The Two World Wars and China’s Changing International Status

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Abstract  In the genesis of China as a modern nation-state, the relationship with the outside world played a fundamental role. The goal of this essay is to outline the fundamental factors that shaped the relationship between China and the League of Nations and between China and the Organization of the United Nations during and following the two world wars, offering an interpretative reading from the perspective of China’s transformation into a modern nation-state. The choice to focus on these two international organisations is due to the fact that China’s bilateral relations with each specific country were very different, making generalisations quite difficult. Conversely, both the League and the United Nations can be considered as representing the world as a whole. As the two world wars were the most important international events in the first half of the twentieth century and prompted the establishment of the two most important, largest and most influential international organisations, China’s relations with the League of Nations and later with the United Nations during those periods represent an important case study for understanding the transformation of China’s international status and the world’s acceptance and recognition of China.


The relation between Chinese history and the two world wars is a quite complicated and multi-faceted historical subject. To focus on one specific aspect, this essay outlines the most basic aspect of China’s relations with the League of Nations and the United Nations during and following the two wars, offering some interpretations.
The choice to focus on relations with international organisations is due to the fact that the bilateral relations between China and each individual country were extremely diverse, which makes generalisations difficult. Conversely, as international organisations gather many countries, they can best be seen as representing Chinese relations with the outside world.¹

The construction of a modern nation-state owes much to the efforts of all internal forces to build a modern country as well as to the country’s relationship with the world and its recognition by other countries. Consequently, China’s changing international status should also be measured against this standard.

The two world wars were the most important international events in the first half of the twentieth century, shaping global history. After World War I and World War II, the two largest, most important and most influential international organisations in modern times were established, respectively the League of Nations and the United Nations. The relations of China with these new organisations, as well as its role within them, are emblematic of the transformation of China’s international status and the degree to which China is accepted and recognised by the outside world.

1 China and the League of Nations (World War I)

In 1912, the Republic of China was established, and through its new face as Asia’s first democratic republic, China’s international status had slightly improved, although it basically remained the ‘banquet’ of a club of international powers. In 1915, Japan forced Yuan Shikai to sign the Twenty-One Demands. This humiliating treaty, signed without being the consequence of an actual military conflict and defeat, was quite unusual in modern China, and aroused a widespread popular anger. The day the Twenty-One Demands were signed, 9 May, was subsequently considered as the ‘day of national humiliation’.

On 28 July 1914, Austria–Hungary declared war on Serbia, and World War I broke out. Because the war took place in distant Europe (China initially called it the ‘European War’), it had little direct relationship with China. After the war broke out, on 6 August 1914, the Chinese government claimed its neutrality in the European conflict.

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In those years, China was going through the era of Yuan Shikai and, after his death, the warlord period. Both warring parties in the European conflict wanted to win over China. Intense political debates took place in China over whether to participate in the war. In the end, China declared war on Germany and Austria–Hungary on 14 August 1917, and sided with the Triple Entente. The United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Italy and other countries of the Allied Powers expressed their welcome and declared that they would do their best to help China enjoy “the proper status and preferential treatment of a major country” in the world (Shi 1994, 130). Although China did not send soldiers to fight in Europe, it provided a large amount of food to the Allied Powers and sent 140,000 Chinese workers to France and other places to serve on the front lines. About 20,000 Chinese nationals died in foreign countries. Fortunately, the Allies won the war.

According to Xu Guoqi, China’s participation in World War I was of great significance, “marking the beginning of the Chinese people’s real search for internationalisation and a new national identity” (2005, transl. by Ma 2019, 1).

As a victorious country, China participated in the Paris Peace Conference: “For the first time China put forward its appeal for equality to the world, expressing its desire to join the international community as an equal member” (Xu 2005 transl. by Ma 2019, 1).

In January 1919, the peace conference took place in Paris, and representatives from 27 countries, including China, attended it. Before the meeting, US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson put forward the Fourteen Principles as a programme for establishing world peace. The Chinese had great expectations of the Paris Peace Conference, believing that victory in World War I had been the victory of justice over arrogance, that the peace conference would uphold justice, and that China would regain all the rights it had lost. A Chinese translation of President Wilson’s wartime speeches became very popular. Intellectual circles were optimistic about the future. The President of Beijing University, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, delivered a speech in Tiananmen Square, claiming that from then on, “the obscurantism of inequality at all international levels will be eliminated and substituted by enlightenment” (Shi 1994, 151).

At the Paris Peace Conference, the Chinese delegation submitted several memoranda on the Shandong question and on its wishes, requesting the abolition of the privileges of foreign powers in China and the recovery of its rights and interests in Shandong. But at the conference, the great powers not only rejected China’s legitimate requests but also transferred the pre-war German privileges in Shandong to Japan. When the news of China’s ‘diplomatic failure’ at the Paris Peace Conference reached the country, Chinese intellectuals were greatly disappointed, and the well-known May Fourth Movement took place. The Chinese representatives even refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles.
However, if we look at the historical significance of the event, China’s participation in the Paris Peace Conference represented a huge progress. First, it was the first time that China participated in a large-scale multilateral international conference, attending it as a victorious country. Moreover, regarding the Paris Peace Conference itself, China was partially successful in presenting a new national image to the world, and it also participated in the process of creating a new world order. Secondly, whereas in most bilateral or multilateral international negotiations in which it had previously participated, China had been forced to concede land for compensation and its sovereignty had been damaged, at the Paris Peace Conference, China made it clear to the whole world for the first time that it wanted to amend unequal treaties and to strive for equal international status. Although the goal was not achieved, the most important first step was taken.

World War I brought opportunities for the rapid development of China’s industry and commerce. During the conflict, due to disputes between the great powers, their attention to investments in the East diminished. Conversely, especially in sectors such as grain processing and textiles, China’s light industry developed rapidly and the number of enterprises increased. This was the ‘golden age’ of China’s national capitalist development. As a victorious country, China stopped paying the high indemnities for the Boxer Protocol. This protocol, signed in 1901, stipulated that China had to pay foreign powers a total of 450 million silver taels (including interest of about 980 million taels). Following its participation in World War I, China suspended the payment of indemnity to some allies; by declaring war on Germany and Austria, it terminated the payment of indemnities to these enemy countries; and with the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the fall of Tsarist power, the newly established Soviet Union and China agreed that the latter would no longer have to pay compensation. Overall, this was a considerable result, permitting China’s exhausted finances to take a breath.

On 10 January 1920, the day the Treaty of Versailles came into effect, the League of Nations was established. All countries that had declared war on the German and Austrian coalition during the Great War and several newly established countries were its founding members. The League of Nations was the first universal international organisation in human history with the purpose of maintaining world peace and security. It was also the largest international organisation after World War I, with more than fifty member states at its largest and with headquarters situated in Geneva. Due to China’s refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles, it failed to join the League of Nations at the beginning, but it became a member on 29 June 1920, after signing the Treaty of Saint-Germain against the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

By adhering to the League of Nations, China had become a member of an international organisation for the first time. At that time, however, civil wars were still frequent and the North and South were
divided. For these reasons, the Republic of China was incapable of playing its proper role in the League of Nations and often even delayed the payment of its membership dues. The Western powers that dominated the League of Nations did not care much about Far East affairs. F.P. Walters, who was the Deputy Secretary-General of the League, recalled that Western countries were “unwilling to listen” to the speeches of the Chinese representatives at the conference (1952, transl. by Han Ao, Nin Jing 1964, 370).

In 1928, after the Nationalist government completed China’s national unification, it began to establish a closer relationship with the League of Nations. The League established a technical cooperation committee with China and sent Ludwik W. Rajchman, Director of the Health Organization, to China as a technical cooperation representative. Rajchman inspected the science, health and agriculture sectors in China and submitted a report to the League Council. Subsequently, the League sent several experts in healthcare and agricultural technology to China. Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 was not fully satisfied with this outcome, as he had hoped that the League would play a role in helping China abolish the unequal treaties. As he told the League of Nations representative,

China is subjected to unequal treaties, and it is the League of Nation’s responsibility if it still permits that one of its members endures these unequal conditions; this is a shame for the League. The association’s prestige and capacity depend on whether it can help China to cancel these treaties.²

On 18 September 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek refused to negotiate directly with Japan, accepted Rajchman’s suggestions and instructed Shi Zhaoji 施肇基, the Chinese representative to the League of Nations, to file a complaint with the Council, requesting that the League send an investigation team. Chiang nourished great hopes in the League of Nations, and he concluded that it would support China: “This time the League of Nations came out and intervened. If our country is able to be united in its relations with the outside world, China will have no personality, and the shame will not end”.³ The League of Nations accepted China’s appeal and sent an investigation team to Manchuria, headed by Victor Bulwer-Lytton, to understand the actual situation of Japan’s invasion of China.

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² Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (1931). Chiang Kai-shek Riji 蒋介石日记 (Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary), 3 April [handwritten]. The original is preserved in the Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford University.

³ Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (1931). Chiang Kai-shek Riji 蒋介石日记 (Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary), 23 September [handwritten].
In October 1932, the Report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry was published simultaneously in Tokyo, Nanjing and Geneva. The report affirmed that Manchuria was a part of China’s territory. It also offered a more objective account of the 18 September Incident and the Manchukuo puppet state, stating that China had been invaded. With forty votes in favour and only Japan voting against, the League of Nations’ General Assembly issued a statement based on Lytton’s report, denying the legal status of Manchukuo and demanding that Japan return Manchuria to China. When the report of the League of Nations was approved, Chiang commented: “Yesterday, the League of Nations proposed to recognise the Chinese sovereignty on Manchuria and not recognised Manchukuo’s puppet state. Its attitude is quite good”. Of course, many Chinese were not satisfied with the report of the League of Nations and believed that Japan should be strongly condemned. Japan was greatly dissatisfied with the League of Nations’ report and announced its withdrawal from the League on 27 March 1933. This is evidence that the League of Nations report was favourable to China.

The attitude of the League of Nations towards the Sino-Japanese dispute reflected how difficult the choice between China and Japan was for Western powers at that time. That is to say, it was impossible to have both. Should they choose the relatively mature Japanese market or the immature Chinese one that had, however, already shown unlimited potential? Western countries were not yet willing to lose the Japanese market, nor did they want to offend Japan, but they had begun to put China and Japan on both sides of the scales and weigh them. This was unthinkable in the past, even at the Paris Peace Conference just twelve years earlier.

2 **China and the United Nations (World War II)**

In July 1937, the Japanese war of aggression against China broke out. While resisting alone with its own forces, China sought for international assistance. On 12 September, Gu Weijun 顾维钧 (also known as Wellington Koo), the chief representative of the Republic of China to the League of Nations, formally filed a complaint, requesting that the League of Nations take appropriate and necessary methods and actions in accordance with the relevant provisions of the association in order to stop Japan’s war of aggression against China. Later, denouncing the large-scale bombing atrocities committed by the Japanese invaders, the Chinese representative proposed that the

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4 Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (1932). *Chiang Kai-shek Riji* 蒋介石日记 (Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary), 14 February [handwritten].
League of Nations declare Japan an ‘aggressive country’ in accordance with the covenant and that member states take specific measures to sanction Japan.

The League of Nations’ Far Eastern Advisory Committee passed a resolution condemning the atrocities of Japanese planes shelling China’s undefended cities and killing civilians. On 6 October 1937, the General Assembly of the League of Nations officially approved a resolution declaring that Japan’s military actions against China violated the obligations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact; it suggested that a summit of the countries in the Nine-Power Treaty should take place as early as possible as a way to seek an agreement and to end the conflict; it recommended that member states express moral assistance to China and refrain from taking any actions that might damage China’s resistance and increase China’s difficulties in this conflict; it also requested that member states attempt to assist China individually (Hong 2009).

In comparison with the Report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry in 1932, this time the League of Nations showed a clearer attitude towards Japan’s invasion of China, as it publicly condemned it and encouraged member states to aid China. However, the League of Nations knew that its binding force was very weak, so it proposed to convene a summit of the Nine-Power Treaty’s countries to solve the problem.

As China was also assisting in the decline of the League of Nations, the focal point in winning international support consequently shifted to another multilateral international organisation: the Nine-Power Treaty. The Nine-Power Treaty is the shortened name of the Nine-Nation Treaty on Principles and Policies Applicable to China’s Events, adopted at an international conference held in Washington in 1922. It had the nature of an international agreement. The core principle of the Nine-Power Treaty was the ‘open door and equal opportunities’ policy for all countries in China. It emphasised that China should be open to all countries, but it also had a certain binding effect on countries (especially Japan) that dreamed of monopolising China. In the following years, several countries joined the pact, and by 1937, there were 19 signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty.

When the news of the upcoming meeting of the Nine-Power Treaty’s members was published, the Battle of Shanghai was taking place fiercely. To gain the support of the countries within the Nine-Power Treaty, Chiang Kai-shek even ordered a gradual loss of initiative on the battlefield, but the Chinese troops that were supposed to withdraw from Shanghai continued to fight to the death. China did not have extravagant expectations that a resolution of the Nine-Nation Treaty would sanction Japanese aggression, but it hoped that this would make a resolution of the League of Nations condemning Japan a reality. More concretely, it hoped that the governments and societies of the participating countries would step up their unanimous
economic sanctions against Japan (actively boycotting Japanese products) and that they would not passively help Japan with their financial and material resources. Moreover, China asked the major powers for loans for war expenses and armaments to help China.

In November 1937, a meeting of the Nine-Power Treaty’s members was held in Brussels. In discussing the Sino-Japanese War, the meeting did not consider the adoption of several suggestions put forward by the Chinese delegation, especially the four suggestions on economic sanctions against Japan. The final declaration adopted at the meeting merely reiterated the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty and the importance of peace, inviting China and Japan to stop the war and adopt a peaceful procedure. Between China and Japan, the Nine-Power Treaty organisation faced the same difficult choice as the League of Nations, and did not issue the resolution that China expected.

Even after the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939, it was still difficult for the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries to make a clear choice between China and Japan. They did not dare to offend Japan and openly support China, and they sometimes even tried to appease Japan at the expense of China’s interests.

On 7 December 1941, more than four years after China had fought alone against Japan, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and the Pacific War broke out. At this time, the strategic value of China’s battlefield against Japan was highlighted, and the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries quickly became allies of China. On 31 December 1941, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, proposing that Chiang become the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the China Theatre, commanding the Allies at that moment or in future operations in China, Vietnam and Thailand. This was the first time that a Chinese leader had been given command by an international military alliance. Subsequently, the Chinese army entered Burma to cooperate with the British army in fighting the Japanese.

On New Year’s Day 1942, Hu Shi 胡适, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, signed the joint declaration of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China against the Axis Powers. This was the sign of China’s entry into the ranks of the ‘world’s top four’. Subsequently, in the United States, the White House announced the Joint Declaration of the United Nations signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China and 22 other anti-Axis countries. The governments of the signatory countries pledged to use all their military and economic resources in the fight against fascist countries and to cooperate closely in the war, never concluding an armistice or peace with the enemy on their own. President Roosevelt proposed to list the United States, China, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union ahead of the other 22 countries. For the first time, China nominally achieved the status
of a great power equal to that of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (Sherwood 1948 transl. by She 1980, 19).

In the autumn of 1942, China signed new separate treaties with the United Kingdom and the United States, which announced the abolition of colonial privileges, such as extraterritorial rights in China. In addition, China declared war on Japan and Germany, and the bilateral unequal treaties imposed on China by the great powers basically lost their effectiveness.

On 30 October 1943, at the meeting of the foreign ministers in Moscow, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed the Declaration of the Four Powers on Universal Security, which clearly stated that they would jointly establish a new international organisation as soon as possible and established the idea that the four major powers would be the centre of gravity of this international organisation. For China, this further confirmed its status as a great power following the Declaration of the United Nations. In his congratulatory message to the leaders of the three major powers, Chiang Kai-shek said the following:

To hear the news of the signing of the joint declaration of the four countries, made me and the whole country and army happy. This historically important document shows the righteousness of fighting aggression to the whole world. It not only strengthens the cooperation between our four countries to achieve common beliefs, but also guarantees the establishment of international peace and universal security for peace-loving nations all over the world. This is a great contribution to the future of the world. (Qin 1981, 815)

In November 1943, Chiang Kai-shek, China’s wartime leader, attended the Cairo Conference and discussed important issues such as the war against Japan and post-war arrangements with US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It was the first time in history that a Chinese leader sat on an equal footing with the leaders of world powers to discuss international plans.

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference from late September to early October 1944, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China reached an agreement on the goals and structure for the establishment of a world organisation, and the United Nations blueprint was drawn. On 13 February 1945, Chiang Kai-shek was very happy to learn through a call from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would establish the United Nations to maintain world peace and security. He considered this “the first note of victory for the New Year” and thanked God.

On 25 April 1945, the representatives of fifty countries gathered in San Francisco to discuss the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations, and the Chinese delegation was among them. On 25 June,
the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Charter, which was the legal basis for the establishment of the United Nations. The Charter stipulates that the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The Chinese delegation, listed first alphabetically among the four sponsoring countries, was the first to sign the Charter. When Chiang Kai-shek heard the news, he was very happy and wrote that the “ratification of the UN Charter is a major event in the world”.

In fact, in the process of participating in the preparation of the United Nations, China had quite a sober and prudent understanding of its ‘status as a great power’. When Chiang Kai-shek was invited to participate in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, he told President Roosevelt that if there were no representatives of the Eastern peoples, “this conference would lose its meaning to half of the world’s human beings” (Qin 1981, 828). This meant that China positioned itself in the meeting as a ‘representative of the Eastern peoples’. During the preparation process for the United Nations, Chinese representatives often spoke from the standpoint of a small and weak country. Sun Fo 孙科 told the media that the Chinese people should regard obtaining the status of a great power as a “duty rather than a right” and that, being a duty rather than a right, China wanted to catch up with advanced countries, keep pace with world powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, the Soviet Union and the future France, and jointly assume responsibility for maintaining world peace (Zhongyang ribao 1945).

It has been said that China’s victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression was a ‘tragic victory’. In fact, China did not yet have the strength to become a world power. It became one of the four powers as the result of President Roosevelt’s promotion of the US strategy, but China was a great power only illusorily. However, if we consider the historical process described above, China began by fighting Japan alone, then formed a military alliance with the anti-fascist countries, then its leader participated in international negotiations, and finally became the founding country of an international organisation. Measured by these events, China’s status as an important member of the international community after World War II is unquestionable.

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5 Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (1945). Chiang Kai-shek Riji 蒋介石日记 (Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary), 25 August [handwritten].
3 Conclusions

If we look at modern China’s efforts and its struggle for equal status in the international community as a curve, the period from 1840 to 1911 represents the first stage, in which China essentially sank and hovered at the bottom. The 1911 Revolution and the founding of the Republic of China forms the second stage of the curve, which China began to climb with difficulty, accelerating after 1919 and then reaching the peak in 1945.

The two world wars led to great changes in the world order. The United States was the greatest beneficiary. They successfully replaced the United Kingdom as the new world hegemonic power. China played a certain role in the two world wars (particularly by becoming an important ally in World War II). It sided with the victorious countries and reaped many benefits. The two world wars allowed China’s international status to achieve a qualitative leap: from being an outsider to modern international organisations, it joined these international organisations and then became a founder, a permanent member of the Security Council and one of the ‘big four’. From being insulted and bullied to being respected and becoming an equal member of the international community, China’s efforts to step onto the international stage have achieved remarkable results.

In search of the reasons for this ‘successful’ path, we can identify the following domestic and international aspects. At the domestic level, after the founding of the Republic, China gradually changed its traditional worldview of seeing itself as the ‘centre of the world’ and embarked on the path of building a unified and independent modern country, striving to integrate with the world. By working hard, China made the world realise that it possessed the basic qualities of a modern country and had bright market prospects. In vol. 13 of The Cambridge History of China, Republican China: 1912-1949, J.K. Fairbank writes about China’s new attitude: “From the autumn of 1936, a new sense of optimism and national unity permeated the whole country” (Fairbank, Feuerwerker 1986, transl. by Yang Pinquan 1993, 181). If we compare the psychological attitude of the Chinese in the 1900s and the 1930s, the latter is obviously more optimistic than the former.

At the international level, faced with the rare opportunities offered by the two world wars, China made the right choice in the contest between two groups of world powers in an era of great transformation, siding with the major countries that represented progress and thus sharing the fruits of victory. Of course, after joining the Allies, China also contributed to the alliance, particularly with its sacrifices and hardships in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, which were widely praised by the Allies.
Bibliography


