

Space Oddity: Exercises in Art and Philosophy

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Making Room: Heidegger's Concept of *Einräumung*

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Abstract The study deals with a little-known concept in Heidegger's thought, that of *Einräumung*, a term that can be translated as 'making space'. In the first section, a quick review is given of the relations between time, space, and existence in *Being and Time*, Heidegger's main work. The second section provides an introductory discussion of the concept of *Einräumung* from the stratification of its meanings. Finally, in the third section, these meanings are transposed into the dimension of Heidegger's thought, showing how *Einräumung* calls into question a much more complex structure, in which a place is arranged so that it in turn arranges hospitality.

Keywords Heidegger. Space. Dwelling. Art. Void.

Summary 1 Time, Space, and Time-Space. – 2 A Question of Meaning. – 3 The Arrangement of Space and Its Conjunction. – 4 Conclusion.

1 Time, Space, and Time-Space

One of the best-known claims by Martin Heidegger is surely that time is the meaning of being (*der Sinn des Seins*), as it is already suggested by the title of his masterpiece, *Being and Time* (cf. Heidegger 1977a, 24-6). This should sound like a revolutionary thesis, insofar as a long-standing tradition has thought of being as an eternal and supratemporal permanence. The temporal nature of the meaning of being is shown through another well-known concept of Heidegger's

thinking, namely the *Dasein*, i.e., that entity that understands something as its own being. Indeed, the rehabilitation of the question of the meaning of being requires the horizon of *Dasein*, because only through *Dasein* can being authentically become a question, since only *Dasein* cares for its own being, and thus it has a privileged and essential relationship with being.

Dasein's 'care' (*Sorge*) for its being is not something simply occasional or accidental for *Dasein*, but rather it is its fundamental trait since it coincides with its very 'being there' (the actual meaning of the German *Dasein*): there is *Dasein* insofar as *Dasein* cares for its being there. Heidegger also expresses this by calling the relationship that *Dasein* holds with its own being 'existence' (*Existenz*). To exist, in its deepest meaning, then, means to open up the question of the meaning of being.

In *Being and Time*, after a meticulous analysis, Heidegger exhibits the temporal character of *Dasein's* opening to being (cf. Heidegger 1977a, § 65). That which most distinguishes the temporality of existence is *Dasein's* 'ecstatic' character, namely the fact that *Dasein* transcends itself and its own being there in the direction of its possibilities, i.e., in the direction of that openness that we have quickly said is its being. In this way, by opening up its being as possible, *Dasein's* past turns out to be its future, in the sense that what constitutes its history is both the outcome of choices – and thus of possibilities – and possibility as such, that is, something itself open to 'repeating' (*Erwiderung*) and a new beginning (cf. Heidegger 1977a, § 74). This complex structure of *Dasein's* being constitutes that which is called by Heidegger 'temporality' (*Zeitlichkeit*), from which derives the common concept of time (*Innerzeitigkeit*), often understood as a 'sequence of Now' (*Jetztfolge*).¹

But if then *Dasein* and its temporality constitute the meaning of being, what does the expression 'making space' have to do with it? Although the topic of this paper is space, rather than time, it is useful keeping in mind the temporal meaning of *Dasein's* existence, because space and the concept of *Einräumung* related to space are essentially intertwined with time and *Dasein's* ecstatic movement. This is a point that has never been sufficiently emphasised, not even by those important studies that have noted the full importance of spatial issues in Heideggerian thought after *Being and Time*.²

It is true, namely, that space acquires ever greater prominence in the thought of being, but it has almost gone completely unnoticed

¹ Heidegger 1977a, 440-2: "Die Zeit als Innerzeitigkeit aber entspringt einer wesentlichen Zeitigungsart der ursprünglichen Zeitlichkeit". Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are by the Author.

² Cf. Malpas 2006; Vallega 2003.

that this increasing preponderance of space over time takes place within what Heidegger calls 'time-space' (*Zeit-Raum*), or at least from it. Time-space is intermediate concerning the path that would lead Heidegger from time to space,³ and seems to indicate both 1) the relationship of space and time 2), as well as their origin, 3) and the origin of the relationship of space and time as well, especially if this relationship is the one thought by contemporary physics.⁴

Time-space has an original status, therefore any reference to time and space cannot avoid the confrontation with time-space. As will be seen shortly, the concept of *Einräumung* too belongs to time-space, and not in exclusive reference to space or time.

To provide an essential introductory framework, a further distinction must be made, this time concerning space. Just as with time, divided into *Zeitlichkeit* and *Innerzeitigkeit*, in *Being and Time* space too is divided into a spatiality of *Dasein* and one of the entities other than *Dasein*, namely the ones that, according to Heidegger, do not have a complex relationship with their own being and possibility, as they are 'simply present' (*Vorhandensein*), i.e., their being is given them all at once.

Paragraph § 12 of *Being and Time* provides a first set of indications on how to understand *Dasein's* spatiality. Here *Dasein's* being-in-space is shown first and foremost as possible only on the foundation of 'being-in-the-world' (cf. Heidegger 1977a, 75), which is the fundamental character of *Dasein* and from which all other determinations of its being depart. How *Dasein* relates to space is then determined by 'being-in' (*In-Sein*), namely the meaning of the 'in' contained in *Dasein's* being-in-the-world.

Being-in is characterised by Heidegger in both negative and positive ways. Negatively: by contrasting it with the *Sein-in*, i.e., the 'being-within/being inside something' proper to the entities characterised by the *Vorhandenheit* (that we could simply call 'things'). Being-within is further defined as *das Beisammen-vorhanden-sein, das Nebeneinander, Ineinander Vorhandener, Inwendigkeit in einem Räumgefäßt* (Heidegger 1977a, 74). In all these variations of being-within, the fundamental presupposition is the identity between the mode of being of the content and that of the container, i.e., always the *Vorhandenheit*. Only two subsistent things can be inside each other. Given that *Dasein* has its own way of being-in, it can never be inside anything else.

³ Heidegger's interest in time can be traced back around to his lectures on "the phenomenology of the religious life" (Heidegger 1995), if not before (cf. Heidegger 1978, 415-33), while its confrontation with space starts at the end of the 1950s. However, during the 1930s, Heidegger speaks neither of space nor time, but of time-space.

⁴ For all of these senses, see Heidegger 1989, §§ 239-241.

The positive characterisation of being-in is instead derived from the etymology of 'in', i.e., *innan-*, which means *wohnen, habitare, sich aufhalten, gewöhnt an, vertraut mit, colo, diligo, pflegen* (73). Heidegger further distances the semantic richness of being-in from the categorical sense of being-within by referring to the difference between the present tense of the first and third person singular of the German verb 'to be', *Sein*, i.e., between *bin* and *ist*: if the thing is (*ist*), I am (*bin*), in the sense of 'being close to' (*bei*), i.e., in the mode of that 'turning to' that Heidegger calls 'taking care of' (*besorgen*)⁵ and that gathers together the different nuances of *In-Sein*. 'In', 'bin', and 'bei' thus express all together the relationship among the world, being, and care.

If paragraph § 12 provides the interpretative framework of space, it is, however, in paragraphs §§ 22-24 that Heidegger develops the main reflection of *Being and Time* on spatiality. Here Heidegger analyses both the spatiality of the "innerweltlich Zuhandene" ('intramundane usable', § 22; to simplify, it is always about the thing, but caught in its instrumental character) and *Dasein*'s one (§ 23-24). In both analyses, space is considered as a constitutive of the world (cf. Heidegger 1977a, 136), therefore not only being-in directs the understanding of space, but also, and above all, the 'worldliness of the world', i.e., the context of significant references teleologically oriented by *Dasein*'s taking-care (cf. Heidegger 1977a, § 18). The spatiality of *Dasein* is thus that of the intramundane space discovered through caring and 'circumspection' (*Umsicht*) and it is only on this ground that spatiality is revealed.⁶ Hence, *Dasein* is in space through its being-in, but space is in turn in the world as 'intra-spatial' (*Innerräumliches*), i.e., as the spatiality of the intramundane entity that is taken care of and whose experience is in turn possible within the phenomenon of (being-in-the) world.⁷

Of course, here Heidegger does not want to reduce space to the mere dimension of 'caring commerce' (*besorgende Umgang*), namely

⁵ To be precise, *besorgen* also includes *begegnen* and *berühren*. *Dasein* is in the world in the sense of 'being-close-to' (*sein-bei*), which allows both *Dasein* to encounter something and, in turn, that something "in der Berührung sich offenbaren kann" (Heidegger 1977a, 74). It should therefore be noted that spatiality has its own stratification, in which each level is a condition for the possibility of another, in accordance with a procedure typical of *Being and Time*. Keeping this in mind will allow for a better understanding of the phenomenon of *Einräumung*. Furthermore, Heidegger states that entities that are not able to touch something else are *weltlos* instead of *raumlos*, anticipating the difficult relationship between space and world that runs through the paragraphs on spatiality (Heidegger 1977a, §§ 22-24) and that recognises the world's pre-eminent position against space.

⁶ Cf. Heidegger 1977a, 151: "Raum kann erst im Rückgang auf die Welt begriffen werden".

⁷ Cf. Heidegger 1977a, 135-6.

our experience of using things, but rather to show how space is preliminarily discovered within the horizon that characterises *Dasein*'s average understanding and experience. Nevertheless, Heidegger struggles to enrich the analysis of spatiality within this setting, and indeed any departure from the average understanding of space always risks becoming a degradation, such as the theoretical consideration of a pure space that is indifferent to what occupies it, as the geometrical space is (cf. Heidegger 1977a, 150).

The very spatiality of *Dasein* itself, characterised by the phenomena of 'de-distancing' (*Ent-fernung*) and 'directing orientation' (*Ausrichtung*), is thought along the lines of that of the usable thing, that is, the 'being in one's own place', which is fixed and reached precisely through 'direction' (*Richtung*) and 'distance' (*Entferntheit*) (Heidegger 1977a, 137-8). There is thus a perfect complementary between the spatiality of the usable thing and that of *Dasein*, which becomes even more acute with the analysis of the *Einräumen*, the 'granting of space' that in *Being and Time* constitutes the main existential of *Dasein*'s spatiality. By granting space, *Dasein* allows for the *Begegnenlassen* of the intramundane entity, that is its coming in proximity that can be arranged according to the multiple modes of spatialisation: *umräumen*, *wegräumen*, and *einräumen* (Heidegger 1977a, 148).

This first appearance of the *Einräumen* within the context of the world and *Dasein*'s relations with 'equipment' (*Zeug*, another Heideggerian expression for things that are used and taken care of by *Dasein*) is surely a harbinger of further insights, and yet they seem to remain in the background of the dimension of the *Umgang*, i.e., the dimension in which things are used.

In a footnote, Heidegger asks, for example, where the distance that is de-distanced comes from and that, above all, allows the primacy of presence, i.e., 'proximity' (*Gegend*).⁸ A little further on, Heidegger also recognises that *Dasein* can never encounter distance as such, especially if the *Begegnenlassen* - and thus every encounter - takes place within proximity; at most, distance can only open up as the *Spielraum* in which we turn our hearing and sight away from what is nearer (Heidegger 1977a, 143), only in the direction of a new encounter. The phenomenon of distance thus remains a mystery in *Being and Time*, and it cannot but be so, since that which is distant is first and foremost the equipment that *Dasein* brings nearer to itself, which is in principle always susceptible to be approached, given its 'being at hand' (*Zuhandensein*).

In addition to the experience of distance, another question remains open in the experience of space in *Being and Time*, namely that of *Dasein*'s own place. While things are in their place about their use,

⁸ cf. Heidegger 1977a, 140.

does *Dasein* have its own place? The question is set out convincingly when Heidegger notes how *Dasein* does not simply occupy a place but, by its spatiality, it takes it, arranging and ordering the place it reserves for itself. However, a few lines further on Heidegger drops any possible development by stating that the ecstatically made space of one's own is the leeway (*Spielraum*) of the sphere of the totality of the things one immediately takes care of (cf. Heidegger 1977a, 487-8). Hence, we know nothing about the very place of *Dasein*.

Of course, after *Being and Time*, these issues are taken up again, provided, however, that space is freed from the dimension of the world and the *Umgang*. On the other hand, the world/space relation is problematic, because either it is recognised that space is completely absorbed by the world and the relation to things (since it has been seen that even the spatiality of *Dasein* cannot be separated from them) or space becomes the aseptic space of geometry – a homogeneous space indifferently suited to everything. A third way of experiencing spatiality, solely concerning *Dasein*, is missing.

The decisive theoretical step, however, consists in no longer experiencing space as a space in which one is. Being-in and being-within are two declinations of how one can be in space, but there is never any question about being already in space, i.e., it is not under discussion that *Dasein* is already in space, and that spatiality is fundamentally understood from the being-in. This is why Heidegger can also base the spatiality of being-in on time: because being-in is 'already' in space, and thus due to a temporal anteriority.⁹ A glance at the semantic richness of being-in, however, shows that if the question is moved in terms of being-in-space, rather than relative to the being of space, then it is not original.¹⁰ The reference to dwelling and the link with the Latin *colo* is only partially taken up by *besorgen*, since the aspect of permanence compared to migration is completely omitted, which is instead fully part of the experience of space and manifests itself where the *colère* designates a site that puts an end to migration, with the introduction of cultivation – a site that is, perhaps, a phenomenon far more original than the everyday trade with things itself.

All these issues are taken up by Heidegger from the *Einräumen* of *Being and Time* as well as from *Dasein's* temporal-ecstatic movement. Heidegger's time-space can thus be seen as a result of the combination of these two topics.

⁹ Cf. Heidegger 1977a, § 70. In the conference *Time and Being* (1962), Heidegger criticizes his own theoretical step, cf. Heidegger 2007, 29.

¹⁰ Cf. Heidegger 2018, 70: "Dasein' hier ganz irrig als ‚Sein im Raume' gefaßt -statt *Sein des Raumes* (genitivus mundi)".

2 A Question of Meaning

Einräumen and the noun related to it, *Einräumung*, are not easily translatable. *Einräumen* means to concede, to grant, to admit, to allot. Since it contains *Raum*, space, that which is granted through the *Einräumen* is a space. A good translation for *Einräumen* could thus be 'making room'.

In *Being and Time*, *Dasein* allows things to come forward in proximity, through de-distancing, as well as to announce themselves in their usability, through orientation within the plexus of references that Heidegger calls 'significance' (*Bedeutsamkeit*). As we have seen, here Heidegger, first of all, thinks of the *Einräumung* about the use of things, and thus the space given to them is all related to this purpose.

There is however another nuance in the meaning of *Einräumung* that may be hard to perceive in English, but it helps to make explicit how *einräumen* makes room. Indeed, *Einräumung* means *dispositio*, which, in turn, stands for both attitude and the way something is arranged. In this sense, the word 'order' means as much arrangement as the result of the act of commanding, therefore it can be used to translate the *Einräumung* when it means *dispositio* (of course, the problem is that the two meanings of *Einräumung* stand together). Notwithstanding that, order means also request, hence we ask ourselves if making space follows an order or is rather the result of a request). In this situation of ambiguity, the possibility of a command to vacate a space is outlined as much as that of a request to occupy it.

The discussion becomes even more complicated if we consider other words to translate *Einräumung*, such as 'disposition' and 'disposal'. Disposition could be a good translation of *dispositio* too because it makes explicit another meaning, namely that of inclination and availability, which, although it does not seem to be immediately shared by *Einräumung*, is nevertheless thought by Heidegger when he uses expressions like "Zur Verfügung den Göttern" ('being at the disposal of the gods', cf. Heidegger 1989, 18). The German word for disposal, *Verfügung*, belongs to the German verb *fügen*, which also means 'to place and arrange', so it has a very similar meaning to *Einräumen*. By including the semantic area of *fügen*, widely used by Heidegger together with the noun *Fuge*, which can be translated as 'juncture', we not only return to the dimension of command, i.e., of injunction, which therefore imposes itself over that of request, but we also learn that the space that is granted and arranged has a juncture, i.e., it is a joint space. Only within conjunction can order be perceived: a simple space is not ordered, as it is bare. Finally, if we leave aside the 'at your disposal' formula, we know that 'disposal' means first and foremost dispersal, divestment, the act of getting rid of something. This too is part of the *Einräumung* experience. When Heidegger speaks of the intertwining of space and time, he is referring to dispersion

(*Zerstreuung*) and estrangement (*Entfremdung*), in the sense of the original condition for the experience of time and space as a collection (cf. Heidegger 1989, 385). As if making order presupposes original disorder.

The last word that makes up the semantic network of *Einräumung* is the German verb *räumen*, which at first could be understood as 'spatialising', 'making space' in the meaning of separating things, drawing a furrow, a hiatus – at least as long as we understand space as a distance between things. More accurately, *räumen* means 'to clear', 'to vacate', or 'to deplete'; for instance, Heidegger links *räumen* to *roden*, i.e., 'to plough', and to the expression "die Wildnis freimachen" ('to clear the wilderness', Heidegger 1983, 206). The connection between *Einräumen* and *Räumen* is first of all confirmed by the fact that Heidegger seems to use one expression and the other equivalently. Indeed, in some pages of *Contributions to Philosophy, Einräumung* appears together with *Zeitigung*,¹¹ while in others the pair is *Zeitigung/Räumung*.¹²

Although this problem cannot be addressed here, it must be said that the semantic valences that certain words have between one language and another, and the problem of translation in general, constitutes a decisive issue for Heidegger (cf. Nardelli 2021). This does not only mean that different languages contribute to a different experience of space, but, above all, that to each language the command of *Einräumung* sounds different, and what Heidegger calls *Volk* is constituted precisely based on the use of space reserved for it within a language. English 'disposal', Latin *dispositio*, German *Einräumung*: these are all translations that have been juxtaposed here in a general network of meanings, but the use of a language is not neutral, thus it does not exist something like a network of general meanings, independent of historical languages. Therefore, reading *Einräumung* and *dispositio* together from a Heideggerian perspective also means having to deal with the Latin-Roman experience of space and the German experience.

This might even sound like a platitude, i.e., a commonplace, were it not that the very discourse on *Einräumung* eliminates the possibility of a commonplace as such because the specific spatial experience of each language has the meaning of a specific command towards the arrangement of space. That is to say, it is not simply a matter of linguistic relativity, but a matter of tuning in to a command within historical languages. Space is thus discovered using a command that always sounds different. In the age of globalisation, this does not sound reassuring at all (cf. Cattaneo 2017), because it means that there is no common space, but always a contested and bounded space, at least

¹¹ Cf. Heidegger 1989, 192, 429.

¹² Cf. Heidegger 1989, 272, 383-5.

until we all speak the same language. However, when that happened, if space is granted within the command of one language, then we may well lack space because the sense of the command of the very language that will impose itself on the others remains undecided.

The richness of the semantic network of *Einräumung* is not a second-order point, for indeed the relationship between language and space is essential. Incidentally, this relationship seems something peculiar to space, since time, on the other hand, presents a much less complex range of meanings.¹³ Of course, time also has its own semantic complexity, as mentioned in the *Zeitlichkeit/Innerzeitigkeit* distinction. Nevertheless, the semantic stratification of time is dictated, in the case of time, by a transcendental procedure: each meaning is a condition of the possibility of another. There is, for instance, the understanding of something as X (e.g., the primacy of the present) and this is due to Y (e.g., the self-temporalisation of the ecstasy of the present; cf. Heidegger 1977a, 460). However, in the case of space, it is a different matter: one moves between the various meanings not because one goes back to more and more original conditions of possibility, but because one listens to the language that speaks of space. The very idea of a condition of possibility is something internal to the *Einräumung*, in its meaning of concession.

In other words, language itself seems to be a form of articulation of space, an arrangement that not only orders the elements of our experience into a syntax but, above all, commands and dictates them. Indeed, Heidegger insists that our experience of language is an experience of listening to language (cf. Heidegger 1985, 29). The experience of listening to the command inherent in the word is dictation. In dictation, the words take their place with authority, and we listen to them and take notes. In the experience of dictation, we cannot help but hear the call to dictatorship. And yet, Heidegger rather makes the case for another experience, namely that of *dichten* and *Dichtung* (cf. Heidegger 1980, 29-30), of poetry, not in the narrow sense of verse composition, but in the broader sense of art as listening and enactment/putting in the work ("ins Werk setzen", Heidegger 1977b, 59) - listening to the language of colours, of materials, and, of course, of language itself in poetry.

Based on this preliminary characterisation of *Einräumung* from its linguistic dimension, *Einräumen* then means being arranged at listening to the order of language; an order that manifests itself in the organisation/displacement of something.

13 In contrast to *Räumung* and *Einräumung*, Heidegger only speaks of *Zeitigung*, a word that has an almost technical meaning. *Zeitigen* means to generate, to produce, and in Austrian also 'to ripen'. While in *Being and Time*, maturation is not approached with the temporality of *Dasein*, it is precisely this that Heidegger gradually uses to refer to time.

3 The Arrangement of Space and Its Conjunction

This network of meanings is explored first of all about the ecstatic movement of existence, which, at the same time, highlights a fundamental ambiguity inside the *Einräumung*. This ambiguity, which has already been seen to permeate the words as *dispositio*, concerns, so to say, the 'object' of the *Einräumen*. What is it that is *ingeräumt*?

In its coming out of itself, *Dasein* leaves a void behind, as if it were a centrifugal suction that leaves no residue. Indeed, it is not a matter of exiting from an essence, according to the traditional sense of *ex-sistere*, because *Dasein* itself does not stand before its existence. This is a theme that Heidegger does not abandon after *Being and Time*, and indeed he takes it up again, remodelling it about Hölderlin and the experience of exile: *Dasein* is driven out of the hearth of being, as we also read in the chorus of Sophocles' *Antigone* (cf. Heidegger 1983b, 165; Heidegger 1984, 63), and its being-there turns out to be therefore a being-outside, a being displaced (*Verrückt*) and exposed (*ausgesetzt*) to the weather of existence (cf. Heidegger 1980, 36, 100).

What is it, however, that stands out before *Dasein*, in its ecstatic movement? If it leaves behind a nothingness, nevertheless there is a nothingness also against it. The possibilities projected are indeed a form of emptiness, and its most authentic possibility, 'being towards death' ("Sein zum Tode"), precisely reveals nothingness as the impossibility of existence (Heidegger 1977a, § 53).

Dasein is thus surrounded by nothingness, and yet the nothingness in front of it does not seem to be, somehow, the nothingness behind it (cf. Spanio 2013, 132). If this were the case, *Dasein* would coincide with itself, that is, it would have an identity, and it would cancel itself out because it would be a thing like any other. Said differently, how could there be such a thing as a movement of existence, if the starting point coincided with the endpoint?

From a metaphysical point of view, discourse around the nullity of something would have followed the direction of a foundation preserving existence from total annihilation. On the contrary, here it takes on an eminently phenomenological sense. Indeed, Heidegger thinks of the nothingness that surrounds *Dasein* both as a void and in spatio-temporal terms: in front of itself, *Dasein* is propelled towards the void by temporal ecstasy; behind itself, it is instead surrounded by the space it has already left to be thrown into the world. The impossibility of representing this movement should not be discouraged, since Heidegger intends precisely to break the primacy of representation. On the contrary, we will see how the phenomenological interpretation of the nullity of *Dasein* is precisely the strong point of Heideggerian discourse. The reference to time and space is of fundamental importance, precisely because it anchors thought to the phenomenological

dimension of experience: an experience that is as much spatio-temporally situated as it is an experience of time and space.

Let us then see how the spatial experience of *Einräumung* fits within this phenomenological framework. If there is a space that *Dasein* leaves behind it, then it must first be recognised that, concerning *Being and Time*, spatiality is addressed in its independence of the world. Hence, space is now released from *Umgang*, and it becomes a space that is free, empty, and open. The emptiness of space should not be understood negatively, i.e., as a deficiency, precisely because *Dasein* is already always ecstatic, and thus does not leave behind a space it could otherwise fill in. Heidegger also links this 'emptiness' (*Leere*) to 'reading' (*lesen*), taking up the connection between language and space (cf. Heidegger 1983a, 209). If the void of space is connected to reading, then the emptiness of space is that which something gathers around, as it is the 'gathering' that expresses the meaning of *lesen* (cf. Heidegger 2000, 215). Heidegger also refers to the hollow centre of a jug (Heidegger 1989, 339), proving that the negativity of the void is somehow functional to a positive moment of space-making. *Dasein* thus leaves behind the spatial void, but this is not lost, rather it surrounds it and somehow gives it form.

Understanding therefore the emptiness of ecstatic movement as a space, rather than a mere nothingness, allows us to discern its constitutive capacity. The clearing present in the making of space (*Räumen*) enables (*räumt ein*) something, that is, it is a making of 'space for'. The idea of making room for something recalls a rather well-known concept from Heidegger's philosophy, namely that of *sein lassen*, to 'let it be' (cf. Haugeland 2007). *Lassen*, in both its active and passive meaning, would indicate for Heidegger "the deepest sense of being" (Heidegger 1986, 363), and is usually interpreted about two other important concepts, such as *Gelassenheit* and *Seinsverlassenheit*. In this way, being lets beings/entities (*Seienden*) be, withdrawing itself from it. Consequently, one could then understand the meaning of *Einräumen* as leaving space for the entity. This is also suggested by some of Heidegger's expressions, in which space appears as the result of *Einräumen* (cf. Heidegger 1989, 62, 298, 429).

However, *Einräumen* does not allow itself to be clarified based on *Lassen*, and it seems that the opposite is rather true, namely that *Lassen* is a way of understanding *Einräumen*.¹⁴ Leaving a space free indeed presupposes that one is in some way in possession of that space, or at least of the faculty to free it. But what is this faculty, and what

14 We have already mentioned that it is *Dasein* that leaves space behind, whereas the subject of *lassen* is being itself. To this we should add that if *Einräumen* meant making space for things, then it would continue to have the same meaning as in *Being and Time*, whereas we have ruled out this hypothesis.

is that space already possessed? Moreover, it should be noted that here the discourse has an ontological significance: the space that is left is the space of being, in which the things that occupy it can be said to be. But then, what does it mean that that space was not previously free? What occupied it? Heidegger undoubtedly speaks of the "retraction" (*Entzug*) and "refusal" (*Verweigerung*) of being (cf. Heidegger 1989, 293), but if it is understood in the sense of leaving space for beings, it means that being is thought of as something that can, in turn, occupy a space: that would sound quite ontic. Furthermore, if abandonment is required for beings/entities to be, it means that being occupied that space without margins, as if it were something unlimited, which then limits itself. All this sounds very metaphysical, also and above all because being's abandonment of beings/entities does not at all guarantee that beings are: according to Heidegger, beings 'are', even without being, in the sense that, in the age of the abandonment of being and the technical domain, our experience of things takes place even without thinking the truth of being within beings (cf. Heidegger 1989, 111). To assert the opposite, namely that being retracts itself for the sake of beings, is to continue to think being in favour of beings, reiterating what for Heidegger is the pattern of thought of metaphysics, which achieves 'beingness' (*Seiendheit*) instead of being. The being of beings (*das Sein der Seienden*) is in a certain sense independent of the abandonment of being: that being withdraws from beings does not mean that beings thus accede to being, but rather that beings lose their original belonging to being.

As in the case of nothingness, sticking to the phenomenological dimension of the *Einräumen* avoids giving it a metaphysical tone, which is completely absent in these pages by Heidegger, and instead allows the character of the space that is *ingeräumt* to come into sharper focus. Space is not the residue of the self-annulment of being, both because this does not make much sense from a phenomenological point of view, and because, above all, this perspective does not allow the special character of space to be grasped, given that, from the point of view of *Lassen*, space is only such insofar as it is liberated, i.e., it follows from something else, in short, it is not grasped from itself: it is not a *Phänomen* in the sense of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1977a, 41).

The space that the *Einräumen* thus opens up has a constitutive character, rather than being a mere nothingness. Nevertheless, we have also seen how the constitution granted by *Einräumung* cannot be understood as a 'leaving space for'. To further clarify this sensitive point, one could also refer to the difference between *räumen* and *einräumen*. The space that, through the *Räumung*, is cleared has negativity absent in that which is granted by the *Einräumung*. The space that is granted is not simply abandoned, a house that is occupied because the previous tenants have left it, more or less in concession. If this were the case, our experience of space would always be priv-

ative, that is, the frame that remains once the picture has been removed (cf. Heidegger 1989, 373).

In what, then, does the proper character of the space of the *Einräumung* consist? What is granted in the *Einräumung* is not simply a space freed from something for something else, a space that is free insofar as it has been freed, but rather a space that is originally welcoming. This is tantamount to recognising that the space one allows oneself is not an inhospitable space (another reason why it is neither nothingness nor deprivation of being), but rather it is a space such that something can come to be in it, and not simply because it is free but by its specific character, which here could be defined as 'hospitality'.

Hospitality can be characterised as the capacity to welcome, not only within oneself. For space is not only that within which things are but also that which surrounds and defines. Boundary, contour, and border are spatial concepts, and can thus be assumed to come into play about hospitality. Concerning *Being and Time*, the relation of things to space thus takes on a markedly constitutive trait, which is expressed by the welcoming things. Hence, the place of things is not only that which endows them with meaning, i.e., which provides indications of their use but also becomes the space around which things have gathered, entering within their contours.¹⁵

However, the space granted by the *Einräumung* is not a space that already invites entry. Rather, it is a space arranged in such a way as to have within it the possibility of both welcome and rejection. Therefore, hospitality does not already imply access but expresses a configuration of space that can allow entry, and in general living. If it is not simply a matter of crossing a threshold, but of living in space, then the space must be configured in such a way as to guarantee this possibility, regardless of whether one lives in it or not. This is the sense of the profound connection between conjunction, configuration, and concession, all expressed by *Einräumung*.

The hospitable space is not just a simple room, into which one enters and from which one leaves, but it is the space of existence, in which the human being experiences his locality, that is, his situatedness, in history, in a people, in a corporeity. The configuration assumed by space is thus that disposition, that *habitus* (hence 'habit') that allows one to inhabit a space. Moreover, we witness a peculiar stratification of space: 1) there is the bare space, 2) the space arranged for living in and, of course, 3) the space inhabited. The central position of the arranged space underlines its intimate possibil-

15 One hypothesis regarding the continuation of this discourse might be that it is neither, of course, a metaphysical discourse, in the vague and broad sense, nor a strictly phenomenological one. Indeed, I do not believe that the few indications given by Heidegger on the constitutive role of space go in the direction of a phenomenology of the processes by which space, rather than consciousness, constitutes the objects of experience.

ity: the fact that hospitality is the result of a command excludes the fact that we are already in a habitable space, as well as that we can dwell in it. This is tantamount to saying that we can remain excluded from the space, even though it is arranged for us. This becomes even more disturbing when we consider the fact that the command of arrangement does not depend on us, but on what reaches our ears from language.

In *Contributions*, the link between space and possibility becomes even more pronounced, as the possibility that is *ingeräumt* is the "Möglichkeit der Schenkung" (Heidegger 1989, 384), i.e., the possibility that the 'refusal' of being (*Sichversagen*) is not total, but rather 'lingers', being fixed and endured precisely through space and its 'bewitching/inviting' (*berückend*) character. The reception of space then guarantees the possibility that the retreat of being is *Ereignis*, the word that for Heidegger indicates the complex relationship between being and *Dasein*. *Einräumung* is thus an arrangement of space such that indecision is delineated in it, that is, whether it welcomes or not, and this remaining suspended defines the character of possibility, its being a pure relationship.

The insistence on purity must not, however, misunderstand the political implications of space. Indeed, the possibility of reception shows that space is always a space traversed by others or a space concerning which others are hunted and kept at the border. Indeed, one does not wish to cross the border to an inhospitable place. This is why the arrangement of space also includes the theme of agreement and contention: the 'contents' of space are as much what is held together (*con-tinēre*) as what is contested. The *Einräumung* thus organises forces that define both the possible and uncertain character of reception and the contractions that animate it. Inside and outside, near and far, but also high and low: it is through these dimensions that space is arranged by the *Einräumung*.

These dimensions of space constitute the conjunction of the arranged space, the object toward which is directed the *Einräumung*. What does it mean that it is the internal structure of space that is arranged? How does the arrangement of, for example, distances take place? What is it, moreover, that decides in favour or against the accommodation of space? What, finally, must the arrangement be, to allow the possibility: for example, must inside and outside be present in equal measure, to generate a perfect opposition and the indecision that constitutes possibility, or not?

These questions make explicit a certain ambiguity in Heidegger's discourse on space, which has already been seen by briefly reconstructing the semantic network in which space is thought. The ambiguity is as follows: is the *Einräumung* directly concerned with space or with something internal to it, which may be called spatial conjunction? What is arranged when one arranges a space?

Let us take the example of distance. The space that is laid out seems to be a space furrowed by great distances since it is precisely distance that marks the difference of space from the world of *Being and Time*, where things are defined by the relationship to hand (*Vor-handenheit/Zu-handenheit*). In *Contributions*, space is also the site where the decision about the proximity and distance of the gods falls, so it is relatively clear that the arrangement of space has to make room for distance. But how is the ordering of these distances directed at space, rather than at things? Said even more clearly: how does one draw a distance without at the same time arranging the extremes of distance? In the specific case of distance, this is all the more evident when one considers that one is talking about the distance of the gods and not just any distance between two points. That is to say, how a god is distant would be incomparable to how a tool is distant since it is not enough for me to stretch out my hand to cancel the distance. If it is the *Einräumung* that arranges distance, then it cannot only address space but also what forms its conjuncture in it. Thus, something strange occurs: there is 'something', such as the gods, which form the conjuncture of space, and its interplay of distances, and these in turn accommodate something else. In this case, the unusual reference to the gods means that the object of the *Einräumung* is not things, which in turn accommodate other things. There is a gap, a difference, in the arranged space between the elements that arrange it and the things that enter it and are welcomed.

In the brief text *Art and Space* (Heidegger 1983a, 203-10), forty years later than *Being and Time*, Heidegger seems to return to the question of the *Einräumung*. Here, the *Räumen* is defined as "Freigabe von Orten" (207), while the *Einräumung* is the occurrence of this liberation of places (207), in the dual sense of giving access (*Zulassen*) and setting up (*Einrichten*). By 'place', Heidegger means instead the space around which the thing gathers, and in whose proximity, it shows itself. Heidegger wonders whether it is not precisely placed, in their imposing themselves and in their gathering, that assign *Einräumung* its fundamental directive, rather than thinking of places as the result of the concession of space. Heidegger seems to lean towards the latter option. That which was then called the conjuncture of space, on which *Einräumung* in the sense of command is directed and from which *Einräumung* in the sense of welcoming concession derives, is place.

The *Einräumung* liberates the place, that is, it arranges the space in such a way that inside it things can constitute themselves and gather. The space arranged in this way, the place, in turn, opens up a 'region' (*Gegend*), i.e., an area within which different things can coalesce. This is not just a co-partnership of things within the same semantic area, or within the same sphere of use: here Heidegger is probably thinking of the much broader co-partnership that takes

place within the *Geviert*, in which earth, heaven, mortals and the divine co-participate (cf. Heidegger 2000, 152-3).

Heidegger states that things themselves are places. The difference between the conjuncture of space, its welcoming structure, and the things that inhabit it then becomes inverted: the things themselves grant space, opening up distances in which no longer other things, but mortals and the divine, are placed. That which comes to inhabit the space laid out by the place unveils a new experience of spatiality, because belonging to a place does not only have the sense of a location but of a coexistence with that which makes our mortality explicit and that which overpowers it.

4 Conclusion

We have thus seen how the thought of *Einräumung* begins with the experience of the spatiality of things being used and ends by returning to things again, but in a radically new sense. Things are no longer tools, and equipment, but become places. In this profound inversion, the experience of spatiality naturally changes: whereas in *Being and Time* it was understood as an approximation of tools within a complex of relations of use (the world), it now becomes the experience of belonging to a region opened up by the thing.

Einräumung, therefore, means the opening up of that particular space that is the place, that is, the space/thing capable of guaranteeing reception. The complex web of meanings, sometimes ambivalent, of *Einräumung*, can thus be explained within the experience of place, which is a thing and at the same time welcomes things, which is open/ordered and in turn opens and disposes of.

But in all this, where is existence, with its time-space movement, ecstatically reaching out into space? If it is the gods, mortals, heaven, and earth that characterise the juncture of the thing/place in the sense of *Geviert*, then existence falls within it: human beings are the mortals. This, however, only indicates that *Dasein* has a meaning not limited to the human being: the *Da* it opens up is itself a place, if not the place *par excellence*. Just as the place is at once a thing, so the *Da* is at once proper to an entity, the human being. In the *Da* too, then, there is the complex movement of *Einräumung*, in the sense of the ecstatic command that moves out of itself by opening up a space and at the same time the invitation to fill and guard it, making it habitable. Existence is thus the original sense of making room.

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