way to select one among the alternatives. It refers to a situation where the addressee cannot decide between two or more options. In the example *Zayd āmad na 'Amr* 'Zayd came, not 'Amr', a person has come, but the addressee does not know who. Then the speaker clarifies, 'Of 'Amr and Zayd, it was Zayd who came'.

Third, *qaṣr-i qalb* 'inversion, exchange, replacement restriction' corrects the opinion of someone who confuses one person with another. In the example, the addressee mistakes the identity of the person to whom the quality refers. Thus, the speaker corrects what he thinks is wrong and replaces the correct names in their proper roles, 'It was not 'Amr who came, but Zayd'.

6 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 188. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 158, *ġazal* 71, v. 1. Avery 2007, 109.

7.5 Restriction Markers

The last section of this unit deals with techniques of restriction. The science of meanings groups them into four strategies, called *turuq-i qaṣr* ‘means of restriction’, each achieving restriction in a different way. I will give a description and an example of each below.

The use of linkers (*‘atf*)⁷ as a means of restriction covers the use of adversatives. While *na* ‘not’ occurs in positive sentences, negative sentences feature *balki* ‘but, instead’, *līk* ‘but’, and the like. For example:

īnki tu dārī qiyāmat ast na qāmat
*w-īn na tabassum ki mu’ǧiz ast u karāmat*⁸

What you have is the Day of Resurrection, not a tall figure!
Also, this is not a smile, for it is a prodigy and a miracle!

man nakardam amr tā sūd-i kunam
*balki tā bar bandaqān ǧūd-i kunam*⁹

I did not command so that I might gain a profit,
But so that I might be generous to the servants.

The technique referred to as ‘negation and exception’ (*nafy wa istiṭnā*), on the other hand, consists of using a word whose meaning is ‘except, unless’ in a negative sentence. The devices suitable for the purpose are *magar* ‘except (perhaps), unless’, *ǧuz* ‘except, other than, apart from, but’ or *illā* ‘except’. For example:

nīst bar lawḥ-i dil-am ǧuz alif-i qāmat-i yār
*či kunam ḥarf-i digar yād nadād ustād-am*¹⁰

On the tablet of my heart there is nothing but the *alif* of the friend’s stature.

What can I do? The Master has taught me no other letter.

Preposing what should be postposed (*taqdīm-i mā ḥaqqu-hu al-ta’ḥīr*) is the third strategy of restriction. Inversions in the standard word

⁷ On *‘atf*, see also § 4.9.

⁸ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 143. Sa’dī 1939, 77, *ǧazal* 143t, [v. 1] (also quoted above, in § 4.9).

⁹ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 143 (with some variation). Mawlawī [Rūmī] 1996, 1: 249, *daftar* 2, v. 1756.

¹⁰ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 193. Ḥāfīz 1983, 636-7, *ǧazal* 310, v. 5. Avery 2007, 386.

order that emphasise one element over the others, in fact, can result in *qaṣr*. Word order is highly relevant to the science of meanings, and references to it appear scattered in different sections of the manuals. Previous sections on the *aḥwāl* ‘states’ of the various elements have already considered the standard (and non-standard) place of the components of the utterance. Here, the focus is on how restriction arises because of a change in the standard order of optional elements (complements and so on). For example, in the following line, the complement *mar ū rā* ‘to Him’ comes before the predicand *kibriyā wu manī* ‘Grandeur and Egotism’. Here, ‘what should be postposed’ is the complement, which appears at the beginning of the line, and the result according to Aḥmadniżād is a restriction:

mar ū rā rasad kibriyā wu manī
*ki mulk-aš qadīm ast u ḡāt-aš ḡanī*¹¹

To Him [only], Grandeur and Egotism suit.
 [He] whose kingdom is ancient, and nature independent.

Finally, the use of dedicated words (*adawāt-i qaṣr* ‘function tools for restriction’) whose meaning is ‘only’ provides restriction. Examples include *faqaṭ* ‘only’, *tanhā* ‘only’ and *wa/u bas* ‘and enough’. For example, compare the use of *u bas* in:

ḡahān ay barādar namānad ba kas
*dil andar ḡahānāfarīn band u bas*¹²

The world, O brother, does not remain for anyone.
 Set your heart upon the world-creator, and that is enough.

The four techniques above resemble those listed in the Arabic science of meanings¹³ but do not cover all the possible Persian means of restriction. Other relevant cases remain excluded. In addition, Persian scholars occasionally mention repetition (*tikrār*) (Šamīsā 1994, 104), suprasegmental features (*takya*) (Humāyī 1991, 127), preposing the subject pronoun + *rā* to the verb (126) and preposing the subject pronoun to the enclitic copula (126). The last two are of particular importance to poetry.

In Persian, a patient placed before the verb does not necessarily produce *qaṣr*. However, if the patient is a subject pronoun followed

¹¹ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 142. Sa’dī 1937a, 2. Adapted from Clarke 1879, 3.

¹² Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 142. Sa’dī 1937b, 14. Thackston 2008, 12.

¹³ On the four Arabic means of restriction, see al-Taftāzānī 1911, 210-24; Simon 1993, 288-96; Jenssen 1998, 101-2.

by *rā*, restriction as an effect should not be excluded. Humāyī considers using *tu rā* ‘you-OBJECT’ before the verb may intend ‘no one but you’ (1991, 126). Some scholars consider this a sub-case of preposing what should be postposed.

Similarly, a subject pronoun followed immediately by the personal ending of the present of the verb ‘to be’ possibly offers a form of restriction. Examples of *qaṣr* of this type are *man-am* ‘I am’ or *tu-yī* ‘you are’ used in the sense of ‘I am the one who, it is me that... (and no one else)’ or ‘You are the one who, it is you who... (and no one else)’. For example:

*man-am ki šuhra-yi šahr-am ba ‘išq warzīdan*¹⁴

I am the one who is the talk of the town for love-making.

*ḥudāwand-i bālā wu pastī tu-yī*¹⁵

You are the Lord of heaven and earth [and no one else].

In this chapter on restriction, the informative utterance has been fully examined. How it is composed and how to manipulate it have been explored. The next chapter will focus on non-informative utterances.

¹⁴ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 104. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 786, *ġazal* 385, v. 1. Avery 2007, 470.

¹⁵ Quoted in Humāyī 1991, 126 and credited to Firdawsī.

8 **The Performative Utterance** **(*inšā*)**

Summary 8.1 The Definition of *inšā*. – 8.2 Requests and Non-Requests. – 8.3 Order (*amr*). – 8.4 Interdiction (*nahy*). – 8.5 Question (*istifhām*). – 8.6 Wish (*tamannī*, *tamannā*). – 8.7 Vocative Expressions (*nidā*). – 8.8 Non-Request Performatives.

8.1 The Definition of *inšā*

A latter-date coinage, the term *inšā* (literally ‘creation, composition’) entered the rhetorical discourse only in the fourteenth century after being a juridical term in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) for decades. It is one term shared by both law and linguistics. Pierre Larcher has devoted many works to the notion of *inšā* in both realms (Larcher 1991; 1998; 2007 among others). Such a notion relates to the function of specific formulas in Islamic law: marrying, divorcing, and other acts all take their juridical effect under a spoken utterance. In the following paragraphs, we will see how the science of meanings integrated the notion of *inšā* as a topic of language analysis.

The science of meanings considers as *inšā* ‘performative utterance’ any utterance that is not subject to the criterion of truth (see § 2.3). Thus, the category of *inšā* encompasses questions, orders, prayers, vocative expressions, exclamations, and juridical performatives, among others. As the list shows, *inšā* does not mean that it is impossible to decide between true and false, but rather that truth is irrelevant to the category.

A further definition applies to *inšā* and has to do with the effects of an utterance. Unlike statements, the so-called *ḥabar*, *inšā* utterances act on the world instead of describing it. Many authors in the Arabic grammatical tradition considered *inšā* an act which is complete at the very moment of uttering a specific formula (or immediately after that). The same view is held in the Persian science of meanings. While the speaker utters an *inšā*, he simultaneously performs a speech act that affects external reality. For example, only through a question can the speaker obtain a reply from the addressee. Whether the requests have a felicitous outcome is also part of the issue, as will be shown. However, what matters most is that the act of uttering gives the request a chance of being realised. The manuals on the science of meanings describe *inšā* as an utterance whose content is realised only through verbalisation.

Based on such a definition, scholars maintain that the notion of *inšā* is identical or very close to that of performative utterance that Austin 1962 introduced in contemporary Western studies (Larcher 1991, 251; Šamīsā 1994, 40-4; Larcher 1998). It must be noted that the Arabic linguistic tradition foreshadowed the notions of constative and performative in the distinction between *ḥabar* and *inšā*. As it is now customary to translate the term *inšā* as performative (in support, see Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 130-1; Larcher 1991, 252; Harb 2020, 237-8 fn. 145), I will adopt *inšā* and performative utterance in this outline as equivalents.

8.2 Requests and Non-Requests

While al-Sakkākī spoke about *ṭalab* ‘request, jussive utterances’ as opposed to *ḥabar* (Simon 1993, 309 ff., 392), later scholars grouped requests together with exclamations as part of the wider category of *inšā*. Such a development is still perceivable in the division of performative utterances into two subcategories: utterances entailing a request (*ṭalabī*) and not entailing a request (*ḡayr-i ṭalabī*). Request performatives comprise order (*amr*), interdiction (*nahy*), question (*istifhām*), unattainable or counterfactual wish (*tamannī*, *tamannā*), and vocative expressions (*nidā*). Non-request performatives include exclamatory expressions of praise (*madḥ*), blame (*ḡamm*), wonder (*ta’aḡḡub*), hope (*riḡā*, *taraḡḡī*), oath (*qasam*), and contractual formulas (*ṣiḡa-yi* ‘*uqūd*). Scholars debate whether *du’ā* ‘supplication, prayer’ is a request or a non-request.¹

¹ See Riḏānizād 1988, 300; Humāyī 1991, 100; Šamīsā 1994, 135 and 138 note 3; Aḥmadnizād 2003, 99.

Both requests and non-requests aim to achieve the speaker's goal but differ in the timing of their achievement and the role of the addressee. Requests of the *ṭalabī* type need some time after the utterance in order to engage the addressee. For example, by saying *biyā* 'Come!' the speaker expects the addressee to obey the command to come near. The request is ultimately successful only if the addressee comes closer to the speaker. Successful communication in this case depends on what the speaker says and how the addressee reacts. In contrast, a non-request is a performative utterance that contains an appeal that is realised at the same time as the speaker articulates the utterance. For example, an utterance of praise, such as *āfarīn* 'Well done!' manifests the will to praise and at the same time fulfils the praise. The aim is to congratulate someone. The expressions of praise, blame, wonder, hope, oath, as well as contractual formulas are immediately effective. In terms of Austin's terminology (1962), they are 'felicitous' in themselves. In this view, *inšā* performatives are either calls to action or actions themselves.

In the following paragraphs, I will provide examples of the categories treated in the Persian manuals. It should be noted that the original Arabic taxonomy of the various types of *inšā* does not distinguish the speech act and the formal means of expressions by which the speech act is realised (Simon 1993, 311 fn. 632). In Arabic, for each category of performatives there is a dedicated form. The same is not always valid for the Persian linguistic tradition as it will be shown.

8.3 Order (*amr*)

The science of meanings defines an order (*amr*) as a command given by a superior to someone lower in rank. The term *amr* also applies to the dedicated verbal form to express orders, the imperative. Examples of imperatives are then *bāš* 'be!' or *biḡīr* 'take!'. If the rank of the addressee equals or surpasses that of the speaker, different techniques should be used to call the addressee to action. For instance, questions are a good strategy when a command should be most politely and respectfully imparted (on this and other secondary meanings of questions see also § 8.5).

In addition to its basic function, the imperative also has secondary meanings. The various possible interpretations and effects of an imperative are discussed in detail in the manuals. In the following, I will focus on a selection of examples in which orders appear in seemingly inappropriate contexts.

The imperative actualises summoning God to provide help and assistance. Manuals call it *du'ā* 'supplication, invocation, prayer'.² Although God's rank is superior to that of the poets, the imperative is one of the poets' favourite strategies to address God. The context, the addressee, and the relationship with the speaker show that the imperative is not intended as an order but should be understood differently. Among the many possible examples, we may quote one line by Ḥāfiẓ. The poet directs his supplication to the Lord in the imperative mood by employing the phrase *sabab-ī sāz* 'devise some means':

yā rab sabab-ī sāz ki yār-am ba salāmat
*bāz āyad u birhānad-am az band-i malāmat*³

O Lord, devise some means whereby my friend might in safety
 Come back and release me from the bondage of reproach.

Imperatives often turn out to be requests or entreaties (*iltimās*). This condition happens when a peer relationship binds the speaker and the addressee. If none of the two can command the other, the imperative downgrades from command to simple request. Kazzāzī maintains that the imperatives *bar hīz* 'jump up!', *dar dih* 'hand round!', and *hāk bar sar kun* 'put to shame!' in the following line exemplify *iltimās*. Consequently, one should assume that the position of the poetic persona of Ḥāfiẓ and the cupbearer is a peer relationship in:

sāqiy-ā bar hīz u dar dih ġām rā
*hāk bar sar kun ġam-i ayyām rā*⁴

O wine-boy, jump up and hand round the bowl:
 Put the sorrows of the day to shame.

Further use of the imperative encompasses *iršād* 'giving guidance, showing the right way'. Guidance, according to the manuals, differs from orders and entreaties. The distinction is not built on a particular formal basis. One should assume it depends on the context. Examples are the admonishing imperatives in *hāmūš bāš* 'shut up!', *tark-i zabān gūy* 'hold your tongue!' and *hama ġūš bāš* 'open your ears!' in this advice penned by Niẓāmī:

² The term *du'ā* evokes a private act. Though often translated as 'prayer', it should not be confused with the obligatory ritual prayer codified in Muslim practice.

³ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 219. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 196, *ġazal* 90, v. 1. Avery 2007, 131.

⁴ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 219. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 32, *ġazal* 8, v. 1. Avery 2007, 30.

gar pur-iy az dāniš ḥāmūš bāš
*tark-i zabān gūy u hama gūš bāš*⁵

If you are full of knowledge, shut up!
 Hold your tongue and open your ears!

One more case suggests imperatives express the permissibility (*ibāḥa*) of different options at the addressee's discretion.⁶ If two imperatives appear to be in conflict, the speaker's goal could be to allow the addressee free choice. The idea is that one or another action makes no difference. The speaker does not command, suggest, or praise the actions he orders. Instead, he encourages the addressee to exercise discretion in choosing between the imperatives. The notion is illustrated by the idiomatic use of the word *ḥwāh*, the imperative of the verb 'to want'. Compare the correlation of *ḥwāh... ḥwāh...* 'would (you)... or would (you)..., either... or...' followed by the imperative *gīr* 'take!' in the following example:

ḥwāh muṣḥaf gīr bar kaf ḥwāh ġām [a]z raff-išān
*harči ḥwāhī kun walīkan mardumāzārī makun*⁷

Either take the book in your hand or the cup from the shelf,
 Do what you want, but never harm anyone!

Finally, the imperative alerts (*tahdīd* 'threat') the addressee to the consequences of an action. In the following line, the warning imperative 'do!' aims to produce a change of attitude in the addressee. The speaker foresees that pursuing bad habits has dire consequences. Thus, the imperative in *harči ḥwāhī bikun* 'Do whatever you want!' only superficially allows any action:

harči ḥwāhī bikun ḥudā-yī hast
*karda rā kayfar u ġazā-yī hast*⁸

Do whatever you want! A God indeed exists.
 For what one has done, there will be punishment and retribution.

⁵ Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 101. Nižāmi 1956, 115, *Maḥzan al-asrār*.

⁶ On *ibāḥa*, see also § 4.9.

⁷ Quoted in Humāyī 1991, 102.

⁸ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 221.

8.4 Interdiction (*nahy*)

Interdiction (*nahy*) is a request made by someone superior to the addressee to not do a specific action. The dedicated grammatical form is the negative imperative (*nahy*), which in Persian takes a negative prefix. Examples are, in classical Persian, *makun* ‘don’t do’ and modern Persian *nakun* ‘don’t do’. The former example features the prefix *ma* which specifically marks the prohibitive in classical Persian. Manuals generally illustrate examples taken from classical poetry, so interdictions are mainly built upon the prefix *ma*.

Order and interdiction generally occupy separate sections in the manuals. The category of interdiction offers a rare case where the Persian science of meanings distinguishes between positive and negative forms. The reason for such distinctiveness seems twofold: linguistic and historical. On one hand, classical Persian had a specific negative prefix *ma*, which applied to the imperative (e.g. *makun* ‘don’t do’) and the precative (e.g. *mabād* ‘let it not be’) only.⁹ The negative prefix *na*, however, has generally supplanted *ma* in modern Persian in every negative clause. On the other hand, Persian manuals follow the distinction made in the Arabic model. Positive and negative forms of the Arabic imperative employ completely different verbal modes. These circumstances explain why orders and interdictions occupied independent sections of the Arabic science of meanings and ended up as two categories in Persian manuals.

Persian scholars seem sometimes uncomfortable with separating orders and interdictions. Humāyī (1991, 101 fn. 3), for example, suggests that positive and negative imperatives in Persian should be intended as one. Thus, he discusses the two under the same heading. In fact, quite predictably, the secondary meanings of orders and interdictions are similar. The following is a selection: supplication (*du‘ā*), entreaty to a peer (*iltimās*), threat (*tahdīd*), wish (*tamannī*), giving guidance (*iršād*), contempt (*taḥqīr*), blame, or reproach (*tawbīḥ*).

8.5 Question (*istifhām*)

Questions (*istifhām*) are intended as requests for information. The dedicated linguistic form is the interrogative sentence, often introduced by interrogative words. Asking for information is the primary communicative goal, provided the speaker does not own that evidence. The science of meanings identifies two possible scenarios. In the first, the speaker suspects that a certain event or circumstance has occurred but wants to verify it. Since the speaker is uncertain

⁹ On the Persian precative, see Lazard 1963, 338-9.

about his hypothesis, he asks for confirmation from someone who is informed about the facts (e.g. 'Is it...?'). A yes/no answer is appropriate in this case. In the second scenario, the speaker is already sure that a given event or circumstance has occurred but wants to know more (e.g. 'What is it?'). The speaker has to converse with an informant in order to learn further details. In this case, the answer will not be limited to the yes/no pair.

Based on the above considerations, the science of meanings groups questions into two major classes: *ṭalab-i taṣdīq* 'request of verification' or *ṭalab-i taṣawwur* 'request of conceptualisation'. The first type includes polar (yes/no) questions that verify the speaker's hypothesis. In other words, the whole utterance undergoes a truth evaluation. The second corresponds to an open-ended question, whose answer enables the speaker to conceptualise the details of an event. Only part of the utterance is under question, and the focus may be on any part of speech (predicand, predicate, patient, and the like).

Distinctive function words pertain to polar and open questions. The following list covers most of the interrogative words (*adawāt-i istifhām*) found in Persian manuals:

- a. *čī* 'what?' is used to ask about the true essence (*ḥaqīqat*) of something, the quality which describes it (*ṣifat*), the species (*ḡins*) or the name (*ism*) of a non-rational being. It also has a compound form *čīst* 'what is it?'
- b. *kī* 'who?' is used to ask about the identity (*ta'yīn*), name, or species of a rational being. It also appears in the compound form *kīst* 'who is...?'
- c. *čirā* 'why?' is used to ask about the reason or cause (*sabab*).
- d. *čisān* 'how?' is used to ask about the way (*waḍ'*) in which something is done.
- e. *kudām* 'what? which (one)?' serves to identify (*ta'yīn*) or specify (*tamyīz*) an individual among many who share something in common.
- f. *kay* 'when?' and *tā kay* 'how long?' inquire about time in terms of point or length of time.
- g. *kuḡā* 'where?' is used to ask about spatial location (*ta'yīn-i makān*).
- h. *čūn* 'how?' is used to ask about the reason or the quality (*kayfiyyat*).
- i. *čīgūna* 'in what way, of what kind?' is used to ask about the way or quality.
- j. *čand* 'how much, how many?' is used to ask about the numerical quantity (*kamiyyat-i 'adadī*).
- k. *āyā* 'is it not?' introduces yes/no questions (*ṭalab-i taṣdīq*).
- l. *maḡar* 'maybe, perhaps that not?' introduces yes/no questions and expresses a sense of uncertainty about the truthfulness of what is asked.

- m. Compounds such as *čizamān* ‘when?’, *kīst ki* ‘who is that?’, *čitawr* ‘in what way, how?’, *čiwaqt* ‘when?’, *čiqadr* ‘how much?’ introduce questions as well.
- n. Questions without an interrogative word. Unlike classical Arabic, Persian also features interrogative sentences that do not contain a dedicated or semi-dedicated morpheme. Persian yes/no questions may differ from the corresponding declarative sentence only in the intonation pattern.

A further classification distinguishes real questions from rhetorical ones. Thus, *istifhām-i taḥqīqī* ‘question to ascertain (facts), real question’ differs from *istifhām-i inkārī* ‘denial question, question to deny’. The latter is a way to make a claim about a fact or opinion in an indirect form. For example, *Kay man īn ḥarf rā zadam*¹⁰ ‘When did I say that?’. The question, in this case, is a denial of the content stated in the interrogative clause (‘I have never said that’). As such, it does not require an answer. Due to its unique *status*, the rhetorical question is understood as an informative utterance (*ḥabar*) expressed in the form of a performative utterance (*inšā*).

There are numerous cases in which the interrogative form serves purposes other than requesting information. Zāhidī (1967, 142) goes so far as to list twenty-six different uses. I have already mentioned questions used to make an order (*amr*) (see §§ 2.4 and 8.3). Here I will add an example where the question is meant to admonish (*tanbīh*) and an example to express wonder (*ta’ağğub*). Thus, the intended meanings of the following two questions are, respectively, ‘I admonish you not to go so hastily’ and ‘What a disdain! What a judge!’:

mabīn ba sib-i zanaḥdān ki čāh dar rāh ast
*kuğā hamī rawiy ay dil bad-īn šitāb kuğā*¹¹

Have no eye for the dimple in the chin: it’s the pitfall in the way.
Where, heart, are you going so hastily? Where?

īn čī istiğnā-st yā rab w-īn čī qādir ḥākīm ast
*k-īn hama zaḥm-i nihān hast u mağāl-i āh nīst*¹²

For the Lord’s sake, what are this utter disdain and this puissant judge,
That all these wounds are suppressed and no scope [is] left for sighing?

10 Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 108.

11 Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 109. Ḥāfiż 1983, 20, *ğazal* 2, v. 6. Avery 2007, 20.

12 Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 110. Ḥāfiż 1983, 160-1, *ğazal* 72, v. 5. Avery 2007, 111.

8.6 Wish (*tamannī*, *tamannā*)

The *tamannī* (or *tamannā*) is expressing the wish that something is true, knowing that it is unattainable or counterfactual. One wishes for something impossible by its very nature or for something impossible to realise at that moment (but possible in another situation).

The wish expresses itself with specific lexical markers. Many Persian features are intended to introduce impossible wishes. Besides *magar* ‘may it be that...!’ and *yā layta* ‘if only!’,¹³ there are verbs of desire such as *ārzū kardan* ‘to wish’, *umīdwār būdan* ‘to hope’, *bū ki* ‘would it be that...’, *bāšad ki* ‘would it be that...’, *āyā buwad* or *buwad āyā* ‘will it be...? could it ever be?’, *āyā šawad* ‘would it be...? could it ever be?’, and *šāyad ki* ‘if only, may it be...!’. However, the chief marker, the one most often mentioned in the manuals, is *kāš* ‘how I wish!’ and its variants *ay kāš*, *kāški*, *kāškī*. For example:

kāškī ḥāk būdam-ī dar rāh
*tā magar sāya bar man afkandī*¹⁴

How I wish I were the dust on the road
So that you may throw your shadow on me.

The authors of Persian manuals appear to be mainly concerned with lexical forms, while tending to overlook the role of morphological means, such as the verbal suffix *-ī* (as in *būdam-ī* in the example above) or the ending *-ād* of the precative.¹⁵

Remarkably, Persian manuals report some interrogative-like utterances under the heading of wish. Some of the expressions mentioned above employ *āyā*, a word that has already been introduced in the section on questions (see § 8.5). We may conclude that *āyā* is considered at different points of the manuals with different values. Scholars do not attempt to distinguish between the two functions of *āyā* in terms of primary and secondary meanings. I suspect Iranian scholars conceive any expression built on *āyā* in this section as a crystallised expression of wish, whose function operates regardless of the form. The potential interrogative nuance of the cluster of words *buwad āyā ki* fades away when it introduces an unattainable desire as in:

¹³ In Arabic, a device directly intended for *tamannī* is *layta* ‘if only’. See Simon 1993, 316-17; Jenssen 1998, 62.

¹⁴ Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 140. Sa’dī 1939, 299, *ǧazal* 538ṭ, [v. 8].

¹⁵ On the verbal suffix *-ī* to express regret, see Lazard 1963, 332 and Lenepveu-Hotz 2014, 139-62. On *-ād*, see Lazard 1963, 338-9.

buwad āyā ki dar-i maykadahā bugšāyand
*giriḥ az kār-i furū basta-yi mā bugšāyand*¹⁶

Could it be that they would open the wine-shops' doors,
 Undo the knot of our business tangled up in failure.

8.7 Vocative Expressions (*nidā*)

A vocative expression (*nidā*) aims to draw the attention of the addressee. The dedicated linguistic form, typical of calls and addresses, is the vocative (*nidā*).¹⁷ Relevant Persian devices are *ay* 'o!', *way* 'o!', *ayā* 'o!', and the suffix *-ā* 'o!'. An example is *malik-ā* 'O King!' in:

malik-ā dīkr-i tu gūyam ki tu pāk-ī u ḥudā-ī
*narawam ḡuz ba hamān rah ki tu-am rāhnumā-ī*¹⁸

O King! I invoke your name, for you are the Pure One and the Lord.
 I take no other path than the one on which you guide me.

Vocative particles may be omitted if the contextual references (*qarīna*) are strong enough to permit the addressee to recognise that it is a call. In specific contexts, vocatives, supported by an appropriate frame of reference, can also convey secondary meanings. These include expressing rebuke (*zaḡr*), painful grief (*tawaḡḡu'*), sorrow (*taḥassur*), wonder (*ta'aḡḡub*),¹⁹ astonishment (*taḥayyur*), or asking for help (*istiḡāta*).

¹⁶ Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 135. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 410-11, *ḡazal* 197, v. 1. Adapted from Avery 2007, 257. Adaptation was necessary here because Avery and Raḡā'ī rely on different readings of the same poem.

¹⁷ On *nidā* in the early Arabic grammatical tradition, see Kasher 2013.

¹⁸ Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 158. Sanā'ī 1996, 653.

¹⁹ On *ta'aḡḡub* in Arabic, see Firanesco 2003.

8.8 Non-Request Performatives

According to the definition, the category of non-request performatives applies to utterances that do not entail a request and do not have truth-evaluable content. The category mainly comprises exclamatory forms. The list of subcategories identified in Persian manuals includes expressions of:

- a. Praise (*madḥ*). It comprises utterances introduced by *ḥunuk ān ki* ‘good is he who...’, *ḥurram ān ki* ‘happy is he who...’, *ziḥī* ‘how good...! what an excellent...!’.
- b. Blame (*ḡamm*). Due to the scarcity of examples, it was difficult to find a specific Persian word of blame in the manuals. Perhaps an example is the use of *či* ‘what a...’ in *či intizār-i ḥastakunanda-yī* ‘what a boring wait!’.²⁰
- c. Wonder (*ta’aḡḡub*). An example of this type is *wah ki* ‘oh, what a wonder that...!’.
- d. Contractual formulas (*šīga-yi* ‘*uqūd*). Juridical performatives serve to validate a contract or a legal act. As stated before, this point underlies the conflation of linguistic interest of both law and rhetoric. However, the topic is only marginal in the Persian science of meanings, which mainly focuses on efficient language having literary value.
- e. Oath (*qasam*). Utterances are built on the formulas *wa-llāhi*, *bi-llāhi*, *ta-llāhi*, *ba ḥudā sawgand*, *qasam ba ḥudā*, or *sawgand bā ḥudā* ‘(I) swear by God!’.
- f. Hope (*riḡā*, also called *taraḡḡī*). An example of this type is *ḥwaš-ā* ‘happy may (he) be’. However, there is some uncertainty about the value of *ḥwaš-ā*. While Riḡānizād (1988, 301) interprets it as an expression of hope, Kazzāzī (1991, 200-1) maintains it is praise in the sense of ‘happy is (he) who...’.

Persian scholars are quite elusive on the notion of non-request performatives. Although the category appears in several manuals, the number of examples is limited or null. Also, scholars disagree on the value of some forms and expressions. I believe accepting the Arabic taxonomy as a point of departure for Persian analysis is responsible for such irregularities. If we look at the list of non-requests in the Arabic model, most entries have a dedicated morpho-syntactical structure or a specific Arabic word, not to mention a specific grammar terminology to describe them. For example, al-Taftāzānī (1911, 224) lists the following: *af’āl al-muqāraba* ‘verbs of approximation (of action)’,²¹ *af’āl al-madḥ wa-l-ḡamm* ‘verbs of praise and blame’ which

²⁰ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 135.

²¹ On which see Kouloughli 2007, 154-5 and Baalbaki 2016.

grammarians adopt for the expressions *ni'ma* 'how good!' and *bi'sa* 'how bad!',²² *ṣiyağ al-'uqūd* 'contractual formulas', *qasam* 'oath', which is mainly conveyed by particles as *wa* or *bi-* '(I swear) by...', *la'alla* and *rubba* 'perhaps', and *kam al-ḥabariyya* 'the constative how much'. The Arabic taxonomy described here covers both form and function. The Persian science of meanings, it seems, works in the opposite way: it focuses on the intended function and then searches for the various expressions that convey a similar one in Persian.

²² On which see Kouloughli 2007, 155-6.

9 **Disjunction and Conjunction** **(*faṣl wa waṣl*)**

Summary 9.1 Disjunction and Conjunction. – 9.2 The Conjunctive Linker *wa*. – 9.3 The Taxonomy of Connected and Disconnected Discourse. – 9.3.1 Unambiguous Complete Separation. – 9.3.2 Complete Connectedness. – 9.3.3 Near-Complete Separation. – 9.3.4 Near-Complete Connectedness. – 9.3.5 Ambiguous Complete Separation. – 9.3.6 Intermediate State Between Complete Separation and Complete Connectedness.

9.1 **Disjunction and Conjunction**

The chapter on *faṣl wa waṣl* ‘disjunction and conjunction’ examines the reasons why a linker (*ḥarf-i 'atf*), which is generally the and-conjunction, is required between utterances. A first dichotomy distinguishes between connected and disconnected discourse. A linker may or may not appear between a segment and the following one. The term *waṣl* defines the former state, as in, for example, *bahārān raft wa gul az būstān raft* ‘Springtime was over, and the flowers disappeared from the garden’. The term *faṣl* defines the latter, that is the absence of any conjunction between two utterances, as in *Bahrām ba man goft biyā* ‘Bahrām said to me: “Come!”’.

There are many factors involved in the decision to use a conjunctive linker. Connected and disconnected discourse are analysed in terms of semantic congruence and syntactic contiguity. Other criteria, such as the risk of misunderstanding, guide the speaker in

making the most appropriate linguistic choice. This chapter considers only matters of coordinated predicates and clause sequences. The use of conjunctive or adverbial linkers between nouns or noun phrases has already been examined (see § 4.9) and falls outside the scope of this unit.

9.2 The Conjunctive Linker *wa*

The chapter on disjunction and conjunction introduces the properties of the conjunctive linker *wa* ‘and’ (also pronounced *u*, *w-*, *wu*).¹ The manuals assign to *wa* the basic sense of *tašrīk* (or *širkat*) ‘association, associating’. Thus, the primary function of the and-conjunction is to emphasise a certain correspondence between two elements. More specifically, the two elements should be either syntactically equivalent predicates or parallel clauses. Syntactic equivalence occurs when the two elements are different predicates referring to the same predicand, as is the case with the verbs *biḥandīd* ‘laughed’ and *big(i)rīst* ‘wept’ in the following line:

*biḥandīd u bigrīst mard-i ḥudāy*²

The man of God laughed and wept.

The other case occurs when the linking device connects independent clauses which have a parallel structure. The coordination of two *ḥabar*-type utterances or, alternatively, of two *inšā*-type utterances, especially if they belong to the same subcategory of the performative, would fit this case. In other words, the two utterances should be of the same type. For example, the two imperative clauses below are connected by the and-conjunction:

*giriḥ zi dil bigušā w-az sipihr yād makun*³

Relax the knot of the heart and ponder not on the heavens.

The science of meanings holds that there should be a semantic relationship between the conjuncts. Technically, the manuals call this

¹ For phonetic reasons, the coordinative conjunction in Persian is realised in a variety of ways: in addition to *wa*, possible realisations are also *u*, *w-* and *wu*. Such variance does not imply any change in function or meaning. Thus, although I will generally refer to *wa* in the following paragraphs, different spellings will appear in the examples.

² Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 170. Sa’dī 1937a, 44. Clarke 1879, 86.

³ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 250. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 210, *ġazal* 97, v. 2. Avery 2007, 139.

ḡihat-i ḡāmi ‘point of contact, common factor’. That is, the conjunction should be motivated in terms of semantic congruence between the elements it links. In the examples above, the predicates ‘laughed’ and ‘wept’ support the and-conjunction because they are semantically antonyms, while ‘relax’ and ‘ponder not’ do so because they are close in meaning. Semantic incongruence, on the other hand, is detrimental to eloquence. Therefore, even if it does not affect grammatical correctness, linking two elements without a common factor should generally be avoided.

Some manuals, such as Āhanī 1978, have also considered connectives other than *wa* ‘and’. Words whose function goes beyond simply joining utterances, such as *pas* ‘so’ and *az in pas* ‘after that’, are considered useful for ordering events one after another (*tartīb*) or adding the idea of mediation or a time gap between two actions (*tarāhī*). Scholars seem to have followed the Arabic model more closely in this case, by looking for the Persian equivalents of the Arabic *fa-* ‘and so, subsequently’ and *ṭumma* ‘afterwards, later’.⁴ However, Persian manuals generally concentrate on the role of the conjunction *wa* and leave limited or no space for different linkers.

9.3 The Taxonomy of Connected and Disconnected Discourse

The science of meanings has introduced a detailed taxonomy of various cases of disjunction and conjunction. Technically, it distinguishes six possible situations (*mawārid*) in which the and-conjunction between two utterances does or does not occur. The first four involve the absence of the conjunction word and are considered cases of *faṣl* ‘disjunction’. The remaining two are cases of *waṣl* ‘conjunction’. Each of the six is motivated and intended in a different way, as I will describe below.

9.3.1 Unambiguous Complete Separation

The first situation of the absence of an and-conjunction is the complete separation without any ambiguity that could lead to misunderstanding (*kamāl-i inqiṭāʾ bidūn-i ihām-i ḥilāf-i maqṣūd*). It consists in the mere juxtaposition of two utterances which have nothing in common. The condition that there should be no ambiguity is necessary to distinguish this situation from another one in which, although the utterances have nothing in common, the and-conjunction is required

⁴ On *fa-* and *ṭumma* in the Arabic science of meanings, see al-Taftāzānī 1911, 248-50; Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 134; Jenssen 1998, 118.

for the sake of disambiguation. The latter case will be the subject of a later discussion in § 9.3.5.

The basic situation of complete separation is two-fold. Either the combined utterances are of different types, one informative (*ḥabar*) and the other performative (*inšā*),⁵ or they are two parallel utterances without any semantic point of contact. An example of the first type appears in the following line. The first half-line contains a statement, while the second is a question. Since the former is informative and the latter performative, there is no and-conjunction between them:

dūš az masǧid sūy-i mayḥāna āmad pīr-i mā
*čīst yārān-i ʔarīqat baʔd az īn tadbīr-i mā?*⁶

Last night our Elder went out of the mosque to the wine-shop,
[So] now, comrades of the Way, what must be our strategy?

As for the second type, the absence of a semantic linkage justifies the lack of the and-conjunction between two utterances, even if they have a parallel structure. Unless there is a risk of misunderstanding, the science of meanings suggests keeping sentences apart. Below is an example of juxtaposition of two informative utterances with a great semantic distance:

Qārūn gūyand ganǧ dāšt nihānī
*Šāh bulandaḥtar ast u saḥtkamān ast*⁷

Korah, they say, possessed a hidden treasure.
The King is born under a lucky star and is a high-strength archer.

I found that the same line also appears in Rādūyānī's *Tarǧumān al-balāga*, an early Persian manual of *badīʔ* written around 1088-1114. Rādūyānī (1949, 135) quotes the line to illustrate a fault of semantic distance called *mutanāfir* or *tanāfur*. Interestingly, while Rādūyānī caught a mistake in this line, Aḥmadniżād (2003, 146) considers it best practice. Such a different evaluation does not only depend on the centuries that have passed from Rādūyānī's time to the present. Rather, different branches of rhetoric focus on different aspects of

⁵ More precisely, the phenomenon occurs when one of the two sentences is an utterance with constative meaning and the other is an utterance with performative meaning. The case described can occur between two utterances, one of which is *ḥabar* and the other *inšā* in form and meaning; or between two utterances both of which are *ḥabar* (or both *inšā*) in form, but one of which is *ḥabar* and the other *inšā* in meaning.

⁶ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 241. Ḥāfiż 1983, 36, *ǧazal* 10, v. 1. Avery 2007, 33 (square brackets added).

⁷ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 146.

speech formulation and evaluate lines of poetry accordingly. Here, the oddity resulting from the absence of a point of contact is the ultimate reason that justifies the asyndeton. On the whole, the lack of a conjunction here is a response to the requirements of the situation, which is the primary concern of the science of meanings.

9.3.2 Complete Connectedness

Complete connectedness (*kamāl-i ittiṣāl*) occurs between two utterances that are close in meaning. This happens when the utterances are alternative formulations of the same concept. An example is when the second utterance has the value of explanatory apposition (*ʿaṭf-i bayān*), is permutational (*badal*), or emphasises (*taʿkīd*) the first. In these cases, it is self-evident that the two utterances have something to do with each other. Since there is no possibility to misunderstand the relationship between the two, there is no need for a conjunction. An example is:

*yak-ī zindagānī talaf karda būd
ba ġahl u ḡalālat sar āwarda būd*⁸

A certain one had squandered his life;
Had passed it in ignorance and error.

9.3.3 Near-Complete Separation

In cases of near-complete separation (*šibh-i kamāl-i inqiṭāʿ*), the disjunction prevents a possible misunderstanding. Here the manuals mainly discuss examples of ambiguity in the sentence chain. Consider, for example, a sequence of a main clause, a subordinate clause, and another clause. If the speaker's intention is to coordinate the last clause with the main one, a conjunction immediately after the first subordinate clause is not desirable. In fact, there is a risk that the coordinated clause will be considered on the same level as the subordinate clause. How then is the speaker supposed to deal with the conjunction? Interestingly, although the conjunction would almost fit after the subordinate clause, leaving it out is the best choice. In the same way, the coordinated clause occurs in asyndeton in:

⁸ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 146. Sa'dī 1937a, 124. Clarke 1879, 217.

yār pindāšt ki man dil ba digar yār diham
*āhir īn dil ba yak-ī yār-i wafādār diham*⁹

The friend thought: “I will give my heart to someone else”.
 Eventually, I will give this heart to a faithful friend.

In the example, disjunction allows eschewing a possible misunderstanding. A main clause and a reported clause appear in the first half-line, while another clause follows in asyndeton in the second half-line. In the hypothesis that the conjunctive linker had occurred, the second half-line would have shifted from reporting the poet’s thoughts to reporting the friend’s speech (‘I will give my heart to someone else and, eventually, I will give this heart to a faithful friend’). The lack of conjunction clarifies that the last clause of the line is parallel to the main clause and not a part of the reported speech.

9.3.4 Near-Complete Connectedness

Utterances that are related but have different meanings need no linker between them. These are cases of near-complete connectedness (*šibh-i kamāl-i ittiṣāl*). The typical example is the juxtaposition of question and answer, where the semantic relationship between the utterances overrides the need for conjunction. However, in order to reproduce a question-answer pattern, it is not necessary to ask a direct question. As the manuals state, it is enough that the first utterance logically leads to a question. For example, the second half-line below answers the unspoken question, ‘Does stone indeed turn to ruby?’:

gūyand sang la’l šawad dar maqām-i šabr
*ārī šawad wa līk ba hūn-i ġigar šawad*¹⁰

They say that in being resigned to patience stone turns to ruby.
 Yes, it does, but it does so with the blood of the liver.

9.3.5 Ambiguous Complete Separation

The first situation of *waṣl* ‘conjunction’ to be discussed is the complete separation with the risk of misunderstanding (*kamāl-i inqitā’ bā ihām-i ḥilāf-i maqṣūd*). As mentioned in § 9.3.1, the speaker should avoid conjunction between utterances that differ because one is *ḥabar*

⁹ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 247.

¹⁰ Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 146. Ḥāfiż 1983, 458, *ġazal* 221, v. 2. Avery 2007, 286.

and the other *inšā* or if they have no common factor. Sometimes, however, the use of the conjunction is preferred. This happens when the absence of the conjunction would allow a reading other than that intended by the speaker. Ambiguity (*ihām* ‘double-entendre’) can lead to *ḥilāf-i maqṣūd* ‘something contrary to the intended purpose’. In these cases, the linker between the two utterances is considered necessary to avoid a possible misinterpretation, as in: [Speaker-A] *Fulān-ī az bīmārī-yi saraṭān nağāt yāft?* ‘Has So-and-so recovered from cancer?’ | [Speaker-B] *Na wa ḥudāy-aš bihbūd diḥād*¹¹ ‘No, and may God bless him with good health!’.

In the example in prose above, the conjunctive linker *wa* connects two utterances that have little in common. The negation *na* answers the previous question, and an exclamative clause follows. In these two utterances we should recognise an informative (*ḥabar*) followed by a performative (*inšā*). By default, there should be no conjunction between the two. However, had it not been in conjunction, it would have grown a risk of misunderstanding. The following rewording better explains the unintended result: [Speaker-A] *Fūlān-ī az bīmārī-yi saraṭān nağāt yāft?* ‘Has So-and-so recovered from cancer?’ | [Speaker-B] *Na ḥudāy-aš bihbūd diḥād* ‘May God not bless him with good health!’. Meaning and tone change radically. It is essential to express the linker *wa*, for its avoidance turns the blessing into a curse. Eloquent speakers should avoid any utterance that does not clearly express their intention. The use of the conjunction sometimes becomes the preferred means of avoiding conveying an unintended meaning.¹²

9.3.6 Intermediate State Between Complete Separation and Complete Connectedness

The last case of conjunction identified by the manuals occurs in the intermediate state between complete separation and complete connectedness (*tawassuṭ bayn-i kamāl-i inqitā’ wa kamāl-i ittiṣāl*). It corresponds to the most trivial case of coordination in terms of *tašrīk* ‘association’. When two elements occupy the same syntactic positions or have a parallel structure, but do not meet the conditions of complete connectedness, the and-conjunction occurs between them. For example, the conjunction connects the coordinated imperatives *yād gīr* ‘remember!’ and *dar ‘amal ār* ‘apply!’ in:

¹¹ Quoted in Riḍānizād 1988, 443.

¹² Riḍānizād (1988, 444) suggests that in speech this can be remedied by inserting a pause between the two sentences. Attention to prosodic phenomena, such as pauses, is a recent addition to the science of meanings and goes beyond the old boundaries of the discipline.

*naṣīḥat-ī kunam-at yād gīr u dar ‘amal ār*¹³

I will give you a piece of advice. Remember and apply it.

In search of the reason behind a linker, the science of meanings analyses utterances in terms of common semantic factors and parallelism in structure and syntactical function. It seems that the science of meanings assumes that disjunction is preferred whenever possible, whereas conjunction requires a specific reason to occur. Conjunction thus presupposes a kind of markedness. Moreover, in one of the most remarkable outcomes of the science of meanings, the discipline also assigns a disambiguating function to the use or lack of the and-conjunction. Counterintuitively, disambiguation leads to the creation of non-standard utterances that distance themselves from the default syntax generally suggested in grammar textbooks.

In this chapter, some examples, especially those used to illustrate the complete separation with the risk of misunderstanding, seem to have been purpose-built. Apparently, it was difficult to find examples in Persian poetry. Classical poetry, with its regular metrical scansion, caesura and pause rarely uses conjunction between utterances. The urge to divide words into sentences and clauses without ambiguities, which may have been a concern of the poets, found in meter and rhyme allies in marking the boundaries of each line and, thus, of each conceptual unit. Some Iranian scholars have questioned the significance of the chapter on conjunction and disjunction in Persian. Šamīsā (1994, 167-8) and his followers relegate it to a mere appendix of their manuals. In Šamīsā's view, the use of punctuation marks, a twentieth-century innovation in Persian writing, now supersedes the need for a theory of conjunction such as that previously established in the science of meanings.

¹³ Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 147. Ḥāfiż 1983, 90, *ğazal* 37, v. 6. Avery 2007, 68.

10 **Brevity, Verbosity and Balance** **(*īḡāz*, *iṭnāb*, *musāwāt*)**

Summary 10.1 Utterance Length. – 10.2 Brevity (*īḡāz*). – 10.3 Verbosity (*iṭnāb*). – 10.4 Balance (*musāwāt*).

10.1 Utterance Length

The final part of the science of meanings is the section on brevity (*īḡāz*), verbosity (*iṭnāb*) and balance (*musāwāt*). After dissecting the components of the utterance in search of context-driven changes of meaning, manuals tackle the issue of the length of the utterance and how it can be manipulated. Ellipsis, clarification, combination of sentences, as well as other operations, are now considered for their effect on length. By moving from smaller to larger units, the science of meanings gradually passes from syntax and semantics to a style guide.

Different utterances have different length. The manuals present such variations as a matter of proportion between wording (*lafz*) and meaning (*ma'nā*). The proportion may favour the former, the latter, or neither. On this basis, three styles of utterance formulation are identified: *īḡāz*, *iṭnāb* and *musāwāt*. The idea of brevity and verbosity as two poles of eloquence in Persian is already mentioned in the earliest tradition of rhetoric. That tradition, mainly interested in matters

of *badī'*, generally recognised the merits of brevity.¹ The science of meanings, on the contrary, does not hunt for the best style in absolute terms. One style is not necessarily superior to the others. There will be situations recommending more or fewer words depending on the needs of the different communicative goals.

10.2 Brevity (*iğāz*)

A brief utterance is shorter than what is usually expected or required but expresses everything necessary. There are many ways to obtain brevity. Manuals describe a first typological subdivision which distinguishes two approaches: a concise style expressing much with a few dense-meaning and well-chosen words (*iğāz-i qaṣr*, also spelt *iğāz-i qīṣar*, 'brevity by means of shortness') and an elliptical speech that drops all the unnecessary words or phrases (*iğāz-i ḥaḍf* 'brevity by means of ellipsis').² The two strategies achieve brevity through contrasting means. One insists on the meaningfulness and expressive potential, and the other on a specific cohesive device.

The conciseness of the first type succeeds in summarising a concept in a highly effective manner. It relies on the ability of the speaker to use meaningful words and adopt an incisive style. It would still be possible to lengthen the statement, but the message's core would not change. It is the style one expects in aphorisms, proverbs, and impressive lines of poetry such as:

guftam-aš silsila-yi zulf-i butān az pay-i čī-st
guft Ḥāfiẓ gila-yī az dil-i šaydā mikard³

I asked, "What are the chain-like curls of idols for?"

He replied, "Ḥāfiẓ has been complaining of the heart madly in love."

This line is considered an example of effective conciseness. The poet tacitly alludes to physically restraining people considered insane. Mentally ill people were kept in chains to prevent them from causing damage to themselves or others. Accordingly, it is not strange that a heart that is madly in love – and causes the poet Ḥāfiẓ to complain – would face restraining with chains. With their chain-like shape, the

¹ On brevity in classical Arabic literary discourse, see van Gelder 1981.

² It should be noted that the word *qaṣr* does not have the same meaning here as it had in the section on restriction (see chapter 6). In the science of meanings, in fact, the term *qaṣr* presents two different technical meanings: 'restriction' and 'shortening, abbreviation'.

³ Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 148. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 288-9, *ğazal* 136, v. 8. Adapted from Avery 2007, 185.

curls of the beloved are apt to enchain the insane, which is the ultimate reason for their existence. Ḥāfiẓ conveyed such a complex meaning with a handful of dense and evocative words.

Conversely, in the case of *īǧāz-i ḥadḥ*, the speaker abridges the utterance by dropping words or phrases. When choosing an elliptical style, the speaker must ensure that the element dropped from the surface structure is otherwise recoverable. As we have seen, syntagmatic and extra-syntagmatic context plays a significant role in the acceptability of ellipsis. Clues for the addressee to retrieve the elided information depend on the contextual frame of reference (*qarīna*). Consider the following line by Sa'dī, which has been quoted earlier to discuss the ellipsis of the predicate (see § 5.2):

dīda-yi ahl-i ṭama' ba ni'mat-i dunyā
*pur našawad hamčunānki čāh zi šabnam*⁴

The eye of the greedy, with the wealth of the world,
Is not filled. Likewise the well with the dew of the night.

Sa'dī adopts an elliptical style where one element, the predicate of the second sentence, is missing. The first sentence provides enough context to suggest that an unspoken predicate *pur našawad* 'is not filled' also applies to the predicand *čāh* 'the well'. Repetition is unnecessary since the lexical connection (*qarīna-yi luǧawī*) between the two sentences guarantees a proper understanding of the elided element. Here brevity is considered the result of deleting one element from the surface structure while it remains in the underlying one.

Sometimes ellipsis does not point to previously stated lexical items but rests on a solid logical connection (*qarīna-yi ma'nawī*). Of course, some hints should point to the ellipsis' content. Even a well-known use would do. One example is the conventional use of expressions such as 'in the name of God', or equivalent opening, to mark the beginning of Persian literary works. In such events, the speaker, in fact, generally omits to state *what* he intends to begin in the name of God. The opening line of the *Šāhnāma* (The Book of Kings) by Firdawsī provides one example of such an ellipsis:

ba nām-i ḥudāwand-i ǧān u ḥīrad
*k-az-īn bartar andiša bar nagḍarad*⁵

In the Name of the God of Soul and Reason!
For beyond this, (human) intellect cannot reach!

⁴ Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 148. Sa'dī 1937b, 172.

⁵ Quoted in Aḥmadnižād 2003, 148. Firdawsī 1988-2008, 1: 3, v. 1. Dabashi 2019, 2.

The poet and his audience share a common background knowledge. The expression ‘in the Name of God’ is reminiscent of the first words of the opening phrase of the Qur’ān, an Islamic formula with which Muslims often begin their activity. In the line above, for brevity, Firdawsī does not specify what he will start. Nevertheless, he does not break communication rules. In place of the ellipsis, the poet could explain the activity he was going to start, but since the text is not cryptic in any regard, any additional wording would be unnecessary and not conforming to brevity.

The section on brevity in the manuals of the science of meanings approaches ellipsis from a peculiar point of view. It tackles notions already appearing in the previous sections dedicated to the ellipsis of predicand (see § 4.2), predicate (see § 5.2) and complements of the verb (see §§ 6.2 and 6.3), but it rearranges the concepts. The discussion is widened to cope with the stylistic purposes of brevity. In this view, the ellipsis is a cohesive feature and may affect any component of the utterance, such as the first element of *iḍāfa* construction (*ḥaḍf-i muḍāf*), the second element of *iḍāfa* construction (*ḥaḍf-i muḍāf ilayh*), the qualified noun (*ḥaḍf-i mawṣūf*), the quality (*ḥaḍf-i sifat*), the if-clause (*ḥaḍf-i šarṭ*) and the main clause in a conditional sentence (*ḥaḍf-i ġawāb*), or even a complete sentence.

Concision should not impair the utterance’s informativeness. Notwithstanding the possibilities mentioned above, radical attempts to economise words, either by shortness or ellipsis, at the expense of contents, are considered flawed kinds of brevity (*iğāz-i muḥill*). Brevity should always ensure understanding of the content of the utterance. Otherwise, linguistic efficiency is compromised. If the amount of signifier expressed is insufficient to convey the meaning, the attempt at brevity does not achieve the desired result.

10.3 Verbosity (*iṭnāb*)

In the science of meanings, verbosity (*iṭnāb*), as a technical term, means an effective way of using many words to express a concept. The term does not seem to express negative connotations. However, in contrast to brevity, a lengthy style must be justified more carefully to be acceptable. Verbosity must ensure that no expression is superfluous in the utterance. Manuals have codified a series of lengthening techniques, many of which I will display in the following paragraphs with examples taken from Persian manuals. Some techniques resemble those listed in earlier manuals of *badī’*, but a different approach applies here. The desire to beautify a sentence, which is what *badī’* is mainly about, is not the main point. The focus here is on the pragmatic and context-driven reasons behind the choice. The context suggests the rationale behind adding extra words.

One technique, usually the first listed in manual inventories, consists of the clarification of what was uttered earlier in an obscure way (*iḍāḥ ba'd az ibhām* or *iḍāḥ pas az ibhām*). Any vague reference later clarified comes under this label. The category mainly includes uses of unclear antecedents and cataphors, whose referent appears only later in the discourse. Some examples include utterances where a cardinal numeral appears before a noun to express quantity, and a one-by-one list of the entities encompassed by that noun follows. In the Arabic science of meanings, a particular technical term, *tawṣīf* 'dual enumeration', defines occasions in which a dual form appears, and then the speaker enumerates the two items.⁶ Although the dual does not exist in Persian, a similar discourse lengthening strategy applies where the numeral is a determiner, as in:

dar mawsim-i zimistān Sa'dī du čiz ḥwāhad
*yā rūy-i āftāb-ī yā āftābrūy-ī*⁷

In the winter season, Sa'dī desires two things:
The face of the Sun or a face like a sun.

The referent intended by the phrase *du čiz* 'two things' is unknown. The speaker has not yet mentioned what he intends with it, and one may wonder what those two things are. The second half-line, where two expressions actualise the unclear antecedent and reveal the intended meaning, clarifies the matter. In contrast to what is generally expected, the numeral points forward, as the entities referred to appear only later in the utterance. Although the author could have expressed the concept more briefly, the statement does not contain any redundant elements.

Repetition (*tikrār*), a different technique, makes the discourse occupy more words than required. To guard against redundancy, reiterated elements should not be superfluous but should add a nuance of meaning. For instance, a valid aim of repetition is to add emphasis (*tikrār ba ḡihat-i ta'kid*) as in the following line:

dāda payambar na ba čašm-ī digar
*balki bad-īn čašm-i sar īn čašm-i sar*⁸

The Messenger of God had seen not with different eyes,
But with these eyes in his head, these eyes in his head!

⁶ See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 292.

⁷ Quoted in Riḍānižād 1988, 451.

⁸ Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 149 (with some variation). Nizāmī 1956, 18, *Maḥzan al-asrār*.

The phrase *in čašm-i sar* ‘these eyes in his head’ (literally, ‘this eye of the head’) appears twice for emphasis, and the repetition makes the whole sense of *in čašm-i sar in čašm-i sar* closer to ‘these very eyes’.

Passing from the general to the specific (*ḡikr-i ḡāšš pas az ‘āmm*), or vice versa from the specific to the general (*ḡikr-i ‘āmm pas az ḡāšš*), is another way to formulate extended utterances. In the following line, the poet first mentions the general *hama čiz u kas* ‘all the things and persons’ and later specifies examples of the elements falling within the intended set:

parastār-i amr-aš hama čiz u kas
*banī ādam u murġ u mūr u magas*⁹

The servant of His order every thing and person:
The son of Adam, and fowl, and ant, and fly.

Perfecting (*takmīl*) consists in partially amending a previously stated assertion. The speaker adjusts his utterance by integrating it with some words that aim to reject possible unintended interpretations. The overall purpose seems to be preventing false impressions. An example is the following line where the connotation of the first occurrence of the word *šāh* ‘the king’ is open to misinterpretation. Since the qualities the word ‘king’ may subsume may be in opposition, as the king may be just or oppressive, the poet perfects the first sentence with an additional refinement to efface any misunderstanding:

sāya-yi kirdiġār bāšad šāh
*šāh-i ‘ādil na šāh-i ‘ādilkāh*¹⁰

The king is the shadow of God [on the world].
The just king, [I mean,] not the unjust king!

Further, completion (*tatmīm*) is another practice of expanding the utterance. It differs from the previous technique in that the addition is not motivated by a need for amendment. It consists of a different, unessential expression following the main sentence when the latter is free of obscurities. Such an elaboration, however, improves the utterance. In the following example, *arči darwiš and* ‘although they are poor’ exemplifies *tatmīm*:

⁹ Quoted in Riḡānižād 1988, 450. Sa’dī 1937a, 2; Clarke 1879, 3.

¹⁰ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 272. Awḡadī 1961, 529, *Ġām-i ġam*, v. 11312.

*nīk rād and arči darwīš and
pas ba māl and u dar dihiš piš and*¹¹

They are very generous, although they are poor.
The lowliest ones are the most liberal in giving.

Adding a coda (*taḡyīl*) means that the speaker adds a further statement at the end of the utterance in support of the previous one, whose contents he reiterates with different wording. It is an addendum to an utterance whose content the speaker formulates differently or from a more general point of view, enlarging the speech to confirm the main idea or argument. In the following line, for example, Ḥāfiẓ approaches the themes of shame, repentance and illicit behaviour from two distinct sides: a personal side in the first half-line and a universal side in the second. The latter exemplifies a coda to the speech. It is a different manner of posing the content exposed in the previous utterance while confirming it:

*ba waqt-i gul šudam az tawba-yi šarāb ḥağīl
ki kas mabād zi kirdār-i nāṣawāb ḥağīl*¹²

In the time of the rose I became ashamed of repenting of wine.
May no one be ashamed of improper conduct!

Final hyperbole (*iğāl*) is an additional phrase, without which the utterance would still be complete, that appears at the end of the utterance to boost the main idea, especially to exaggerate one's argument in support of it. The detailed and emphatic account *pur gawhar u bā qaymat u pur lu'lu'-i lālā* 'full of gems, precious and shining with pearls!' ends the following line with hyperbole:

*daryā-yi suḥanhā suḥan-i ḥūb-i ḥudāy ast
pur gawhar u bā qaymat u pur lu'lu'-i lālā*¹³

The ocean of words is God's excellent word.
Full of gems, precious and shining with pearls!

Finally, parenthesis (*i'tirāḡ*) is the insertion of a parenthetical clause, generally introduced in an intermediate position inside the sentence. While it does not affect the meaning, there are reasons to consider it effective and eloquent, notably when it adds a prayer, blessing, curse,

11 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 273.

12 Quoted in Āq-Iwlī n.d., 130. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 614-15, *ğazal* 299, v. 1. Avery 2007, 372.

13 Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 269. Nāṣir-i Ḥusraw 1928, 3, v. 16.

eulogy, or other subtlety. Examples of this type are the insertion of *gufta* and ‘they say’ and *ki dīkr-aš ba ḥayr bād* ‘may his mention be good’ in the following two lines:

surūd-i mağlis-i Ğamšīd gufta and īn būd
*ki ġām-i bāda biyāwar ki Ğam naḥwāhad mānd*¹⁴

The anthem of Jamshid’s assembly – they say – was:
“Bring the bowl of wine because Jam won’t remain.”

dī pīr-i mayfurūš ki dīkr-aš ba ḥayr bād
*guft-ā šarāb nūš u ġām-i dil bibar zi yād*¹⁵

Yesterday the wine-selling Elder – may his mention be good –
Said, “Drink wine and the heart’s regret banish from memory.”

Not all additions fall under the techniques mentioned above. Any addition which is uninformative or lacking in finesse falls outside of lengthening strategies and impairs utterance effectiveness. In this regard, it is interesting to note the status assigned to the embellishment device called *ḥašw* ‘pleonastic interpolation’. According to the science of embellishments (*ilm-i badī*), it consists of one or more unnecessary words, with little or no informative content, incorporated in a line of poetry to create an artifice. In terms of aesthetic merit, it can be ranked as *malīḥ* ‘elegant, gracious’, *mutawassiṭ* ‘average, neutral’ or *qabīḥ* ‘ugly, incorrect’. Blessings and good wishes are considered gracious. Metrical fillers in a line of poetry are neutral. Pleonasms proper are ugly. From the point of view of the science of meanings, the *mutawassiṭ* and *qabīḥ* types seem not to qualify as appropriate lengthening strategies because a low level of informativity is detrimental to utterance effectiveness. The *ḥašw* of the *malīḥ* type is usually a prayer or an apposition. Šamīsā (1994, 154 and 164) considers it a form of *iṭnāb*.

A fault in the application of lengthening techniques may result in *taṭwīl* ‘long-windedness, prolixity’. The concept of *taṭwīl* is different from both *ḥašw* and *iṭnāb*. Unlike pleonastic interpolation, prolix utterances are unnecessarily long but one cannot isolate the elements where lengthiness exactly lies. It is the whole utterance that occupies too much space compared to what it communicates. The difference between *iṭnāb* and *taṭwīl* is a matter of effectiveness. While *iṭnāb* is a suitable communicative strategy in appropriate contexts, *taṭwīl*

¹⁴ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 277. Ḥāfīz 1983, 368, *ğazal* 176, v. 5. Adapted from Avery 2007, 235.

¹⁵ Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 275. Ḥāfīz 1983, 208, *ğazal* 96, v. 1. Avery 2007, 138.

is not. The latter describes the over-long style of a wordy and uninformative utterance. The following rule applies for qualifying a long utterance as effective: extra words should not appear as pure fillers but also as bearers of meaning.

10.4 Balance (*musāwāt*)

Another strategy used in many Persian texts in prose and poetry is called *musāwāt* ‘balance, equilibrium, proportionate length’. The utterance contains nothing more and nothing less than what is needed to express what the speaker intends to convey. The achievement of balance accounts for equivalency in signifier and signified, or, according to a different definition, the intermediate condition between brevity and verbosity.

Balance is the strategy that best resembles plain speech, but possibly with a twist. The science of meanings considers it possible to manipulate a proportionate utterance for reasons of effectiveness. One technique is choosing short words. Manuals distinguish then between two kinds of balance: *musāwāt bā iḥtiṣār* ‘balance with shortening’ and *musāwāt bidūn-i iḥtiṣār* ‘balance without shortening’. The two strategies highlight the importance of a conscious choice of words and the speaker’s attention towards word length. The basic idea is that utterances that employ long words tend to seem lengthier. Short words give the false impression that the passage tends towards conciseness. The practice of abbreviating is positively evaluated. So, the quest for shortening (*iḥtiṣār*) may be considered a piece of stylistic advice. Once more, the choice of the most effective utterance resides in various strategies, techniques and finely tuned literary practices.

11 Conclusion

The previous chapters have provided a panorama of the main topics studied in the Persian manuals of the science of meanings (*‘ilm-i ma‘ānī*). More than a hundred technical terms have been discussed, clarified, and contextualised alongside the general principles and concepts. I have examined how the discipline looks at the speaker’s intention behind the utterance and how a set of pre-established patterns reshape pieces of discourse to convey different senses, from direct to subtle meanings. The Persian science of meanings was the product of two highly influential legacies: the Arabic science of meanings as a model and the Persian classical poetry as a canon of eloquence. Both have played a role in shaping the Persian discipline as it is today, including strengths and weaknesses. This concluding chapter offers some reflections on the Persian science of meanings in terms of its nature, relationship with the Arabic model, and significance as a literary study.

The object of study is the utterance (*kalām*), that is, a sentence in a context. Utterances can inform, show knowledge of facts or thoughts, ask, command, forbid, express sentiments, and induce many other effects. Such results are obtained through a range of operations that manipulate the utterance and its components in smaller or larger scale. On one hand, the so-called *aḥwāl* ‘states’ cover the different forms and functions of the basic components of an utterance. On the other hand, specific cohesive features and strategies organise larger sequences of utterances. Syntactic forms and patterns of expression

have codified functions that the language user can play with to find what best suits the situation. The context is made up of many varied elements. These include information about the people with whom the speaker is interacting (rank, attitude, thoughts, beliefs, and feelings among others), surrounding words given in previous utterances, and the shared knowledge of the world and of linguistic conventions. From the point of view of the search for eloquence (*balāḡat*), the pragmatic linguistic attention that characterises the discipline is considered relevant.

Eloquence requires perspicuity. And the science of meanings considers where ambiguity may lie in utterance formulation. First, the same form can take on different meanings in different contexts. Second, different forms can achieve similar meanings in different contexts. To justify the economy of forms in relation to the sea of meanings, and vice versa, the science of meanings advances the hypothesis of different levels in language. For many linguistic forms, a primary and several secondary meanings may be identified. Contextual references, whether lexical or logical, clarify which of these multiple meanings should emerge as the correct meaning of the utterance. The utterance is seen as an organised system where each component should make sense within the framework of internal and external references.

The *ma'ānī* 'meanings' that give the science its title are also linked to the idea of expectation. The speaker, it seems, has a kind of mental image of what he wants to communicate before any word is uttered. Expressing such an idea in a form that is transparent and consistent within the context opens the way to linguistic efficiency. Each situation creates an expectation, which also enables the addressee to make predictions. The spoken utterance, then, either meets the expectations or, if there is a reason to do so, breaks them. The more expectations are broken, the more meaning is expressed. However, this general principle only works within certain conventional limits described by the discipline. Indeed, in order to distinguish efficient expressions from bad ones, the condition that there should be a reason is necessary. As a result, the science of meanings teaches both a grammar of expectations and acceptable breaches of expectations.¹

With a few exceptions, Iranian scholars have essentially followed an imitative approach. Assuming that most of what was true for Arabic could also be true for Persian, Iranian scholars attempted to describe the latter language based on the results of a theory designed to describe the former. This method generally works in early

¹ The idea of the unexpected as a means of eloquence in the Arabic tradition has been previously pointed out by Hatim, who calls Arabic rhetoric (*balāḡa*) "the grammar of stylistic unexpectedness" (2010, 70), and by Harb, who considers it part of a wider "aesthetic of wonder" to which "the element of the unexpected" pertains (2020, 249).

bilingual manuals where Persian examples support the understanding of the Arabic science of meanings. Unfortunately, this method fails to provide a complete picture of the expressive possibilities of the Persian language. On the one hand, some Persian linguistic operations are overlooked. On the other hand, some operations are given more space than may be relevant to Persian. This has also biased more recent works that focus on Persian. Although these tend to pay more attention to the peculiarities of the language under study, they are not necessarily equipped for a comprehensive re-examination of Persian syntax from a pragmatic perspective. This is suggested by the fact that scholars tend to disagree on the interpretation of some typical Persian forms. Conceivably there is room for further developments of the Persian science of meanings. This may well happen in the coming years through a more detailed analysis of the Persian linguistic reality.

In this outline, I have tried to highlight the instances in which the adaptation of the science of meanings to Persian has necessitated a rethink. The basic principles and a big part of the sophisticated Arabic analysis can apply to the Persian language. Integrating Persian data into Arabic theory, however, required effort. The structural differences between the two languages posed some insurmountable obstacles, and the process of adaptation left obvious traces in the manuals. Phenomena relevant in Arabic shifted their original import once integrated into Persian theory. Iranian scholars, each according to their own sensibilities, reshaped and eschewed some of the topics that were part of their model. Likewise, transferring taxonomies from Arabic to Persian occasionally showed some weaknesses. They generally perform well at the top of the taxonomic tree structure but can falter at lower nodes. In fact, sometimes the relevant level of detail in Arabic was almost irrelevant in Persian.

Arabic and Persian disciplines occasionally differ in the method. The Arabic model generally tends to tie a particular Arabic linguistic form to its pragmatic functions. Persian scholars in some cases have done the opposite. Two tendencies, form-oriented and function-oriented, coexist in the Persian manuals. The first aspires to consider Persian patterns of expression from a semantic and pragmatic point of view and, as we have seen, is probably still incomplete. The second explores the idea of some abstract functions whose existence is as possible in Persian as they were in Arabic, but whose forms in Persian may vary. Form and function generally overlap in the Arabic science of meanings, but not necessarily in Persian.

Handbooks generally use classical Persian poetry as a repertory of linguistic facts. This is perhaps a tribute to the long tradition of Persian rhetoric books, which were lists of technical terms, followed by a definition, usually brief, and a few poetic examples. Another possible reason is a perceived superiority of classical Persian

poetry over any other form of expression among Iranian scholars. If the science of meanings in addition to being a language science is a theory of aesthetic and literary merit, as it seems to be nowadays, then accordingly the best examples should come from poetry. Lines from different periods are quoted, but virtually no reference is made to possible changes in syntax through the history of the language.² The science of meanings, arguably prefers to describe a set of universal criteria and eternal functions. It appears that these criteria and functions are assumed to be stable and intrinsic features at the very core of the Persian language.

The integration of poetry into the system of the science of meanings has obvious consequences which need to be considered. First, poetry is regarded as being composed of utterances. The smallest meaningful string in classical poetry is generally considered to be the *bayt* 'line' which usually carries a complete concept. The utterance, thus, becomes another category through which the single line of poetry is discussed. Second, because utterances are sentences in a context, lines of poetry should also be immersed in a context. While it is easy to agree that poetry has internal and external references, it is more difficult to understand the interplay of other elements of the context. Poems handed down through generations have only a few ties to the original context of utterance. And we may have no idea of the original addressee and the hearers. In a context that is often fictional, the idea of a speaker and an addressee whose attitude influences the formulation of the utterance does not seem very clear. Third, like any other utterance, poetry should respond to the requirements of the situation through mechanisms of met and violated expectations. However, if the role of the addressee in poetry is not clear, whose expectations should the poet meet or breach?

A paradigm shift may be a possible solution to the last two paradoxes. Not only does the utterance reflect the context, but the context also emerges from the utterance. The poet, like any speaker, works under several constraints. He should carefully polish all the elements of the utterance to faithfully reproduce the idea he has in mind. Among the various tools at his disposal, the subtleties of syntax help to paint a credible portrait of an otherwise imaginary context of utterance. Skilled poets manipulate the tools to reproduce the authentic mechanisms of speech and the audience seemingly accepts the created as if it were real. The more information about the context that is given, the more valuable the line of poetry is. From this perspective, the theory can apply whether the context is real or fictitious.

² For a similar critique of the lack of diachronic perspective in Persian rhetorical studies, see Fašāraki 1974. See also Kārdgar 2016.

The principles of the science of meanings are also used to explain certain literary conventions typical of classical Persian poetry. From a stylistic point of view, the discipline is also a study of how poets got the most out of syntax and how they employed different techniques to enhance their compositions. A theory grounded in linguistics becomes a means to explain literary practices.

In a sense, the Persian science of meanings today is also a philological practice. Philology seeks to make sense of texts. Texts are to be preserved in both form and content. The discipline outlined in this monograph preserves a number of lines of poetry and provides tools for understanding the exact meaning of these lines beyond literalness. Many more examples than I could mention in this outline illustrate the various taxonomies, and the activity of selecting examples is part of the individual contribution of each scholar who has written a handbook. The ability to recognise appropriate patterns of expression in a literary corpus is required of someone trained in the field. Some recent textbooks also contain exercises in which the learner is asked to identify a particular operation in a line of poetry. Rarely, if ever, is the learner asked to produce an utterance as an exercise.

As well as offering interesting insights into poetry, and a theory of linguistic efficiency, the Persian science of meanings broadens our knowledge of world literary theories. The importance it attaches to the subtleties of language, and the meanings that they can convey, may also provide food for thought for translators. Heightened awareness of the specific features of *ma'ānī* could provide an opportunity to rethink translation practices from Persian into other languages. As the experiment of 'translating' the Arabic science of meanings into Persian repeatedly proved, there is not a complete correspondence of forms, functions, and patterns between different languages. The beauty of syntax, as well as its subtle meaning, is easily lost in translation.

Bibliography

Abbreviations

*EI*² = *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. 12 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2005.

Arabic Works

- al-‘Askarī, Abū Aḥmad (2006). “Risāla fī l-tafḍīl bayna balāḡatay al-‘arab wa-l-‘aḡam” (Epistle on the Assessment of the Relative Merits of Arabic and Persian Eloquence). Ed. by ‘A. Arḡila. *Ḥawliyyāt al-ādāb wa-l-‘ulūm al-iḡtimā‘iyya*, 27 [251].
- al-Ḥāšimī, al-Sayyid Aḥmad (n.d.). *Ġawāhir al-balāḡa* (The Gems of Rhetoric). Beirut: Dār iḥyā’ al-turāṯ al-‘arabī.
- al-Taftāzānī, Sa’d al-Dīn Maṣūḍ (1911). *Kitāb al-Muṭawwal fī šarḥ Talḥīṣ al-Miftāḥ* (The Long Commentary on the *Talḥīṣ al-Miftāḥ*). Istanbul: Aḥmad Kāmil, 1330 (Repr. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-turāṯ).

Persian Works

- Adib al-Mamālik Farāhānī (1933). *Dīwān-i kāmīl* (Complete Collected Poems). Ed. by W. Dastgirdī. N.p.: Armağān, 1312.
- Āhanī, Ğ. (1960). *Naqd-i ma'ānī. Dar šan'at-i nazm wa naṭr-i fārsī* (A Critical Approach to Rhetoric. On the Craft of Persian Prose and Poetry). Isfahan: Kitābfurūšī-yi Ta'yīd, 1339.
- Āhanī, Ğ. (1978). *Ma'ānī-yi bayān* (Rhetoric). Tehran: Bunyād-i Qur'ān, 1357.
- Aḥmad Sulṭānī, M. (2005). *Dar bāra-yi ma'ānī wa bayān* (On Rhetoric). Tehran: Rūzgār, 1384.
- Aḥmadniżād, K. (2003). *Ma'ānī wa bayān* (Rhetoric). Tehran: Zawwār, 1382.
- 'Alawī Muqaddam, M.; Ašrafzāda, R. (1997). *Ma'ānī wa bayān* (Rhetoric). Tehran: Sāzmān-i muṭāla'a wa tadwīn-i kutub-i 'ulūm-i insānī-yi dānišgāhhā, 1376.
- Anwarī, H. (2003). *Farhang-i buzurġ-i suḥān* (Sokhan Comprehensive Dictionary). 8 vols. Tehran: Intišārāt-i Suḥān, 1381.
- Āq-lwlī, H. (n.d.). *Durar al-adab. Dar fann-i ma'ānī, bayān, badī'* (Pearls of Literature. On the Art of Rhetoric). N.p.: al-Hiğra.
- Ārzū, S. (2002). *Atīyya-yi kubrā Mawhibat-i 'uzmā* (The Great Gift). Ed. by S. Šamīsā. Tehran: Firdaws, 1381.
- Awḥādī (1961). *Kulliyāt-i Awḥādī-yi Işfahānī ma'rūf ba Marāġī* (Collected Works). Ed. by S. Nafisī. Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1340.
- Fašārakī, M. (1974). "Ma'ānī-yi bayān-i fārsī ba rawi-š-i ġadīd" (Persian Rhetoric. A New Methodology). Iskandarī, M.H. (ed.), *Maġmū'a-yi maqālāt-i čahārūmin kunġra-yi taḥqīqāt-i īrānī*. Shiraz: Dānišgāh-i Pahlawī-i Šīrāz, 1353, 2: 237-55.
- Firdawsī (1988-2008). *Šāhnāma* (The Book of Kings). Ed. by Ğ. Ḥāliqī Muṭlaq. 8 vols. New York: Bibliotheca Persica, 1366-86.
- Ğāhidġāh, 'A.; Riḍā'ī, L. (2012). *Balāġat 1 - Ma'ānī* (Rhetoric 1 – The Science of Meanings). Tehran: Dānišgāh-i Payām-i Nūr, 1391.
- Ğamālī, F. (2009). "Bāztāb-i 'ilm-i ma'ānī dar šī'r-i Rūdakī" (The Science of Meanings as Reflected in Rūdakī's Poetry). *Pažūhišhā-yi zabān wa adabiyāt-i fārsī*, 45(2), 1388, 99-114.
- Ğāmī, N.'A. (1999). "Yūsuf wa Zulayḫā" (Joseph and Zulaykha). Afšaḫzād, A.; Aḥmad Tarbiyat, H. (eds), *Maṭnawī-yi Haft awrang*. 2 vols. Tehran: Muṭālaāt-i īrānī, 1378, 2: 17-209.
- Ğāwān, 'I.M. (2002). *Manāẓir al-inšā'* (The Aspects of Composition). Ed. by M. Ma'dankan. Tehran: Našr-i Āṭār, Farhangistān-i zabān wa adab-i fārsī, 1381.
- Ğihād, L. (2008). "Barrasī-yi naẓariyya-yi irtibāṭ-i kalāmī-yi Yākūbsun dar 'ilm-i ma'ānī" (A Study of the Application of Jakobson's Communication Theory to the Science of Meanings). *Kitāb-i māh-i adabiyāt*, 129, 1387, 11-15.
- Ḥāfiż, Ḥ.Š.M. [1980/1359] (1983). *Dīwān-i Ḥāfiż. Ğild-i awwal* (Collected Poems). Ed. by P.N. Ḥānlarī. 2nd revised ed. Tehran: Ḥwārīzmī, 1362.
- Ḥānlarī, P.N. (1964). *Dastūr-i zabān-i fārsī* (Persian Grammar). Tehran: Tūs, 1342.
- Ḥayyām, 'U. (1959). *Rubā'īyyāt* (Quartrains). Ed. by R.M. Aliev, M.N.O. Osmanov and E.E. Bertel's. 2 vols. Moskow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR.
- Humāyī, Ğ. (1991). *Yāddāštḥā-yi Ustād 'Allāma Ğalāl al-Dīn-i Humāyī dar bāra-yi ma'ānī wa bayān* (Notes on Rhetoric). Ed. by M. Humāyī. Tehran: Našr-i Humā, 1370.
- Işfandiārpūr, H. (2004). *Arūsān-i suḥān. Naqd wa barrasī-yi iştīlāḥāt wa šinā'āt-i adabī dar badī'* (Literary Embellishments. A Critical Study of the Literary Terms used in Rhetoric). Tehran: Firdaws, 1383.

- Kārdgar, Y. (2016). “İlm-i ma‘ānī dar guḍar az sabkhā-yi šī‘r-i fārsī” (The Science of Meanings at the Crossroads of Different Styles of Persian Poetry). *Du faşlnāma-yi ‘ulūm-i adabī*, 9, 1395, 223-40.
- Kazzāzī, M.Ġ. (1991). *Zībāşīnāsī-yi suḥan-i pārsī 2. Ma‘ānī* (The Aesthetics of the Persian Discourse 2. The Science of Meanings). Tehran: Naşr-i markaz, Kitāb-i mād, 1370.
- Manūčīhrī (1947). *Dīwān-i Manūčīhrī-yi Dāmġānī* (Collected Poems). Ed. by M. Dabīr Siyāqī. Tehran: Zawwār, 1326.
- Mawlawī [Rūmī] (1996). *Maṭnawī-yi ma‘nawī* (The Masnavi, or The Spiritual Couplets). Ed. by ‘A. Surūş. 2 vols. Tehran: Şirkat-i ‘ilmī wa farhangī, 1375.
- Māzandarānī, M.H. (1997). *Anwār al-balāġa* (The Lights of Eloquence). Ed. by M.‘A. Ġulāmīnīzād. Tehran: Markaz-i farhangī-yi naşr-i Qibla, 1376.
- Murādī, A.; Yūsufi, H.; Nī‘matī, F. (2016). *Tahqīq dar ma‘ānī wa bayān wa funūn-i adab-i fārsī* (A Study of Persian Rhetoric and Literary Practices). Tehran: Dānişġāh-i Payām-i Nūr, 1395.
- Nāşir-i Ḥusraw (1928). *Dīwān-i aş‘ār-i Ḥakīm Abū Mu‘īn Ḥamīd al-Dīn Nāşir ibn Ḥusraw Qubādiyānī* (Collected Poems). Ed. by N. Taqawī. Tehran: Maġlis, 1307.
- Nīzāmī (1956). *Kulliyāt-i dīwān-i Ḥakīm Nīzāmī-yi Ganġāī* (Collected Works). Ed. by W. Dastgirdī. Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1335.
- Rādūyānī, M.‘U. (1949). *Kitāb-i tarġumān al-balāġa* (The Interpreter of Eloquence). Ed. by A. Ateş. Istanbul: Ćāphāna-yi Ibrāhīm Ḥurūs.
- Raġā‘ī, M.Ĥ. (1961). *Ma‘ālim al-balāġa. Dar ‘ilm-i ma‘ānī wa bayān wa badī‘* (Landmarks in Rhetoric). Şīrāz: Dānişġāh-i Şīrāz, 1340.
- Ranġbar, A. (2006). *Ma‘ānī* (Rhetoric). Tehran: Asāţīr, 1385.
- Riḍānīzād, Ġ. ‘Nūşīn’ (1988). *Uşul-i ‘ilm-i balāġat dar zabān-i fārsī* (Principles of Persian Rhetoric). N.p.: al-Zahrā, 1367.
- Rūdakī (1994). *Dīwān-i Rūdakī-yi Samarqandī* (Collected Poems). Ed. by I. Braginski and S. Nafīsī. Tehran: Nigāh, 1373.
- Sa‘dī (1937a). *Būstān-i Sa‘dī* (The Orchard). Ed. by M.‘A. Furūġī. Tehran: Birūḥīm, 1316.
- Sa‘dī (1937b). *Gulistān-i Sa‘dī* (The Rose Garden). Ed. by M.‘A. Furūġī. Tehran: Birūḥīm, 1316.
- Sa‘dī (1939). *Ġazaliyyāt-i Sa‘dī* (Ghazals). Ed. by M.‘A. Furūġī. Tehran: Birūḥīm, 1318.
- Sa‘dī (1941). *Mawā‘iz-i Sa‘dī* (Homiletic Poems). Ed. by M.‘A. Furūġī. Tehran: Birūḥīm, 1320.
- Şādiqiyān, M.‘A. (2003). *Ťirāz-i suḥan. Dar ma‘ānī wa bayān* (The Form of Discourse. On Rhetoric). Yazd: Rayhāna al-rasūl, 1382.
- Şafā, D. (1952). *Āyin-i suḥan. Muḥtaşar-i dar ma‘ānī wa bayān-i fārsī* (The Mode of Discourse. A Short Introduction to Persian Rhetoric). Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1330.
- Şāliḥī, F.; Dākīrī, A.R. (2015). “Barrasī-yi muşābahat-i ‘ilm-i ma‘ānī (ba ‘unwān-i yak-ī az şāḥahā-yi balāġat-i islāmī) wa naẓariyya-yi irtibat-ī Yākūbsun bā takya bar āyāt-ī Qur‘ān-i karīm” (A Study of the Similarities Between the Science of Meanings (as One of the Branches of Islamic Rhetoric) and Jakobson’s Theory of Communicative Functions with Emphasis on Verses of the Holy Qur‘ān). *Pażūhişhā-yi zabānşīnāḥti-yi Qur‘ān*, 7, 1394, 1-22.
- Şamisā, S. (1994). *Ma‘ānī* (Rhetoric). Tehran: Mītrā, 1373.
- Sanā‘ī (1950). *Ḥadiqat al-ḥaqīqa wa şarī‘at al-ṭarīqa* (The Garden of Truth). Ed. by M.T. Mudarris Riżawī. Tehran: Sipīhr, 1329.

- Sanā'ī (1996). *Dīwān-i Ḥakīm Sanā'ī-yi Ġaznawī* (Collected Poems). Ed. by P. Babāyi. Tehran: Nigāh, 1375.
- Tāġidīnī, B. (2012). *Kitāb-i ṭalāyī-yi ma'ānī wa bayān wiṣā-yi dānišġūyān-i dānišġāhhā-yi sarāsar-i kišwar* (The 'Golden' Book of Rhetoric). Tehran: Ṭalāyī puyandagān-i dānišġāh, 1391.
- Tāġlīl, Ğ. (1983). *Ma'ānī wa bayān. Barā-yi rišta-yi adabiyāt-i fārsī dar dawra-yi kāršināsī* (Rhetoric). N.p.: Markaz-i našr-i dānišġāhī, 1362.
- Taqawī, N. (1939). *Haṅġār-i guftār (dar fann-i ma'ānī wa bayān wa badī'-i fārsī)* (The Standards of Discourse. On Rhetoric). Tehran: Čāpġāna-yi Maġlis, 1317.
- Zāhidī, Z. (Ğ.) (1967). *Rawiš-i guftār. 'Ilm al-balāġa dar fann-i ma'ānī, bayān, badī'* (The Mode of Discourse. The Science of Rhetoric). Mašhad: Čāpġāna-yi dānišġāhī, 1346.

Works in Other Languages

- Abdel Haleem, M.A.S. (1992). "Grammatical Shift for Rhetorical Purposes: *Itifāt* and Related Features in the Qur'ān". *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 55(3), 407-32. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00003621>.
- Abdul-Raof, H. (2006). *Arabic Rhetoric. A Pragmatic Analysis*. London; New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203965399>.
- Al-Azmeh, A. [1986] (2013). *Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies*. London; New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203381465>.
- Austin, J.L. (1962). *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Avery, P. (transl.) (2007). *The Collected Lyrics of Ḥáfiz of Shíráz*. Cambridge: Archetype.
- Baalbaki, R. (2016). "Grammarians on the *Af'āl al-Muqāraba*: Steps in the Sources towards a Subdivision of Operants". Pomerantz, M.A.; Shahin, A. (eds), *The Heritage of Arabo-Islamic Learning. Studies Presented to Wadad Kadi*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 373-97. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004307469_017.
- Blankinship, K.Y. (2019). *The Inimitable Qur'ān. Some Problems in English Translations of the Qur'ān with Reference to Rhetorical Features*. Leiden; Boston: Brill. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004417441>.
- Bohas, G.; Guillaume, J.P.; Kouloughli, D.E. (1990). *The Arabic Linguistic Tradition*. London; New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315512778>.
- Bonebakker, S.A.; Reinert, B. (1984). s.v. "al-Ma'ānī wa-l-bayān". Bearman, P. et al. (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. 12 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2005, 5: 898-902. https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0595.
- de Bruijn, J.T.P. (1983). *Of Piety and Poetry. The Interaction of Religion and Literature in the Life and Works of Ḥakīm Sanā'ī of Ghazna*. Leiden: Brill. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004660366>.
- Chalisoṽa, N. (2009). "Persian Rhetoric: 'Elm-e Badī' and 'Elm-e Bayān". de Bruijn, J.T.P. (ed.), *A History of Persian Literature*. Vol. 1, *General Introduction to Persian Literature*. London: I.B. Tauris, 139-71. <https://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9780755610396.ch-006>.
- Clarke, H.W. (transl.) (1879). *The Bustān by Shaikh Muṣliġu-d-Dīn Sa'dī Shírázī*. London: W.H. Allen.

- Dabashi, H. (2019). *The Shahnameh. The Persian Epic as World Literature*. New York: Columbia University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7312/daba18344>.
- Davis, D. (transl.) (2016). Abolqasem Ferdowsi. *Shahnameh. The Persian Book of Kings*. New York: Penguin.
- Dickins, J. (2009). Review of Abdul-Raof 2006. *Language*, 85(4), 908-12.
- Firanescu, D.R. (2003). *Exclamation in Modern Literary Arabic. A Pragmatic Perspective*. Bucharest: Editura Universității din București.
- Firanescu, D.R. (2009). "Speech Acts". Versteegh, K. et al. (eds), *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*. Vol. 4, Q-Z. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 328-34. https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1570-6699_eal1_EALL_COM_0319.
- Firanescu, D.R. (2011). "Reading Notes on Sakkākī's Concept of 'Semantic Engendering'". Avram, A.A.; Focșeneanu, A.; Grigore, G. (eds), *A Festschrift for Nadia Anghelescu*. Bucharest: Editura Universității din București, 215-33.
- van Gelder, G.J. (1981). "Brevity, the Long and the Short of it in Classical Arabic Literacy". Peters, R. (ed.), *Proceedings of the Ninth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants* (Amsterdam, 1st to 7th September 1978). Leiden: Brill, 78-88
- van Gelder, G.J. (2001). Review of Jenssen 1998. *Edebiyât*, n.s. 12(1), 123-8.
- van Gelder, G.J. (2008). "Poetic License". Versteegh, K. et al. (eds), *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*. Vol. 3, Lat-Pu. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 647-52.
- van Gelder, G.J. (2009). "Traditional Literary Theory. The Arabic Background". de Bruijn, J.T.P. (ed.), *A History of Persian Literature*, Vol. 1, *General Introduction to Persian Literature*. London: I.B. Tauris, 123-38. <https://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9780755610396.ch-005>.
- Ghersetti, A. (1998). "Quelques notes sur la définition canonique de *balāġa*". Vermeulen, U.; De Smet, D. (eds), *Philosophy and Arts in the Islamic World. Proceedings of the Eighteenth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants* (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, September 3-September 9, 1996). Leuven; Paris; Sterling, VA: Peeters, 57-72.
- Ghersetti, A. (2002). "La définition du *ḥabar* (énoncé assertif) dans la pensée rhétorique de 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī". Leder, S. (ed.), *Studies in Arabic and Islam. Proceedings of the 19th Congress, Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants* (Halle 1998). Leuven; Paris; Sterling (VA): Uitgeverij Peeters, 367-77.
- Ghersetti, A. (2007). Review of Abdul-Raof 2006. *Quaderni di studi arabi*, 2, 251-3.
- Giolfo, M.E.B.; Hodges, W. (2017). "The System of the Sciences of the Arabic Language by Sakkākī: Logic as a Complement of Rhetoric". Sartori, M.; Giolfo, M.E.B.; Cassuto, P. (eds), *Approaches to the History and Dialectology of Arabic in Honor of Pierre Larcher*. Leiden: Brill, 242-66. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004325883_014.
- Gladwin, F. (1801). *Dissertations on the Rhetoric, Prosody, and Rhyme of the Persians*. Calcutta; London: Oriental Press.
- Hallaq, W.B. (1988). "Notes on the Term *Qarīna* in Islamic Legal Discourse". *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 108(3), 475-80. <https://doi.org/10.2307/603870>.
- Hallaq, W.[B.] (2001). s.v. "Zāhir". Bearman, P. et al (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. 12 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2005, 11: 388-9. https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_8077.

- Haldén, P. (2005). "What is Arabic Islamic Rhetoric? Rethinking the History of Muslim Oratory Art and Homiletics". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 37(1), 19-38. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743805050038>.
- Harb, L. (2020). *Arabic Poetics. Aesthetic Experience in Classical Arabic Literature*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108780483>.
- Hatim, B. (1997). *Communication Across Cultures. Translation Theory and Contrastive Text Linguistics*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press. <https://doi.org/10.47788/EDII7204>.
- Hatim, B. (2010). *Arabic Rhetoric. The Pragmatics of Deviation from Linguistic Norms*. Munich: Lincom.
- Heinrichs, W. (1984). "On the Genesis of the *Ḥaḳīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy". *Studia Islamica*, 59, 111-40. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1595297>.
- Jenssen, H. (1998). *The Subtleties and Secrets of the Arabic Language. Preliminary Investigations into al-Qazwīnī's Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*. Bergen: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies.
- Karimi, S. (2005). *A Minimalist Approach to Scrambling. Evidence from Persian*. Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110199796>.
- Kasher, A. (2013). "The Vocative as a 'Speech Act' in Early Arabic Grammatical Tradition". *Histoire Épistémologie Langage*, 35(1), 143-59.
- Key, A. (2018). *Language between God and the Poets. Ma'nā in the Eleventh Century*. Oakland: University of California Press. <https://doi.org/10.1525/Luminos.54>.
- Kouloughli, D.E. (1983). "A propos de *lafz* et *ma'nā*". *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, 35, 43-63.
- Kouloughli, D.[E.] (2007). *Le résumé de la grammaire arabe par Zamaḳṣarī*. Lyon: ENS Éditions.
- Larcher, P. (1990). "Éléments pragmatiques dans la théorie grammaticale arabe post-classique". Versteegh, K.; Carter, M.G. (eds), *Studies in the History of Arabic Grammar II. Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on the History of Arabic Grammar* (Nijmegen, 27 April-1 May 1987). Amsterdam; Philadelphia: Benjamins, 195-214. <https://doi.org/10.1075/sihols.56.16lar>.
- Larcher, P. (1991). "Quand, en arabe, on parlait de l'arabe...(II) Essai sur la catégorie de 'inṣā' (vs ḥabar)". *Arabica*, 38, 246-73. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157005891X00194>.
- Larcher, P. (1998). "Une pragmatique avant la pragmatique: « médiévale », « arabe » et « islamique »", in "Les Grammaires Indiennes", monogr. no., *Histoire Épistémologie Langage*, 20(1), 101-16. <https://doi.org/10.3406/hel.1998.2697>.
- Larcher, P. (2007). "Inṣā'". Versteegh, K. et al. (eds), *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*. Vol. 2, *Eg-Lan*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 358-61. https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1570-6699_eall_EALL_COM_vol2_0050.
- Larcher, P. (2013). "Arabic Linguistic Tradition II. Pragmatics". Owens, J. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Arabic Linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 185-212. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199764136.001.0001>.
- Lazard, G. (1963). *La langue des plus anciens monuments de la prose persane*. Paris: Klincksieck.
- Lazard, G. (1992). *A Grammar of Contemporary Persian*. Costa Mesa (CA); New York: Mazda Publishers [and] Bibliotheca Persica.
- Lenepveu-Hotz, A. (2014). *L'évolution du système verbal persan (X^e-XVI^e siècles)*. Leuven: Peeters.

- Levin, A. (1981). "The Grammatical Terms *al-Musnad*, *al-Musnad 'ilayhi* and *al-'Isnād*". *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 101, 45-165. <https://doi.org/10.2307/601756>.
- Losensky, P.E. (1997). "'DEMAND, ASK, SEEK': The Semantics and Rhetoric of the *Radif Talab* in the Persian *Ghazal*". *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 21(2), 19-40.
- Marogy, A.E. (2010). *Kitāb Sibawayhi. Syntax and Pragmatics*. Leiden: Brill. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047440529>.
- Moutaouakil, A. (1982). *Réflexions sur la théorie de la signification dans la pensée linguistique arabe*. Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Université Mohamed V.
- Orsatti, P. (2011). "The Deictic Suffix *yā-ye ešārat*: A Hypothesis on the Origin of the Relative *-i* in Persian". Maggi, M.; Orsatti, P. (eds), *The Persian Language in History*. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 41-88. <https://doi.org/10.29091/9783752005318>.
- Peled, Y. (2009). *Sentence Types and Word-Order Patterns in Written Arabic. Medieval and Modern Perspectives*. Leiden; Boston: Brill. <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004170629.i-250>.
- Peled, Y. (2010). "Sibawayhi's *Kitāb* and the Teaching of Arabic Grammar". *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 37, 163-88.
- Sartori, M. (2022). "Suprasegmental Criteria in Medieval Arabic Grammar". Sartori, M.; Binaghi, F. (eds), *The Foundations of Arabic Linguistics V. Kitāb Sibawayhi, The Critical Theory*. Leiden: Brill, 198-222. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004515895_011.
- Schacht, J. (1968). "Ibāḥa". Bearman, P. et al (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 12 vols. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2005, 3: 660-2. https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3015.
- Scholz, J. (2019). "Modern Arabic Rhetorical Manuals. A Transcultural Phenomenon". Abu-Er-Rub, L. et al. (eds), *Engaging Transculturality. Concepts, Key Terms, Case Studies*. London; New York: Routledge, 170-84. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429430060-15>.
- Simon, U.G. (1993). *Mittelalterliche arabische Sprachbetrachtung zwischen Grammatik und Rhetorik: 'ilm al-mānī bei as-Sakkākī*. Heidelberg: Heidelberg Orientverlag.
- Smyth, W. (1993). "The Making of a Textbook". *Studia Islamica*, 78, 99-115. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1595608>.
- Smyth, W. (1995). "The Canonical Formulation of 'ilm al-Balāghah and al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-'Ulūm*". *Der Islam*, 72(1), 7-24. <https://doi.org/10.1515/islm.1995.72.1.7>.
- Thackston, W.J. (transl.) (2008). *The Gulistan (Rose Garden) of Sa'di. Bilingual English and Persian Edition with Vocabulary by Shaykh Mushrifuddin Sa'di of Shiraz*. Bethesda: Ibex.
- Versteegh, K. (1994). "The Notion of 'Underlying Levels' in the Arabic Grammatical Tradition". *Historiographia Linguistica*, 21(3), 271-96. <https://doi.org/10.1075/hl.21.3.02ver>.
- Versteegh, K. (1997). *Landmarks in Linguistic Thought III. The Arabic Linguistic Tradition*. London; New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203444153>.
- Yunis Ali, M.M. (2000). *Medieval Islamic Pragmatics. Sunni Legal Theorists' Models of Textual Communication*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315027586>.

How does syntax interact with context to convey subtle meanings beyond expectations? A branch of the Arabic-Islamic study of rhetoric known as ‘the science of meanings’ (*‘ilm-i ma‘ānī*) discusses this point. This volume is an introduction to the Persian science of meanings as it appears in a selection of textbooks published in Iran over the last century. It examines basic concepts, clarifies jargon, and comments on dozens of examples, mainly taken from classical Persian poetry. It also offers insights into how the Arabic model was adapted to Persian and eventually transformed into a literary theory of how Persian poets made the best use of syntactical possibilities.

Alessia Dal Bianco PhD, is a research fellow in Persian language and literature at the Sapienza University of Rome, where she also teaches courses on Persian literature and the translation of Persian poetry. Her main research interests are classical Persian poetry, Arabic-Persian literary theory, and the traditional linguistic disciplines of the Islamic world. She is the author of the monograph *La qāfiya nel Kaššāf ištīlāhāt al-funūn*. She has also published *Giuseppe e Zoleykhā*, a complete Italian translation of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī’s masterpiece *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* (Joseph and Zulaykha).



Università
Ca' Foscari
Venezia