2 Notable Terms

Summary


2.1 The Science of Meanings (‘ilm-i maʿānī)

How to refer to Persian ‘ilm-i maʿānī in English? Studies dealing with Arabic ‘ilm al-maʿānī have offered various solutions. Notable efforts include ‘semantics of syntax’ (Bonebakker, Reinert, EI, s.v. “al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān”), ‘Lehre von den Bedeutungen (der syntaktischen Muster)’ (Simon 1993, 395), ‘the stylistics of syntax’ or ‘syntactical semantics’ (van Gelder 2001, 124), ‘semantic syntax’ (Abdul-Raof 2006, 2). Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli (1990, 118-19) consider it ‘grammatical semantics’ but also employ the word-for-word translation ‘the science of meanings’. The latter seems to be the preferred choice in recent times (Versteegh 1997, 124; Halldén 2005, 21; Giolfo, Hodges 2017, 42; Harb 2020, 233) and is used here.

The science of meanings studies how the speaker manipulates the utterance by making variations at the syntactic level to adapt

---

1 I have not included Abdul-Raof’s translation ‘word order’ (Abdul-Raof 2006, 2) since critical reviews have considered it misleading (see Dickins 2009, 910; Ghersetti 2007, 252).
it to express what he (or she) intends to convey. As such, its domain does not fully overlap with any Western categories. As a branch of the study of *balāġat* ‘eloquence, linguistic efficiency’, it is generally associated with literary rhetoric. Scholars with a linguistics background emphasise that it is instead a language science. Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli (1990, 119) state that “questions related to grammatical semantics and pragmatics” fall within its domain. Larcher (2013, 189) calls it “a contextual semantics” and “a pragmatics” (192). Harb (2020, 237-9) argues that the realm of the science of meanings transcends the narrow path of linguistics proper since its main concerns involve an aesthetic perspective. As we have seen above, both linguistics and the aesthetics of poetry are particularly relevant to contemporary Iranian scholars’ conceptions of the Persian science of meanings.

The science of meanings takes syntactical features into account in its analysis. However, it differs substantially from *ṣarf* ‘morphology’, *nahw* ‘syntax’, or *dastūr-i zabān* ‘rules of grammar’. Normative grammarians assume that acceptability depends on whether the sentence follows certain rules that are valid regardless of the moment, the circumstance, or the person pronouncing the sentence. The science of meanings, on the other hand, examines the utterances in the context in which they occur. Consequently, a well-formed grammatical construction which may be appropriate in some contexts may be semantically ineffective in others.² Also, an expression may undergo semantic shifts in different contexts.

Manuals define the science of meanings as the discipline that studies how linguistic expressions adapt (*muṭābaqat*) to what the communicative situation requires (*muqtaḍā-yi ḥāl*). The concept of adequacy is one of the cornerstones of the whole study of eloquence (*balāġat*). Eloquence, a desirable property of the speaker and the utterance, entails at least two requirements: fulfilment of the needs and *fasāḥat* ‘purity, intelligibility, absence of speech impediment’. The term *fasāḥat* encompasses grammatical accurateness and the smooth flow of sounds. In other words, the skilled speaker says the right thing at the right time in the most correct and pleasant-to-hear phrasing. Two aspects are relevant. First, eloquence deals with contingent situations (i.e. utterances set in their context). Second, the definition implies that there should always be some utterances that meet the requirements in each communicative situation.

Recurring terms play a significant role in the science of meanings. Many are widely used but rarely defined. Since their meaning is not always transparent to a non-specialist audience, this prelimi-

² On the distinction between *nahw* ‘grammar, syntax’ and *ma‘ānī* in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Smyth 1995, 11-15.
nary overview will tackle the notable terms whose knowledge is necessary to approach the topics of the science of meanings. In the following pages, readers will find a selection of the most frequent terms and a brief guide to how to interpret them. The appropriate chapters of the monograph will then discuss the technical terms in more detail and cover the terms not included in this chapter.

2.2 Participants (mutakallim, muḫāṭab, sāmi’)

The science of meanings envisages a theory of the efficient use of language. Efficiency, here, means the ability to transmit the intended message including subtle nuances. The model holds that delivering a message involves at least two participants: the speaker (mutakallim, ḥwānanda or gūyanda) and the addressee (muḫāṭab). The addressee, the person to whom the speaker targets the utterance (kalām), is also referred to as ‘hearer’ (sāmi’ or šinawanda). The words for ‘hearer’ also apply to a listener not directly engaged in the conversation. The science of meanings does not have a collective term for the speaker, the addressee and the hearer(s) as a group. Here I will use ‘participants’, a term borrowed from communication studies to refer to the sender and receiver(s) of a message in a communication encounter. These include interlocutors and listeners.

The terms that define the roles of the participants hint at a spoken exchange. However, most exemplifying quotes in the Persian handbooks come from poetry collections. In addition, manuals do not generally make a clear distinction between oral and written texts. The labels speaker and addressee, then, should be understood broadly to encompass authors and readers. In this book, I will adopt ‘speaker’ and ‘addressee’ as conventional translations of mutakallim and muḫāṭab to intend the main participants involved in any utterance production.

Participants influence the course of communication in various and substantial ways. According to the science of meanings, the speaker should carefully prepare the utterance for a specific addressee. Awareness of the addressee’s attitude, role, and knowledge of the world is then essential for effective formulation. Also, the presence of casual observers influences the discourse. The speaker should then consider the listeners as well as the addressee. Dynamics among these actors influence the strategy of utterance formulation. Typical examples include artful utterances that inform the addressee while excluding other listeners, or that tell the addressee what was meant for another person, so that the latter indirectly receives the message.

---

3 Some authors, however, like Tağlıl (1983, 15) mention gūyanda ‘speaker’ and niwisanda ‘writer’ in addition.
2.3 **Utterance** (*kalām, ḥabar, inšā, aṣl*)

The utterance (*kalām or guftār*) is the central unit under examination in the science of meanings. Manuals use the term in the light of the earlier linguistic tradition which distinguishes the utterance from the sentence (*ǧumla*). The sentence is an organised chain of words and the object of the study of syntax. The utterance, which the science of meanings investigates, is a sentence expressed in a communicative situation (*maqām*). While the former is an abstraction, the latter is intended as an actual piece of communication. Sequences of utterances also form larger units. Manuals do not coin new terms for these macro-units. However, they have technical names to describe the connected and disconnected discourse (see chapter 9) and the various techniques for enlarging utterances (see chapter 10).

The science of meanings offers a preliminary taxonomy of utterances, distinguishing two types: ḥabar (literally ‘information, news, account’) ‘informative, constative utterance’ and inšā (literally ‘creation, composition’) ‘performative utterance’. According to the general definition, the difference between the two categories lies in the applicability of a truth-criterion. A ḥabar is any utterance that can be true or false. An example of ḥabar is an assertion such as *paranda-yī rūy-i diraḥt ast* ‘A bird is on the tree’, whereas *čirā āmadī?* ‘Why did you come?’ or *āftāb rā bibīn* ‘Look at the sun!’ are examples of *inšā*. Utterances of the *inšā* type thus include commands, questions, wishes, and the like. Another definition, which appears in the context of the *inšā* discussion, considers how utterances act in the world. Whereas ḥabar-type utterances declare something about an event or a state of affairs that exists independently of speech, *inšā*-type utterances, on the contrary, produce a speech act (see also § 8.1).

Informative utterances (ḥabar) are, by definition, truth-evaluable statements. One may wonder, however, how to understand truth (*ṣidq*) and falsehood (*kaḏib*). How does the science of meanings assess a true or false utterance? In answer to this question, scholars recall how thinkers in the past have approached the problem. I will briefly summarise the main theories of truth based on the information provided by Humāyī (1991, 93-5). Historically, three theories of truth have gained popularity in the Arabic-Islamic framework of sciences: the standard theory, the theory of al-Naẓẓām (d. ca. 835-845),

---

4 On *kalām* and *ǧumla* in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Jenssen 1998, 48-50.
5 On *ḥabar* and *inšā* in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Larcher 1990; Larcher 1991; Moutaouakil 1982; Ghersetti 2002.
6 The examples are quoted in, respectively, Aḥmadnižād 2003, 90 and Šamīsā 1994, 112 and 134.
Bibliotheca Trimalchionis Tertia 1

The Subtle Meaning, 13-24

and the theory of al-Ǧāhiẓ (d. 868). The standard theory defines truth as the perfect correspondence between what the utterance expresses and reality. According to al-Nazzām, the truth is instead the perfect correspondence between what the utterance expresses and the speaker’s belief. A person is telling the truth if he believes so, regardless of the facts. Al-Ǧāhiẓ, on the contrary, problematises the issue by combining the two positions. In his opinion, correspondence to reality and the speaker’s convictions makes an utterance true. An utterance is false if its content does not correspond to reality and the speaker is aware of its falsehood. Between truth and falsehood, there are intermediate cases which are neither true nor false. Persian manuals do not discuss the evaluation of truth further. Nor do the different views contribute to what the manuals generally explore. The criterion of truth somehow appears as a cursory subject with loose connections to what follows.

In order to pursue its analysis, the science of meanings breaks down the utterances under study into smaller units. The main constituents of the utterance are the *musnad ilayh* ‘predicand’ and the *musnad* ‘predicate’. The predicand is the topic being talked about, the conceptual starting point. The predicate, on the other hand, is what the speaker has to say about that. In utterances like *Bahrām mīniwīsad* ‘Bahrām writes’ or *Bahrām niwīsanda ast* ‘Bahrām is a writer’ the personal name Bahrām functions as *musnad ilayh*, whereas *mīniwīsad* ‘write’ and *niwīsanda ast* ‘is a writer’ are *musnad*:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Bahrām} & \text{mīniwīsad} & \text{Bahrām} & \text{niwīsanda ast} \\
&\downarrow & \downarrow & \downarrow & \downarrow \\
&\text{musnad ilayh} & \text{musnad} & \text{musnad ilayh} & \text{musnad}
\end{align*}
\]

A third key term, *isnād* ‘predication’, is also introduced. The term *isnād* refers to the predicative relationship that links a predicand to its predicate. As the examples above show, the distinction between *musnad ilayh* and *musnad* applies regardless of the type of predicate, whether verbal or nominal. The concept of *isnād* is assumed to justify the fact that the combination of a predicand and a predicate, whether nominal or verbal, into an utterance conveys a piece of information. Usually, such information is new.

The three terms *musnad ilayh, musnad*, and *isnād* derive from the same Arabic root meaning ‘leaning, supporting’. Literally, *musnad ilayh* means ‘that on which something leans’ or ‘the support’, *mus-

---

7 On the criterion of truth in Arabic, see al-Taftāzānī 1911, 38-43; see also Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 128-9; Simon 1993, 70-2 fn. 24.
nad means ‘that which is leaned, the supported’ (Larcher 2013, 189), and isnād means ‘the act of leaning’. Some Persian scholars, for example Kazzāzī (1991, 44) and Šamisā (1994, 65), also pair musnad ilayh and musnad with the terms nahād ‘subject’ and guzāra ‘predicate’. In principle, they generally overlap in Persian. In this monograph, however, I preferably translate musnad ilayh, musnad and isnād as predicand, predicate and predication, much as Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli did earlier (1990, 122-3). This preserves the semantic connection between the three original terms in the specific framework in which they appear.

A blanket term with many usages in the science of meanings, the word aṣl ‘base, principle, default expression’ covers a range of senses in relation to utterances. Looking at how the manuals employ the term, several concepts may approximate its meaning in English. Below I will discuss three possible highly relevant notions in this regard: underlying structure, unmarked utterance, and pre-established form. I am not suggesting that the word aṣl bears various senses in the original, my point is that it could be helpful to approach this all-encompassing term from different angles in English.

In the science of meanings, whatever form the utterance takes, an underlying level called aṣl is theorised. In other words, it seems that every utterance associates tacitly with an underlying structure at some abstract level. This idea allows for justifying linguistic gaps such as ellipsis. In addition, the term aṣl makes sense of unmarked forms. Wherever a variation in the sentence’s syntactic structure adds an element of meaning, and the two forms differ only in syntax, the most basic form, which is unmarked in comparison with the other, is called aṣl. For instance, manuals discuss changes in word order in terms close to the concepts of markedness and unmarkedness. A non-typical word order, like placing the object before the subject, takes, in addition, a semantic component that is generally absent from the standard word order. The standard word order is thus considered aṣl in the science of meanings. Also, a pre-established form is called aṣl. The science of meanings, it seems, searches for a privileged, two-way relationship between a given meaning (maʿnā) and the linguistic form that best expresses it. Thus, aṣl-i maʿnā ‘the basic meaning’ indicates the conventional form that expresses a given function. For example, the imperative in commands is aṣl, which means that it is the pre-established linguistic form that expresses orders.

8 On underlying levels according to the Arabic grammatical tradition, see Versteegh 1994.

9 I will observe the position assumed in maʿānī manuals that the sequence predicand/predicate is the standard word order in Persian and any change adds a nuance of meaning. To my knowledge, the theory of scrambling (Karimi 2005), which has been applied to modern Persian, has not yet entered the manuals of maʿānī.
Defining what *aṣl* is in a given situation is one of the chief concerns of the discipline. Although speakers innately distinguish a basic meaning from that which requires more thought, a function of the manuals is to clarify the *aṣl* of many linguistic forms. The science of meanings endeavours to account for the variety of the Persian language. Utterances take many forms, and literality is taken as the benchmark for measuring eccentricities. The *aṣl* is the starting point for discussing deviations from the norm as will be shown.

2.4 **Speaker’s Intention (maʿnā, ḡaraḍ, murād, qaṣd)**

The translation ‘the science of meanings’ seems relatively obscure unless we clarify what *maʿānī* ‘meanings’ means. The word *maʿnā* (plural *maʿānī*), a multipurpose term whose assessment poses many troubles to Western scholars,\(^\text{10}\) in a broader sense, means ‘communicative intentions’ or ‘what (the speaker) intends (to say)’. The science of meanings identifies two orders of *maʿānī*: the *maʿānī-yi awwali* ‘primary meanings’ and the *maʿānī-yi ṭānawi* ‘secondary meanings’ (also called *maʿānī-yi maḏā zi* ‘transferred meanings’). Primary meanings mean that there is a correspondence between what the speaker says and what he communicates. Secondary meanings, on the contrary, imply that the meaning of an utterance undergoes a context-sensitive shift to the point that the utterance tells more and/or something different from what words say. I use the word ‘secondary’, though these secondary meanings are no less important than the primary ones.

I will give an example to illustrate the difference between primary and secondary meaning. According to the science of meanings, the primary meaning of the interrogative clause is to ask for information, just as the primary meaning of an imperative clause is to give an order. In Persian, as in English, commands are sometimes rephrased as questions. For example, ‘Open the window’ becomes ‘Would you mind opening the window?’. Assuming this is the case, how do we evaluate commands that differ in form, one interrogative and the other imperative? In both cases, the speaker’s goal is to give an order. However, whereas the imperative is the established form (*aṣl-i maʿnā*), the interrogative takes this sense only indirectly. Command is one of the secondary meanings of this kind of question. More of-

---

\(^{10}\) The word *maʿnā* is an Arabic loanword in Persian. Concerns about the meaning and origin of the term are expressed by Bonebakker, Reinert, EI², s.v. “*al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*”. On the meanings of the term *maʿānī* in Arabic philological disciplines, see Kouloughli 1983 and Key 2018. See also Versteegh 1997, 118-19 and Al-Azmeh 2013, 114-23. Key 2018 challenges that ‘meaning’ is too vague and suggests ‘mental content’ as a more accurate translation of *maʿnā*. 
ten than not, the choice of the indirect form also adds an additional semantic or pragmatic element. Politeness, as in the example above, is one. The analysis of secondary meanings takes up a lot of space in the manuals. It is probably the most substantial part of the discipline and is what really distinguishes the science of meanings from normative grammar.

The word maʿnā is not the only word that qualifies the speaker’s intention. Other terms appear in Persian manuals: ġaraḍ, murād, and qaṣd. The term ġaraḍ ‘purpose, goal, intention’ is most often used to designate the effects that the speaker intends to evoke in the mind of the addressee, the ‘perlocutionary force’. Thus, as a possible ġaraḍ, the utterance may express praise or blame, provoke joy or threaten, glorify or demean someone. The term murād ‘intended will, what one wanted (to say but did not say)’ is often used to indicate the form of the sentence under ordinary conditions. For instance, the murād of an elliptical utterance is the form the sentence would have had if the ellipsis had not occurred. The term murād comes very close to aṣl in the sense of underlying form. Depending on the case, the meaning of the word qaṣd ‘intentional meaning’ in the manuals shifts between effect and basic form. Šamīsā (1994, 67) considers ‘illocutionary act’ as a possible English translation for qaṣd. However, fluctuations in the use of these terms suggest that, at least in Persian manuals, they serve broad scopes. In addition to technical usage, they are general words that cover whatever the speaker intends with his speech.\(^{11}\)

### 2.5 Communicative Situation (maqām, ḥāl)

By its very definition, the science of meanings is the study of how utterances conform to the requirements of the situation (muqtaḍā-yi ḥāl). This description testifies to the paramount importance of the situational context. The manuals employ different terms to refer to the setting and background of the utterance. The different terms seem very close in meaning but appear in different circumstances to convey slightly different ideas of what context is. Here I will make a tentative distinction between two of them: maqām and ḥāl, while leaving qarīna for a separate section (see § 2.6).

The word maqām ‘context, situation, position’ indicates the communicative situation in which the utterance occurs. It broadly encom-

\(^{11}\) On murād in al-Sakkākī, see Firanescu 2011, 227. On the difference between ġaraḍ and qaṣd in Arabic, see Firanescu 2009, 333. Firanescu argues that, for the Arabic grammarian al-Qarṭāǧannī (d. 1285), the following distinction applies: “the ‘intentional meaning’ (qaṣd) is subordinated to the scope, indicated by the term ġaraḍ (pl. ‘aġrāḍ), which designates both ‘internal psychical act’, achieved in the soul of the poet, and the ‘perlocutionary effect on the receiver’, which is supposed to be similar” (333).
passes all factors that influence the communicative effort, including the participants, the spoken (or written) text that had preceded, and the shared knowledge of the world. Consider, for example, different communicative situations in which the speaker has to mention a particular individual. Depending on the speaker’s and addressee’s knowledge of this person, the speaker will mention the referent in a more or less definite way. If both know the person, a definite noun will identify the referent (for example, a personal name as Zayd ‘Zayd’). On the contrary, if the referent is unknown, the speaker should rather use an indefinite noun (for example, mard-i ‘a man’). In one case, the communicative situation requires a definite reference (maqām-i ta’rif ‘situation of definiteness’), in the other an indefinite one (maqām-i tankir ‘situation of indefiniteness’).

‘Communicative situation’ is also one of the meanings of hāl ‘state, circumstance’. However, hāl takes a narrower sense than that given by maqām. While maqām evokes a more stable condition, hāl emphasises a sense of transience and change. In this sense, the word hāl appears in the syntagma muqtaḍā-yi hāl, which is part of the definition of the science of meanings. The discipline is concerned with ways of adapting the sentence to what the particular communicative situation requires. Manuals display linguistic formulations that meet specific needs in different contexts. Mastering these variations is a major concern of the science of meanings.

However, things are even more complex than that. There are countless deviations from the standard. The science of meanings defines some of these circumstances as being in contrast to the outward requirements (bar ḥilāf-i muqtaḍā-yi zāhir ‘in opposition to the requirement of the outward (meaning)’). Here zāhir ‘outward’, hence ‘manifest, apparent, noticeable’, refers to what appears appropriate by default in contrast to other less obvious potential requirements. Manipulations that go against what one would typically predict in a given situation are often meant to gain more subtle meanings. Thus, breaking the ‘rule’ of expectation proves eloquent in many cases and an unexpected wording may better fit the overall situation.

The word hāl also occurs in the manuals in another sense. The plural form aḥwāl ‘states, modes, patterns’ appears in the title of three of the eight units that traditionally form the set of topics of the science of meanings: aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh ‘states of the predicand’ (see chapter 4), aḥwāl-i musnad ‘states of the predicate’ (see chapter 5),

12 On hāl and maqām in the Arabic linguistic tradition, see Ghersetti 1998, 64-8.

13 See also the meaning of the term zāhir in the realm of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). As Hallaq summarises: “zāhir [...] lit. the outward meaning of a word, language or event [...] It is the meaning first comprehended by the mind upon hearing a particular term or expression that potentially has two or more meanings” (Hallaq, EI², s.v. “zāhir”).
and اَحْوَالُ-ي المُتَّلِقَاتُ-ي الفَعْلَ ‘states of the complements of the verb’ (see chapter 6). What اَحْوَالُ means here is the range of linguistic operations that affect the constituents of the utterance. A prominent part of the science of meanings is concerned with context and purpose. Of particular importance are the linguistic operations themselves, the communicative situations that require such operations, and how those features determine a change in meaning.

2.6 Contextual References (قَرِينَة، دَلِيل)

Interpreting the meaning of an utterance is a process that goes beyond understanding words and grammar. The utterance often tells more than the words in the sentence literally say. The question is, what justifies the recovery of the intended meaning? The science of meanings indirectly answers this question by considering the context as an essential interpretative guide.

The term قَرِينَة (literally ‘connection, binding’) ‘context, frame of reference, associative indicator’ indicates those elements and connections that build contextual references. In general, manuals confine the use of the term to those situations where they need to justify the recovery of words or ideas not directly stated in the utterance. The concept helps to explain, for example, the effective use of the omission of parts of speech or the use of anaphoric and cataphoric pronouns or phrases. It also contributes to the understanding of figurative language.

The manuals distinguish between verbal and non-verbal contexts. Consequently, the قَرِينَة is either lexical (قَرِينَة-ي الفَصْلِ/الفَصْلِيَّ) or logical (قَرِينَة-ي المَناَوي/المَناوِي). The first points to the knowledge of the co-text, while the second searches for factors outside it. Lexical connections refer to something previously stated in the discourse. In general, the existence of a backward or forward reference depends on the lexical قَرِينَة. However, words do not always support the decoding of the utterance. Whenever there is a lack of lexical context, or the lexical context is too weak, the science of meanings considers that a logical connection may supply the lexical قَرِينَة.

Another taxonomy distinguishes قَرِينَة as overt (قَرِينَة-ي الْمَفْتَنِ ‘outward connection’) or covert (قَرِينَة-ي المَهْفُ ‘hidden connection’). The former consists in the frame of reference shared by all actors in the communicative exchange. Conversely, covert connections pre-

---

14 Versteegh (1997, 82) reports that اَحْوَالُ in Arabic also stands for declensional endings. More studies exploring how اَحْوَالُ and the system of Arabic declensional endings converse in the Arabic science of meanings are a desideratum. Persian language does not feature a declensional ending system comparable to the Arabic i‘rāb system, therefore in the Persian science of meanings اَحْوَالُ takes a broader sense.
suppose knowledge that is open to some but unknown to others. In conversation, covert connections are functional to establish ‘power’ relations. The speaker may exploit his knowledge of hidden facts to exclude some listeners from understanding the speech. Similarly, he may deliberately refer to covert connections in order to weigh someone else’s knowledge of facts.

Effective navigation of the network of connections is essential. The qarîna provides evidence (dalîl ‘sign, clue’) for the correct interpretation of the utterance. The scope of the term dalîl and of the related term dalâlat ‘signification, emergence of evidence, the fact of indicating’ is not defined in the Persian manuals. It seems that the word dalîl ‘clue’ applies to two processes. Similar to the distinction of qarîna into lexical or logical, also for dalîl two orders of evidence are recognised: dalîl-i lafżî ‘lexical, verbal clue’ and dalîl-i ‘aqlî ‘rational, intellectual clue’. The first applies to words that have been clearly uttered by the speaker and that help to grasp the meaning of the following references. The second implies that innate reasoning has to cope with the absence of previously uttered lexical references but eventually arrives at the correct understanding of an utterance. The clues are thus keys to interpretation that allow the addressee to complete the understanding of the meaning of the utterance.\textsuperscript{15}

2.7 Taxonomy and General Organisation

The science of meanings traditionally divides its topics into eight parts: predicative relationship (isnād-i ḫabarī); states of the predicand (aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh); states of the predicate (aḥwāl-i musnad); states of the complements of the verb (aḥwāl-i mutaʿalliqāt-i fiʿl); restriction and delimitation (qaṣr wa ḥaṣr); performative utterance (inšā); disjunction and conjunction (faṣl wa waṣl); brevity, verbosity, and balance (īǧāz, iṭnāb wa musāwāt).

The eight-fold arrangement displays a specific programme of study. In the beginning, five parts consider the characteristics of informative utterances. Some general notions on the role of the speaker and the addressee appear in the first part. The following three sections scrutinise the constituents of informative utterances. This sequence of topics makes it possible to comment on operations relevant to nominals, verbs, and complements. The next part considers how specific devices limit the scope of predication. An examination of performatives concludes the analysis of single utterances. The last two units look at how sentences follow one another. One addresses

\textsuperscript{15} On a similar use of the terms qarîna and dalîl in the Islamic legal discourse, see Hallaq 1988 and Yunis Ali 2000.
how sentences join together, while the other considers lengthening or shortening techniques. Each unit provides a taxonomy of primary and secondary meanings with illustrative examples.

Many Persian manuals systematically arrange the topics in the order of the traditional Arabic eight-part plan. However, some propose innovative arrangements. For example, Šamīsā 1994 and his fellow follower Tāḡidīnī 2012 reorganise the contents of the first six parts into four chapters named after the four sentence types (ǧumalāt): declarative (ḥabarī), interrogative (pursišī), imperative (amrī), and exclamative (ʿāṭīfī). In other words, they follow a classification by sentence purpose similar to that used in twentieth-century grammar textbooks for high-school students such as Ḫānlarī 1964. As for the remaining topics, the length of discourse occupies an autonomous chapter in accordance with the general framework, while conjunction and disjunction form a final unit together with some Western notions alien to the traditional plan.

Less radical changes of arrangement have occurred elsewhere. While generally respecting the sequence of topics, minor changes consist of combining separate matters or omitting what seemed inappropriate to Persian. The more traditional manuals provide side-by-side examples in Arabic and Persian, whereas other works focus exclusively on the Persian language. The jargon, however, is mainly based on Arabic loanwords. Since the science of meanings is considered only one part of a broader study of eloquence, most Persian manuals treat it in combination with other branches of rhetoric. It is common to find textbooks that couple maʿānī with bayān or treat maʿānī as part of a three-volume set that includes two other volumes on bayān and badi’. Preliminary chapters on the concepts of faṣāḥat and balāḡat, or the historical development of the discipline are also common features of many Persian manuals. In brief, the general organisation may vary. Nonetheless, whatever the presentation plan, there is a consistent agreement on what the science of meanings should investigate and how. In the next chapters, I will follow the eight-part convention to outline the contents of the Persian science of meanings in more detail.