e-ISSN 2724-1572 ISSN 2724-1394

Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World 2 —

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek and H˘ ocaza¯de

Efe Murat Balıkçıog˘lu

**2**

**Edizioni** Ca'Foscari

## Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World

Series edited by Pietro Daniel Omodeo

2

## Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World

#### Editor-in-chief

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#### Editorial board

Tina Asmussen (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Schweiz) Marius Buning (Freie Universität Berlin, Deutschland) Elaine Leong (University College London, United Kingdom) Pietro Daniel Omodeo (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia) Jonathan Regier (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Italia) Claudia Stein (University of Warwick, United Kingdom)

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e-ISSN 2724-1572 ISSN 2724-1394

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Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488)

Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

Venezia **Edizioni Ca' Foscari** - Venice University Press 2023

Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms. Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

© 2023 Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu for the text © 2023 Edizioni Ca' Foscari for the present edition

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Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms. Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) / Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu— 1. ed. — Venice: Edizioni Ca' Foscari, 2023. — xii + 236 p.; 25,5 cm. — (Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World; 2). — ISBN 978-88-6969-644-2.

URL http://edizionicafoscari.unive.it/it/edizioni/libri/978-88-6969-644-2/ DOI http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-643-5

Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

## Acknowledgments

I have accrued many debts to those who offered their help, time, and guidance during this long and arduous journey of research and writing. I am most indebted to Pietro Daniel Omodeo and Harun Küçük for providing timely encouragement and assistance during the entire process that resulted in this book. I am also immensely grateful to Cemal Kafadar, Hacı Osman Gündüz, Abdurrahman Mihirig, and Ahmed Tahir Nur for their generous comments, revision suggestions, and diligent readings. The feedback of the two anonymous readers was thoughtful and welcome. I had the chance to present an earlier draft of the Arabic texts along with my English translations at Harvard University's Classical Arabic Reading Group in Spring 2018. I would like to thank Shady H. Nasser, Giovanni Carrera, and Hacı Osman Gündüz for inviting me to present my research. I began to work on this manuscript during the early months of the unfortunate COVID-19 pandemic. Walden Pond in Concord, MA has been such a peaceful and devotional place for me to draw inspiration for this manuscript during this solitary time. I was also delighted to see that the Turkish manuscript libraries had the most efficient and accommodating system for acquiring copies of manuscripts relevant to one's research. I would like to thank the personnel at Süleymaniye (especially Hasan Tetik), Millet, and Beyazıt Devlet Libraries in Istanbul, Turkey.

This book has been also made possible by the support of several departments and programs. I would like to acknowledge the generosity of Ca' Foscari University of Venice's Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Wellesley College's Departments of Religion (Barbara Geller) and Italian Studies (Sergio Parussa/David Ward), the University of Bologna Faculty Research Exchange Program, and Harvard University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) for their institutional support. Furthermore, I wish to thank Fedor Benevich, Oscar Aguirre-Mandujano, Hasan Umut, and Akif Ercihan Yerlioğlu for their invaluable comments on the earlier draft of this book, as well as Aslıhan Akışık, Ömer Aygün, Joanna Burdzel, Giancarlo Casale, Sharon Elkins, Khaled El-Rouayheb, Simon Grote, Hasan Hacak, James Hankins, Didem Havlioğlu, Nilüfer İsvan, Lidwien Kapteijns, Bruce Lawrence, Roy Mottahedeh, Gülru Necipoğlu, Adnan Onart, Stefano Pellò, İrvin Cemil Schick, Benny Shaffer, Sunil Sharma, Engin E. Sezer, Jacob Stump, Himmet Taşkömür, Cem Tecimer, Wheeler Thackston, Emilio Vavarella, Dilan Yıldırım, Sina Zeytinoğlu, and the students who took my REL/PHI 366 Islamic philosophy seminar at Wellesley, for their friendship, collegiality, and thoughtful conversations on the topics covered in this book.

Last but not least, I am eternally thankful to my beloved Seval Haraç and my parents Tevfik and Yasemin Balıkçıoğlu. Without their love, devotion, and moral support indeed, I would not be able to complete this study. All remaining errors are entirely of my own.

Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

## Acknowledgments

I have accrued many debts to those who offered their help, time, and guidance during this long and arduous journey of research and writing. I am most indebted to Pietro Daniel Omodeo and Harun Küçük for providing timely encouragement and assistance during the entire process that resulted in this book. I am also immensely grateful to Cemal Kafadar, Hacı Osman Gündüz, Abdurrahman Mihirig, and Ahmed Tahir Nur for their generous comments, revision suggestions, and diligent readings. The feedback of the two anonymous readers was thoughtful and welcome. I had the chance to present an earlier draft of the Arabic texts along with my English translations at Harvard University's Classical Arabic Reading Group in Spring 2018. I would like to thank Shady H. Nasser, Giovanni Carrera, and Hacı Osman Gündüz for inviting me to present my research. I began to work on this manuscript during the early months of the unfortunate COVID-19 pandemic. Walden Pond in Concord, MA has been such a peaceful and devotional place for me to draw inspiration for this manuscript during this solitary time. I was also delighted to see that the Turkish manuscript libraries had the most efficient and accommodating system for acquiring copies of manuscripts relevant to one's research. I would like to thank the personnel at Süleymaniye (especially Hasan Tetik), Millet, and Beyazıt Devlet Libraries in Istanbul, Turkey.

This book has been also made possible by the support of several departments and programs. I would like to acknowledge the generosity of Ca' Foscari University of Venice's Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Wellesley College's Departments of Religion (Barbara Geller) and Italian Studies (Sergio Parussa/David Ward), the University of Bologna Faculty Research Exchange Program, and Harvard University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) for their institutional support. Furthermore, I wish to thank Fedor Benevich, Oscar Aguirre-Mandujano, Hasan Umut, and Akif Ercihan Yerlioğlu for their invaluable comments on the earlier draft of this book, as well as Aslıhan Akışık, Ömer Aygün, Joanna Burdzel, Giancarlo Casale, Sharon Elkins, Khaled El-Rouayheb, Simon Grote, Hasan Hacak, Didem Havlioğlu, Nilüfer İsvan, Lidwien Kapteijns, Bruce Lawrence, Roy Mottahedeh, Gülru Necipoğlu, Adnan Onart, Stefano Pellò, İrvin Cemil Schick, Benny Shaffer, Sunil Sharma, Engin E. Sezer, Jacob Stump, Himmet Taşkömür, Cem Tecimer, Wheeler Thackston, Emilio Vavarella, Dilan Yıldırım, Sina Zeytinoğlu, and the students who took my REL/PHI 366 Islamic philosophy seminar at Wellesley, for their friendship, collegiality, and thoughtful conversations on the topics covered in this book.

Last but not least, I am eternally thankful to my beloved Seval Haraç and my parents Tevfik and Yasemin Balıkçıoğlu. Without their love, devotion, and moral support indeed, I would not be able to complete this study. All remaining errors are entirely of my own.

Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

## Table of Contents


**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98[?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

# Notes on Transliteration and Dates

For the Romanization of texts written in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish, this book uses a slightly modified version of the conventional transliteration system by the *IJMES* (*International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*). The modification that I applied is as follows: For [خ [in Ottoman Turkish I used [ḫ] instead of [kh]; and for [ق],[ ص[, and [ط [in Ottoman Turkish words, I used [ḳ], [ṣ] and [ṭ] to distinguish them from [ك],[ س [and [ت [respectively.

For reference, I have included the transliterations of all passages that I included in the footnotes. Some of my translations and readings are tentative, and I am open to various other alternative readings and suggestions by the wider scholarly community.

I follow the respective rules of Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, and Persian depending on the language of the text, even if some terms may be common in all three languages. I kept common Arabic terms such as *medrese* (Muslim college) and *ulema* (the learned class) as they are pronounced in modern Turkish leaving out the letter *ayn* for reading purposes.

If an Ottoman Turkish expression has an Arabic or Persian origin, then I transliterated the word according to the modified *IJMES* transliteration conventions. If the word is originally Ottoman Turkish, then I did not put any transliteration including Ottoman titles, as in the cases of Kātib Çelebi, Sinān Paşa or Nevʿī Efendi (not Çelebī, Pāshā or Efendī). There were a great number of fifteenth-century Ottoman scholars coming from diverse backgrounds. If the scholar was born and studied in the lands of Rūm, then I treated that scholar as having Ottoman Turkish origins and I used Ottoman Turkish transliteration conventions with an Ottoman Turkish *iżāfet* in the title. If the scholar was from Arab or Persian lands, then I transliterated his name by using Arabic conventions (such as ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī) unless indicated otherwise in some Persian names. For instance, Sinān-ı ʿAcem, a Persian émigré-scholar is generally addressed with a Persian *iḍāfa*, not as Sinān el-ʿAcemī. Some Ottoman Turkish sources also referred to al-Ṭūsī as ʿAlī-yi Ṭūsī or Mevlānā Ṭūsī. For full titles, the Ottomans tended to give the full name in Arabic *iḍāfa*. For instance, in the case of the Ottoman scholar Ḫayālī's full title (i.e. Şemseddīn Aḥmed bin Mūsā el-Ḫayālī), I transliterated his name according to Arabic conventions, but with a Turkish pronunciation.

Last but not least, many works in Ottoman Turkish may have Arabic titles, but the content could still be in Ottoman Turkish. In that regard, if the work is in Ottoman Turkish with an Arabic title, then I transliterated the title and the quotations from that work according to the above-mentioned Ottoman Turkish transliteration conventions (i.e. *Mevżūʿātüʾl-ʿulūm or Tācüʾttevārīḫ*). If both the title and main text of the work are in Arabic, then I used the *IJMES*' Arabic conventions, even if the work was compiled by an Ottoman scholar (i.e. *Kashf al-ẓunūn*).

Dates are given according to the Common Era and the Islamic Hijra calendar together.

Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488)

Schild der Nothwendigkeit. Höchstes Gestirn des Seins! — das kein Wunsch erreicht, das kein Nein befleckt, ewiges Ja des Sein's, ewig bin ich dein Ja: *denn ich liebe dich, o Ewigkeit!* — —

Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ruhm und Ewigkeit"\*

See the fourth part of the poem "Ruhm und Ewigkeit" in Friendrich Nietzsche's "Dionysos-Dithyramben". *Dionysos-Dithyramben*, 150-1; and *Sämtliche Werke*, 404. The expression "Schild der Nothwendigkeit" is a metaphor by analogy denoting the Aristotelian paradigm set in opposition to "Schild des Dionysos" (Groddeck, *Dionysos-Dithyramben*, 243). For the English version: "Shield of Necessity. | Highest of constellation of Being! | Which no desire can attain, | Which no negation can taint, | Eternal Yes of Being, | I am your lasting Affirmation: | For I love you, oh Eternity!" (Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 140).

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

# <sup>1</sup> Introduction **The Agonistic Spirit at the Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Court**

**Summary** 1.1 A Literature Review. The Nature of Early Muslim Debates and Disputations (From *Jadal* and *Munāẓara* to *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāẓara*). – 1.2 The Transformation of Disputations. The Rise of Collaborative Research and Practice. – 1.3 The Ottoman Case. An Attempt at Reconciling Past Schools by Verification (*Taḥqīq*). – 1.4 An Archaeology of a Court Debate. Ḫocazāde versus Zeyrek on God's Unicity.

The fifteenth-century Ottoman philosophical corpus is a neglected area of research in early modern intellectual history, which has been overshadowed by innumerable studies on philosophical production in other contemporaneous contexts, such as the Italian Renaissance or early modern European thought. These philosophical debates and disputations that took place in Ottoman public and private settings were highly rich in terms of intellectual extent, covering subjects at the intersection of philosophy, theology and, in certain cases, Sufism. These scholarly events mined for potential parallels to specific developments in the history of philosophy. And a good number of them were based on certain Graeco-Arabic doctrines originally purported by the Muslim Peripatetic philosopher and physician Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), also known as Avicenna in the West.

For the early twentieth-century scholarship, the genres of commentary (*sharḥ*) and gloss (*ḥāshiya*), which were popular registers for knowledge production in the post-classical Islamic world, were previously regarded as stale, static, and unoriginal, only restricting themselves to redundant expositions. New studies on the commentary and gloss tradition, however, reveal that the production of knowledge in the early modern Islamic world was a dynamic seedbed of intellectual change and scientific investigation. The analyses of lemmata in the plethora of post-classical commentaries and glosses reveal that scholars could posit numerous and disparate doctrinal positions, each referencing particular texts, through which the scholars gave their own syntheses based on their own unique perspectives.<sup>1</sup> In order to delve into the philosophical traditions of the late fifteenth-century Ottoman medrese, contemporary scholars of post-classical Islamic intellectual history have to consider the recontextualized philosophical discussions emphasized in the multilayered texts of glosses, by bearing in mind the time span between the *Urtext* and the later textual amendments. The textual tradition in each book could span over hundreds of years.

Competition was a law of the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship. The scholarly communities and medrese networks were dominated by countless formal debates, royal commissions, written encounters, and snap challenges in which the scholars engaged to prove their superiority in scholarly merit, argumentation, referencing, and religious piety over one another.<sup>2</sup> The content of these debates covered a wide range of scientific disciplines from religious sciences, such as jurisprudence,<sup>3</sup> inheritance law and manumission,<sup>4</sup> and theology,<sup>5</sup> to philosophical matters, including logic,<sup>6</sup> metaphysics and

2 For an index of academic debates, intellectual rivalries, and scholarly collaborations, see Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 478‑82.

3 See the set of exchanges written concerning the question of four principles (*muḳaddimāt-ı erbaʿa*), a topic in the principles of jurisprudence. The discussion was initiated by the Ottoman scholar Mollā ʿAlāeddīn-i ʿArabī (d. 901/1496), and there were responses prepared by his other fifteenth-century contemporaries, including Ḳasṭalānī, Ḥasan-ı Ṣamsunī, Ḫatībzāde, and Ḫācı Ḥasanzāde, preserved in a single manuscript (Süleymaniye Library, MS Bağdatlı Vehbi 2027). See Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 487; Atçıl, *The Formation of the Ottoman Learned Class*, 279‑83; Köksal, "Osmanlılarda Mukaddimât-ı Erbaa Literatürü".

4 Korkmaz, *Molla Hüsrevʾin 'Velâ' Hakkındaki Görüşleri*; Özer, "Molla Hüsrevʾin *er-Risâle fîʾl-Velâʾ*sı"; "Molla Hüsrevʾin *Velâ* Meselesi".

5 The famed fifteenth-century theologian Ḳasṭalānī (d. 901/1496) wrote a treatise of polemics concerning the Timurid verifier al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī's (d. 816/1413) alleged mistakes in six theological issues under the title *Iʿtirāḍāt al-Ḳasṭalānī ʿalā al-Sayyid al-Sharīf*. Sinān Paşa (d. 891/1496) responded to these objections on behalf of Jurjānī, and the exchange was also referred to as "[Ḳasṭalānī's] boastings" (i.e. the *tafākhur* debate). See Ünver, "Molla Kestelliʾnin Seyyid Şerifʾe", 111‑13.

6 Mollā Luṭfī (d. 900/1495) wrote a treatise titled *al-Sabʿa al-shidād*, a critique of Jurjānī's views on the term of logic 'subject' (*mawḍūʿ*) in response to the verifier Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī's (d. 766/1363) points in his commentary on Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī's (d. 682/1283) *Maṭāliʿ al-anwār* in logic (Gökyay, Özen, "Molla Lutfi", 258). Mollā ʿİzārī (d. 901/1496), who was in charge of Luṭfī's execution, also penned a refutation of this treatise. See Ḫocazāde's defense of Jurjānī in a discussion with two prominent scholars, the Shaykh al-Islām Efḍālzāde (d. 908/1503) and the Sultan's tutor Ḫoca Ḫayrüddīn (d. ?). The debate concerns Taftāzānī's statement regarding *kalām* being in need of logic (Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 90‑1). Besides Mollā Luṭfī's work, also see Mollā Ḫüsrev's (d. 885/1480) *taḥqīq* on the question of logical definitions with regard to the unity of genus and species, see Üçer, "Müteahhir Dönem Mantık Düşüncesinde".

<sup>1</sup> See *Oriens*'s special issue on "The *Ḥāshiya* and Islamic Intellectual History" introduced and edited by Asad Q. Ahmed and Margaret Larkin, *Oriens*, 41(3‑4), 2013. For glosses in *ḥikma* and *kalām*, see Ahmed, "Post-Classical Philosophical Commentaries/Glosses", and Wisnovsky, "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice". The rich nature of commentary and gloss in the post-classical context was previously studied by Wisnovsky in his "The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary".

natural philosophy,<sup>7</sup> as well as others, such as rhetoric,<sup>8</sup> dialectical inquiry,<sup>9</sup> and mathematics.<sup>10</sup> In fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship, verifying the truth in the face of different domains of knowledge took many forms, including Sufi epistemology,11 as well as a dialogue with certain other non-Muslim traditions (see chapter 2).

The scholarly exchanges were opportunities for scholars to display their knowledge, make names for themselves and, most importantly, establish their mastery in synthesizing knowledge coming from diverse schools of thought by way of verification (*taḥqīq*), a method of arbitration, closely associated with Avicennism and the post-classical commentary and gloss practice.<sup>12</sup> *Taḥqīq* is a form of constatation to ascertain already established truths through the process of acquiring a thing's true existence, an essential way of knowing based on skepticism towards the past and openness to independent reasoning and syncretism. According to Khaled El-Rouayheb, the culture of arbitration during the seventeenth century, which could be regarded as the "age of *taḥqīq*" in the Arabic-speaking regions of the Ottoman Empire, insisted on the insufficiency of 'imitation' (*taqlīd*), that is, acceptance of the creed based on uncritical affirmation of what one has been

8 The celebrated jurist Mollā Ḫüsrev penned an unedited gloss on Taftāzānī's *Muṭawwal*, objecting to the criticisms by ʿAbdullāh-ı Ḳırımī (d. 879/1474) (Millet Library, MS Feyzullah Efendi 1791). See Alak, "Molla Hüsrevʾin Belâgat İlimlerine" and "Şeyhülislâm Molla Hüsrevʾin Belâgatle".

9 For an adjudication in dialectical inquiry (*ādāb al-baḥth*), see Belhaj, "Mullā Khusraw as a Dialectician".

10 Fazlıoğlu, "Ali Kuşçuʾnun Bir Hendese Problemi".

11 See the forthcoming article by Balıkçıoğlu, "In the Crucible of Ottoman *Taḥqīq*" to be published in the special *taḥqīq* issue of *The Journal of Early Modern History*, 27, 2023 edited by Giancarlo Casale. The term *ahl-e kashf wa-taḥqīq* (often contrasted with *ahl-e ẓāhir* or *taqlīd*) was initially used for a select number of distinct Timurid scholars who synthesized Ibn ʿArabī's doctrines with Sunnī theology, occultism, and Avicennan philosophy. For the use of taḥqīq in the context of the Timurid scholar Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī (d. 858/1454) and his milieu, see Binbaş, *Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran*, 98‑9. The earlier sense of *taḥqīq* implied the concordance of natural, philosophical, scriptural, and mystical knowledge with specific references to Akbarī theosophy, the Neoplatonist vocabulary of the syncretic *Ikhwān al-ṣafāʾ*, esoteric sciences, as well as various key doctrines, such as the unity of opposites, the causal connectivity among lower and celestial bodies (astral determinism), *waḥdat al-wujūd*, and the belief that Arabic letters inscribed in the Qurʾān hid divine secrets. Associating a distinct intellectual network of scholars who sought ways to prove the unity of *madhab*s and differing schools of thought including the fifteenth-century Timurid syncretic universalist-occultists Yazdī and Ibn Turka, *ahl-e taḥqīq* was a term further employed for a distinct network of Islamicate jurists like Ḥusayn al-Akhlāṭī (d. 799/1397) and Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābertī (d. 786/1384), as well as the Hanafi lettrist-mystic al-Bisṭāmī (d. 858/1454). All those figures were linked to Ottoman verifiers, such as Mollā Fenārī and Qāḍīzāde-i, as well as the jurist-mystic rebel Şeyḫ Bedreddīn (d. 819/1416) in various capacities (Binbaş, *Intellectual Networks*, 100‑6). Having spent most of his later life in the Ottoman Brusa, Bisṭāmī was known for his preoccupation with natural sciences, prognostication and astronomical/astrological compendia based on Timurid models. His extant compendia with apocalyptic/messianic themes date back to the first two years of Meḥmed II's reign, which suggests that the millenial-universalist tendencies in political vision was a common trend in the post-Mongol Islamicate world (Fleischer, "Ancient Wisdom and New Sciences", 232‑6). As a category different from *faylasūf* or *mutakallim*, *muḥaqqiq* (one who realizes) referred more specifically to high caliber Sufis associated with the school of Ibn ʿArabī (Chittick, *Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul*, 45‑57; "The School of Ibn ʿArabī", 510‑16; Dagli, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and Islamic Intellectual Culture*, 100).

12 Wisnovsky, "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice", as well as Brentjes, *Teaching and Learning the Sciences*, 175‑7; and, for the context of verification in the Ottoman North Africa, see El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*.

<sup>7</sup> See the fifteenth-century Ottoman adjudications (*muḥākamāt*) on Ghazālī's critique of the philosophers in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (Özervarlı, "Arbitrating Between al-Ghazālī and the Philosophers", 375‑97 and van Lit, "An Ottoman Commentary Tradition", 368‑413).

told by elders, peers, teachers, and books<sup>13</sup> – as opposed to the rational demonstration of the truth of the Islamic creed through demonstrative arguments and critical assessments.<sup>14</sup>

Within the very limited literature available on early modern Islamic intellectual history, the contemporaneous achievements of Muslim scholars during the Renaissance are vastly overlooked. Current research reveals that like their contemporaries in the Italian world, there was a similar vibrant community of Muslim scholars who mediated between different schools of thought through synthesis and verification, even those deemed to be against the central orthodoxy of Islam.15 A competent verifier (*muḥaqqiq*) in the Ottoman context was expected to arbitrate among diverse doctrines with rigor and finesse in argumentation, not with blind imitation. In that sense, a master verifier was not only asked to give exact references to past debates, but also should be able to restate them in the new context. *Taḥqīq* required that the verifier adhered most closely to demonstrative (*burhānī*) arguments as opposed to rhetorically persuasive arguments, often having followed Avicenna's own critical method or defended his positions.<sup>16</sup> *Taḥqīq* did not necessarily aim at breaking away from the tradition but tackled new formulations based on the internal assessment of traditional sources present by moving away from the standard interpretation.

The fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarly culture denoted the efficacious resort to skill, power, calculation, and self-control, which could be argued to have corresponded to the Ancient Greek principle of *agôn* (ἀγών).17 With regard to the formal qualities of various types of games, Roger Caillois singles out agonistics as the backbone of competitive games, including sports, as well as scholarly debates and disputations, in which adversaries confront each other under ideal conditions, susceptible to assigning precise and incontestable value to the winner's triumph based on ambition, valor and, in the early Ottoman context, erudition and scholarly merit. The Ottoman agonistics were total actions, reflecting authority, codification, and competitive merit. The evaluations were based on the arbitration of a capable referee who acted as the guardian of truth and veracity.<sup>18</sup>

Besides scholarly debates and disputations, snap challenges were also a form of popular exchanges among Ottoman scholars with past rivalry and personal animosity. These phenomena aimed at proving one's superiority in knowledge and argumentation skills in often off-the-cuff settings, and had

<sup>13</sup> In the religio-legal context, *taqlīd* is understood to be a scaffolded doctrine within the system of school conformism as opposed to *ijtihād*, yet this did not mean that many possible changes and amendments could be introduced within each doctrine. In the scholarly context, *taqlīd*, in turn, is understood in juxtaposition to *taḥqīq*. For the religio-legal context, see Ibrahim, "Rethinking the *Taqlīd* Hegemony" and Jackson, "*Taqlīd*, Legal Scaffolding".

<sup>14</sup> In their dictionaries of technical terms, ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Munāwī (d. 1622) and Ebūʾl-Beḳā Kefevī (d. 1684) both defined that *taḥqīq* is "to establish the proof of a scholarly question" (*ithbāt dalīl al-masʾala*) (El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 4, 27‑8, 357‑60).

<sup>15</sup> Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 1‑23.

<sup>16</sup> For the case of verification in the Islamic context of philosophical sciences, see Wisnovsky, "On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism", 273. Technically speaking, verification is a method of acquiring a real definition of a concept by achieving a complete and essential conception (Ibrahim, "Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", 396; Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 276‑9).

<sup>17</sup> Caillois, *Man, Play and Games*, 72; Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 30‑1, 48‑50.

<sup>18</sup> For the status of referees in the Italian debate culture, Quint, "Dueling and Civility", 231‑4.

close connotations in the Greek concept of 'dare to contest' as in *agôn* and, arguably, Immanuel Kant's later *sapere aude* (dare to know) borrowed from the Latin poet Horace. There are numerous extant accounts of such exchanges in which the fellow scholar tried to challenge the other party in the presence of other scholars before even greeting his adversary.<sup>19</sup>

The practice of *agôn* is a vindication of personal responsibility, and assumes sustained attention, determined application, and the desire to win.<sup>20</sup> Its corruption only begins when no referee or decision is recognized. Depending on the context of the scientific method and value system of the society, an agonistic debate has to be based on meritocracy and high achievement.<sup>21</sup>

The culture of scholarly debates (*mubāḥas̱āt-ı ʿilmiyye* in Ottoman Turkish)<sup>22</sup> was a prominent feature of court life in the post-classical Islamic world. Particularly through its formal structure, ambitious display of scholarly pride, and close links to patronage activities, this culture shared an affinity with the intellectual life of other contemporary Islamicate courts, including Timurid/post-Timurid Persia and Mamlūk Egypt,23 and found new venues in knowledge transfer, especially in the cases of Baghdad and Isfahan, two cities that were in continued intercity dialogue despite their competing distinctions in language (Arabic/Persian), religious affiliation (Sunnī/Shīʾī) and cultures of early sciences and their developments.<sup>24</sup> The Ottoman Sultan, his viziers, or the scholars themselves could initiate the scholarly debates. If a discussion was commissioned or ordered (*ʿamara*) by the Sultan, an official debate could be held in front of the members of the ruling class along with various reputable scholars of the day, and the debate could result in the promotion of the victorious party to a higher post or the loser's removal from a seat, should the end result prove especially humiliating. These exchanges were not limited to sciences but also extended to the arts, and the case of the Ottoman panegyrics even saved the lives of scholar-poets who managed to combine political confessionalism with advanced rhetorical skills.<sup>25</sup>

The egalitarian spirit of *agôn*, a term that dates back to Ancient Greece, was at the heart of the Ottoman scholarly practice. The debates were regulated and subject to arbitration and evaluation by a qualified referee or a

21 Caillois, *Man, Play and Games*, 46.

<sup>19</sup> As for exemplary snap exchanges, see Ḫocazāde and ʿAlī Ḳuşçu on the tidal waves in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bosporus: Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq al-nuʿmāniyya*, 161; Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 490‑1; al-Laknawī, *al-Fawāʾid al-bahiyya*, 352; Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 94‑5. The epistolary exchange between the late fifteenth-century scholars Aḫī Çelebi and Gulām Sinān regarding the critique of their respective glosses on Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa's commentary on *al-Wiqāya* in jurisprudence: Özen, "Sahn-ı Semânʾda Bir Atışma".

<sup>20</sup> Caillois, *Man, Play and Games*, 14‑18; Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought*, 46‑7.

<sup>22</sup> In Ottoman biobibliographical sources, the term was employed as *mübāḥis̱-i ʿilmiyye*. See, for instance, Muḥtesibzāde, *Ḥadāʾiḳ al-reyḥān* [*Terceme-i şaḳāʾiḳ*], MS TSMK 1263, f. 98a.

<sup>23</sup> See Brentjes, "Patronage, Networks and Migration"; Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion*, 63‑4; Broadbridge, "Academic Rivalry and the Patronage System".

<sup>24</sup> See Kheirandish, *Baghdad and Isfahan*. For 'one-volume libraries' (as in Franz Rosenthal's coinage) from Iṣfahān, which included a *thematically-curated* select number of cannonical works in philosophy, see Endress, "Philosophische ein-Band-Bibliotheken aus Isfahan".

<sup>25</sup> The competitive spirit, as well as the rewarding mechanism, extended to skillfully composed panegyrics addressed to the ruling class, which were often honored with salaries, prizes, and ceremonial robes. The Ottoman panegyrics were always politically motivated. In some cases, they also saved one's life, as in Veliyüddīn Aḥmed Paşa's (d. 902/1496‑97) panegyric to Meḥmed II (Aguirre-Mandujano, "The Social and Intellectual World").

notary before the announcement of the victorious.<sup>26</sup> Though the agonistic spirit had often been associated with sports in Ancient Greece, the Socratic tradition did encourage philosophy as *agôn* as an indispensable feature of the philosophical method *elenchos*/*elenchus* (ἔλεγχος, cross-examination) to get at truth, which was in direct opposition to the rhetorical character of philosophical sophistry. In this case, the combativeness of the Homeric hero in warfare was directed at philosophical truth and certainty, and Socrates' agonistic *elenchos* also transformed the interlocutors in their commitment to inquiry, the outcome of which could be evaluated based on the criteria of the day.<sup>27</sup>

All knowledge including philosophy is polemical by nature, and polemics cannot be divorced from agonistics.<sup>28</sup> An agonistic impulse in philosophical debates gravitates towards the rigor and ambition to reach truth through a cooperative search between the interlocutors. In the case of *elenchus*, the questioner takes upon himself the task of refuting the other party's arguments or bringing out counter-explanations.<sup>29</sup> 'Winning' means showing oneself superior in the outcome of a game since the object for which scholars compete is victory that may be based on merit, erudition, etiquette or, simply, a semblance of superiority in expected criteria.<sup>30</sup>

The relationship between erudition and credibility informs the dynamics of early modern Ottoman disputes, which, in fact, resembled highly codified (verbal) duels exercised in the Italian Renaissance.<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless "there were no medals to be won", as Monica Azzolini suggests, in scientific duels in the Italian context, so the discussions were more directed at one's public reputation rather than institutional standing. One could race with another for a prospect, yet, for the Italian context, there were no apparent losers or those who were removed from their positions indefinitely.32 A great variety of semi-


32 Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 264‑5.

<sup>26</sup> See the exchange between the mathematician Niccolò Tartaglia (1499/1500‑57) and the polymath Girolamo Cardano (1501‑76) for the case of notary, Azzolini, "There Were no Medals", 275‑6.

<sup>27</sup> Metcalf, *Philosophy as Agôn*, 22, 106 and for its crossovers in classical Chinese thought, Wong, "*Agon* and *Hé*". In turn, for sophistry as play, see Huizinga, "Play-Forms in Philosophy", in *Homo Ludens*, 146‑57. With regard to the Socratic *elenchus*, the method of refuting the empty belief in one's own wisdom, Gregory Vlastos has singled out two types, i.e. standard versus indirect *elenchus*, such that the former corresponds to Socrates' main instrument of philosophical investigation, for the latter is uncommitted to the truth of the premise-set from which he deduces the refutation of the refutand in a way that the original claim does not play a role in the process (Vlastos, "The Socratic *Elenchus*", 711‑14). Recent studies have shown that there was no such distinction in Socrates' method; and both aspects rather consider *elenchus* as "an argument in which an interlocutor's original claim is rejected when it is seen to be inconsistent with other things that the interlocutor believes" (Young, "The Socratic *Elenchus*", 56‑8). Recent discussions concerning the nature of *elenchus* focus on whether this method is a systematic and uniform method of refutation with set premises or it simply exposes certain inconsistencies without being able to refute a given moral thesis or *endoxon* (Wolsdorf, "Socratic Philosophizing", 34‑40).

<sup>31</sup> There were various types of duels, including verbal and hot-blooded vendetta, yet violence still had its codified etiquette of politeness, even if it ended in a gory fashion. Duellos could be verbal, physical or written (e.g. in lieu of *cartelli*) (see Quint, "Dueling and Civility", 264‑5; Weinstein, "Fighting or Flyting?"). In the early Islamic world, the debates against the dialectics of the philosophizing theologians were "fierce" (Belhaj, "Disputation is a Fighting Sport"). In the fifteenthcentury Ottoman context, could the execution of Mollā Luṭfī, which have been recently viewed to be political rather than theological in nature, be considered as a revenge act in lieu of dueling?

public exchanges were simply based on honor, reputation, and personal ani‑ mosity with the aim of "gaining profit in the form of status and patronage".<sup>33</sup> Scholars were making careers out of polemics and controversy, as honor and reward were complementary aspects of court visibility and state support.

Similar to the fifteenth-century Ottoman world, the scholarly exchang‑ es at the Italian Renaissance universities were verbal arenas in which the scholars demonstrated their ability to argue strongly in Latin, by reflect‑ ing on a question, making inferences and conclusions through their strict argumentation and, in the case of the medical professor Girolamo Cardano (1501‑76) who was never bested by anyone in his lifetime, even by discom‑ forting opponents with quoted passages from memory.<sup>34</sup>

Some of these exchanges were simply motivated by claims of supremacy, original authorship, historical meanings or priority<sup>35</sup> in a given subject, in‑ stead of focusing on content and output. Historically speaking, a good num‑ ber of disputes in the context of the Italian Renaissance, such as the ex‑ changes between the mathematicians Niccolò Tartaglia (1499/1500‑57) and Ludovico Ferrari (1522‑65) or the astronomers Galileo Galilei (1564‑1642) and Baldassarre Capra (1580‑1626), were related to honor, priority, and the claims of plagiarism, rather than scientific credibility and content.

Both in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean, disputations were not also limited to the junior and senior members of the academy. Novice stu‑ dents were able to only find lectureship positions in the coming academic years or even future preferment in ecclesiastical and political enterprises based on their performance (see the case of scholarly disputations at the University of Bologna at the turn of the sixteenth-century).<sup>36</sup> A novice stu‑ dent, as in the case of one of the primary scholars of this study, Ḫocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā (d. 893/1488), was eager to seek an agonistic activ‑ ity with his peers or seniors in order to demonstrate his prowess and ap‑ titude in knowledge. Likewise, disputations had a lasting impact in one's career, and universities often competed one another in order to gain the upper hand to make a name for their institutions and designate academic adversaries, often motivated by ensuing political conflicts and tug-of-wars for territorial hegemony.<sup>37</sup>

Across cultures and traditions, the functions of debates and disputations as global social constructs may vary from legitimizing, defending, and ac‑ knowledging certain rights and doctrines,<sup>38</sup> to creating a propaganda for

38 Graf, "Christliche Polemik", 832‑4.

<sup>33</sup> Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 269. For a case study of Italian artistic games of honor and profit, see Hoklman, "'For Honor and Profit'", and for the case of the professional disputes and feuds among English medical practitioners, Harley, "Honor and Property".

<sup>34</sup> Grendler, *The Universities of the Italian Renaissance*, 152‑4. Also see the case of Ḫocazāde in chapter 3.

<sup>35</sup> For the priority dispute between the mathematicians Tartaglia and Cardano concerning a general rule for the solution of algebraic equations to the third degree or cubic equations, see Long, *Openness, Secrecy, Authorship*, 198‑201. The debates could be even extended to the his‑ torical meanings of certain words against various forms of politico-legal codifications and cen‑ sorships, see McCuaig, *Carlo Sigonio*, 174‑250. For Carlo Sigonio's (1524‑1584) famous disputa‑ tion with the humanist Francesco Robortello (1516‑1567) on the Roman questions and the re‑ public with references to various volumes of commentary, see McCuaig, *Carlo Sigonio*, 41‑50.

<sup>36</sup> Matsen, "Students' 'Arts' Disputations".

<sup>37</sup> Denley, "Academic Rivalry and Interchange".

promotion, reinforcing communal identity, and having an instructive nature.<sup>39</sup> Besides the institutional and careeristic aspects of disputations, the defense of certain doctrines did lead to a conflict with the religious authority. One of the most famed disputations of the Renaissance, which never took place, was the anticipated defense of Pico della Mirandola's (1463‑94) thirteen theses included in his *Conclusiones nongentae*. Out of nine hundred, the papacy condemned thirteen theses offering Pico to participate in a disputation in Rome sometime after 6 January 1487.<sup>40</sup>

## 1.1 A Literature Review. The Nature of Early Muslim Debates and Disputations (From *Jadal* and *Munāẓara* to *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāẓara*)

Dialectic was an indispensable tool for scientific inquiry and knowledge transfer in the Islamic world, promulgating rational methods and procedures for scholarly disputation under the rubric of *jadal* (dialectical disputation) and *munāẓara* (dialectical investigation) or, in later centuries, *ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāẓara* (protocols of dialectical inquiry and investigation).<sup>41</sup> *Jadal*, an early adopted method of argumentation in religious sciences, was a pedagogical instrument that sought the opponent's assent, whereas the *munāẓara* was perceived as a more truth-oriented investigation, since it sought veracity through proof – not the rhetorical superiority over one view over another.<sup>42</sup>

*Munāẓara* gained technical precision by the thirteenth century, and began to be often associated with rational sciences as a method of inquiry formulized under *ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāẓara*, a style aimed at bungling inquiries, reducing your opponent to concession, or silencing based on proofseeking indicants and logical implications.43 As a form of formal investigation, *baḥth* was directed at veracity and brought a new parameter that was picked up by philosophers who eschewed from *jadal* due to its rhetorical and logical fallacies.<sup>44</sup> It was not a coincidence that the court debates and disputations – whether oral or written – in the Ottoman context, were re-


42 Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 9‑11. Compared to the Aristotelian dialectic, the Arabic *jadal* (especially in the case of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, d. 478/1085) was closer to the peirastic form than to eristic since *jadal* was believed to lead to truth in theology and jurisprudence (Widigdo, "Aristotelian Dialectic, Medieval *Jadal*", 19). For an overview of disputation culture in early Islamic history, Abū Zahra, *Tārīkh al-jadal*. For a full bibliography of primary and secondary resources in Islamic culture of disputation, see the website of Society for the Study of Islamicate Dialectical Disputation (SSIDD): https://ssidd.org.

43 Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 9‑11.

44 Fārābī regards philosophy among the certain sciences that asserted themselves as the intended end of investigative activity with principles that are universal, true, and certain; whereas the dialectic, that is, the tool or servant of scientific art, is equally concerned with where something is said as well as what is said, aiming for universal and generally accepted premises (Di Pasquale, *Al-Farabi's Book of Dialectic*, 149‑51). As for Fārābī's criticism of *ādāb al-jadal* that this method failed to establish truth with thorough examination, close study, and precision (*istiqṣāʾ*), see Gyekye, "Al-Fārābī on the Logic" and Miller, "Al-Fārābī's Dispute". With regard to theological discussions in the method and criteria for logical reasoning, see Frank, "The *Kalām*" and van Ess, "The Logical Structure".

ferred to as *baḥth* from the root *b-ḥ-th* or, as a verbal noun in its increased third form, *mubāḥatha*/*mübāḥas̱e*, which also described a mutual exercise directed at acquiring knowledge through investigation.

Dialectic as the art of argumentation first diffused into the Abbasid sources through the first translation of Aristotle's *Topics* by the Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I (d. 208/823) under the title *Kitāb al-jadal*, a work which was commissioned by the third caliph al-Mahdī (d. 169/785). Timothy I was also known for his apology (including a discussion on the singular versus triune nature of God) written as a result of a two-day's debate between him as the Catholicos of the East Syrian Church and the Caliph himself. Both sides debated the tenets of each other's religion in sympathy and piety – the former especially praising the Caliph's theology.<sup>45</sup>

The introduction of *jadal* as a general method for knowledge inquiry had close connections to the claims of universalism, political leadership, and proselytizing religion.<sup>46</sup> The early collections of scholarly exchanges in the Islamic world go back the ninth- and tenth-century Abbasid Baghdad, at a time when Christian and Muslim scholars penned disputations in a great variety of subjects, and most of these debates consisted of either interfaith dialogues between Christian and Muslim theologians or discussions related to the transmission of knowledge from different religious sources and intellectual communities.

Before the advent of Islam, the disputation was already a form of formal exchange between religious scholars, and there were even earlier debates recorded, such as the case of the debate between the Sasanian viceroy of northern Iraq, Mar Qardagh, and his Christian mentor, the hermit Abdišo, on the question on the nature of eternal and created realities, an event indicated the transfer of knowledge and cultural exchange at the Byzantine-Sasanid border.47 As early as the fifth century, there were East-Syrian Christian disputations (*drāšā*) directed at controversial aspects of prevalent religions of the day, including apolegetics, propaganda pamphlets in support of a candidate for the elections of a new catholicos,48 as well as defenses of certain Christian tenets against various monotheistic denominations and their non-monotheistic opponents, such as Jews, various Christian sects, Samaritans, Zoroastrians, Manicheans, and other pagan religions.<sup>49</sup>

The rigor of religious disputations of the Syriac Christian scholars carried over to the early centruries of the Islamic period. Scholars like Josef van Ess, Michael Cook, and Gerhard Endress studied the narrative structure of early Syriac and Arabic polemics, showing the abundance of dialectic disputations as the foremost method of intellectual inquiry in the context of Mus-


<sup>45</sup> Mingana, *The Apology of Timothy the Patriarch*, 1‑10 and, for the definitions of God in both traditions, 17‑23. Also see Beaumont, "Speaking of the Triune God".

<sup>46</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, 62‑7; Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 46‑8.

<sup>49</sup> For a list of such religious polemics and disputations, see the titles preserved by the East-Syrian bibliographer ʿAbdišoʾ of Nisibis (d. 1318) in *Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers*. Walker mentions that some of the titles were framed as prose dialogues in the Byzantine style (Walker, "Refuting the Eternity of the Stars", 169‑70). For an overview of Byzantine polemical disputations, Cameron, "Disputations, Polemical Literature" and a study of polemics with regard to the Byzantine anti-Judaism, Külzer, *Disputationes Graecae*.

lim-Christian dialogue.<sup>50</sup> These debates and disputations covered a number of interreligious subjects concerning the transmission and modification of Greek and Syriac works into Arabic, the relationship between reason and revelation and/or logic and grammar, along with topics in Syriac and Arabic philosophy and theology, including but not limited to, hypostases, unicity, trinity,<sup>51</sup> the nature of created beings, and the question of God's divine attributes and causal power.<sup>52</sup>

With the advent of the translation movement in Baghdad, the general concerns of the debate shifted from Christian-Muslim disputes related to catechism and creed, to the question of reconciliation of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonist traditions with the monotheistic strands of religious thought.<sup>53</sup> This trend also continued in the post-classical Islamic world, where the system of Avicenna was discussed, amended, and criticized by a plethora of scholars who produced work in post-classical Avicennism (*ḥikma*) and philosophical theology (*kalām*) that developed twelfth century onwards and, as in the Ottoman case, a great number of debates attempted at reconciling these traditions in the face of emerging scholarship.

Dialectical disputation was indeed an esteemed literary genre in early Arabic literary tradition, a source of amusement, competition, and struggle that lent other Islamicate contexts certain traits in etiquette and composition. Having analyzed the common narrative structures of extant public disputations during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, Bo Holmberg has presented various distinctive traits of the genre that also existed in the Ottoman world, such as motivation, description, the presence of an official person, the rewarding mechanism, as well as the winner ('hero') versus the loser ('anti-hero').<sup>54</sup> The narratives regarding competing parties were common literary topoi in Arabic biobibliographical sources, often taking a position on the personage in question through praise or polemic.<sup>55</sup>

51 For a treatise on a similar topic with the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate, see Holmberg, *A Treatise*. Also Hundhammer, "Die Trinitätsdiskussion".

52 As for the early Christian apologetics in defense of Christianity against the doctrinal criticism of Islam, see Griffith, *The Beginnings of Christian Theology*, as well as his "Disputing with Islam in Syriac". For the sources of early Syriac Christian-Arab Muslim disputations, Pietruschka, "Streitgespräche", 152‑8. For Arab Christian apologetics, see Sbath, *Mubāḥath falsafiyya*.

53 See Watt, "The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition". In the works of the sixth-century Syriac scholar and priest Sergius of Rēshʿaynā, Watt has argued that Syriac Aristotelianism was a compromise between Christianity and the pagan philosophy taught in the School of Alexandria.

54 Watt, "The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition", 48‑50.

55 For a study of the general characteristics of polemical exchanges in Islamic biobibliographical sources, see Douglas, "Controversy and Its Effects".

<sup>50</sup> There are various case studies of early Muslim disputations and dogma published by Josef van Ess and Michael Cook, such as van Ess, *Traditionistische Polemik* and Cook, *Early Muslim Dogma* respectively. Cook has accentuated the importance of Syriac intermediaries in the role of the Muslim theologians' acquiring this method for the development of *kalām* (Cook, "The Origins of *Kalām*"). For a recently edited volume, which covers the philosophical exchanges and case studies among the rival Muslim and Christian scholars, see Janos, *Ideas in Motion*; especially the chapters by Gerhard Endress and Olga Lizzini. Also see the article on the logical roots of Arabic theology by van Ess, "The Logical Structure". For the uses of disputation in theology, see van Ess, "Disputationspraxis in der Islamischen Theologie", 932‑8 and, for the genres of refutations (*muʿāraḍa*) and public disputation (*munāẓara*), and the structure and milieu of the *munāẓara* practice, van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, 4: 725‑37. For the sociopolitical contexts of interfaith dialogues on dialectics, Aristotelian physics, and theology, see Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, 61‑74; and also with regard to the context of early heresies (*zanādiq*), *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, 1: 423‑56.

In this sense, dialectical disputations merged arrogance and quarrelsomeness with competitiveness based on the scholars' skill in syllogistic logic.<sup>56</sup> A paragon of the early debate genre was the seminal exchange between and the Arab grammarian Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and the tenth century Christian philosopher Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 328/940), one of the pioneers of the Baghdad School of Aristotelianism. The court debate was held upon the request of the Abbasid vizier Abuʾl-Fatḥ Ibn Furāt in the year 320/932, who asked Sīrāfī to take up the refutation of Bishr Mattā's claim that logic was the only way to distinguish truth from falsity. The debate itself carried the tension raging between the representatives of conventional Arabic scholarship versus the proponents of the Greek sciences (especially logic). The accounts showed that Mattā was not able to keep up with Sīrāfī's questions, coming to terms with the fact that, as in the words of Gerhard Endress, he failed to prove that Greek logic transcended the limitations of language, and contained universal laws of reason inherent in the structure of language.<sup>57</sup>

The early sources on Arabic disputation etiquette outlined various reasons for defeat. Refraining from answering the question, lacking a guiding principle, or having an inadequate reply to the arguments presented were explicit reasons but, additionally, there were also some other individual signs of defeat, such as silence, peevishness, incapacity, digression, contradiction, incommensurability, reduction *ad absurdum*, and appeal to the crowd.<sup>58</sup>

In that context, one of the highlights of the debate was the Abbasid vizier Ibn Furāt's intervention in the discussion obliging Mattā to reply Sīrāfī's tangential questions with substantial counter-arguments. Mattā himself regarded the vizier's points as digressions and could not fully develop and reiterate his point in a deft manner, thereby accepting the opponent's superiority.<sup>59</sup> Ibn Furāt's intercession indicates the presence of an external arbiter who directed the conversation if the answers were not satisfactorily outlined, which was a sign of defeat.

Beyond the formal setting of reading groups at various mosques (*ḥalaqāt*), which were mostly reserved for religious sciences, the *majālis* (sing. *majlis*), i.e. séances of learned literary exchange grouped around influential scholars, were the main social settings for learning, deliberation, and discussion.<sup>60</sup> The model of Mattā-Sīrāfī debate had a lasting impact on future generations because, despite the fact that he was the loser of the debate, his students were armed with a better understanding of the grammarian's technique in the decades to come. Mattā's successor to the chair of logic, the

58 For a list of signs of defeat based on early works on *jadal*, such as by the Karaite Jew Jacob al-Qirqisānī (d. after 937) and his Shīʿīte contemporary Abū al-Ḥusayn Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Kātib, see Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 39‑46.

60 Osti, "The Practical Matters of Culture"; Endress, "Theology as a Rational Science", 225.

<sup>56</sup> van Ess, *The Flowering of Muslim Theology*, 185‑8.

<sup>57</sup> For the historical account of the debate, see the eleventh-century philosopher al-Tawḥīdī, *Kitāb al-imtāʿ waʾl-muʾānasa*, 107‑33 and Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Muʿjam al-udabāʾ*, 894‑908. There is a manuscript recorded in Sultan Aḥmed III's (d. 1149/1976) Topkapı Palace Library inventory of Tawḥīdī's work from the year 815‑16/1413, see MS 2389 Topkapı, 429 folios. *Kitāb al-imtāʿ* covers Tawḥīdī's philosophical and literary conversations with his friend Abū al-Wafā al-Buzjānī and the Buwayhī vizier Ibn Saʿdān, including forty topics and spanning a period of thirty-nine nights (Tawḥīdī also included the episode between Sīrāfī and Mattā). See Margoliouth, "The Discussion", and Abderrahmane "Discussion". For the précis of the debate, Endress, "The Debate"; Versteegh, "The Debate Between Logic and Grammar" and Günaydın, *Al-Sīrāfī's Theory*, 47‑77.

<sup>59</sup> Margoliouth, "The Discussion", 123.

Jacobite scholar Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974), and his Muslim disciple Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (d. after 391/1001) continued in the path of their master by preparing treatises on the meaning and topic of logic and grammar as fundamental disciplines.<sup>61</sup> Along with those on other subjects,<sup>62</sup> they argued for the independence of logic and its centrality in scientific inquiry. It was another student of Mattā, the great Muslim philosopher Abū Nasr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) who would later place logic to the highest position in his enumeration of the sciences.<sup>63</sup>

Thanks to the Islamic practice of dialectical investigation, the Abbasid debate culture fostered a group of scholars who would continue to develop their research practice in generations to come. The legacy of early debates characterized by a strict code of disputation etiquette, thus, paved the way for future systematic investigations led by the scholars of classical Arabic philosophy and theology.

### 1.2 The Transformation of Disputations. The Rise of Collaborative Research and Practice

The medieval Latin *quaestiones* had a different trajectory from post-classical Islamic disputations. It was the chief method of instruction at schools and universities until its demise in the seventeenth century, especially when a new form of criticism challenged the status of the Aristotelian *sophismata* as a verified way of scientific inquiry.<sup>64</sup> Starting with its eleventh century application in Roman law, theology, and exegesis, and finally to logic in the Mertonian tradition of the fourteenth-century Oxford, the disputations as methods of scientific inquiry gained prominence and began to be employed for discussions in medicine and natural philosophy afterwards.65 It was only from the sixteenth century onwards, the reaction against the fallacious nature of scholastic disputations took many forms, by garnering first the attention of the Italian humanists and, then, the emerging class of medical doctors and scientist-engineers who especially favored a new empirical methodology based on anatomical and surgical procedures.

61 Çıkar, "Nahiv ve Mantık".

<sup>62</sup> The relationship between logic and grammar was not the only subject-matter to be covered, and even questions on the definition of the Aristotelian concept of nature was also debated in a series of lemmata by Christian Arab philosophers of the eleventh-century Baghdad against Avicenna's disposition: Brown, "Avicenna and the Christian Philosophers".

<sup>63</sup> Endress, "The Debate", 320.

<sup>64</sup> See the chapter "The *disputatio de sophismatibus*", in Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 39‑44. For the reception of dialectic in Christian Latin tradition, Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation* and Donavin, Poster, Utz, *Medieval Forms of Argument*, especially Bose, "The Issue of Theological Style", 4‑8.

<sup>65</sup> As for the development of new syllogistic methodology to be applied to scientific discussions and later its application to medicine and natural philosophy, see chapters "The Mertonian Tradition", "Medial *quaestiones disputatae* c. 1250‑1450", and "*Quaestiones disputatae* in *physica* During the Late 15th and 16th Centuries", in Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 45‑52, 66‑84, and 85‑100 respectively.

Having been adopted as an essential method of theological inquiry in the late medieval world, disputations expelled any qualms about the applicability of logical techniques to religious dogmas early on.<sup>66</sup> The academic counterparts to the Timurid and Ottoman public debates were also present at medieval universities of Europe, including Oxford, Paris, and Padua: the *quaestiones ordinariae* were disputations on a fixed subject with the participation of questioners, professors, and students, whereas the *quaestiones de quodlibet* could cover any subject proposed by any participant. The debates could concern any range of topics from the merits of particular sciences to cross-religious theological and eschatological matters, such as the Trinity and the unicity of the monotheistic God, similar to the Islamicate world.

The earlier application of disputations in law and theology at medieval universities yielded to often controversial, innovative, and productive results in combatting heresies, as well as resolving or harmonizing conflicting references, which constituted alternative solutions to perennial debates in theology. They applied induction, experiential method, and verification to philosophical subject (including more practical Aristotelian topics), paving the way for an attempt at verifying complex universal truths in medieval quodlibetal disputations.<sup>67</sup>

By the fourteenth century, the quodlibetal disputations took another form culminating in types of disputations called the *sophismata* that dwelled on ambiguous, puzzling or simply difficult sentences that had to be resolved, or the ambiguous propositions that could be both true and wrong (see the case of the Liar Paradox in Islamic philosophy).<sup>68</sup>

The *sophisma* was a technical term with no pejorative connotations, which referred to a puzzling or an ambiguous sentence presenting logical hardships. Despite being distinguished from sophism, these types of disputes still presented certain difficulties by virtue of faulty formulations. A new approach was developed to dismantle possible fallacies based on the meaning of words, the analysis of the terminology involved and, finally, the supposition of terms employed in proposed statements.<sup>69</sup>

As quodlibetal disputations started to lose prestige from the fourteenth century onwards, the masters became extremely reluctant to preside over such exchanges due to the improper use of dialectic in scholastic disputations.70 In addition to the critics in theology who claimed this method of inquiry was against the will of God, the later generations of Italian humanists also had a critical attitude towards the use of the *sophismata* as a method of inquiry. The rhetorical character of these exchanges began to be utilized

70 Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 101‑28.

<sup>66</sup> The systematic use of logic in religious inquiry was already embraced by the eleventh-century theologian St. Anselm (Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 9).

<sup>67</sup> Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 26 and 36‑8. Also see the views of the thirteenth-century theologians William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste on this new method of verification employed by the *quaestio disputata* especially when applied to the teaching of physics: see Dales, "Robert Grosseteste's Scientific Works", 381‑4 and also the study the scientific methods of aforementioned scholars: Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Grosseteste*, 272‑8.

<sup>68</sup> Alwishah, Sanson, "The Early Arabic Liar", 106. Having begun as a bitter argument in a scholarly gathering and then led to written exchanges, the debate between Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 903/1498) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1503) was the most detailed scrutiny of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. For the topic of discussion and Dashtakī's alternative solution, see El-Rouayheb, "The Liar Paradox".

<sup>69</sup> Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 41‑2.

for departmental rivalry, personal feuds, and rhetorical exercises based on the *sophismata* rather than a clash of opposite philosophies.<sup>71</sup>

The pervasiveness of the scholastic *quaestio disputata* as a general method of instruction and scientific inquiry led its utilization in subjects not limited to law, theology, and logic, and this was one of the main reasons behind the unitary character of late medieval learning both in medieval Latin and post-classical Islamicate traditions. With the increased knowledge in Greek texts and its commentaries, as well as the humanist tendency of using the dialogue and the treatise to expound ideas and challenging positions, the method of disputation caused a new trend of questions dwelling on particular issues in natural philosophy. For instance, the *sophismata*-based reasoning in fourteenth-century physics highlighted common analytical languages applied to theology and philosophy, by enabling Aristotelian conceptions, definitions, and principles to prevail in theological subjects.72 These disputations were often written in the form of *cartelli di sfide* and directed at certain contemporary adversaries (*concurrentes*).<sup>73</sup> In the late medieval world, both traditions kept on producing knowledge based on the modified version of Aristotelian dialectic and ended up accumulating a vast corpus over centuries.

As the fifteenth-century Ottomans were interested in rectifying certain standards to dialectical investigation as a primary method of scientific inquiry, the Latin West saw it as an obstacle to practical naturalism and astronomy. Even though the Italian humanists directed eloquent criticisms to the Aristotelian logic and rhetoric, the later generations to come, in an ironic way, still continued to use this method in their disputations. As Paul Oskar Kristeller suggests, the humanism and scholasticism of the Italian Renaissance arose in medieval Italy at about the same time, having coexisted while also developing different branches of medieval learning. Contrary to the commonly held view, Aristotelianism was not overridden by the humanist perspective. This did not, however, mean that Aristotelianism did not remain entirely untouched. It was further modified and enriched with the revival of Neoplatonism and Stoicism in the Humanist movement. With the sixteenth century, mathematics and astronomy, along with mechanics, would assume flourishing importance in their practical application through the advent of new empirical methodologies and revised curricula for universities.<sup>74</sup> In the Ottoman context though, the scholastic efforts of the *quaestio disputata* continued in theology and philosophy (i.e. logic, metaphysics, and, even to an extent, physics) as a generic exercise, and used as a viable tool to rule out unfounded assertions and derive religious and rational information.

<sup>71</sup> In the words of the Italian nobleman and philosopher Pico della Mirandola, "only useful for causing disgrace an associate and for upsetting the memory by repetition but they [disputations] were of little or no us for finding out the truth" (Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 111‑12). Also see Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources*, 99‑100.

<sup>72</sup> Murdoch, "From Social into Intellectual Factors", 303‑8.

<sup>73</sup> The early exponents of disputations on Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics were comprised of figures like Nicoletto Vernia (1426‑1499) and Agostino Nifo (c. 1473‑1545), who often listed and qualified three resources (the late Greek, Latin, and Arab) for their inquiry into the Aristotelian principles (Mahoney, "Philosophy and Science", in *Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance*). Similarly, the bitter animosity that arose between the Ockhamist theologian Alessandro Achillini (1463‑1512) and the humanist-philosopher Pietro Pamponazzi (1462‑1525) led to the production of a set of exchanges on the Averroestic doctrines of the unity of the intellect, the immortality of the soul, and the Aristotelian theory of passive and active intellects.

<sup>74</sup> Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources*, 101‑4.

The late sixteenth century in Northern Europe was a period when a new sociotype of scientist-engineers emerged whose knowledge was based on high artisanship. During this period, the sociotype of *ingenere* was still regarded as a denigration of the 'court philosopher' status,<sup>75</sup> and philosophy in the hierarchy of knowledge was still placed high. This was the case until when a new vision of mathematical philosophy of nature derived from the discipline of mechanics that attacked the prevailing Aristotelianism, thereby drafting a new natural philosophy with the elevated status of practical investigation.<sup>76</sup>

With the decline of disputations and the further development of scientific-technological in the Latin West that made the European globalization possible, the reconfiguration of geopolitics by excursions and explorations became the new norm and the agonistic spirit was carried into the voyages in the race of discovering the New World.<sup>77</sup> The technical edge and the rise of practical branches of sciences that would ultimately led to an empiricist method and a new scholarly etiquette, which brought openness and collaboration. This new sense of scientific collaboration was based on the model of peer review, collegiality, as well as a new type of precision and certainty in proof and persuasion,78 rather than secrecy, dramatic gestures, and argumentative disputations.<sup>79</sup>

## 1.3 The Ottoman Case. An Attempt at Reconciling Past Schools by Verification (*Taḥqīq*)

The post-classical scholarly disputations in theology came with the rise of a new scientific paradigm based on Aristotelian logic, physics, and metaphysics in the later medieval world, and was a result of the clash between different currents of scholarly traditions that often contradicted one another over centuries. For the case of the fifteenth-century Ottomans, debates and disputations reflected attempts at reconciling and reconstructing certain aspects of past scholarships in post-Avicennan philosophy (*ḥikma*) and Muslim philosophical theology (*kalām*) within the context of the post-classical Islamic thought. With a few exceptions, there were no radical attempts at leaving the disputation framework in favor of collaboration, nor challenging Aristotelian metaphysical and physical dogmas through the introduction of, more desirably, mathematical or mechanical proofs.


<sup>75</sup> See the example of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Battista Benedetti (1530‑90), who was the contemporary of the Dutch scientist-engineer Simon Stevin (1548‑1620), as well as Mario Biagioli's setting 'Galilei the courtier' as opposed to the image of 'Galilei the engineer' (Omodeo, "The Engineer and the Philosopher", 25‑6). And for the short-lived fever of Ottoman explorations, Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*.

<sup>76</sup> Omodeo, "The Engineer and the Philosopher", 35‑6.

<sup>77</sup> Renaissance philosopher, physician, and mathematician Girolamo Cardano observed in his autobiography *De vita propria liber* that three canonical technologies of the modernity, i.e. gunpowder, the compass, and the printing press, were overshadowed by the geographical discoveries of his time (Omodeo, *Amerigo Vespucci*, 18; and for a list of expeditions reflecting the competitive spirit of geographical discovery, 27‑9). For a case of *tahqīq* in geography from the Islamic world, see Casale's "On Tahqīq, Space Travel, and the Discovery of Jetlag" to be published in *The Journal of Early Modern History*, 27, 2023.

For the Ottoman case, it had been already more than four centuries since Avicenna produced works and, in the centuries that followed him, there was already a full-fledged corpus that had developed through critiquing his central doctrines both within (post-Avicennans, i.e. *ḥikma*) and outside (theologians, i.e. *kalām*). The post-classical Islamicate world, therefore, was dealing with a long set of objections, refutations, and amendments and, for a fifteenth-century Ottoman scholar, the central question focused on how to reconcile these clashing views in the face of scholarly veracity.

The discipline *ḥikma* as the new technical term for philosophy as a naturalized form of *falsafa* and, in the sixth/twelfth century, it replaced *falsafa* as a self-description of the practice of philosophy, just as *ḥukamāʾ* replaced *falāsifa*, the latter of which was often taken in negative connotation, especially from Suhrawardī onwards.<sup>80</sup> It was after the critical works of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) that *falsafa* started to be applied to Avicenna, yet it generally referred to the 'sages' in the past.<sup>81</sup>

Recent studies on Ottoman philosophical production from the period reveal that contrary to the view about the decline of Islamic philosophy after Ghazālī, the Ottomans employed, if not, studied and acknowledged certain aspects of Avicennan-Aristotelian philosophy (*falsafa*) that had been incorporated into the post-classical corpus through certain modifications. These reworkings of classical *falsafa* doctrines were often classified under *ḥikma*, a discipline officially taught and studied at early modern Ottoman medreses that was often taken in juxtaposition to post-classical philosophical theology, that is, *kalām*.

After the second half of the fifteenth-century, the core doctrines and positions studied at Ottoman medreses were products of this tension between *ḥikma* and *kalām*, mostly based on the works and commentaries of previous Persian verifiers, such as philosophers ʿAthīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265) and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), as well as Il-Khanid and Timurid theologians ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), Ṣaʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). The works of these Perso-Islamic scholars were used as standard medrese handbooks, and an accomplished Ottoman student or tutor was expected to know their contents lemma-by-lemma and evaluate them in a critical manner.82 The Ottoman imperial consciousness based itself on the Timurid models of disputation, in which the famous set of exchanges between the rival theologians Taftāzānī and Jurjānī were often taken as paragons of scholarly rigor and exactitude.

The theoretical antinomies of the Aristotelian worldview were only to be challenged with some efforts in the pre-Ottoman world but, for the case of the fifteenth-century Ottomans, the Aristotelian-Avicennan assertions and doctrines still prevailed in a modified form. Many of the famed medrese scholars of the time continued to study, teach, and comment on Aristotelian-Avicennan principles, for instance, in theoretical physics, without resorting to independent mathematical models in astronomical calculations.

80 Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 200.

<sup>81</sup> Griffel, "Ismāʿīlite Critique of Ibn Sīnā", 211.

<sup>82</sup> For a survey of Jurjānī's scholarly investigations and debates with other competing scholars: Gümüş, *Seyyid Şerîf Cürcânî*, 99‑106. As for his exchanges with the Sufi shaykh Shāh Niʿmatullāh Walī, Binbaş, "Timurid Experimentation", 277‑303; and for the account of this debate, Aubin, *Matériaux pour la biographie*, 86‑7.

As an émigré scholar who received patronage outside the medrese network, the Timurid-Ottoman astronomer and mathematician ʿAlī Ḳuşcu (d. 879/1474) had a flexible position at the Ayaṣofya mosque/medrese complex, which may be equivalent of today's high-paying research posts at institutes for advanced study. For the fifteenth-century context, it was mostly with his qualified criticism that the astronomy was to be freed from the idée fixes of the Aristotelian conceptualizations of theoretical physics.<sup>83</sup>

During his tenure, not only did Ḳuşçu conduct informal reading groups in physics, astronomy and mathematics at Ayaṣofya (the persecuted Ottoman polymath Mollā Luṭfī (d. 900/1495) was a prominent pupil) but also continued his separate research that would establish mathematics as a foundational discipline for astronomy. His paradigmatic shift and critique, as displayed by George Saliba, bore new evidences for the transmission of Arabic science to Europe, being traced particularly in the writings of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473‑1543).<sup>84</sup> Yet it should be noted that Ḳuşcu's post was outside medrese networks. He was often engulfed in his own research without much communal appreciation and embrace, and the upholders of the Perso-Islamic medrese curriculum turned a blind eye on his output in theoretical physics, which only became widely available at medreses in the centuries to come.<sup>85</sup>

With a few exceptions, Aristotelian-Avicennism was still a dominant and popular current in fifteenth-century Ottoman metaphysics and physics that employed classical Islamic dialectic disputation and investigation techniques in argumentation. The main figures of this study, Ottoman scholars Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497‑98) and Ḫocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā (d. 893/1488), represented this *ancien régime* of theoretical medrese framework, emulating a broadly Perso-Islamic culture of learning, which saw scientific inquiry as a product of the tension between *ḥikma* and *kalām*, and often had the intention of applying theory to practice.<sup>86</sup> As a Sufi-scholar who neither studied nor produced works in *falsafa* or *ḥikma*, Zeyrek was a representative of the *kalām* tradition from the perspective of Sunnī orthodoxy. In contrast, Ḫocazāde, a famed figure in the study of *ḥikma* and *kalām*, was a representative of a tradition who were conversant in both schools well and had the merit to evaluate their points as a verifier (*muḥaqqiq*).

The fifteenth-century was a period before practical sciences branched out into a wide range of subcategories, which were often practiced by scholars outside medrese networks and career paths.87 Aristotelian-Avicennan terminology constituted the core of metaphysics and physics and, as the influence of scholastic theology waned, the practicalization of natural knowledge

<sup>83</sup> Ragep, "Freeing Astronomy from Philosophy"; "Copernicus and His Islamic Predecessors"; "ʿAlī Qūshjī and Regiomontanus" and "Ṭūsī and Copernicus".

<sup>84</sup> Saliba, *Islamic Science*, ch. 6: "Islamic Science and Renaissance Europe. The Copernican Connection".

<sup>85</sup> Given the paucity of early copies, ʿAlī Ḳuşcu's primarily theological work, that is, his 'new' commentary on the thirteenth-century polymath and philosopher Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād*, was started to be studied only after the sixteenth-century onwards, replacing the scholar Iṣfahānī's popular 'older' commentary.

<sup>86</sup> Küçük, *Science Without Leisure*, 56‑8. Also see the recent exchange on the arguments of the manuscript: For Nir Shafir's review article of Küçük's monograph *Science Without Leisure*, see Shafir, "The Almighty Akçe".

<sup>87</sup> As for the practicalization of the sciences, see the high number of branches among practical sciences in Kātib Çelebi's the seventeenth-century encyclopedia *Kashf al-ẓunūn* when compared with Ṭaşḳöprizāde's earlier compendium.

gained momentum. It was with the Ottoman seventeenth-century that practical naturalism gained an unprecedented epistemological value and interest.<sup>88</sup>

As the fifteenth-century progressed, the Ottoman verifiers like Ḫocazāde continued to refine and amend previous frameworks, building their own syntheses through arbitration and verification, without resorting to either discipline – whether *ḥikma* or *kalām*. For the contemporaneous European context though, a new form of persuasion and proof in physics, mathematics, and practical sciences was on the rise, and the dialectic started to be perceived as either insufficient or fallacious. As the Latin West was moving away from the *sophismata* by finding new empirical methods to replace the classical disputation techniques inherited from the medieval Latin tradition, the Ottoman educators not only seemed to concentrate on the reconciliation of past debates through synthetic arguments based on careful arbitration and verification, but also reconstructed them in the new scholarly context.

#### 1.4 An Archaeology of a Court Debate. Ḫocazāde versus Zeyrek on God's Unicity

The debate between Zeyrek and Ḫocazāde on God's unicity (*tawḥīd*), a private court event that was held in the presence of Sultan Meḥmed II, his grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa, and an arbiter-scholar Mollā Ḫüsrev, occupies a significant place in post-classical dialectical disputation and investigation. For scholars the extant texts of the event provide invaluable insights about early modern conventions of scientific study, knowledge acquisition, source critique, and scholarly patronage, by laying out the Ottoman rules of conduct in religious and rational inquiry, exemplifying preference in scholarship, and giving a bird's-eye view of what was accepted as scientifically true and rigorous during the day.

As the story goes, the famed Sultan Meḥmed II (second reign 855/1451‑886/1481) orders the young verifier Ḫocazāde to pen an inquiry upon Zeyrek's unfounded criticism of the master verifier Jurjānī's piety. According to the extant texts, Zeyrek criticizes the verifier based on his leniency towards the philosophers' premise that states that necessity is identical to God's quiddity/essence with regard God's unicity. For Zeyrek though, who follows the theologians' view, necessity (like existence) is an accident superadded to God's quiddity/essence externally and, contrary to the philosophers' thesis, cannot be identical with Him since it goes against God's singularity. In response to his opponent's counter-arguments in support of the philosophers' formulation, Zeyrek further remarks that none of the stated meanings of necessity corresponds to 'necessity' in the philosophers' sense, which is a proof that necessity should be taken as an *accidental* quality.

In later lemmata, Ḫocazāde, on the other hand, for the sake of verification, shows that what the philosophers have claimed concerning necessity, like the case of existence, is valid in their own paradigm and, that is why, Jurjānī did not rule out this premise as impossible. This, however, does not mean that the Timurid master followed the proof, he simply quoted it to exemplify the philosophers' formulation and line of thought. It is important to note that Ḫocazāde does not necessarily follow the philosophers' view (as

<sup>88</sup> See Küçük's *Science Without Leisure*, Introduction, chs 2‑3.

evidenced by certain other passages in another work, especially his adjudication – *muḥākama* – on the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*). His aim was not only to demonstrate Zeyrek that the philosophers' premise regarding necessity is true in and of itself (with respect to the accepted meanings of necessity in Avicennan philosophy), but also how Avicenna's proof can still be reconciled with the new post-classical framework of mental considerations (*iʿtibārāt*) in philosophy (see Conclusion).

As our sources indicate, the debate continued unusually for a week – a story often depicted ostentatiously in Ottoman biobibliographical sources. The duration of the debate indicated that there were a number of attempts by each scholar to object, refute, counter-object, or amend the other's arguments. This also meant that the exchange was a deliberative event in which the Sultan and the other scholars present could involve in evaluating both sides remarks, coming to a conclusion about what was discussed.

The present study aims to contextualize a famed fifteenth-century philosophical debate that occurred between two celebrated scholars of the late fifteenth-century, by tracing their sources and arguments in past scholarship. The debate covers a wide range of subjects in the context of God's unicity, by often employing arguments ranging from classical Arabic philosophy to postclassical philosophical theology through philological rigor and close reading.

The book attempts at reconstructing the sociocultural context of the debate through the information found in biobibliographical sources, and it comments on the intellectual reasoning behind its commission, by evaluating the positions of each scholar with the aim of mapping early Ottoman scholarly conventions. Chapter two gives a general survey of the early Ottoman attitudes towards knowledge production, by tracing different aspects of the Ottoman intellectual community, such as imperial patronage, scholarly etiquette, culture of meritocracy, institutionalization, and the role of palatine libraries. In light of the Sultan's urban development projects in Constantinople, the chapter will first cover the ways in which fifteenth-century endowment deeds, the Sultan's Code of Law, and contemporary Ottoman historical chronicles portray the institutional novelties introduced by the centralized imperial policies; subsequently it will provide anecdotal instances regarding academic rivalry, cases of jealousy, and the Ottoman scholarly sentiment for academic autonomy.

Chapter three covers background information about the debate available through biobibliographical sources, as well as the context of a wide range of subjects regarding the scholarship of the day, such as the categorization of philosophical and theological texts, the clash of conflicting doctrines at postclassical medreses, Ottoman debate/disputation etiquette, and Zeyrek's alleged declaration of Ḫocazāde's unbelief. The chapter aims to provide the sociocultural background of the debate through various primary source materials dating back to the early Ottoman biobibliographical dictionaries.

Chapter four provides an intellectual background of the main subjectmatter by referencing previous scholarship on the proof of God's singularity contrary to the claims of non-monotheists. The main context of the debate concerns the validity of a thesis included in the philosophers' proof of God's *tawḥīd*, which is the central doctrine of Muslim creed and theology. The proof originally goes back to the works of philosopher Avicenna, whose definitions and formulations were reinterpreted and modified by later commentators. The chapter also traces how Avicenna's proof was outlined and later criticized or modified by post-classical theologians, such as Jurjānī.

After outlining the debate's philosophical background in classical and post-classical scholarship, chapter five will resume with the outline and analysis of the debate lemma-by-lemma to show the breadth of its referencing and arbitration, with references to past and contemporaneous philosophical scholarship in the footnotes. By way of conclusion, it should be noted that even though Ḫocazāde did not believe in the philosophers' thesis precisely, he defended it for the sake of the debate, by proving that it was true in and of itself on their own terms.

The analysis at hand does not extend to other contemporaneous fifteenthcentury discussions and debates held in the presence of the Sultan. Given the number of debates in various genres including jurisprudence, catechism, logic, etc., this will be beyond the scope of this book which, rather, aims to exhume an oft-mentioned but previously unanalyzed debate in Ottoman philosophy and theology, by laying out all its socio-political and intellectual context – especially in light of new studies as in the case of the Sultan's newly studied library and study room, as well as the pieces of information included in biobibliographical dictionaries. The extent of the philosophical debate culture and the influence of Avicennism in early Ottoman scholarship will be a topic of another book. The extent of the philosophical debate culture will be a topic of another book. The translations of Zeyrek's and Ḫocazāde's texts, along with their *editiones principes* and the facsimiles of their original manuscripts, could be found in the Appendix. I believe that analyzing such a complex debate argument-by-argument not only shows the diversity of references to past passages and positions but also exemplify the breadth and depth of early modern disputation culture and scholarly methodology utilized during the Ottoman 'age of scholarly debates'.

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

<sup>2</sup> The Ottoman Age of Scholarly Debates **Cultures of Patronage, Pride, and Merit in Fifteenth-Century Scholarship**

**Summary** 2.1 Sultan's Great Jihad. Constantinople and Meḥmed II's Education Policy. – 2.2 Setting the Standard for Learning. The Sultan's Code of Law, the Construction of the *Ṣaḥn-ı semān*, and Other Endowments by His Bureaucrats. – 2.3 Critiquing the Sultan. Scholarly Autonomy, Pride, and Academic Rivalry. – 2.4 Court Debate Culture and Palatine Libraries. – 2.5 The Social Functions of Scholarly Patronage. Legitimacy, Honor, and Prestige.

Sultan Meḥmed II's second reign (855/1451‑886/1481) signaled the beginning of a new phase in Ottoman scholarship. With an imperial program that developed a highly structured bureaucratic system, Meḥmed II's new establishment set rigid rules that regulated the scholarly path by establishing prestigious institutions based on merit, codifying a hierarchical order, and creating opportunities for a lifetime career in academia that crossed paths with politics.<sup>1</sup> The Ottoman formation of a new learned class in the fifteenth-century also coincided with (albeit not entirely shaped by) a turning point with the conquest of Constantinople/Ḳosṭanṭiniyye in 857/1453, namely the creation of a new capital distinctly imperial and universalist Muslim in character.

In the second half of the fifteenth-century, the fledgling Ottoman principality was transformed into an empire due to Sultan Meḥmed II's efforts, vision and oft-criticized centralization policies. On the one hand, the cen-

<sup>1</sup> For the formation and transformation of the ulema in the early Ottoman Empire, Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 59‑74. Atçıl traces the formation of the ulema class to the centralization policies of Meḥmed II, referring to the period spanning from the reign of Meḥmed II to the first decades of Süleymān I (857/1453‑937/1530) as "the formation of the Ottoman learned class vis-à-vis its inclusion as a state apparatus" (Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 70‑4).

tralization helped the Sultan to instigate his image as an all-powerful absolute monarch and, on the other, Meḥmed II sustained this image via cosmopolitan and universalistic claims, which set him as a patron of science and arts in a dazzling variety of disciplines. For a monarch who had the claims of a world emperor, the Sultan had to make his new empire a hub for learning. It was a common route for many Ottoman scholars before his reign to leave Anatolia for advance learning in other Islamicate centers, such as Tabriz, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and Samarkand. The brain drain was an imminent problem and, thus, having claims of universal patronage meant reverting this tendency to study abroad and to find ways to attract the luminaries from East and West. Through the establishment of well-funded medrese circuits in different regions of Rūm and Thrace during Meḥmed II's reign, the Ottomans were able to create a self-sustaining system of educational mobility, in which the scholars did not feel the need to relocate for other centers of culture and learning. And this institutional novice also contributed to the rise of locally-educated scholars which brought stability and uniformity of education in the lands of Rūm.<sup>2</sup>

The key term that described the Sultan's and his grand viziers' attitude towards the learned class and interest in sciences was *rağbet* (continual interest, favor), an expression often repeated to describe their policies on learning as well.<sup>3</sup> The Sultan commissioned works to the luminaries of his time and did not hesitate to arrange extremely generous rewards and favors for those who accepted the Sultan's offer and further pursued their careers in the new capital (as in the case of the aforementioned ʿAlī Ḳuşçu).<sup>4</sup>

Inherent among the foregoing historical and historiographical debates Meḥmed II was a great patron for sciences and the arts. His understanding of patronage was not only limited to works within the Islamicate context but also encompassed geography and maps,<sup>5</sup> Christian art,<sup>6</sup> and relics,<sup>7</sup> as well as philosophy, with commissions by a good number of late Byzantine and Quattrocento artists, scholars, and luminaries, some of which took active part in the Ottoman imperial court.<sup>8</sup> Given Meḥmed II's universalistic vision and interreligious discourse in his political mission of empire building, the patronage in Graeco-Roman art, philosophy, and religious scholarship served as a political and aesthetic medium for the Ottoman new

2 Atçıl, "Mobility of Scholars".

<sup>3</sup> See the phrases *ʿulemāʾya rağbet* or *ʿilme rağbet-i tāmm* (Gelibolulu, *Künhüʾl-aḫbār*, 2: 70‑1). Also "Sulṭān Meḥemmedʾiñ ʿulemāʾya rağbeti ziyāde olmağın" (Neşrī, *Ğihānnümā*, 325).

<sup>4</sup> "Bir ehl-i kemāl olsa ey İsṭanbulʾa götürürdi. Ḥattā Semerkandʾdan faḫrüʾl-ʿulemāʾ Mevlānā ʿAlī Ḳuşçu cemīʿ-i teʿalluḳātıyla getürdüb bī-ḳıyās meblāğ aʿtā idüb emvāle garḳ itmişdi" (Neşrī, *Ğihānnümā*, 308).

<sup>5</sup> For Meḥmed II's map atelier and the works produced there, see Pinto, "The Maps Are the Message".

<sup>6</sup> Raby, *El Gran Turco* and Necipoğlu, "Visual Cosmopolitanism and Creative Translation". Also for various other maps, woodblocks, and drawings presented, Redford, "Byzantium and the Islamic World, 1261‑1557".

<sup>7</sup> The Sultan's treasury had twenty-one relics along with historically and religiously significant miscellaneous objects, including the bodies of the Prophet Isaiah, one of the innocents massacred by Herod, Saint Euphemia, and Saints John of Damascus and Chrysostom, as well as the Gospel of Saint John the Evangelist and Jesus' cradle (Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", esp. 298‑300).

<sup>8</sup> See Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, 31‑57 and Bádenas, "The Byzantine Intellectual Elite".

order.<sup>9</sup> Unlike his father Murād II's emphasis on the use of Turkish especially in manuscript production, Arabic continued its past status as an international *lingua franca* of the polyglot interconfessional scholars during Meḥmed II's reign. It was utilized for writing on theology, law, philosophy, and science, as well as oral communication among scholars and palace visitors. A handful of Greek texts translated into Arabic (not into the Sultan's native Turkish) in the imperial setting,<sup>10</sup> notably including fragments from the Neoplatonist Greek philosopher Georgios Gemistos Pletho's controversial *Book of Laws* accompanied by his edition of a pagan revelation in dactylic hexameter, *The Chaldean Oracles*, which argued for religio-political reform in Christian monotheism through Pagan and Neoplatonist sources,<sup>11</sup> and the Aristotelian philosopher George Amiroutzes' translation of Ptolemy's *Geographia* with his son Basil/Meḥmed Bey12 along with a cartographic study that used the book's mathematical system to create a large-scale world map in a united whole.<sup>13</sup>

The Sultan's library and Greek Scriptorium14 were comprised of manuscripts like Arrian's *Anabasis* (a biography of Alexander the Great), Homer's *Iliad*, the fifteenth-century Italian humanist Leonardo Bruni's arrangement of the first book of Polybius on the Punic Wars, as well as a Greek translation of St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, which all reflected the Sultan's political vision, interests, and models. The imperial acquisitions were included under three categories: gifts, commissions, and requisitions through conquests.15 Meḥmed II's imperial library, which held non-Islamic manuscripts, objects, and relics, also saw a marked development in illumination, calligraphy, and bookbinding (an Ottoman variation on the inter-

10 Mavroudi, "Translations from Greek".

11 Hankins considers Pletho as the fountainhead for the Neoplatonic revival during the later Quattrocento (Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, 194). Christian and Islamic interpretations of Platonic philosophy were often associated with calls for religious and social reform (in juxtaposition with Aristotelianism in philosophical theology and Orthodoxy in creed), as well as a "universalization of religion" which sought an inner harmony between different religious systems (Mavroudi, "Pletho as Subversive". With regard to Pletho and his relationship to the Ottomans, see Akasoy, "George Gemistos Pletho and Islam", esp. 351‑2 and her "Plethons *Nomoi*". Pletho often appropriated Pagan, Neoplatonist, and non-Christian (Islamic) sources in order to demonstrate that they could be compatible with the teachings of Greek Orthodoxy (De-Bolt, "George Gemistos Plethon on God").

12 George of Trebizond developed a friendship with the Sultan's close associate the Greek scholar Amiroutzes and helped the scholar to compose an introduction to Ptolemy's *Almagest* in Greek along with a dedication of the book to the Sultan before having executed its Arabic translation, together with the latter's son Basil/Meḥmed Bey (Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 302).

13 Casale, "Mehmed the Conqueror", 860.

14 Raby, "Mehmed the Conqueror's Greek Scriptorium". It has been argued that there is substantial evidence from reliable sources that allows scholars to eliminate certainly Greek and mostly Latin from the list of languages that Meḥmed II might have been competent (Patrinelis, "Mehmed II the Conqueror"). One reference that refutes this position is included in a panegyric composed by Amiroutzes, stating the line "many thought that you did not know this language [Greek] at all" (Mirmiroğlu, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet", 100‑1).

15 For the Greek manuscripts attributed to the Ottoman court, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 304‑11.

<sup>9</sup> Casale, "Mehmed the Conqueror". For the ways in which the Sultan modified and adapted other forms of knowledge in his cultural politics, see Akasoy, "Die Adaptation byzantinischen Wissens".

national Timurid style).<sup>16</sup> Despite Meḥmed II's efforts in collecting a vast number of manuscripts for his imperial library, as well as procuring Greek books, there had been a wave of propaganda in the West against his religio-cultural policies, which misinformed that there were 120,000 destroyed volumes by the Barbarian Turks (an allusion to the burning of the Library of Alexandria) in the fifteenth-century Venetian humanist Lauro Quirini's note written on 15 July 1453 in Crete.<sup>17</sup>

The barbaric image of the Turks that lacked reason and rational assessment was a common topos in political discourse during the Quattrocento<sup>18</sup> as exemplified by the well-known humanist writer Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (1405‑64), who later assumed the papal title Pius II in 1458. In a letter written to Meḥmed II with the 'intention' of converting him into Christianity, Pius II vilified the Turks as not having possessed a naturally rational disposition, and demonstrated the philosophical contradictions of their religion.19 The pervasiveness of the Crusade literature and rhetoric in Renaissance Humanism may tell us a lot about the so-called 'humanistic attitude' towards the Muslim advancement,20 yet there were other attempts at presenting an interreligious dialogue or disputation without disparaging the Sultan's philosophical inclinations.

Prior to discussing the Sultan's patronage activities, a celebrated Ottoman bureaucrat Ṭursun Beg (d. 896/1491 [?]), also known as being highly critical of some of Meḥmed II's policies in his book of history *Tārīḫ-i Ebüʾlfetḥ*, <sup>21</sup> regarded him as a learned (*ʿālim*), judicious (*ʿādil*), and intelligent (*ʿāḳil*) ruler whose words and decisions embodied divine wisdom or philosophy (*ḥikmet*).<sup>22</sup> The historian Neşrī (d. 926/1520 [?]) added to this, noting that he was a friend of scholars and virtuous ones,23 whereas the Ottoman historian-dervish Āşıḳpaşazāde (d. after 889/1484) similarly stressed his benevolence and generosity towards the learned class, as well as poor mystics.<sup>24</sup>

Written upon Bāyezīd II's request, his *Tārīḫ-i Ebüʾl-Fetḥ* was a book of history, which chronicled the events and deeds during and after the conquest of Constantinople with certain elements from the advice literature (*nasīḥa*). Though Meḥmed II was portrayed as a great conqueror, and an in-

19 Akasoy, "Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy", 249‑50.

20 Hankins, "Renaissance Crusaders".

21 Specifically speaking, Ṭursun Beg criticized Sultan's policies on taxation, emergency contributions as well as the confiscation of certain endowment properties. See İnalcık, Murphey, "Editors' Introduction", 23.

22 "Sulṭān Ebüʾl-fetḥ ʿālim ü ʿāḳil ve taṣarrufāt-ı cüzʾiyyātda māhir ü kāmil, aḳvāli zīnet-i ḥikmet ile ḫālī" (Ṭursun Beg, *Târîh-i Ebüʾl-Feth*, 65).

23 "Muḥibb-i ʿulemāʾ u fuḍalāʾ melikdi" (Neşrī, *Ğihānnümā*, 308).

<sup>16</sup> See the essays in Raby,Tanındı, *Turkish Bookbinding in the 15th Century*.

<sup>17</sup> Pertusi, "Le Epistole storiche di Lauro Quirini", esp. 227. According to Akasoy, the Byzantine Greek Metropolitan Isidore of Kiev did not mention any concrete figures, and the fifteenthcentury Byzantine historian Doukas spoke only of the "throwaway prices" for books (Akasoy, "A Baghdad Court in Constantinople/Istanbul", 140‑1).

<sup>18</sup> As a response to the Ottoman advancement, a great number of Crusade orations and histories, as well as tracts on converting the Turks to Christianity were produced. For the assessment of such works in the context of Renaissance political discourse and propaganda, see Bisaha, *Creating East and West* and Meserve, *Empires of Islam*.

<sup>24</sup> "ʿUlemāʾya ve fuḳarāya ve eyāma ve ṭūl ʿavretlere ṣadaḳa virürdi" (ʿĀşıḳpaşazāde, *Die Altosmanische Chronik*, 195).

telligent ruler, Ṭursun Beg also underlined the Sultan's hubris as one of his main vices. According to this work, the Sultan had arrogance (*ʿaẓamet ü kibr*) and bad temper (*gaḍab*), and never practiced forbearance (*ḥilm*) and gratitude (*şükr*), the latter of which was rather the quality of the much-revered Byzantino-Serbian-born scholar and grand vizier Maḥmūd Angelović Paşa (d. 878/1474) who was put to death by the Sultan tragically due to a complicated series of events. Upon this unfortunate event, Maḥmūd Paşa, a much revered figure by the common people, was elevated to a position of a Sufi saint and his highly appreciated personality was praised in many posthumous hagiographies written on his behalf.<sup>25</sup> It is, therefore, understandable why Ṭursun Beg, who received the patronage of Maḥmūd Paşa during much of his career, put the Sultan on the spot as a powerful monarch who, at the same time, succumbed to his ego and presumptuous choices.

Sultan Meḥmed II was not the sole instigator of scholarly patronage in the fifteenth-century Ottoman world and, the scholars themselves, as well as his viziers should be also given credit in the Ottoman upsurge of scholarly activities and institution building. There were eighty-four medreses founded in Rūmili and Anatolia during the time of the first six Ottoman rulers – thirty-seven of them belonging to the reign of his father Murād II (d. 855/1451).<sup>26</sup> There were, in contrast, tens of mosques, medreses, and soup kitchens that were built during the time Meḥmed II,<sup>27</sup> both endowed by him and his viziers such as Maḥmūd Paşa, Murād Paşa,<sup>28</sup> and Rūm Meḥmed Paşa<sup>29</sup> in Constantinople along with many others.<sup>30</sup> Apart from these educational endowments, the Sultan's new Code of Law had the simultaneous effect of drawing clear distinctions among the members of the learned class in terms of bureaucratic hierarchy, which was both praised and presented as a model in subsequent centuries (see § 1.2 below).

## 2.1 Sultan's Great Jihad. Constantinople and Meḥmed II's Education Policy

The conquest of Constantinople in 857/1453 inaugurated the vision of a new imperial city as the seat of a multi-confessional world empire.<sup>31</sup> In order to ensure the provisioning of the city, Meḥmed II had to restore the prosperity of neighboring villages and move people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, later by way of forced resettlement, in order to repopulate and revitalize the city.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>25</sup> İnalcık, Murphey, "Editors' Introduction", 22‑3. Uçman, "Menâkıb-ı Mahmud Paşa-yı" and Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Toplumunda".

<sup>26</sup> İhsanoğlu, "Osmanlı Medrese", 897 and Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 32.

<sup>27</sup> See for a list of all structures built in Istanbul during the time of Meḥmed II, Ayverdi, *İstanbul Osmanlı Miʾmârîsinin*, and his earlier *Fâtih Devri Mimarîsi*.

<sup>28</sup> Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, 123‑5.

<sup>29</sup> "Rūm Meḥemmed Paşa Üsküdarʾda bir ʿimāret ve bir medrese yapdı" (Neşrī, *Ğihānnümā*, 323).

<sup>30</sup> For the full list of fifteenth-century Ottoman viziers who established endowments in various parts of the empire, see Neşrī, *Ğihānnümā*, 320‑4.

<sup>31</sup> Necipoğlu, "From Byzantine Constantinople to Ottoman Kostantiniyye".

<sup>32</sup> İnalcık, "The Policy of Mehmed II", 235 and Lowry, "'From Lesser Wars to the Mightiest War'".

The resettlement policy did not work well initially,33 and the Sultan further decided to revitalize the city by introducing other means, such as constructing prestigious educational institutions and religious spaces to attract the luminaries of his time.<sup>34</sup> The books of history written by Ottoman statesman Ṭursun Bey and Byzantine historian Kritovoulos (d. 1470) gave a detailed account of the vigor and effort involved in the repopulation<sup>35</sup> and the urban development (*istiʿmār*) <sup>36</sup> of Constantinople, along with the Sultan's great investment in higher education institutions that attracted the attention of many scholars to the capital of the lands of Rūm.

The new imperial scheme was generous to the learned class, partly due to the grand revitalization projects that were undertaken by Meḥmed II to renovate the city as an emerging center for learning. These projects not only shaped the political institutions but also defined the ways in which the members of the learned class could cooperate with the other agents of bureaucracy and navigate upwards in the social hierarchy. An Ottoman historian Gelibolulu Ālī (d. 1008/1600) observed how the realization of the Sultan's grand construction project, the prestigious *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān* complex, contributed to the organization and formation of the learned class, thereby preventing the outliers (*ecnebīler*) who did not have the right merit and credentials to instruct, that is, those who belonged to a non-academic lineage, from merging freely with the learned class. In other words, according to Ālī, the building of such a prestigious institution, the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*, set the standard for the profession.<sup>37</sup>

Urban development in Constantinople was a serious undertaking, so much that the Ottoman Turkish endowment charter (*vaḳfiye*) that was published by the Directorate General of Foundations in 1938 referred the conquest of Constantinople as "the smaller jihad" (*cihād-ı aṣgar*), whereas the revitalization of the city was addressed as "the greater" (*cihād-ı ekber*).<sup>38</sup> These deeds of endowment provide important clues about the ways in which teaching and learning were perceived by the State, and how salaries and promotions were implemented during the early decades after the conquest of the city. These charters not only documented the changing features of the city but also pinpointed extant buildings from the Byzantines, which turned into Islamic educational spaces.

Besides historical chronicles, extant endowment deeds from the period constituted vital firsthand sources for the Sultan's education policy, shed-

<sup>33</sup> "Sulṭān Meḥemmed Ḫān Gāzī kim İsṭanbulʾı fetḥ itdi […] ve cemiʿ vilāyetlerine ḳullar gönderdi kim ḫāṭrı olan gelsün İsṭanbulʾda olur bāğlar bāğçeler mülklüğe gelüb ṭutsun dedi ve her kim ki geldiyse vardılar bu şehr bununla maʿmūr olmadı" (Āşıḳpaşazāde, *Die Altosmanische Chronik*, 133). The Sultan afterwards resorted to the policy of forced resettlement.

<sup>34</sup> For an extensive account of construction projects realized in Meḥmed II's new capital in the making, see Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, as well as her earlier *The Ottoman Capital in the Making*.

<sup>35</sup> Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 93‑4.

<sup>36</sup> See the section on the Sultan's urban development projects in Constantinople: Ṭursun Beg, *Târîh-i Ebüʾl-Feth*, 65‑76. In addition to the term *istiʿmār*, the Sultan used the phrase "şehri ʿimāret etmek" (Neşrī, *Kitâb-ı Cihan-nümâ*, 709).

<sup>37</sup> "Çünki bünyān-ı medāris-i s*̱*emāniyye ki görildi, baʿdehu ʿulemāʾ tarīḳiniñ niżāmına cell-i himmet buyurıldı. […] ve içlerine, ecānibden kimse ḳarışmasun deyü silsile-i ṭarīḳleri kemāl-i intiżāmla istiḥkām bula" (Gelibolulu, *Künhüʾl-aḫbār*, 2: 68).

<sup>38</sup> See *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 32, f. 37; and also Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, "Fâtih Sultan Mehmedʾin Ayasofya Vakfiyesi", 259, f. 11.

ding light on the construction of higher education institutions in the new capital. As in other Islamicate contexts, these deeds offer an insight into the arrangement of educational institutions<sup>39</sup> such that they outlined the nature and duties of the endowment by giving a detailed account of the buildings employed, as well as the personnel who got involved. Nonetheless, one prob‑ lem with relying heavily on endowment deeds is that they only give a for‑ mal view about educational activities in the empire. There were, however, other informal means of scholarly interaction, such as special instructional circles on various topics in which novice students could also acquire knowl‑ edge outside the formal classroom context through the *ḥalaqāt* and *majālis*. 40

## 2.2 Setting the Standard for Learning. The Sultan's Code of Law, the Construction of the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*, and Other Endowments by His Bureaucrats

Right after the conquest of Constantinople, Meḥmed II undertook a great number of projects in the new capital, by turning eight decrepit churches in‑ to Muslim higher education institutions<sup>41</sup> and by establishing new ones. Our sources indicate less than eight such structures, yet there are additional oth‑ er churches recorded as being converted into mosques apart from this list, such as Fetḥiyye and Kenīse Ḫura (Ḳariye or Chora). Extant Arabic and Ot‑ toman Turkish endowment charters count Ayaṣofya (Hagia Sophia), Zeyrek, Eski ʿİmāret, Ḳalenderḫāne, Silivri, and Mesadomenko in Galata (with a lec‑ ture space – *dersḫāne* – among the converted churches along with other new‑ ly built mosques in Constantinople's *Yeñi Cāmiʿ* and *Ḳulle-i cedīde* districts.<sup>42</sup>

Certain rules of conduct, job specifications, as well as salary amounts in these newly established institutions were listed in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish endowment deeds in detail. To this date, there are eleven extant endowment deeds from the period.<sup>43</sup> Some of these deeds were copied and edited in later centuries, and we have several of these extant documents highlighting the key aspects of fifteenth-century educational institutions.<sup>44</sup>

41 "Eyyām-ı sālifādanberi meʿabād-ı küffār ḫāksār olan kenāʾis-i nā-üstevārdan sekiz ʿaded kenīseleri medrese idüb" (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 1: 117).

42 For the list, see Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, "Fâtih Sultan Mehmedʾin Ayasofya Vakfiyesi", 259‑61, ff. 12‑16; *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 33‑7, ff. 40‑8.

43 For the full list, see "Giriş", in *Fatih Sultan Mehmedʾin 877/1472 Tarihli Vakfiyesi*, VII-XI.

<sup>39</sup> For a study for the Mamlūk educational context: Haarmann, "Mamluk Endowment Deeds".

<sup>40</sup> Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge*, 88‑91 and Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice*, 74‑9. *Majālis* referred to informal gatherings, that is *salons*, not *séances* – with conversa‑ tional debates overheard, not practiced (Goodman, "Rāzī vs. Rāzī", 101). With the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Arab lands, a new culture of salons arose which was vital in the transmission of knowledge, as well as the prevalence of Arabic literary culture among scholars, poets, and bureaucrats from the lands of Rūm, who received posts in North Africa and the Le‑ vant. The rise of salons among Ottoman scholarly and literary elite not only enabled advanced linguistic training, but also were centers where the scholars shared their recent works, seeking for instruction, debate, and feedback on works in progress (Pfeifer, *Empire of Salons*, 166‑99, esp. 166‑76). Medreses were highly regulated institutions, and salons started as spaces for in‑ tellectual production that refrained from the meddling of the political class as well as the de‑ tailed stipulations of medrese endowment charters (Pfeifer, *Empire of Salons*, 198).

<sup>44</sup> Most of these documents have been recently studied and grouped by Hayashi in his "Fatih Vakfiyeleriʾnin Tanzim", 94.

Three of these eleven documents are based on the original text initially drafted by Meḥmed II – though they had been also reorganized during the reign of his son Bāyezīd II (r. 886/1481‑918/1512). The precise dates of these deeds cannot be determined, so it is difficult to pinpoint exactly which political decisions were pivotal in their drafting. Endowment deeds list all given landholdings of a particular institution that ensured revenue and the perpetuity of the endowment. There are strict rules for each endowment to observe, and the positions for hire and salary rates are fixed and included within each deed. Apart from the section regarding "salaries" (*veẓāʾif*), each endowment includes a section of "general terms and conditions" (*şarṭ-ı vaḳfiye*), which outline the rules and regulations under which each endowment had to operate.<sup>45</sup>

In addition to the endowment deeds, the Sultan's new Code of Law also regulated a tenure system based on rank and merit, and certain schools, such as the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*, were considered the epitome of Ottoman learning and teaching, a case that could be evidenced by its staffing of famed scholars and high salary levels. Nonetheless, there were also other cases in which the hierarchy of learning was not strictly maintained, and the decision-making prerogative of the Sultan still had a tremendous influence on promotions and appointments.

Due to his centralizing tendencies, Meḥmed II could intervene in the process whenever he wished since the Sultan was a law unto himself.46 Furthermore, changing places or posts in every couple of years was common during this period. It was not necessarily the case that whenever a scholar received a prestigious position, he would continue in that post until his retirement. This suggests that the late fifteenth-century appointments were already temporary and always shifting. Many of the scholars from the period occupied numerous posts located in various towns and cities during their career spans, even relocating to less paid jobs due to losing the Sultan's favor or clashing with bureaucrats and other scholars.

The Sultan's premier educational complex was called the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān* (The Eight Courtyards) due to the eight colleges that it housed, and the number eight also had an allusion to the Eight Heavens (*heşt bihişt*) 47 in Islamic eschatology, the alleged eight gates of the paradise.<sup>48</sup> The complex was built on the ruins of the Church of the Holy Apostles in Constantinople, a church founded by Constantine the Great in the 330s, which was used as a burial site for the Byzantine emperors from Constantine onwards.<sup>49</sup> The church had been a nodal point for Byzantine ceremony, where the relics of Eastern Orthodox saints (including Timothy's relics) were housed and conferred a spiritual and political legitimacy on the dynastic claims of the em-

<sup>45</sup> See the Turkish translation of Ayaṣofya's endowment charter (*vaḳfiye*) along with the original Arabic document in Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, "Fâtih Sultan Mehmedʾin Ayasofya Vakfiyesi", 296, f. 132.

<sup>46</sup> Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 69.

<sup>47</sup> "Ṣaḥn medreseleri dimekle maʿrūf ve heşt-bihişt evṣāfiyle" (Gelibolulu, *Künhüʾl-aḫbār*, 2: 69). Also "Ol şehriyār-ı ḳāmkārun dārüʾl-ḳarārda heşt-bihişte vüṣūlune vesīle olmuşdur" (İbn Kemāl, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, 547).

<sup>48</sup> Also see Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 95‑7.

<sup>49</sup> See Dark, Özgümüş, "Chapter 6. The Church of the Holy Apostles"; Downey, "The Tombs of the Byzantine Emperors" and, for a homily that included a description of the church, see James, Gavril, "A Homily with a Description".

perors newly rooted in Constantinople.50 As recent studies suggest, the edifice was essentially square in plan, with a porticoed courtyard to its west and two broad lateral stairways giving entrance both to the main prayer hall and the courtyard, as well as a walled compound to the east, which included the mausoleums of Meḥmed II and one of his wives, Gülbahār Ḫatun.<sup>51</sup>

As Çiğdem Kafescioğlu has observed, the mosque at the new educational complex lacked the convent for Sufi dervishes that all prior mosques in sultans' complexes, and the iconic presence of the mosque at the summit of a hill highlighted the highest-ranking medrese within the Ottoman realm with its eight medreses placed in rows of four on opposite ends of the Renaissance-style plaza, thereby having represented the Sultan's new hierarchy of the religious establishment.<sup>52</sup> Endowment charters concerning the education at the *Ṣaḥn* offer no information about whether each college was devoted to a particular discipline. However, it is clear that each college at the *Ṣaḥn* was assigned and entrusted to the tutelage of a particular scholar and was consequently addressed by their name. In certain documents, some of these colleges were simply referred to as *Şeyḫiyye*, *Sinobiyye*, *Ṣālibuddīn*, and *Muṣliḥuddīn* after the name of the scholar who was in charge of the college.<sup>53</sup> This naming practice is not uncommon since education in Islam was structured around personal ties; and the letters of recommendation (i.e. licenses, sing. *icāzetnāme*) only bore the names of tutors and the books studied, not the institutions themselves.<sup>54</sup> Whether Muslim colleges could be seen as independent institutions with a unique program of education or only be taken within the context of personal connections has been debated in contemporary historiography.55 Nevertheless, the case for Meḥmed II's endowments combines both aspects of these readings, as the hierarchy that the Sultan envisioned among educational institutions, the education policy stressed in endowment deeds, not to mention his Code of Law, all regarded the *Ṣaḥn* as an independent institution with a unique system of education.

During the reign of Meḥmed II, obtaining an appointment at the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān* also entailed the favor of the Sultan. Appointments and teaching at the *Ṣaḥn* depended on the Sultan's permission, favor, and approval in addition to individual merit. Meḥmed II's Code of Law included a separate sec-


55 In contemporary historiography, this debate comprised several distinct elements, including construction, administrative organization, and potential library endowments. For instance, George Makdisi saw colleges as having an organized student body with a specified curriculum, whereas A.L. Tibawi stressed the fact that despite the foundation of rigid endowed institutions of learning, Islamic education had always remained flexible, informal, and tied to persons rather than institutions. It is right that learning could not be reduced to endowed institutions during this period since the informal ways of acquiring knowledge were also common as in the cases of certain private reading circles. For the discussion, see Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*, 281 and Tibawi, "Origin and Character of *al-Madrasah*".

<sup>50</sup> The Holy Apostles also served as the primary religiopolitical prototype for the basilica of San Marco in Venice (Israel, "A History Built on Ruins", esp. 107‑10).

<sup>51</sup> Dark, Özgümüş, "Chapter 6. The Church of the Holy Apostles", 84. According to the Ottoman inscription on the main door, Meḥmed II's original *külliye* was constructed from February 1461 to January 1471. The large cupola was severely destroyed later by an earthquake in 1179/1766 and rebuilt under Muṣṭafā III (r. 1171‑87/1757‑74). Also see Aga-Oglu, "The Fatih Mosque", esp. 179‑83.

tion about those who could teach at this institution. Due to the privileged status of the school, the Sultan did not simply see this school as a conglomerate of best scholars but a creation transcending that: a prestigious, independent institution with its own preparatory schools, in which qualified scholars were appointed upon fair judgment.<sup>56</sup>

With regard to the career paths of famed fifteenth-century scholars, a position at the *Ṣaḥn* was not often their last appointment. When a scholar established a reputation – whether, during early or mid-career – he would also secure a position in one of the eight medreses at the *Ṣaḥn*. In most documented cases, an appointment at the *Ṣaḥn* was temporary, since a scholar at the *Ṣaḥn*, according to the Sultan's Code of Law, could further be qualified to become a chief military-judge (*ḳāḍīʿasker*). Consequently, appointments in the fifteenth-century context were usually transitory, and a certain scholar was even expected to take up posts, ranging from İzniḳ to the Balkan settlements of Dimetoḳa and Filibe depending on the vacancy.<sup>57</sup>

Meḥmed II's deeds suggest that the institution had to be endowed for the benefit of those competent students and tutors who were eager to learn or acquire knowledge.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, each college should be organized by the directives of a scholar, who could easily deal with hard problems (*ḥall almushkilāt*) and dispel doubts (*dafʿ al-shubhāt*) about certain issues,<sup>59</sup> that is, someone who could have the sufficient intelligence and capacity to grasp the classification and contents of various sciences.60 The appointed scholar should be able to teach both rational and traditional sciences (*ʿaḳliyāt ü naḳliyāt*), which proved a scholar's prowess in different aspects of Islamic sciences.<sup>61</sup> As for the desired qualifications of scholars to be appointed at these colleges, the Ottoman Turkish deed further notes that the scholar (*müderris*) had to be competent in various sciences, knowledgeable in certain levels of wisdom (*ḥikem*), as well as elaborating on longer and more detailed textual accounts (*muṭavvelāt*).<sup>62</sup>

As for drafting, the Sultan personally supervised the preparation of each endowment deed, but also received some help from reputable scholars and bureaucrats. For instance, during the time of Bāyezīd II, Mollā ʿAlāeddīn ʿĀlī, a member of the prominent bureaucrat-scholar family of the Fenārīs, was

<sup>56</sup> İdrīs-i Bitlisī here equates scholars with prophets (*anbiyāʾ*) and mentions how the Sultan made fair appointments based on intellectual capacity and virtue (İdrîs-i Bitlisî, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 36).

<sup>57</sup> For a list of the medreses and the scholars from Filibe and Dimetoka, see Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 167‑9.

<sup>58</sup> The student or assistant to be assigned has to be someone who has the ability to address others (*muḫāṭabeye ḳābil*) and demands knowledge (*ṭālib-i ʿilmler*) (*Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 146, f. 265; and also *Fatih Sultan Mehmedʾin 877/1472*, 105).

<sup>59</sup> *Fatih Sultan Mehmedʾin 877/1472*, 155.

<sup>60</sup> Ṭursun Beg narrated that Meḥmed II built the new complex so that virtuous scholars could devote themselves to teaching (*tedrīs*), articulation (*ifāde*), as well as disciplining (*terşīḥ*) their students in religious and scientific issues: "Ve efrād-ı efāżıl-ı ʿulemāʾdan – ki her biri Şüreyḥ-i ʿahd ü ʿallāme-i devrdür, tedrīs ü ifādet ve terşīḥ ü ifāżat içün müteʿayyin oldular" (Ṭursun Beg, *Târîh-i Ebüʾl-Feth*, 71).

<sup>61</sup> Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, "Fâtih Sultan Mehmedʾin Ayasofya Vakfiyesi", 296, f. 133; and *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 246 or, for the Ottoman Turkish, see 144, f. 262. Also see İdrîs-i Bitlisî, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 75.

<sup>62</sup> *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 145, f. 263.

consulted with the preparation of certain endowment deeds,63 being particularly in charge of the Ayaṣofya document.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, there were other cases in which certain Ottoman scholars (including the main figures of this study, Ḫocazāde and Mollā Ḫüsrev) got involved in the drafting of deeds and signed them for approval.<sup>65</sup>

Apart from the *Ṣaḥn*, Meḥmed II also ordered the establishment of other medreses in the new capital, including those of Ayaṣofya (Hagia Sophia) and Eyüb, and many skillful Ottoman and Persian architects worked in their construction, as well as in Ayaṣofya's renovation.<sup>66</sup> Similar to the case of Zeyrek,<sup>67</sup> probably the books at the Eyüb medrese were later transferred to the great library within the *Ṣaḥn* upon its completion.<sup>68</sup> An inscription in the marginalia of the Eyüb deed does not mention the status of rational sciences but has a specific emphasis on the study of religious sciences including its main and secondary branches.<sup>69</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Ayaṣofya equaled and even surpassed the Sultan's premier institute *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān* in rank and distinction (*pāye*),<sup>70</sup> a fact reflected in recorded salary rates.<sup>71</sup> Meḥmed II initially built the medrese, but Bāyezīd II extended the premises after his commissioning a second floor.<sup>72</sup> It is mentioned in our sources that Mollā Ḫüsrev (d. 885/1480), the arbiter of the debate at hand, was the first scholar to be appointed there, and Ḳuşçu worked and taught there from two hundred aspers a day, a position that he held until his death.

The Sultan was not alone in his endeavors of patronage. Among all the viziers of Meḥmed II's reign, Maḥmūd Paşa held a special place, since not only

63 Erünsal, "Fâtih Devri Kütüphaneleri", 70.

64 See Ayaṣofya endowment periodic registers in Tekindağ, "Ayasofya tahrir defterlerine", 305 and Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 10‑11.

65 See the endowment deed of ʿĪṣā Bey dated 839/1435‑36 on page 58 in the appendix of Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*. Also Mollā Ḫüsrev authenticated the deed of the medrese of İzniḳ (Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 297).

66 "ʿArab u ʿAcem ü Rūmʾdan māhir miʿmārlar ve mühendisler getürüb", as well as "Ve Ayaṣofyaʾyı ve sūr-ı Ḳosṭanṭīniyyeʾyi meremmet idüb bināsın tecdīd etti" (Ṭursun Beg, *Târîh-i Ebüʾl-Feth*, 71 and 74‑5 respectively). For the section on job specifications and salary amounts (*veẓāʾif*) for the case of Ayaṣofya mosque, see *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 166‑70, ff. 305‑13.

67 For job specifications and salary amounts at the Zeyrek mosque, see *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 170‑1, ff. 314‑16. There is no position for a bookkeeper or a librarian included in the deed.

68 This fact is evidenced by the colophons of certain books originally belonged to the Zeyrek medrese (Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 15‑16; Cunbur, "Fatih Devri Kütüphaneleri", 6 and Şehsuvaroğlu, *İstanbulʾda 500 Yıllık*, 16). A copy of *Kīmyā-ye saʿāda* included in SK, MS Hz. Halid 178 has a note stating that it was endowed to the library of the Eyüb medrese by Meḥmed II's grand vizier Ḳaramanī Meḥmed in 884/1480 (see Ünver, "Sadrazam Karamanlı".

69 "Eyyûb Vakfiyesinin Tercümesi", in *Fatih Mehmed II Vakfiyeleri*, 317.

70 "The Ayaṣofya medrese is at the same level as the Ṣaḥn medreses […] if a professor in a medrese position of twenty-five aspers in the *içil* [Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa, and their environs] wants to become a judge, he is appointed to a judgeship with a salary of forty five aspers" (Meḥmed II's *Ḳānūnnāme* was translated and quoted in Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 70‑3; for the original text, see *Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman*, 11‑12).

71 The Sultan's Code of Law assigned the salary of fifty aspers per day to a teacher at the *Ṣaḥn*, whereas İdrīs-i Bitlisī assigned hundred aspers per day (İdrîs-i Bitlisî, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 75). Compared to the salaries at the *Ṣaḥn* – fifty or hundred aspers a day – a two hundred-asper daily salary was twice the distinction (*pāye*), showing the prestige of the position (see Erünsal, "Fâtih Devri Kütüphaneleri", 60‑1).

72 "Baʿde medrese ḥücerātınıñ üzerine bir ṭabaḳa daḫı binā olunub ḥücerāt ṭarḥ olunmaḳ Sulṭān Bāyezīd Ḫānʾdır" (Ayvansarâyî, *Hadîkatüʾl-Cevâmiʿ*, 42).

was he the longest standing grand vizier, but also was known for his patronage activities and close ties to the learned class. His tenure did not last long and, as noted earlier, Maḥmūd Paşa lost the Sultan's favor and was eventually killed due to his alleged poisoning of the prince Muṣṭafā who supposedly had an affair with his second wife.<sup>73</sup> During his tenure, Maḥmūd Paşa was the second most influential man in the empire as a patron of arts and sciences. He was the only grand vizier of the time to build more than one mosque under his name and was even regarded as a popular figure among common men with a hagiography assigned to his name and legacy.<sup>74</sup> Before falling from favor, Maḥmūd Paşa was regardless a loyal supporter of the Sultan's policies and the key figure in introducing the most accomplished scholars from the learned class to him and his entourage.<sup>75</sup> He showed favor and benevolence to the members of the academic community (*ṭarīḳ-ı ʿulemā*),<sup>76</sup> and was remembered for his regular scholarly gatherings (sing. *meclis*) and his personal support for scholars like Mollā İyās and Mollā ʿAbdülḳerīm, the latter of whom allegedly helped him quit drinking wine.<sup>77</sup>

Maḥmūd Paşa provided further financial support for the ulema, and he was one of the engineers of the incorporation of the Ottoman learned class into the court and religious bureaucracy. He subsequently built two medreses, one in Istanbul and another in the village of Hasköy near Edirne.<sup>78</sup> The latter was a granted library endowment by the grand vizier, and the books were recently transferred to the mosque of Sultan Selīm I upon the demolition of the medrese in 1914.<sup>79</sup> Apart from his endowments, Maḥmūd Paşa, who was also present at the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate along with the Sultan, was an acclaimed patron of poets and historians. Two significant histories, the poet-historian Enverī's *Düsturnāme*, in Ottoman Turkish, and historian Şükrullāh's (d. after 868/1464) *Beḥcet al-tawārīkh*, in Persian, were also dedicated to him.<sup>80</sup>

Whether Maḥmūd Paşa belonged to the learned class remains debatable but Ṭaşḳöprizāde, who generously included many scholars of the day in his *al-Shaqāʾiq*, did not have such an entry for him. In some anecdotal instances, Maḥmūd Paşa, yet, had been considered as an ideal vizier with a scholarly background who was mostly remembered for his support for the learned class.<sup>81</sup> His portrayal had also changed over the course of the next century. Later historians like Gelibolulu Ālī in particular instrumentalized his case to criticize one of the later grand viziers such as Rüstem Paşa (d.


78 "Maḥmūd Paşa İsṭanbulʾda bir ʿimāret bünyād idüb yanında bir medrese yapdı ve Edirne civārında Ḫaṣ Köyʾde bir medrese ve Ṣofyaʾda bir cāmiʿ yapub" (Neşrī, *Ğihānnümā*, 141).

79 Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs*, 307‑9; and for the number of books in philosophy and logic, Ünver, "Mahmud Paşa Vakıfları", 69.

80 As for the Ottoman historical writing in Persian as well as Şüḳrullāh's contributions to the genre, see Yıldız, "Ottoman Historical Writing in Persian", 443‑50.

81 "Lā-siyyemā ṭarīḳ-ı ʿulemāʾdan ẓuhūr ve ṣadāret rütbesine bir ṣadr-ı meşhūr olan Maḥmūd Paşa nevverallāhu merḳadahu taʿyīn olunub merātib-i ʿulemāʾya, ol şehryār-ı ṣāḥib-i saʿadet-i maʿnā-maʿrifeti rāgıb bulması iʿtilāʾ-i feżāʾili istidʿā eyledi" (Gelibolulu, *Künhüʾl-aḫbār*, 2: 69).

968/1561), a figure accused of being one of the chief instigators of bureaucratic corruption.<sup>82</sup>

#### 2.3 Critiquing the Sultan. Scholarly Autonomy, Pride, and Academic Rivalry

On the one hand, Sultan Meḥmed II's Code of Law and his endowments might have established certain fifteenth-century standards in terms of teaching, appointment, and career track; and, on the other, there were many other cases in which the critics of Meḥmed II's authoritarian tendencies raised their voices against the breach of his own conduct by direct intervention in bureaucratic and scholarly functioning.

The sixteenth-century historian Gelibolulu Ālī offered an alternative narrative in which he argued that there were certain rules observed in scholarly promotion coming from the centralizing reign of Bāyezīd I (r. 1389/791‑1403/805). Having set strict rules, Meḥmed II, ironically, breached them by intervening in ulema career paths. Gelibolulu credited him with the early Ottoman structural reforms, the intellectual vision, and the scientific patronage but he also backdated the charges of bureaucratic degeneration to Meḥmed II's reign, having set him as the main instigator of decline in scholarship since he incessantly intervened in certain ulema career paths by removing them from their merited posts often on a whim.

In the cases of Ḫocazāde and the Sufi-scholar Sinān Paşa (d. 891/1486), the Sultan, for instance, violated legal conventions, as his bad temper resulted in rash decisions that contravened the rules outlined in his Code of Law concerning academic appointment and merit.<sup>83</sup> Again in the cases of Ḫocazāde and his junior rival Ḫatībzāde (see chapter 3), the Sultan violated the legal conventions by appointing scholars to inferior teaching posts for punishment.<sup>84</sup>

Fifteenth-century scholars had their code of honor, and there were many proud ones who turned down bureaucratic opportunities offered by the Sultan since, for them, this meant succumbing to the political authority and leaving the path of knowledge. Scholarly pride did not, however, deter scholars from challenging others in scholarly debates to receive favors from certain patrons including the Sultan himself. The late sixteenth-century scholar and Shaykh al-Islām Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn's biobibliographical dictionary *Tācüʾttevārīḫ* offered numerous references to intellectual rivalry among certain Ottoman scholars, and stressed scholarly pride and respect as common

<sup>82</sup> Gelibolulu Ālī, *Künhüʾl-aḫbār*, 69, 76.

<sup>83</sup> Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 199.

<sup>84</sup> "Eger çi ki ecdād-ı ʿiẓāmından Yıldırım Bāyezīd Ḫān merḥūmdan kendülerüñ zamān-ı saʿādetlerine gelince vāḳıʿ olan āḫāʾ-ı kirām, bu ḳavānīnüñ bir miḳdārını icrā buyurmuşlar; lākin biʾt-tamām tertīb ü ihtimām u iḫtitām niyyetini güyā ki Ebūʾl-Fetḥ Sulṭān Meḥemmed Ḫān merḥūmuñ meṣūbatı defterine taʿlīḳ ḳılmışlar. Ammā bu nehc-i laṭīf, meslūk-i vażʿ-ı şerīf olduḳdan soñra baʿżı fevāżıl-ı meşāhir ve müʾellifīn-i ṣāḥib-i taḥrīr olan neḥārir zümreʾ-i celīlesinden merḥūm Ḫatībzāde ve Ḫocazāde ve anlaruñ ems*̱*āli fużalāʾ-ı pāk-nihāda ṭayy-i merātible riʿāyet olınub otuzar aḳça medreseden ḫāceʾ-i şehryārī ve ḳāḍıʿaskerlik gibi pāye-i kām-kārī rütbe-i sāmiye ile iltifāt ü rağbet buyurmaları vuḳūʿ buldı. Yaʿnī ki, fużalāʾ-ı nādiredān ve feylesūfān-ı mevṣūfān-ı zīşān, ḫuṣūṣ aṣḥāb-ı teʾlīf nāmındaki rūşen-i rū-şināsān ḥaḳḳında ki, her birinüñ ḳadri 'waʾl-qad iṣṭafaynāhu fī al-dunyā' ḫilʿatiyle maʿni müzeyyendür. Anlaruñ riʿāyetinde metāʿ-ı himmete endāze lāzım olmadığı remz-i vāżıḥları ile şüyūʿ buldı" (Gelibolulu, *Künhüʾl-aḫbār*, 73‑4).

themes. The work interjected the lines below introducing a section exemplifying how another contemporary scholar, the competitive Ḫatībzāde (d. 901/1495), took pride in his profession as a scholar and never paid lip service to the ruling authority in order to receive high-paid judgeships.

the perpetuity of the state of the Ottomans is due to [the autonomy of scholars] her glory comes from such respect for scholars<sup>85</sup>

An utmost devotion to the academia by upholding the autonomy of scholars was a must but this code did not deter scholars to initiate personal attacks. A contemporary theologian, Ḫatībzāde was famous for being supremely ambitious in proving his superiority in knowledge. Similar to the case of Renaissance verbal fights over academic priority, it was common in the Ottoman context to challenge a fellow scholar to prove one's superiority in terms of scholarly rectitude. In cases such as that of Ḫatībzāde, this could go so far as challenging a senior scholar (whether Ḫocazāde or the celebrated sheikh al-Islām Efḍālzāde [d. 908/1503]) and making rash claims in such debates which were often negatively received by his opponents and other arbiters.

According to our sources, Ḫatībzāde's bold remarks during exchanges were sometimes interpreted as insulting and condescending by senior scholars, and he was often criticized for his insolence and combative behavior. During a discussion with the religious scholar Mollā ʿAlāʾeddīn-i ʿArabī concerning God's speech (*kalām*) and vision (*ruʾya*) in the presence of Bāyezīd II, Ḫatībzāde's words offended both the scholar and the Sultan. In order to appease the Sultan, Ḫatībzāde later prepared a treatise that arbitrated various positions dedicating the work to His Excellency.86 However the Sultan rejected it and, subsequently, Ḫatībzāde complained about receiving no money from the Sultan despite his dedication, threatening to move to Mecca for the rest of his life. Knowing that the Sultan would be angered by Ḫatībzāde's abandonment of his teaching post in the lands of Rūm, the grand vizier Çandarlı İbrahīm Paşa (d. 905/1499) sent ten thousand aspers from his own pocket; yet this time Ḫatībzāde, who was full of himself, got angry for receiving such a trivial amount.<sup>87</sup> This anecdote suggests that the fifteenth-century scholars were not easily intimidated by the ruling authority and were instead able to exercise their autonomy, professional pride, in spite of the Sultans' prerogative.

Despite Meḥmed II's determined interference with scholars' decisions and lives, scholarly pride was tolerated to a certain degree, and scholars

<sup>85</sup> "Devām-ı devlet-i ʿOs*̱*mānīyān bu vażʿladır | riʿāyet-i ʿulemāʾdır medār-ı cāhları" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 484).

<sup>86</sup> Two copies of this work, *Risāla fī baḥth al-ruʾya waʾl-kalām*, are recorded at the Topkapı Palace, MS TSMK 4947 and 4948 (see Karatay, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi*, 90). Also there is a copy recorded in SK, MS Ayasofya 2276.

<sup>87</sup> "Bir gün Sulṭān Bāyezīd Ḫān Ḥażretleri ʿaḳd-ı meclis-i ʿulemāʾ idüb Ḫatībzāde ile Mevlānā ʿAlāʾeddīn-i ʿArabī meyānında baḥs*̱*-i ʿilmī cereyān idicek Ḫatībzādeʾniñ baʿżı kelimātı bāʿis*̱*-i inḥirāf ḫāṭır-ı ḫaṭīr pādişāhı olıcaḳ keyfiyet-i ḥāle mütefaṭṭan olub mebḥas*̱*-ı rüʾyet ve kelām taḥḳīḳine müteʿalliḳ bir risāle yazub ism-i sāmī-i Sulṭān-ı zemān ile taṣdīr idüb vezīr İbrahīm Paşa eliyle meclis-i hümāyūna īsāl itdükde maḥz-ı ḳabūle vusūl olmayub renceş-i ḫāṭırlarıñ iẓhār buyurdılar. Ḫatībzāde recā-ı cāʾize ideriken ḫilāf-ı melḥūẓı ẓuhūr idecek vezīr-i mezbūre varub Mekke mücāveretine icāzet istedi vezīr gördi ki ʿarż iderse vaḥşet-ziyād olmaḳ muḳarrerdir. Birḳaç günden ṣoñra kendi mālından on biñ aḳçe cāʾize-i Sulṭāniye ṣūretinde irsāl eyledi. Lākin Ḫatībzāde cāʾizeniñ teʾḫīr ve taḳlīli vezīrden ẓann idüb iẓhār-ı renceş eyledi" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 484).

were afforded respect and immunity as the members of the learning class. In contrast to the sixteenth-century ulema, the scholars of this age were not fully incorporated into the bureaucratic apparatus. In other words, their actions were not fully controlled by the ruling class, and it was common for a scholar to take easily pride in refusing high-paid judgeships. For instance, prior to a royal meeting, the future Shaykh al-Islām Efḍālzāde would greet any high-ranking bureaucrat entering the room. Having hit his chest hard with the back of his hand, the proud Ḫatībzāde again told Efḍālzāde that he ruined the reputation of the ulema by submitting to the ruling authority.<sup>88</sup>

In this sense, there was a code among fifteenth-century scholars that receiving a non-academic job was something to be looked down upon, and a great number of scholars actively took pride in their decision to reject various bureaucratic posts. In this vein, the famed fifteenth-century theologians Ḫayālī and Ḫatībzāde bragged about their decisions to never stray from the path of knowledge (*ʿilm*) by assuming judgeships.<sup>89</sup> Similarly, Mollā ʿİẕārī claimed that the only mistake that the master Ḫocazāde committed in life was his choosing to take up non-academic posts as in the cases of the judgeships of Edirne, Constantinople, and İzniḳ – though it was known that he was in some way forced to make these decisions, having ended up regretting them.<sup>90</sup>

Similar to the early Abbasid context, there were also theological debates with certain Christian scholars or monks in an attempt to proselytize.91 These religiously motivated debates were common features of the fourteenth-century Ottoman world, especially when Thrace and western parts of Anatolia belonged to the Byzantine realm. As the Ottomans established strong educational institutions in now fully integrated territories of Thrace and Anatolia, the attention shifting from proselytization to the reconciliation of Avicennan thought with philosophical theology. One example of such proselytizing debates was the case of a certain Zeynī shaykh known as ʿAlī, one of the successors of ʿAbdurraḥīm-i Merzifonī. Likewise, it was reported that before the conquest, Mollā Ḫayrüddīn debated forty Christian monks at Ayaṣofya and, due to his finesse in theological assessment, all the monks allegedly converted to Islam, yet keeping this fact a secret.<sup>92</sup>

Many scholars of the early Ottoman world were members of religious groups, and the Zeyniyye order, which was known for its strict work ethics, was among the most popular. An often-recorded maxim in biographical sources is that a good scholar should not pursue worldly gain. This code of conduct possessed affinities with the Sufi concept of renunciation of worldly affairs. It was due to this maxim that many of the fifteenth-century figures had humble outfits and, aside from their achievements in religious and ra-

<sup>88</sup> "Efḍālzāde erkān-ı saʿādet ṭarafına meyl idüb selām vericek el arḳası ile göğsüne urub ʿarż-ı ʿilmi hettiñ eylediñ didi" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 483).

<sup>89</sup> Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 483.

<sup>90</sup> Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 472.

<sup>91</sup> For an overview of the early Ottoman polemical literature, see Krstić, *Constested Conversions*, 6‑12, 51‑74. And for a fifteenth-century case of an autobiographical narrative of conversion (Abdallāh al-Tarjumān's *Tuḥfa*) influenced by the genre of Muslim disputation/polemic, see Szpiech, *Conversation and Narrative*, 200‑13; Krstić, "Reading Abdallāh".

<sup>92</sup> "Şeyḫ ile İsṭanbulʾa fetḥ olunmamış iken varub Ayaṣofyaʾya girdiñ anda sākin olan rāhibler ile Şeyḫ Ḥażretleri mübāḥas*̱*e idüb ilzām idecek ḳırḳ rāhib İslāmʾa gelüb İslāmlarını ketm itdiler" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 466).

tional sciences, they never boasted about their riches, worldly gains or bureaucratic jobs that they accepted.<sup>93</sup>

Religious etiquette did not mean that there was no open rivalry among religious scholars. Jealousy (*ḥased*) among scholars was a serious challenge, and many anecdotes in biographical dictionaries concern bold exchanges between scholars, as well as the machinations initiated by various state dignitaries. For example, Persian émigré scholar ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's student Mollā ʿAbdülḳādir<sup>94</sup> was also a tutor and an advisor to the Sultan. Prior to an appointment with the Sultan, Mollā ʿAbdülḳādir was feeling weak, being excused from meeting him. It is recorded that Maḥmūd Paşa, who will be later replaced by another of Ṭūsī's students through palace intrigue, convinced the young scholar for a walk on that same day through the intermediary of certain hypocrites at the palace, and having heard that the scholar accompanied Maḥmūd Paşa in the palace garden, the Sultan believed that Mollā ʿAbdülḳādir lied to him about his sickness. Meḥmed II, later on, dismissed him from his post.<sup>95</sup>

As a common deal-breaker among scholars, jealousy generally manifested in fights over the protocol. When a senior scholar or a high-ranking official entered the room, the other parties were expected to rise out of respect. If a scholar sat on the left of the Sultan instead of the right, this could signify that the former held an inferior position. All these particularities of saluting and demonstrating respect were figured in the motivations behind verbal exchanges among scholars. For instance, Mollā Ḫüsrev and Mollā Gürānī (d. 893/1488) were the most reputable jurist-scholars of the time, and there was a known scholarly rivalry between them. In court meetings, controversy often emerged over who would sit on the Sultan's right. Knowing that Meḥmed II thought highly of Mollā Ḫüsrev, Mollā Gürānī sent a humble message to the Sultan explaining that he would rather prefer to stand during the meetings to come. In response to this act of humility, Meḥmed II decided that Gürānī should sit on his right during meetings. Upon hearing this, Mollā Ḫüsrev was reported to have said that teaching and learning (*ʿilm*) superseded political affairs. Thereupon he excused himself from official meetings and moved to Brusa to establish his own medrese.<sup>96</sup>

94 "Ṭūsīʾniñ tilmīẕi" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 501).

95 "Sulṭān Meḥemmed Ḫān Ḥażretlerine muʿallim olub taḳarrubı bir ṭabaḳaya irişdi ki Maḥmūd Paşa ḥased idüb bir güne engīz ile ḥayzüʾl-iltifātdan dūr itdi". The marginalia of the text further comments on the incident as follows: "Ṣūret-i engīz bu idi ki bir gün Pādişāh esneyüb mizācında nevʿ-i fütūr olmağın iʿtiẕār itmişidi. Baʿżı muṣāḥibleri ki ṣoḥbetinde münāfıḳ ve nihānī Paşa ile muvāfıḳ idiler. Tenezzüh içün bir bağçe seyrine taḥrīk idüb Paşaʾya ḫaber virmişler. Paşa daḫı Pādişāhʾa ʿarż idüb istiʿalām buyurıldıḳda seyre gitdüği s*̱*ābit olıcaḳ rençeş-i ḫāṭırların ẓāhir idüb ʿizz-i ḥużūrlarından dūr itdiler" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 501).

96 "Ḥattā Sulṭān-ı ʿaṣr ittiḫāẕ-ı velīme idüb üstādı olan Mevlānā Gürānī ḫāṭrını taṭbīb içün ne maḥalde cülūs iderler deyü istiḫbār itdiler Mevlānā Gürānī daḫı böyle ḫayr gönderdi ki bize lāyıḳ olan oldur ki ol meclisde cülūs itmeyüb iḳāmet-i ḫıdmet-i mevḳıfında ḳıyām ide ve bu ḫaber-dīlāvīz ve żamīr-menīr-i pādişāhīye teʾs*̱*īr idüb cānib-i yemīnlerini Mevlānāʾya taʿayyun itdiler. Mevlānā Ḫüsrev ve cānib-i yesārda cülūsa rāżī olmayub gayret-i ʿilmiyye böyle iḳtiżā ider ki ben ol meclisde ḥāżır olmayım meżmūnı müştemil bir mektūb bedīʿüʾl-üṣlūb inşā idüb

<sup>93</sup> Wealth and affluence might have played a role in the production and transmission of knowledge especially in educational novelty, but it should also be noted that there was already an early generation of Ottoman scholars who relied on the (Zeynī) principle of poverty, who rejected any career opportunities outside academia that would instigate their incorporation into the bureaucratic apparatus. While the economic means do have an impact on scholarly novelties, one could imagine other context where money was not the only determiner (see the discussion in Shafir's review article of Küçük's monograph *Science Without Leisure*, "The Almighty Akçe", 269).

#### 2.4 Court Debate Culture and Palatine Libraries

The debate examined here likely took place at the Topkapı Palace's ashlar masonry building called the 'Inner Treasury' in its L-shaped suite of four halls, whose architectural features and multifunctional design have been recently studied by Gülru Necipoğlu.<sup>97</sup> The Treasury-cum-Bath, also known as the Meḥmed the Conqueror's Pavilion (*Fātiḥ Köşkü*) in the later centuries, was the first royal edifice built by Meḥmed II around the year 866/1462‑63. This complex was also a preferred site for philosophical and theological discussions, including those about the principles of the Peripatetics.98 As detailed by Greek chronicler Kritovoulos (d. 1470), Meḥmed II preoccupied himself with philosophical debates in the summer of 869/1465, in the company of the grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa, as well as other scholars, including George Amiroutzes and his two sons.<sup>99</sup> The Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate dated as 871/1466 may very well have unfolded in Meḥmed II's palatine library, which housed the most quintessential book collection of its time with more than 5,700 volumes in the inventory. Its library holdings surpassed those of premier libraries in Europe, such as the semi-public library at the Vatican, the library of Palazzo Medici, as well as those by Matthias Corvinus, the King of Hungary (r. 1458‑90), and Federico da Montefeltro (1422‑82), the Duke of Urbino.100 Some of the theological, philosophical, and scientific debates might have taken place in the Sultan's throne room with a niche on the upper right corner for the throne seating, which most probably also housed the Sultan's library (see Room no. 2 below located in **[fig. 1a]** Ground plan and its recent photos in **[figs 2a-b]**).<sup>101</sup>

Meḥmed II had a keen interest in Arabic Peripatetic (Avicennan) philosophy, as well as those of other schools, such as Suhrawardī's Illuminationism, an aspect of his patronage in rational sciences also praised in certain panegyrics. This is evidenced in the poems of Persian Sufi-poet ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī (d. 898/1492) and Amiroutzes, which praised his thoroughgoing support for Aristotelian and Platonic strands of thought.102 It is no coincidence that the philosophy corpus, numerically dominated by Avicenna's works and their commentaries, was the second largest set of manuscripts in librarian ʿAṭūfī's famed palace inventory prepared for Bāyezīd II in the year 908/1502‑03.103 The inventory, which also includes the book acquisitions bequeathed by Meḥmed II, has been recently studied and analyzed in

97 Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 3.

98 Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 14.

99 Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 177, 209‑10 and Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 10. Amiroutzes had two sons, Basil and Alexander, who might have converted into Islam after Meḥmed II's death in 1481 in order to save their position under his son (Argyriou, Lagarrigue, "Georges Amiroutzes et son Dialogue", 41‑4; Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 10).

100 Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 16‑17. Also see Csapodi, *The Corvinian Library*; Tanner, *The Raven King*, 8‑12 and Arbizzoni, Bianca, Peruzzi, *Principi e signori*.

101 Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 10.

102 "Rāh-e Mashshaʾiyān ze tu wāḍiḥ | nūr-e Ishrāqiyān be tu lāyiḥ || ṭabʿ-e pāk-e tu rā ki vaqqādast | fahm-e ḥikmat-e ṭabīʿī uftādast || bar dilat ḥikmat-e ilāhī tāft | ke rukh az ẓulmat-e malāhī tāft" (al-Jāmī, *Dīwān*, 174). For Amiroutzes' panegyric, see § 2.6.

103 Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 44.

dīvān-ı ʿālīye gönderüb hemāndem keştīye girüb Brusaʾya vardı. Bu belde-i mezbūrede bir medrese bināʾ idüb tedrīse şurūʿ eyledi" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 464).

**Figures 1a-c** Inner Treasury (Treasury-Bath complex). [1a] Ground plan. [1b] Elevation from the third courtyard. [1c] Cross-section from the third courtyard (Reproduced from Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 4. Drawings: Eldem, Akozan, *Topkapı Sarayı*, pls 71-4)

**Figures 2a-b** Inner Treasury. [Left] Second hall (throne room) interior with throne alcove and fireplace. [Right] First hall interior with multi-tiered niches and fireplace. (Reproduced from Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 6; Photos: Devrim, "Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi", 90-1)

two volumes by a number of leading contemporary academics with invaluable contextualizations, who commented on each genre based on the scholarship of the day. Observing that the collection encompassed non-Islamic philosophical and scientific works alongside others reminiscent of pre-Islamic universalism, Cemal Kafadar has underscored Meḥmed II's universalist and cosmopolitan ambitions in the same line with the competitive post-Timurid scholarly traditions.<sup>104</sup>

With regard to God's unicity and his lack in participation in other beings, Amiroutzes defined God, in an attempt at assimilating Aristotelian metaphysics with late Greek Neoplatonism and Christianity,105 as "incommunicability in itself, which, whatever it is, subsists from itself, sufficient in itself and unchangeable, existing in radical unity and oneness, transcending all communion, sharing no relation and being unparticipated in".106 With certain affinities with the Avicennan paradigm, Amiroutzes further defined God

106 Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 38.

<sup>104</sup> Kafadar, "Between Amasya and Istanbul", 1: 99‑100. Contrary to the commonly held misperception that medrese libraries represented a strict Sunnī Orthodoxy in terms of inventory holdings, Konrad Hirschler has argued that the books held at the Ashrafiyya library in medieval Damascus were equipped with the rationalist way of approaching theological questions (Hirschler, *Medieval Damascus*, 102‑32, esp. 122). On the other hand, an opposite trend can be observed in Persia especially during and after the Mongol invasion: the Mongol rulers preferred not to subsidize religious or theological titles over science and literature, a fact that might reflect the Mongol's reversal of Seljūq Sunnism and scholarly standardization (Biran, "Libraries, Books, and the Transmission of Knowledge", 489 and al-Ṭiqṭaqā, *Al-Fakhri on the Systems of Government*, 16). Also see for the underrepresentation of theological and philosophical sciences in the library of a thirteenth-century Shīʿīte scholar, Kohlberg, *A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work*.

<sup>105</sup> Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 41. Almost no philosophical writings of his were known, yet Monfasani has recently come across a group of fifteen tractates of Amiroutzes in a manuscript in Toledo, which were later edited and published by the author. In a work written against the Platonic *metempsychosis*, Amiroutzes brought a Christian-Aristotelian bent when demolishing the position (Monfasani, "A Note on George Amiroutzes", 125‑6).

as the One, the Indefinite Dyad, i.e. God, "that cannot be predicated other than oneness itself".<sup>107</sup> Conceptually speaking, oneness can be "combined with being Being"; however, it is not necessarily combined with oneness since oneness is prior to being. In the words of Amiroutzes, "if a particular thing were self-existing, it would not be said that something is added to it, making what exists by virtue of itself and by its own existence prior to what participates in it".<sup>108</sup> This, in turn, sets the One's precedence over the many.

Philosophical discussions commissioned at palace libraries were common features of the 'connected histories' of early modern intellectual history.<sup>109</sup> For instance, Pico della Mirandola (1463‑94) completed his treatise *De Ente et Uno* (On Being and Unity) during his residency at the Badia Fiesolana near Florence in 1490‑91.<sup>110</sup> Pico's work, similar to the content of the debate at hand, covers the question of God's oneness, singularity, and simplicity with regard to the contingent multitude in the world, yet different from the Aristotelian-Avicennan scope of the Ottoman context,111 his treatise does not hold the validity of the Peripatetics but tries to reconcile Aristotle and Plato in light of other traditions of the past, including schools as wide as Christian Neoplatonism (Dionysius the Areopagite), Christian Latin tradition (St. Anselm, Duns Scotus, St. Thomas etc.), Arabic Aristotelianism (Avicenna, Averroes), as well as Kabbalah.<sup>112</sup> Despite his use of a greater range of sources, Mirandola, in line with Ḫocazāde's mission of verification, aims to "vindicate truth"113 with an attempt at synthesizing different schools of thought.

The Badia Fiesolana was one of the most spectacular libraries of its time, with a richness comparable to the size of Bāyezīd II's library, where, in a similar fashion, Aristotelian works were given much more weight in the li-

110 Dressen, "Peripatetici pariter et platonici", 376.

<sup>107</sup> Quoted from Monfasani, "Tractate I. The Philosopher What the Ancients Taught Concerning Being", *George Amiroutzes*, 71.

<sup>108</sup> Quoted from Monfasani, "Tractate XIV. The Same Author Concerning the First Principle", *George Amiroutzes*, 187.

<sup>109</sup> With regard to the notions of universalism and humanism under the broad head of 'historical anthropology' in the connected early modern world, see Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories", 739‑40.

<sup>111</sup> Maybe with the exception of the term *al-iʿtibārāt*'s connotation in Suhrawardī's Illuminatonism, the terms (and scholars) cited and commented in the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate tend to be rather related to the Arabic Peripatetic tradition or its post-classical critique by certain theologians. There does not seem to be any direct Platonist figures cited in response to the Aristotelian-Avicennan worldview. Due to the dominance of the latter school during this period, there does not seem to be any medrese handbooks positing Illuminatonist doctrines. On the contrary, there tend to be parts in certain treatises, in which Suhrawardī's doctrines were criticized (İbn Kemāl, "Risāla fī ziyāda al-wujūd", 9‑49). With regard to the question whether there was an Ottoman Illuminationist school, see Arıcı, "Osmanlı İlim Dünyasında İşrâkî Bir Zümreden Söz Etmek Mümkün mü?".

<sup>112</sup> Hamm, *Pico della Mirandola of Being and Unity*. Mirandola's discourse on unicity covers the similar ground with the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate, especially when questioning how God's four attributes did not go against His unicity. Here Avicenna's view is given in light of Averroes' criticism, and by using Platonic vocabulary, Mirandola defined unicity as the most expense *genera*, a view that the Arabic Avicenna would go against since God, for him, cannot be defined by logical categories, such as genus and species (Hamm, *Pico della Mirandola of Being and Unity*, ch. 8, 28).

<sup>113</sup> See Pico's letter to his friend Ermolao Barbaro, where he refers to his project as "vindicating truth" translated by Hamm in *Pico della Mirandola of Being and Unity*, 6.

brary holding over Platonic texts.114 To evaluate the quality of the Badia library stock requires some thoughtful attention to the conventions of reading and study and, having studied the inventory, Angela Dressen notes that the size of patristic and theological works at the Badia have often been downplayed to the extent that the biggest collection at the library constitutes theological scholastic works. The fifteenth-century study practices suggest that the influence of theology, especially in the philosophical discourses produced at the Badia, was far more reaching than previously assumed.<sup>115</sup> An avid collector of books and a denizen of the ancient Near East, Pico was even accounted as having penned a treatise "defending the scholastic philosophers against the charge that their barbarous style disqualified them as thinkers".<sup>116</sup> Ḫocazāde's synthetic method reconciling different aspects of knowledge, including Avicennan philosophy and post-classical theology, had an affinity with Pico's syncretic approach due to his constant dialogue with different schools of thought and attempts at scholarly arbitration.<sup>117</sup>

### 2.5 The Social Functions of Scholarly Patronage. Legitimacy, Honor, and Prestige

To conclude, patronage was a productive and dynamic system that propelled clientele-fostering networks and thought processes, rewarded ingenuity, crafted scientific approaches, and legitimized knowledge based on the trends of the day. The context of Ottoman courtly life and scientific patronage indeed shaped the practice and presentation of the sciences in the eyes of the learned class, but given the fact that getting bureaucratic favors or posts at the Ottoman court was looked down upon by many fifteenth-century reputable scholars, it would be an oversimplification to limit the scientific culture only to distinction and social taste,118 i.e. not amounting to content and scientific criteria. The fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship did not establish a fitting discourse based on court satisfaction but, rather, fostered objectivity within the confines of the present scholarship. The rule of scholarly aptness was based on arbitration and verification, both of which depended on the correct use of syllogisms, rigorous argumentation, and the knowledge of past scholarship.

Court culture was a recognized tool to legitimize the sciences and, in turn, the study of sciences also sought legitimization through patronage. Recent scholarship with a sociological bent tended to overpower the role of courtly life, by reducing the cultivation of science and the arts to courtly manners,

118 Bourdieu, *Distinction*.

<sup>114</sup> Dressen, *The Library of the Badia Fiesolana*, 48. I would like to thank the author for sharing a copy of her monograph with me.

<sup>115</sup> Dressen, "Peripatetici pariter et platonici", 371‑3. Also see other secondary literature regarding the weight of theology in Pico's philosophy: Monnerjahn, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola* and Dulles, *Princeps Concordiae*, 144‑64.

<sup>116</sup> See Pico's another letter to Ermolao Barbaro mentioned in Grafton, *Commerce with the Classics*, 109.

<sup>117</sup> Behind the synthetic formulations of both Italian and Ottoman contexts, there also lied developments in library classification and cataloguing systems which were becoming more diversified and, in some ways, universalistic based on the idea of the unity of science (see Besson, *Medieval Classification and Cataloguing*).

social propriety, and decency. In his tendentious study Mario Biagioli has pushed on the image of the Italian polymath Galileo Galilei (1564‑1642) as a courtier, arguing that his courtly role was integral to his scientific achievement and artisanship to a degree that Galileo had to refashion himself as a successful philosopher – thereby downplaying his interest in mechanics to receive sustained favor and patronage.<sup>119</sup> It is true that scholars did not live in a vacuum and their concern for patronage and social climbing, thus, were not external to Galileo's scientific pursuits. On the one hand, Galileo's increasing commitment to Copernicanism and his self-fashioning as a successful court client fed off each other, constructing a socio-professional identity that led him to put forth a new natural philosophy within the confines of his tenure and professional choices;<sup>120</sup> on the other, it would be simplistic to treat the patronage networks as no more than labels and resources to be tapped into by clever opportunists playing language games.

The modes of behavior and etiquette in court debates indeed had close ties to the sociogenesis of the ruling class and its actions. As in Norbert Elias' coinage "civilizing process" regulated the self-image of the Sultan and his domain, which were shaped by a wide variety of facts determining his political absolutism based on the level of technology, the type of manners, the development of scientific knowledge, religious ideas, and customs.<sup>121</sup> Yet, for the sympathizers of the 'patronage-first' approach, it is a problem that the imperial patronage directed at scientific objectivity and scholarly argumentation may not still garner the sincere attention of patrons and influence their worldviews. In other words, the court debate might simply be a showcase of power, as well as a legitimizing tool for political absolutism to a degree that the patrons might simply lack commitment to the issues addressed.

It could be argued that court debates had an inner fallacy of associating the power's acknowledgment with objectivity and verity. On the one hand, the discourse of power may simply dismiss certain options and alternative explanations but, on the other, utilize them in its favor – whether through the utilization of physical objects (e.g. maps, commemorative coins, and medals), works of art imbued with a religious/cosmic undertone (e.g. Lorenzo de' Medici's commissioning of votive images at churches,122 Louis XIV's ostentatious display of his sun image in plays), or theological and philosophical justifications (e.g. the Catholic theology of the *Corpus Mysticum* or the polymath Blaise Pascal's political commentary). In this regard, the Ottoman context was not significantly different from its other European and Islamicate counterparts.

<sup>119</sup> See Biagioli, *Galileo, Courtier*. In his first review, Michael Shank has argued that Biagioli downplays the scientific achievements of Galileo in order to assign a crucial role to the prevalent aristocratic culture, thereby playing by the evidence to bolster his point concerning his "social context-first approach". The trap of microhistory, for Shank, has the perils of disregarding the trajectory of intellectual continuity and scientific eruditions of a particular scholar. For Shank's review, Biagioli's reply, and the former's rejoinder: Shank, "Galileo's Day in Court"; Biagioli, "Playing with the Evidence" and Shank, "How Shall We Practice History?".

<sup>120</sup> Biagioli, *Galileo, Courtier*, 1‑8.

<sup>121</sup> Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 1: 3. As in the words of Huizinga, culture arises in the form of contest, proceeding in the shape or the mood of the game, and contest, in this regard, contributes to civilizing functions (Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 50).

<sup>122</sup> Lowe, "Patronage and Territoriality", esp. 262. For a survey, Gombrich, "The Early Medici as Patrons of Art" and, for the role of Cosimo de' Medici (1389‑1464) in artistic and religious propaganda for the new republic, see Hollingsworth, *Patronage in Renaissance Italy*, 48‑94 and Kent, "The Dynamic of Power".

The court society is undoubtedly connected to the advancing centralization of state power and might, and the image of the king, as in the classical case of Louis XIV, the *Roi Soleil*, has been often taken as an utmost model of the omnipotent absolute monarch.<sup>123</sup> In a similar fashion, Sultan Meḥmed II, who was known for his centralization policies in administration and had turned the fledgling principality into a world empire, attracted many scholars, artists, and literati from East to West.<sup>124</sup> He was never portrayed as an ignorant monarch. He was rather portrayed as meticulous in his decisions and determined to give the utmost chance to deserving philosophical and artistic traditions, at all costs.

Meḥmed II was an absolutist monarch, who was said to have gleamed like the Sun possessing divine wisdom – even by the Byzantine scholars and Italian humanists of the period.<sup>125</sup> The late Byzantine philosopher Georgios Amiroutzes (1400‑70), whose acquaintance with the Sultan went back to the conquest of Trebizond in 866/1461, also praised the Sultan's patronage of Graeco-Arabic philosophy in a panegyric with allusions to both Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, and paralleled his virtuous character to the glimmering quality of the encompassing sun:


In his panegyrics, Amiroutzes refers to Plato and Aristotle along with the latter's father-in-law Hermias (d. 341 BC) as the Sultan's ultimate virtuous models. Amiroutzes' second fragment above was adapted from Aristotle's "Hymn to Virtue" written in commemoration of Hermias, a funerary hymn that was recited by the initiates of Aristotle's school and philosophy.127 Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus and a companion of Platonists, was a great patron of philosophy who sponsored Aristotle during his exile in Assos, and the philosopher ultimately married to her daughter Pythias. Aristotle and the Peripatetics were indebted to him to such an extent that they had a reason to portray him as a devout student and patron of philosophy.<sup>128</sup>

125 Babinger, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet ve İtalya" and "Mehmed der Eroberer".

128 Ford, *Aristotle as Poet*, 18.

<sup>123</sup> See Marin, *Portrait of the King*; Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, vol. 2 and Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*. Also a ruler of the Anatolian Seljūqs ʿAlā al-Dīn Kayḳubād I (d. 1220/616‑1237/634) and the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen (r. 1220‑50) refashioned themselves in their coins and seals after the models of pagan solar cult, such as that of Apollo and Sol Invictus and the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 963/1556‑1014/1605), who was also the instigator of eclectic belief systems like 'Divine Faith' (*dīn-e ilāhī*) and 'Universal Peace' (*ṣulḥ-e kull*), was also preoccupied with the divine light imagery (see the articles by Suzan Yalman on Suhrawardī's use of light imagery in assigning a cosmic rulership to the Seljūq Sultan: "ʿAla al-Din Kayqubad Illuminated", her research précis "Light of the Heavens and Earth" and "Repairing the Antique", 226‑31).

<sup>124</sup> Akasoy, "A Baghdad Court in Constantinople/Istanbul", 136‑47.

<sup>126</sup> Janssens, van Deun, "George Amiroutzes". I want to thank Aslıhan Akışık for sharing this source and translating Amiroutzes' panegyric verse on the Sultan for this study. Also see Mirmiroğlu, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet", 98‑9.

<sup>127</sup> Renehan, "Aristotle as Lyric Poet" and LeVen, "Aristotle's Hymn to Virtue".

The cases of scientific universalism, syncretism, and encyclopedism were common grounds for early modern Islamicate ideologies, which were often shaped by the prevailing religio-political imperial vision of a 'cosmic sovereign', and the doctrinal accumulation of Islamicate domains of knowledge coming from different sources. It is in this context that the image of Sun as 'the Absolute' emphasized Meḥmed II's illuminating quality of patronage in philosophy, a motif tied to the Neoplatonist cosmology inherited by certain strands of Graeco-Arabic thought – whether the Muslim Peripatetics or Illuminationists. The Sultan here is portrayed as the 'Necessitating One', an 'Unmoved Mover', emanating beams of existence and truth. In certain other Ottoman works, the Sultan was also depicted as a fountainhead that beget the divine light of philosophy when radiating wisdom and knowledge. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that in his Persian book of history *Hasht bihisht*, the Kurdo-Ottoman historian İdrīs-i Bitlisī counted *ḥikma*, a term that may refer to a wide range of meanings, including Avicennan philosophy, Suhrawardī's thought, or 'divine wisdom' in its most general sense,<sup>129</sup> among the Sultan's natural faculties (*malaka*). Bitlisī's account may resonate strongly with Jāmī's and Amiroutzes' panegyics due to its utilization of Neoplatonist vocabulary. For this reason, the Kurdo-Ottoman historian here links the Sultan's 'overflowing wisdom' to the 'Active Intellect' (*ʿaql-e faʿāl*) in Aristotelian-Avicennan cosmogony.<sup>130</sup> The Sultan as the 'Active Intellect' or the 'ever-present Sun' here governs both the celestial and the sublunary, so that he can enable the actualization of potential intelligibles within the material intellect, giving a push to the sublime and, at the same time, initiating the patronage of Muslim Peripatetic and Platonist schools of philosophy in the Ottoman world.<sup>131</sup>

It has been recently argued that Meḥmed II's cultural politics was deeply inflected by a particular thread of Renaissance philosophy called the *Prisca Theologia*, the Renaissance dialectic between humanism and scholasticism. This strand of thought, in many ways, could be associated with the sixteenth-century Mughal emperor Akbar's *Ṣulḥ-e kull* that motivated the revival of more eclectic and mysterious forms of ancient learning (including Neoplatonism) along with a political narrative of reasserting himself as a 'renewer' (*renovatio*/*mujaddid*) and restoring the world to its pristine order under a universal ecclesiastical authority.132 Matthew Melvin-Koush-

131 İdris-i Bitlisî, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 36.

132 Casale, "Mehmed the Conqueror", 846‑50; "From Parallels to Intersections", 23‑5. With regard to the Mughal cases of religious coinciliation, universalism, and mixing of cultures

<sup>129</sup> For an analysis of different sections in philosophical genres (*ḥikma falsafiyya* and *ḥikma islāmiyya*) in the Török manuscript prepared by the fifteenth-century palace cataloguer ʿAṭūfī, which includes the full list of books belonged to Bāyezīd II's palace library, see Gutas, "Philosophical Manuscripts". Also see ch. 4 in Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 206‑13. For the fifteenth-century Ottoman nuances among *falsafa*, *ḥikma* and *kalām*, see Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *Miftāḥ alsaʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ*, 1: 311‑12, 2: 150, as well as the Ottoman Turkish version translated by his son Ṭaşḳöprizāde Meḥmed, see Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *Mevżūʿātüʾl-ʿulūm*, 1: 331‑5, 2: 256. Ṭaşḳöprizāde's definition of *ḥikma* also follows Jurjānī's dictionary of terminology (al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-taʿrīfāt*, 97).

<sup>130</sup> For the uses of Neoplatonic vocabulary in the fifteenth-century Ottoman poetry, see the cases of Tācīzāde Caʿfer Çelebi (d. 921/1515) and Mihrī Ḫatun (d. after 917/1512), in Andrews, "Ottoman Poetry" and Havlioğlu, "Mihrî Hatun and Neoplatonic Discourse", 169‑87 and 188‑202 respectively. Especially in Caʿfer Çelebi's case, love always had its grounding in a cosmic connection through the use of Neoplatonist imagery in a series of emanations descending from a primal unity loosely signified by notion of "God as the [ultimate] Truth [*el-Ḥaḳḳ*]" (see Andrews, "Ottoman Poetry", 171‑4). For Mihrī Ḫatun, also see Havlioğlu, *Mihrî Hatun*, 18‑19, 104‑6.

ki has recently observed that early modern Islamicate empires in the post-Mongol world include certain common forms of religiopolitical legitimacy, such as messianism, apocalypticism, ecumenism, occultism, and the principle of saint-philosopher-kingship. The latter aspect is a common feature that implies cosmic universalism at the nexus of mysticism, political legitimacy, and philosophical studies.<sup>133</sup>

It is no coincidence that Meḥmed II was regarded as the 'Second Renewer' (*müceddid-i s̱ānī*) of the Hagia Sophia, who appropriated and embodied its sacred power for a firm religio-political mission by way of a discourse steeped in the Neoplatonic *renovatio*/*tajdīd*. In İdrīs-i Bitlisī's history, the Sultan was depicted as having seen himself as a 'cosmic sovereign', a conduit between the world of men and the divine, which was a quality comparable to the Byzantine emperor Justinian I (r. 527‑65), who was the edifice's first founder.<sup>134</sup>

It should be noted that despite that many descriptions of Meḥmed II accentuated the Platonic aspects of his patronage in philosophy, there could be found other representations of him as a supporter and resuscitator of studies in Arabic Aristotelianism.135 In most descriptions included in history books, I argue that there is a fine balance between Aristotelian and Platonic features of Meḥmed II's scholarly interests, the latter being more highlighted in contemporary scholarship due to its terminological resting on the image of sun rays. On the other hand, there is a plenty of evidence that Meḥmed II was an instigator of Aristotelian sciences and, in the case of the Ottoman medrese, this would amount to the study of Avicenna and Avicennism that diffused into the disciplines of *ḥikma* and *kalām*.

George Amiroutzes, who was allegedly related to the grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa,<sup>136</sup> gave an alternative account of Meḥmed II's philosophical interests in his "Dialogue with the Sultan on Christus' Faith",<sup>137</sup> in which the philosopher rather emphasized the Sultan's familiarity with Aristotelian doctrines based on the model of Alexander the Great.<sup>138</sup> In this work, Amiroutzes saw Meḥmed II as the harmonizer of Christianity and Islam *par* 

137 For the edition of the text, Argyriou, Lagarrigue, "Georges Amiroutzes et son Dialogue".

<sup>(</sup>*āmīzish-e farhang*) including Akbar's *Ṣulḥ-e kull*, see *Modern Asian Studies*' May 2022 special issue on Mughal political theology (volume 56): Moin, "*Sulh-i kull* as an oath of peace"; Gommans, Huseini, "Neoplatonism and the Pax Mongolica"; Sheffield, "Exercises in peace"; Pye, "The Sufi method behind the Mughal 'Peace with All' religions". Also see Kinra, "Revisiting the History and Historiography of Mughal Pluralism" and Amanat "Nuqṭawī Messianic Agnostics of Iran".

<sup>133</sup> Melvin-Koushki, "Early Modern Islamicate Empire", 356‑62.

<sup>134</sup> Casale, "Mehmed the Conqueror", 853‑5.

<sup>135</sup> As in the case of Meḥmed II exemplified previously, the term *faylasūf* generally refers to an Avicennan philosopher who acknowledges the cosmological and ontological assumptions of Arabic Aristotelianism. See astronomer-mathematician Fatḥullāh al-Shirwānī's (d. 891/1486) designation of Ulugh Bey as "al-sulṭān al-faylasūf" in a text included in his *Sharḥ al-tadhkira fi ʿilm al-hayʾa* (Fazlıoğlu, "The Samarqand Mathematical-Astronomical School", 41).

<sup>136</sup> Monfasani has written that there are two sources regarding the connection between the two men: the first source suggests that their mothers were daughters of Iagari, a Greek noble man Marko Yagari; and, according to Laonicus Chalcocondyles' account, Amiroutzes might be Maḥmūd Paşa's cousin, *exadelphos*. See Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 8.

<sup>138</sup> According to Kritvoulos, Amirutzes was a late Byzantine philosopher who was learned in physics, dogmatics, mathematics, geometry, as well as Peripatetic and Stoic philosophy. For Kritovoulos on Meḥmed II's generosity towards Amiroutzes, see Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 117 and Mirmiroğlu, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet", 94‑100. For a full survey of the Sultan's patronage activities, see Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, 462‑93. For Amiroutzes' praise

*excellence* under a unified rubric from the Aristotelian religio-philosophical point of view.<sup>139</sup>

Another such text is the late Byzantine philosopher and Aristotelian polemist George of Trebizond's (1395‑1484) "Preface to Meḥmed II for the *Isagoge* to Ptolemy's *Almagest*". As John Monfasani has suggested, this work was written while George was in Constantinople, where he had gone in the spring of 1465 and remained until early 1466. The scholar was not able to present this dedication during his visit; he, instead, proposed to send it to the Sultan along with his dedication of the Latin *Comparatio* and other writings from Rome, including *The Difference between Plato and Aristotle*, a work in comparative philosophy that the Sultan would highly appreciate.<sup>140</sup> A Byzantine theologian, humanist, and convert to Catholicism, Cardinal Bessarion (1403‑72), who was a pupil of Pletho and a supporter of Platonism, got hold of George's Latin letters, found out about George's flattering words for Meḥmed II and, along with the Spanish theologian and diplomat Rodrigo Sánchez Arévalo (1404‑1470), led the scholar to be imprisoned for a period of four months due to his 'heretical' assertions that Meḥmed II "succeeded by divine right to the universal monarchy of the Roman emperors and popes over the whole world".141 Having described His Excellency as *peritia philosophiae peripateticae, doctrina in multis disciplinis* (being learned in terms of peripatetic philosophy and various other sciences) in these letters,<sup>142</sup> George also extolled the Sultan's interest, familiarity, and patronage in Aristotelian philosophy as follows:

I have the praise of your power, thinking that there is nothing better in the present life than to serve a wise king and one who philosophizes about the greatest matters. For in addition to your other manly virtues which befits a king, Your Mightiness is also said to study Aristotle even more than those who have a professional responsibility to study Aristotle.<sup>143</sup>

In the rest of the preface, George counted the Sultan's stated interest in Ptolemy's *Great Synthesis* (i.e. his *Almagest*) among his virtues, a work that synthesized cartography, topography, and astronomy with mathematical precision, so that it was highly practical for military strategy, territorial mapping, as well as apocalypticism and political prognostication.144 An-

of the Sultan's knowledge in Aristotelian[-Avicennan] philosophy, see Akasoy, "Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy", 253.

139 Bádenas, "The Byzantine Intellectual Elite", 28.

140 Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 281‑2. George dedicated this work to the Ottoman sultan, whom he believed to be an "Aristotelian" (Shank, "The *Almagest*", 58).

141 Trame, *Rodrigo Sánchez Arévalo*, 185‑6.

142 Akasoy, "Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy", 255.

143 Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 281. Also see another treatise by George that depicted the Sultan's penchant for Aristotelian philosophy titled "On the Divinity of Manuel", a text that might have been written in 1467 for the Sultan's hypothetical conversion, stating that the Sultan "mastered the works of Aristotle" (Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 566‑7).

144 Berggren and Jones have observed that the primary contributions of Ptolemy's *Geography* were supplying "a detailed and extensive topography of the entire known parts of the world (i.e. Europe, Africa, and Asia), a clear and succinct discussion of the roles of astronomy, and other forms of data-gathering in geographical investigations", in which the scholars would be able to write down "the coordinates of latitude and longitude for every feature drawn on a world map so that anyone possessing Ptolemy's work could reproduce a precise world map at any time, in na Akasoy has recently suggested that the conviction that the Sultan was familiar with Aristotelian doctrines is highly striking in another treatise called "On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat".<sup>145</sup> After having mentioned that the Sultan's qualities outshined those of the Byzantine emperor Constantine the Great (r. 306‑37) – "just as the sun outshines the moon" – George, in this work, talked about the Sultan's interest in Ptolemy's *Great Synthesis* and introduced the theme of the Aristotelian canon in order to justify certain Christian doctrines in the eyes of Aristotelianism.<sup>146</sup> Chapter II of this treatise concerned the Holy Trinity with regard to God's unicity, in which, by applying Aristotelian definitions (i.e. statements that designate the essence of something) to Christian theology, the Trinity concurred with Aristotelian propositions, such that the statement "God is one in Trinity" did not clash with "He is one but not in Trinity" per se.<sup>147</sup> With another work dated in July 1453 called "On the Truth of Christians' Faith", which was reelaborated into two treatises, George of Trebizond regarded the Sultan as the new Emmanuel, i.e. Jesus Christ in the flesh, unifying all the people of the world. This vision that he developed was an original vision of the providential role of Islam as a protector and renewer of the Church, as well as Meḥmed II being the emperor of a universal kingdom.<sup>148</sup>

whole or in part, and at any scale" (Berggren, Jones, *Ptolemy's Geography*, 3). For the translation history of Ptolemy's *Almagest*, see Dalché, "The Reception of Ptolemy's Geography".

<sup>145</sup> Akasoy, "Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy", 254.

<sup>146</sup> Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 493.

<sup>147</sup> Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 497.

<sup>148</sup> Bádenas, "The Byzantine Intellectual Elite", 29‑30; Akasoy, "A Baghdad Court in Constantinople/Istanbul", 144.

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

# <sup>3</sup> What the Sources Say **The Sociocultural Context of the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde Debate**

**Summary** 3.1 Lives of Two Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Professors. – 3.1.1 A Pious Sufi-Scholar. Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]). – 3.1.2 Life of a Verifier. Ḫocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā (d. 893/1488). – 3.1.2.1 Ḫocazāde's Scholarly Breadth and Esteemed Argumentative Skills in Debate. – 3.1.2.2 Common Phrases Used for Ḫocazāde's Vast Knowledge in Various Sciences. – 3.2 The Diversity of Genres in Philosophy and Theology. Two Types of Scholars at Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Medreses. – 3.3 Ottoman Culture of Court Debate and Disputation Etiquette. – 3.4 A Question of Unbelief. – 3.5 Extant Manuscripts.

The debate at hand between two prominent Ottoman scholars Zeyrek and Ḫocazāde, which was constructed through a limited number of primary source materials, concerned a hefty philosophical/theological topic regarding the validity of the philosophers' proof of God's unicity. In addition to the single extant copies of each scholar's response, there are only a few extant descriptions of the actual event, compiled more than a century later. The oldest extant narrative is known to have recorded by the Ottoman *littérateur* Ṭaşḳöprizāde Aḥmed Efendi (d. 968/1561) in a popular imperial biobibliographical dictionary called *al-Shaqāʾiq al-numʿāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya*, an almanac of Ottoman scholars and Sufis until his time. Ṭaşḳöprizāde's narration was employed as a model for later texts, and the biographers to come embellished this narrative by adding more context and rhetorical remarks, which made the debate memorable for future generations. Nearly a hundred years after the initial debate, Ṭaşḳöprizāde narrated the events as follows:

One day, the virtuous scholar [Mawlānā Zeyrek] made certain claims about al-Sayyid al-Jurjānī in the presence of Sultan Meḥemmed Ḫān. These words bothered the Sultan and he summoned Ḫocazāde, who, at the time, was an instructor in Brusa working at the Meḥemmed Ḫān Medrese, and ordered him to hold a debate with Mawlānā Zeyrek. There was an inquiry (*suʾāl*) about the proof of God's unicity by Ḫocazāde, and he sent this inquiry to Mawlānā Zeyrek so that the senior scholar would pen a response to him. Afterwards Zeyrek penned his response in the presence of the Sultan. The referees present at the debate were the scholar-jurist Mawlānā Ḫüsrev and the grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa, the latter kept standing on his feet. Ḫocazāde started with his statement first and he stated: "Let the Sultan know that it is not necessary to deny what it is claimed. [Otherwise] I am afraid that people will say that Ḫocazāde denies God's unicity". Then Zeyrek settled Ḫocazāde's initial inquiry and responded to him. There followed a great debate, and many words were exchanged between the two. The matter was not settled on this day and the debate continued for six days. The Sultan ordered on the sixth day that each one of the contestants should peruse what they have written. Mawlānā Zeyrek said: "I do not have an extra copy other than my own". Then Ḫocazāde stated: "I have another copy. I will gave this to Zeyrek and then I will write what he penned at the back of my copy". Then he started to jot down Zeyrek's response. [After a while] the Sultan replied to Ḫocazāde in a joking manner: "Don't write Master Zeyrek's points wrong". Then Ḫocazāde replied: "Even if I were to copy things down wrong, my mistakes would never exceed the mistakes of my opponent". [Upon hearing this] the Sultan laughed at Ḫocazāde's words. Then, on the seventh day Ḫocazāde gained the upper hand and this was also judged as such by Mawlānā Ḫüsrev. Afterwards the Sultan added addressing Ḫocazāde: "O Master, it is said in *ḥadīth* literature that those who were killed were killed. You verily killed this man and we witnessed this. I give his medrese post to you". At the time Mawlānā Zeyrek was an instructor at one of the churches among the Constantinople churches [i.e. the medrese of Zeyrek] that Meḥemmed Ḫān [had] converted into medreses before the construction of the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*. 1

As Ṭaşḳöprizāde's account suggests, the debate on God's unicity notoriously continued for six days, and on the sixth, the Sultan asked both scholars to pen their points, rather than proceeding orally, so that on the next day it could be determined who made the most convincing argument. Finally on the seventh day, the debate came to an end upon the review of their responses, and Ḫocazāde was elected as the winner when the scholar-jurist Mollā Ḫüsrev (d. 885/1480) announced his victory by quoting the well-known *ḥadīth* "Those who were killed were killed, and the winner [Ḫocazāde] had the booty".<sup>2</sup>

Disputations could be a vehicle for personal prestige and generous favors in patronage; yet, for the losing party, it could mean one's humiliation or dishonoring.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes the expressions employed in such debates may include a metaphorical language of murder and revenge, as in the afore-

<sup>1</sup> Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 124‑5.

<sup>2</sup> "Man qatala qatīlan fa-lahu salbuhu" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 467; Bosnalı Ḳoca Ḥüseyin, *Bedāyiʿü̈ʾl-veḳāyiʿ*, 2: 285b; Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāż*, 270).

<sup>3</sup> Written or verbal, disputations could confer honors, as well as used to dishonor (*dedecora*). See the reference for Cardono's autobiography in Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 272. The dialogue between scholars involved numerous references to terms of dishonor, such as shame (*vergogna*), and honor, such as honesty (*onestà*), courtesy (*cortesia*), and loyalty (*lealtà*) (Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 276).

mentioned *ḥadīth* that mentioned 'killing'. The arbitrators of the debate, more specifically Mollā Ḫüsrev, seemed to be disappointed with Zeyrek's headstrong attitude in nuanced theological issues and his inability to verify the philosophers' point, such that this may have been what subsequently led him to remove Zeyrek from his post at his new highly prestigious medrese *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*, and conferred his post on the younger Ḫocazāde. At the end of the anecdote, biographical sources write that Zeyrek eventually quit teaching and moved to Brusa to lead a pious and reclusive life for the rest of his days. Though later Meḥmed II intended to win him back by offering another post, the heartbroken Zeyrek felt offended, and securing a humble amount of twenty aspers per day from a certain local merchant called Ḫoca Ḥasan, he never left Brusa again, spending his days in devotion and piety.<sup>4</sup>

There are some curious details about the debate in the later Turkish adaptation of *al-Shaqāʾiq* by the *littérateur* Mecdī Meḥmed Efendi (d. 999/1591), who embellished his narrative by interjecting elaborate prose and poetry describing the mood and disposition of the parties involved. The Ottoman biobibliographical sources do not specify Zeyrek's initial question of contestation against Jurjānī, but it was widely known that this was not the first time that the young Ḫocazāde had, in the presence of other prominent scholars, refuted the established Zeyrek in a formal debate (see below). This remarkable debate was a final glorious round in a highly anticipated series of Ottoman intellectual boxing matches.

It may be that, remembering this initial snap exchange over a decade ago (see the miniature **[fig. 3]**), Meḥmed II commissioned Ḫocazāde again, after many years, to tackle the senior scholar's boasts of being a more virtuous Muslim than the Timurid verifier Jurjānī. After some words about how Zeyrek praised his own rational capacity and religious devotion, Mecdī included a curious couplet from the fourteenth-century Persian ghazal master Ḥāfeż in order to mock Zeyrek's vanity in the debate, "Be bitter the mouth of him, who the candy [of my sweet verse] aspersed! | Be dust on the head of him, who the denier of the limpid water [of my verse] became!"<sup>5</sup> – the meaning of which was interpreted by the Ottoman Sufi commentator Sūdī of Bosnia (d. 1007/1599)<sup>6</sup> as "lacking thankfulness and appreciation is like denying clear water".<sup>7</sup>

To dramatize the scene, the biographer Mecdī further added that Zeyrek's bitter words passed through Sultan Meḥmed II's chest like a sharp arrow, greatly offending him and causing him to look for unsubstantiated faults in the Sufi-scholar's rectitude in religion with his "piercing axe".<sup>8</sup> Zeyrek found it necessary to bring refutations to silence (*ilzām-ı iltizām idüb*) the master verifier's arguments related to piety. Upon this, knowing his acumen and argumentative style in philosophical arguments, the Sultan ordered Ḫocazāde, who was residing in Brusa at the time, to prepare an initial inquiry on Jurjānī's

4 Ünver, "Molla Zeyrekʾin gücenmesi", 70.

5 Clarke, *The Dīvān-ı Ḥāfiz*, 946. The original lines are as follows: *bādā dahānash talkh ke ʿayb-e nabāt guft | khākash ba-sar ke munker-e āb-e zulāl shud* (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 1: 142). "Be dust on the head of him" is an idiomatic term that expresses disrespect.

6 Aruçi, "Sûdî Bosnevî". Also for an account of his life and works, Hoca, *Sûdî, Hayatı, Eserleri*.

7 Bosnawī, *Sharḥ-e Sūdī bar Hāfe*ẓ, 2741‑2.

8 "Pādişāh-ı cemm-i ḥaşmet, fāżıl-ı mezbūruñ sihām-ı kelām sīne-i güzārından mecrūḥuʾlḫāṭır olub Seyyid Şerīf Cürcānīʾye tibr-i ṭaʿana ile söz atduġundan rencīde-i bāl oldı" (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 142).

section on God's unicity, in which Jurjānī evaluated positively the philosophers' version against the Dualists. Ḫocazāde, as Mecdī recounts, was known to have then prepared a written inquiry on God's unicity, which acted as an antithesis to Zeyrek's sophistical claims about the weakness of Jurjānī's evaluation of the philosophers' unicity formulation.<sup>9</sup> Ḫocazāde, in turn, argued for the premise's validity in the eyes of the philosophers.

According to Mecdī, Zeyrek – often portrayed as haughty and assuming in manners (i.e. *tekebbür*) – desisted Ḫocazāde's reply and claimed that he committed 'innovation' in religion, implying that his position suggested the denial of God's unicity. Brushing off the claim of unbelief (*kufr*) with his rigid verification and argumentation method, Ḫocazāde made the most sound judgments regarding the subject matter based on the arbitrator Ḫüsrev's decision.<sup>10</sup> The persistent Zeyrek still resisted Ḫocazāde's rejoinders and brought more counter-arguments, which were all again refuted by the junior scholar – by way of verification.

The exchange between Ḫocazāde and Zeyrek followed the formal rules of scholarly debate and investigation. 'Verification' (*taḥḳīḳ* in Ottoman Turkish),<sup>11</sup> a term also employed as a method in private reading (*muṭālaʿa*) in the centuries to come as well,<sup>12</sup> was a key term used here to describe the utmost rigor in scholarship and reading. Along with its meanings associated with objective reasoning in scholarly research and inquiry, *taḥqīq* may also denote originality, methodological and philological rigor, comparison of primary sources, and epistemological commitment to certain truth-claims.<sup>13</sup> This method indicated that the scholar in question possessed the requisite intellectual tools and expertise to analyze the sources and cull a synthesis of his own via arbitration. From the Sultan's acerbic words and ironic jokes for Zeyrek in Mecdī's prose, it is apparent that the Sultan was impressed by Ḫocazāde's debating skills and it was, therefore, no coincidence that, on the seventh day Ḫocazāde's statements were deemed more certain and truthful, dispelling the doubts about the master verifier Jurjānī's exposition.

<sup>9</sup> "Menḳūldur ki Ḫocazāde ḥażretleriniñ burhān-ı tevḥīdde muḳaddimāt u mebādīsi ve ḥimāyet ü muġālaṭātla muḫāliṭeden ḫālī bir suʿāli ve ḳıyāsāt-ı mustakīmiyetüʾl-ṣuver gibi ʿaks-ı naḳīż ve ʿadem-i intāç iḥtimāli meslūb bedīʿüʾl-uslūb bir sözi var idi" (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 143).

<sup>10</sup> "Esās-ı kelāmı aṣlından teʾsīs u terṣīṣ eyleyüb mevrid-i iʿtirāżı taḥḳīḳāt-i bāriʿe ve tedḳīḳāt-ı fāʾike ile aḥḳām eyledükden soñra kendü suʾālini taḳrīr ü taḥḳīḳ idüb" (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 143).

<sup>11</sup> A verbal noun of increased verb form II from the root *ḥ-q-q* meaning 'to be true'.

<sup>12</sup> There are certain other uses of *taḥqīq* especially in the seventeenth-century *ādāb al-baḥth* literature on private reading (*muṭālaʿa*) practices. For the rise of 'deep reading' see El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 97‑128. The Ottoman scholar Müneccimbaşı Aḥmed's (d. 11/1702) refers to the practice of *al-ʿilm al-taḥqīqī* as a way of inferencing (*istidlāl*) in private reading, Örs, "Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dedeʾnin", 61; for the Arabic text, 91‑3.

<sup>13</sup> See the forthcoming special issue of *Journal of Early Modern History* on *taḥqīq*; especially editor Giancarlo Casale's "Introduction". The articles included in the volume by Giancarlo Casale, Rajeev Kinra, Stefano Pellò, Maria Vittoria Comacchi, Francesco Calzolaio, and Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu analyze specific cases from the Indo-Persian to the Mediterranean worlds. For the case of *taḥqīq* as 'direct experience', see the articles by Casale and Calzolaio; *taḥqīq* as 'philological rigor' and 'literary research', see Pellò's article in the same volume, as well as Dudney, "A Desire for Meaning". With regard to this term's application to the study of classical Islamic sciences: El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*. The closest cases for El-Rouayheb's sense of 'independent research' also exist in Kinra's article "The Truth is Out There (and Also in Here)". Stressing the philological and universalistic aspects of the term, Matthew Melvin-Koushki, however, extends its application to various other underrepresented disciplines including occult sciences (Melvin-Koushki, "*Taḥqīq* vs. *Taqlīd* in the Renaissance of Western Early Modernity").

**Figure 3** Ḫocazāde (front right) and Mollā Zeyrek (far left) are portrayed seated for a debate in Muḥtesibzāde Meḥmed's (d. 968/1560) Turkish translation of *al-Shaqāʾ iq al-nuʿmāniyya, Ḥadāʾ iḳ üʾr-reyḥān*, a work completed in 967/1560. The miniature above is from a later copy of this work and is attributed to the seventeenth-century artist Naḳşī. The caption reads that Mollā Zeyrek was seated on one side of the Sultan and the Persian scholar Mevlānā Seyyid ʿAlī on the other. After the Sultan welcomed Ḫocazāde, who approached him to introduce himself and receive favors, the scholar placed his face in the dirt under the Sultan's feet and prayed for his longevity.\* The miniature seems to depict the young scholar's first encounter with Zeyrek at the foothills of Constantinople as the background suggests, yet the biographical sources mention that the scholars debated in the presence of the Sultan while being peripatetic, not seated.\*\* The depiction can be seen as a mélange that conflated both encounters, that is, Ḫocazāde's novice appearence and the current debate, since it was only during the second encounter that the grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa (probably depicted smaller in size above) was present. During the debate, he was said to have remained standing due to his utmost respect for scholars – while others were seated. The figure seated next to the Sultan could be either Mevlānā Seyyid 'Alī or, the arbiter of the debate at hand, Mollā Ḫüsrev (probably the former). The miniaturist did not seem to have paid particular attention to the chronology and context of both events. As for the attire, the white headgear with a red top may signify one's links to the state and the bureaucratic path since the Sultan and Maḥmūd Paşa here seems to have matching tops, and likewise a green top may imply one's association with the *ʿilmiyye* class (see the headgears of Ḫocazāde and Seyyid ʿAlī above). The Sufi-scholar Zeyrek's green robe depicted here with a green headgear may have connections to his Bayrāmī background. (Photo Courtesy: Serpil Bağcı and Ahmet Tunç Şen)

\* "Ol meclisde ḥażret-i Sulṭānʾıñ bir yanında Mollā Zeyrek bir yanında Mevlānā Seyyid ʿAlī cālisler imiş pes pādişāh ḥażretleri Ḫocazādeʾye merḥabā ḫoş geldiñ deyü ḫitāb idüb anlar daḫı pādişāh-ı ʿālem-penāh ḫazretleriniñ ḫākpāylarına yüz sürüb duʿā idüb oturmuşlar" (Muḥtesibzāde, *Ḥadāʾ iḳ üʾr-reyḥān* [*Terceme-i şaḳ āʾ iḳ*], MS TSMK 1263, f. 90a). \*\* *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 469.

The Ottoman debates at the court of Meḥmed II had a 'zero-sum' logic, which was structured around the honor or recognition bestowed upon the contesters, since one's being victorious also meant that the other side being on the losing end, whose prestige, reputation, and posts could be transferred to the other party. Meḥmed II punished Zeyrek by handing in his post at the prestigious *Ṣaḥn* to the victorious Ḫocazāde of Brusa. This rash move diverged sharply from the meritocratic bestowal of career lines specified in Sultan's Code of Law and, as mentioned earlier, Gelibolulu Ālī took it as an example of Meḥmed II's overly centralized and authoritarian rule – a transgression that violated even his own rule of law and set standards.<sup>14</sup> In his arrogance, even after the debate Zeyrek continued to distort the truth about its outcome: whenever in the company of friends, he would claim that after Ḫocazāde denials of God's unicity during the debate, he slapped him with his palms until the novice scholar accepted the truth – both of which were patently false.<sup>15</sup>

#### 3.1 Lives of Two Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Professors

#### **3.1.1 A Pious Sufi-Scholar. Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?])**

Beginning his career at Brusa's Murādiye medrese, Mollā Meḥmed, also known as Zeyrek, was a famed Sufi-scholar, who held a prestigious teaching post at the Zeyrek medrese for more than twenty years. This post was created after the Pantocrator Monastery was converted into a mosque and a medrese, immediately following the conquest of Constantinople in 857/1453.<sup>16</sup> It seems that the rooms that once monks occupied were used for teaching during the first decade of the conquest temporarily. The eighteenth-century handbook of history of Istanbul mosques *Ḥadīḳatüʾl-cevāmiʿ* observes that the lodge (*zāviye*) next to the mosque building was given to Mollā Zeyrek directly by the endower (*vāḳıf*) Meḥmed II.<sup>17</sup>

The Zeyrek Medrese was one of most panoramically situated Byzantine monuments that stood on the fourth hill of the historic peninsula and overlooked the south-east across the valley to the third hill called *Oxeia* ('steep' in Greek), where the Süleymaniye complex is now crowned.<sup>18</sup> Before the foundation of the

14 Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 199.

15 "Mevlānā Zeyrekʾüñ aḥbāb u aḥzābı yanına cemʿ olub keyfiyet-i mübāḥaṣeden istifsār eyledüklerinde Mevlānā Ḫocazāde meclis-i pādişāhīde tevḥīde inkār idüb cādde-i ḥaḳḳdan ʿadūl eyledi. Ben anı tevḥīde ḳāʾil idüb ḥaḳḳa iḳrār etdürinceye değün başına başına tabānça ile żarb eyledüm. Bu mābeynde ne meżkūruñ kendübaşına dermānı ṭoḳunub ḳurulmaġa ḳādir oldı ve ne Mevlānā Ḫüsrev ol serfirāzı elimden almaġa mālik oldı deyü yordılar" (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 144).

16 Meḥmed II put *Zeyrek Medresesi Odaları*, the rooms previously occupied by Byzantine monks on the western part of the edifice, at the disposal of the scholar Zeyrek and his students (*Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 35, ff. 43‑4). For the Arabic of the same passage, Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, "Fâtih Sultan Mehmedʾin Ayasofya Vakfiyesi", 259, f. 13.

17 "Cāmiʿ-i meẕkūr kenīseden münḳalıbdır. Vāḳıfı Ebūʾl-fetḥ Sulṭān Meḥemmed Ḫānʾdır. Maḥfil-i hümāyūnu vardır. Veẓīfesi Ayaṣofyaʾdandır. Muttaṣılında olan zāviyeye ibtidāʾ Zeyrek Mollā Meḥemmed Efendi müderris olmaġla, cāmiʿ-i şerīfiñ sebeb-i şöhret olmuşdur" (Ayvansarâyî, *Hadîkatüʾl-cevâmiʿ*, 172). Another source suggests that Zeyrek's salary and daily expenditures were met by the Ayaṣofya mosque (Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 123).

18 Magdalino, "The Foundation of the Pantokrator Monastery", 33‑5; Stanković, Berger, "The Komnenoi and Constantinople".

Pantokrator complex between 1118 and 1136, which served as the new imperial mausoleum (after the Holy Apostles Church) for the Komnenian dynasty,<sup>19</sup> there was an aristocratic mansion that had first become a convent at the end of the eight century, which then turned into a hospital by the Emperor Theophilos (r. 829‑42).20 When John II and Eirene founded the structure, the Komnenian dynasty was in power for more than fifty years. The monastery was composed of three large interconnected churches constructed in three phases – the south church dedicated to the Christ Pantokrator having served as the *katholikon* of the monastery.21 The edifice was associated with the sacralization of the Komnenian imperial image22 with references to early Christian themes and depictions of cosmos that paralleled those at the Great Palace, as well as the Samson cycle (often being associated with the *ghāzī* father of Digenes Akrites, a twelfthcentury romance produced at the Komnenian court),<sup>23</sup> and the zodiac signs.<sup>24</sup> With the conquest of Constantinople by the Latin Crusaders army in 1204, the structure was converted into administrative headquarters in the hands of the Venetians<sup>25</sup> and, besides the early renovation attempts of the structure by the architect F. Çuhadoroğlu between 1960 and 1970, a group of leading scholars of antiquities and architecture, including Robert Ousterhout, Zeynep Ahunbay, and Metin Ahunbay, have recently studied and started the restoration of the Zeyrek Camii after the structure gained a 'world heritage' status in 1985.<sup>26</sup>

19 In the eighteenth century, Jean-Claude Flachat, the first merchant to the Sultan, recorded as having seen in the grounds of the Topkapı Palace, the marble tomb of Manuel I Comnenus, which was originally in the Pantokrator Monastery (Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 298). As a victory monument representing the Komnenian dynastic might, power, religiosity, the Pantokrator reflects the two ways that its patronage would have been understood, as a celebration of piety (often female; here Piroska-Eirene) and military valor (usually male) (Ousterhout, "Piroska and the Pantokrator", 227). The Church's interior and exterior mosaics were so lavish that its mosaics shone like the sun as noted by Russian travellers – its interior ostentation having close connections with the Pala d'Oro at San Marco in Venice (Majeska, *Russian Travellers to Constantinople*, 43 and 289; and Ousterhout, "The Decoration of the Pantokrator (Zeyrek Camii)", 439). The Pantokrator held various relics including the headless body of St. Michael, the 'stone of annointing' where Jesus' body was allegedly laid form the cross, as well as stained glass windows which signalled the Komnenian fascination with the west (Majeska, *Russian Travellers to Constantinople*, 292‑4; Ousterhout, "Piroska and the Pantokrator", 230). The edifice also held the tombs of the Komnenian emperors. In the eighteenth century, Jean-Claude Flachat, the first merchant to the Sultan, recorded as having seen in the grounds of the Topkapı Place, the marble tomb of Manuel I Comnenus, which was originally at the premises of the Pantokrator Monastery (Raby, "East & West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 298).

23 Hull, *Digenis Akritas* and Magdalino, "Digenes Akrites and Byzantine Literature".

25 Kotzabassi, "The Monastery of Pantokrator".

<sup>20</sup> Magdalino, "Medieval Constantinople", 50‑1; "The Foundation of the Pantokrator Monastery", 35.

<sup>21</sup> Ousterhout, "Architecture, Art and Komnenian Ideology", 142‑4.

<sup>22</sup> The image of the Pantokrator represented Eirene's policy of religious piety and poverty. She became a protector of orphans and widows, and enriched monastic dwellings with money (see the commemorative text in the appendix concerning Eirene as the "founder of the venerable monastery of the Pantokrator Saviour Christ", in Magdalino, "The Foundation of the Pantokrator Monastery", 53‑4).

<sup>24</sup> Ousterhout, "Architecture, Art and Komnenian Ideology", 145‑7.

<sup>26</sup> Ousterhout, Ahunbay, Ahunbay, "Study and Restoration. First Report"; "Study and Restoration. Second Report", as well as Zeynep Ahunbay's summary "Zeynep Camii Restorasyonu" prepared for *Voyvoda Caddesi Toplantıları* (2006‑2007), which can be found at https://archives. saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/159589.

*al-Shaqāʾiq* refers to the medrese of Zeyrek as one of the first medreses in operation before the building of the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*. <sup>27</sup> This suggests that education in Constantinople continued in converted church buildings until the completion of the Sultan's education complex in 875/1470‑71, and after this, education at Zeyrek halted completely since the medrese building of Zeyrek was utilized as a mosque.<sup>28</sup> Mecdī's entry suggests that Meḥmed II only turned [eight] churches that had been in half ruins [with non-durable edifices] at the time of the conquest.29 It is, however, also noted that turning these buildings into colleges was a righteous act since the Sultan justly initiated the study of the opening verse of the Qurʾān, *al-Fātiḥa*, upholding God's unicity (*tevḥīd*) and benediction (*taḳdīs*) in place of obsolete Christian texts or, metaphorically speaking, the bells of the infidel community.30 Erasing the Christian past meant upholding God's unicity as the core beliefs of Islam but here the sixteenth-century biographer Mecdī might have been making a subtle reference to the celebrated debate between Ḫocazāde and Mollā Zeyrek when mentioning God's unicity in the context of the Zeyrek mosque.

Mollā Meḥmed was known as *zeyrek* due to his acuteness of mind, an epithet given by the mystic Ḥācı Bayrām-ı Velī (d. 833/1430), who, according to our sources, initiated him to his order with the same name.31 The green headgear with a red top worn by Zeyrek in the miniature above follows the early depiction of the Bayrāmī headgear. This illustration may not have paid attention to Ḥācı Bayrām's changing of the official headgear color from red to white, upon Sultan Murād II's (d. 855/1451) request, so that he would be able to distance his order from that of the Bayrāmī Sufis of Ardabil.<sup>32</sup> Still, the Bayrāmī symbolism of unicity was a known phenomenon, also observed in the symbolism of three-folded headgears worn especially to follow the shaykh Bayrām's example.<sup>33</sup> Naḳşī's depiction above might have followed this detail, having missed the chronology of the change in the Bayrāmīs' headgear coloring.

The Ottoman sources regularly depicted Zeyrek as a pious scholar more preoccupied with worship (*ibādet*) than with *scientia* (*ʿilm*) – whether rational or religious.<sup>34</sup> Given that the unicity of God (i.e. *tawḥīd*) was the central

31 Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 123. Steingass defines the Persian word *zayrak* or *zīrak* as "ingenious, intelligent, prudent, penetrating, sagacious, smart, and quick in understanding or at manual labor" (Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary*, 634).

32 Bayramoğlu, Azamat, "Bayramiyye", 270.

33 Bayramoğlu, Azamat, "Bayramiyye", 270. Also for a general overview of Sufi symbolism in clothing, Muslu, "Türk Tasavvuf Kültüründe".

34 Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 467.

<sup>27</sup> "Thumma naqalahu al-Sulṭān Muḥammad Khān ʾilā iḥdā al-madāris [Zeyrek] allātī ʿayyanahu ʿind fatḥ madīna Ḳosṭanṭīniyye qabl bināʾ al-madāris al-thamān" (Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 124). And one of the first urban edifices to be appropriated for Islamic use as the new Ottoman capital's first medrese (Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, 22).

<sup>28</sup> The Ottoman Turkish endowment charter from this period also gives the impression that the place was used as a temporary teaching spot until the completion of the *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*. See "Kenīse-i mezbūre cāmiʿ olmaḳ bābında fermān-ı ḳażā-cereyān ṣudūr itmişdir" (*Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 35, f. 44).

<sup>29</sup> "Eyyām-ı sālifādanberi meʿabād-ı küffār ḫāksār olan kenāʾis-i nā-üstevārdan sekiz ʿaded kenīseleri medrese idüb" (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 117).

<sup>30</sup> "Edyān-ı bāṭıla üzere olan ṣuḥuf-ı merfūʿ-ı mensūḫeyi oḳudub mebānī-i meʿānī-i sebʿüʾlmes*̱*ānī olan fünūn berāʿat-ı nişānı anıñ yerine oḳutaraḳ emr eyledi. Zemzeme-i ruhhābīni āvāze-i ḫutbe-i belāgat-nişāne tebdīl idüb aṣvāt-ı nevāḳīs küffārı bī-nevāmīsi kelbānıñ tevḥīd ü taḳdīse taḥvīl eyledi" (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 117).

doctrine in Bayrāmī rituals, it is understandable why Zeyrek might have felt compelled to criticize Jurjānī's piety, exposition, as well as affirmative take on the philosophers' positions with regard to the nature of God's necessity and existence.

#### **3.1.2 Life of a Verifier. Ḫocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā (d. 893/1488)**

Born around the year 838/1434 to a rich merchant family based in Brusa, Ḫocazāde was one of the most brilliant assistants of Ḫıżır Bey (d. 863/1459), a famed Ottoman theologian teaching at Meḥmed I's (d. 824/1421) prestigious Sulṭāniye Medrese in Brusa.<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that similar to the case of the affluent medieval cities of Khorasan, such as Nishapur and Marw, Brusa was a center of trade, in which traders and scholars often linked to same families, a fact that led a dominating group of upper-class merchant families having invested on education to satisfy their desire for prestige and legacy.<sup>36</sup> According to the Ottoman sources, Murād II was said to have appointed Ḫocazāde at the town of Ḳastel upon graduation (probably both as a novice instructor and a jurist) during his second short reign, just before the Second War of Kosovo in 852/1448.<sup>37</sup> On his way back from this victorious campaign, Murād II reappointed him at Esediyye medrese by the Grand Mosque of Brusa with a low salary of ten aspers per day, where Ḫocazāde spent formative six years, committing *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* to memory and jotting down glosses in the marginalia of his copy. Ṭaşḳöprizāde cited the sixteenth-century scholar ʿArabzāde, claiming that the contemporary Sufi-scholar Ḥasan Çelebi (d. 891/1486), who was also harshly criticized by Ḫocazāde in reply to Zeyrek below, obtained the manuscript and incorporated Ḫocazāde's memos into his own gloss.<sup>38</sup> This backstory must be the reason why Ḫocazāde lashed Ḥasan Çelebi's comments on Jurjānī's take on unicity during the debate.

It was during this time when Ḫocazāde first encountered Zeyrek during the young scholar's unsolicited visit to Sultan Meḥmed II to receive his favor. The story of the first encounter is as follows: Following the conquest of Constantinople in 857/1453, Ḫocazāde decided to show his reverence for the young Meḥmed II by congratulating him in person for his successful campaign. This encounter was perceived as a great opportunity for Ḫocazāde, who was a novice in teaching (*mülāzım*), to receive patronage from court members, or to seize a post in the Ottoman hierarchical service out of the Sultan's benevolence.<sup>39</sup> However, the junior scholar did not have enough

38 Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 137; Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2:, 474.

<sup>35</sup> Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 68.

<sup>36</sup> See Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur*, 20‑7, 59 and Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 26; also see Rudolph, "Khōdjā-zāde".

<sup>37</sup> Biographical sources could be mistaken here since Ḫocazāde would be at the age of fourteen, but, on the other hand, he was often depicted as a child prodigy who was good at grasping complex problems and offering solutions to them. Historian Philippe Ariès has traced the age of schooling in the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France and England to the ages seven and eight; and a boy aged between thirteen and fifteen was already a full-grown man and shared in the life of his elders (Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood*, 151, 164).

<sup>39</sup> Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 470. Meḥmed II was known for having shown (*raġbet itmek*) kindness (*luṭf*) and favor (*iltifāt*) to the scholars, and Ḫocazāde thought that this was the

money to finance a trip to the new capital. He borrowed eight hundred aspers from one of his students to buy two horses, and left Brusa immediately with the student. By this way, he would be able to give his best offerings to the Sultan in time, who was at the foothills of Constantinople, waiting to leave for a new campaign towards Edirne.

According to Kātib Çelebi (d. 1067/1657), Ḫocazāde presented a poem composed in praise of the scholar-grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa,40 who introduced him to the Sultan. This was a common way to establish contact with the Sultan or, at least, establish a reputation for oneself as a noted scholar during the early years of the nascent empire. Unlike the set standards in Meḥmed II's Code of Law, which would be promulgated later during the last years of the Sultan, academic promotions were closely monitored by the Sultan and his viziers, and prominent scholars could have proposed candidates, although the Sultan always had the last word.41 In short, Ottoman debate culture was a byproduct of this early promotion scheme based on the duplex of meritocracy and patronage.

As the story goes, Meḥmed II was chatting with two celebrated scholars of the time, the Persian scholar Mollā Seyyid ʿAlī (d. 860/1456), a student of the famous theologian Jurjānī,<sup>42</sup> along with the Bayramī scholar Mollā Zeyrek. Ḫocazāde joined their conversation and argued successfully against the aged scholars – allegedly dumbfounding and silencing even the senior Zeyrek during this short exchange.<sup>43</sup>

Ḫocazāde's encounter with these experienced scholars highlighted his acuity and foreshadowed his future scholarly debates (*mubāḥes̱āt-ı ʿilmiyye*) and successes. At the end of the day, the established scholars obtained gifts from the Sultan, while the poor Ḫocazāde dressed in shabby clothes received no favors. His student even became annoyed at Ḫocazāde's inability to demonstrate competence so much that he directly accused Ḫocazāde of not making a good impression. Quite the contrary was true, however. After his student fell asleep at night, two guards brought Ḫocazāde a great number of gifts, including horses and mules, precious clothes, and ten thousand aspers. Apparently the guards had not initially believed that the scholar whom the Sultan wanted most to honor was this mendicant-looking man.<sup>44</sup> Ḫocazāde woke his disgruntled student, informing him that he had attained status and fortune (*devlete irdi*), and officially became the Sultan's tutor,45 a 'rags-toriches' saga often recounted in Ottoman biobibliographical sources.<sup>46</sup>


42 "Şerīf Cürcānī ḫıdmetine vuṣūl bulub meşkūh-ı feżāʾilinden iḳtibās itmiş" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 456).

43 Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 469; Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 148.

44 Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 128; Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 471; Ḥüseyin, *Bedāyiʿüʾlveḳāyi*, 286b. Belīğ's *Güldeste-i riyāż* skips this piece of information after summarizing the whole anecdote only in two short sentences.

45 Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 471.

46 See Ḫocazāde's earlier encounter with Şeyḫ Velī Şemseddīn, a successor (*ḫalīfe*) of the city saint of Brusa, i.e. Emīr Sulṭān, who advised him to continue his pursuit in knowledge instead of becoming a tradesman (Repp, *The Mufti of Istanbul*, 69).

right moment to benefit (to take a share, *behremend*) from his benevolence (*luṭf u iḥsān*) (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 470; Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 148).

The jealousy of grand viziers often invited state intervention in career paths. In the case of Ḫocazāde, his career was interrupted at least twice when the grand viziers of the time decided to expel him off from Meḥmed II's immediate circle. Whenever a scholar became closely associated (*taḳarrub*) with the Sultan, sources indicate that grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa had always found a way to dispel this person (*dūr itmiş*) from the Sultan's immediate milieu, thanks to his finesse in palace politics. Our sources indicate that, as a palace tutor, Ḫocazāde worked closely with the Sultan, teaching him ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Zanjānī's book on Arabic morphology.<sup>47</sup> They spent so much time together that Maḥmūd Paşa, allegedly became jealous (*ḥasad*),<sup>48</sup> and tricked the Sultan by misinforming him that Ḫocazāde was not satisfied with his post and desired a career in religious bureaucracy.<sup>49</sup> In fact, such a post, on the contrary, would be resisted by many independent-minded scholars like Ḫocazāde, who saw this as a way to succumb to political authority.

The grand vizier convinced the Sultan to give Ḫocazāde the chief military judgeship (*ḳāḍıʿasker*) in Edirne in the year 862/1457‑58,<sup>50</sup> so that the latter would be away from the Sultan's retinue. Ḫocazāde rejected this offer initially, but could not resist Meḥmed II's insistence and accepted the post. Later on he regretted this decision since, for the first time, he had digressed from the academic path (*ʿilm-i ṭarīḳ*) for a post in the bureaucracy.<sup>51</sup> Dissatisfied with the position, the young scholar longed to occupy himself with teaching (*tedrīs*) <sup>52</sup> and, at the age of thirty-three, he was given a post at his *alma mater* Sulṭāniye with a salary of fifty aspers per day.<sup>53</sup> His new teaching post at Sulṭāniye, as Ṭaşḳöprizāde's father narrates, was a position that was far more superior to his previous posts of chief judge of Edirne and tutor to the Sultan,<sup>54</sup> which could be interpreted as that a medrese job might have been perceived as more prestigious than a palace or bureaucratic post. As a result, Ḫocazāde was removed from the judgeship upon his own request, since it was a job that he never desired to take in the first place, and had only assumed it due to the Sultan's persistence.<sup>55</sup>

50 Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāż*, 268.

51 "Kabūlden imtināʿ itdi […] ibrāmla rām itdi" (Ḥüseyin, *Bedāyiʿüʾl-veḳāyi*, 2: 287a).

52 Ḫocazāde's decision here echoes a past encounter. During his youth, he met the local Sufi Velī Şemsüddīn (d. 875/1470), one of the successors of the Sufi sheikh Emīr Sultān (d. 833/1429), who advised him never to leave the path of knowledge (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 142).

53 Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 142. *Sicill-i ʿOs̱mānī* writes that Ḫocazāde quit his military-judgeship in Edirne on his own, yet he should have been rather dismissed (*ʿazl*) from the office upon his request (S̠üreyyā, *Sicill-i ʿOs̱mānī*, 4: 490).

54 Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 130.

55 *Güldeste*'s inclusion of Ḫocazāde's post at Sulṭāniye just after his first job at Esediyye is probably a misattribution. After mentioning that Ḫocazāde left his post in Edirne, İsmāʿīl Belīğ directly skipped to his second encounter with Zeyrek (Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāż*, 269). However,

<sup>47</sup> The name and the nature of the work that Ḫocazāde studied with the Sultan is only given in Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 129. His notes from this time should be *Sharḥ al-ʿIzzī fī al-taṣrīf*  (SK, MS Tekelioğlu 628). Ḫocazāde's commentary is waiting to be studied.

<sup>48</sup> Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 129. Ottoman chronicles and biographical dictionaries included instances in which palace bureaucrats often assigned pensions to scholars and constituted a channel between scholarship and power, which were also present in the early Abbasid court (Osti, "The Practical Matters of Culture", 157).

<sup>49</sup> Osti, "The Practical Matters of Culture" and Ḥüseyin, *Bedāyiʿüʾl-veḳāyi*, 2: 287a. Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ* mentions that Maḥmūd Paşa also devised the same scheme to the Sultan's another tutor Mollā ʿAbdülḳādir (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 501).

There were two parallel career tracks that a scholar could pursue in the late fifteenth-century: academic or religio-legal (excluding other jobs that were open to medrese graduates, such as librarians, preachers, imams, schoolteachers, reciters, tutors etc.). Whenever a scholar was dismissed from these posts upon losing the Sultan's favor, he could find himself in a remote post, but his salary would not necessarily diminish, especially in certain cases of well-established scholars. In other words, a scholar-bureaucrat could lose the Sultan's favor at any time and be removed from his post even receiving an inferior one, but the salary that he received always reflected his merit, and even in such cases, losing a judgeship did only temporarily affect his academic prestige in the long run.

There were recounted cases in which a prestigious scholar lost the Sultan's favor and received a remote post upon the machinations of certain other court members, as in the case of Ḫocazāde in later life. Due to the grand vizier Ḳaramanī's animosity, he was reportedly removed from the judgeship of Constantinople and given a position at the Orḫāniye medrese, along with the judgeship of İzniḳ, the latter of which Ḫocazāde abandoned due to his devotion to teaching and learning. It is true that his judgeship at İzniḳ was an inferior post after his position at Constantinople. As compensation, therefore, he was given two posts with a probably equal amount of salary compared to his previous one – one of these appointments being the most reputable teaching posts in İzniḳ at the oldest Ottoman medrese Orḫāniye. Bāyezīd II was reported as having reversed many policies implemented during the last years of his father Meḥmed II and his grand viziers.<sup>56</sup> For instance, when Bāyezīd II was enthroned, Ḫocazāde was reappointed to a teaching post at Sulṭāniye from one hundred aspers a day, probably in reaction against the much-hated Ḳaramanī's decision, a figure who had favored Prince Cem (d. 900/1495) for the throne and executed after having lost the bet.

It was during his first year at Sulṭāniye that Ḫocazāde was asked to pen an initial question (*suʾāl*) for the disputation against Zeyrek's unqualified criticism against Jurjānī. He was then summoned to the capital to debate Zeyrek on the topic of unicity. Shortly after the encounter, Ḫocazāde was also promoted to chief judge of Constantinople. In the marginalia of Mecdī's *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, it is reported that Ḫocazāde was appointed to the former position in the year 871/1466, right after the Zeyrek debate, a fact which evidenced the year of the debate at hand.<sup>57</sup>

### 3.1.2.1 Ḫocazāde's Scholarly Breadth and Esteemed Argumentative Skills in Debate

The professional competition was ubiquitous in the Ottoman scholarly world, and the monetary rewards, as in the case of the Italian Renaissance,<sup>58</sup> was only second to scholarly recognition and academic promotion. In some cases though, the extra rewarding did also mark a nuanced distinction between

it is a curious question whether *Güldeste*'s claim that Ḫocazāde was appointed to the position in place of his *Tahāfut* rival Ṭūsī was true or not. This point is not mentioned in other sources.

<sup>56</sup> Neşrī, *Ğihānnümā*, 320.

<sup>57</sup> Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 149.

<sup>58</sup> Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 270; Biagioli, *Galileo, Courtier*, 60.

the academic outputs of scholars. The accounts of Ḫocazāde's life in Ottoman biobibliographical dictionaries transitions to his famed adjudication (*muḥākama*) on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*<sup>59</sup> written in competition with the Persian Ashʿarite Sufi-scholar ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 887/1482).<sup>60</sup> Kātib Çelebi narrates the Sultan's order as follows: Ḫocazāde completed the manuscript in four and Ṭūsī in six months, and the Sultan favored the former by presenting each ten thousand silver coins (*dirham*), but an additional precious mule (*bughla nafīsa*) only for Ḫocazāde. Ṭūsī's departure from the land of Rūm is often attributed to his disappointment associated with the debate.<sup>61</sup> Most of the Ottoman biographical sources, as well as references in contemporary scholarship, say that Ṭūsī's receiving less favor and recognition (minus a mule) could be the main reason for Ṭūsī's return to his homeland.<sup>62</sup>

Ḫocazāde was among the seven scholars who, according to the seventeenth-century encyclopedist Kātib Çelebi, combined post-classical Avicennan philosophy (*ḥikma*) with the Islamic doctrine (*Sharīʿa*), and were among the famed arbitrators of knowledge during the day, who upheld the validity of certain arguments and proofs included in the philosophical corpus.<sup>63</sup> Today he is mostly remembered for his aforementioned adjudication on the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, as well as numerous scholarly debates that he participated in and won. He was one of the few scholars during his time who predominantly worked on topics related to metaphysics and physics,<sup>64</sup> and wrote super-glosses on almost all medrese handbooks of philosophical theology and post-Avicennan philosophy, including Abharī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma*, Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād*, and Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, suggesting his interest, aptitude, and erudition in philosophical studies.<sup>65</sup>

Ḫocazāde was a master in debate, participating in many scholarly disputes. He was recorded of having only lost once,<sup>66</sup> which was to the fellow scholar Ḫayālī (d. 845/1470 [?]), a master in theology and creed. The latter

62 Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 1: 825. For instance also see "wa-kāna huwa al-sabab fī dhihāb al-Mollā al-Ṭūsī ʿilā bilād al-ʿAjm" (Kātib Çelebi, *Sullam al-wuṣūl*, 2: 403).

63 Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 2: 680. For the analysis and context of Kātib Çelebi's designation see Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 1‑23.

64 For instance, see Ḫocazāde's treatise on rainbows, as well as on the hypothetical center of the world: Fazlıoğlu, "Evrenin Bir Merkezi Var mıdır?", and Ziaee, "Ḫocazāde's Contributions to Islamic Sciences".

65 For a tentative list of Ḫocazāde's extant works: Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 466‑72.

<sup>59</sup> Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 149; Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 130; and Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāż*, 269. For the intellectual context of the adjudications, Özervarlı, "Arbitrating Between al-Ghazālī and the Philosophers" and Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Coherences*, 346‑61.

<sup>60</sup> Ḫocazāde prepared his adjudication after having received Zeyrek's post at the *Ṣaḥn* (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 467).

<sup>61</sup> "Fa-kataba al-Mollā Khojazāda fī arbaʿa ashhur wa-kataba al-Mollā al-Ṭūsī fī sitta ashhur. Fa-faḍḍalū kitāb al-Mollā Khojazāda ʿalā kitāb al-Ṭūsī, wa-ʿaṭā al-Sulṭān Muḥammad Khān likull minhā ʿashara ālāf dirham wa-zāda li-Khojazāda bughla nafīsa wa-kāna dhālik huwa sabab fī dhihāb al-Mollā al-Ṭūsī ʾilā bilād al-ʿAjm" (Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 1: 513). Also see the section about Ṭūsī's *Dhakhīra fi al-muḥākama bayna al-ḥukamāʾ waʾl-Ghazālī*: "ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Ṭūsī al-mutawaffā sana […] allafahā fī al-Rūm wa-lammā ṣāra marjūḥan bi-taʾlīf-i Khojazāda taraka al-Rūm wa-sāfara ʾilā Khorāsān" (Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 1: 825).

<sup>66</sup> Ḫocazāde's case brings the example of the well-read and formidable debater Italian theologian Achillini who, according to a document called "Dispute in Scolari", appeared in forty-four scholarly disputes, either as a disputing Master or as a supervisor of a student's disputation exercise (Matsen, "Alessandro Achillini (1463‑1512) and 'Ockhamism'").

was known for his extreme solemnity, and he was only spotted once smiling (*tebessüm*) in his life, which was when he was declared victorious against the master verifier. In the wake of the debate, Ḫayālī refers to Ḫocazāde in a derogatory manner as the grandson of "Ṣāliḥ the stingy" (*bin Ṣāliḥ baḫīl oğlunuñ*) referring to his privileged background.67 The debate itself is depicted in the Topkapı copy of Muḥtesibzāde's translation of *al-Shaqāʾiq*, and Ḫayālī is portrayed there with an open mouth (maybe having a quirky smile). Mecdī wrote that Ḫayālī beat Ḫocazāde in a debate due to his divinely inspired power (*ḳuvve-i ḳudsiyye*),<sup>68</sup> a capacity that dwelled in saints, which implied that the verifier Ḫocazāde lacked this quality. Ḫocazāde was said to have filled with fear (*ḫavf*) whenever Ḫayālī's name came up. This was because of the latter's superiority in knowledge<sup>69</sup> since Ḫocazāde was able to sleep with peace of mind only after Ḫayālī's death.<sup>70</sup>

It was clear that scholarly disputations were how fledgling scholars built their reputation and fame, yet in some cases, they even made a fool of themselves, as in the case of the young and ambitious scholar Ḫatībzāde who tried to challenge the senior Ḫocazāde but overturned twice.<sup>71</sup> Ḫatībzāde was proud of his scholarly preoccupations and was said to have spent all of his life reading and studying – never expecting a career outside academia. As mentioned earlier, his competitiveness was embroiled in scandals, to the degree that there were several occasions where Ḫatībzāde made a fool of himself and tried to challenge his seniors in a hasty manner without being able to make right justifications. His youthful vanity (*gurūr-ı şebāb*) was often emphasized partially because of his premature attempt to challenge senior scholars.<sup>72</sup>

During his first attempt at debating Ḫocazāde, the Sultan immediately dismissed the novice Ḫatībzāde. Meḥmed II challenged the young scholar, asking whether he was actually capable of debating with a master verifier, having contested his competence in Islamic sciences.<sup>73</sup> The Sultan and his viziers generally decided who would debate with whom. When it came to merit and rank, there was always a question of reputation, and junior scholars were not expected to challenge their seniors without justifiable reason, especially for the sake of gaining rash prestige, since an outright respect for the experienced elders was a strict rule of moral conduct to be abide by.

68 Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 159.

70 Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 141.

72 Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 473.

73 "Anıñla baḥs*̱*e ḳādir misin?" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 473). *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*'s account in probably based on an Arabic exchange in *al-Shaqāʾiq*: "Anta taqaddara al-baḥth maʿhu?" (Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 147). Yet the exchange is not included in Ḥüseyin, *Bedāyiʿüʾl-veḳāyi*.

<sup>67</sup> Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 479. Mecdī mentions that this is Ḫocazāde's nickname (*mütelaḳḳıb*) (Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 159).

<sup>69</sup> Meḥmed Ṭāhir does not mention this incident between two scholars, but writes that Ḫayālī was on the same level with Ḫocazāde in terms of knowledge (Bursalı Meḥmed Ṭāhir, *ʿOs̱manlı Müʿellifleri*, 1: 291).

<sup>71</sup> A similar penchant for controversy was the case of Galileo whose case was documented by numerous treatises written by him and his adversaries (Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 264, f. 17). It was noted in biographical sources that Ḫatībzāde's preoccupation with knowledge (*iştigāl-i ʿilm*) was motivated by his greedy passion for winning scholarly debates (*galebe-i ḥırṣdan*) to prove his intellectual superiority (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 483). Indeed it was true that he was able to win most of the scholarly debates that he participated, but with the exception of those with Ḫocazāde (Ḥüseyin, *Bedāyiʿüʾl-veḳāyi*, 2: 291a; Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 147).

Having broken such a rule of etiquette, Ḫatībzāde seemed to have been dismissed from the Sultan's immediate circle and appointed to a certain medrese so that he would continue his teaching and learning away from the Sultan's sight.<sup>74</sup>

Ḫatībzāde challenged the master verifier for a second time, and the story is as follows: after his post at the *Ṣaḥn*, Ḫocazāde left academia one more time to become the judge of Constantinople. Yet, after a short period, he was removed from the post due to the intervention of the grand vizier Ḳārāmānī Meḥmed Paşa,<sup>75</sup> a student of his academic nemesis Ṭūsī. Our sources point out that there was a connection between Ḳārāmānī and Ṭūsī, an emphasis that suggests that Ḳārāmānī's intervention could be associated with the debate. Ḳaramanī convinced the Sultan that the air of Constantinople had a bad impact on Ḫocazāde's memory and promoted him to a double appointment as the chief jurist of İzniḳ and the head of Orḫāniye medrese at the same time.76 The judgeship of İzniḳ was a less paid post than that of Constantinople in the Sultan's Code of Law, and Ḫocazāde's double appointment both as a teacher and a jurist to compensate the loss could be attributed to his relegation to an inferior position in teaching through the intervention of the grand vizier.<sup>77</sup> After some time Ḫocazāde left the judgeship for good, and devoted himself to full-time teaching (*tedrīs*) at Orḫāniye, a school where Ḫayālī was previously appointed.

It was during his İzniḳ days that the bold Ḫatībzāde challenged the senior scholar after being provoked (*taḥrīż*) by the same notorious Ḳaramanī Meḥmed Paşa.78 The exact nature of the challenge is not mentioned; however, there is a treatise attributed to Ḫocazāde on the nature of good and evil (*ḥusn wa-qubūḥ*) in certain sources,<sup>79</sup> which dealt with the question of whether good and evil were absolute (*muṭlaq*) or essential (*dhātī*) qualities, or whether they were among intellectible beings (*ʿaqliyyāt*).<sup>80</sup>

After being summoned, Ḫocazāde went to Constantinople to visit the tent of Ḳaramanī in the company of Mollā Yarḥiṣārī, a scholar at the medrese of Murād Paşa, as well as two of his best students Mollā Bahāüddīn and Mollā Sirācüddīn, both of whom were teaching at the *Ṣaḥn* at the time. When Ḳārāmānī Meḥmed told Ḫocazāde that he was summoned to the capital to participate in a debate with Ḫatībzāde, the master scholar replied that the scholars in his company were already capable of debating him, and his two best students, Mollā Bahāüddīn and Mollā Sirācüddīn, who also held posts at the *Ṣaḥn* like Ḫatībzāde, were rather his equals – definitely not him. Ḫocazāde then added that he would only face him if only Ḫatībzāde

74 Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 147

75 The story should have taken place sometime during the grand vizierate of Ḳārāmānī Meḥmed between the years 882/1477 and 886/1481.

76 Belīğ writes that Ḫocazāde was promoted to the latter post in place of Ḥasan Çelebi in the year 877/1472‑73 (Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāż*, 269).

77 Yet Orhāniye is considered as the first medrese founded by Orḫān Gāzī and was not inferior to the prestigious Sulṭāniye in salary (quoted in Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 68).

78 Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 473; Ḥüseyin, *Bedāyiʿüʾl-veḳāyi*, 2: 287b.

79 As for Ḫocazāde's treatise on good and evil: *Risāla fī al-jadhr al-aṣam*, SK, MS Esad Efendi 1143/18, fols. 89‑91; MS Şehid Ali Paşa 2830/21, fols 74a-b; MS Halet Efendi 802, fols 52b-56b. As for Ḫatībzāde's reply, *Risāla fī ḥall maghlaṭat al-jadhr al-aṣam*, Bayezid Devlet, MS Veliyüddin Efendi 2122; SK, MS Laleli 2200.

80 Köse, "Hocazâde Muslihiddin Efendi", 209.

beat his students first. The grand vizier insisted, but another scholar in his company, Sinān Paşa, warned him that when Ḫocazāde debated with scrutiny, there was no way to win.

Meḥmed II's previous rhetorical remark whether Ḫatībzāde had the right credentials to challenge Ḫocazāde also echoes the scholar-vizier Sinān Paşa's warning.<sup>81</sup> After Sinān Paşa's intervention, Ḳārāmānī Meḥmed chose not to organize the debate. The sixteenth-century compiler Mecdī further speculates that Ḫatībzāde allegedly spread the fake news (*töhmet eyledi*) that the reason why Ḫocazāde avoided debating him was that the master got scared of (*ḫavf*) or intimidated (*ḫaşyet*) by Ḫatībzāde's scholarly scrutiny.82 The anecdote suggests that there was a clear distinction in terms of rank and merit among the Ottoman ulema, and whoever dared to challenge a senior scholar without any legitimate reason could be ended up being ridiculed. It was right after this debate that Meḥmed II passed away and Bāyezīd II was enthroned, so the challenge attempt must have been around the year 886/1481.<sup>83</sup>

#### 3.1.2.2 Common Phrases Used for Ḫocazāde's Vast Knowledge in Various Sciences

The classical titles and epithets given to the patrons and scholars with a good record of public disputations generally included the fifteenth-century Italian ideals of excellency (*magnificentia*) and magnanimity (*maganimitas*), both of which had connotations that placed wisdom, glory, and civic conduct above all else with an emphasis on the greatness of one's soul.<sup>84</sup> If one were asked to provide the best phrase to designate Ḫocazāde's scholarly attitude, his (sometimes presumptuous) assertiveness and ambition (*ḥırṣ*) in knowledge would be the most suitable conditions to describe his personality. In addition to his ambition, Mecdī also underlines Ḫocazāde's perseverance (*ʿazm*) in knowledge. He further quoted Ṭaşḳöprizāde's father's words that when Ḫocazāde's legal opinion was challenged due to a legal disagreement (*ḫilāf*), he presumptuously claimed that he belonged to an elite group of scholars who had the ultimate license to offer authoritative solutions to legal issues by reasoning.<sup>85</sup>

Ḫocazāde's pride in his knowledge did not always stop him from being overly competitive or making *ad hominem* comments and jokes about his students or academic rivals. However, when it came to scholarly issues, if he was wrong, he would stand corrected and give the other person his due. In an anecdote that only appears in Mecdī, Sultan Ḥusayn of Herat sent presents to the newly crowned Bāyezīd II via his emissary from Khorasan in the year 866/1481, a fledgling scholar who wanted to study with Ḫocazāde during his time in the lands of Rūm. The person who narrated this story was also in the same class with the emissary from Khorasan, and they read Jurjānī's gloss on Ibn Ḥājib's work in the principles of jurisprudence *Sharḥ mukhtaṣar al-muntahā* together. The scholar from Khorasan had two objec-


tions to Ḫocazāde and the narrator of the story objected to the emissary convincingly. The next day, when the emissary from Khorasan made another objection, Ḫocazāde did not favor his student's answer and, this time found the emissary's point justifiable. Later when they went over Jurjānī's text one more time, Ḫocazāde changed his mind and, instead, accepted his student's reply. This shows that the experienced master did not refrain from correcting himself when someone caught his misreading.<sup>86</sup>

The most common phrases employed in praise of Ḫocazāde include Arabic expressions and adjectives, such as intelligent (*ẕakī*), virtuous (*faḍīla*), good at writing and speaking (*ḥusn al-taḥrīr waʾl-taqrīr*),87 as well as epithets, such as the learned scholar (*ʿālim*), perfect human being (*kāmil*),<sup>88</sup> and savant (*baḥr*, *mubaḥḥir* or *baḥruʾl-faḍāʾil*).<sup>89</sup> There are certain *Persianized* Ottoman Turkish constructions which emphasized his scholarship and perfection (*ʿilm ü kemāl*), deep knowledge and perfection (*dāniş ü kemāl*),<sup>90</sup> distinction in knowledge (*şeref-i ʿilm*) <sup>91</sup> and virtues in knowledge and learning (*feżāʾil-i ʿilm ü ʿirfān*).<sup>92</sup> And some works did not refrain from referring to him as a philosopher (*ḥakīm*).<sup>93</sup>

## 3.2 The Diversity of Genres in Philosophy and Theology. Two Types of Scholars at Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Medreses

In biobibliographical sources, there were two different registers of science denoting the philosophical corpus, *falsafa* and *ḥikma*, each possessing distinct connotations in the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship. Along with a third discipline, the philosophical theology of the post-classical scholarship (*kalām*), these three genres incorporated a lot of Aristotelian conceptions through Avicenna's works in later centuries.

*Falsafa* and *ḥikma* could have been used interchangeably in many sources; yet they might have also conveyed a subtle distinction such that *falsafa* could be used as an umbrella term which included Ancient Greek Philosophy, whether Aristotelian or Platonic, and the Neo-Platonist thought, as well as their incorporated forms in the Islamic tradition (i.e. Graeco-Arabic philosophy and Illuminationism). *Falsafa* could or could not have been in line with the teachings of religious sciences and classical theology. That is, for instance, Islamic theology accepted that the world was created by an omnipotent God at a specific time (*ex nihilo*); whereas the Aristotelian-Neoplatonist tradition in the works of Muslim philosophers Fārābī and Avicenna conceded the pre-eternity of the world, meaning that the world was never created but always emanated pre-eternally.


<sup>86</sup> Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 155. The late nineteenth-century dictionary *Ḳāmūsüʾl-aʾlām* misrepresents this story by asserting that there were people who came all the way down from Khorasan to study with Ḫocazāde (Sāmī, *Ḳāmūsüʾl-aʾlām*, 3: 2064).

<sup>87</sup> Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 468.

On the other hand, the term *ḥikma*, which means 'wisdom' in Arabic, seems to gain a special meaning in post-classical Islam, specifically after the thirteenth century, such that the term *ḥikma* was reserved for the canonized reworkings of Aristotelian-Neoplatonist doctrines in Avicenna's philosophical works, most importantly, including those Avicennan doctrines that did not go against the cosmological assumptions of Islamic theology. In other words, the term *falsafa* belonged to the scholarly pursuit of previous centuries, but for the fifteenth-century Ottoman intellectual context, *ḥikma* was still vital and, by this way, post-classical Avicenna philosophy would be the best way to describe this common genre. According to his scrutinous study on the formation of the post-classical philosophical tradition in the greater Islamic world, Frank Griffel observes that the texts in *ḥikma* could report, doubt, and criticize Avicenna, as well as implementing the principle of sufficient reason and endorsing or correcting Avicennan philosophy.<sup>94</sup>

The difference between certain scientific disciplines, as in the cases of *falsafa*, *ḥikma*, and *kalām*, was often blurred, and the definition, as well as the categorization of these disciplines, could cross one another. Thus, it is not easy to exactly determine which category should be used to classify a particular philosophical or theological medrese handbook. Both the Sultan's Code of Law and Gelibolulu Ālī's *Künhüʾl-aḫbār* give an outline of the hierarchical organization of Ottoman medreses based on the levels of education, studied texts, and salary. According to these sources, the most common philosophical and theological handbooks studied at Ottoman medreses were Abharī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma* in *ḥikma*, Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* and Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* in *kalām* and Ḫayālī's gloss on the *Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid* in Muslim creed.

Most of the Ottoman encyclopedists distinguished *kalām* from *ḥikma* such that the latter category included the post-classical handbooks extracted or compiled from the Avicenna corpus, such as *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, *Hidāya al-ḥikma* and *Ḥikma al-ʿayn*. 95 With regard to discussions in metaphysics and natural philosophy, *ḥikma* was also taken on the same level with *kalām*<sup>96</sup> such that metaphysics and natural philosophy were covered by both *ḥikma* and *kalām* texts save their differences in approach, origin, and scope. The traditional Avicennan-Aristotelian themes, on the other hand, continued with certain modifications and mitigations in the post-classical renderings of *ḥikma*, corresponding to the general outline of the religious community on basic issues.

Avicenna's modified doctrines were still in use and dominated the scientific paradigm save his emanative cosmogony.<sup>97</sup> Common handbooks of philosophical theology *Tajrīd* and *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* were known to have synthesized certain philosophical and theological doctrines under the cosmological frameworks of the theologians, rejecting the Avicennan emana-

<sup>94</sup> Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 326, 341, 407, 524.

<sup>95</sup> Avicenna's *Ishārāt* was categorized under *ḥikma* (see Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 1: 94). In the same vein with Uzunçarşılı and Baltacı, İzgi has classified *Hidāya al-ḥikma* and *Ḥikma al-ʿayn* as works in *ḥikma*, and has a lengthy list of their commentaries and glosses under the categorization of "theoretical *ḥikma*" (İzgi, *Osmanlı Medreselerinde İlim*, 2: 115‑27).

<sup>96</sup> "Kamā ʾanna al-ḥikma al-ṭabīʿiyya waʾl-ilāhiyya minhā bi-manzila al-kalām minhā" (Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 1: 677).

<sup>97</sup> In the sixteenth-century Safavid world, there is an upsurge of interest in early layers of Graeco-Arabic philosophy as a reaction against the domination of the Avicennan *ḥikma* in philosophical studies, see Pourjavady, Schmidtke, "An Eastern Renaissance?".

tionist scheme. In that regard, for the context of the post-Avicennan scholarship, these handbooks gave a new perspective to *kalām* such that they could also be characterized as texts in 'philosophical theology', which had elements from Graeco-Arabic philosophy and its post-classical interpretation. There were, thus, certain crossovers between *ḥikma* and *kalām* by the time of the Ottomans.

The significance of this categorization was that there existed three types of genres, e.g. *falsafa*, *ḥikma*, and *kalām*, that dealt with metaphysical and physical questions in Ottoman scholarship and, since there were different approaches to similar questions, such as existence, quiddity, causality, and unity, there also existed different typologies of scholars who followed different formulations among Ottoman handbooks.

Ḫocazāde and Zeyrek represented two different types of scholars in the sense that the former was a type who tended to incorporate elements from philosophical works or, at least, when the question of the validity of the philosophers' doctrines came about, he tried to outline, acknowledge, and defend the philosophers' positions as clearly as possible. Zeyrek, on the other hand, seemed to be more prone to the theological corpus and tended to reject most controversial aspects of Arabic philosophy due to his ontological assumptions about the nature of God and the universe. Each represented a distinct 'scholar type' that prevailed at Ottoman medreses, and the reason why the Sultan may have asked them to present on such a fundamental topic in theology could be to see how different types of scholars would react to the philosophers' formulation, a fact which indicates the scope of the Sultan's patronage, education policies, as well as scholarly interests.

#### 3.3 Ottoman Culture of Court Debate and Disputation Etiquette

The Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate followed the formal rules of debate and disputation in the style of 'questions and answers' (*masāʾil wa-ʿajwiba*), a technique of argumentation that included unsolved problems or inquiries followed by explanations and refutations.<sup>98</sup> The written disputations were set forth as motives and authorities supporting the opposite view often in the form of invalidations, objections, replies, and counter-arguments. This method of argumentation was construed differently from monographs since the scholar's main intention was not to set his own views in the form of a systematic account with clearly outlined supporting arguments. Through certain *dubia*, the scholar investigated each and every case, and arbitrated among possible options. Recent studies have shown that this formula constituted a new science of 'dialectical inquiry and investigation' (*ādāb albaḥth wa-l-munāẓara*) in post-classical Islamic intellectual history, which was not only limited to Arabic literary context, but extending to other Islamicate traditions.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>98</sup> Daiber, "Masāʾil Wa-Adjwiba", 636. The genre also existed previously in Syriac and Nestorian sources: Pietruschka, "Streitgespräche", 159; Clarke, *The Selected Questions of Ishō bar Nūn*; and for the prevalence of this genre among Nestorian, Jacobite, and Melkite scholars, see Varsányi, "The Concept of *ʿaql* in Early Arabic Christian Theology". For the context of dialectic in early Arabic philosophy, see Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 52‑86.

<sup>99</sup> Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 196. Also for its influence in Urdu literature, Bruce, "Debate Literature, Urdu".

Among the conspicuously low number of works on dialectic (*jadal*) in ʿAṭūfī's Ottoman palace inventory, there were no early dialectic books included before the thirteenth century. The holdings mostly constituted Turco-Persian works with only a few Ottoman manuscripts, yet the standard handbook of disputation of the day was a short treatise by the fourteenthcentury astronomer and mathematician Shams al-Dīn al-Samarkandī,<sup>100</sup> who was, according to Larry Benjamin Miller, the first Arab logician to have devoted himself, *qua* logician, to the logic of debate,101 by turning the Aristotelian dialectic into an alternative appellation for the science of disputation based on demonstration (*istidlāl*) and investigation (*baḥth*).<sup>102</sup>

The verifier Samarkandī most notably defines *munāẓara* as a way of speculative reasoning (*naẓar*) directed at revealing truth through mutual effort; and the activity of *naẓar* here denotes paying attention to meanings (*iltifāt al-nafs ʿilā maʿānī*).103 Arriving at truth is not the only function of such investigations, whereas it is also about invalidating the other side's assertions.<sup>104</sup> According to Samarkandī's texts on the fundamentals of Arabic disputation (*al-Qusṭās* and his epistle on *ādāb al-baḥth*), the scholarly debates should ensue as follows: the claimant (*muʿallil*) sets down his thesis (*iddiʿāʾ*) and argument (*qawl*) and, when establishing his proof (*dalīl*), he also lays out two sound premises (sing. *muqaddima*), being responsible for the validity of the proof. The exchange then begins in the form of 'questions and answers' in theological dialectic.<sup>105</sup>

For Samarkandī, both sides of the disputation are called *muʿallil* since both are responsible for bringing out sound justifications in order to demonstrate their own rationales, whereas starting with the seventeenth-century Ottoman scholar Saçaklızāde, the later scholars rather assign *muʿallil* unilaterally to the person who defends a thesis, i.e. the scholar on the side of the assent (*taṣdīq*).106 In this case, Ḫocazāde as a defender of the philosophers' proof falls under the role of the 'claimant', whereas Zeyrek who challenges the validity of the philosophers' demonstrative reasoning by a series of rebuttals is the 'questioner' (*sāʾil*).

The questioner has several options: he may raise specific objections (sing. *manʿ*) and counter-objections/indications (sing. *munāqaḍa*) directed at one

102 Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 107.

103 Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânîʾnin (905/1500)*, 139. *Naẓar* also has the senses of 'approach', 'logical inquiry', and 'investigation' in Avicenna terminology (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 99).

104 Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânîʾnin (905/1500)*, 140‑2.

106 Pehlivan, "Saçaklızâdeʾde Muʿallil", 188‑9.

<sup>100</sup> El-Rouayheb, "Books on Logic (*Manṭiq*) and Dialectics (*Jadal*)", 894‑5.

<sup>101</sup> Nevertheless Belhaj has argued that Larry Miller's and Nicholas Rescher's statement about *ādāb al-baḥth* as being a 'logical art' of disputation is inaccurate since this claim has been often conflated with the logicization of *jadal*. Samarkandī's main agenda, instead, was to reorganize debates in theology and philosophy on the same model adopted for juridical dialectic, so that debates in both disciplines would be upgraded to the level of rigorous abstract argumentation through the partial syllogization of legal dialectic. In short, Samarkandī transformed juridical dialectic into an art of disputation – his concern for theology and philosophy being only secondary (Belhaj, "Al-Samarkandī's *Ādāb al-baḥt*", 46‑7, 53). For Rescher's statement, see Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic*, 209.

<sup>105</sup> For an outline of argumentation and debate etiquette in post-classical disputation theory, see Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 127‑39; especially see the chart on 137‑9, as well as the Arabic edition on 266‑79; and Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 196‑234.

or more premises of an argument, devise an objection to the claimant's proof in a general way without establishing the truth of the purported conclusion (*naqḍ*), and bring out counter-evidences (sing. *muʿāraḍa*) to set up a proof contrary to the one set up by the opponent.<sup>107</sup> *Manʿ* asks specifically for further proof or evidence (*dalīl*) to support a statement, whereas *naqḍ* is directed at the charge of incommensurability of the *definiens* and the defined – challenging what is generally accepted (*al-mashhūr*).<sup>108</sup> *Naqḍ* often argues for the absence of judgment from the evidence, and *munāqaḍa*, in contrast, denotes "disagreement" or "contradiction" by disallowing a premise of the proof, often formulated as "we do not grant x".<sup>109</sup> According to Samarkandī, the opponents can turn the tables at any moment, directing questions at one another's arguments. A contestant is always obliged to respond to every objection that a claimant brings.110 Furthermore, refutations (sing. *naqḍ*) are directed at the contestant's inconsistencies in argumentation by way of contradiction.<sup>111</sup> Once there are no further objections and the refutation has been established, a contestant is silenced (*ifḥām*), or expected to concede the outcome (*ilzām*) <sup>112</sup> – the latter of which is often through forcing your opinion to commit a mistake.113 One of the contributions of Samarkandī's new method in disputations concerning philosophy and theology includes an accentuation on *taqrīr* and *taḥrīr*, as a way of identifying the main problematic, as well as restricting argumentation only to the subject matter under the rubric of *taʿyīn maḥall al-nizāʿ*. 114

In light of the new studies, Khaled El-Rouayheb has argued that the practice of commentary and gloss associated with the genre of *ādāb al-baḥth* was not simply "comment-mongering" as previously thought, which rather transcended the generic structure of recrossing familiar grounds in the same familiar way, by undergoing significant reformulations and developments in the centuries to come.<sup>115</sup> Samarkandī's text was the most prevalent work in this genre with a number of significant early commentaries, including *Sharḥ ādāb al-Samarkandī* by the verifier Kamāl al-Dīn Masʿūd b. Ḥusayn al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1500) – arguably the most popular commentary in *ādāb albaḥth* at the fifteenth-century Ottoman medreses with more than 170 copies in Turkish manuscript libraries.<sup>116</sup>


114 In his *Tahāfut*, Ḫocazāde, for instance, recontextualizes Ghazālī's discussions which he deemed to be the inferior *jadal*, under the new rubric of "locating the main point of contention" via *taqrīr* and *taḥrīr* (Pehlivan, "Âdâbuʾl-Bahs *veʾl-Münâzara*", 95, 99).

115 El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 71.

116 For the epithets of 'verifier' used for Samarkandī and Shirwānī, as well as the list of glosses on Shirwānī's commentary on the former, see Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 1: 39‑40. According to his autobiography, Ṭaşḳöprizāde was said to have studied this work at a young age (Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 554).

<sup>107</sup> El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 60‑96; esp. 72‑5. Belhaj, "Al-Samarkandī's *Ādāb al-baḥt*", 49‑51.

<sup>113</sup> "ʾInnahu qad yakūn al-gharaḍ min jānibay al-khuṣūṣa ka-layhumā taghlīṭ al-khaṣm" (Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânîʾnin (905/1500)*, 140).

Having expanded on Samarkandī's outlined aspects, Shirwānī's popular commentary makes certain points regarding how to attain precision without falling into the common fallacies associated with the method of scholarly investigation in disputations. For instance, Shirwānī divides counterobjections/indications (sing. *munāqaḍa*), which are directed at refuting the antecedent of the argument into two types for argumentational rectitude: in order for counter-objections to be effective, one could also include an additional point of substantiation (*shāhid*), supplementing the refutation of the overall claim. If the latter is the case, then this is called an 'overall refutation of a proof' (*naqḍ ijmālī*); if not, it is considered to be resorting to 'haughtiness' (*mukābara*).<sup>117</sup> For the case of setting up proofs against the opponent's points by propounding another proof (*muʿāraḍa*), Shirwānī further comments that these types often appear in sophistical arguments (*mughalāṭa*) such that if the adversary's so-called new proof corresponds to the claimant's initial version, then this is called an 'inversion' (*qalb*).118 Lastly, with regard to *naqḍ*, Shirwānī adds that if the questioner argues that the proof does not correspond to the proof's consequent, it is again called an 'overall refutation'; and if the questioner rejects the validity of the proof according to his criteria for evidencing, then it would be a 'counter-indication by way of inversion' (*muʿāraḍa ʿalā sabīl al-qalb*).<sup>119</sup> In addition to these types of objections, there are also justifications (sing. *mustanad*) that can be employed in debates, which are rather weaker forms of objections based on the claimant's assumptions.<sup>120</sup>

Another classical work on *ādāb al-baḥth* based on Samarkandī's urtext is the *littérateur* Ṭaşḳöprizāde's popular and useful manual at the intersection of ethics, logic, and law, which, nevertheless, made less demands on students by leaving out Samarkandī's abstruse examples in theology and philosophy,<sup>121</sup> but also including the primary proof attested at the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate: the proof in reciprocal hinderance (*burhān al-tamānuʿ*).<sup>122</sup> The genre of *ādāb al-baḥth* went beyond the rules of argumentation and logical reasoning, having also covered the moral conduct and etiquette of debates in accordance with Islamic norms. In that sense, it was necessary for the debater to avoid the criteria of conciseness/brevity, redundancy, strange/ambiguous words, responding without understanding the adversary's thesis, digressions, laughing or raising one's voice, underestimation, as well as disputing with someone who inspired him fear or veneration.<sup>123</sup>

In the context of disputation etiquette, Ṭaşḳöprizāde warns that unsubstantiated refutations directed at the questioner may be perceived as


121 El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 72. Yet it should be noted that Samarkandī's text assumes that there were different ways of arguing in *ḥikma* and *kalām*, providing different sets of examples for these genres (Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 14).

122 The unicity of the Necessarily Existent was one of the most popular topics discussed in *ādāb al-baḥth* (see Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânîʾnin (905/1500)*, 195‑6).

123 Belhaj, "Ṭāshköprüzāde's *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāẓara*", 291‑2. Belhaj has also suggested that the Aristotelian origins of *ādāb al-baḥth* is unfounded; the genre rather had roots in ethics and juridical dialectic (Belhaj, "Ṭāshköprüzāde's *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāẓara*", 299).

<sup>117</sup> Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânîʾnin (905/1500)*, 158‑9, 170‑7.

<sup>118</sup> Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânîʾnin (905/1500)*, 158‑9.

'haughtiness' (*mukābara*), that is, the outright rejection of the claimant's thesis without any evidence or direct proof, a move that was often associated with scholarly precipitation, superciliousness, and arrogance.<sup>124</sup> Following Samarkandī's manual, Ṭaşḳöprizāde mentions another fallacy in argumentation called 'usurpation' (*ghaṣb*), which is a way of avoiding the questioner's initial thesis by introducing a fresh new position, a move to be avoided by verifiers, i.e. scholars who based their scientific positions on scholarly arbitration.<sup>125</sup> This might have been the reason why Ḫocazāde warned his opponent in the initial written response that any question related to the Avicenna's notion of 'pure existence' would be perceived as a digression, probably knowing that Zeyrek could resort to usurpation. Ḫocazāde here follows Samarkandī's principle of 'designating the main point of contention' (*taʿyīn maḥall al-nizā*).

In several cases during the debate, Zeyrek repeated the theologians' view without qualifying his opponent's points, and he did not seem to engage in the philosophers' proofs by rejecting their views outright or disregarding their textual evaluations (see chapter 4 below). It was probably due to Zeyrek's failing of these two proscribed protocols that the main arbiter (*ḥākim*) of the debate, Mollā Ḫüsrev, might have considered some of Zeyrek's debate tactics in the context of *mukāraba* – all the more since, as we will see below, in two instances he dared to declare himself as the *fait accompli* winner in the presence of the Sultan and other attendants. While Ḫocazāde seemed to have taken the *munāẓara* etiquette more seriously by only focusing on verifying the truth, Zeyrek was more interested in his opponent's assent and silencing so that his position would be accepted without further hesitation, having failed in fulfilling the criterion of verification. In the eyes of the attendants, the scholars differed in scholarly approach, argumentation and execution, and thus the official winner was announced to be Ḫocazāde.

### 3.4 A Question of Unbelief

Zeyrek's claim of Ḫocazāde's unbelief (*takfīr*) occupies a special place in Ottoman Turkish biobibliographical sources, and the accusation is often recounted as follows: after a day of discussion, Zeyrek accused Ḫocazāde of denying the unicity of God by using the expression *inkār al-tawḥīd*<sup>126</sup> and continued to repeat his objections insistently. In his commentary on Ṭūsī's handbook of philosophical theology *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād*, Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1348) noted that *kufr* denoted a lack of belief in a single God (*īmān*), since it precluded obedience, not in the absolute sense, but with regard to

<sup>124</sup> "Fa-ʿin manaʿa biʾl-shāhid fa-huwa al-naqḍ. Wa-ammā manaʿuhu bilā shāhid fa-huwa mukābara gayru masmūʿatin ittifāqan". See the edition of Ṭaşḳöprizāde's *Risāla fī ādāb albaḥth* in Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 272; the translation and analysis of this epistle in Arif, "The Art of Debate in Islam", 207 and Belhaj, "*Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāẓara*", 303‑6.

<sup>125</sup> For the Arabic text, Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânîʾnin (905/1500)*, 167, "Wa-ammā manaʿahu biʾl-dalīl; fa-huwa ghaṣb gayru masmūʿ ʿind al-muḥaqqiqīn" (Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 272; Arif, "The Art of Debate in Islam", 206‑7).

<sup>126</sup> Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 124. Or see the Ottoman Turkish "tevḥīd-i münkir imiş" in Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 467.

the particular articles of belief.127 Zeyrek's accusation did not yet have a serious impact on Ḫocazāde as in the case of the sharp-tongued scholar Mollā Luṭfī (d. 900/1495), a victim of political intrigue who was claimed to have committed apostasy or concealed belief (*zandaqa*), as well as, according to the contemporary scholar Ḫatībzāde, provided support for the obsolescent doctrines of the philosophers (*tamassaka bi-muhmalāt al-falāsifa*).<sup>128</sup> Unlike apostasy, the claim of *takfīr* may not imply dire consequences<sup>129</sup> and was not particularly covered as a topic in jurisprudence manuals.<sup>130</sup> Unbelief was perceived as a lighter form of apostasy since the latter was closely associated with non-monotheist traditions as in the Dualists arguing against God's unicity.<sup>131</sup>

The accusations of unbelief, as Sonja Brentjes suggests, may have differing rationales, such as covering religious matters, issues of social relationship (including loyalty towards a patron, upholding an oath, exerting influence in scholarly circles, ruining competitors for positions of power and wealth, etc.), standards of proper behavior and culture, as well as military conflicts and rebellions.<sup>132</sup> Yet, for the context of scholarly exchange, the shades of the *takfīrʾs* meaning can also vary from intellectual inferiority, shallow learning, age or status, the power dynamics between the two men,<sup>133</sup> as well as supporting the doctrines of the philosophers.134 In his encyclopedia of sciences, Ṭaşḳöprizāde set 'religious benefit' as a criterion for any science, whether rational or religious. According to him, if unicity was discussed in the context of the Muʿtazilites, such a central doctrine could be harmful; this should not, nonetheless, expunge its significance as a topic of

#### 127 Al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawāʾid*, 2: 1219.

128 Winter, "İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) on Ibn ʿArabī's Hagiology", 142. For the politics of hatred and jealousy involved in Mollā Luṭfī's execution, see the articles by Şükrü Özen: "Molla Lutfîʾnin İdamına Karşı Çıkan" and "İslâm Hukukunda Zındıklık Suçu". According to Özen, *münkir* and *zındīḳ* are two different categories in Islamic jurisprudence – yet the denial of God's unicity or existence could have also led one to be condemned to death due to the claim of *zandaqa*. Also for the case of Mollā Ḳābıż (d. 933/1527) (Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar*, 203‑50). By referring to the post-classical verifiers like Jurjānī, Taftāzānī, and Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/ 1233), the verifier İbn Kemāl gives a detailed analysis of lexical and religio-legal definitions of the term *zindīq* along with its shared valences with *munāfiq* and *mulḥid* (See İbn Kemāl, "Taṣḥīḥ lafḍ al-zindīq wa-tawḍīḥ maʿnāhu al-daqīq").

129 The later writings of Ghazālī point out that capital punishment may be applied to "unbelief" (Griffel, "Toleration and Exclusion, 352). As Griffel has pointed out, Ghazālī denied the right of repentance (*istitāba*) to those found guilty of *zandaqa*, yet this also paved the way for state representatives to adjudicate the status of one's belief based on one's external actions, thereby blurring the distinction between internal unbelief (*kufr*) and professed apostasy (*irtidād*) (Griffel, "Toleration and Exclusion", 344‑54; al-Tikriti, "A Contrarian Voice", 66; "*Kalam* in the Service of State", 131‑49).

130 Özen has observed that religious rulings concerning *takfir* were not covered by the books of Ḥanafī jurisprudence but generally amended in lieu of legal opinions (Özen, "Molla Lutfîʾnin İdamına Karşı Çıkan", 61‑2). For instance, Mollā Ḫüsrev's *Durar al-ḥukkām fī sharḥ gurar alaḥkām*, a work in jurisprudence completed and presented to Meḥmed II in the year 883/1478, does not mention *takfīr* as a topic.

131 For instance, see Kristó-Nagy, "Denouncing the Damned *Zindīq*!".

132 Brentjes, "The Vocabulary of 'Unbelief'", 107.

133 Brentjes, "The Vocabulary of 'Unbelief'", 113, 117.

134 In the context of Safavid Shiʿism, for instance, the Sunnism of Ibn ʿArabī's school, its association with mystical monism, as well as the socially disruptive elitism of *ḥukamāʾ* were bases for unbelief (Rizvi, "The *Takfīr* of the Philosophers (and Sufis)", 245).

scholarly debate.<sup>135</sup> Arabic philosophy, in this sense, was only deemed valid as long as it could be employed for the sake of religious benefit.

Disputations and exchanges could often serve as an opportunity and a means for revenge, in which the other party was expected to fall into disrepute.<sup>136</sup> Zeyrek's allegations about Ḫocazāde's unbelief, therefore, could be characterized as a retribution against the young scholar's assault on Zeyrek's prestige. Ḫocazāde objected to Zeyrek's claim by stating that refuting a particular proof would not necessarily undermine the overall statement, since Zeyrek's point of his denial of God's unicity would only undermine the proof itself, not the overall statement that God is singular.<sup>137</sup>

Frank Griffel has noted how the legal meaning of *kufr* had changed during the time of Ghazālī, from a matter that God dealt with in the Afterlife, that is, rarely implying any action more than social sanctioning, to a legal term that the jurists, the rulers, and their military had to observe and take action especially after the Shāfiʿite legal tradition started to associate this concept with apostasy.138 Thus, the claim of *takfīr* was not legally binding and could only have rather limited social consequences, such as some scholars' refraining from greeting or welcoming philosophers etc. In other words, declaring someone an unbeliever (i.e. the act of *takfīr*) was a tactic often used to slander one's theological opponent with the (rare) implication of legal sanctions – especially in the early theological disputes. Following Ghazālī to an extent, Zeyrek might have accused Ḫocazāde with *takfīr* probably due to the latter's pro-*falsafa* views in the debate, though this claim was not common and did not have rigid legal consequences (maybe with the exception of the fallen scholar-vizier Sinān Paşa, d. 891/1486).<sup>139</sup> For the Ottomans, the accusation of *kufr* might have had a rhetorical connotation since, in the case of Zeyrek, it indicated a resorting to *ad hominem*, which signaled that the accuser might have lost the debate, or simply gone straight to the top during the exchange.

It should be noted that the *takfīr* of the philosophers was a minority view among the later generations of Ottoman scholars. An Ottoman jurist and scholar of high caliber Cārullāh Efendi (d. 1151/1738) was said to have dismissed Ghazālī's *takfīr* of the philosophers, arguing that the claims of *takfīr* are legal opinions and even if there is a single person in the religious community who does not have the same opinion, the claim is ruled out.<sup>140</sup>

Another reason for Zeyrek's accusation could be a historical reference to the early reception of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* among religious scholars, such as ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Kirmānī (d. 505/1111) and Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/114‑15), who deemed this proof to be an outcome of unbelief. In his book of Matūrīdite theology *Tabṣira al-adilla*, Nasafī voiced this view, after having cited the Muʿtazilite scholar Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī's (d. 321/933) objection to the proof, by deeming it to be incomplete due to its false prin-

135 Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *Mevżūʿātüʾl-ʿulūm*, 1: 335.

138 Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, 104‑5; *Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam*, 223‑6.

139 Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 499.

140 Arıcı, "Müzmin Felsefe Okuru Cârullah", 16‑20.

<sup>136</sup> For the cases of revenge from the Italian Renaissance in the context of artistic competition, see Holman, "For Honor and Profit", 556‑63.

<sup>137</sup> "Delīle iʿtirāż ve inkārdan müddeʿāyı inkār lāzım gelmez" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 467).

ciples.141 In other words, before the philosophers employed the Necessarily Existent in *burhān al-tamānuʿ*, there had been an early context, in which failing to provide a certain proof in *tawḥīd* was associated with unbelief.<sup>142</sup> Zeyrek's claims of Ḫocazāde's unbelief and the former's use of the term *tamma al-dast*, a term borrowed from Jurjānī's text which signified that his opponent was formally silenced in the debate, shows that he saw Ḫocazāde as an apologist for the philosophers' doctrines that went against the fundamental aspects of Sunnī creed, including God's unicity.

#### 3.5 Extant Manuscripts

There is a single extant copy of each exchange written during the final day of the debate. The treatise titled *Risāla li-Mawlānā Zeyrek fī baḥth nafs almāhiya*, also recorded as *Mubāḥatha bayna Ḫocazāde wa-Zeyrek Efendi* in manuscript catalogues, includes Zeyrek's positions and rejoinders in lieu of lemmata in reply to Ḫocazāde. The manuscript is housed at Süleymaniye Library in MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, ff. 120b-121b,<sup>143</sup> and the initial title suggests that the central topic of discussion concerns the nature of God's quiddity. The text seems to be written in a cursory manner without following many of the classical conventions of consonant pointing, vowel marks, and supplementary diacritics, as well as manuscript framing, which indicate that the text might have been for personal use. The *waqf* seal on the flyleaf is partially defaced and unreadable (see **[fig. 4]**).<sup>144</sup> The flyleaf also lists the titles of the works in red ink.

Unlike Ḫocazāde's text, the treatise does not include an invocation (*ḥamd ü s̱enā*) section, as well as an introduction stating the overall argument and context. It is, therefore, hard to reconstruct Zeyrek's text, envisioning the subject matter covered each day. The manuscript must have been from the year circa 1082/1671, a date noted by the copyist Muʿīd Meḥmed Efendi<sup>145</sup> at the end of another treatise in the same manuscript, that is, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī's (d. 903/1497) super-gloss on the famed handbook of logic called *al-Shamsiyya*, by Najm al-Dīn ʿOmar al-Kātibi al-Qazvīnī (d. 675/1277).<sup>146</sup>

<sup>141</sup> See the reference for *kufr* in the context of the proof for God's unicity, see al-Nasafī, *Tabṣira al-adilla*, 88; Yavuz, "Vahdâniyyet", 429. For a list of those scholars who deemed this proof as unbelief, see Ibn Ḳutluboğa, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā al-musāyara*, 49. A contemporary of Zeyrek, Ibn Ḳutluboğa (d. 879/1474) writes in his commentary on his teacher Ibn Humām's *al-Musāyara* that the demonstration of God's singularity via the proof from reciprocal hindrance is an impossibility by way of rational proofs due to its allegedly false principles (Ibn Ḳutluboğa, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā al-musāyara*, 49).

<sup>142</sup> Yavuz, "Vahdâniyyet", 429.

<sup>143</sup> This *majmūʿa* was initially recorded under 3571, which was later changed into MS Giresun 99. The same collection also houses a copy of Ḫocazāde's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (see MS Giresun 107).

<sup>144</sup> It seems that there are two seals on the flyleaf, one in the middle and the other on the lower left side. Most probably the latter is the acquisition (*temellük*) seal. Hasan Tetik of Süleymaniye Manuscript Library was kind enough to check the original flyleaf to see whether the seals could be read, but no avail.

<sup>145</sup> An instructor at the prestigious Süleymaniye medrese, as well as the jurist of Ḥaleb, Muʿīd Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1090/1679) was an established scholar of his time known for his knowledge in various Islamic sciences (Şeyḫī Meḥmed, *Veḳāyiʿüʾl-fuḍalā I*, 3: 459‑60).

<sup>146</sup> See Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā ḥāshiya ʿalā al-shamsiyya* housed at Süleymaniye, MS Giresun Yazmalar 3571, f. 48b.

Zeyrek's rejoinder is included in MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, a miscellany (*majmūʿa*) with twenty-three treatises on a wide range of subjects from logic, astronomy, natural philosophy, and theology to disputation, semantics, and eschatology, written mostly by the famous post-classical Persian verifiers of philosophical theology – such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Jurjānī, Shirāzī, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 918/1502), as well as the Ottoman scholar ʿAlī Ḳuşçu (d. 879/1474), who has two works listed, which are his famous treatises concerning theoretical astronomy (*hayʾa*) and the science of imposition (*ʿilm al-waḍʿ*) in semantics. There are two eschatological works attributed to the classical Arabic philosopher Avicenna (d. 428/1036) in the manuscript, one on the throne of God (*ʿarsh*), and the other on grave visitations, proceeding Ghazālī's epistle on death and the Afterlife. Ṭūsī has the greatest number of philosophical treatises with specific discussions covering complete causes, eternal life of souls after body, and separate substances. In the context of the central topic of our current debate, one could count Rāzī on God's unicity, as well as Ḥusayn al-Ḥalḥālī (d. 1030/1621) on the proof of God's necessary existence as treatises the closest.

*Risāle fī al-tawḥīd* by Rāzī is a short treatise that outlines different approaches to God's singularity in the Islamic world, ranging from the standard Sunnī and Shīʿīte views to the explanations purported by various scholarly communities, such as theologians, philosophers, Illimunationists, mystics, and star-worshippers. In spite of his partial sympathy towards each of these groups, Rāzī prefers the positions of philosophers and theologians as valid, even upholding the philosophers' view being stronger than the former due to its religious authentication based on reasoning.<sup>147</sup> It is highly interesting that such a treatise acknowledging the validity of the philosophers' proof is included in the same compilation with Zeyrek's defense of the theologians' position.

Ḫocazāde's defense of the philosophers is preserved at Süleymaniye Library under the title of *Risāla fī al-tawḥīd* in MS Ayasofya 2206, ff. 12‑21. Similar to MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, Ayasofya 2206 is also a miscellany compiling seven treatises written in various subjects, including theology, creed, eschatology, and *ḥadīth* commentary. Most notably, the collection includes the popular gloss on Ṣaʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī's *Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid* prepared by the Ottoman scholar Şemseddīn Aḥmed bin Mūsā el-Ḫayālī (d. 875/1470 [?]), as previously noted, the only scholar who was known to have won a debate against Ḫocazāde.

The flyleaf includes the small round seal of the Ottoman Sultan Selīm I (r. 918/1512‑926/1520) but not Bāyezīd II's almond-shaped seal that may be found in the extant books included in ʿAṭūfī's palace inventory (see **[fig. 5]**). Given these facts, the manuscript is probably dated from the reign of Selīm I. According to Gülru Necipoğlu, the 915/1509 earthquake, also known as the Lesser Apocalypse (*küçük ḳıyāmet*), transformed the Inner Treasury into a storage space crowded with accumulating treasures. A couple of years after the disaster, Selīm I decided to lock down the room, which was still in need of repair, in order to close the space (except for his rare visits), es-

<sup>147</sup> See Ceylan's chapter on Rāzī's arguments from the existence of God, which is based on the Persian translation of the work housed in Süleymaniye, MS Fatih 5426 and, for Rāzī's upholding of the philosophers' view being stronger, see f. 23a (Ceylan, *Theology and Tafsīr*, 109‑11).

pecially until the annual revenues came from the newly conquered Egypt.<sup>148</sup> The inscription on the upper right corner, *odadan çıḳa ʿarabī*, an expression that could be also found in books included in Bāyezīd II's famed library, indicates the circulation policy of the book, further suggesting that the work might have been transferred from the Privy Chamber to the Treasury for reading or study purposes, a convention practiced from Selīm I onwards.<sup>149</sup>

There is a *waqf* inspection note on the flyleaf written by an inspector named Şeyḫzāde Aḥmed, who worked for the Pious Endowment of the Two Holy Cities (*Awqāf al-ḥaramayn al-sharīfayn*). The inscription indicates that the book was bequeathed by Maḥmūd I (r. 1143/1730‑1168/1754)<sup>150</sup> most probably to the public library that he established adjacent to the Ayaṣofya (Hagia Sophia) mosque when renovating the edifice. The collection today is known as Ayasofya, which was transferred to the Süleymaniye Library in 1968.151 The date of bequest should be after 1147/1734 since Maḥmūd I received the epithet of *el-Gāzī*, i.e. 'the holy warrior', after having taken Tabriz back from Nāder Shāh Afshār (d. 1160/1747), which he lost it to him again during the following year.

MS Ayasofya 2206 is a well-preserved, meticulously-prepared *majmūʿa* with a conscious attention given to writing conventions, including consonant pointing. The script is elaborate, and the folio layout displays a clear ruling pattern of text framing and bordering. The invocation section and the first two words (i.e. *qāla*/*aqūlu*) of some lemmata (indicating the authors of the cited remarks) are copied in red ink. The change of color in subheadings may suggest a transition from one discussion to another, perhaps even implying each successive day in the timeline of the debate.

Coming from the early 1870s, an Ottoman writer and political activist Nāmıḳ Kemāl (1840‑88) was known to have penned a series of biographies of prominent Ottoman Sultans, including Sultan Meḥmed II, crediting him as one of the key historic Muslim figures who transformed the Ottomans into a civilized society.<sup>152</sup> With the intention of criticizing the rulers of his time, as well as historicizing an imagined past to be proud of, Kemāl instrumentalized Meḥmed II as an idealized enlightened figure in Turkish history, whom he believed to have single-handedly established the conventions of the Ottoman scholarly culture. For Kemāl, Meḥmed II was the founder of a civilizing Muslim state on a truly nationalistic basis, whose existence culminated in Ottoman nationalism;153 yet his political motivations and interest in giving the Sultan the utmost intellectual agency led him misconstrue the factual realities of this debate. He rather utilized this scholarly event as a landmark of the Sultan's accomplishments without paying much atten-

153 Kuran, "Ottoman Historiography of the Tanzimat Period", 426‑7.

<sup>148</sup> Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 9.

<sup>149</sup> Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 21.

<sup>150</sup> "Der vaḳf-ı hāẕāʾl-nüsḫatüʾl-celīle Sulṭānüʾl-āʿẓim veʾl-ḫāḳānüʾl-muʿaẓẓam māliküʾd-dīn veʾl-muḥarrameyn ḫādimüʾl-ḥarameyniʾl-şerīfeyn es-Sulṭān bin es-Sulṭān bin es-Sulṭān el-Ġāzī Maḥmūd Ḫān vaḳfen ṣaḥīḥen şerʿiyyen li-men ṭaʿāla ve-istirāde ve-emāne ve-istiʿāde ḫāledallāhu mülkehu ʿillā Muḥammed ḥarrarahu el-faḳīr Aḥmed Şeyḫzāde el-müfettiş bi-evḳāfiʾl-ḥarameyniʾlşerīfeyn evvelihimā" (*Risāla fī al-tawḥīd* in MS Ayasofya 2206, 1a). For a similar note by the same inspector with a similar inscription: Sobieroj, *Variance in Arabic Manuscripts*, 177‑8.

<sup>151</sup> Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 23; Kut, "Sultan I. Mahmut Kütüphanesi", 99‑103.

<sup>152</sup> Kaplan, "Namık Kemal ve Fatih", 74‑6; Brockett, "When Ottomans Become Turks", 406‑8.

**Figure 4** The flyleaf of MS Giresun Yazmalar 99

**Figure 5** MS Ayasofya 2206 is stamped with the small round Inner Treasury seal of Selīm I (center), the large round *waqf* seal of Maḥmūd I (upper left), and the oval seal of his *waqf* inspector (bottom). Selīm I's seal represents the perpetuity of his endowments, stating "My trust/confidence comes from my Creator" in Arabic (*tawakkulī ʿalā khālikī*) \*

1

<sup>\*</sup> For the *waqf* seals of Selīm I and Maḥmūd I respectively, see Kut, *Yazma Eserlerde Vakıf Mühürleri*, 20, 31.

tion to the content or the efforts of scholars, even mispronouncing Zeyrek's name as Ḫatībzāde.<sup>154</sup>

İsmail Hakkı İzmirli (1869‑1946), a celebrated teacher and scholar of Islamic theology and philosophy, was one of the first modern scholars to write on the debate along with the Turkish physician and historian Süheyl Ünver (1898‑1986).<sup>155</sup> Having corrected Nāmıḳ Kemāl's encyclopedic mistakes, İsmail Hakkı noted that the debate concerned the philosophers' version of the argument from reciprocal hindrance (*burhān al-tamānuʿ*). Yet, when parsing the main point of contention, he made an oversight by constructing the proof generically around the "impossibility of having two Gods with equal power (*qudra*)", instead of establishing the "reducibility of necessity and existence into quiddity/essence in God" as the central discussion of the debate. İsmail Hakkı İzmirli, in that context, might have based his impressions of the debate on biobibliographical sources, since the question of God's attribute of power was neither mentioned in the debate nor as part of the main context. He further notes that Ḫocazāde, in a similar fashion with Taftāzānī, did not see the philosophers' formulation as certain (*qaṭʿī*) but presumptive (*ẓannī*).156 Still, there does not seem to be a reference in the debate mentioning the name of the Timurid theologian Taftāzānī per se. Most recent scholars seem to have based their description on secondary sources overlooking the extant copies of the debate.

<sup>154</sup> "Giceli gündüzlü eṭrāfını iḥāṭadan bunca aṣḥāb maʿrifeti dāʾimen ḥużūrunda baḥs̱ itdirür ve baʿżı göre kendi mümeyyiz olurdı. Nitekim Ḫocazāde ile Ḫatībzāde beyninde cereyān iden is̱bāt-ı vācib cedel meşhūrunda ḥükm-i Fātiḥ idi" (Kemāl, *Evrāk-ı Perīşān*, 251). Instead of acknowledging Maḥmūd Paşa and Mollā Ḫüsrev in decision-making, Kemāl chose to give the full agency to the Sultan, probably mixing the current debate with Ḫatībzāde's unsolicited attempt with the senior Ḫocazāde (Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 86‑90).

<sup>155</sup> The debate is briefly mentioned in Ünver via İsmail Hakkı's notes written especially for his book, see Ünver, "Molla Zeyrekʾin gücenmesi", 68‑73, as well as İzmirli, "Tevhid Burhanı meselesi", 209‑10 and Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, 40. There are no studies at hand about the philosophical content of the debate. Also see Arslan, "Osmanlı Entelektüel".

<sup>156</sup> Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 209.

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

# <sup>4</sup> The Philosophical Context of the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde Debate

**Summary** 4.1 God's Unicity in Early Interreligious Debates. – 4.2 Background in Philosophy I. God as the Necessarily Existent (*al-wājib*). – 4.3 Background in Philosophy II. Existence, Quiddity/ Essence, and Necessity in Post-Classical Philosophical Theology. – 4.4 The Rise of Conceptualism. *Iʿtibārāt*, Avicenna, and Beyond. – 4.5 Main Intellectual Context I. God's Unicity in *Sharḥ almawāqif*. – 4.6 Main Intellectual Context II. Aspects of the Philosophers' Proof.

The philosophical theology of the fifteenth-century Ottoman world combined post-classical Avicennan philosophy (*ḥikma*) with (mostly Ashʿarite) philosophical theology (*kalām*). This trend could be observed in Ottoman medrese handbooks, since discussions related to physics, metaphysics, and theology were mostly covered in three key texts belonging to past Perso-Islamic scholars from the Il-Khanid and Timurid courts studied through their commentaries and glosses at the fifteenth-century Ottoman medreses. These texts were as follows: Abharī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma* in Avicennan philosophy (via commentaries by Central Asian scholars Ibn Mubārakshāh al-Bukhārī (d. ca. 735/1335) or Mullāzāde al-Kharziyānī (d. 809/1407),<sup>1</sup> as well as two works in philosophical theology, Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* (via Iṣfahānī's commentary and Jurjānī's gloss) and Ījī's *al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām* (via Jurjānī's commentary and Ḥasan Çelebi's gloss). The fact that these urtexts were studied through their commentaries highlights the influence of Timurid and post-Timurid philosophical theology on Ottoman educational institutions, cur-

1 A great deal of confusion has surrounded the real identities of Ibn Mubārakshāh and Mullāzāde, who were often conflated with other figures. For their identification, see El-Rouayheb, "The Fourteenth-Century Islamic Philosophers".

ricula, and study practices. Many comments and modifications of Ottoman scholars were dependent on the arbitrations of such post-classical verifiers as the general framework.

In light of the formulations on God's unicity (*tawḥīd*) present at Ottoman medreses, this chapter intends to provide an intellectual background to the current discussion. After mentioning the early interreligious context of unicity debates, the chapter will first outline the doctrines included in classical Arabic philosophy – through referencing Avicenna's modal designation of God as the Necessarily Existent vis-à-vis his ontological conceptions, such as existence, quiddity/essence, and necessity. Afterwards, the chapter will trace the later interpretations of Avicenna's formulation by looking at how the philosophers' unicity appeared in Jurjānī's popular commentary on Ījī's *al-Mawāqif*, which was the main text for the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate.

#### 4.1 God's Unicity in Early Interreligious Debates

Going back to the early interreligious dialogues in Late Antiquity, God's unicity was one of the most referenced issues in the early Muslim theological corpus – both as theological attempt to describe God as One, and as apologetic to justify the Christian description of his consubstantiality. This is because unicity, on the one hand, concerned the central conception of Muslim monotheism and, on the other, represented a philosophical effort to find a logically coherent predication of the One (the Aristotelian-Neoplatonist First Principle).<sup>2</sup> From the ninth century onwards, Christian scholars penned debates in order to explain the ways in which how Christian theological corpus upheld the unity and trinity of God. For the Muslim critics though, the principles of the Trinity and hypostases in Eastern Christianity had apparent problems in the eyes of God's singularity, since their binary presence could imply plurality in God's essence.

In reply to his Muslim adversaries in his *Treatise on the Affirmation of the Unity of God*, the tenth-century Nestorian Christian scholar Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, for instance, attributed two different meanings to unicity: 'uniqueness' and 'oneness'. By using these different shades of meaning, he achieved a 'modulated' understanding of monotheism to prove that the Trinitarian formulation upheld the Divine Unity.<sup>3</sup>

The philosophical definition of God in the Islamic tradition, as well as ʿAdī's exposition, was based on Aristotle's Chapter Six of *Metaphysics* Λ, which stated that the One, i.e. the First Cause, is one neither as a genus nor a species, nor by virtue of some relations or as a continuous or indivisible being.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the One is 'one *qua* substance', and it has plurality only in virtue of the constituent parts of its definition, i.e. attributes that may be predicated of His divine essence. Also these aspects of the Trinity are inseparable from the One in divine knowledge since the Intellect is in-

2 Lizzini, "What Does *Tawḥīd* Mean?", 254.

<sup>3</sup> Lizzini, "What Does *Tawḥīd* Mean?", 263; Martini Bonadeo, "On Ideas in Motion", 242.

<sup>4</sup> In the words of Bertolacci, Avicenna places God's existence outside the context of common logico-ontological categories, saying that God is not a substance (Bertolacci, "The 'Ontologization' of Logic", 44).

separable from its knowing and the object of its knowledge.<sup>5</sup> In the cases of unicity and trinity, God is only one in definition, which implies that He is one in essence and, therefore, His multiplicity and diversity should be understood from a certain point of view not applicable to contingent beings.<sup>6</sup>

## 4.2 Background in Philosophy I. God as the Necessarily Existent (*al-wājib*)

The specific arguments in the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate unfolded in a particular philosophical context, which took its cue from the Muslim Peripatetic Avicenna. One of the most significant contributions of Avicenna's ontology was his introduction of modal concepts, such as necessity, possibility, and impossibility, when describing the existence of God in relation to that of other beings. All of these aspects of Avicennan philosophy found their ways into Timurid and Ottoman medrese handbooks in philosophical theology via modifications. To show how particular beings differ from God in terms of essence, existence, and modality, Avicenna defines God as *the* Necessarily Existent, that whose existence does not depend on the existence of any another, but rather must be necessary by virtue of being itself. In turn, he sees all other existents as being contingent on another, thereby addressing them as 'possibly existents'.<sup>7</sup>

There are various cosmological proofs of God's necessary existence, including arguments from distinct aspects, such as causality, priority, simplicity, and unicity. However, in order to argue for these aspects for God, the philosophers (represented here by Avicenna) must also consider the complex relationship among certain concepts, such as necessity, quiddity/essence, and existence, by reducing them into one in the reality of God to be able to acknowledge His unicity. Being *the* Necessarily Existent does not entail that this aspect is an attribute of God, but God's quiddity/essence itself is simply the same as the Necessarily Existent, suggesting that God does not have a quiddity apart from it. Thus, all these aspects must be essentially one in the Necessarily Existent, implying neither multiplicity nor particularity.<sup>8</sup> This formulation brought with it numerous questions discussed in later centuries: In what sense does contingent existence differ from God's

7 Hourani has provided various translated passages from four treatises along with certain sections from *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt* and *Dānish-nāma*, in which Ibn Sīnā concentrated on the question of necessary and possible existence (Hourani, "Ibn Sīnā"). Also on the Avicennan doctrine of God: Donaldson, "Avicenna's Proof"; Adamson, "From the Necessary Existent to God".

<sup>5</sup> Martini Bonadeo, "On Ideas in Motion", 243; Lizzini, "What Does *Tawḥīd* Mean?" 263; Endress, "Theology as a Rational Science", 232‑3.

<sup>6</sup> ʿAdī developed his position over time, arguing in his *Risāla fī tathbīt* that in addition to being one in definition, the Creator was also one in species. This point is linked to his defense of Christian Trinity since both definitions of the Creator provided valid explanations for the hypostases: God being one in species answers the question how three hypostases may be one God, while that God is one in definition answers the question how the one God may be three hypostases (Holmberg, *A Treatise*, 39‑40). Israel of Kashkar follows ʿAdī especially in the utilization of God's being one in species.

<sup>8</sup> This concept was an Avicennan trademark which may have found its way into the medieval Latin tradition via Thomistic commentators with certain modifications (Carlo, *The Ultimate Reducibility*). For an exposition of the Avicennan thesis that the Necessarily Existent is 'pure existence' and its textual influences in the medieval Latin tradition, see Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 78‑82; for the critique of the Avicennan unity of God's essence and existence by Ockham (1237‑1347) and Duns Scotus (1265‑1308), 83‑4.

existence? How could it be deemed that different from contingent beings, God's existence is not composite? More importantly, how could the relationship between God's essence and existence be construed so that His existence would not connote multiplicity?

## 4.3 Background in Philosophy II. Existence, Quiddity/Essence, and Necessity in Post-Classical Philosophical Theology

As indicated above, the distinction between essence and existence is a distinguishing feature of Avicennan metaphysics.<sup>9</sup> It is a contested phenomenon which continued to haunt the post-classical commentators of Graeco-Arabic philosophy in the following centuries<sup>10</sup> including the early Ottoman scholarship;11 and this feature pervades the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate. This notional differentiation was also carried over into the ontological proof of unicity, consequently including necessity in its formulation.12 Avicenna did not distinguish God's necessity from His existence, since this would cause diversity in His unity. He regarded God's 'necessary existence' on a par with His 'necessity of existence', thereby implying the unicity of these notions (essence, existence, and necessity) in God's essence. Avicenna sees essence and existence as inseparable and mutually correlative, such that existence may be interpreted as being always and everywhere a 'necessary concomitant' of the essence.<sup>13</sup>

Following the third-century Hellenistic philosopher Plotinus' principle of simplicity, Avicenna points that quiddity and existence correspond to the distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically necessary existence, which makes him achieve a simpler formula than the Neoplatonists since, according to the latter, God as One is distinguishable from God as God. God exists through or by virtue of His quiddity and so has 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*) that is entirely of His own. 'Many-in-the-one' seems to be a fundamental aspect of His essence,<sup>14</sup> such that God's proper existence is unique to him with no 'acquired sense of existence' (*wujūd muḥaṣṣal*) in the mind or the concrete. It should be noted that the philosophers are interpreted to have made a distinction between God's 'special existence' and the universal category of existence, which is also called 'absolute existence'

<sup>9</sup> For the Avicennan distinction between quiddity/essence and existence, see Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, 149‑53; "Essence and Existence"; Bertolacci, "The Distinction of Essence and Existence".

<sup>10</sup> For the post-classical context, see Eichner, "Essence and Existence"; Benevich, "The Essence-Existence Distinction".

<sup>11</sup> For example, the fifteenth-century scholar ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Ṭūsī finds Avicenna's equating existence with essence in God faulty following Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 209‑29).

<sup>12</sup> With regard to different senses of necessity (i.e. essential versus predicative) and how this terms is related to the distinction between essence and existence, see Benevich, *Essentialität und Notwendigkeit*, 43‑70.

<sup>13</sup> This is a formulation that also diffused into the Christian Latin tradition: Black, "Mental Existence", 25; and MacIntyre, "Essence and Existence", esp. 60. For the reception of the Avicennan concomitance of essence and existence in medieval Europe with regard to Aquinas, see Corrigan, "A Philosophical Precursor" and Wippel, "The Latin Avicenna". Aquinas recognizes the primacy of the existential over the essential order, whereas Avicenna argues for the vice versa (Black, "Mental Existence", 44).

<sup>14</sup> Wisnowsky, "Essence and Existence", 31‑2.

(*wujūd muṭlaq*). This distinction was often conflated into one category, in which God is equated to 'absolute existence' by the later theologians and the Akbarī Sufis.<sup>15</sup>

The concept of pure quiddity is simple and ontologically distinct with essential constituents that are embraced all at once due to its essential irreducibility. God's pure quiddity preserves its irreducible and special mode of existence even when it is a part of a complex or a composite being as a mode that essentially precedes that of the universal existence; and it is not in itself a genus, although 'genus-ness' can be attached to it in the mind. As Damien Janos has argued, quiddity itself neither exists in the mind nor in the concrete in a contingent and composite mode, but exists in the mind in a mode which concerns only itself and which excludes all other things.<sup>16</sup> In God's intellect, quiddity is for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from His essence without producing multiplicity. This means that God can be regarded as only existence, as well as only necessity. In God, necessity, quiddity, and existence become one. In this context, existence and essence have been interpreted as being *coextensive* and *coimplicative* in Avicenna (albeit not coextensive in terms of acquired existence (*wujūd muḥaṣṣal*), which is restricted to things that owe their existence to another)<sup>17</sup> that is, extensionally identical but intentionally distinct.<sup>18</sup>

Examining the relationship among these three concepts in the context of the necessarily and possibly existents, Avicenna first considers the link among them by way of three possibilities, i.e. identicalness, a strong relation of concomitance, or a weaker form of accidentality. Eliminating the last two, he then demonstrates that equivalence is the best way to describe His nature ontologically. In order for God to retain His unicity, His necessity should be equal to His quiddity/essence, which is due to His necessary existence. This formulation links all three concepts, i.e. existence, quiddity, and necessity, without undermining God's singularity.

For the Ottoman context at hand, the key passage is included in Jurjānī's post-classical handbook of philosophical theology, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, a commentary on the Il-Khanid theologian Ījī's popular work with the same title. Position Two, Observation One, Intention Three (2.1.3) in the book is a section that lists all accepted positions in philosophy and theology with regard to the relationship between existence and quiddity/essence among the necessarily and possibly existents. According to Ījī/Jurjānī's outline there are three cases: **(i)** Ashʿarī's view that existence and essence are identical in both God and the possibly existents; **(ii)** the philosopher's (and the Akbarī Sufis')19 view that existence and essence are only identical for God but su-

15 Altaş, "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği", 110‑13.

16 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 189, 201‑3, 211.

17 See Jari Kaukua's "Review Article" of Damien Janos' *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, especially pages 156‑7. For the distinction of special and acquired existences, see Ibn Sīnā's *Madkhal* I.12 in Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifāʾ*, 471‑88, 500‑1, 531‑6.

18 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 393‑2, 531. Yet it should be also noted that essence enjoys a logical priority over existence (Wisnowsky, "Essence and Existence", 29).

19 The term also appears in Jurjānī's designation of these types of the Sufis with the epithets of *muwaḥḥid*, *wujūdiyūn*, *muḥaqqiq*. The main differences between the philosophers and the Akbarī Sufis are as follows: the latter group does not hold the distinction between *wujūd khāṣṣ* and *wujūd muṭlaq*, basing their method on *kashf* rather than *ʿaql*, and taking existence as negative (*salbī*). For instance, see the case of the thirteenth-century Akbarī Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī peradded for possibly existents; and **(iii)** the theologians' view that existence is superadded or occurs externally to essence both in the necessarily and possibly existents.<sup>20</sup>

According to Ījī, the philosophers' rationale is based on the notion that if existence is superadded to God's quiddity/essence, then existence has to subsist in it, implying need, composition, or multiplicity, the aspects to be avoided for unicity. Subsequently, subsistence and superaddition imply that existence is in need of a quiddity, and the relation of need is only reserved for the possibly existents whose existence depends on others.<sup>21</sup> One of the main reasons why the post-classical theologians tended to go against Avicenna's equating existence (and necessity) with quiddity/essence in necessary existence is that the theologians had the doctrinal tendency of **(a)**  refuting 'modulation'; **(b)** seeing existence as a species'/genus' nature; **(c)**  omitting the distinction between special and absolute existence; **(d)** equating 'abstracted existence' with 'absolute existence'; and **(e)** regarding that absolute quiddity has existence.<sup>22</sup> And all these points that Ījī covered also appear in the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate.

As a conclusion, neither Ījī nor his commentator Jurjānī seems to single out one view over another with a clear preference, which leads one to wonder whether they were agnostic about the exact nature of existence and quiddity/ essence vis-à-vis one another.<sup>23</sup> Alnoor Dhanani has recently observed that if we assume that mental existence is ruled out, then the first case that is attributed to Ashʿarī above would probably be Ījī's preferred position, whereas Jurjānī was probably inclined towards the third option **(iii)** above in order to rule out the philosophers' equating necessity with quiddity in God.<sup>24</sup>

The philosophers argue that as God's existence and quiddity/essence are equal to one another, it could be assumed that necessity will be the same as both concepts in the Necessarily Existent so that God's unicity still holds to be true. And in the post-classical paradigm, the nature of *iʿtibārāt*, which is only distinguished in the mind conceptually, can be interpreted as having conformed to the philosophers' equating necessity and existence in necessary existence.

<sup>(</sup>Altaş, "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği", 104‑12; Keklik, *Allah-Kâinat ve İnsan*, 73‑5). With regard to the Sufi doctrine *waḥdat al-wujūd*, Jurjānī has further other texts including his gloss on al-Iṣfahānī's commentary on the *Tajrīd*, which affirm the view **(ii)** above (see Heer, "Five Unedited Texts").

<sup>20</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 135‑68; for the philosophers' view, 135‑7. For the summary of accepted positions in philosophy and theology in this medrese handbook, Dhanani, "*Al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām*", 381‑4. A fourth option can be attributed to the Muʿtazilites, who, different from the philosophers, argued that non-existent (*maʿdūm*) beings can exist conceptually in the external immutability (*thubūt*); that is why, existence can be superadded to quiddity. With regard to the statuses of existence and quiddity among the possibly existents, see İbn Kemāl, "Risāla fī ziyāda al-wujūd".

<sup>21</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 135‑6.

<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that Jurjānī's views regarding the nature of existence vis-à-vis God are also included in two other texts in addition to *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*: his treatise on *marātib al-wujūd* and gloss on Iṣfahānī's commentary on the *Tajrīd* (Heer, "Five Unedited Texts"; Altaş, "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği", 105‑6). Among the Islamic manuscripts copied for Meḥmed II, there is a manuscript at the Topkapı Palace R.472 belonging to Jurjānī, *Risāla al-wujūdiyya*, a simple production with small blind-tooled stamps in the form of the *tschang* knot (see Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 311).

<sup>23</sup> Eşref Altaş seems to be in the same opinion, though he also expresses that Jurjānī tends to have an unfavorable take on the Akbarī Sufi position as implied in his *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 35 (also quoted in Altaş, "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği", 121‑2).

<sup>24</sup> Dhanani, "*Al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām*", 384.

The Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate concerns the validity and use of this formulation in the context of unicity. Zeyrek maintains that the philosophers' proof is incomplete since necessity is a superadded accident to quiddity which cannot be defined in the way that the philosophers formulated. Ḫocazāde's counterposition in this context features a synthesis with Avicennan metaphysics, highlighting the dynamism and flexibility of fifteenth-century Ottoman knowledge production (see § 4.4).

#### 4.4 The Rise of Conceptualism. *Iʿtibārāt*, Avicenna, and Beyond

With its probably roots in Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's separation between universals and quiddities,<sup>25</sup> *iʿtibār* is a term initially employed by Avicenna with a variety of meanings. According to Damien Janos' recent study, the expression *iʿtibār* appears 324 times in all *al-Shifāʾ* with its conceptual, psychological, and logical shades of meaning in Avicenna's philosophy.<sup>26</sup> An *iʿtibār* is neither faculty- nor object-specific, and can be infinitely multiplied at will – a term that chiefly refers to the rational operations of the mind and its ability to unite and divide intellectual/mental conceptions, as well as creating and multiplying relations and distinctions between them.<sup>27</sup> *Iʿtibārāt* require that a mental operation is feasible or possible and its object intrinsically conceivable, in which human mind can devise various considerations with no multiplicity.<sup>28</sup> They are not primary or necessary notions, rather suppositional and presumed. Strictly speaking, an *iʿtibār* is divested from *nafs al-ʾamr* ('the thing in itself' or 'the fact of the matter') since it is purely conceptual and suppositional.<sup>29</sup>

The term also appears in Islamic philosopher and physician Abuʾl-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 547/1152 [?]), who employed it as a distinguished method of reflection through careful arbitration.<sup>30</sup> In post-classical philosophy, the term was further modified into a broader category launched by the twelfthcentury scholar Suhrawardī, probably having influenced by the Persian mathematician and philosopher ʿOmar Khayyām (d. 526/1132), who was said to have incidentally passed away while perusing a section highly relevant to the current discussion, i.e. "the One and the Many" included in the Metaphysics of Avicenna's *Shifāʾ* III.2‑3.<sup>31</sup>


29 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 121‑2, 206. For a recent study on *nafs al-ʾamr* as objective truth and Taşḳöprizāde's new formulation of this term in the Ottoman context, see Spiker, *Things as They Are*, 1‑5, 82‑99, 155‑62.

30 To bracket out Avicennan epistemological realism, Abuʾl-Barakāt used *iʿtibār* as a method of critiquing apodeixis in philosophy, i.e. "establishing something through personal reflection or careful consideration" (Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 563, 490, 493‑7; also see Pines, "Nouvelles études", 97). On a similar note the medieval Muslim poet Usāma ibn Munqidh (d. 584/1188) used the term as "a way of gaining knowledge by contemplation via instructive examples or proofs" (Ibn Munqidh, *The Book of Contemplation*, xxxiv; via Nur's unpublished paper "On the Meaning(s) of *iʿtibār* in Arabic").

31 The earliest account on the life of Khayyām is in Ẓahīr al-Dīn al-Bayhāqī's *Tarīkh al-ḥukamāʾ al-Islām* completed before 549/1154‑55, which also served as the source for *Chahār Maqāla* of Niẓām-e ʿArūḍī (d. 552/1157 [?]), as well as *Nuzha al-arwāḥ* of Muḥammad Shahrazūrī (d. af-

<sup>25</sup> Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 81, 85; Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes*, 53.

The term *iʿtibār* was construed as a critique of the distinction between essence and existence in God<sup>32</sup> by later Avicennan scholars,<sup>33</sup> as well as Abū Ḥashim's controversial coinage of *aḥwāl* (states) as an intermediary category that neither falls under existence nor non-existence. Abū Ḥashim devised his theory of states as a response to the Muʿtazilite position, which entailed that all attributes could collapse into God's self, a case, according to him, that reduced the semantic content of God's attributes into meaningless attributive assertions.<sup>34</sup> To uphold against the skepticism about the real existence of attributes including existence, Khayyām undermines *aḥwāl* since this principle is in violation of the Law of Excluded Middle enunciated by Aristotle, i.e. that there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate.<sup>35</sup> Khayyām rather sees existence as conceptually (*maʿnā iʿtibārī*) superadded (*zāʾid ʿalā*) (not extramentally), which can be separated in the mind (*tafṣīl fī al-ʿaqlī*).<sup>36</sup>

In his translation-cum-commentary of a treatise on existence attributed to Avicenna, *Risāla fī al-wujūd*, Khayyām divides attributes into various types, such as essential (*dhātī*), accidental (*ʿaraḍī*), necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), as well as a fourth category, conceptual (*iʿtibārī*), the latter of which is separable from the characterized thing *only* in the faculty of estimation (*mufāriq biʾl-wahm*) without any existence in the outside world.<sup>37</sup> Based on the distinction between an existential and an accidental attribute, the classic example that Khayyām used to address non-existential mental constructs is 'blackness' as color, a quality not located in a body. For Khayyām, the observed 'blackness' in bodies is indeed something superadded in concrete reality, yet when 'blackness' is separated from the corporeality, that is, as the attribute of colorness, it indicates something conceptual/mental without

33 Unlike the commonly held view, Suhrawardī rather responds to Rāzī's univocity of existence (Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 46).

34 Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 36; Thiele, "Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī's (d. 321/933) Theory of 'States' (*aḥwāl*)".

35 Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 176, 199‑200.

37 Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 37.

ter 687/1288). See Denison Ross, Gibb, "The Earliest Account of ʿUmar Khayyām", 470 (Arabic) and 473 (English).

<sup>32</sup> Wolfson translates the term as "mental and estimative considerations" (*iʿtibārāt dhihniyya wa-taqdīriyya*) (Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 199). By ruling out certain aspects regarding the relationship between quiddity and existence, Suhrawardī argues that existence cannot be a concrete thing that could be added to the former, and existence should be taken among "beings of reason" (*iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya*). As for mental considerations vis-à-vis the Necessarily Existent, see al-Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 45‑7, 83, as well as Sajjad H. Rizvi, who offered the translation mental considerations or notionals for *iʿtibārāt*, in "An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?", 222‑3. The nature of 'beings of reason' (sing. *ens rationis*) garnered the attention of scholars like the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez who, in one of his expositions, defined them as "shadows" of true beings that can only be treated derivatively and distinct from real essences (Novotný, *Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel*, 38; for the intension and extension of 'beings of reason', see also 48‑51). As for mental considerations as opposed to extramental realities in mathematics and natural philosophy, Fazlıoğlu, "Hakikat ile İtibar".

<sup>36</sup> For the edition of the text: Khayyām, "Risāla fīʾl-wujūd", 106, 113; Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 413, 498.

an existential notion.<sup>38</sup> *Iʿtibārī* notions associated with God are only manyin-the-one without violating His oneness.<sup>39</sup>

The term *iʿtibārī* is often used in opposition to *wujūdī*, which denotes external existence, that is, a real external addition. This term is regarded within the broadly construed category of mind-dependent concepts, that is, intellectual predicates that we are bound to use in all cognition. These entities consist of a wide variety of logical second-order concepts, such as universal, particular, genus, species, and differentia, as well as second intentions/intelligibles like quiddity/essence, existence, privation, necessity etc.40 The *iʿtibārī* nature of necessity according to Suhrawardī41 was a conceptualization that denoted no real value, in which, for him, all reality relies on the hierarchy of light; in other words, quiddity and existence are only distinguishable in the mind, not in concrete reality.42 This view is also acknowledged in common handbooks of philosophical theology studied at Ottoman medreses, as in the case of Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī's (d. 748/1348) commentary on the *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād*. 43

The term was initially rejected by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī in *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-ḥikma* due to his earlier Ashʿarite epistemological convictions.44 The nature of mental considerations and their utilization for certain philosophical terms, such as existence and quiddity, were also common issues discussed among the works of following generations of verifiers, such as Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 648/1250) and the above-mentioned Iṣfahānī, who were famed early commentators on the *Tajrīd* by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (Rāzī's great rival in interpreting Avicenna). Following the philos-

38 Khayyām, "Risāla fīʾl-wujūd", 103‑4; Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 38‑40; Aminrazavi, *The Wine of Wisdom*, 180‑3.

39 Hayyam, *Rubaîler ve Silsilat-al-Tartîb*, XXVIII, as well as 130 (Persian) and 180 (Turkish). Also see the term *bi-iʿtibār-ı ʿaqlī* in Khayyām's Persian translation-cum-commentary of an invocation to God attributed to Avicenna concerning God's existence, unicity, eternity, omnipotence etc. In Khayyām's Persian translation, the passage is as follows: "He does not belong to any genus because there is no plurality in His Self; neither *intellectually* (*bi-iʿtibār-ı ʿaqlī*), so as to make the limit of His essence plural by Him, like the limit of whiteness in color and quality; nor (physically) in the composition parts, like that of a body in matter and form. In the names and meanings attributed to God, such as existent and necessary are adjectives and relative concomitants which do not constitute plurality, like some many relative and negative names" (Akhtar, "A Tract of Avicenna", 228 [Persian], and 223 [English]).

40 Starting with Suhrawardī, *iʿtibārāt* has been defined as 'second intentions', i.e. necessary entailments of the first-order concepts in which they are grounded – rather than arbitrary mental constructs (Kaukua, "*Iʿtibārī* Concepts in Suhrawardī", 41‑2, 48‑53). The term is also translated as "intellectual frictions" in Walbridge, *Science of Mystic Lights*, 45‑6 or "beings of reason" in al-Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, xxi.

41 The term can be traced to Suhrawardī's *Mashāriʾ* (Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 138).

42 Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 45. Following the Avicennan thesis that essence and existence are identical in necessary existence, Abharī also endorses the view that existence is a mental construct in his *Muntahā al-afkār* via the influence of Suhrawardī, as opposed to Rāzī's understanding of existence that is being shared without its gradations (Eichner, "Essence and Existence", 126‑8).

43 Iṣfahānī often mentions the term 'mental consideration' in the contexts of specification (al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawāʾid*, 1: 425‑6), singularity (437‑8), as well as the ontological modalities, such as necessity, possibility, and impossibility (253). Furthermore, he counts quiddity, essence, reality (477), thingness (243), cause and effect (489) as secondary intentions that are sometimes used interchangeably with mental considerations. This is because both denote abstractions derived from primary intentions (i.e. from things with extramental existence).

44 Except in a passage in *al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya*, Rāzī does not seem to accept mental existence arguably due to its lack of presence (*ḥudūr*) (Eichner, "'Knowledge by Presence'", 118‑20). ophers' position, the latter holds that existence as a mental consideration is equal to the quiddity of God's reality (*ḥaqīqa*), thereby being self-evident (*badīhī*), whereas the former takes existence as a reality that precedes the quiddity of reality due to its being simple, by concluding that they cannot be the same.<sup>45</sup>

The common view in the post-classical world was that existence and necessity are mental considerations denoting no concrete reality; thereby being connected to quiddities in general but as in a relationship of priority/ posteriority. There are certain other objections to both Ḥillī's and Iṣfahānī's positions in the context of fifteenth-century scholarship. For instance, Jurjānī objects to the former saying that existence does not have extramental existence, hence existence and quiddity are self-evident *iʿtibārāt* belonging to the same type of entities with no relationship of priority/posteriority. As an objection to this point, though, the Ottoman scholar Taşḳöprizāde brings a twist to the self-evident nature of existence vis-à-vis quiddities in his epitome on the *Tajrīd*. He argues that existence cannot be solely reduced to a mental consideration because it is a mental concept that can be abstracted from extramental existents or, more precisely, that it is a secondary intention/intelligible 'by modulation' (*biʾl-tashkīk*).46 The exact natures of existence and quiddity will continue to occupy a significant place in the centuries to come, and there is much that is worthy of further study, not least the further uses of *iʿtibārāt* in metaphysics, but also its analogous transformations over time in *ḥikma* and *kalām*.

#### 4.5 Main Intellectual Context I. God's Unicity in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*

The main focus of the Zeyrek-Ḫocazāde debate is a discussion about the proof of God's unicity included in Position Five, Observation Three (5.3) of Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, a section that outlines various proofs by various Muslim schools of thought (including theologians and philosophers) marshalled against the claims of the Dualists (see Appendix). More specifically, the discussion covers various versions of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* (the proof from reciprocal hinderance), a classical formulation devised against the possibility of one or more beings with absolute attributes who could act as partners to God – thereby concluding that the world would not be able to come into existence due to each partner's conflicting powers.47 This proof is directed at preventing the existence of two gods at the same time, by showing the impossibility of a commonality between two such existents, and by further affirming that God has to be unique and one.<sup>48</sup>

Owing to the influence of Avicenna's ontology, post-classical theologians continued to classify 'what exists' into the categories of the necessarily and possibly existents.49 As the only being with necessary existence, God was of-

48 Gimaret, "Tawḥīd".

<sup>45</sup> Altaş, "Taşköprizâde'nin Tecrîd Hâşiyesi", 2319.

<sup>46</sup> Altaş, "Taşköprizâde'nin Tecrîd Hâşiyesi", 2320.

<sup>47</sup> See a short overview of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* and Taftāzānī's hesitation in acknowledging this proof (al-Taftāzānī, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, 37‑9; Yavuz, "Vahdâniyyet", 428).

<sup>49</sup> The concept of God as the Necessarily Existent here existed in pre-Avicennan theological discussions but the ontological distinction between the necessarily and possibly existents was

ten used interchangeably with the term 'the Necessarily Existent' in postclassical manuals of philosophical theology. Since now God can be defined as the Necessarily Existent, the interplay between the concepts of necessity and existence becomes significant in the philosophers' version of this proof.

All Muslim schools in both philosophy and theology agreed on the validity of this proof's logical consequence, because the proof from reciprocal hinderance was one of the central arguments upholding the main tenet of monotheism, which underscored the singularity (*waḥdāniyya*) and oneness (*aḥadiyya*) of God.<sup>50</sup> Though used interchangeably, it should be noted that both terms have certain nuances in theology and Sufism: *waḥdāniyya* expressed a superior notion defined as recognizing God's unity vis-à-vis His essence, attributes, and other creations in a universal way (*kullī*). *Aḥadiyya*, on the contrary, denotes oneness as in knowing God's essence through His essence without taking His attributes and creations into the equation.<sup>51</sup>

Over the centuries, not only did Muslim scholars develop arguments to eliminate commonality and partnership to God in order to demonstrate God's oneness, but they also avoided attributing to Him those particular qualities used for the possible existents, such as commonality, multiplicity, individualization, and composition,52 because all of these qualities implied contingency and particularity, as opposed to necessity, oneness, or singularity. Nevertheless, a contention arose among these schools especially when the theologians further investigated whether the philosophers based their proofs on premises that had been demonstrated to be certain and valid, having looked for loopholes in their argumentation.

Muslim philosophers provided proofs in favor of monotheism, but their proofs resulted from their conceptualizations and terminologies and, therefore, drew fierce criticism from their theologian counterparts. For the latter group, the main problem of the philosophers was their premises, especially their assertions about the Necessarily Existent, i.e. that, in the case of God, necessity would be the same as quiddity/essence, as well as 'pure existence' (i.e. existence as it is), a debated Avicennan designation.

thanks to Avicenna. See Wisnovsky, "Avicenna's Islamic Reception", 203, 211.

<sup>50</sup> The tenth question of Jurjānī's famed debate with the Sufi shaykh Shāh Niʿmatullāh Walī in 815/1412 covers the question of unicity's definition. As an Akbarī Sufi, Niʿmatullāh Walī sees *tawḥīd* as a specific term closely associated with Ibn ʿArabī's ontological unity between God and His creation, a view that will be associated with *waḥdat al-wujūd* (the unity of being) in the generations to come. The tenth question concerns the difference between the terms 'the One' (*aḥad*) and 'the Singular/Unique' (*wāḥid*) in God, and Walī responds that God is One (*aḥad*) in essence but Unique in terms of attributes, such that he defines Unicity (*wāḥidiyya*) as the "unity of the attributes of the One which are subsumed in him". On the other hand, Jurjānī wants to distance unicity from its Akbarī connotations by arguing that *tawḥīd* presupposes the plurality of beings (*dar tawḥīd kardan taʿaddud lāzim ast*), and using this notion to prove waḥdat al-wujūd would be similar to "explaining water by referring to a desert image" (*ke bā sarāb-e bayābān ḥaqīqat-e āb-e ḥaywān rā rūshan gardānd*), so this term only encourages a seeker on the path of the truth but the real *tawḥīd* can only be experienced in the Afterlife (Binbaş, "Timurid Experimentation", 286‑9; for Jurjānī's Persian text, Muṭlaq, "Iskandariyya yā Risāla dar uṣūl al-dīn", 1446‑7).

<sup>51</sup> Uludağ, "Ahadiyyet", 484.

<sup>52</sup> As for commonality and composition as aspects to be avoided in the Necessarily Existent, see al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawāʾid*, 945‑7.

#### 4.6 Main Intellectual Context II. Aspects of the Philosophers' Proof

According to *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* 5.3, two philosophical artefacts filtered their way into the philosophers' version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ*. The first is by resorting to the 'argument from entification' (*taʿayyun*), which asserts that it is impossible to have two equal Necessarily Existents, since differentiation by entification will eliminate the possibility of a common quiddity and an entification existing at the same time. This will, otherwise, lead to the affirmation of a Necessarily Existent with entification, which is impossible.<sup>53</sup> There can be no such cases of the Necessarily Existents since entification refers to a being with a particular identity and existence that cannot be associated with God. In other words, in order for these Necessarily Existents to distinguish themselves from one another, the principle for differentiation, i.e. entification, has to penetrate into their individual haecceities. This will assume that each haecceity (*huwiyya*), which is applicable to all existents,<sup>54</sup> will be composite of both a common quiddity and an entification, thereby undermining the Necessarily Existent's singularity.<sup>55</sup>

The philosophers define necessity as "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others", just as the term 'entification' suggests a sense of 'differentiation'.<sup>56</sup> This crossover between necessity and entification is where Ḫocazāde bases his initial argument regarding how this meaning of necessity corresponds to the senses of necessity in the philosophers' initial thesis. The philosophers' reasoning here, according to *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, relies on the assertion that necessity is an existential notion (*wujūdī*), that is, externally existing (a term that is often used in juxtaposition to *iʿtibārī*). This approach might be based on a previous misrepresentation by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, an argument criticized by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in his *Ishārāt* commentary and ruled out in Ḫocazāde's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. 57

In later centuries, Jurjānī observes that in order to make their proof more complete and certain, the philosophers ought to demonstrate the existentiality of necessity, which is missing in their exposition. This is because the Necessarily Existent has to exist necessarily, and the philosophers assume that if existence is identical to the quiddity in the Necessarily Existent, then necessity will be equal to God's quiddity/essence *only due to the condition of existentiality*. Adding to this point, Jurjānī's text further asserts that the philosophers' version should be taken as incomplete, since it does not adequately demonstrate the immutability (*thubūt*) of necessity and entification, giving the impression that both can denote diversity when present together.

The philosophers' first criterion for the proof acknowledges the requirement of entification for necessity; the second aspect, which is also based on

<sup>53</sup> One of the exchanges between the Akbarī Sufi Qūnawī and Ṭūsī concern the status of 'entification' (*taʿayyun*) with regard to the necessarily and possibly beings. Ṭūsī argues that entification is only reserved for individuals since they need an additional entification to come out, whereas God cannot have this additional quality since His so-called 'entification' (i.e. appearing in existence) corresponds to His very reality – not amounting to whether it is equal to His existence or superadded to it (Konevî, *el-Mürâselât*, 117‑18).

<sup>54</sup> Al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawāʾid*, 2: 278.

<sup>55</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45‑6.

<sup>56</sup> Jurjānī defines entification as "that which distinguishes a thing from another insofar as it does not participate in the other" (al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-taʿrīfāt*, 65).

<sup>57</sup> Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 193. See also ch. 4 and Conclusion.

the same premises, asserts that, contrary to Avicenna's position about entification's being concomitant (*lāzim*) to quiddity in *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, 58 it has to be superadded (*yanḍimmu ʿalayhi*) to quiddity (and necessity) in order to prevent God's multiplicity. To prove this, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* then outlines two other possibilities, namely 'entification's requiring necessity' or 'necessity's and entification's requiring one another', ruling out both options by resorting to the problems of posteriority (*taʾakhkhur*) and separation (*infikāk*) in each aspect respectively. Ottoman scholars in the current debate indeed commented on both cases.

For Jurjānī, the reason why necessity requires a superadded entification is because entification, otherwise, may become a prior term or a cause to necessity. This is impossible because *first* necessity and entification have to be separated from one another since the latter is a superaddition; and *second*, necessity is the cause for entification (not the other way around). So, for Jurjānī, a thing is always in need of entification to differentiate itself from others, but entification does not necessarily need to be an 'existential' quality, that is, a real quality that externally exists. Quiddity requires entification to restrict the species' quiddity by an individual to be able to come out and, if this process of entification should be necessary for the case of God, then this leads us to the conclusion that there cannot be two differing Necessarily Existents existing and requiring entification at the same time.

In conclusion, in order to refute the position of the Dualists, *Sharḥ almawāqif* lists various positions regarding God's unicity that are put forth by various past schools of thought, including the philosophers' classical position. When parsing out their formulation, Jurjānī (and Ījī) observe that for the philosophers it is impossible for a thing to exist without entification, albeit not meaning that entification always requires necessity since it is also true for the possibly existents (i.e. *the first aspect*). In other words, once these two equally Necessarily Existents are differentiated from one another via entification, they would also contradict the principle of singularity that the Necessarily Existent connotes. This means that necessity requires entification to emerge and, for this reason, necessity cannot be more than one when requiring entification (i.e. *the second aspect*). By this way, the quiddity that requires an entification restricts the species of that quiddity by an individual, preventing another Necessarily Existent from appearing.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Avicenna's point about "entification's being a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*)", see al-Taḥtānī, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

<sup>59</sup> A similar view was also mentioned in Ḫocazāde in response to Ghazālī's point about the first aspect of the philosophers' proof (Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 181‑2; also see Conclusion).

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

# <sup>5</sup> "If Only Necessity Were God's Quiddity" **Analysis of the Debate**

**Summary** 5.1 Outline of Zeyrek's (Z) Position. – 5.2 Outline of Ḫocazāde's Position. – 5.3 Analysis of Zeyrek's Position. Necessity Occurs to God Accidentally. – 5.3.1 Day One. On the Philosophers' Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in God. – 5.3.2 Day Two. On Whether Any of the Stated Meanings Can Prove that the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God's Quiddity/Essence. – 5.3.3 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence. – 5.3.4 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*). – 5.3.5 Background to Z's Position on the Univocity of Existence. An Overview of Univocity, Equivocity, and Analogicity Among the Early Verifiers. – 5.3.6 Day Four. Concluding Remarks. – 5.3.7 Day Five. On Whether Necessity *Necessarily* Denotes a Single Essence. – 5.3.8 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis. – 5.4 Analysis of Ḫocazāde's Position. Making the Philosophers' Proof Cohere with Post-Classical Scholarship. – 5.4.1 An Invocation on God's Unicity. "He Neither Begets Nor Is Born". – 5.4.2 Day One. Ḫ's Response to Objections to the Philosophers' Thesis by J/ḤÇ. – 5.4.3 Day Two. On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers' Thesis and on Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular. – 5.4.4 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence. – 5.4.5 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification. – 5.4.6 Day Five. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*). – 5.4.7 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence according to Their Thesis.

According to the Ottoman biobibliographical sources, the debate between Zeyrek and Ḫocazāde continued for five days and, on the sixth, the Sultan asked the scholars to prepare copies of their responses for further evaluation on the next day. The extant texts reproduced in the Appendix below include these accounts from the last day of the debate. Due to the fragmented nature of both responses, it is hard to determine which objection followed which response exactly. Given that post-classical disputations followed a standard of specific sets of objections and explanations along with rejoinders and counter-objections in reply, the analysis below intends to include a possible timeline of the debate, matching each scholar's lemmata on a given day, and thereby showing how the debate evolved over the course of one week. The blow-by-blow reconstruction, in this sense, provides us with fresh insights about how the Ottoman scholars defended their points within the formal framework of debate etiquette and how the method of verification and referencing past scholarship were further utilized.

There are certain other hardships in reconstructing the event from extant texts. Both sides adamantly repeated their positions during the debate, having resisted any concessions to each other's arguments. This insistence was to such a point that they sometimes ended up repeating the same points over and over again. In their restatements each scholar also resorted to several points included in past texts, having digressed into various other aspects and positions in philosophy and theology, and this must be the very reason why the debate extended over a week with no resolution.

By referencing some key points and contexts related to the debate, my analysis divides the exchange into six days, assuming that the seventh was the final day of review based on the treatises prepared on the previous night. The name of scholars and some common terms below will be given in abbreviations, as in Zeyrek (Z), Ḫocazāde (Ḫ), Ījī (Ī), Jurjānī (J), Ḥasan Çelebi (ḤÇ), and the Necessarily Existent/God (NE).

The terms 'quiddity' (*māhiya*) and 'essence/quintessence' (*dhāt*) were often used interchangeably during the debate: the philosophers' 'quiddity' was an ontological term used by Avicenna, denoting 'whatness' or 'what a thing is [by essence (*biʾl-dhāt*)]', whereas 'essence', a term most commonly employed by the theologians, denoted the real underlying nature of a thing.<sup>1</sup> The preference and use of these terms signified each scholar's tendency in arbitration, thereby Ḫocazāde, as a scholar with a background in *ḥikma*/ *falsafa*, mostly employing the former definition, and Zeyrek, who was more prone to the theological literature, the latter. To avoid confusion, I used both terms interchangeably as in 'quiddity/essence'.

<sup>1</sup> Demir, "Zât", 148‑9. Quiddity or essence (*māhiya*), which arguably corresponds to 'whatness' or, arguably, 'pointability', is the result of conception and, in certain contexts, may be used as a synonym for 'quintessence' (*dhāt*) or reality/true nature (*ḥaqīqa*) (Arnaldez, "*Māhiyya*", 1261). Yet, technically speaking, there exists a distinction between the philosophers' *māhiyya* and the theologians' *dhāt*, such that the latter group considers *dhāt* as 'unoriginated' (*gayri majʿūl*), criticizing that the former considers the concept of *māhiyya* originated due to their wrong reasoning. In a treatise that dispels the assumptions of quiddities' origination (*jaʿl*), the Ottoman scholar İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) writes that the theologians like Ījī and Jurjānī mistake the philosophers' term for the Muʿtazilite concept of a "non-existent essence" (*dhāt maʿdūm*), such that the philosophers never claim that quiddities are originated. What they, instead, meant is that quiddity is not originated through the Originator's (hence God's) origination/making (*jaʿl al-jāʿil*, the Creator's creation) directly, but takes on the attribute *majʿūl* as an external and mental accident, which can well attach to a haecceity (*huwiyya*). It is in this sense for İbn Kemāl that quiddity is originated in their doctrines (Demirkol, "Kemalpaşazâdeʾye Göre Mahiyetin Mecʿuliyeti"). For the Arabic text of the treatise, see İbn Kemāl, "Risāla fī bayān maʿn al-jaʿl". For the Turkish translation, İbn Kemāl, "Yaratmanın (Caʿl) Anlamının Açıklanması".

## 5.1 Outline of Zeyrek's (Z) Position

## **DAY ONE: In Response to Ḫocazāde's (Ḫ) Initial Written Question (***Su'āl***) on the Philosophers' Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in the Necessarily Existent (NE)**

**Z's thesis and initial objection:** Necessity and quiddity cannot be the same for the NE because a commonality in both aspects would undermine God's unicity.

**Ḫ's written response:** The philosophers' argument is true based on the fact that necessity has three meanings, which are **(1)** "essence's requiring existence"; **(2)** "that which has no need of others in existence"; and **(3)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others". And the third affirms the meaning of necessity in their argument. This statement neither implies change nor diversity since both necessity and quiddity are mental considerations (*iʿtibārāt*).

**Zeyrek's further objection to Ḫ's premise:** The third meaning of necessity does not exactly support the philosophers' statement since it cannot be an 'intension' (*mafhūm*) but only 'what falls under' (*mā-ṣadaq*) the third meaning, i.e. its extension. That is why, necessity has to occur to God's quiddity/essence externally as a superaddition accidental to it.

### **DAY TWO: On Whether Any of These Three Meanings Can Prove That the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God's Quiddity/Essence**

**Z's two counter-objections: (a)** Even if the third meaning corresponds to the intension of their argument, there is no guarantee that God's quiddity/essence will be singular in this case. Necessity has to occur to quiddity externally as an attachment; therefore, such meanings cannot be affirmed with certainty. **(b)** There is no certain proof that the first two meanings, which Ḫ claims both to be connected to the third, do not *necessarily* imply compositeness in God.

### **DAY THREE: On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence**

**Z's objection to Avicenna:** As a response to Avicenna's statement that the NE is the same as 'pure existence', Z asks why one should assume that God would be equal to 'pure existence' just because it is singular. Here Z might have been mistaken 'pure existence' for 'absolute existence' – a debated distinction in Avicennan philosophy. Next, Z resorts to the theologian's position that existence has to be superadded to God's quiddity.

**Ḫ's repeated counter-objection to Z in defense of the philosophers:** Necessity's being the same as 'pure existence' in reality corresponds to the intension of necessity's third meaning. Then Ḫ turns the table, asking how his opponent could hinder this fact.

**Z's repeated reply:** All three meanings of necessity are accidental superadditions with no implications in reality. Far from being this statement's intension, the third meaning can only be regarded as a mental consideration that falls under this meaning, with the condition that necessity is something that occurs to God's reality externally. And this case does not even demonstrate certainly that necessity has to be a single reality.

## **DAY FOUR: On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (***Wujūdiyya***)**

**Z's provided proof and two objections:** First, Z states that Ḫ may define necessity as "that which distinguishes the NE from others"; yet God's quiddity/essence can also be defined as such, and there is no certain proof that this meaning is only restricted to necessity. Second, necessity's being without extramental existence means that it is 'relational' (*nisbī*), a term that does not denote an existential notion. Relational aspects can get into interaction with possibly existents by attaching to them externally, and there is again no certain proof that necessity here does not refrain from such relational qualities that lead to multitude. Z further follows the position shared by Ījī (Ī), Jurjānī (J), and Ḥasan Çelebi (ḤÇ), which states that necessity may well be considered 'non-existing' (negational, *ʿadamī*) for possibly existents. Necessity does not have to be externally existing as an accidental quality, and it may well be used in the context of contingent beings. Zeyrek might be misattributing absolute or specific existence here to the philosophers' 'pure existence'.

**Z's rebuttal and conclusion:** Necessity does indeed denote an existential notion/existentiality (*wujūdiyya*) as in the case of possibility. This means that necessity, like possibility, is an accident that could occur to things externally and, therefore, cannot be equal to God's quiddity/essence, which is beyond existence. Z's tries to point to a contradiction in the philosophers' thesis but arguably conflating absolute or specific existence again with 'pure existence'.

### **DAY FIVE: On Whether Necessity** *Necessarily* **Denotes a Single Essence**

**A possible objection by the philosophers:** Both Z and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī are wrong in asserting that according to Avicenna, God's essence can acquire a generic accident (*ʿaraḍ ʿāmm*) or a genus' nature (*ṭabīʿa jinsiyya*). Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī attributes this criticism to Rāzī's misinterpretation of Avicenna.

**Z's rejoinder:** Existence in general cannot be the same as the NE because it can be applied to other existents which may take on species. Species is simply a logical category to be avoided in God. Due to the univocity of this word, the existence of the NE may be applied to possibly existents, and hence Z also regards existence as an accidental superaddition that avoids change/diversity. By referencing J, Z denies that the philosophers' so-called 'pure existence' is different from the generic category of 'absolute existence' since the word 'existence' may reference a wide range of meanings.

#### **DAY SIX: On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis**

**Z's conclusion:** The definitions of necessity do not demonstrate whether necessity has to have a single essence or can be attached to multiple essences, a point ironically mentioned in Ḫ's adjudication on the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (see Conclusion). Z's implied conclusion is that both necessity and existence are generic concepts that occur to essences externally as accidental superadditions, thereby following the post-classical theologians' position as represented in **(iii)** (see § 3.3). This means that both of these concepts should be avoided when proving God's unicity, and the philosophers' proof is neither complete nor proven to be certainly true.

## 5.2 Outline of Ḫocazāde's Position

## **DAY ONE: Ḫ's Initial Response to Two Common Objections to the Philosophers' Thesis Addressed by J/ḤÇ**

**Ḫ's thesis and argument:** The third meaning of necessity corresponds to the meaning of necessity in the philosopher's initial statement about God's unicity.

**ḤÇ's two objections:** ḤÇ invalidates the philosophers' version of *burhān altamānuʿ*, by questioning **(a)** whether the denial of a partner in species could be applicable to the case of divine metaphysical principles (i.e. God), and **(b)** whether the existence's necessity has to refrain from receiving a haecceity (*huwiyya*). For ḤÇ both imply individuation and multiplicity.

**Ḫ's response:** Rather, the thrust of the debate is whether the negation of an equal partner is required for God's unicity when necessity is the same as His quiddity, not existence. Hence HÇ's above-mentioned objections are invalid.

## **DAY TWO: On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers' Thesis and On Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular**

**Exposition of Ḫ's thesis:** There are three meanings associated with necessity, which are **(1)** "essence's requiring existence", **(2)** "that which has no need of others in existence", and **(3)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others". The first two meanings are not directly related to the nature of the NE but the third corresponds to the meaning of necessity that appears in the initial premise of the philosophers' proof. This is true only if we assume that necessity is a mental consideration that has no reality in the extramental world.

**Restatement of Ḫ's thesis vis-à-vis ḤÇ:** The third meaning of necessity here appears more in the sense of 'specification' (in the sense of 'differentiation' only reserved for the NE), and ḤÇ does not disagree with this point.

**Ḫ's textual proof from J:** By referencing various passages from *Sharḥ almawāqif*'s section 2.1.3, a passage devoted to various positions on God's quiddity and existence, Ḫ shows that Ī/J also follow his position, by implying that the third meaning of necessity is valid and widely accepted.

**Ḫ's critique of J:** Unlike J, Ḫ states that the first two meanings of necessity may not be directly related to the third but they are also true and relevant in its demonstration. Ḫ also wants to establish a relationship between the first two and the third meanings.

**Ḫ's additional textual proof from J:** A note in the marginalia probably added by the author or a later commentator verifies that J sees the third meaning in a restricted sense as an extension (*mā-ṣadaq*) – not as an intension (*mafhūm*). Afterwards, Ḫ repeats a previous comment, noting that it will be inconceivable that necessity constitutes multiple essences or individuals since these will ultimately need to be differentiated from one another, which is impossible given that necessity is singular.

**Ḫ's additional textual proof from J:** The first two meanings imply a limitation in participation for two equal partners, and the same limitation should be considered in the case of the third. Otherwise, necessity here will imply accidentality, i.e. an *ʿāriḍ*-*maʿrūḍ* relationship.

**Şeyḫ Şücāʿ's argument:** According to the philosophers' proof, there is no guarantee that necessity has to be a singular entity with regard to God. One cannot be set for sure what meanings of necessity are appropriate here and, therefore, necessity here cannot correspond to existence as the philosophers claimed.

**Ḫ's response to Şeyḫ Şücāʿ:** Necessity should be taken as 'singular by default' when discussed in relation to the philosophers' God, especially because the third meaning (necessity as a differentiator of essences) does not undermine the singularity of the NE. It is because of this reason necessity can be equal to 'pure existence' in God as Avicenna claimed. It should be noted that Avicenna distinguishes 'absolute existence' from 'pure existence'. The former could be shared by multiple entities and linked to particular existences upon individuation, yet not the latter since, according to Avicenna, it corresponds to God's quiddity/essence.

### **DAY THREE: On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence**

**Ḫ's disclaimer from Ī/J:** Necessity is neither universal nor particular, so it can correspond to quiddity, which also has similar features and no real existence *in concreto*.

**Ḫ's point:** Each individual may well be composed of quiddity and entification, but this does not mean necessarily that both imply multiplicity or superaddition due to their mental nature.

**Ḫ's reply to Ī/J:** Each individual may need entification to be able to come out by distinguishing their natures, yet this does not mean that entification, which is also required for the NE's necessity to distinguish itself from others, denotes multiplicity. Thus, there is no question of unbelief here when entification is used in the context of the NE (this point is probably in reference to Z's claim of Ḫ's unbelief [*kufr*]).

**Question of entification:** Every individual might be composed of quiddity and entification in the philosophers' exposition, yet these are similar to genus and differentia, which do not really exist and only distinguished by the mind, as the term 'mental considerations' (*iʿtibārāt*) suggests. Ḫ here wants to show that the post-classical *iʿtibārāt* could be reconciled with Avicennan philosophy.

**Ḫ's further analogy regarding species' quiddities (sing.** *māhiyya nawʿiyya***):** Likewise, individuation and species' quiddities are mental capacities in consideration. The Glossator ḤÇ is wrong in thinking that necessity will be in need of intelligible parts (sing. *juzʾ ʿaqlī*) since necessity, as mentioned above, has neither universal nor particular existence for the case of the NE.

**ḤÇ's counter-evidence:** ḤÇ, similar to Shahrastānī/Rāzī and other Ottoman contemporaries like Ḫayālī<sup>2</sup> and Ṭūsī,<sup>3</sup> claims that the philosophers regarded necessity and existence as 'species' natures' (sing. *ṭabīʿa nawʿiyya*). This point takes him to the conclusion that both concepts lead to multiplicity and contingency; therefore, cannot be used when providing a proof for God's unicity. In this context, ḤÇ points out two possible contradictions in the philosophers' thesis that **(a)** existence and necessity are 'species natures', and **(b)** necessity relies on another thing due to its being a 'species nature'. Based on these, ḤÇ aims to show that, contrary to their claim, necessity and existence are accidents that are superadded to quiddity by occurring externally.

**Ḫ's reply:** J divides the philosophers' version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* into two aspects: the first aspect affirms the requirement of entification for necessity, whereas the second aspect states that entification has to be superadded to necessity and quiddity. Ḫ seems to affirm the validity of the first as long as necessity is not regarded as a 'species' nature' in the absolute sense, and argues that the second aspect supports the fact that entification is a superaddition. Ḫ's position here, different from the philosophers' argument, follows Taḥtānī's *al-Muḥākamāt*.

### **DAY FOUR: On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification**

**ḤÇ's critique of entification:** Ī/J argue that if the philosophers assume that entification requires necessity, then there will be circular reasoning. This is because necessity already requires the former by default. ḤÇ notes that there is no circularity here since entification's requiring necessity, which is based on the necessity's lack of requiring entification, does not imply circularity.

**Ḫ's response:** ḤÇ is misinformed since, as J explains in some other text, necessity is a cause for entification – not the other way around. It does not follow that entification requires necessity; and only if the latter statement is taken to be true, then there will be circularity. A similar analogy could be made with regard to first and second intentions, such that entification as a second intention cannot be a cause of a first intention.

**Ḫ's further citation from J:** Necessity is associated with 'pure causality' (*mujarrad al-ʿilliyya*); and entification, as argued by Taḥtānī, is only a superaddition to necessity. Ḫ does not follow Avicenna's view that entification is a '(necessary) concomitant' (*lāzim*).

<sup>2</sup> Ḫayālī, *Sharḥ al-ʿallāma al-Ḫayālī ʿalā al-nūniyya*, 164.

<sup>3</sup> ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 220‑1.

**Ḫ's further citation from J:** The definition of necessity depends on neither its requirement nor lack of requirement by entification or any other entity. That is, necessity is not bound by entification, and both terms are *non-entitative*, that is, mental considerations that are distinguished in the mind; therefore, they do not exist in the outside world as two separate entities at all. Here Ḫ uses a quote from J to strengthen his hand.

#### **DAY FIVE: On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (***Wujūdiyya***)**

**Question of existentiality:** The questions of whether necessity is externally existing and how it is further related to existence are begging for an answer in the eyes of certain theologians, such as Razī, Ī, Z, and ḤÇ. Due to these questions, ḤÇ deems that only the first two meanings may fall under 'necessity' in the philosophers' initial thesis. Ḫ rebuts ḤÇ's claim, stating that what is mentioned here as existence refers to the 'special existence' of God, a nuance which should not be confused with existence's absolute or particular senses. Given this fact, the third meaning, for Ḫ, matches with the very sense of necessity in the initial thesis.

#### **DAY SIX: On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence According to Their Thesis**

**Ḫ on the nature of the NE:** The terms related to the NE can neither be regarded as 'generic accidents' nor 'genus' natures', since these suggest multiplicity. And none of these terms makes the NE a composite being due to their *iʿtibārī* nature as mental considerations.

**Ḫ's conclusion regarding the nature of entification:** Ḫ signals that even though he is defending the validity of the philosophers' statement in their own paradigm, he follows Taḥtānī's *al-Muḥākamāt* in certain aspects, especially with respect to entification's being an accident to necessity and quiddity. Ḫ suggests that as long as entification is taken as a superadded quality, the question of multiplicity in God is resolved. Ḫ's enthusiastic support of certain aspects of the philosophers' view could simply be for the sake of the debate. In conclusion, Ḫ is in agreement with Z as long as necessity is mental (*iʿtibārī*) but not accidental (*ʿaraḍī*), since *iʿtibārāt* do not go against the philosophers' version of unicity.

## 5.3 Analysis of Zeyrek's Position. Necessity Occurs to God Accidentally

The main framework of the debate is based on the problem of commonality in necessity, which is a consequence for Z to be avoided in proofs from reciprocal hindrance (*burhān al-tamānuʿ*). The philosophers based their version of the proof on the assumption that necessity is identical to God' quiddity/essence of the NE. On the contrary, Z's intention here is to show that this premise cannot be validated with certainty as none of the stated meanings<sup>4</sup> (sing. *maʿnā*) of necessity can be equal to God's quiddity/essence or existence, thereby deeming the philosophers' overall proof incomplete. Later on, Z brings certain vexed aspects of Avicennan philosophy, such as 'pure existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), existential notion/existentiality (*wujūdiyya*), privation/non-existence (*ʿadm*), genus/species' nature (*ṭabīʿa jinsiyya*/*nawʿiyya*), and entification (*taʿayyun*), into discussion in order to demonstrate that there are certain irreconcilable aspects of the philosophers that contradict God's singularity. As a reply to Z's objections, Ḫ will show that these aspects (with the exception of entification and species' nature) are in line with their views and do not implicate composition in God's essence.

## **5.3.1 Day One. On the Philosophers' Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in God**

As the first lemmata of the extant texts suggest, Z objects to the philosophers' proof of God's unicity on the grounds that its consequent cannot be true because, otherwise, a commonality in necessity would imply a commonality in quiddity, by asserting multiplicity in God. Z disregards the reducibility of necessity and quiddity into one as in their description, by pointing out that this would imply differing commonalities for each of these concepts (necessity and quiddity) in God. On the first day, Z formulates his initial objection as follows:

If necessity (*wujūb*) were [to be] the same thing as quiddity (*māhiya*), a commonality (*ishtirāq*) in necessity would also participate in this very quiddity. **The poor soul [Ḫocazāde] states** that necessity (*wujūb*) here cor-

<sup>4</sup> As Damien Janos observes, 'meaning' (*maʿnā*) here is a generic Avicennan term "employed to describe the quidditative meaning itself, as well as the internal or constitutive elements that compose it and, finally, to the concomitants that are entailed by it" (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 655). That is to say, meanings may correspond to the quidditative meaning itself, the intension of a composition, or its external concomitants. In Avicennan philosophy, the term 'meaning' may suggest a variety of connotations based on logical, psychological, and metaphysical contexts. In Arabic logic, 'meaning' designates a notion in abstraction from any ontological consideration. In metaphysics, similar to the term *iʿtibār*, it is often associated with the conceivable and enunciable aspects of quiddity, whereas different from the former, 'meaning' has a emphasis on the intrinsic intelligibility of pure quiddity (rather than those of generic quiddities associated with the universals). Furthermore, 'meaning' in metaphysics may also describe the quiddity in itself (see "1.3. Quiddity in Itself as a Meaning or Idea (*maʿnā*)", in Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 128‑52; esp. 132, 137, 143, 656). In the context of Avicenna's *al-Ibāra* (*De interpretatione*) in *al-Shifāʾ*, meaning does not necessarily fall under a fixed ontological category (i.e. neither mental nor extramental) with a sense of the signification of an expression (Mousavian, "Avicenna on the Semantics of *Maʿnā*"). In the context of Abuʾl-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Pines defines *maʿnā* as 'thought-content', which is an attribute of mental forms (*ṣuwar dhihniyya*) linked to the medieval *intentio* (Pines, "Studies in Abuʾl-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's Poetics and Metaphysics", 279) – though Gutas will later distance 'intention' from the Avicennan *maʿnā* (Gutas, "The Empiricism of Avicenna", 430‑1).

responds to three meanings (sing. *maʿnā*): [necessity defined as] **(i)** "essence's (*dhāt*) requiring existence"; **(ii)** "that which has no need of others in existence"; and **(iii)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others". There is no doubt that neither of the first two meanings assumes that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent since both meanings are only mental considerations (sing. *al-iʿtibārī*). Then what is intended by the philosophers' statement about necessity's being the same as the Necessarily Existent's quiddity only falls under the third meaning (*mā yaṣdiqu ʿalayhi*), but it is not [the same as] the very meaning itself. Then [there is] no doubt for a rational man that the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is not the intension (*mafhūm*) of what distinguishes essence [as in **(iii)**] but, rather, this intension is accidentally superadded to (*ʿāriḍ lahu*) essence.

Z begins his initial objection by quoting his opponent's initial written response ordered by the Sultan, which includes three historical meanings of necessity purported by the philosophers. These definitions are: **(1)** "essence's requiring existence", **(2)** "that which has no need of others in existence", and **(3)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others". Based on these, necessity *is* the same thing as the quiddity of the NE, *not only* because the third meaning listed here validates this statement, *but also* this statement would not insinuate multiplicity in reality. Necessity and quiddity can be regarded as two separate entities *only* mentally. Ḫ, in turn, will base his position on the premise that one of the definitions of necessity directly fulfills the meaning included in the initial statement.

As an immediate objection to Ḫ's premise, Z then asserts that the first two meanings of necessity do not support its being the same as quiddity. Instead, the only possible case could be that this statement may only *fall under* the third meaning as its *extension* – not exactly corresponding to its meaning per se. To show that none of the meanings of necessity can correspond to the philosophers' usage, Z here resorts to a distinction based on 'what a term designates' (extension) versus 'what it means' (intension).<sup>5</sup> In post-classical logic, *mā-ṣadaq* is often contrasted to *mafhūm* such that the *mafhūm* of a concept is the meaning or intension, and its *mā-ṣadaq* is what it is true of and what falls under this concept as extension. Thus, *mafhūm* gives the universal meaning. The *mafhūm* of a human being, for instance, is rational animal, whereas its *mā-ṣadaq* includes an ostensive definition, as in individual human beings that fall under this concept – a term that ultimately suggests multiplicity and diversity. If two things are said to have different intensions but the same extension, then it means that they convey distinct meanings, referring to the same set of entities.<sup>6</sup>

This point takes Z to the conclusion that necessity cannot be the same as quiddity – due to the fact that the third meaning corresponds to the extension of quiddity, not to its intension. This resolution suggests that necessi-

<sup>5</sup> In intensional logic these terms distinguish an expression's intension (roughly, its 'sense' or 'meaning') from its extension ('reference' or 'denotation'). See Garson, "Intensional Logic". In the context of the ninth-century dispute on the consubstantiality of God between the neo-Arian Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Arabic philosopher Kindī, intension and extension were defined as "undistributed and distributed commenness" in the context of philosophy and logico-semantics (see Schöck, "The Controversy").

<sup>6</sup> Bertolacci, "The Distinction of Essence and Existence", 260; for extension, 275.

ty is something that occurs to God's quiddity externally (*al-ʿāriḍ lahu*), attaching to it accidentally. For Z, none of the definitions above directly gives this meaning as a 'universal' that exactly corresponds to the philosophers' statement; however, the concept of necessity, as restated here, may only fall under this meaning, which makes the philosophers unable to demonstrate the validity of their statement with certainty.

## **5.3.2 Day Two. On Whether Any of the Stated Meanings Can Prove that the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God's Quiddity/Essence**

**In that case, we say** that what you claimed about compositeness (*tarkīb*) with respect to multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent follows that if 'what falls under' this statement were to be **[120b]** the intension of necessity, then the veracity of an 'accidental affection' (*ʿāriḍ*) occurring to an 'object of accident' (*maʿrūḍ*) would be a single reality with two isolated constituents (sing. *fard*). This is impossible because why would it not be permissible that two different essences that distinguish themselves [from one another] would not resort to the need for the first two meanings without the implication of compositeness (*luzūm al-tarkīb*)? Consequently, the unicity of the Necessarily Existent, in that case, cannot be established by the meanings of "essence requiring His existence" and "that which has no need of others in terms of His existence".

On the second day, Z provides two counter-objections. The first is a counter-objection to Ḫ's possible answer by repeating that the meaning of necessity addressed in the philosophers' statement cannot be the exact meaning/intension of the third. For Z, avoiding the accidentality of necessity will undermine God's singularity since, by this way, God can be also denoted as a single reality with two separate constituents. In his first counter-objection, the headstrong Z repeats this previous point that an *ʿāriḍ*-*maʿrūḍ* relationship is the best way to describe the attachment of necessity to God's essence/quiddity without undermining His singularity. This is because *ʿāriḍ* and *maʿrūḍ* are just two accidental units in a single reality of God that occur externally – without directly affecting His quiddity/essence.<sup>7</sup>

Second, Z objects to Ḫ's other claim that all three definitions of necessity has a role in the philosophers' initial statement since the first two meanings provide support for the third. Z here challenges Ḫ to demonstrate that the 'differing essences' mentioned in the first two meanings of necessity would not imply compositeness in God. Z's precipitate attack seems to ignore Ḫ's earlier comment that the first two meanings are already mental conceptions (*iʿtibārāt*) with no implications on His singularity. Z's main intention is to show that necessity, as defined by the philosophers, can come across as an accidental entity and this, in turn, undermines its essentiality vis-àvis God. Yet, as Ḫ suggests, necessity's being a mental conception does not still undermine this, and the post-classical designation of *iʿtibārāt* could be reconciled with the paradigm of classical Arabic philosophy.

<sup>7</sup> The expression *ʿāriḍ lahu* denotes an external additional or attachment to something. Izutsu translates the term as "that which occurs or happens to externally" (Izutsu, *The Concept and Reality of Existence*, 91).

## **5.3.3 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence**

On the third day the discussion moves to another relevant question, whether necessity is the same as existence as the philosophers claimed. Avicenna is known to have arguably equated the Necessarily Existent (God) with 'pure existence', and this controversial formulation incurred the criticism of the theologians in the centuries to come. As Ḫ makes a reference to Avicenna's enigmatic passage to demonstrate the link between necessity and existence in God, Z sees this as an opportunity to evince the inconsistency of the philosophers' thesis. Ḫ deems Z's point to be a digression moving away from the main point of contention, yet to demonstrate that this statement is valid on their own terms, he refers to the discussions in *al-Shifāʾ*'s Book Eight, Chapters Four and Five (VIII.4‑5), which concern the primary attributes of the One that is necessary in its existence, as well as the unity of the NE and His attributes. Before asserting that the NE is equal to 'pure existence',<sup>8</sup> Avicenna gives an overview of the definition of the One with regard to necessity, quiddity, essence, and individual existence.

The Necessary Existent is one, nothing sharing with Him in His rank, and thus nothing other than Him is a Necessarily Existent, He is the principle of the necessitation of existence, necessitating [each thing] either in a primary manner or through an intermediary. […] The Necessary Existent does not become multiple in any respect whosoever and that His essence is utterly unitary, pure truth […]. He is one in essence and does not become multiple is that He is as such in His essence. […] The First has no quiddity other than His individual existence. […] It would not be true [to maintain] that the Necessary Existent has a quiddity of which necessary existence adheres as a necessary concomitant.<sup>9</sup>

One of the most important points in this passage is that Avicenna does not assign a specific quiddity to the Necessarily Existent as he does with created beings, since, for the case of God, quiddity here will correspond to God's being the Necessary Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) 10 or His very individual essence (*inniyya*/*anniyya*) <sup>11</sup> that does not depend on any other being for existing (rather than a specified quiddity which opens some leeway for contingency).

<sup>8</sup> See Book Eight, Chapter Four (VIII.4), in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, 275‑7. Marmura translates both *mujarrad al-wujūd* and *al-wujūd al-ṣirf* as 'pure existence'.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, VIII.4.1‑6, 273‑4.

<sup>10</sup> See VIII.4.13: "[T]here is no quiddity for the Necessary Existent other than its being the Necessary Existent. And this is [the thing's] 'thatness', [its individual essence]". Also see VIII.5.3, which states that necessary existence has no quiddity that connects with it other than necessary existence (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, 276 and 279 respectively).

<sup>11</sup> Also VIII.4.3: "The First has no quiddity other than His individual essence (*inniyya*/*anniyya*)" (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, 274). *Inniyya*/*anniyya* refers to the essential characteristics of a thing that identify it as an individual, which is distinct from quiddity, such that the former refers essentially to the question of 'which' (*ayy*) thing it is, whereas the latter pertains essentially to 'what' (*mā*) a thing is (see Marmura's note in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, 383). For the term *inniyya*/*anniyya*, which is associated with the Latin *anitas* 'whether-ness' or *esse* 'being', see Frank, "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term *anniyya*", and, for other recent studies, Lizzini, "Wuğūd-Mawjūd/Existence-Existent in Avicenna", 112; esp. fn. 5.

The First, hence, has no quiddity. Those things possessing quiddities have existence emanate on them from Him. He is 'pure existence' (*mujarrad alwujūd*) with the condition of negating privation and all other description of Him. Moreover, the rest of the things possessing quiddities are possible, coming into existence through Him. The meaning of my statement, "He is pure existence with the condition of negating all other additional [attributes] of Him", is not that this is the absolute existence (*wujūd muṭlaq*) in which there is participation [by others]. If there is an existent with this description, it would not be the pure existence with the condition of negation, but the existent without the condition of positive affirmation. I mean, regarding the First, that He is the existent with the condition that there is no additional composition, whereas this other is the existent without the condition of [this] addition. For this reason, the universal is predicated of anything that has addition. [And] everything other than Him has addition (*ziyāda*).<sup>12</sup>

Avicenna defines God as 'pure existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), yet with the condition of negating privation and all other descriptions of Him, warning his readers that 'pure existence' should not be mixed with 'absolute existence' (*wujūd muṭlaq*), the latter of which participates in others. This means that the First is a Necessarily Existent with the condition that there is no composition, diversity, or change in Him, that is, being refrained from any sense of addition (*ziyāda*). On the other hand, the universal properties are predicated of anything that has addition; for this reason, it is only everything other than Him that has composition, diversity, change, and addition.

By referencing this passage, Ḫ provides a further answer for Z's point by showing how necessity can be equal to existence according to Avicenna's paradigm:

**It cannot be said** that necessity is not a thing other than 'abstracted existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*) just because there is no change/differentiation (*ikhtilāf*) in abstracted existence. Indeed, an existence conjoined (*muqārin*) with quiddity changes in accordance with its attachment (*iḍāfa*) [to that quiddity]. As for 'mere existence' (*maḥḍ al-wujūd*), it is a single concept in itself which has no diversity, **because we say that** what is demanded here is that the true nature/reality of necessity (*ḥaqīqa al-wujūb*) is the same as the intension of 'sole existence' (*wujūd baḥt*), which is different from existence's occurring to quiddity; and this would be absurd. If what is meant here is that the reality of necessity's being true for 'pure existence' (*wujūd ṣirf*) denotes "an accidental affection's occurring to its object of accident", then this is conceded. However, we do not concede that what falls under 'pure existence' does not contain in it any. Then, why would it not be permissible that pure existence could be two different realities such that both are not being distinguished from quiddity?

Z starts the third day with an objection to Avicenna, arguing that existence is shared by all existents including God, and its being equal to Him will hinder unicity (an interpretation previously attributed to the twelfth-century

<sup>12</sup> See VIII.4.13 in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, 276‑7.

theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī).<sup>13</sup> Now the tables have turned, not only Z has to refute the philosopher's point but also prove that existence occurs to God's quiddity externally.

As a follow-up, Z objects to the claim of Ḫ and the philosophers, arguing that the NE cannot be just the same as 'abstracted existence' because 'pure existence' is singular and devoid of composition. In line with the theologians' common position quoted in J's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, <sup>14</sup> Z resorts to a similar argument that he previously employed with regard to necessity and quiddity, pointing out that existence should also be externally added to quiddity. Opposing Avicenna, he underlines the distinction between two ontological states, i.e. 'being conjoined with something' (*muqārin*) and 'being added to something' (*iḍāfa*), to further restate that the reality of necessity cannot be the same as the intension of 'sole existence'. This is because, for Z, existence is an added quality that already occurs to quiddity/essence, making the latter come out in the extramental world.

In defense of the philosophers' thesis, Ḫ insists that necessity's third definition meets the intension of their statement. Here the philosophers are portrayed as having an ontologically realist point of view, in which they argue that the true nature of God's necessity is the same as that of His 'pure existence', hence His quiddity. Ḫ's emphasis on the post-classical term *iʿtibārī* ('mental conception') here is a result of his conceptualist interpretation of Avicennan realism, a post-classical rapprochement between Avicennism and philosophical theology.<sup>15</sup>

Z continues to defend his position with a further counter-objection:

**If you say that** what is mentioned previously proves the sufficiency of the intension of necessity's being the same thing as quiddity, then how would you negate this fact? **I reply to this that** we verify that we necessarily know that the first two meanings are only mental considerations with no extramental existence. We also know necessarily that the very intension that distinguishes essence (*dhāt*) is a mental consideration occurring to the accidents of the Necessarily Existent's reality. Thus, it is claimed that the Necessarily Existent is one (*wāḥid*) in the sense that, as mentioned previously, the Necessarily Existent is the same thing as quiddity. Therefore, this [point] is abolished totally as a rejoinder never heard [before], even

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* as the theologians' view, Rāzī posits that existence is superadded to both necessarily and possibly existents, arguing for the later Ashʿarite position that existence is an accident superadded to God's quiddity: "This answer [i.e. existence is equal to God's essence] is not a remedy for us since it confesses that the share of being in the extramental world is accidental to God's quiddity, as in the case of its being accidental to the quiddity of the possibly existents". Quoting from *al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya*, J also references the following point regarding the univocity and superaddedness of existence from Rāzī: "If you were to say that [a sense of] existence that is common among the existence of the possibly existents in conception is concomitant to the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, then the making of existence in the truth of the Necessarily Existent would be conjoined with His quiddity […]. There is no difference between the necessarily and possibly existents in terms of existence since in both cases existence is added as an accident to the quiddity" (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 159‑60).

<sup>14</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 156‑69; esp. 156‑61.

<sup>15</sup> Benevich traces this sort of epistemological conceptualism back to the works of the twelfthcentury scholars Abuʾl-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and Shahrastānī. Their epistemological 'conceptualism' holds that words do not refer to extramental objects but to the concepts in the mind (Benevich, "The Metaphysics of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī", 333‑5, 345‑8; Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Islamic Philosophy*, 386; Pines, "Studies in Abuʾl-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's Poetics and Metaphysics", 284).

if one claims that what falls under the third meaning is the same thing as quiddity. Then this is conceded; yet, this does not [still] require that necessity is a single reality, so what is demanded is not established here.

Just as the first two meanings of necessity are mental considerations with no real existence in the extramental world, Z replies his opponent that the third meaning also denotes a mental consideration *but* in the sense of an attachment that occurs to the reality of the NE, not in a way applied to God essentially. Therefore, for Z again, none of these meanings supports the reality of necessity's being the same as quiddity – maybe with the exception that necessity may only 'fall under' the third, as passed previously. Even if this is the case, the third meaning's extension does not necessarily demonstrate that necessity has to be a single reality, because necessity, in the eyes of the theologians, is an accidental mental consideration that denotes externality. This point hinders the fact that necessity has to be a single reality, further suggesting the possibility that necessity can still take on multiplicity.

## **5.3.4 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (***Wujūdiyya***)**

Starting with the fourth day, Z digresses into other controversial aspects of Avicennan philosophy, compelling Ḫ to resolve them in light of the philosophers' doctrines. On the last two days, Z tends to repeat his arguments through restatements, with the hope that his adversary and the arbitrators of the debate will acknowledge the superiority of his point of contestation.

**Ḫocazāde**, may Almighty God have mercy on him, exercises little much patience in discernment, such that he says that necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent, is what distinguishes essence. Why would it not be that what distinguishes one from another is an essence for each one of them? This intension is accidental to both of these aspects without deliberation. In the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*: it cannot be said that necessity opposes an isolated constituent, and necessity's being relational (*nisbī*) contradicts with the aforementioned purpose, that is, necessity's **[121a]** being an existent. **For this, we say that** [this is] because one cannot say that the quest to know this expression is conveyed by the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*. If necessity were to be an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), then it would not be added to quiddity such that what is meant by necessity here would cast doubt on its being externally existing. Yet, it should be that necessity is related to non-existence (*ʿadamī*), as it was previously proven by the word of *al-Mawāqif*, in such a way that if this were to be true for them, then the competition has ended.

**The outcome** is that there is no doubt for the rational ones that this statement about necessity, which was claimed to be true by some, concerns necessity's external proposition together with that of possibility. And there is no doubt that possibility is a single thing. Likewise, necessity, yes, this very necessity in terms of its externally existing, is what distinguishes essence from others. Whoever discerns this position is marveled at this argument by Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

After having an *ad hominem* attack on Ḫ's ability to reason, Z states that Ḫ, equating necessity with the NE, ends up defining God in the third sense ("that which distinguishes essence"). However, for Z, this does not again hold true for two reasons: *first*, as repeated early on, God's quiddity/essence can still be defined as such and there is no certain proof that this meaning is only reserved for necessity. And *second*, based on Rāzī's assertion, necessity must be relational (*nisbī*), rather than essential (*dhātī*).<sup>16</sup>

As for the second point, Ī/J rule out the possibility that necessity is relational, yet the glossator ḤÇ, along the same line with Z, opens leeway for this possibility by stating that *what falls under* a relation may *fall under* necessity as well.<sup>17</sup> HÇ's leeway for relationality depends on the following condition: necessity's being relational does not rule out the possibility of an individual (an isolated constituent) in necessity, as well as its being nonexistent for contingent beings, thus linking necessity with contingency by disassociating it from God. This point makes Z's hand stronger since, proving a negative, he wants to establish that if necessity is taken as a non-existent quality, then it can never be connected to existentiality through its absence. In other words, necessity's being a relational quality via non-existence provides some leeway for contingency, precluding that the philosophers' necessity is directly equal to God's quiddity/essence.

The support for necessity's being non-existent (hence relational) is present in J, which is outlined in Z as follows: if necessity were to denote an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), that is, if it were to exist externally, then it would not be an added quality, which is, as claimed in J, impossible. This means that necessity's being non-existent could be related to its being relational essentially.

The question whether or not necessity can be qualified as an existential notion was a common topic discussed by post-classical commentators. For instance, if A denotes B, then there is no B that we cannot refer to as A, but it is observed that necessity does not exhaust all existential notions, meaning that it is only *one* among many existential notions.

To refute Ḫ's (and Avicenna's) point about necessity's being existential, Z further cites Ī's passage on unicity, arguing that necessity can be well regarded as 'non-existent' (*ʿadamī*), a line of thought that insinuates that if a term has connections to non-existence, then it cannot be an existential notion. That is, if necessity's non-existentiality provides that existence does not need to exist externally, necessity, for Z, cannot be on a par with existence either.<sup>18</sup> In this text, Ī also brings a similar point as a counter-argument to the philosophers' argument by questioning whether necessity has to be an existential notion.

<sup>16</sup> Another figure who argues that necessity is a relational attribute is Rāzī. Yet, given the number of books that he composed, Rāzī seems to have changed his mind regarding the nature of necessity in different passages. In *Nihāya al-ʿuqūl*, he is recorded as having considered this and, in *Muḥaṣṣal*, he seems to have accepted necessity as a *wujūdī* aspect with external existence (Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 144).

<sup>17</sup> According to J's Position Two, Observation Three, Intention Two (2.3.2) in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, necessity is the very quiddity itself, not a relation (*nisba*) – especially if one considers the third meaning of necessity as valid. Yet, ḤÇ criticizes J's point, arguing that necessity's being an existent does not rule out that it could be a relation as well (see the lemma "ʾannahu nisba", in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 116).

<sup>18</sup> This apophaticism in handling necessity is included in Rāzī's criticism of Avicenna: as Rāzī puts it, the fact that multiple things share in necessity does not follow that there is multiplicity. These qualities may also share in their negation of everything else, and sharing in negativity also implies multiplicity (Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 210).

As not to fall afoul of God's unicity, an influential historian and scholar Abū al-Fatḥ al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153), basing some of his views on Avicenna, brings an alternative solution to the problem of composition, in which he deems all attributes of God, including necessity, as *non-entitative* by way of either relation or negation. Necessity may signify that God's existence does not depend on anything else. Yet, there are specific other ways to describe God, as in the case of First Cause or the First Principle of Graeco-Arabic philosophy. Taking all these attributes as 'relational' or 'negational' with regard to other beings would not add anything entitative to God, hence avoiding multiplicity.<sup>19</sup> This view is also present in Ghazālī, such that God's essence is one, and the names associated with it become many by "relating something to it", "relating it to something", or "negating something of it". And, for him, neither relation nor negation in this context can denote multiplicity in the NE.<sup>20</sup>

Referring back to Ī's position, Z still insists that the philosophers never demonstrate the existential quality of necessity with certainty. The same point is also repeated by J and ḤÇ on the grounds that accepting that necessity is an existential notion contradicts the philosophers' point that quiddities do not exist. So, for Z, if quiddity is not an existential notion that exists outside (Ī, in fact, establishes its being non-existent), then how can existence be equal to it? This rather shows that existence has to be a *non-entitative* relational quality superadded to a quiddity that is beyond existence.<sup>21</sup>

Resorting to non-existence, Z follows a similar line of reasoning here as in Rāzī's objection to Avicenna's equating God's quiddity with 'pure existence'.<sup>22</sup> Rāzī aims to prove the univocity of existence since it is a concept that may seem to be shared by all beings, yet its applicability to the cases of both necessarily and possibly existents brings in the question of its ambiguity in meaning and its consequent disassociation from existence.

19 Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 140.

22 Avicenna argues that existence cannot be superadded to quiddity in the NE since this will imply need, priority/posteriority, or cause/effect, which are only reserved for contingent beings. As an objection to Avicenna's proof in his *Muḥaṣṣal*, Rāzī brings the counterevidence that a quiddity cannot be negated by way of existence, since non-existence itself is also a quiddity. Thus a quiddity must be a separate essential entity, and Rāzī argues that the philosophers contradict with this aspect by equating it with existence. For Rāzī's argument and Ṭūsī's rejoinder, see Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 97 and also mentioned in Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 210 and Altaş, *Fahreddin Râzîʾnin İbn Sînâ Yorumu*, 399‑400.

<sup>20</sup> Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 89‑90. Yet could it be said that quiddities do exist? It is a vexed question that has been recently tackled by Damien Janos who concluded that there are different modes of existences, and quiddities do 'exist' in God in a special mode – not in a different mode from essence – as well as being a necessary concomitant to 'pure existence', without producing any multiplicity (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 648, 712‑15).

<sup>21</sup> See ḤÇ's lemma "mabnī ʿalā ʾanna al-wujūd wujūdī", which argues for the irreducibility of quiddity and existence into one due to the latter's being an existential notion: "If necessity were to be a non-existing thing superadded to quiddity, then the way that the philosophers constructed these two proofs here would be based on the existentiality of existence; therefore, the latter's being the same thing as quiddity would be terminated" (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 46).

### **5.3.5 Background to Z's Position on the Univocity of Existence. An Overview of Univocity, Equivocity, and Analogicity Among the Early Verifiers**

The nature of existence vis-à-vis God and His created subjects is one of the most debated aspects in metaphysics. The main question remains, which Z also instrumentalizes in the debate, is that if created beings do also exist like God, in what ways will He be different? Or, in other words, if absolute existence is a universal capacity that is applicable to all beings, then in what ways can God's existence be perceived as 'special'? Moreover, does this suggest that existence is a relational or a contingent faculty, thereby making it impossible that it can be equal to God's quiddity/essence? Based on a critique in Rāzī's *Ishārāt* commentary, these questions make Z's hand stronger by compelling Ḫ to make some clarifications.

The status of existence concerns whether an existent is predicated with existence in a similar or different way, that is, by way of equivocity or univocity – a point of contention closely linked to the status of existence and quiddity vis-à-vis God and created beings. How could God be necessary existence if existence is an accident superadded to His quiddity? Or what are the ways in which one could separate "God *qua* existence" from that of contingent beings if it is observed that existence inheres in the divine essence. Along with health (*ṣiḥḥā*) and others,23 there are various other modulated terms in Avicennan philosophy, most importantly two paradigmatic cases which concern the present debate, i.e. oneness (*waḥda*) and existence (*wujūd*). In this case, Avicenna's 'modulation' applies mostly to external and non-constitutive concomitants (sing. *lazim*) of quiddity, whereas strict univocity is reserved for the quiddities of natural things (such as 'horse' or 'human') that are constitutive of essence and associated with genera.<sup>24</sup>

Asserting the "superaddedness of existence to essence" (*ziyāda al-wujūd ʿalā al-māhiyya*),25 Rāzī reformulates Avicenna's position in a way that essence and existence are regarded as indistinguishable extensionally while remaining distinguishable intensionally. This means that existence is a univocal entity (i.e. in one meaning) that can be shared between all things including God, hence quiddity/essence and existence have to be distinguished in God and contingent beings. There are several reasons for Rāzī's position. The first, according to Robert Wisnovsky, is to conform to the Kullābites

<sup>23</sup> For the case of existence, see Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)'s *The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, I.5, 24.11‑12 and, for that of oneness, III.2, 74.4. In addition to health, existence, and oneness, Avicenna also includes form (*ṣūra*), possibility (*imkān*), strength (*quwwa*), soul (*nafs*), and medical condition (*ṭibbī*) among modulated concepts (Janos, "Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation", 54). Also see Druart, "Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being's Univocity", 19‑22. For Avicenna, primary notion of 'one' notionally amplifies the intension of the notion of 'being', without affecting its extension (De Haan, "The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being", 268‑70).

<sup>24</sup> Janos, "Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation", 50‑1. On the other hand, Druart interprets that oneness is a concomitant of *mawjūd* which is univocal (Druart, "Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being's Univocity", 21). Strict equivocity concerns names that do not possess the same intension, that is, there is no intensional similarity among diverse meanings, whereas pure univocity requires that a name is predicated of some object with a universal meaning that is perfectly unified in its intension and extension (De Haan, "The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being", 268‑70).

<sup>25</sup> According to Rāzī, existence and essence are regarded as strictly distinct from one another and could be distinguished in terms of necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), relation (*muḍāf*), concomitant/consequence attribute (*lāḥiq*), accidental attachment (*ʿāriḍ*) (Wisnovsky, "On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism", 206, 275).

view that the divine attributes are meaningfully distinct from the divine self and that there is a non-identity between the divine self and His attributes.<sup>26</sup> Second, God's essence has to be also distinct from His existence since, for Rāzī, if existence and essence are the same, there will be then no causation (thus God's existence must be concomitant to its existence being causally followed by Him).<sup>27</sup>

Avicenna identifies the quiddity in itself as a distinct and fully legitimate consideration, as an existing form and intelligible in the mind, which is considered abstractly and prior to its particularization in nature or the universalization that occurs when expressed in a universal proposition.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, Rāzī disregards this, arguing that existence has to be an external and a *non-constitutive* concomitant of quiddity (quiddity in abstraction from existence): existence is simply a predicate that cannot be understood as an entity by itself.<sup>29</sup> In order to bridge the difference between essence and existence, Rāzī uses the Avicennan notion of (necessary) concomitant (*lāzim*) to make sure that God's existence is not only separate but also concomitant to His essence (based on essence's priority).30 This means that existence is construed as univocal, remaining distinct from quiddity as a superaddition.<sup>31</sup> It should be noted that this view is in direct opposition to Ashʿarī who argued that both quiddity and existence are intensionally and extensionally the same.<sup>32</sup>

In defense of Arabic philosophy, Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī is often known to have clarified and amended Rāzī's so-called oversights in favor of the philosophers' doctrines in his famed commentary on the *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, a work that dispels the qualms about the intricacies of Avicenna's terminology. It is, in this context, that Ṭūsī criticizes Rāzī of misrepresenting the philosophers' point, by misattributing 'absolute existence' (*wujūd muṭlaq*) to 'pure/abstracted existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*).33 The former is a universal category, a conceptual matter that falls under the secondary intentions/ intelligibles (*maʿqūlāt thāniyya*), whereas Avicenna's 'pure/abstracted exis-


<sup>26</sup> This view is rejected by ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī via Ṭūsī such that this is only possible in the possible beings, not intrinsically in necessary beings. Both identify God's essence with existence (as in "His essence is identical to His existence"), and Ḥillī was said to have reverted the Il-Khanate historian, vizier and scholar of the Rāzī lineage Rashīd al-Dīn al-Hamadānī (d. 718/1318) to the Ṭūsīan position, by convincing him to accept the position of "soft univocity" (Wisnovsky, "On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism", 277‑8, 294, 302).

<sup>30</sup> Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 399. For *lāzim* and its essential form in Avicenna, Benevich, *Essentialität und Notwendigkeit*, 347‑65.

<sup>31</sup> It should be noted that Rāzī is not consistent with this view in all works. In *Sharḥ ʿuyūn al-ḥikma*, he writes that God's reality (*ḥaqīqa*) is equal to His existence (Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 43).

<sup>32</sup> Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 41‑3.

<sup>33</sup> In his commentary on Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, Ṭūsī makes a distinction between 'absolute existence', which is intelligible, and God's 'necessary existence', which is called the philosophers' 'pure existence' that goes beyond intellection (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *al-Ishārāt waʾltanbīḥāt*, 3: 461). *Mujarrad* is an ambiguous term, which could be applied to both pure and universal quiddities. Avicenna arguably uses this expression for universal quiddities that are abstracted from matter, whereas his post-classical critics often (mis)interpret the term arguably by extending to Avicenna's "pure quiddity" (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 236).

tence' denotes something that is beyond universality and particularity, an expression only reserved for God. Rāzī's reading, on the other hand, unduly paves the way for associating God with contingent beings, which instigates Ṭūsī to clarify that Avicenna is not saying that God is existence, rather He is identical to His own 'special existence',<sup>34</sup> i.e. the highest grade of existence, which is neither absolute nor specific but only in its purest form.35 In opposition to Rāzī's view that existence is a real accident superadded to quiddity, he furthermore argues that the being of quiddity cannot be mentally separated from existence.36 For Ṭūsī, pure quiddity is not disconnected from existence but only exists abstractly in the mind, contrary to his opponent, who sees pure quiddity as being fully abstracted and distinct from existence.

As a further response to Rāzī, Ṭūsī brings the interpretation that God's essence is identical to His perfect existence, which is also predicated of it. It is in this sense that existence can neither be, as Rāzī claims, predicated in a strictly univocal way, nor equivocally to God and contingent beings following Shahrastānī – but with a specific way called 'by modulation' (*biʾltashkīk*), which denotes a sense of gradated differentiation in meaning.37 According to Ṭūsī's Avicennan thesis of 'modulation of existence' (*tashkīk alwujūd*) <sup>38</sup> in response to Rāzī's univocity, even if it is agreed that existence is predicated of the necessarily and possibly existents, it will apply to different objects in different degrees (a view probably influenced by Suhrawardī), making God's existence distinct from that of others.<sup>39</sup> In another work called *Taḥṣīl al-muhaṣṣal*, which is a critical commentary on Rāzī's *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn*, Ṭūsī brings more objections to Rāzī's designating existence as a superaddition to God's quiddity as well as a univocal term, by arguing that if existence is superadded to His quiddity, then it will be in

<sup>34</sup> This view is also mentioned in Iṣfahānī's *Tajrīd iʿtiqād* commentary as a proof that the NE's existence depends on the negation of an equivalent partner to Him, such that the NE's 'special existence' can only be described with respect to necessity in itself. This implies that 'special existence' cannot be shared by two such beings (see the section on the negation of a partner – *nafī al-sharīk* – in al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawāʾid*, 2: 945). For God's 'special existence', see Benevich, "Die 'göttliche Existenz'", 125 and Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 214.

<sup>35</sup> Donaldson, "Avicenna's Proof", 297.

<sup>36</sup> Rizvi, "An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?", 224.

<sup>37</sup> For Ṭūsī's sense of 'modulation', see Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 150. There are several English terms that have been used interchangeably for *tashkīk*, such as "ambiguous/ amphibolous" (Wolfson), "analogicity" (Vallat, De Haan, McGinnis) and "modulation" (Treiger). See Janos, "Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation", 23; as well as the studies by aforementioned scholars: Wolfson, "The Amphibolous Terms"; Vallat, *Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie*; Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Physics of* The Healing; De Haan, "The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being"; Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion".

<sup>38</sup> In a series of letters exchanged between the Akbarī Sufi Qūnawī and Ṭūsī, the first inquiry is devoted the issue whether existence in the Necessarily Existent is extraneous (*zāʾid*) to its reality (*ḥaqīqa*) or identical with its quiddity. While Qūnawī goes with the first view (arguing that existence is simply an superadded attribute (*ṣifa*), Ṭūsī goes with the latter view because, otherwise, the quiddity's priority to existence will be absurd, deeming quiddity neither existing nor non-existing. For Ṭūsī, the relationship between existence and quiddity is by way of 'modulation' (*tashkīk*) such that existence, like light, becomes related to different realities in differing degrees (Chittick, "Mystic versus Philosophy", 101; Konevî, *el-Mürâselât*, 114‑15). For a study of the extant manuscripts of this correspondence: Schubert, "The Textual History".

<sup>39</sup> Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 134‑5. While holding the ontological primacy of quiddity, Suhrawardī states that quiddity/essence in itself is a conceptual and an unreal notion like existence, which has no correspondence to reality or real value. And this is due to the fact that all reality is seen as a hierarchy of lights (Rizvi, "An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?", 222‑4).

need of it, making God a contingent being in essence.<sup>40</sup> On the contrary, this sense of existence can only be in need of a haecceity (*huwiyya*) among the contingent beings.<sup>41</sup>

The notion of *tashkīk* goes back to Avicenna who arguably devised the notion in order to distinguish God's existence from other modes of existence. According to one reading, the basic sense of being for Avicenna extends to all concrete and mental entities, to all substances and accidents, albeit according to a gradation or modulation of meaning. By virtue of this, the modulation of existence explains how existence applies exactly to each instance as an external concomitant of essence. The special modulated version of existence belongs exclusively and irreducibly to 'pure quiddity', which finds its originative source in God's 'special existence'.<sup>42</sup> Whether Avicenna's *tashkīk* could be interpreted as 'soft-univocity' or 'soft-equivocity' is a still debated topic among contemporary scholars who offered differing propositions to the problem.<sup>43</sup>

Another view which argues for the equivocity of existence appears in Shahrastānī's *Kitāb al-muṣāraʿa*, namely *Wrestling with the Philosophers*, a work that aims at modifying Avicenna's positions rather than rejecting them outright. The third chapter of the book concerns how Avicenna proves God's unity and simplicity, in which he argues that existence only applies to all created things, establishing the absolute transcendence of God by distancing His existence from a Rāzīan sense of univocity.

For Shahrastānī, defining God as the Necessarily Existent, i.e. as a necessary being on which the existence of other contingent beings depends, is problematic because existence here is being postulated as if it is a genus of existents, that is, subdivided into two species by the differentiae of 'necessary' and 'contingent' (thereby turning the Necessarily Existent into a species). And Avicenna's modulation does not solve the problem. Likewise, this will imply that God's essence will be composite such that it will be dependent on the notions of existence and necessity (as constituents of the Necessarily Existent), violating the principle of oneness.<sup>44</sup> Shahrastānī might have proposed the category of 'modulated terms' (*asmāʾ mushakkika*) in or-

41 Al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 100.

42 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 449, 497, 712.

44 Genera always apply to their species equally (not in a modulated way), and the NE cannot be a genus since, otherwise, God's essence will imply a composite nature of a genus and a differentia (Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion", 329‑30).

<sup>40</sup> Al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 98. Also in the next lemma, Ṭūsī states that necessity (*wujūb*) is never part of the "objects of accident" (sing. *maʿrūḍ*), and hence it should be taken as a mental quality (*kayfiyya ʿaqliyya*) (not extramentally). In the case of two NEs in the philosophers' version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ*, necessity is an intelligible (*maʿqūl*) equivalent to the case of a homonym (not a synonym) (al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 100, 102). So, similar to existence, necessity can neither be univocal nor common (*mushtarak*) in the case of the philosophers' two NEs (101).

<sup>43</sup> As for recent arguments that vie for the Avicennan *tashkīk al-wujūd*'s denoting a sense of univocity, which are mostly based on his *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2 and I.5, see Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion"; Druart, "Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being's Univocity", 15‑24; Menn, "Avicenna's Metaphysics", 163; De Haan, "The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being", 261‑86. Based on various discussions scattered in different works of Avicenna, including *al-Shifāʾ*, along with certain passages in the philosopher's letter to the vizier Abū Sʿad, Damien Janos, alternatively, argues that Avicenna's modulation connotes a moderate sense of equivocity. See Janos, "Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation", 1‑62; esp. "Avicenna's Distinction between Univocal, Equivocal, and Modulated Terms", 6‑16. Contrary to Janos' claim, Kaukua argues that his designation of "moderate equivocity" still falls under "a modulated univocity of being" (Kaukua, "Review Article", 162‑3).

der restrict the univocity and equivocity of being; however, he was not able to successfully accomplish his task since, in the end, Avicenna had arguably to vie for upholding a univocity making existence a single genus for all things whose species would be necessary or possible.45 Shahrastānī's misunderstanding of Avicenna's conception of the Necessarily Existent is a way of turning God into a species of the genus 'existence', with 'necessary' serving in the role of differentia.<sup>46</sup>

As a way of conclusion, the question whether existence is 'univocal' (Rāzī/ Zeyrek),<sup>47</sup> 'equivocal' (Shahrastānī), or 'modulated' (Avicenna/Ṭūsī)<sup>48</sup> is a highly contentious subject for the post-classical world. The common questions are: in what way can existence predicate others? Does this predication suggest contingency and multiplicity? And if it suggests these aspects, in what ways could we say that existence is related to God's essence?

For the late medieval theologians, 'predication' suggests something beyond a logical relation. It was a reference to metaphysical entities and theological consequences about the nature of God and His creatures. The predication of a term (let it be an animal or an abstract concept, such as health) indicated a term's relation to others and gives clues about its very nature and meanings. There were three common ways to predicate a term in medieval theology, as in 'univocally', 'equivocally', and 'analogously' (*analogia entis*); and the predication of existence was equally central in many post-classical Islamic and medieval Latin scholarly disputations.<sup>49</sup> For instance, the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas Aquinas defined these three terms as follows: 'Univocally', which is predicated according to the same name and reason; 'equivocally', which is attributed of some things; and 'analogously/by modulation',<sup>50</sup> which is predicated of many whose reasons/definitions are different from each other. Going back to the thirteenth-century Islamic context, existence in the sense of God and His creatures fits with the third case in Ṭūsī, since existence in the same line here could be applied to distinct entities due to different reasons.

49 The fifteenth-century Italian Ockhamist theologian Alessandro Achillini, also a contemporary of Ḫ, defended the case of existence's analogicity based on certain interpretations of Aristotle and Averroes (Matsen, *Alessandro Achillini*, 119‑21). What distinguished Achillini from Ḫ was that he was an anti-realist, but with a moderate nominalist bent inherited from Ockham.

<sup>45</sup> Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 449‑50.

<sup>46</sup> Wisnovsky, "On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism", 297; Madelung "Aš-Šahrastānīs Streitschrift", 250‑3.

<sup>47</sup> It should be noted that the univocity of existence in its application to God and created beings opens some leeway for religious monism. Even though Ghazālī would be in agreement with Rāzī, he does not give an opinion in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* whether existence is univocal or equivocal since neither view violates his Ashʿarite convictions. See Griffel, "Ismāʿīlite Critique of Ibn Sīnā", 223, 229.

<sup>48</sup> Ṭūsī is known to have vied for "soft-equivocity" and it is still debatable whether Avicenna's sense can be regarded in the framework of Ṭūsī's interpretation, or denotes a sense of "soft-univocity" closer to Rāzī's reading, or not.

<sup>50</sup> Achillini, known for his *dubia* on key theological aspects, based his argument concerning the analogicity of existence in Thomas Aquinas' description. Having famously employed by Aristotle and Avicenna, health (*ṣiḥḥa*), in the words of Aquinas, was a great example of this aspect, since health is said of an animal body and of urine and of a medicine but it does not signify the same entirely (i.e. meanings of 'health') in all these instances. Existence like health is analogical (Matsen, *Alessandro Achillini*, 102‑5).

#### **5.3.6 Day Four. Concluding Remarks**

By overseeing 'pure existence' as 'absolute existence' as Rāzī does, Z falls into the same pitfall: he does not regard that 'pure existence' is a special term only reserved for God and this leads him to assume that existence is univocal, thereby making God's existence comparable with that of the possibly existents.<sup>51</sup> Z seems quite confident that if his opponent cannot prove otherwise, he has won the debate. Used in J's discussion on unicity as a polemical utterance against the Dualists, *tamma al-dast* (also passes in ḤÇ's gloss)<sup>52</sup> is a rhetorical expression in Islamic dialectics, which implies that a contestant has silenced his opponent by providing certain refutations and proofs, and that the competition is over in his favor.<sup>53</sup>

At the end of the fourth day, Z concludes that the reason why necessity has to be taken as an existential notion is only because its binary term 'possibility' is also existential. In other words, if possibility is a single thing superadded, how will then necessity's singularity be different? The possibility has a capacity to exist externally, and this may easily apply to the case of necessity. Z also provides proofs backing necessity's being non-existent in order to show that the philosophers' point about necessity's being an existential notion is not justified. If and only if necessity is defined as an existential notion, it may well correspond to the third meaning since only an 'externally existing' necessity can 'fall under' the third meaning. Apart from this condition, we cannot say that the third meaning meets the exact intension of necessity in the philosophers' initial thesis. Again, Z overlooks the distinction between 'pure existence' and other types of existence, including universal and absolute.<sup>54</sup>

## **5.3.7 Day Five. On Whether Necessity** *Necessarily* **Denotes a Single Essence**

**If you say that** we do not concede that the Necessarily Existent is entified (*mutaʿayyan*) by His essence, [because] then there would be a limitation in that meaning. The reason why this is as such is that only if the Necessarily Existent were of a single essence, then this would have followed; but it is impossible since it would be permissible that it could be a generic accident (*ʿaraḍ ʿāmm*) or a genus' nature (*ṭabīʿa jinsiyya* or lit. 'the nature pertaining to genus'). There are species under Him and every specie requires its essence being entified (*taʿayyun*). What follows is that [while] every specie (*nawʿ*) is limited to an individual (*shakhṣ*), the Necessarily Existent is not [limited to an individual]. **It is replied to this such that** the Necessarily Existent cannot be existence itself, since if it were to have

<sup>51</sup> Z's support for the univocity of existence may have had some parallels with Duns Scotus' view based on the assumption of *natura communis* (Matsen, "Alessandro Achillini (1463‑1512) and 'Ockhamism'", 444‑5).

<sup>52</sup> See the lemma "wa-dhālik li-wajhayn" in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

<sup>53</sup> *Dast* is a game or a single act of a game, and the rhetorical expression *tamma lahu al-dast* can be translated as "the game ended/has ended in his favor" (Lane, *The Arabic-English Lexicon*, 878).

<sup>54</sup> Shahrastānī also overlooks this distinction in *Struggling with the Philosophers*, 52‑3 (Arabic) and 48‑9 (English).

species, it would then have various realities (*ḥaqāʾiq mukhtalifa*). Existence would have a commonality in utterance [i.e. equivocal as in homonyms], and this is false. There is a weakness in this [statement], because the Necessarily Existent is not the same as 'absolute existence' (*wujūd muṭlaq*), but as 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*). The purpose in this chapter is that various realities have specific existences, so the absolute commonality of existence is not required in utterance [i.e. not univocal].

On the fifth day, the discussion moves to another central question: whether or not necessity has to denote a single essence. Z directs pointed questions at Ḫ by asking how come Avicenna's designations of genus' and species' natures would be in line with the philosophers' initial thesis.

The philosophers are known to have objected to necessity's being relational or accidental, thus holding that necessity signifies a single essence with no implications of multitude. Their answer to a possible counter-thesis by the theologians is the following: God's necessary existence can neither be entified nor added to God's essence since the NE then will not qualify to be a single essence – meaning that He can acquire a genus' nature that leads to multiplicity and individuation. The NE, therefore, has to be one and equal to His quiddity. If the NE were to have a species or a genus that is normally necessary for an individual thing to come out, then God would be individualized, which is impossible.

Genus' and species' natures are generic accidents applied to the existence of contingent beings, and the philosophers here, therefore, want to avoid their direct involvement with God. In various works, Avicenna repeatedly states that the NE does not have a genus or a species, so it cannot be defined, and is neither generic nor specific.55 In his *al-Shifāʾ*, the genus' nature (sing. *ṭabīʿa jinsiyya* or lit. 'the nature pertaining to genus') primarily refers to the nature or quiddity considered in itself, a nature that when so considered is neither particular nor universal, neither one nor many.<sup>56</sup> Yet, due to Avicenna's ambiguous use of the term, it is easy to misinterpret the genus' nature as, similar to what Z does in the debate, something that exists individuated in external reality. This interpretation led some later commentators to identify existence with multiplicity.<sup>57</sup>

The common misconception of associating a genus' nature with existence also resonates with Rāzī's misattribution of existence having a 'species' nature' (*ṭabīʿa nawʿiyya* or lit. 'a nature pertaining to species'). Basing on Avicenna's statement that a species' nature is applied to all its individuals on equal footing, Rāzī observes that the same thing can be said for existence as well, insinuating that existence has a connection to multiplicity and individuation, i.e. aspects to be avoided for God.<sup>58</sup> Ṭūsī detects that Rāzī again bases this view on an inaccurate representation of the philosophers. Based on Ṭūsī's interpretation, the philosophers rather argue that

<sup>55</sup> For the definition of the NE, see Ṭūsī's commentary on *al-Ishārāt*, 3: 472‑4, 479‑81.

<sup>56</sup> Marmura, "Avicenna's Chapter on Universals", 39.

<sup>57</sup> Marmura, "Avicenna's Chapter on Universals", 42.

<sup>58</sup> In one of many objections directed at Avicenna in his commentary on *al-Ishārāt waʾltanbīḥāt*, Rāzī questions how existence can be both applied to the necessarily and possibly existents, by making the incorrect assertion that existence is among natures pertaining to species (Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 213; Altaş, *Fahreddin Râzîʾnin İbn Sînâ Yorumu*, 407).

existence is not directly applied to the possibly existents but only 'by modulation' (*biʾl-tashkīk*).<sup>59</sup>

Similar to Z, the Perso-Ottoman theologian ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī also maintains that a certain number of great verifiers have found the philosophers' equating existence with God's quiddity to be equally valid, yet adding that he, nonetheless, firmly holds that existence is an accident superadded to quiddity following the theologians' position (especially Rāzī's). Ṭūsī believes that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's proposed solution by way of introducing modulation is invalid for it does not deter the fact that existence might be an accident.<sup>60</sup> Reiterating Avicenna's point as mentioned in Taḥtānī's adjudication,<sup>61</sup> Z, in line with ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, follows Rāzī, by firmly settling on the theologians' position as outlined in **(iii)** as a way of consensus (see § 3.3).<sup>62</sup>

**The truth** in this answer is that what is mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in his *al-Shifāʾ* is that the Necessarily Existent is not something other than 'pure existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), and there is no change in it. **Indeed,** an existence conjoined with quiddities changes in accordance with its attachment [to them]. As for 'mere existence', it is the same thing as existence that there is no real change [in it] with respect to the veracity of *al-Muḥākamāt* by Mawlānā al-ʿAllāma [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī], Peace be upon him.

In closing, Z reiterates his points one more time: indeed, for Z, the NE cannot be the same as existence just as He cannot have any genus or species; otherwise, He will be constituting varied realities that denote multiplicity and composition. Existence here nevertheless has the problem of equivocity simply because it denotes a commonality in utterance as in homonyms in languages. Aristotle distinguishes words applied to different things with a single meaning (i.e. synonyms/univocals) from those that applied to different things but with different definitions (i.e. homonyms/equivocals).63 In a similar way, the Neoplatonic tradition defines homonymous predication as "inhering *in* a subject", a term in opposition to synonymous predication, which denotes "being said *of* a subject", an essential predication.64 For Z, if existence is the same as necessity, it will then only imply a sense of commonality in utterance (like homonyms) with regard to the modes of participation (*mushārakāt*), which is impossible. In Avicenna, on the other hand, homonyms share the name only, whereas synonyms share both the name and the

<sup>59</sup> For a reference that existence is applied to other things by modulation, see Rāzī's considering existence in terms of a species' nature in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 161, 167. Similarly, Iṣfahānī writes that existence is superadded to quiddity but only *by modulation*, i.e. different from other types of attachments (al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawāʾid*, 1: 199). See Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 203, 212; and on how perfections are predicated of God by modulation in later medieval Latin tradition via Avicenna: Acar, *Talking About God*, 50‑5.

<sup>60</sup> Al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 220‑1.

<sup>61</sup> This fact may indicate that Z gathers most of his information about Avicenna's philosophy from later handbooks of *kalām*, not specifically from Avicenna's original writings.

<sup>62</sup> For the theologians' position which states that existence is superadded or occurs externally to essence both in the necessarily and possibly existents, see § 3.3, "Background in Philosophy II".

<sup>63</sup> Wisnovsky, "On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism", 285.

<sup>64</sup> Kalbarczyk, *Predication and Ontology*, 74‑5, 82.

definition,<sup>65</sup> such that the philosophers' formulation (as well as Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Ḫ's points) rather perceive the relationship between existence and necessity as in the case of homonyms.

Z is resistant to accept his rival's explanations: Ḫ's position is arguably mistaken since, for Z, Avicenna, on the contrary, might have regarded existence as 'univocal'.<sup>66</sup> As mentioned earlier, Z's oversight might rely on the assumption of equating the NE's special existence with absolute (or generic) existence, thereby assigning God an unfounded capacity for receiving a genus/species and an individualization. For Z, existence, in line with the above-mentioned theologians' view in **(iii)**, has to be an externally added entity with a capacity to receive a genus and a species, which are universal logical categories indispensable for particular existences and individuals to emerge in the extramental world.

Reducing existence to a homonym restricts this term to a generic category for all existents. Absolute existence, in this case, is an unqualified aspect of existence common to all contingent beings but significantly different from 'pure existence'. The philosophers will hypothetically object to Z's designation of 'pure existence' as a commonality of existence in utterance since he seems to anachronistically apply something that is true for the possibly existents to the ontological category of the Necessarily Existents, by equating God with contingency without any foundational basis.

Another possible answer to Z's argument in favor of the univocity of existence among the necessarily and possibly existents, which follows Rāzī, could be by demonstrating that these divisions are only lexical (*lafḍī*), that is, equivocal in meaning (*biʾl-ishtirāq al-lafḍī*), which is in direct opposition to univocity (*biʾl-ishtirāq al-maʿnāwī*). When describing the commonality between two partners, Ghazālī's second point in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* about the philosophers' inability to prove God's unicity, i.e. the argument from commonality, similarly resorts to nominalism, which could be summarized as follows: if there are two hypothesized NEs, then these must be either similar in every way or totally different. The first is absurd (*muḥāl*) 67 since two things cannot be separate and be similar in every way. Even if the NEs differ from another, it must be that they either share in something or not share in anything. The latter is impossible due to the shared necessity of existence within the NE's characterization, and the former implies that there will be composition and lexical division.

Based on this thought experiment, necessary existences cannot have composition due to their being qualitatively indivisible. The composition will, otherwise, dictate that they either share in something or not share in anything. The latter is impossible due to the shared necessity of existence within the NE's characterization, and the former implies that there will be composition and lexical division, thereby not implying a real one. Thus, both

<sup>65</sup> Kalbarczyk, *Predication and Ontology*, 138.

<sup>66</sup> Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 150.

<sup>67</sup> As Avigail Noy suggests, the term *muḥāl*, which is found in Islamic texts in linguistics, literary theory, and philosophy, denotes a "co-occurrence of two contradictory [things] within the same object at the same time, in the same element [or] the same relative state", such as describing an object as being both black and white at the same time. *Muḥāl* is not only non-existent but also inconceivable; and the philosophers make a distinction between "that which does not exist but is imaginable" and "that which does not exist and is unimaginable" (Noy, "Don't Be Absurd", 29).

cases are impossible. Ghazālī sees existence ontologically one with essence in God, yet, different from Z's accidentality of existence, he regards existence as a '(necessary) concomitant' (*lāzim*) due to the nominalism of lexicality – not as 'subsisting in essence'.<sup>68</sup> Regardless, Z neither seems to entertain this counterposition in his evaluation nor comments on the nature of concomitants vis-à-vis different shades of existence.

## **5.3.8 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis**

**I say that** if the utterance 'necessity' were to be valid for a single mental consideration and this mental consideration is dislodged from being existing externally, then there would not be any competence (*majāl*) here, **[121b]** since one could respond [to this] by the permissibility that this intension would be attached to two differentiated essences, one differing from the other in essence. If the author of *al-Mawāqif* says "thus, the existence of the Necessarily Existent is true for philosophers", then the competition has ended in favor of Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

The last day of the debate concerns the question whether the NE has to conform to singularity according to the philosophers' proof. Since now Z applies existence in utterance to necessity, maintaining that necessity is an accidental superaddition, he is certain that the commonality here would be only in utterance, as in the case of homonymous expressions.<sup>69</sup> Upon this point, Z further argues that the necessity's intension, in this case, does not again provide the certain proof that necessity has to be a single essence that does not attach to multiple essences.

In conclusion, neither existence nor necessity, for Z, can be specifically defined for God. Both are generic univocal categories that may be shared by all existents and, therefore, should be regarded as superadded accidents that occur externally to the quiddity, that is, with no direct involvement with God's quiddity essentially per se (a point that he follow Rāzī). This contingency, for Z, proves that the concepts of necessity and existence are non-essential relational qualities that are not suited for providing proof in support of God's unicity. Also Z questions the certainty of the philosophers' proof, trying to demonstrate that there is no guarantee that necessity must be the same as God's quiddity/essence. It could be easily argued that necessity can be construed as, let's say, relational (*nisbī*), non-existent (*ʿadamī*), or superadded accidentally (*ʿaraḍī*) etc. Most importantly, the philosophers' proof cannot rule out the possibility that necessity can be a superadded accident. Thinking that he has refuted his opponent by showing the contingency and imprecision of the philosophers' proof, Z, at the end of the debate, declares himself victorious for the second time.

68 Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 86‑7.

69 For Rāzī's statement about the linguistic commonality with respect to the necessarily and possibly existents, see al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 101.

#### 5.4 Analysis of Ḫocazāde's Position. Making the Philosophers' Proof Cohere with Post-Classical Scholarship

The philosophers give a central role to necessity in their version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* and, to achieve this end, they resort to the reducibility of necessity to quiddity/essence in God – a view regarded in line with their premise that He is the same as 'pure existence'. This is the main point of contention between them and the theologians, and the latter group represented by Z, as shown, denies this by claiming that necessity is a superadded accident denoting no essentiality. On the other hand, Ḫ defends the validity of the philosophers' statement as the main thrust of his reply, arguing that necessity at least corresponds to one of its stated meanings in philosophy, especially the third ("what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others").70 Ḫ's defense of the philosophers is closely linked to a passage in J's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* on God's unicity in Position Five, Observation Three (5.3). Here he follows J's expositions on this point, critiquing his academic adversaries Z and ḤÇ on the same subject matter who, instead, prefer the theologians' view indefinitely due to the philosophers' inability to demonstrate their claim.<sup>71</sup>

Both Z/ḤÇ assert that the philosophers' proof is incomplete due to their unsubstantiated premise that necessity is the same as God's quiddity/essence, a statement which, according to ḤÇ, contradicts with their claims about **(a)** quiddity's not being an existential notion, and **(b)** entification's implying individuation and multiplicity (see the analysis below).<sup>72</sup> To refute ḤÇ/Z, Ḫ provides more citations from J, evidencing that at least one of the stated meanings of necessity can be taken in the philosophers' sense. He also insists that ḤÇ might have misrepresented J's line of thought in certain lemmata: for instance, the commentator J does not seem to reject the philosophers' proof outright, only mentioning his concern with **(a)**, but found no fault in **(b)**, adding that the author Ī does not raise any objection to the latter either.<sup>73</sup>

Ḫ's defense concerns the validity of the philosophers' contested premise. Setting J's expositions as evidence, he demonstrates his opponents that not only this meaning of necessity is true on their own terms but also widely conceded by later post-classical commentators and critics as a term that does not suggest multiplicity. Throughout the debate, Ḫ sets out to verify Avicenna's 'many-in-the-one' approach, determinedly providing counter-arguments and additional textual proofs from past masters against those of Z and ḤÇ. Bringing out learned expositions to the counter-arguments from past and contemporary scholars, Ḫ further clarifies in the second half of his defense how certain controversial philosophical terms – such as 'entification' (*taʿayyun*), 'individuation' (*tashakhkhus*), 'specification' (*takhṣīṣ*), and

73 Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 47.

<sup>70</sup> There are three levels to 'meaning' (*maʿnā*) in the scholarly context: the lexical meaning, the intention of the speaker, as well as the meaning or function of a particular word as discussed by the grammarians (Versteegh, "The Debate Between Logic and Grammar", 59).

<sup>71</sup> See ḤÇ's lemma "fa-yalzimu tarkībuhumā": "I will, therefore, suggest that what we have pointed out here as an answer (i.e. necessity and existence are accidental qualities superadded to God's quiddity) is established based on the principles of the theologians, just as we alerted you about it before" (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45).

<sup>72</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

'genus/species' nature' (*ṭabīʿa jinsiyya*/*nawʿiyya*) – do not overall contradict with the philosophers' thesis. In most instances he closely follows their exposition for the sake of the debate. Only in one point, though, he disagrees with them, favoring that entification and species' nature are rather superadded accidents. Except these, Ḫ argues as a way of conclusion that the philosophers' doctrines are coherent in their own paradigm and they can even be reconciled with the current trends in post-classical Islamic scholarship.

## **5.4.1 An Invocation on God's Unicity. "He Neither Begets Nor Is Born"**

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Glory be to Him who is one and who neither begets nor is born, nor is there to Him any equivalent. [*al-Ikhlās* 112:3‑4] Pray on Muḥammad and on the family of Muḥammad.

Ḫ's defense of the philosophers begins with verses from the Meccan *sūra* of *al-Ikhlās* [112:3‑4], which was included as a literary topos, implying the central subject matter of the debate (*tawḥīd*).<sup>74</sup> Invocation sections have a key role in defining a locus for the central argument of a text,<sup>75</sup> and here the quotation from the Qurʾān sets the main thrust as God's singularity. The verse "He neither begets nor is born" implies that God neither has a partner nor is caused by another, that is, the intended conclusion of the debate.

Having studied the exegetical texts included in Ottoman scholar and librarian al-ʿAtūfī's (d. 948/1541) recently edited inventory of Bāyezīd II's royal library, Mohsen Goudarzi highlights the centrality of al-Zamakhsharī's *al-Kashshāf* and the prevalence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's voluminous exegesis *Mafātiḥ al-ghayb* in the fifteenth-century Ottoman intellectual world.<sup>76</sup> Indeed the connection between the debate's subject-matter (*burhān altamānuʿ*), and the quotations from *al-Ikhlās* can be traced in these popular works: for instance, *al-Kashshāf* writes that the verse "He neither begets nor is born" is significant in negating partners to God since the concept of one (*aḥad*) implied here is a property of His singularity.77 Likewise, according to Rāzī's voluminous Qurʾānic exegesis also known as *al-Tafsīr alkabīr*, *sūra al-Ikhlās* is referred as the "Chapter on [Divine] Unicity",<sup>78</sup> a verse which, for him, not only uses God's singularity (*waḥdāniyya*) as a proof of unicity (especially due to the first verse "Say, He is Allah, who is, One"), but also provides a direct revelation (*naqlī*) for God's singulari-

<sup>74</sup> Islamic treatises originally start with an invocation, though Z's version does not include such a prefatory note, which may indicate that Z's surviving text might be a later scholar's personal copy or cursory notes – i.e. a text that was not prepared as an officially commissioned copy.

<sup>75</sup> Tezcan, "The Multiple Faces of the One".

<sup>76</sup> Goudarzi, "Books on Exegesis", esp. 267‑73. Goudarzi writes that Zamakhsharī's *al-Kashshāf*, which is represented by thirteen copies and thirty-six glosses and commentaries in the list, has the highest number of copies under the exegesis section along with Rāzī's *Mafātiḥ* and Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī's (d. 685/1286) *Anwār al-tanzīl* (p. 270). Books on exegesis are included in the first section of the inventory, a case that highlights the importance of exegetical works among religious and rational sciences. Though Zamakhsharī's *al-Kashshāf* precedes the *Mafātiḥ* chronologically, it is observed that the latter's is the first work to be listed on the inventory probably due to the former's immediate affiliation with the Muʿtazilite thought (pp. 270‑2).

<sup>77</sup> "Aḥad waṣf biʾl-waḥdāniyya wa-nafī al-shurakāʾ" (al-Zamakhsharī, *Tafsīr al-kashshāf*, 1228).

<sup>78</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 175.

ty, without making Muslim scholars resorting to reason (*ʿaql*) and rational inference (*istidlāl*).<sup>79</sup>

There is, however, another context of evaluating God's unicity in the Meccan *sūra* of *al-Anbiyāʾ* [21:22], which states "Had there been other gods besides Allah in the heavens or the earth, both realms would have surely been corrupted. So Glorified is Allah, Lord of the Throne, far above what they claim". A century after the debate, a Persian émigré scholar Muṣliḥuddīn al-Lārī (d. 979/1572) pens a treatise on *burhān al-tamānuʿ*, 80 in which, debating the ideas of past masters, such as Jurjānī, Taftāzānī, and Dawānī, he argues that the mentioned verse presents a sound rational proof of God's singularity.<sup>81</sup>

### **5.4.2 Day One. Ḫ's Response to Objections to the Philosophers' Thesis by J/ḤÇ**

**The author** [ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī/al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī], may Almighty God have mercy on him, said in Observation Three [of *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*] on God's unicity (*tawḥīd*), a discussion also mentioned in the Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi], that the denial of a partner to God is required for His unicity; and there is no need to pursue this further. [With regard to God's unicity] Ḥasan Çelebi replied that the negation of an equal partner (*sharīk*) in species (*nawʿ*) does not require the negation of a partner in divinity (*ulūhiyya*), and that the existence's necessity literally permits each partner's requiring a haecceity (*huwiyya*).<sup>82</sup>

**I say that** if the necessity (*wujūb*) of existence (*wujūd*) were to be the same thing as essence (*dhāt*), as this is the basis for the proof here, then an equal partner would be eliminated in terms of species. There is no doubt that the reverence [of God] is required [to be refrained] from a partner that shares [the same] divine attributes, as well as the necessity of **[12b]** existence – unless it is claimed that the course of the argument in the competition just concerns the negation of an equal partner and existence's being the same as necessity (or not) is never noted.

As outlined in the first lemmata, Ḫ's thesis included in his initial written response is as follows: according to the philosophers, necessity has to be equal to God's quiddity/essence since the third meaning of necessity (i.e. "what distinguishes the NE from others") corresponds to the meaning in the initial statement. Ḫ notes that the denial of a partner is an indispensable element of *burhān al-tamānuʿ*, an aspect conceded by all scholars in the religious community, further adding that there are certain objections to the various aspects of this proof.

Most notably, his contemporary ḤÇ objects to this thesis in his gloss on the *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, by questioning **(a)** whether the denial of a partner in species can be applicable to the case of metaphysical principles, and **(b)**


whether the existence's necessity can refrain from receiving a haecceity.<sup>83</sup> Both cases imply individuation and multiplicity; therefore, for HÇ, taking necessity as an essential aspect of God must be avoided.

It is ironic that Ḫ starts his defense of the philosophers by quoting two objections from ḤÇ, who, having allegedly incorporated certain sections of Ḫ's gloss on the *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* into his own, was accused of plagiarism during the early years of his teaching in the city of Brusa. Ḫ's targeting ḤÇ at the beginning of his text may echo the purported bad blood between two scholars and, most probably, was not a coincidence.

Ḫ's reference here is a passage that passes in ḤÇ's gloss on the *Sharḥ almawāqif*. The full text of ḤÇ's objections addressed here are as follows (see the main point in italics):

**ḤÇ's gloss on Jurjānī's statement "with regard to God's unicity […]"**: Unicity here refers to all meanings included under the conviction of unicity, that is, those denoting a lack of commonality (*mushāraka*) with others in divinity; and this is what is intended here. A commonality in divinity requires a commonality in necessity, such that the latter of which is the source of each perfection and the temple of each deficiency. That is why, the philosophers are content with negating the [option of] a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*) [for necessity, but argued for its equivalence to quiddity]. If one is to say that negating the equivalent partner (*mathl*) is required, then there is no need for what J discusses. *Then I will say that negating an equivalent partner* (*sharīk mumāthil*) *in species does not require that in divinity – adding that the necessity of existence here is taken literal due to the permissibility that each would require a haecceity*. If this is conceded, then it will be accepted that what is understood by this implication also appears in the section about God's deanthromorphism, which is of importance.<sup>84</sup>

ḤÇ's objections **(a)** and **(b)** point out the most problematic aspect of the philosophers' proof, which is, in the words of ḤÇ, "refuting an equal partner to God *in species* implies refuting a partner *in divinity*". This statement highlights the discrepancy between the necessarily and possibly beings and, as an objection, questions whether particular conclusions can be reduced to divine aspects, and if so, on what basis this must be.

The philosophers argue that the necessity of a partner's existence may not permit its requiring a 'haecceity' (*huwiyya*). Haecceity here refers to an individualized aspect of quiddity in the outside world that leads to multiplicity. However, this does not mean that this same principle can be applied to divine or metaphysical realities since haecceity may well be associated with contingency.

For ḤÇ, to negate a commonality among partners *in divinity*, a scholar needs to first negate the commonality *in necessity*, not *in species*. Similar to Z's point in the debate above, his lemma suggests that due to its univoc-

<sup>83</sup> See J's passage related to quiddity in Discussion Two, which asserts the following: "Whether it is general or particular, every being has a reality (*ḥaqīqa*). If it is a particular reality then it is 'identity'; if it is a general reality; then it is 'quiddity'" (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 18‑21; esp. 18).

<sup>84</sup> See the lemma "qawluhu: fī tawḥīdihi taʿālā", which is quoted by Ḫocazāde verbatim during the debate, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

ity, necessity is a concept that may also interact with the possibly existents that are defined – unlike the Necessarily Existent – as beings that are only necessary by another. ḤÇ implies that there is no guarantee that necessity has to be absolved from multiplicity and plurality in the philosophers' case. This is simply because necessity may be regarded as attaching to multiple essences and, more importantly, receiving a haecceity, leads him to the conclusion that it will be better to consider it as 'accidental' (instead of 'essential'). Or else, if necessity is defined in terms of a 'necessary concomitant' (*lāzim*) or as identical to God's quiddity/essence, then this will indeed open some leeway for multiplicity in God. In order to bridge this gap, ḤÇ mentions that the philosophers are ready to negotiate that necessity is a concomitant rather than being equal to God's quiddity/essence.

According to ḤÇ's conceptualization, receiving a haecceity means that it is possible for the necessity of the partner's existence to be individualized among species via the philosophical term 'entification' (*taʿayyun*), and these aspects applied to the possibly existents (as in haecceity, individualization, and entification) should not be used in proofs defining God's singularity:

#### **ḤÇ's gloss on Jurjānī's statement "so the compositeness of both is required**

**[…]"**: If you were to say that entification's being an accident is a possibility – as mentioned in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*'s Intention Two, Observation One – then compositeness would not follow. Thus, I say that we point to an answer here in the sense that what we mentioned is established based on the principles of the theologians – just as we alerted you about this before [i.e. regarding the theologians' view that necessity and existence are superadditions]. As for the philosophers, they said that entification superadded to quiddity does not defend the implication of a haecceity's compositeness. *As for its being superadded to quiddity, this is not intelligible because haecceity is a particular individual, in which the very conceptualization of its intension* (*mafhūm*) *refrains from the occurrence of a partner that would participate in it*. If the way of the universal quiddity were to be regarded as something *either* by itself (*biʾl-ʿayniyya*) *or* by another particularity (*biʾl-juzʾiyya*), then the very intension could not be imagined insofar as its being hindered from the occurrence of commonality in it. That is why, quiddity cannot be a particular individual [and there is no composition in it].<sup>85</sup>

ḤÇ's objection in **(b)** is related to the term 'entification' that is often defined as "what distinguishes a thing from another without being participating in another".<sup>86</sup> Entification is closely associated with necessity, since both terms denote how beings could be distinguished from one another: the latter in terms of ontology, and the former by way of extramentality. Along with Z, ḤÇ takes entification as a superadded accidental quality following the theologians, further suggesting that if entification is a necessary concomitant as in the philosophers' sense, then it cannot be used in Avicenna's proof for unicity (because it will still denote multiplicity).

<sup>85</sup> See the lemma "fa-yalzimu tarakkubuhā", in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

<sup>86</sup> "Al-taʿayyun: mā bihi imtiyāz al-shayʾ ʿan gayrihi bi-ḥaythu lā yushārikuhu fīhi gayrihi" (al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-taʿrīfāt*, 65).

Entification is an aspect mentioned in the philosophers' formulation of *burhān al-tamānuʿ*; and the NE, by default, is expected to require an entification by essence to be able to distinguish Him from other beings.<sup>87</sup> Unlike ḤÇ's gloss though, J seems to acknowledge this premise as true in the philosophers' paradigm, suggesting that entification does not necessarily contradict with God's singularity, as well as their initial premise.

In short, ḤÇ's and Z's points, for Ḫ, are not valid objections since the thrust of the debate (as in Samarkandī's principle *taʿyīn maḥall al-nizāʿ*) is whether or not the negation of an equal partner is required for God's unicity, and this thrust is based on the philosophers' initial premise that necessity is the same as God's quiddity, a case which is coherent. Thus, probably knowing that Z, similar to the theologians of the past like Rāzī, would likely bring up the philosophers' oft-misrepresented thesis that God is the same as 'absolute existence', Ḫ comments that Z's last contention is not directly relevant and should, instead, be treated as a digression. Despite Ḫ's disclaimer, the third day of the debate will cover the exact status of existence with respect to God's quiddity/essence, hence their relationship to necessity.

## **5.4.3 Day Two. On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers' Thesis and on Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular**

On the second day, Ḫ provides a set of answers for his opponent's thesis that none of the stated meanings of necessity corresponds to the philosophers' sense. Z's view is based on the common fact that necessity is construed as accidental and suppositional, not suited for God's case essentially. Ḫ's detailed reply is as follows:

The author, may God have mercy on him, said that you have set forth beforehand that necessity is the same as quiddity. The unique mind of his time **[Ḫocazāde]**<sup>88</sup> **said** concerning the refutation of this premise: "I know that necessity corresponds to three meanings (sing. *maʿnā*): [necessity defined as] **(i)** "essence's (*dhāt*) requiring existence"; **(ii)** "that which has no need of others in existence"; and **(iii)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others". There is no doubt that one thing that is not mentioned in the first two meanings is that necessity is the same as quiddity since both [necessity and quiddity] are mental considerations (sing. *iʿtibārī*). What is intended by the [philosophers'] statement is that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, which refers to the third meaning. **Indeed, in this case**, as for the assumption about the Necessarily Existent's multiplicity, it is objected that **[13a]** the Necessarily Existent requires composition if necessity is a single reality that has two isolated units (sing. *fard*) etc.

I say that there is no doubt why this question appears, and you should not worry about its answer – but [know that] the statement about the term

<sup>87</sup> For the relationship between the NE and entification, see Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, 3: 464.

<sup>88</sup> In the marginalia Ḫocazāde is noted as the subject of this argument, which might have been added by a later copyist.

'specification' (*takhṣīṣ*) in the third meaning denotes necessity. **The Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi] expressed** this view insofar as specification is not objected.

As a reply, Ḫ further defends his point by arguing that the post-classical term *iʿtibār* could be applied to the very cases of necessity without undermining the validity of the philosophers' initial thesis. Ḫ's defense is stated as follows: in section 5.3, J defines necessity as *iʿtibārī*, i.e. a conceptual/mental consideration with no real existence in the outside world, thus not lacking multiplicity.<sup>89</sup> This aspect does not undermine the philosophers' unicity since Ḫ notes that there are three meanings associated with necessity as passed: **(1)** "essence's requiring existence", **(2)** "that which has no need of others in existence", and **(3)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others". In the first two meanings there is no direct allusion to the nature of necessity and quiddity in God, yet the third, for Ḫ, meets this condition, since both concepts are taken here as equivalent mental considerations with no real existence in the extramental world. This means that necessity cannot be a single reality that constitutes multiple units at the same time, as, otherwise, the NE would be perceived as composite. Following J, Ḫ here appeals to the position that necessity and existence are simply *non-entitative*, meaning that they do not constitute a distinct entity in the extramental world. This new designation in the post-classical world, for Ḫ, does not necessarily contradict with the view of classical Arabic philosophy, so making it valid within the limits of the philosophers' paradigm.

After arguing that the *iʿtibārī* nature of necessity can be reconciled with necessity's third meaning in Arabic philosophy, Ḫ expands his argument to other confusing cases of Avicenna metaphysics. For instance, the third meaning of necessity may have the sense of 'specification' (*al-takhṣīṣ*), an ontological term that denotes 'differentiation by limitation'. This term may well correspond to the meaning of necessity in the philosophers' thesis and, as Ḫ suggests, the glossator ḤÇ appears to have agreed with this point.<sup>90</sup>

In the later lemmata of Day Two, Ḫ uses extensive citations from *Sharḥ almawāqif* to prove that J's position does not necessarily clash with the philosophers' initial premise. Ḫ wants to show his opponent Z that the third meaning of necessity has been already in use among the theologians as well.<sup>91</sup> Then the conversation moves on to consider the question in what sense the third meaning is linked with the first two, and Ḫ continues to demonstrate, on the second day, how the third meaning is indirectly related to other two meanings by further referencing J's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*.

**[Jurjānī] states that** this is because both [necessity and quiddity] are mental intelligibles (sing. *iʿtibārī ʿaqlī*) which do not have existence in the extramental world; and this is accepted such that both are taken absolutely (*ʿalā al-iṭlāq*); otherwise why would it not be permissible that the specific one [of the two] is a real entity different from the quiddity of the Neces-

89 Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 112.

90 The closest reference to 'specification' is probably the lemma about 'specificity' (*khuṣūṣiyya*), used in reference to the specificity of the NE's essence in relation to other existents (see ḤÇ's lemma "mabnī ʿalā ʾanna al-wujūb wujūdī", in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45‑6).

91 See Ī/J's mentioning the third meaning as a valid definition of necessity in section 2.3.2 on necessity in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 116.

sarily Existent, as the scholars would all agree? **[Jurjānī] states that** what is intended by the philosophers' statement is that necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, as in the third meaning.

**I say that** this limitation<sup>92</sup> is an opinion of **[13b]** this virtuous scholar [Jurjānī] himself, and this claim has been put forth in some books. So there is no need for a thing to be contrary to what the evidence testifies, and this is noted in Discussion Three concerning necessity – especially in the later sections of this proof – such that the first or second meaning of necessity is and was the same [thing] as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, God bless him. Their statement did not pay attention to the fact that it is obligatory for these two meanings to exist among all externally existing things and to be the same as the Necessarily Existent. [This is] due to the weakness of their statement about this subject. The limitation of their statement does not depend on the question; rather it is just based on the demonstration of [its] occurrence. Whoever addresses an answer with a statement lacking the philosophers' intention [also] has the third meaning according to their statement, in which necessity is the same as [His] reality [*ḥaqīqa*]. **Rather [14a]** the intention of one of the first two meanings does not bring anything to support the advent of the question by this virtuous scholar, because its advent, in that case,<sup>93</sup> is more obvious and clear. Upon my life, the answer remarked by some of the virtuous scholars accompanied by certain additional points is more exalted than those that stand on the horizon of the heavens of my thought, but when the headstrong intentions of this verifier [Jurjānī] manifests, then the answer is concealed and becomes impossible [to refute].

According to the lemmata above, Ḫ's first textual proof from J is the following: the philosophers suggest that the exact logical intension (*mafhūm*) of their initial premise only corresponds to the third definition of necessity, a view which can be traced in J's passage about the definitions of necessity,<sup>94</sup> as well as the early theologians' position quoted by Ī.<sup>95</sup> In his *Mashriqiyūn*, Avicenna identifies a defined quiddity with an intension, as a real definition of quiddity sought through conceptualization.<sup>96</sup> If a meaning corresponds to the intension of a term, then it will be identified as a real definition of its quiddity, a case which may well correspond to the third meaning of necessity in this statement.

As a determined realist, Avicenna arguably assumes that this correspondence is a real case, so his initial suggestion is different from the nominalist tendencies of the post-classical context. The post-classical verifiers, such

<sup>92</sup> "A notional constriction consists in adding an intensional layer to some notion, thereby constricting or limiting the scope or extension of the initial meaning of a notion" (De Haan, "The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being", 264).

<sup>93</sup> In the marginalia: "Its purpose is to express the meaning only in a more informed manner and no more".

<sup>94</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 163.

<sup>95</sup> Ī/J cite the Muʿtazilite theologian Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī's (d. 303/915) view that God's essence is distinguished from others in four ways, and necessity is considered among the four distinguishing marks of the NE outlined by him (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 17).

<sup>96</sup> See the translation and analysis of *al-Mashriqiyūn*'s section on Logic 39.8; 45.1‑2. Benevich, "Meaning and Definition", 34.

as J and Ḫ, on the other hand, try to make sense of this case through their conceptualization of *iʿtibārāt*, affirming that both necessity and quiddity are mental considerations with no real extramental existence. Both entities here are taken in their most absolute/generic sense (i.e. not as existing physically) as opposed to Avicennan realism, since, otherwise, they both have to be acknowledged as God's real entities, which will ultimately imply multiplicity in Him. It is in this context that Ḫ, following J, asserts that one of the ways to make the philosophers' thesis consistent is to acknowledge that all these entities are *iʿtibārī*. In this way, even if necessity is taken as a single reality with more than two individuals, this will not imply diversity due to its being a mental consideration.

As passed in section 3.5 of this book, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* is devoted to the exposition of three common positions concerning the nature of existence and quiddity among the necessarily and possibly beings.97 And Ḫ's conclusion is that the theologian's view here refers to the third meaning of necessity as a limitation, but still affirming the philosophers' sense.<sup>98</sup>

Even though Ḫ provides evidence from J to support his point, this does not prevent him from critiquing the past master. Ḫ further comments that J acknowledges the validity of the third meaning, yet conceding that the first two meanings of necessity may not correspond to the meaning in the philosophers' premise exactly. This is because both meanings imply external existence, as well as a relationship of need and priority/posteriority, that is, aspects to be avoided when necessity is taken as a distinguishing mark. J underlines that the philosophers' initial thesis does not correspond to the intensions of the first two meanings completely, and he further eliminates these two options for a sound designation of necessity.

As a response, Ḫ critiques the second half of J's point, writing that the first two meanings may not be directly related to the debate at hand, but they are true and relevant only with regard to the demonstration of necessity's occurrence in the third sense. In other words, the first two meanings are indispensable to derive the third and, that is why, still relevant to the philosophers' proof. It is in that sense that Ḫ defends the validity of the philosophers' oft-critiqued 'argument from entification' (i.e. the NE can be distinguished from others via entification) as still suitable to affirm God's unicity. This argument, for Ḫ, is correctly based on necessity's third meaning directly.

**[Jurjānī] states that** what is intended by their statement is that necessity's being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is the third meaning, which comes from this statement such that what is intended is the third meaning's being the same as quiddity by itself, and likewise their intention here is rather such that 'what falls under' this statement (*mā-ṣadaq ʿalayhi*) is not [necessity's being] the same as quiddity. Otherwise, this would not be correct. **[Jurjānī] states that** consequently what

<sup>97</sup> For a summary of the views in this discussion, see section 17.2 on "Essence and Existence" in Dhanani, "*Al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām*".

<sup>98</sup> "Essential necessity implies two sides in the NE, one side is existence and the other is quiddity. This is because necessity is what distinguishes the NE from others [which is also the definition that is supported by the philosophers and Ḫ in the debate]. And this thing corresponds to the NE's essence because the NE has to be distinguished from other essences" (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 163). For essential necessary concomitants that are *min ḥaythuʾl-māhiyya* in Avicenna, Benevich, *Essentialität und Notwendigkeit*, 349‑54.

I claimed to be composition (*tarkīb*) in relation to the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent **[14b]** will be rather required if necessity is a reality with two isolated units. Yet, whenever necessity has two different essences, each being differentiated from one another, then it is no secret that one meaning cannot be conceivable since two different essences would be distinguished from each other essentially.

Upon this short digression, Ḫ continues to cite other additional textual proofs from J. In the next lemma, Ḫ insists that the validity of the third meaning already appears in J – albeit with a later correction in the manuscript: a curious marginal note<sup>99</sup> that might have been added by the author or a later commentator notes that he checked J once again verifying that J (ironically similar to Z) only saw the third meaning in a restricted sense as the extension of the philosophers' thesis (that is, as neither its exact equivalent nor intension). It is still a question how one should make sense of this later addition: could we see this as a correction on Ḫ's behalf? Or does J, as Ḫ claims, support the fact that the third meaning of the philosophers is an intension of their thesis? The authorship of the note could give us a perspective about J's verdict.

Ḫ might have corrected one of his attestation to J but, later during the day, he continues to cite other passages in support of his position, affirming that, for J, the third meaning never implies multiplicity. Even if it is assumed that necessity is a reality with two individuals, it will be still inconceivable for J that necessity has two essences simply because these two essences can be differentiated from one another essentially, a case which is evidently impossible, and hence not violating simplicity.

Ḫ's main intention in providing proofs from J is to show that none of the stated meanings of necessity assigns it multitude, settling that necessity has to be singular in nature. After these points, the exchange briefly moves on to discuss another question regarding how the limitations on the meanings of necessity are related to God's quiddity/essence. Ḫ includes another textual support from J, warning that the meanings mentioned here still have restrictions: if all three meanings are used in an unrestricted way, then they may suggest, as Z claims, an *ʿāriḍ*-*maʿrūḍ* relationship, so that they cannot be directly associated with God. The emphasis on restriction here seems to be a precaution against further counter-objections by Avicenna's critics.

**[Jurjānī] states that** the two partners mentioned in the first two meanings suggest a limitation in participation, and this is not as such [for the third meaning], since the unrestricted application of the third also [implies] a shared accidental affection, occurring to both [meanings externally] in this respect. This is apparent for those who paid attention and

<sup>99</sup> In the marginalia: "After writing this we found out a detailed version of this book to verify this matter. He explained here that, as we mentioned, what is intended is not the same as the third meaning (i.e. its intension), rather [it is] a judgment that falls under (*mā-ṣadaq ʿalayhi*) a particular question (i.e. its extension)". This note maybe added by Ḫ who was known to have glossed J's text. In a discussion about the undulation of tidal waves with ʿAlī Ḳuşçu (upon the latter's arrival to Constantinople), Ḫ asks one of his assistant to bring his gloss to J in order to refresh his memory about the exact place of his gloss on the past master's text (Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 161; Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 490‑1; al-Laknawī, *al-Fawā'id al-bahiyya*, 352; Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 94‑5). Ḫ may have later added this point upon the perusal of his notes.

thought about this. Mawlānā Shujāʿ's (d. 929/1523) statement, which we consider to be evidently invalid, responds to this question with the third meaning, such that if the third meaning were to have two different realities, then the meanings of **[15a]** necessity would not be equipollent with the [concept of] existence in the first two senses – without each of these realities being in the other. Then, it would be necessary that the third meaning is a single reality, and the likely diversity needed to be refuted corresponds to the multiplicity of an isolated unit. So, if a multiplicity accompanied by oneness in reality requires composition, which is impossible, then the way of its appearance will be that the implication (*talāzum*) here corresponds to nothing other than [something] between the first two meanings and the absolute sense of the third. This is because absoluteness was common in this respect, not distinguishing any of these three meanings from one another. **What is obtained** [from this discussion] is that the answer depends on the proof that a single entity is the same as the Necessarily Existent – regardless of whether this entity is necessity or some other thing. **[15b]** What they said is that 'sole existence' (*wujūd baḥt*) is the same as the Necessarily Existent, only if Ibn Sīnāʾs answer is correct in his *al-Shifāʾ*, which was excerpted in [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī's] *al-Muḥākamāt*. 100

In the last lemmata of the second day, Ḫ cites a counter-objection from a fellow scholar, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's student Şeyḫ Şücāʿ (d. 929/1523),<sup>101</sup> who was also said to have upheld J as more virtuous than his peer Taftāzānī like Ḫ.102 Şücāʿ's argument assumes that necessity does not need be a single reality and, for this reason, it cannot be equal to 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*) in Avicenna's famous formulation that equates 'pure existence' with

#### 100 Al-Taḥtānī, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

102 The text in *al-Shaqāʾiq* implies that Şücāʿ found J more virtuous than Taftāzānī since, though the latter was a noble man, [some of his views] were troublesome (Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 318). Mecdī adds that the latter was stricken with a junk of unfounded apprehensions, delusions, and doubts ("ḫis ū ḫāşāk-ı tevehhümāt ve şükūk u şübhāt ile mükedderdür", in Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 330). This is also apparent from the fact that Şücāʿüddīn provides specific references from J's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* on many instances in his gloss in comparative perspective with Taftāzānī's *Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid* (see MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513, ff. 20b-21a, 30a, 40a, as well as 36b, the latter of which also refers to J as a virtuous "verifier" [*muḥaqqiq*]).

<sup>101</sup> Due to the epithet *şeyḫ*, the scholar referred here should probably be Ṭūsī's brilliant student Şeyḫ Niyāzī Şücāʿüddīn-i İlyās, not Ḫ's student with the same name, who also held a post at the prestigious *Ṣaḥn-ı s̱emān*. At the time that Şeyḫ Şücāʿüddīn İlyās was Ṭūsī's assistant, he also became Eşrefzāde-i Rūmī's (d. 874/1469‑70 [?]) close associate in Sufism. Eşrefzāde considered him better at solving puzzles than his master Ṭūsī (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 567). As a great admirer of Ḫ, Şücāʿüddīn-i İlyās also contemplated to study with the master in Brusa but did not go against the will of his mother who did not want him to study in peripheral Anatolian cites (Ṭaşḳöprizāde, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 318; Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 330‑1). Having taught for many years in cities, such as Edirne, Brusa, and Constantinople, Şücāʿüddīn also wrote glosses on J's gloss on the *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* (Süleymaniye, MS Fatih 2939), as well as Ḫayālī's gloss on Taftāzānī's *Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid* (Süleymaniye, MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513). Taftāzānī's work briefly refers to *burhān al-tamānuʿ* with regard to the arguments from power, free will, unity and contradiction, incipience, need, and possibility – without dwelling much on arguments from necessity and existence (al-Taftāzānī, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, 37‑9). One possible place of this argument might be in Şücāʿs gloss on Ḫayālī where he argues that quiddities do not imply diversity in God since they do not come from the genus of things, which would, otherwise, require the Necessarily Existent to be composite. See the lemmata "kawnuhu taʿālā min jins alashyāʾ" and "fa-lā yalzimu al-tarkīb, naʿm, yalzimu mushārakatahu taʿālā liʾl-ashyāʾ fī tamām almāhiya, fa-yalzimu al-imkān wa-hādhā muḥāl", in Şücāʿüddīn-i İlyās, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā ḥāshiya ʿalā sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid*, MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513, f. 26b).

the NE. In other words, if the philosophers cannot guarantee that the third meaning is not composite of multiple realities, that is, if necessity here has two realities, then, for Şücāʿ, it cannot be equivalent to existence as in the first two meanings.

As the text indicates, Ḫ responds to Şeyḫ Şücāʿ's counter-argument in the following way: necessity can never have multiple essences in the context of the NE, because the third meaning already guarantees that necessity is a differentiator of essences that ensures that the NE is singular. For Ḫ, avoiding multiplicity is a must, and here it precisely refers to the multiplicity of isolated units that necessity may constitute. As follows, the necessity in the third sense has to be taken as a single reality in any case with regard to God.

As an answer to both Şücāʿ and Z, Ḫ then concludes that this case is still in line with Avicenna's argument concerning 'pure existence'. Otherwise, there would be no way to pinpoint necessity's exact meaning here for it may denote anything from the first two meanings to the absolute sense of the third. Ḫ notes again that this cannot be the case, since absoluteness may also denote a commonality that is shared among multiple entities. In certain passages, Avicenna distinguishes 'absolute existence' from 'pure existence', and the former cannot denote God's singularity but refers to a generic logical category shared by other entities. This distinction is in a passage excerpted by the celebrated post-classical theologian Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī in *al-Muḥākamāt*. <sup>103</sup> What Avicenna may mean here is that God has a *special* mode of existence called 'pure existence', which is perfectly consistent with his initial thesis.

### **5.4.4 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence**

Ḫ ended the previous day by linking necessity with the philosophers' 'pure existence'. Upon Z's counter-arguments and denial of this claim, the thrust of the debate on the third day moves to the status of existence and necessity in the philosophers' God and the question whether necessity can be equal to His 'pure existence'.

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that this aspect has been preceded by the argument that necessity is the same as quiddity. This statement assumes that the universal quiddity here belongs to the Necessarily Existent, and this is not correct regardless of whether it directly has external multiplicity by what is required by this proof. Thus, what is intended by quiddity [here] is an individuated haecceity (*huwiyya shakhṣiyya*). The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that then this implies composition.

Ḫ continues his defense with a disclaimer from Ī/J: according to Ḫ, both scholars observe that the philosophers' claim concerning 'pure existence' is preceded by the premise that necessity is equal to quiddity. However, in this

<sup>103</sup> In a discussion about the nature of entification, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī writes that the reality of the NE is 'pure (or abstracted) existence' that subsists in essence. See "waʾl-jawāb: ʾinna ḥaqīqa al-wājib mujarrad al-wujūd al-qāʾim bi-dhātihi, wa-laysa nafs al-wujūd al-muṭlaq", in al-Taḥtānī, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

context, necessity, like quiddity, can neither be universal nor particular,<sup>104</sup> so this premise contradicts with their thesis.<sup>105</sup> This is because quiddities, for Ī/J, are never specific to universal categories or individuated haecceities; otherwise, they will undermine the singular nature of God, which cannot be conceived similar to the logical categories of universality and particularity.

Upon citing Ī/J's view, Ḫ's point here is to clarify certain philosophical vocabulary like individuation and haecceity in the face of God's existence. According to the philosophers, each particular individual is composed of a quiddity and an entification at the very moment when each individualizes to distinguish itself from others. This hinders multiplicity, since both terms are only mental entities (and pure quiddities do not exist in the outside world unless they receive concomitants). Likewise, an existent is a thing with a distinctive individuality, and the unity of all these features does not imply multiplicity either. Again Ḫ emphasizes the status of *iʿtibārāt* to indicate that these terms are not real entities: necessity and existence defined as conceptual can well justify the Avicennan thesis.

Another possible reply to Ī/J can be phrased through the *iʿtibārī* term 'entification' (*taʿayyun*), and the argument is as follows: each individual composed of quiddity is in need of an entification to be able to emerge externally; thus, there cannot be two Necessarily Existents because they will eventually have to distinguish themselves from one another.106 Contrary to the positions of Z and Rāzī, entification here denotes neither composition nor outside existence, since it is, as Ḫ underlines, simply "in relation to the mind" (*bi-ḥasab al-dhihn*) – with no implications in extramentality.

Blasphemy was a common accusatory rhetoric employed in court debates and theological exchanges, especially when a losing party had no grounds to argue further against his opponent other than desperately accusing him with blasphemy. Also served as a reply to Z's claim of *kufr* on the same day, Ḫ's rejoinder underscores that entification is a mental consideration as in the cases of quiddity, existence, and necessity, which may be called 'Avicenna's trinity'.<sup>107</sup>

What quiddity is to individuals here is like what genus is to differentiae, and all these terms are among *iʿtibārāt*. This point also passes Ḫ's gloss on Mullāzāde al-Kharziyānī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma* commentary, which states that genus and differentia are only mental capacities that are one in making and

106 The first aspect regarding the philosophers' proof is the argument from entification, which is as follows: "If there are two Necessarily Existents, these two existents will then be differentiated by entification, primarily because necessity, as we said before, is the same thing as quiddity" (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45). In the same line with Ḫ, this argument defines necessity as that which requires to be distinguished from others by essence.

107 Ghazālī asserted that the root cause of the philosophers' unbelief (*kufr*) was due to their emulation of the Jews and the Christians in thinking, which led their disregard for religious law and negligence of religious duties (Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 83). Provided that Avicenna's formulation of simplicity and singularity went back to Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's formulations of simplicity in the Trinity, it could be arguably claimed that Z might have accused Ḫ of emulating a controversial Christian Orthodox doctrine.

<sup>104</sup> Marmura, "Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna", 61. Marmura writes that Avicenna sometimes uses 'universal' in a broad sense to refer to quiddity/essence, which is not properly speaking related to 'universality'. Also see Marmura, "Avicenna's Chapter on Universals", 39.

<sup>105</sup> Quiddities are described as being neither one nor many, neither particular nor general, and neither existing nor non-existing. These points also appear in J's Position Two, Observation Two, Observation Two (2.2.2) on Quiddities (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 18‑21). Also see Avicenna's and Ṭūsī's comments in *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, 3: 472‑4, 479‑81.

existence,<sup>108</sup> meaning that the relationship between quiddities and distinct individuals can be freely applied to the case of logical categories.109 Ḫ's emphasis on the *iʿtibārī* nature again is probably to silence Z, since, from the theologians' perspective, mental conceptions can also conform to their assumption that necessity and existence are accidentally superadded to God's quiddity/essence.

**I say that** the author has explained in the discussion about entification (*taʿayyun*) that an auxiliary individual (*shakhṣ muʿayyan*) is composed of quiddity [and entification], and the entification [here] is rather with regard to the mind with no [implications in] extramentality (*khārij*) since the author said that the relationship of quiddity to concrete individuatednesses (*mushkhaṣṣāt*) is here like the relationship of genus (*jins*) to differentia (*faṣl*). It is that **[16a]** a genus is ambiguous (*mubham*) in the mind having a capacity for multiple quiddities, and there is no entification for any of them – except differentia's attachment (*inḍimām*) to genus. Both [quiddity and entification] are united in essence, in making, and in existence in the extramental world, and the genus [here] can be distinguished only in the mind. Likewise, this 'species' quiddity' (*māhiya nawʿiyya*) has a capacity for multiple entities that do not have multiplicity for any of them – albeit individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*), which is conjoined with the quiddity pertaining to species. These are united outside in essence, in making, and in existence, being distinguished only in the mind. **[16b]** So, there is no quiddity existent in the extramental world, and an existent is a distinctive individual (*shakhṣ*) such that an isolated unit (*fard*) is composed from both (nonetheless it is not correct to predicate quiddity with its individuals). Yet, there is nothing here except a single existent, that is, an individual haecceity – with the exception of the mind breaking both into a species' quiddity and an individuation, which is like breaking the species' quiddity into a genus, a differentia, and a mental composition under the truth of Almighty God's reality. And no evidence [of this] has ever been refuted. The Glossator explains this in his discussion of necessity insofar as saying "as for the contradiction (i.e. the contradiction of necessity), the need of an intellective particular (*juzʾ ʿaqlī*) would not be then apparent". And this cannot be proven since what is needed [here] is its conceptualization (*taṣawwur*), not its existence in the extramental world.

To put Ḫ in a tight spot, Z then picks up on the philosophical terms 'entification' (*taʿayyun*), 'individuation' (*tashakhkhuṣ*), and 'species' quiddity' (*māhiya nawʿiyya*, lit. 'a quiddity pertaining to species'), compelling his opponent

<sup>108</sup> See Ḫ's lemma "**Qāla:** ʾan law thabata […]", which investigates the ways in which the term 'form' (*ṣūra*) could be defined. See Ḫ's gloss on Mullāzāde al-Kharziyānī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma* commentary housed in Süleymaniye, MS Carullah 1326, 98b (dated 889/1484): "**He said:** 'If it is affirmed that […]'. **I say:** 'Genus is an equivocal (*mubham*) thing which penetrates into existence only after acquiring a specified difference, and both are in agreement with respect to the extramental world in making and existence'". The next lemma states that form is a species' quiddity. For the Arabic: "**Qāla:** ʿan law thabata […]. **ʿAqūlu**: Al-jins ʿamr mubham lā yadkhulu fī al-wujūd ʿillā baʿd taḥṣīlihi bi-faṣl yuʿayyanahu wa-humā muttaḥidān bi-ḥasab al-khārij fī al-jaʿl waʾl-wujūd".

<sup>109</sup> Criticizing Porphyry's definition of differentia as being predicated of many items differing in species, Avicenna redefines differentia as "an [essential] universal that is predicated of a thing in answer to 'what sort of thing is it?' with regard to its substance" in *al-Ishārāt waʾltanbīḥāt* (Di Vincenzo, "Avicenna Against Porphyry's Definition", 179).

to clarify how their involvement will not affect God's singularity. During the rest of the day, Ḫ makes specific analogies between necessity and other mental considerations to show how necessity will not denote multiplicity *in concreto*. With one crucial difference from Avicenna, Ḫ does not see entification and species' quiddity as 'necessary concomitants' (sing. *lāzim*), a term that denotes essential co-existence rather than accidental superaddition. For him, their existence does not limit the philosophers' proof; nonetheless, his own verified position is that the two are superadded entities.

As a way of clarification, Ḫ expands on the nature of entification as such: according to the philosophers and their later critics like Ī, entification is required for quiddity to come out in the extramental world, and is a key step before individuation. There are no real entifications extramentally, and this is true again for the similar case observed in differentia's attachment to genus. For instance, if animal is a genus of human beings, then the differentia here, that is, the characteristics that distinguishes human beings from other animals, will be rationality, a term that gives haecceity to this quiddity.

Technically speaking, entification is a mental quality that only comes out when there is a differentia, that is, a universal distinguishing mark in relation to a genus, entifying one individual from another. Otherwise, a genus among individuals will have the capacity of receiving multiple quiddities only in the mind. The division among them is precisely mental, with no existence in the outside world. In short, for Ḫ, quiddity, entification, and distinctive individuals in this case are all one in essence, making, and existence, but only distinguished in the mind to overcome composition. This is the reason why the cases of genus and differentia are used as analogies in Ḫ's text.

Moving along the same line, a similar analogy can be also applied to the Avicennan cases of individuation and species' quiddity, both of which are among mental considerations. Individuation is an aspect that appears when predicating a quiddity of a subject in terms of particularity,110 and it is conjoined with a species' quiddity only mentally and accidentally.<sup>111</sup> As Ḫ states, both terms are united outside in essence, making, and existence, being only distinguished in the mind. Once an entity becomes distinct through quiddity's receiving a species' quiddity via entification, it becomes existent as an individual haecceity. Again, none of these terms entails multiplicity, since they are simply the mind's apparitions that provide explanations for individuation. Quiddity's acquiring individuation and entification simply belongs to our mental capacity.

It is observed that the same point also appears in Ḫ's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, which is as follows: being composed of individuation and quiddity is like being composed of intelligible parts (sing. *juzʾ ʿaqlī*), which are among intelligibles – not of extramental parts.<sup>112</sup> Having argued that entification and individuation are mental qualities similar to the logical categories distinguished in the mind, Ḫ comes to the conclusion that the glossator ḤÇ is wrong in thinking that necessity is in need of intelligible parts. Necessity neither depends on anything to exist nor has any real existence in the outside world. Thus, the necessity's dependence on mental particularities can-

110 Marmura, "Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna", 62‑3.

111 Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 205.

112 "Al-tarakkub min al-tashakhkhuṣ waʾl-māhiya tarakkub min al-ajzā-ʾ al-ʿaqliyya, li-ʾanna al-māhiya waʾl-tashakhkhuṣ min al-ajzāʾ al-ʿaqliyya liʾl-shakhṣ lā min al-ajzā-ʾ al-khārijiyya" (Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 187‑8).

not be true in reality. The only modification to Avicenna's position that Ḫ brings is that despite the philosophers' thesis that entification and species' quiddity are necessary concomitants that coexist with quiddities essentially, both terms should be interpreted as 'superadded accidents'.

The Glossator said that each of these aspects relies on existence's being a species' nature (*ṭabīʿa nawʿiyya*). **I say that** there is a disagreement [here] since if we were to assume the validity of both aspects, then [the aspects of] "necessity's being a nature pertaining to species" and "its relying on a thing (*shay*ʾ)" would be invalid. It is certain that this is true and evident according to the validity of this thing. As for that, there is a contradiction between [the statement about] necessary concomitances [with regard to] the validity of these aspects and [the statement about] existence's being **[17a]** a species' nature. This is because the validity of both [of these statements] requires the negation of multiplicity absolutely; and necessity's being a species' nature requires [the aspect of] multiplicity. At least, this [aspect] is in the mind, and one should beware of, so to speak, the composition of species' nature and entification necessarily.

In the next lemma, Ḫ entertains a possible objection by ḤÇ. Again to evidence that Avicenna's sense of necessity connotes diversity, ḤÇ notes that, in certain passages, the philosophers identify existence and necessity with species' natures, which are, in certain other passages, described as capacities applicable to particulars.<sup>113</sup> If necessity is a species' nature, then it will rely on another quiddity, thereby becoming an existent with real existence *in concreto* – not mentally as previously suggested. ḤÇ's original lemma that appears in J's discussion on God's unicity is as follows:

**His statement "This has two aspects […]"**: Each of these aspects relies on necessity's being a species' nature, and this is impossible due to the permissibility that the intension of necessity is a universal that occurs externally to what falls under it among the realities of necessity's isolated units. There is no doubt that what is imagined by necessity's being equal to the Necessarily Existent's quiddity is not this generic intension but 'what falls under it'; therefore, two Necessarily Existents will end up being distinguished [from one another] by essence. As a result, compositeness will not follow, and this special necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent's quiddity, will require an entification. Thus, the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent is impossible, and what we have said shows that the Necessarily Existent is not dependent on the proof of the philosophers. The statement of the author is invalid, and the competition is over.<sup>114</sup>

ḤÇ renders the philosophers' point by interpreting that necessity is associated with a species' nature; therefore, necessity cannot be the generic intension of God's quiddity. ḤÇ does not, however, realize that the philoso-

<sup>113</sup> The same misconception about the philosophers that they apply species' natures to the Necessarily Existent, a debatable interpretation which makes God, in turn, predicated by many, also appears in Shahrastānī's section on "On the Unity of Necessary Existence", in *Struggling with the Philosophers*, 46 (Arabic/English).

<sup>114</sup> See the lemma "qawluhu: dhālik li-wajhayn", in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

phers do not precisely say this. For them, the terms like quiddity, existence, and necessity (especially in relation to God's essence), are concepts transcending universality and particularity. In fact none of these implies multiplicity in the philosophers' paradigm by way of 'species'/genus' natures' (sing. *ṭabīʿa nawʿiyya*/*jinsiyya*). This oversight leads ḤÇ to conclude, similar to Z's repeated point, that necessity cannot be the exact intension (the real meaning of its quiddity) since it is associated with a species' nature only in the case of 'what falls under it'.

Based on this, ḤÇ further points out two possible internal contradictions in Avicenna, which are also mentioned in Rāzī's commentary on *al-Ishārāt*. If the philosophers' doctrine is interpreted to be dependent on existence's being a species' nature, this will suggest the assertions that **(a)** necessity is a species' nature and **(b)** relies on another thing.<sup>115</sup> As a reply to Rāzī, Ṭūsī has rebutted such claims, noting that the philosophers never stated that existence and necessity are species' natures.116 And Rāzī's view might simply be picked up by ḤÇ.

The argument that necessity is a species' nature was a common attribution to the philosophers, and many fifteenth-century Ottoman theologians, such as Ṭūsī and Ḫayālī, in a similar fashion to ḤÇ, seemed to have based their interpretations on this assumption.<sup>117</sup> Remembered most notably for his famed gloss on the *Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid* and a commentary on his tutor Ḫıżır Beg's (d. 863/1459) *al-Qaṣīda al-nūniyya*, Ḫayālī penned a similar exposition in the latter work:

The philosophers said that if the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent were to be by His [own] essence and if the necessity [here] were the same as His quiddity, then both partners would be distinguished by entification. This is because there can be no dualism without differentiation (*imtiyāz*) by [way of] entification (*taʿayun*), and the compositeness of each of these two haecceities would require a common quiddity and a differentiating entification, which would be absurd. It is no secret that the basis [of this proof] is [related to] necessity's being a species' nature. For, otherwise, provided that necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, both partners will never differentiate [from one another] by essence without the need for entification. On the contrary, the Necessarily Existent is regarded as immutable, [but this is not guaranteed] in any respect. There is no proof of this. Rather, the verified view is that necessity is a mind-dependent attribute, so there will be no compositeness whatsoever. I know that this issue is almost bound by the necessity's premises that are crucial for this proof. That's why, you see that the wise ones do not adhere to the dispute other than the Dualists.<sup>118</sup>

118 Ḫayālī, *Sharḥ al-ʿallāma al-Ḫayālī ʿalā al-nūniyya*, 164.

<sup>115</sup> Mayer writes that Rāzī's interpretation regarding the NE being a species' nature is also implied in Avicenna's argument (Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 203). Regarding Rāzī's point on the existence being a species' nature, see also Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 212.

<sup>116</sup> One of the four inconsistencies that Shahrastānī identifies in his *Muṣāraʿa* is related to the fact that the Necessary of Existence can be predicated by many, which makes God a species even though He cannot be (see al-Shahrastānī, *Struggling with the Philosophers*, 46 [Arabic/English]).

<sup>117</sup> A similar (mis)attribution to the philosophers is also present in al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 220‑1.

According to Ḫayālī's commentary, the philosophers claim that if there are two NEs, then they will have to distinguish themselves from one another *by entification* in order to realize their respective necessary existences. This is absurd since, in turn, this will imply composition. Entification, for Ḫayālī, cannot be an essential aspect, and if it is, then cannot be used for God.

Again Ḫayālī oversees the fact that this proof derives from necessity's being a species' nature (an attribution to the philosophers by Shahrastānī and Rāzī). This is because, otherwise, both partners will not be able to differentiate one another due to Ḫayālī's associating entification with a species' nature since only contingent beings can get entified. He claims that the point about the nature of entification cannot be proven, yet based on this, it could be demonstrated that necessity is an accidental superaddition to quiddity since this is the only thing that will guarantee no composition in God's nature. Due to necessity's purported links to a species' nature, there are other similar views in support of Z's claims about the accidentality of necessity, a conceded view among Ottoman theologians.

The lemma above indicates that Ḫayālī conversely envisioned entification as evoking a sense of commonality due to its being associated with a species' nature. Therefore, he thinks that there is no place for entification in certain proofs, including that of God's unicity. Similar to Z and Rāzī, he simply follows the theologians' view that necessity is solely superadded and accidental. After summarizing his opponent's views, Ḫ ends the day with some concluding remarks as follows:

**So the correct answer is** the position in the first sense, which states that necessity's reliance [on a thing] is [due to] necessity's being a species' nature, not absolutely, but with respect to the assumption of multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent or its being the same as the Necessarily Existent [itself]. These are required for the position, and it is no secret that this reliance does not refute the assumption of the aforementioned aspect's validity. As for the second aspect, it relies on necessity's being the same as the Necessarily Existent, not on the species' nature that it has. This is because if the statement that is based on "necessity's being the same as a species' nature" here follows that the Necessarily Existent is composed of both [necessity and nature pertaining to species] **[17b]**, as well as an entification that is not observable, then the occurrence [here] would imply a difficulty (*maḥdhūr*). Let's think about this! **It is no secret that** even if the reliance of these two aspects were to be correct with regard to necessity, but not with regard to a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), [this is] because, according to the assumption of multiplicity, their reliance in reality would be based on the immutability (*thubūt*) of a thing's being the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, as well as on the immutability of this thing being a common species' quiddity. Just as [the philosophers] claimed that necessity is the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, they, likewise, also agreed that existence is the same as its very quiddity. This does not validate their consideration that each of these things would be the same as the Necessarily Existent. In this way, what is said about the first aspect is correct: if there were two necessary beings to be distinguished by entification – because existence is, in this case, a shared reality between the two – then the differentiation does not acquire an entification, which does not necessarily verify **[18a]** a dualism. Thus, the difficulty [here] implies composition. For the second aspect, existence is what is required for entification, so if it were to be as such, then existence would either require entification (hence circularity follows), or not. As follows, the separation of both would be permissible without entification, and this would be absurd.

As a possible reply to Z, ḤÇ and, indirectly, to Ḫayālī, Ḫ makes the following conclusion. In his discussion on God's unicity, J divides the philosophers' version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* into two aspects via Ī: while the first aspect of the proof acknowledges the requirement of entification for necessity, the second aspect, which is also based on the same premises, asserts that entification is superadded (*yanḍimmu ʿalayhi*) as an accident to necessity and quiddity to prevent composition.

Ḫ acknowledges the validity of the first aspect, which is based on the assertion that necessity relies on another thing due to necessity's being a species' nature. The first aspect is correct for Ḫ, insofar as necessity is not taken here as a 'species' nature' in the absolute sense since the requirement of entification by itself prevents the existence of two Necessarily Existents. The only difficulty here is the implication of multiplicity due to necessity's being a species' nature. Ḫ settles that necessity's being equal to God's quiddity/essence neither supports the first aspect nor acknowledges J's point.

The second aspect, on the other hand, relies on the philosophers' initial thesis concerning necessity – albeit without the implication of a species' nature. For Ḫ, this leads J to the mistaken conclusion that the NE will then consist of species' nature and necessity. He rather notes for the second aspect that entification requires existence, but it cannot be said vice versa or else there will be circularity, and the separation of both partners without entification will be impossible. Unlike the first there does not seem to any hefty objections to the second aspect by Ḫ.

As a way of conclusion on the fourth day, Ḫ suggests that the terms 'entification' and 'species' nature' cannot necessarily signify composition according to the philosophers' original thesis. Their proof may hold these terms to be 'necessary concomitants', yet, from the post-classical perspective, their existence is still problematic because they create multiplicity in quiddity and, to hinder this fact, both should be simply accepted as being superadded accidentally. And accepting them as necessary concomitants as the philosophers did in the past, will, nonetheless, make them unfitting for this proof for his contemporaries – a position of the philosophers that Ḫ ends up amending and modifying in the debate.

## **5.4.5 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification**

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that if entification requires necessity, then it requires to be posterior, and this is circular. **I say that** [this is] necessity's being justified by entification. **The Glossator said** that an objection could be raised [here] such that entification's requiring necessity with respect to the privation (*ʿadm*) of necessity's requiring entification does not bring circularity. This is because entification would only require necessity if it were not to assume this privation first. **It is responded that** this assumption does not prevent the necessity of circularity as the fact of matter (*nafs al-ʾamr*), not **[18b]** corresponding to the occurrence [itself] since necessity is [in fact] a cause for everything else as in reality (*nafs al-ʾamr*).

The fourth day continues with a discussion on the status of entification. Ḫ first outlines ḤÇ's points in the latter's gloss and then argues for their insufficiency by providing further references from J's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*. ḤÇ's initial critique of entification along with a summary of Ī/J's line of thought is as follows: Ī writes that if entification requires necessity, then it is assumed that entification is obtained by necessity as well – a position that may lead to circularity since necessity is already a cause for entification. Following Ī, J acknowledges a problem here, for entification may be perceived as a cause for necessity. This is simply impossible because entification will still need to be acquired by necessity in the first place.

Based on these two comments about circularity, ḤÇ takes the contrary view, writing that entification's requirement of necessity is based on necessity's lack of requiring entification. For him, Ī is wrong in saying that there is circularity here, because entification's requiring necessity with respect to the privation of necessity's requiring entification will imply neither complementarity nor circularity.<sup>119</sup> As a follow-up, one possible response to ḤÇ's denial of circularity could be that necessity is a cause for everything else including entification; so if entification requires necessity, then the other way around is also true, a fact leading to circularity.<sup>120</sup>

Contrary to ḤÇ, Ḫ denies that there is no circularity here, arguing the following: entification cannot be a cause for necessity since the latter is already the cause of the former, preventing entification to require necessity. In the lemmata above, Ḫ defines entification as a second intention in relation to the first intension of necessity, not vice versa. The distinction between first and second intentions can be traced back to Avicenna, who speaks of logic as a science dealing with second intentions as applied to the first.121 Entification cannot be a cause of necessity, since, deriving from first intentions, second intentions act as causes to them. As follows, necessity does not necessarily need entification; therefore, there is no evident case of circularity.

I say that it is no secret that this answer [here] is terrible since the second intention is an entification that is based on the first intention for necessity. Thus, if entification is considered to be a real characteristic (*ḥāla*) for necessity, i.e. its cause, then there is no doubt that this real characteristic would not come together with the aforementioned intention, meaning that it will not be a cause. Then the first intention is invalidated and the second [intention] is corrupted for its being based on it; hence, there is no circularity. A similar statement also precedes the Glossator in a discussion about smooth surfaces (sing. *ṣafḥa mulassaʾ*), but he [also] had a [different] position there.

<sup>119</sup> For the quote verbatim, see the lemma "qawluhu: wa-yalzimu al-dawr li-ʾanna al-wujūd", in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 46.

<sup>120</sup> See the quote verbatim in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 46‑7.

<sup>121</sup> First intentions are concepts of extramental things, such as horses, while second intentions are 'concepts of concepts' (for example, species which includes horse and human). See Amerini, "Intention, Primary and Secondary", 555.

Ḫ supplements his answer with three further references from J's same work showing that the past master already speaks of the philosophers' sense: as for the first reference, Ḫ makes an analogy between necessity/entification and the case of smooth surfaces (sing. *ṣafḥa mulassaʾ*). The latter example passes in J's passage on place (*makān*), which is as follows: the philosophers argue that two equal smooth surfaces that perfectly correspond to one another will not be separated (like entification does with necessity), whereas it is the theologians who argue that they are two different things that can be distinguished.<sup>122</sup> What J indicates here is that the philosophers' case of smooth surfaces could be applied as an analogy to that of entification.

[Jurjānī] states that after accepting the sufficiency of 'pure causality' (*mujarrad al-ʿilliyya*), the privation of sufficiency is [now] imagined; however, if necessity were to be a complete cause – just as it is apparent in [the case of] necessity's being **[19a]** the same as the Necessarily Existent – then there is no doubt about the sufficiency of this premise. It is also objected to this by the author in such a way that necessity is a requirement for an entification useful in limiting it, since, otherwise, this statement would be a negation of this limitation not due to a principle of requirement. As follows, it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement, as well as the implication of circularity, are based on the first possibility, and the permissibility of separation (*infikāk*) on the second. And this is subject to debate in this answer.

[Jurjānī] states that it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement are conceded. What is imagined from this is that the negation for limitation is not due to a principle of requirement. How is it then conceivable that the lack of requirement is nothing more than this? [Jurjānī] states that the implication of circularity is based on the first possibility and the permissibility of separation from the second is not apparent **[19b]** since the center of discussion in the examples of these cases is one only in mental consideration. [Jurjānī] states that these aspects are aware of the soundness of the first two ways. Both have preceded their states and this question has been [further] inquired. He has taken this as the correct answer, which is mentioned by the Glossator after taking his statements and positions into account so that it is responded to this as such etc.

As for the second reference, J associates necessity with 'pure causality' (*mujarrad al-ʿilliyya*), concluding that necessity requires entification as a quality that limits, in some ways, the extent of necessity (not the other way around). And for the third, which is supplemented by two additional short glosses by J, the definition of necessity depends on neither its requirement nor its lack of requirement of entification and any other entity. The circularity in the third reference is due to entification's requiring necessity, which cannot be true. Otherwise, if entification and necessity are taken as separate entities from one another, then there will be no circularity due to the fact that these aspects are distinguished only mentally.

<sup>122</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 5: 142‑3. ḤÇ further comments that the possibility of two smooth surfaces touching one another is evident (see the lemma "wa-illā lam yakun al-tamāss", al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 5: 142‑3).

Ḫ concludes on the fourth day that the question whether necessity requires an entification, hence circularity is directly related to the first aspect mentioned above, which requires necessity to take on entification. Yet the permissibility of separation between necessity and entification is, in fact, associated with the second aspect, which can be further interpreted as having vied for entification's being a superaddition, a view that departs from the philosophers.

## **5.4.6 Day Five. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (***Wujūdiyya***)**

The fifth day is devoted to the question whether, as the philosophers claim, necessity can be regarded as an 'existential notion' (*wujūdiyya*). Given the fact that Ḫ, along with the most post-classical theologians, see necessity, as well as existence, among *iʿtibārāt*, it cannot be said that necessity can be externally existing by way of *wujūdiyya*. The problem of associating necessity with existential notion has been addressed before in the context of *al-Ishārāt* and its commentaries on Z's fourth day, and Ḫ provides a possible answer to him through referencing Ī and ḤÇ in critical light.

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that [this statement] is based on necessity's being an existent. **The Glossator said that** even if this is not necessarily so, it will be because necessity [here] is [defined as] either "essence's requiring existence" or "that which has no need of others in existence". **I say that** the aspect of limitation in this is [similar to] what was mentioned previously in the discussion about necessity and possibility, such that necessity in the second meaning is not in reality but unrestrictedly applied to it either by the allegorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*) of necessity, or by that of the principle of necessity. **[20a]** This [i.e. what the Glossator mentioned] is the foundation of proof for the invalid premise, and there is nothing wrong with it. There is no way to prove this invalid premise, and the proof that they have established does not work. Yet, it is possible that we can object to the proof, as the Glossator has also invalidated this, by questioning why it would not be permissible according to them that necessity would be a specific case (*khāṣṣ*), and what falls under these two intensions would be the same as what makes [the specific case's] non-existence inconceivable by way of equating existence to necessity. Thus, existence is a thing *in concreto* (*fī al-aʿyān*). There is no doubt that [necessity] is a thing in mental consideration that cannot be verified in the extramental world, and the position is that they proved that the specific [case] and what falls under it would be the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent. As for [the case of] derivative predication (*ḥaml ishtiqāqī*),<sup>123</sup> **[20b]** this occurrence is also in existence

<sup>123</sup> Does Ḫ refer to compositional or attributable predications by the term 'derivative predication' here? Different from homonyms (identifying "inhering *in* a subject") and synonyms (identifying "being said *of* a subject"), another category of predication, paronyms, which share a ground with homonyms, can be associated with derivative predications that denote composition and accidentality. Among none of the genera the predication is paronymous, which rather needs to be predicated univocally, since they are predicated synonymously with species. Going back to the Baghdad Peripatetics, there are two types of predications that inhere *in* a subject, i.e. homonymous and paronymous predications, the latter of which stresses "having mode of attribu-

(*fī al-wujūd*). The answer lies in the answer of this point. **[Jurjānī] states that** an unintelligible thing is intelligibly unintelligible, yet the statement here is not about something intelligible, which is a generic thing in mental consideration, but rather about the specific, and a specific thing's being an intelligible thing by its true nature is prohibited.

In a passage in his *al-Mawāqif*, Ī writes that the philosophers' initial thesis relies on necessity's being an existent, which is not true for their doctrine because, like quiddity, necessity is not an existent that has a real existence *in concreto*, only conceptually superadded. The glossator ḤÇ agrees on the view of the author Ī by stating that if it were not to be the case, it would still be due to the first two meanings of necessity mentioned above, i.e. **(a)** "essence's requiring existence" and **(b)** "that which has no need of others in existence".

In a later lemma on ḤÇ's objection against necessity's being an existential notion, Ḫ argues that the second meaning may only imply this but ḤÇ's objection about the first is far from valid. As a more correct way to address this issue, Ḫ further suggests that ḤÇ could have directed his critique in a different way, maybe by asking why the proof here do not relate to a specific case or what falls under the first two meanings of necessity. It should be further noted that one of Ḫ's contributions in the debate is to set necessity as *iʿtibārī* (not *wujūdī*) in order to conform to the position that it can be equal to God's quiddity/essence rather than being superadded.

After this comment, Ḫ concludes that necessity's being an existential notion is widely accepted in post-classical scholarship,124 and that the philosophers has successfully articulated that the special case of existence, as well as what falls under the meaning of necessity, is identical to God's quiddity/ essence. Thus, Z's objections are not valid.

### **5.4.7 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence According to Their Thesis**

The last day of the debate concerns whether it could be proven that the NE has to be a singular essence in light of the philosophers' formulation. In order to prove that there is no instance of multiplicity in God, Ḫ has to further reconcile certain philosophical terminology like entification, individuation, and genus' natures, by referring to the post-classical scholar Taḥtānī's famed book of arbitration *al-Muḥākamāt*.

The author of *al-Muḥākamāt* said that if you say that we do not accept that if the Necessarily Existent were to be an entification of its essence,

124 See Ī/J's description of necessity in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 116.

tion" and is defined as just like we say "Socrates is a grammarian". Those which are *in* a certain subject that correspond to accidents are predicated by way of paronymy. In the words of Alexander Kalbarcyzk, the species and genera of accidents according to Avicenna may be predicated of substances only in the *having* mode of attribution or by way of paronymy, and hence the meaning or definition of any accidental attribute is not predicated of a substance as something which it *is* (Kalbarczyk, *Predication and Ontology*, 75‑6, 214, 216). For Aristotle, derivative expressions are deprived of being in their own right and, paronymous expressions, which are often associated with adjectival and attributive predications, are introduced as a relation between two beings and not between two expressions (Bäck, *Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, 155‑6).

then this would be limited by that auxiliary principle; and, indeed, this would be likewise if the Necessarily Existent were a singular essence. This [point] would prevent the permissibility of the Necessarily Existent being a generic accident or a genus' nature. Also this [aspect] is subject to debate because if necessity were a genus' nature, then this would be correct. Distinguishing species that are classified under the Necessarily Existent from differentia follows from this. This [point also] brings a difficulty for the Necessarily Existent since He would be dependent on the composition of a species' nature and an individuation. There is then no difference between them such that **[21a]** each of them has a mental composition, as we have mentioned previously.

The Commentator said: "What is required for entification that superadded to it […]". **I say that** this requirement is in line with [the points concerning] the addition of entification and the requirement of composition. **FINIS**.

Elaborating on a previous point, Ḫ brings evidence from Taḥtānī's *al-Muḥākamāt*, noting that mental conceptions like necessity, quiddity, and existence, which are all equal to the NE according to the philosophers' formulation, cannot again be considered as 'genus' natures' due to these terms' connotating contingency. Avicenna notes that the Necessarily Existent has no differentiating factors additional to His quiddity, such as entification or individuation, which are parts of a thing's haecceity.<sup>125</sup> If the NE is accepted to be an entification of its own essence, then it is of a singular essence, demanding neither universality nor particularity. Otherwise, if necessity is taken as a species classified under the NE, then it will be requiring a differentia to emerge distinctly. This is impossible because this case will imply that the NE is composite of a species' nature and an individuation. Affirming Taḥtānī's position, Ḫ makes the conclusion that there is no problem in this statement as long as all these terms are one, only being distinguished mentally.

While Ḫ defends the philosophers' version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ*, he also adheres to Taḥtānī (and Rāzī) in other aspects, like the nature of entification vis-à-vis that of necessity.<sup>126</sup> Upon following the post-classical verifiers who accepted that entification is an accidental superaddition, Ḫ ends the debate amending the position of Avicenna (and Ṭūsī), such that if and only if entification is prevented from being a necessary concomitant as the theologians have claimed, then the problem of entification's constituting composition in God will be solved.

In conclusion, the nature of entification is the only part on which Ḫ seems to disagree with the philosophers. In other occasions, he follows them very closely in the nitty-gritty of their unicity proof, especially with regard to the stated meanings of necessity. Yet, when the discussion is extended to other tangential topics, he does not also refrain from stating his own view, such that entification and species' natures, contrary to Avicenna, are accidental superadditions (rather than necessary concomitants). Ḫ's main aim in his defense is to show that Z is mistaken in his evaluation of the philos-

<sup>125</sup> Mayer, "Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Critique", 289‑97.

<sup>126</sup> Al-Taḥtānī, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 79. Rāzī states that entification cannot be a concomitant since *first* it denotes commonality and, *second*, it ultimately leads to multiplicity (al-Rāzī, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 80).

ophers' doctrine, and the nuances of their exposition are coherent in and of themselves. As a post-classical scholar who is skeptical about Avicennan realism, Ḫ argues that the Avicennan model can also be translated into the conceptualism of post-classical thought with certain modifications – especially through the conceptualization of mental considerations. In either case, necessity is taken as an ontological term that is conceptually distinct but the same as God's quiddity/essence, as well as 'pure existence' in reality, a view for Ḫ that does not affect God's singularity. While most theologians take necessity as a superadded accident, Ḫ argues that as long as necessity (as well as existence and entification) is taken as an *iʿtibār*, a *non-entitative* term that can only be distinguished in the mind, the philosophers' thesis that necessity and existence are the same as God's quiddity/essence can still be verified.

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

# <sup>6</sup> Conclusion **Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms**

**Summary** 6.1 Summary of the Debate. Ḫocazāde's Persistent Point on the Non-Entitativity of Necessity. – 6.2 Ḫocazāde's Personal Opinion. His Perusal of *al-Shifāʾ*, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, and Beyond. – 6.3 For the Sake of the Debate. Verification in Defense of the Philosophers.

> In baḥr-e wujūd āmade bīrūn ze nehoft, Kas nīst ke īn gowhar-e taḥqīq basoft. Harkas sokhanī az sar-e sowdā gofte ast, Zānrūy ke hast, kas namīdāned goft.

This ocean of existence has come from the Obscure, And none can verify the truth of this substance. Each has uttered according to his humor, None being able to define it from the surface level.<sup>1</sup> ʿOmar Khayyām

The present debate is a product of the tension between two widely studied disciplines at early Ottoman medreses, *ḥikma* (post-Avicennan philosophy) and *kalām* (philosophical theology), which, over the course of centuries, accumulated a great number of crossovers, valences, as well as discrepancies among various schools of thought. Each scholar present in the exchange

<sup>1</sup> The English version is based on Khayyām, *The Rubaʾiyat of Omar Khayyam*, 39. I modified the terms that appear in the quatrain, such as *wujūd*, *jawhar*, and *taḥqīq*, according to their philosophical meaning in Avicennan metaphysics. The Persian version is Number Fourteen in Furūghī and Ghānī's selection published in 1941 and Number Eight in Hedāyat, *Tarānahā-ye Khayyām*. Also see Balıkçıoğlu, "Şair, Feylesûf ve Şüphe", 114‑15.

showcases their knowledge in past positions and objections by making references to various classical and post-classical authors. The texts that they refer to during the debate reveal their expertise in rational and religious sciences, especially their background in debates involving the discrepancies between *falsafa*/*ḥikma* and *kalām*. The current debate, in this context, addresses how prominent Ottoman scholars can respond to the antinomies of past schools and articulate their own take through referencing other contemporaries. It should be noted that the debate culture in the post-classical world followed the formal rules of debate etiquette, and the way that a scholar employed his own proofs and premises or objected to his opponent's was granted more important than sometimes arriving at a certain conclusion. The ornate detailing in post-classical argumentation during the Ottoman age of scholarly debates particularly favored the deconstruction of the opponent's method and argumentation style, as well as exactitude in referencing, which also interplayed a significant role in one's scholarly arbitration.

The Sufi-scholar Zeyrek brings an initial rebuttal of the validity of the philosophers' proof concerning the univocity of terms like necessity and existence when described with regard to God, by criticizing the Timurid verifier Jurjānī's inability to refute it. As a response, even though he does not uphold the philosophers' thesis as being true precisely, the verifier Ḫocazāde, for the sake of the debate, defends the philosophers' doctrine concerning unicity, by proving Zeyrek that the philosophers' version is coherent on their own terms. To convince the Sultan and the scholars present during the debate, Ḫocazāde justifies certain aspects of Avicennan metaphysics not only through referencing the philosophical corpus with scrutiny, but also referring to acclaimed post-classical critics, such as Jurjānī and Taḥtānī, concluding that the philosophers' proof can also be upheld as true according the post-classical paradigm.

During the debate both scholars accept that necessity is a mental consideration (*i ʿ tibār*), a widely conceded position in post-classical philosophical theology, yet they are not in agreement with the ways in which necessity as an *i ʿ tibār* is linked to God's quiddity/essence or whether its being an *i ʿ tibār* also entails its accidentality or, as Ḫocazāde claims, it can be said to have conformed to the philosophers' position. The term *i ʿ tibār* chiefly refers to the rational operations of the mind and its ability to unite and divide intellectual/mental conceptions, as well as creating and multiplying relations and distinctions between them. Yet, different from accidentality, it neither implies extramental existence nor external occurrence as an accidental superaddition (see § 3.4). The term *iʿtibār*, in this context, seems to harmonize with the alternative views listed under *ḥikma* and *kalām*, such that it refers to the conceptual distinctness of existence in an agnostic way without particularly singling out one view (whether its being equal or superadded) over another.

Following Rāzī and other post-classical scholars who argued for the accidental superaddition of existence and necessity to quiddity/existence in necessary beings, Zeyrek argues that this mind-dependent concept, necessity, should be deemed as a separate superadded (*zāʾid*) accident, hence cannot be equal to neither God's quiddity/essence nor His existence. Ḫocazāde, on the other hand, defends that the post-classical conceptualization of *iʿtibārāt* does not go against the philosophers' thesis (i.e. that God's quiddity/essence is equal to His existence and necessity), even cohering with it, since it conforms to God's singularity. In this context, the main point of Ḫocazāde's defense of the philosophers is that he wants to demonstrate his opponent that Avicenna's realist account of necessity can be successfully resituated in the new post-classical context of *iʿtibārāt* by regarding the term as *non-entitative* (without its connotations in accidentality).<sup>2</sup> The diverse number of topics outlined, as well as the references to past and contemporary commentators, proves, as evidenced in this analysis, the breadth of Ḫocazāde's knowledge and careful arbitration before settling his own position.

#### 6.1 Summary of the Debate. Ḫocazāde's Persistent Point on the Non-Entitativity of Necessity

Following the theologians' view, Zeyrek objects to Jurjānī's treatment of a premise on the philosophers' formulation of *burhān al-tamānuʿ*, by arguing that the premise "necessity is equal to quiddity/essence in the Necessarily Existent" cannot be true because the nature of necessity raises the problem of multiplicity in God. For Zeyrek, as a better option, not only does necessity need to be accidental to God's quiddity, but also to His existence.

When Ḫocazāde brings the counter-evidence that the third meaning of necessity, a view that also appears in the fifteenth-century handbooks of philosophical theology including *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, corresponds to the meaning of necessity in the philosophers' statement, Zeyrek counters that the meaning in the third sense cannot even be the intension of this concept, but what falls under it. Unlike intensions, extensions are identified as ostensive definitions according to which certain individuals are enumerated, and the use of necessity here as an extension implies that necessity may occur or attach to God's quiddity externally. Post-classical thinkers often see God's essence as a case of metaphysical necessity, yet the role of necessity's modality in understanding the concept of essence has been recently contested since no modal account of essence seems possible.<sup>3</sup>

Then Zeyrek moves to another aspect of the discussion, namely, the question of the philosophers' equation of necessity with 'pure existence', in which he seems to equate 'pure existence' with 'absolute existence' following Rāzī,

<sup>2</sup> One of the later glossators of Ḫocazāde's *Tahāfut*, Meḥmed Emīn el-Üsküdarī (d. 1149/1736) will associate this position (i.e. that existence is not superadded externally to quiddity but only in the mind – *fī al-dhihn* – as a mental consideration – *iʿtibār ʿaqlī*) with Suhrawardī's *Ḥikma al-ishrāq*. In the gloss, Üsküdarī rules out this option arguing that existence will be characterized (*ittiṣāf*) by quiddity being in need of it – a fact that will undermine their being equivalent to one another (Üsküdârî, *Telhîsu*, 168 [English] and 169 [Arabic]). Before describing Avicenna's view that existence cannot be a superadded accident to God's quiddity (since, otherwise, existence will be subsisting in it), Üsküdarī starts the chapter by acknowledging that Avicenna's position does not go against the principles of Islam. Even though he does not give a definitive answer, he outlines three historical responses to this proof which are listed along with their possible objections: Suhrawardī's view that existence is a mental conception; Rāzī's view that the cause of existence is not prior to its effect, i.e. making existence dependent on another thing; and Ghazālī's view that existence is actually in need of an efficacious agent, hence cannot be the same as God's quiddity. Üsküdarī does not choose one position over another; he rather evaluates the later critics of Avicenna, finding certain faults in their proofs (Üsküdârî, *Telhîsu*, 168‑75; also see Muḥyiddīn el-Ḳarabagī's (d. 942/1535) gloss on Ḫocazāde, which states that no one can speak ill of the philosophers' proof despite their imprecision since the theologians' proofs are also incomplete (Güzel, *Karabağî ve Tehâfütʾü*, 108).

<sup>3</sup> As Kit Fine suggests, "the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equal to a modal notion", meaning that propositions about essences are irreducible to modal propositions (Fine, "Essence and Modality", 1‑3).

that is, overlooking pure existence's 'special status' in God, as passed in Avicenna's certain works.<sup>4</sup> Here Zeyrek makes two objections, arguing that *first*, the term existence also has to be superadded to quiddity in God and, *second*, that all three meanings of necessity imply that it is an accidental aspect. As a result, he states that none of these meanings (which all suggest accidentality and contingency) can provide a substantial proof that the necessity here has to be a single reality with no diversity – and its being a mental consideration does not guarantee this. This point, in turn, deems the philosophers' proof incomplete, and Zeyrek proclaims himself as the winner.

In his textual response, Ḫocazāde affirms the validity of the philosophers' doctrine according to their paradigm, arguing that *at least* one of the three meanings of necessity (namely its third) corresponds to the exact meaning of God's necessity. That is, as opposed to Zeyrek's claim that the third meaning, at the most, can only fall under the philosophers' sense of necessity, Ḫocazāde not only shows that the third is the intension of this term, but also the first two meanings are fundamental in the derivation of the third.

For the philosophers, necessity is the same as God's quiddity/essence, which, likewise, is also identical to His existence. Yet, of course, this does not mean that God is each of these things. On the following days, Ḫocazāde has the harder job of defending the philosophers' thesis, since even though the young scholar asserted that the question of 'pure existence' along with others would be perceived as a digression, Zeyrek is determined to bring the questions of 'pure existence', entification, and individuation vis-à-vis God's singularity, demanding him to show that each of these Avicennan doctrines is consistent with the other.

The young scholar's position in the debate is difficult for another reason: his defense of the philosophers does not mean that Ḫocazāde supports their views completely. As a post-classical scholar who follows the works of verifiers like Jurjānī and Taḥtānī, Ḫocazāde holds in his *Tahāfut* that necessity and entification were superadded accidents to God's quiddity/essence. This view is contrary to what he defended during the debate. While arguing thus, he did not outright accept the positions detailed in the handbooks of the philosophers of his time. He perused further interpretations held in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* with scrutiny, by especially refuting two objections to the philosophers' proof by his long-time adversary Ḥasan Çelebi.

Ḫocazāde may not have held that the philosophers' statement about 'pure existence' was true, but he does show that the philosophers' position is valid in and of itself, since existence's being an accident superadded to quiddity does not do justice to God's necessary existence as it places existence secondary to the essential aspect of quiddity. And, at the end of the debate, when the question came to the status of entification or individuation visà-vis God, Ḫocazāde did also defend the philosophers' thesis outlined in Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt*, but also included his own view that if entification, a term closely tied to necessity, is taken as a concomitant in the philosophers' sense: it may indeed imply multiplicity in God's essence. Hence, different from the philosophers, he asserts that entification should be taken as a superadded accident that does not have any real existence in the outside world.

<sup>4</sup> Avicenna assigns a 'proper mode of existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*) to God which is distinct from 'realized existence' (*wujūd muḥaṣṣal*), the latter of which reserved for universal and particular existences. The conceptualization of the term goes back to Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 498‑531).

Ḫocazāde's view with regard to the nature of necessity, quiddity/essence, and existence falls under the 'conceptualist' reading of these terms in postclassical philosophy.<sup>5</sup> It has been argued that there are two such approaches in the philosophical corpus: one group asserts that essence and existence can be distinguished only conceptually, whereas objectively or extramentally they are identical; on the other hand, the rival view states that the distinction between the two is real.<sup>6</sup> The philosophers' view, as well as Ḫocazāde's rendition follows the former position, which has been also posited by the famed thirteenth-century post-classical philosophers, such as Abharī and Ṭūsī, who were both instrumental in the transmission of Avicennan concepts through their commentaries and modified doctrines in the post-classical Islamicate world.<sup>7</sup>

Zeyrek's position depends on the problem of composition, according to which the presence of both existence and necessity in God, in relation to His quiddity/essence, may require diversity and composition in the Necessarily Existent. One of the most common ways to argue against God's purported multiplicity in pre-Ottoman Islamic scholarship (e.g. theology of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) was to show that necessity and existence were *non-entitative*, by taking both terms as either *iʿtibārī* ('with no distinct entitative metaphysical component'), or *ʿadamī*/*salbī* (negational, or 'simply ascribing some feature of extramentality which adds nothing to that entity').<sup>8</sup> Ḫocazāde here certainly follows the *non-entitative* position in the first case, not upholding the second, by concluding that the philosophers' proof, which may not be the most sound formulation, is still true in and of itself, according to their paradigm (though he does not follow this thesis personally in his *Tahāfut*). On the other hand, Zeyrek, acknowledging both aspects of *non-entitativity* to a certain extent, concludes, also following the theologians' view as in the third meaning, that necessity (and existence) should be considered as accidents that occur to quiddity externally; that is, that they are non-essential superadditions not identical to God's quiddity/essence. Zeyrek deems that the philosophers' answer can only be validated through accepting necessity as an accident – a view that goes against their provided assumptions.

### 6.2 Ḫocazāde's Personal Opinion. His Perusal of *al-Shifāʾ*, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, and Beyond

Ḫocazāde's main aim during the debate was not only to show that this line of thought was true according to the philosophers, but also the meaning of necessity in their sense was also present in various texts of philosophical theology studied at Ottoman medreses, including Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*. In his exposition of the subject, Ḫocazāde does not directly follow the past verifiers by reporting their views, but he corrects, comments, amends, and


<sup>5</sup> Different from the case of extreme/absolute nominalism, Pines associates the conceptualist reading with the view that the universals are merely mental forms, which have a relation to many things in such a way that it may be said of each one of them that it is it; and this reading is a weaker form of extreme nominalism (Pines, "Studies in Abuʾl-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's Poetics and Metaphysics", 282‑4).

modifies them if needed in order to craft his own formulation depending on the nature of the disputation.

Indeed, Ḫocazāde's defense was not new to the medrese curriculum, since one of the popular works in post-classical philosophy, Abharī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma*, already acknowledges that God's existence, as well as the necessity and entification of His existence, is equal to His real essence in Chapters Two and Three of the *Metaphysics* by giving a summary of Avicenna's views.<sup>9</sup> In a polemical treatise concerning Jurjānī's mistakes in six theological issues, the acclaimed Ottoman verifier Ḳasṭalānī (d. 901/1496)10 also argued, different from Jurjānī and Zeyrek, that existence and quiddity may even be the same among the possible existents, yet with one additional condition: the existent in question must be an essential (*dhātī*) quality.<sup>11</sup>

Mollā Ḳasṭalānī was a contemporary of Ḫocazāde, who garnered the master verifier's utmost respect as a tutor and a scholar. After having taught Jurjānī's works for many decades, he penned a short *dubia* on six issues, each of which had the intention of revising Jurjānī's points and showing that the scholar's answers failed to verify the truth absolutely. The third question in Ḳasṭalānī's *dubia* concerns Ījī/Jurjānī's third corollary whether or not existence is superadded to quiddity among the possibly existents. Ḳasṭalānī observes that there are two types of existents (sing. *mawjūd*), one type is by way of essence (*li-dhātihi*) and the other being external to its essence but in conjunction with it (*khārij ʿan dhātihi muqāran lahu*), concluding that in the former case one cannot argue that quiddity is prior to existence. This means that, in the first case, once existence is removed from quiddity, the latter will be negated as well, hence there will not be an existent in the first place.

It could be said that the verifier Ḳasṭalānī does the same thing with his contemporary Ḫocazāde: in addition to a full-fledged restatement and defense, he also criticizes and modifies Jurjānī's exposition of the philosophers in light of their view. In this lemma, he aims to show off his scrutiny in scholarship, by showing that Ījī/Jurjānī's position here is not categorically absolute, and these scholars did not take distinct types of possibly existents into full account. In his objections to Ḳasṭalānī's objections, the Sufischolar Sinān Paşa, on the other hand, points out that Jurjānī did mention this point in another work (i.e. his gloss on Iṣfahānī's *Tajrīd*), and Ḳasṭalānī was simply unaware of this lemma, by questioning how come he could be called a 'verifier'. This did not, however, stop the skeptical Sinān Paşa to point his arrows of criticism at the famed Persian theologians of the past:

<sup>9</sup> See "faṣl fī ʾanna wujūd wājib al-wujūd nafs ḥaqīqatihi" and "faṣl fī ʾanna wujūb al-wujūd wa-taʿayyanuhu ʿayn dhātihi" (al-Abharī, *Hidāya al-ḥikma*, 96‑7).

<sup>10</sup> For a short account of Ḳasṭalānī's works, see Şen, "Molla Kestelî'nin Hayatı ve Eserleri".

<sup>11</sup> For the Arabic: "**Qāla**: fī baḥth al-wujūd istidalla ʿalā kawn al-wujūd zāʾidan ʿalā al-māhiya ʿannahu law lam yakun zāʾidan ʿalayhā lākin li-kāna nafsahā ʿaw juzʾahā, fa-lā yumkinu salbahu ʿanhā. Wa-ʿajību bi-ʿannahā nafsuhā taqabbala al-ʿadm, fa-ʾin al-māhiya idhā irtafaʿat, irtafaʿa wujūduhā. Fa-li-dhālik la-dhā kāna wujūdahā ʿaynuhā, jāza irtifāʿahā. **Aqūlu**: al-mawjūd ḍarbān mawjūd li-dhātii, lā li-maʿnā khārij ʿan dhātihi muqāran lahu, fa-lā yutaṣawwaru zawāl wujūdihi ka-mā ʿanna al-insān lā-annahu insān li-dhātihi lā yutaṣawwaru salb insāniyatihi ʿanhu. Wa-ḍarb mawjūd lā li-dhātihi; bal li-maʿnā muqāran lahu, wārid ʿalayhi min ghayrihi. Fa-huwa fī ḥadd dhātihi qābil li-salb dhālik al-maʿnā ʿanhu, fa-huwa mumkin ʿan yujad wa-ʿin lā yujad" (Ḳasṭalānī, *Iʿtirāḍāt al-Ḳasṭalānī ʿalā al-Sayyid al-Sharīf* [Süleymaniye, MS Karaçelebizâde Hüsâmeddin 330, f. 3a]). Also see a recent edition of this *dubia*, Şen, "Molla Muslihuddin Kestelîʾnin", for a short analysis, 179 and, for the Arabic text, 198‑9. Also see a more extensive analysis of Ḳasṭalānī's sources and Ījī/Jurjānī's positions in Yıldırım, *Kestelîʾnin Es-Sebʾul-Muʿallaka*, 78‑82.

for him, neither Ījī nor Jurjānī brought a new perspective but simply copied the Ashʿarī position without adding any ingenuity.<sup>12</sup>

In the fifteenth-century Ottoman world, Graeco-Arabic philosophy was mostly known through Avicenna's compendia of philosophy prepared later in his life, such as *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, as well as the verifier Taḥtānī's adjudication on the two famed commentaries on the same text called *al-Muḥākamāt* – not through his complex voluminous masterpiece *Kitāb alshīfāʾ*. This fact is also evidenced in Zeyrek's and Ḫocazāde's citing the philosophers' thesis concerning 'pure existence' in the debate, since they, in every instance, choose to quote the philosophers via *al-Muḥākamāt* instead of going back to the original sources (a practice that may also be observed in certain discussion in the *Tahāfut* debate).<sup>13</sup>

Ḫocazāde's overutilization of Taḥtānī's *al-Muḥākamāt* is also evident in a heartfelt confession by him, who announced at a banquet in the presence of notable scholars, including Mollā Luṭfī and Ḫatībzāde, that he had never read Avicenna's magnum opus *Kitāb al-shifāʾ* cover-to-cover, which may indicate that he knew its arguments through close readings of certain parts or from its later renderings. As a reply, the fellow Ḳasṭalānī proudly claims to have read the work at least seven times, and each time he was as enthusiastic as a novice studying the work as if for the first time.<sup>14</sup> This anecdote does not precisely suggest that the master verifier Ḫocazāde never read certain sections of the work with scrutiny or was not aware of the arguments in *al-Shifāʾ*, since there are certain other cases in the *Tahāfut* where he directly quoted from this book.<sup>15</sup> It may still be inferred that Ḫocazāde, who might have supported the philosophers for the sake of the disputation, did rather follow Taḥtānī in certain regards, including the position that entification, as evidenced here, is a superadded accident to God's quiddity.

This piece of biographical information should not make us think that Ḫocazāde was misinformed about the philosophers' point. In fact, one could find his ultimate position on unicity, in lieu of the philosophers' critique, in his famed adjudication on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, a work that was writ-

15 Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 119.

<sup>12</sup> For the Arabic text, "Hādha kalām ḥaqq lā yaḥūmu ḥawlahu shāʾiba shakk wa-inkār. Wa-ʿashāra ʿilayhi al-fāḍil al-sharīf fī ḥawāshī Tajrīd wa-ghayrihā. ʿIllā ʿannahu aktifā hahunā baḥl al-kalām al-muṣannif min ṭaraf al-ashāʿira ʿalā māhir daʾbihi kathīran fī hādha al-kitāb" (Yıldırım, *Kestelîʾnin Es-Sebʾul-Muʿallaka*, 45).

<sup>13</sup> For instance, Ṭūsī's Discussion Thirteen in his *Tahāfut* adjudication, in which he summarized the philosophers' position concerning God's knowledge of the particulars via *al-Muḥākamāt* only (al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 271).

<sup>14</sup> During a banquet, blood gushed forth from Mollā Luṭfī all of a sudden, and some of the scholars around the table were amused by the scene and got intrigued by the possible medical reasons for this condition. Ḳasṭalānī explained Luṭfī's condition by quoting from Avicenna's *al-Qānūn fī al-ṭibb*, and Ḫocazāde was highly impressed with the scholar's extensive knowledge about the Avicennan corpus. Upon Ḫocazāde's astonishment, Ḳasṭalānī further claimed that, in addition to *al-Qānūn*, he had read *al-Shifāʾ* seven times from cover-to-cover, while the master confessed that he never did. As for the text: "Mevlānā daḫı didi ki tenhā Ḳānūnʾı değil belki Şeyḫʾüñ ʿāmme-i müʾellifātını bā-cemʿuhā ḥattā *Şifāʾ*yı daḫı tamām-ı muṭālaʿa itmişim Ḫocazāde taʿaccub idicek eyütdi ki yā siz *Şifāʾ*yı tamām görmek vāḳıʿ olmamuş mıdur? Ḫocazāde eyütdi ki tamām görmedüm emmā mevāżıʿ-ı mühimmesini ʿalā ḳadriʾl-ḫāce görüb diḳḳat üzre muṭālaʿa itmek vāḳıʿ olmuşdur. Mevlānā didi ki ben *Şifāʾ*yı biʾt-tamām yedi kerre muṭālaʿa idüb marra-ı sābiʿada ders-i cedīd muṭālaʿasın ider yeñi dānişmend gibi muṭālaʿa itdüm" (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 482). It was due to this exchange, Ḳasṭalānī was one of the two scholars whom Ḫocazāde respected to an extent that he referred to him as *mollā*, and the other scholar was Ḫayālī (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 482).

ten soon after this debate. In this adjudication, not only did he repeat his position concerning differentiating factors, such as entification and individuation, that they are superadded accidents to quiddity,<sup>16</sup> but also he argued the opposite of what he had defended against Zeyrek, that even necessity should be deemed as a separate accidental superaddition<sup>17</sup> as in the case of entification, hence not being directly equal to God.

In his *Tahāfut*'s Discussion Seven on the philosophers' inability to prove God's singularity, Ḫocazāde writes that terms such as 'necessity', 'entification', and 'individuation' should be taken as *non-entitative* in the sense of the first aspect above, that is, as *iʿtibārī* concepts appearing to quiddity without extramental existence – yet adding that he neither holds that these concepts can be externally existing (*wujūdī*) nor *non-entitative* in the negational (*ʿadamī*/*salbī*) sense, thereby suggesting their accidentality in several places.<sup>18</sup> As a conclusion, he does not strictly follow *non-entitativity*, finding the philosophers' formulation of unicity imprecise. Ḫocazāde's acknowledgment of this thesis against Zeyrek should simply be for the sake of the debate.

As passed in the analysis of the text presented at the debate, the verifier Ḫocazāde does not hold that the philosophers' designation of entification is true. By way of summary, the philosophers argue that entification is an existent with an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), that is the same as quiddity in the external world, which can only be distinguished mentally. On the other hand, the theologians hold that entification is a non-existent being (with no existence in the outside world) but superadded accidentally to quiddity. In his *Tahāfut*, Ḫocazāde synthesizes both views arguing that entification is an existent that cannot be the same as quiddity in reality but must be superadded to it. Entification implies a 'need-based' relationship associated with identity and specification, such that God's having His own special entification would still go against His necessary existence, and thereby deeming it to be a superadded accident (*ʿāriḍ*).

In his *Tahāfut*, Ḫocazāde provides three proofs from the philosophers regarding the nature of entification, the first regarding what entification is and whether it is an existent (*mawjūd*) or not; the second regarding the view that it is impossible for two quiddities with necessary existence to be existents; and the third stating that the individuals of a single nature or quiddity dis-

<sup>16</sup> "Rather, the outcome is that if necessity were to denote a sense of commonality between two partners, the entification of the Necessarily Existent could not be the same as His quiddity, and it is apparent [from this] that it would be added to the quiddity". As for the Arabic: "Bal maḥṣūluhu huwa ʿannahu law kāna al-wujūb mushtarakan bayna ithnayn lam yakun taʿayyun al-wājib nafs māhiyatihi, wa-huwa ẓāhir bal kāna zāʾidan ʿalayhi" (Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 186). Or: "As an answer to this, it is apparent that we do not concede necessity's being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, rather it is an accident among God's accidents". As for the Arabic: "Fa-jawābuhu: al-zāhir ʿan yuqālu: lā nusallam kawn wujūb al-wujūd nafs māhiya al-wājib, bal huwa ʿāriḍ min ʿawāriḍihā" (Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 190).

<sup>17</sup> "The answer is that according to the second position [as outlined by Ghazālī], what is intended by necessity is existence's requiring essence. Thus we do not accept that necessity is the very reality of the Necessarily Existent, rather it is a mind-dependent thing with no existence in the outside world strictly speaking. So, how could necessity then be the same thing as the reality of the Necessarily Existent?" As for the Arabic: "Al-jawāb: ʿan al-maslak al-thānī ʿannahu ʿin urīd biʾl-wujūb iqtiḍāʾ al-dhāt al-wujūd, fa-lā nusallam ʿannahu nafs ḥaqīqa al-wājib, bal huwa ʿamr iʿtibārī lā wujūd lahu fī al-khārij qaṭʿan. Fa-kayfa kāna nafs ḥaqīqa al-wājib?" (Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 184).

<sup>18</sup> Ḫocazāde rules out the possibility of necessity's existentiality (*wujūdiyya*) based on the philosophers' statement (Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 193), and argues that necessity cannot also be negational (*salbī*) in its *non-entitativity* (Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 191).

tinguish themselves through a superadded entification. He concludes that the philosophers contradict themselves regarding the nature of entification, since while their first proof upholds entification's being equal to quiddity, their second proof, which hypothesizes about the possibility of two Necessarily Existents, employs entification's being superadded in a possible line of thought.<sup>19</sup> The rationale that Ḫocazāde bases his position is linked to the problem of the entification's cause: if God's entification has a cause of itself, then this will cause multiplicity in Him; similarly, if God has His own special entification, that is the same as His essence, then this would also hinder His singularity, which leads us to the conclusion that entification has to be a superadded accident.

In his gloss on Ḫocazāde's adjudication, which chiefly concerns itself with critiquing the ways in which the authors of the *Tahāfut* lineage present and establish their proofs, the Ottoman verifier and religious scholar İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) has a passage regarding the nature of entification and its relation to quiddities. For him, all proofs present here could be used in support of the philosophers' argument regarding entification that states that it is the same as quiddity in the outside world, only distinguishable mentally. He follows Ḫocazāde's most points, arguing that in the first proof, entification does not necessarily show that it has to be superadded, but the second could be utilized to make a case for its accidentality. Nonetheless, for İbn Kemāl, as long as entification is taken as a mental consideration, it will conform to the philosophers' doctrine.<sup>20</sup>

In a partial commentary on the fifteenth-century Persian scholar Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī's *al-Risāla al-qadīma fī ithbāt al-wājib* ("The Old Treatise on Establishing the Necessary"),21 as well as his epistle on verifying the necessity of the Necessarily Existent (*al-Risāla fī taḥqīq wujūb al-wājib*), İbn Kemāl also outlines his views regarding the logical and metaphysical status of existence and necessity with regard to God. Following the Avicennan definition of God's unicity, he (via Dawānī)<sup>22</sup> argues that God's divine quiddity/essence is equal to His 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*),<sup>23</sup> since

20 İbn Kemāl, *Tehâfüt Hâşiyesi*, 399‑400. Additionally he addresses a third option for the case of entification with regard to Ḫocazāde's synthesis, which is as follows: the philosophers regard quiddity as the reason for the existence of entification; by this way, they argue that entification may be construed as a necessary concomitant to quiddity. On the other hand, post-classical theologians are hesitant in associating entification, a term that denotes individuation and concretization, with quiddity, setting it as entification's cause. In order to justify the philosophers' view in the eyes of post-classical scholarship, İbn Kemāl offers a modification to their doctrine, by saying that if quiddity is taken as the reason for entification's being superadded instead of the direct reason of entification itself, then entification will not be associated with the Necessarily Existent's quiddity, not being able to penetrate into His essentiality. With this amendment to their proof, the philosophers can now justify the position that entification is a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*) (İbn Kemāl, *Tehâfüt Hâşiyesi*, 392‑3).

21 According to the colophon of MS Ragıp Paşa 1457 in Süleymaniye, this work is dedicated to Bāyezīd II in 894/1489. For this work, Dawānī was said to have received a letter from the Sultan along with five hundred filori (Pourjavady, *Philosophy in the Early Safavid Iran*, 11‑12).

22 See Dawānī's old treatise *Establishing the Necessary*, which follows the classical Avicennan formula regarding God's necessary existence: "God is equal to His 'special existence' which subsists through its essence that is free of relations and considerations with the necessity denoting the necessity of essence's requiring existence" (in Bdaiwi, "Philosophia Ottomanica", 324‑5).

23 Unlike the theologians and the Akbarī Sufis, İbn Kemāl, seems to distinguish 'absolute existence' from 'special existence', such that the former is a conceptual matter or secondary in-

<sup>19</sup> Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 181‑8. Also see Ahmet Arslan's analysis in *Haşiye Alaʾt-Tehafüt Tahlili*, 259‑60 and İbn Kemāl, *Tehâfüt Hâşiyesi*, 394‑5.

God's essence should not be reduced to a secondary intelligible shared by all things.<sup>24</sup>

Several times in the *Tahāfut*, Ḫocazāde directs questions concerning the veracity of the philosophers' point by stating that their doctrine does not provide certain proofs that, for instance, entification can be a concomitant (as supported in *al-Ishārāt*). This is because if entification is not an accident, then entification and necessity will indicate a cause-and-effect relationship as in the case of the possibly existents, thereby implying contingency and multiplicity in God.25 Similarly, Ḫocazāde also highlights one of the premises of the philosophers' inference (i.e. necessity's being the same as quiddity) as problematic. This is because, if we assume that necessity would be a commonality between two equally necessary partners, then their being distinguished from one another by a concomitant entification cannot be valid since the quiddity's species that belongs to the Necessarily Existent here would be in need of a discrete thing (*ʿamr munfaṣil*), rendering it multiple. Ḫocazāde concludes in his *Tahāfut* that entification should rather be superadded to fulfill the philosophers' criterion.<sup>26</sup>

#### 6.3 For the Sake of the Debate. Verification in Defense of the Philosophers

The verifier Ḫocazāde's unique synthesis in this debate is in demonstrating that not only was necessity verily identical to God's quiddity/essence, and 'pure existence', according to the philosophers' paradigm, but also, in line with the new trends in post-classical philosophical theology, the use of *iʿtibārāt*, a conceptualist interpretation of Avicennan ontological realism, did not undermine their formulation to a certain extent. He even wants to show that *iʿtibārāt* can be used to modify their exposition, with the condition that the *non-entitativity* does not suggest accidentality.

26 Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 186.

telligible. See, for instance, Jāmī who seems to have merged both categories of existence into one following Akbarī monism (Heer, "Al-Jāmī's *Treatise on Existence*").

<sup>24</sup> In that regard, İbn Kemāl has an alternative view that links God's 'special existence' to the general concept of existence shared by other beings: for him, the meaning of the divine essence's requiring existence is the requiring of existent-ness (*mawjūdiyya*) as opposed to existence/existentiality (*wujūdiyya*) itself. Unlike Rāzī, for instance, İbn Kemāl (and Dawānī) vie for the identity of essence and existence in God, such that the divine essence distinguishes itself by way of its existent-ness (*mawjūdiyya*), a term with a sense of superaddition. If the term *mawjūdiyya* is employed for God, His divine essence will rather be equal to the specificity (*khuṣūṣiyya*) of existent-ness (as in "the light is luminous" as opposed to "the earth is luminous"), meaning that, in the case of God, existent-ness will not denote a substrate in which existence inheres (rather it results from external effects) (Ansari, "Ibn Kemal, Dawānī and the Avicennan Lineage", 257‑9, 263). By this way, *mawjūdiyya* via *wujūdiyya* will be a secondary intention that is predicated univocally of all things and extrinsic to their essence, without denoting plurality in God. See al-Fārābī's point regarding different senses of *mawjūd*, which distinguishes *mawjūd* as 'having-aquiddity-outside-the-soul' from *mawjūd* as 'the true' (Menn, "Al-Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*", 83‑4). Following Jurjānī's disclaimer on the Sufis who upheld the controversial doctrine of *waḥdat almawjūd*, İbn Kemāl notes in his treatise on existence that multiplicity (*taʿaddud*) has to be categorically cancelled out from *mawjūd*, which is a mental conception, so that it would be equal to the reality of existence (for Jurjānī's text, see al-Jurjānī, *Ḥāshiya al-tajrīd*, 2: 66 and, for İbn Kemāl's Arabic text, Bakhtari, Kocaoğlu, "Kemalpaşazâde'nin *Beyânuʾl-vücûd*", 268).

<sup>25</sup> Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 182‑3.

One perennial issue with Ḫocazāde's synthesis is the question of coherence. Can we confidently say that a particular theory coheres when it is restated in a different paradigm? Or if a scholar reenvisions Avicennan ontological realism in the new framework of post-classical conceptualism, would that be still valid? It should be noted that each paradigm is true in and of itself, and applying one conjecture to another will result in a syncretic effort – not in a comprehensive system of thought that is necessarily coherent in and of itself. Dimitri Gutas has recently argued in a provocative article that the efforts of post-classical scholars should be deemed as "pseudo-philosophy", since synthesizing different strands of thought does not necessarily mean that there is an encompassing rational basis justified *scientifically* in a systematic fashion.<sup>27</sup> Ḫocazāde's synthesis here falls into Gutas' categorization in some ways, since necessity, as the philosophers define, fits in with God's unicity only within the parameters of Avicennan realism; that is, turning it into a conceptualist position does not necessarily correspond to Avicenna's initial framework. In certain other ways, Gutas' designation of pseudo-philosophy is not exactly suiting for this case either. Since Ḫocazāde's defense here is a rhetorical effort for the sake of the debate, and his main aim is to show his erudition through verification – not upholding the philosophers' position, true in his own teachings. His other works reveal that he neither complies with the philosophers' nor the theologians' expositions precisely. Having his own unique position, Ḫocazāde only asserts the *non-entitativity* of necessity as a mental conception in the post-classical world, conforming to some commentators and going against some others.

Ḫocazāde was not interested in whether the philosophers' proof remained valid as an actual argument in his time. Rather, he was keen to showcase his mastery in demonstrating what they had intended, what steps they had taken to realize it, and show whether their doctrines were compatible with the standards of his day. This does not mean that he never contested any of their points. On the contrary, there were cases in which he would follow their expositions in certain other adjudications or glosses.28 Ḫocazāde's defense, in this sense, was a way of holding a mirror to his opponent Zeyrek, so that his opponent would realize how misinformed he was about Arabic philosophy and its reception in post-classical philosophical theology.

The method of verification was a way to digest past debates so that the new generations of scholars could address loopholes in past arguments by questioning their precision, certainty, and validity. Ḫocazāde's *Tahāfut alfalāsifa* is a great example of this exercise. As in the philosophers' first position outlined in Ghazālī, it might be true that, if there were to be two Necessarily Existents, both by nature would distinguish themselves from one another through entification, by making two equal Gods impossible. Again Ḫocazāde adds a question mark to this proof, arguing that even though it appears intuitive, there is no guarantee that there would be two different realities, rather than one as in God, so that each one of the partners would require an entification.29 In a similar vein, he continues to further his investigation in the *Tahāfut*, by questioning why we should think that there

<sup>27</sup> Gutas, "Avicenna and After". Also see Jari Kaukua's evaluation of Gutas' thesis, "Post-Classical Islamic Philosophy".

<sup>28</sup> See the case of secondary causes in Balıkçıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*.

<sup>29</sup> Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 181.

should be one existence, rather than different realities, each requiring an entification. Or an additional question that investigates the veracity of another point: why should it not be that there are multiple realities distinguished from one another, which fall under 'pure existence'?<sup>30</sup>

The fifteenth-century Ottoman world was a period in which texts of Islamic philosophy had accumulated to an extent that the literature in philosophical theology was replete with a vast number of distinct positions on various topics. In order to compose a new argument, a competent verifier first had to demonstrate his erudition and pedantry in close textual readings of primary source materials by arbitrating among a number of schools and textual traditions. In that regard, the Ottoman medreses did not feed from a single source, and referencing the past in scholarly discussions encompassed a great variety of positions. It seems to me that Sultan Meḥmed II's choice of these scholars for the debate was deliberate, as both represented different backgrounds and choices of arbitration in such an essential topic.

For centuries many theologians found faults in the philosophers' assertions, devising counter-arguments to demonstrate that the philosophers' proofs did not reflect the absolute truth. A master Ottoman verifier, in this context, should be a scholar who traced all these lines of arguments and counter-arguments by heart, even making suitable amendments to bring in his own unique perspective. This debate is a testament to the Ottoman scholars' skills in verifying different schools in order to demonstrate their syntheses of past masters. The time of Ḫocazāde was a period in the Ottoman world when the state was going through a definitive imperial restructuring, which was based on Meḥmed II's cosmopolitan and universalistic ambitions, as exemplified by the all-encompassing selection of books in his glorious palatine library, where this debate most probably took place.

Ḫocazāde put forth his unique position on God's unicity in his *Tahāfut* adjudication, a view in which he did not follow the philosophers' perspective. Though he seemed to have followed their thesis closely during the debate, he did not also accept it outright – he further modified and corrected their given thesis while justifying it. The nature of the present debate was fairly distinct from the context of his *Tahāfut*, and the main aim in this exchange was to demonstrate his opponent that even if he did not hold this to be true, the philosophers' point was true in and of itself when one considered it within their own paradigm. If the nature of the debate demanded it, Ḫocazāde could pose as a philosopher in order to uphold the truth for the sake of debate, showing how the philosophers could be compatible with the post-classical context of philosophical theology. In this context, not only did Ḫocazāde ascertain the truth on the philosophers' terms, but both scholars in the debate also verified their respective versions of God's unicity on their own terms.

Ottoman court debates were combative at heart, not scripted imperial games.31 There were real losers or winners, and a respected scholar al-

30 Ḫocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 182.

<sup>31</sup> There were no medals to be won in the Renaissance and so no dire enforcements on the losing party. There were no severe punishments, such as the humiliation of removing a senior scholar from his post (Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 264‑5). A winner might boast for his argumentative skills as in the case of the Italian disputation master Achillini and the polymath Girolamo Cardano, but "victory rather than consensus" was the ultimate goal rather than the ravishing victory of one over another (Grendler, *The Universities in the Italian Renaissance*, 152‑6).

ways had the mishap to lose his post and reputation, or to be humiliated in front of his colleagues. It is in this context that the efforts of the Ottoman verifiers should not be seen as futile scholarly attempts of mere apologetics since, as in the case of Ḫocazāde, these scholars had the courage and erudition to even argue for doctrines with utmost scrutiny that they did not actually hold to be true or complete.

# Appendix

**English Translations, Arabic** *Editiones Principes***, and Manuscript Facsimiles**

## Editiones principes

## *Risāla li-Mawlānā Zeyrek fī baḥth nafs al-māhiya (Mubāḥatha bayna Ḫocazāde wa-Mawlānā Zeyrek)* **[Süleymaniye, MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, ff. 120a-121b]**

#### **[Day one. Response to Ḫocazāde's initial question]**

**]a120 ]**ً وإذا كان الوجوب نفس املاهية، كان االشتراك فيه اشتراكا في نفس املاهية. **يقول الفقير** الوجوب يطلق على ثالثة معان، اقتضاء الذات الوجود، ّ واالستغناء عن الغير في الوجود، وما به يتميز الواجب عن غيره. وال شك أن ًشيئ ّ ا من املعنيني األولني ال يتصور كونه نفس ماهية الواجب، ألنهما اعتباريان. ّ فاملراد بقولهم إن الوجوب نفس ماهية الواجب هو ما يصدق عليه املعنى ّ الثالث، ال نفس املعنى الثالث. إذ ال شبهة لعاقل في أن ماهية الواجب ليس مفهوم ما يتميز به الذات، بل هذا املفهوم أمر عارض له.

#### **[Day two]**

**ٍ فحينئذ نقول** ّ ما ادعيته من التركيب على تقدير تعد ّ د الواجب إمّنا يلزم لو كان ما يصدق **]b120 ]**َ عليه مفهوم الوجوب، صدق العارض على املعروض، حقيقة واحدة لها فردان، وهو محال، مما ال يجوز أن يكونا ذاتني مختلفتني متمايزتني بأنفسهما من غير احتياج إلى معنيني مشتركني في اقتضاء الوجود ٍ واالستغناء على الغير من غير لزوم تركيب. فال يثبت حينئذ وحدة الواجب مبعنى ما يقتضي ذاته وجوده أو ما يستغني عن الغير في وجوده.

#### **[Day three]**

ّد الوجود. نعم، ّد الوجود، فال اختالف في مجر **ال يقال:** ّ الوجوب ليس إال مجر الوجود املقارن للماهية يختلف بحسب اختالف إضافته إليها. وأما محض ً الوجود، فهو في نفسه مفهوم واحد ال اختالف فيه أصال، **ألنا نقول إن** ّ أريد أن حقيقة الوجوب هو نفس مفهوم الوجود البحت غير الوجود العارض للماهية، ّ فمحال. وإن أريد أن َ حقيقة الوجوب يصدق عليه الوجود الصرف صدق العارض ّ ّ م أن ما يصدق عليه الوجود الصرف ال ّم، ولكن ال نسل على املعروض، فمسل ً اختالف فيه أصال. فلم ال يجوز أن يكون حقيقتني مختلفتني يصدق عليهما ّ الوجود الصرف مبعنى أنهما غير متغايرتني للماهية؟

Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World 2 **164** Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms, 163-212

## Translation of the Texts

## *A Treatise on [Necessity's Being] the Same as [God's] Quiddity* **by Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) [Süleymaniye, MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, ff. 120a-121b]**

#### **[Day one. Response to Ḫocazāde's initial question]**

**[120a]** If necessity (*wujūb*) were [to be] the same thing as quiddity (*māhiya*), a commonality (*ishtirāq*) in necessity would also participate in this very quiddity. **The poor soul [Ḫocazāde] states** that necessity (*wujūb*) here corresponds to three meanings (sing. *maʿnā*): [necessity defined as] **(i)** "essence's (*dhāt*) requiring existence"; **(ii)** "that which has no need of others in existence"; and **(iii)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others". There is no doubt that neither of the first two meanings assumes that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent since both meanings are only mental considerations (sing. *al-iʿtibārī*). Then what is intended by the philosophers' statement about necessity's being the same as the Necessarily Existent's quiddity only falls under the third meaning (*mā yaṣdiqu ʿalayhi*), but it is not [the same as] the very meaning itself. Then [there is] no doubt for a rational man that the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is not the intension (*mafhūm*) of what distinguishes essence [as in **(iii)**] but, rather, this intension is accidentally superadded to (*ʿāriḍ lahu*) essence.

#### **[Day two]**

**In that case, we say that** what you claimed about compositeness (*tarkīb*) with respect to multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent follows that if 'what falls under' this statement were to be **[120b]** the intension of necessity, then the veracity of an 'accidental affection' (*ʿāriḍ*) occurring to an 'object of accident' (*maʿrūḍ*) would be a single reality with two isolated constituents (sing. *fard*). This is impossible because why would it not be permissible that two different essences that distinguish themselves [from one another] would not resort to the need for the first two meanings without the implication of compositeness (*luzūm al-tarkīb*)? Consequently, the unicity of the Necessarily Existent, in that case, cannot be established by the meanings of "essence requiring His existence" and "that which has no need of others in terms of His existence".

#### **[Day three]**

**It cannot be said** that necessity is not a thing other than 'abstracted existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*) just because there is no change/differentiation (*ikhtilāf*) in abstracted existence. Indeed, an existence conjoined (*muqārin*) with quiddity changes in accordance with its attachment (*iḍāfa*) [to that quiddity]. As for 'mere existence' (*maḥḍ al-wujūd*), it is a single concept in itself which has no diversity, **because we say that** what is demanded here is that the true nature/reality of necessity (*ḥaqīqa al-wujūb*) is the same as the intension of 'sole existence' (*wujūd baḥt*), which is different from existence's occurring to quiddity, and this would be absurd. If what is meant here is that the reality of necessity's being true for 'pure existence' (*wujūd ṣirf*) denotes "an accidental affection's occurring to its object of accident", then this is conceded. However, we do not concede that what falls under 'pure exist**فإن قلت:** ّ ما ذكره من الدليل يدل على كون مفهوم الوجوب نفس املاهية، فكيف مينع ذلك؟ **قلت:** ّ نحن نعلم بالضرورة أن املعنيني األولني اعتباري محض ّز به الذات ً ال وجود له في اخلارج. ونعلم أيض ّ ا بالضرورة أن نفس مفهوم ما يتمي ّ عارض اعتباري من عوارض حقيقة الواجب. فإنه ادعى بهذا االستدالل كون ٍ واحد ّ فقط مما ذكر نفس املاهية، فسقط في مقابلة ال يسمع، وإن اد ّ عى أن ما صدق عليه املعنى الثالث نفس املاهية، فمسلم لكن ال يلزم أن يكون حقيقة واحدة، فال يثبت املطلوب.

#### **[Day four]**

**خواجه زاده،** ّ رحمه اهلل، ال يتصو ّ ر من صبر له أدنى متييز أن يقول إن الوجوب ّز الذات، فلم ال يجوز أن يكون ذاتان كل الذي هو عني الواجب ما به يتمي ّ ّ ز عن الغير؟ وهذا املفهوم عارض لهما بال روية. قول صاحب منهما ما به يتمي ًا ينافي الغرض املذكور وهو ّ املواقف: ال يقال هذا معارض، إلى قوله: وكونه نسبي كونه **]a121 ]**كونه ً موجودا. **ومن هذا، نقول ألن** يقال فيه إنه طلب للعلم بكالم ً ً ا، لم يكن زائدا على ماهية إذ ّ يفهم من قول صاحب املواقف. إذا كان وجودي ً ّ ا، كما دل ّ ّ املراد بالوجوب ما يشك في وجوديته. بل ينبغي أن يكون عدمي ّ عليه لفظ املواقف لذا، فإن صح لهم مت الدست.

**واحلاصل** ّ أن ّ ه ال ريب لعاقل في أن الكالم في الوجوب الذي زعم البعض وجوديته ّ مع وجودية اإلمكان، وال شك ّ أن اإلمكان شيء واحد، فكذا هذا الوجوب. نعم، ً يكون هذا الوجوب على تقدير كونه وجوديا ما به ميتاز الذات عن الغير. فمن وقف على هذا املقام يتعجب من ذلك الكالم ملوالنا زيرك رحمه اهلل.

#### **[Day five]**

ًا لذاته انحصر في ذلك **فإن قلت:** ّ ال نسلم أن واجب الوجود لو كان متعين املعنى، وإمن ً ا يكون كذلك لو كان واجب الوجود ذات ً ا واحدة وهو محال جلواز أن ً ا أو طبيعة جنسية، فيكون حتته أنواع، وكل نوع يقتضي لذاته ً يكون عرض ّ ا عام ًا. فيلزم انحصار كل نوع في شخص، ال انحصار واجب الوجود في شخص. تعين ence' does not contain in it any. Then, why would it not be permissible that pure existence could be two different realities such that both are not being distinguished from quiddity?

**If you say that** what is mentioned previously proves the sufficiency of the intension of necessity's being the same thing as quiddity, then how would you negate this fact? **I reply to this that** we verify that we necessarily know that the first two meanings are only mental considerations with no extramental existence. We also know necessarily that the very intension that distinguishes essence (*dhāt*) is a mental consideration occurring to the accidents of the Necessarily Existent's reality. Thus, it is claimed that the Necessarily Existent is one (*wāḥid*) in the sense that, as mentioned previously, the Necessarily Existent is the same thing as quiddity. Therefore, this [point] is abolished totally as a rejoinder never heard [before], even if one claims that what falls under the third meaning is the same thing as quiddity. Then this is conceded; yet, this does not [still] require that necessity is a single reality, so what is demanded is not established here.

#### **[Day four]**

**Ḫocazāde**, may Almighty God have mercy on him, exercises little much patience in discernment, such that he says that necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent, is what distinguishes essence. Why would it not be that what distinguishes one from another is an essence for each one of them? This intension is accidental to both of these aspects without deliberation. In the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*: It cannot be said that necessity opposes an isolated constituent, and necessity's being relational (*nisbī*) contradicts with the aforementioned purpose, that is, necessity's **[121a]** being an existent. **For this, we say that** [this is] because one cannot say that the quest to know this expression is conveyed by the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*. If necessity were to be an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), then it would not be added to quiddity such that what is meant by necessity here would cast doubt on its being externally existing. Yet, it should be that necessity is related to non-existence (*ʿadamī*), as it was previously proven by the word of *al-Mawāqif*, in such a way that if this were to be true for them, then the competition has ended.

**The outcome** is that there is no doubt for the rational ones that this statement about necessity, which was claimed to be true by some, concerns necessity's external proposition together with that of possibility. And there is no doubt that possibility is a single thing. Likewise, necessity, yes, this very necessity in terms of its externally existing, is what distinguishes essence from others. Whoever discerns this position is marveled at this argument by Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

#### **[Day five]**

**If you say that** we do not concede that the Necessarily Existent is entified (*mutaʿayyan*) by His essence, [because] then there would be a limitation in that meaning. The reason why this is as such is that only if the Necessarily Existent were of a single essence, then this would have followed; but it is impossible since it would be permissible that it could be a generic accident (*ʿaraḍ ʿāmm*) or a genus' nature (*ṭabīʿa jinsiyya* or lit. 'the nature pertaining to genus'). There are species under Him and every specie requires **ّ أجيب عنه بأن** واجب الوجود ملا كان عني الوجود، فلو كان له أنواع لكان ًا، وهو باطل. وفيه ّ ً له حقائق مختلفة. فيكون الوجود مشترك ً ا اشتراكا لفظي ّ ضعف، ألن واجب الوجود ليس الوجود املطلق، بل عني الوجود اخلاص. وغاية ما في الباب أن يكون للوجودات اخلاصة حقائق مختلفة، فال يلزم اشتراك مطلق ً الوجود لفظا. **واحلق** ّ في اجلواب ما ذكره الشيخ في الشفاء أن واجب الوجود ّد الوجود. **نعم،** الوجود املقارن ّد الوجود، وال اختالف في مجر ّ ليس إال مجر للماهيات مختلفة بحسب اختالف إضافته إليها. وأما محض الوجود، فهو ً في نفسه ال اختالف فيه حقيقة محاكمات، ملوالنا العالمة رحمه اهلل.

#### **[Day six]**

**أقول:** إذا كان لفظ الوجوب يطلق على أمر اعتباري واحد ويدحر وجودية ذلك االعتباري، فال مجال، **]b121 ]**ً ألن يقال بجواز أن يكون ذلك املفهوم عارضا ّ لذاتني ممتازتني أحدهما عن اآلخر بالذات. ولذا قال صاحب املواقف: فإن صح ّ للحكماء وجود الوجوب، مت الدست ملوالنا زيرك، رحمه اهلل تعالى رحمة واسعة. its essence being entified (*taʿayyun*). What follows is that [while] every specie (*nawʿ*) is limited to an individual (*shakhṣ*), the Necessarily Existent is not [limited to an individual]. **It is replied to this such that** the Necessarily Existent cannot be existence itself, since if it were to have species, it would then have various realities (*ḥaqāʾiq mukhtalifa*). Existence would have a commonality in utterance [i.e. equivocal as in homonyms], and this is false. There is a weakness in this [statement], because the Necessarily Existent is not the same as 'absolute existence' (*wujūd muṭlaq*), but as 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*). The purpose in this chapter is that various realities have specific existences, so the absolute commonality of existence is not required in utterance (i.e. not univocal). **The truth** in this answer is that what is mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in his *al-Shifāʾ* is that the Necessarily Existent is not something other than 'pure existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), and there is no change in it. **Indeed**, an existence conjoined with quiddities changes in accordance with its attachment [to them]. As for 'mere existence', it is the same thing as existence that there is no real change [in it] with respect to the veracity of *al-Muḥākamāt* by Mawlānā al-ʿAllāma [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī], Peace be upon him.

#### **[Day six]**

**I say that** if the utterance 'necessity' were to be valid for a single mental consideration and this mental consideration is dislodged from being existing externally, then there would not be any competence (*majāl*) here, **[121b]** since one could respond [to this] by the permissibility that this intension would be attached to two differentiated essences, one differing from the other in essence. If the author of *al-Mawāqif* says "thus, the existence of the Necessarily Existent is true for philosophers", then the competition has ended in favor of Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

*Risāla fī al-tawḥīd li-Ḫocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā* **[Süleymaniye, MS Ayasofya 2206, f. 12a-21a]**

**[Day one. Response to Ḫocazāde's initial question]**

**[a12 [**بسم اهلل الرحمن الرحيم ّ سبحان من هو واحد أحد لم يلد ولم يولد يا من ليس له كفوا أحد صل على محمد وعلى آل محمد.

**ّ قال املصنف** ّ ، رحمه اهلل تعالى: املرصد الثالث في توحيده أورد عليه احملشي أن نفي املثل مستلزم للتوحيد، فال حاجة إلى ذكره. وأجاب بأن نفي الشريك املماثل في النوع ال يستلزم نفي الشريك في األلوهية؛ ووجوب الوجود ظاهر اجلواز كون كل منهما مقتضى الهوية.

**أقول**: إذا كان وجوب الوجود عني الذات، كما هو مبنى الدليل هنا، فالتنزيه ّ عن الشريك املماثل في النوع ال شك يستلزم التقديس عن املشارك في صفات ّاّل أن يقال مساق الكالم في السباق األلوهية ووجوب **[b12 [**ّ الوجود، اللهم إ مجرد نفي الشريك املماثل في النوع ولم يالحظ فيه عينية الوجوب وال غيريته ً أصال.

### **[Day two]**

ّ قال املصنف رحمه اهلل: وقد تقدم أن الوجوب نفس املاهية. **قال ]خوجة زادة[** وحيد عصره في منع هذه املقدمة: واعلم أن الوجوب يطلق على معان ثالثة: اقتضاء الذات الوجود واالستغناء في الوجود عن الغير وما به يتميز الواجب عن ّ الغير. وال شك ً أن شيئا من املعنيني األولني ال يتصور كونه نفس املاهية ألنهما ّ اعتباريان. فاملراد بقولهم إن الوجوب نفس ماهية الواجب هو املعنى الثالث. **فحينئذ** يقال على تقدير تعدد الواجب **[a13 [**إمن ّ ا يلزم التركب لو كان الوجوب حقيقة واحدة لها فردان الخ.

أقول ّ ال شك في ورود هذا السؤال بحيث ال يحوم البال بباله حول جوابه لكن الكالم في تخصيصه باملعنى الثالث للوجوب. **وقد أفصح احملشي** حيث لم يتعرض للتخصيص.

#### *A Treatise on God's Unicity* **by Ḫocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā (d. 893/1488) [Süleymaniye, MS Ayasofya 2206, ff. 12a-21a]**

#### **[Day one. Response to Ḫocazāde's initial question]**

**[12a]** In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Glory be to Him who is one and who neither begets nor is born, nor is there to Him any equivalent. [*al-Ikhlās* 112:3‑4] Pray on Muḥammad and on the family of Muḥammad.

**The author** [ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī/al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī], may Almighty God have mercy on him, said in Observation Three [of *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*] on God's unicity (*tawḥīd*), a discussion also mentioned in the Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi], that the denial of a partner to God is required for His unicity, and there is no need to pursue this further. [With regard to God's unicity] Ḥasan Çelebi replied that the negation of an equal partner (*sharīk*) in species (*nawʿ*) does not require the negation of a partner in divinity (*ulūhiyya*), and that the existence's necessity literally permits each partner's requiring a haecceity (*huwiyya*).<sup>1</sup>

**I say that** if the necessity (*wujūb*) of existence (*wujūd*) were to be the same thing as essence (*dhāt*), as this is the basis for the proof here, then an equal partner would be eliminated in terms of species. There is no doubt that the reverence [of God] is required [to be refrained] from a partner that shares [the same] divine attributes, as well as the necessity of **[12b]** existence – unless it is claimed that the course of the argument in the competition just concerns the negation of an equal partner and existence's being the same as necessity (or not) is never noted.

#### **[Day two]**

The author, may God have mercy on him, said that you have set forth beforehand that necessity is the same as quiddity. The unique mind of his time **[Ḫocazāde]**<sup>2</sup>  **said** concerning the refutation of this premise: "I know that necessity corresponds to three meanings" (sing. *maʿnā*): [necessity defined as] **(i)** "essence's (*dhāt*) requiring existence"; **(ii)** "that which has no need of others in existence", and **(iii)** "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others". There is no doubt that one thing that is not mentioned in the first two meanings is that necessity is the same as quiddity since both [necessity and quiddity] are mental considerations (sing. *iʿtibārī*). What is intended by the [philosophers'] statement is that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, which refers to the third meaning. **Indeed, in this case**, as for the assumption about the Necessarily Existent's multiplicity, it is objected that **[13a]** the Necessarily Existent requires composition if necessity is a single reality that has two isolated units (sing. *fard*) etc.

I say that there is no doubt why this question appears, and you should not worry about its answer – but [know that] the statement about the term 'specification' (*takhṣīṣ*) in the third meaning denotes necessity. **The Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi] expressed** this view insofar as specification is not objected.

<sup>1</sup> Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

<sup>2</sup> In the marginalia Ḫocazāde is noted as the subject of this argument, which might have been added by a later copyist.

**قوله:** )ألنهما اعتباريان عقليان، ليس لهما وجود في اخلارج(، مسلم إن ّاّل َ لم ال يجوز أن يكون اخلاص منهما أمراً ً حقيقيا أرادهما على اإلطالق، وإ غير ماهية الواجب عندهم باالتفاق؟ **قوله:** املراد بقولهم إن الوجوب عني ماهية الواجب هو املعنى الثالث.

**أقول** هذا احلصر رأي من عند نفس ذلك **[b13 [**الفاضل، وقد يدعي وقوعه ً في بعض الكتب، فال يلزم عليه شيء بكونه مخالفا ملا يشهد عليه القرائن ويشعر به الكالم في املبحث الثالث من مباحث الوجوب، وفي أواخر هذا ّ الدليل من أن املعنى األول أو الثاني للوجوب هو عني حقيقة الواجب. وكأنه، ّ ّ مه اهلل، لم يلتفت ملقالهم في أن الوجوب بهذين املعنيني من األمور الوجودية سل ّ وعني الواجب لشد ّ ة ضعف كالمهم فيه. وليس حصره لتوقف سؤاله عليه، بل ملجرد بيان الواقع. فمن تصدى جلوابه **]**موالنا زيرك**[** ببيان عدم كون مرادهم من الوجوب هو املعنى الثالث في قولهم الوجوب هو نفس احلقيقة، **بل** كان **[a14[** ّاّل تأييداً لورود سؤال ذلك الفاضل، املراد أحد املعنيني األولني، لم يأت بشيء إ <sup>1</sup> يكون أظهر وأجلى. ولعمري إن اجلواب الذي أشرنا إليه من ألن وروده حينئذ بعض األفاضل مع نكت زائدة قد أشرق من أفق سماء خاطري، لكن ملا جتلت ّ شموس مرام ذلك احملقق احتجب وصار كأن لم يكن.

**قوله** فاملراد بقولهم إن الوجوب عني ماهية الواجب هو املعنى الثالث، يتبادر منه أن يكون مراده كون املعنى الثالث بنفسه نفس املاهية، وليس كذلك. بل <sup>2</sup> قوله فحينئذ يقال ما ّاّل ّ لم يصح. مراده أن ما صدق عليه هو نفس املاهية وإ ادعيته من التركيب على تقدير تعدد الواجب **[b14 [**إمنا يلزم لو كان الوجوب حقيقة لها فردان. وأما إذا كان ذاتان متخالفتان يتمايز كل منهما عن اآلخر إلى اآلخر إذ ال سترة أن املعنى الواحد ال يتصور أن يكون نفس ذاتني متخالفتني تتمايز كل منهما عن األخرى بالذات.

<sup>1</sup> غرضه إيراد املعنى على وجه أبلغ فحسب.

<sup>ّ</sup>ح فيها مبا ذكرنا من أن مراده ليس نفس املعنى الثالث، بل 2 ّ وقد وجدنا بعد حتريرنا هذا نسخة مفصلة للتحقق يف هذه املادة. قد صر ما صدق عليه .

**[Jurjānī] states that** this is because both [necessity and quiddity] are mental intelligibles (sing. *iʿtibārī ʿaqlī*) which do not have existence in the extramental world, and this is accepted such that both are taken absolutely (*ʿalā al-iṭlāq*); otherwise why would it not be permissible that the specific one [of the two] is a real entity different from the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, as the scholars would all agree? **[Jurjānī] states that** what is intended by the philosophers' statement is that necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, as in the third meaning.

**I say that** this limitation<sup>3</sup> is an opinion of **[13b]** this virtuous scholar [Jurjānī] himself, and this claim has been put forth in some books. So there is no need for a thing to be contrary to what the evidence testifies, and this is noted in Discussion Three concerning necessity – especially in the later sections of this proof – such that the first or second meaning of necessity is and was the same [thing] as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, God bless him. Their statement did not pay attention to the fact that it is obligatory for these two meanings to exist among all externally existing things and to be the same as the Necessarily Existent. [This is] due to the weakness of their statement about this subject. The limitation of their statement does not depend on the question; rather it is just based on the demonstration of [its] occurrence. Whoever addresses an answer with a statement lacking the philosophers' intention [also] has the third meaning according to their statement, in which necessity is the same as [His] reality [*ḥaqīqa*]. **Rather [14a]**, the intention of one of the first two meanings does not bring anything to support the advent of the question by this virtuous scholar [Mawlānā Zeyrek],<sup>4</sup> because its advent, in that case,<sup>5</sup> is more obvious and clear. Upon my life, the answer remarked by some of the virtuous scholars accompanied by certain additional points is more exalted than those that stand on the horizon of the heavens of my thought, but when the headstrong intentions of this verifier [Jurjānī] manifests, then the answer is concealed and becomes impossible [to refute].

**[Jurjānī] states that**<sup>6</sup> what is intended by their statement is that necessity's being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is the third meaning, which comes from this statement such that what is intended is the third meaning's being the same as quiddity by itself, and likewise their intention here is rather such that 'what falls under' this statement (*mā-ṣadaq ʿalayhi*) is not [necessity's being] the same as quiddity. Otherwise, this would not be correct. **[Jurjānī] states that** consequently what I claimed to be composition (*tarkīb*) in relation to the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent **[14b]** will be rather required if necessity is a reality with two isolated units. Yet, whenever necessity has two different essences, each being differentiated from one

<sup>3</sup> What is meant by limitation here is that only the third meaning of necessity justifies the philosophers' view that necessity is the same as His quiddity.

<sup>4</sup> Mawlānā Zeyrek's name is included in the marginalia.

<sup>5</sup> In the marginalia: "Its purpose is to express the meaning only in a more informed manner and no more".

<sup>6</sup> In the marginalia: "After writing this we found out a detailed version of this book to verify this matter. He explained here that, as we mentioned, what is intended is not the same as the third meaning (i.e. its intension), rather [it is] a judgment that falls under (*mā-ṣadaq ʿalayhi*) a particular question (i.e. its extension)".

**قوله** ِ )مشتركتان في املعنيني األولني( يوهم اقتصار االشتراك فيهما وليس ً كذلك ألن املطلق من املعنى الثالث أيضا ً يكون عارضا ً مشتركا بينهما على ذلك التقدير وهذا ظاهر ملن هو متأمل وناظر فيه. و**]**موالنا شجاع**[** بهذا الذي ذكرنا ظهر فساد قول من أراد أن يجيب عن ذلك السؤال بأن يقول: إن املعنى الثالث لو كان حقيقتني مختلفتني لم يكن معاني **[a15 [**الوجوب متالزمة ّ لوجود املعنيني األولني بدون كل واحدة من احلقيقتني في األخرى. فوجب أن ّ يكون املعنى الثالث حقيقة واحدة والتعد ّ د احملتمل احملتاج إلى إبطاله هو تعدد ّحّتاد في احلقيقة يلزم التركيب، وإنه محال. وجه الظهور ّ الفرد. فلو تعدد مع اال ّاّل بني املعنيني األولني واملطلق من املعنى الثالث، وملا كان ّأن التالزم ليس إ ً املطلق مشتركا على ذلك التقدير لم يفترق واحد من املعاني الثالثة عن اآلخر. **واحلاصل** ّ أن اجلواب عن هذا اإلشكال موقوف على إثبات كون أمر واحد نفس الواجب، سواء كان ذلك األمر الوجوب أو غيره. **[b15 [**ّ وما قالوا من أن ّ الوجود البحت نفس الواجب لو مت ّ لصح جواب الشيخ في الشفاء الذي نقله صاحب احملاكمات.

#### **[Day three]**

ّ قال املصنف ّ ، رحمه اهلل، وقد تقد ِ م أن الوجوب نفس املاهية. هذا يوهم أن ّ يكون للواجب ماهية كلية وليس بصحيح سواء لم يكن له تعدد خارجي أوال مبقتضى هذا الدليل، فاملراد باملاهية الهوية الشخصية. قال ّ املصنف، رحمه اهلل: فيلزم التركيب.

**أقول**: قد تب ّنّي في مباحث التعّنّي أن تركب الشخص املعّنّي من املاهية والتعّنّي إمن ّ ا هو بحسب الذهن دون اخلارج حيث قال املصن ّ ف: واعلم أن نسبة املاهية إلى ّ املشخصات كنسبة اجلنس إلى الفصل. فكما **[a16 [**أن اجلنس مبهم في العقل ّاّل بانضمام فصل إليه وهما يحتمل ماهيات متعددة وال تعّنّي لشيء منهما إ ّاّل في الذهن. كذلك املاهية ّمت ً حدان ذاتا ً وجعال ً ووجودا في اخلارج. وال يتمايزان إ ّاّل ّ بتشخص ينضم إليها ّ النوعية يحتمل هويات متعددة ال تعدد لشيء منها إ ّ وهما مت ً حدان في اخلارج ذاتا ً وجعال ً ووجودا متمايزان في الذهن فقط. فليس في اخلارج موجود هو املاهية وموجود آخر هو الشخص حتى يتركب منهما ّاّل موجود واحد، ّاّل ّ لم يصح حمل املاهية على أفرادها. بل ليس هناك إ فرد وإ

Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World 2 **174** Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms, 163-212

another, then it is no secret that one meaning cannot be conceivable since two different essences would be distinguished from each other essentially. **[Jurjānī] states that** the two partners mentioned in the first two meanings suggest a limitation in participation, and this is not as such [for the third meaning], since the unrestricted application of the third also [implies] a shared accidental affection, occurring to both [meanings externally] in this respect. This is apparent for those who paid attention and thought about this. [Mawlānā Shujāʿ's (d. 929/1523)] statement, which we consider to be evidently invalid, responds to this question with the third meaning, such that if the third meaning were to have two different realities, then the meanings of **[15a]** necessity would not be equipollent with the [concept of] existence in the first two senses – without each of these realities being in the other. Then, it would be necessary that the third meaning is a single reality, and the likely diversity needed to be refuted corresponds to the multiplicity of an isolated unit. So, if a multiplicity accompanied by oneness in reality requires composition, which is impossible, then the way of its appearance will be that the implication (*talāzum*) here corresponds to nothing other than [something] between the first two meanings and the absolute sense of the third. This is because absoluteness was common in this respect, not distinguishing any of these three meanings from one another. **What is obtained** [from this discussion] is that the answer depends on the proof that a single entity is the same as the Necessarily Existent – regardless of whether this entity is necessity or some other thing. **[15b]** What they said is that 'sole existence' (*wujūd baḥt*) is the same as the Necessarily Existent, only if Ibn Sīnāʾs answer is correct in his *al-Shifāʾ*, which was excerpted in [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī's] *al-Muḥākamāt*. 7

#### **[Day three]**

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that this aspect has been preceded by the argument that necessity is the same as quiddity. This statement assumes that the universal quiddity here belongs to the Necessarily Existent, and this is not correct regardless of whether it directly has external multiplicity by what is required by this proof. Thus, what is intended by quiddity [here] is an individuated haecceity (*huwiyya shakhṣiyya*). The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that then this implies composition.

**I say that** the author has explained in the discussion about entification (*taʿayyun*) that an auxiliary individual (*shakhṣ muʿayyan*) is composed of quiddity [and entification], and the entification [here] is rather with regard to the mind with no [implications in] extramentality (*khārij*) since the author said that the relationship of quiddity to concrete individuatednesses (*mushkhaṣṣāt*) is here like the relationship of genus (*jins*) to differentia (*faṣl*). It is that **[16a]** a genus is ambiguous (*mubham*) in the mind having a capacity for multiple quiddities, and there is no entification for any of them – except differentia's attachment (*inḍimām*) to genus. Both [quiddity and entification] are united in essence, in making, and in existence in the extramental world, and the genus [here] can be distinguished only in the mind. Likewise, this 'species' quiddity' (*māhiya nawʿiyya*) has a capacity for multiple entities that do not have multiplicity for any of them – albeit individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*), which is conjoined with the quiddity pertaining to species.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Taḥtānī, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

ّاّل ّ أن العقل يفصلهما إلى ماهية نوعية وتشخص، أعني الهوية الشخصية إ كما يفصل **[b16 [**املاهية النوعية إلى اجلنس والفصل والتركيب الذهني في ّ ّ ح به احملشي في ّحق ّ حقيقة احلق تعالى، لم يقم على بطالنه دليل. وقد صر مباحث الوجوب حيث قال )وأما منافاته، أي منافاة الوجوب لالحتياج إلى ّ اجلزء العقلي، فليس ببديهي وال مبرهن عليه، فإن احملتاج حينئذ تصوره، ال وجوده في اخلارج.

قال احملشي: كل من الوجهني مبني على كون الوجود طبيعة نوعية. **أقول**: ّ فيه نظر إذا لو فرضنا صحة هذين الوجهني، يلزم بطالن كون الوجوب طبيعة ّ نوعية، ومبنى الشيء ال بد ّ أن يصح ّ عند صحة ذلك الشيء وهذا ظاهر. أما ّ ذاك، فللتنافي بني لوازم صحة هذين الوجهني وكون الوجوب **[a17 [**طبيعة ّ نوعية، فإن صحتهما يقتضي نفي التعدد مطلقا وكون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية ّ يستلزم التعد ّ د وأقل ما في الذهن، واحملذور أعني التركيب من الطبيعة النوعية والتعّنّي بالضرورة.

**فالصواب** نظراً إلى الوجه األول أن يكون مبناه كون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية، ال ّ على اإلطالق، بل عند فرض تعدد الواجب أو كونه نفس الواجب، وهذا مستلزم لذاك، **وال يخفى** ّ أن هذا املبنى ال يبطل عند فرض صحة الوجه املذكور. وأما نظراً إلى الوجه الثاني أن يكون مبناه كون الوجوب نفس الواجب، ال طبيعة ّ نوعية له، إذ لو بني الكالم فيه على كون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية يلزم التركب منها **[b17 [**ومن التعّنّي بال مرية، فيلزم الوقوع في احملذور؛ تأمل. وال يخفى أن ً بناء الوجهني وإن كان صحيحا نظراً إلى الوجوب، لكنه ليس بالزم، ألن مبناهما باحلقيقة على ثبوت كون شيء ما نفس حقيقة الواجب، وثبوت كون ذلك ّ الشيء ماهية نوعية مشتركة عند فرض التعدد. وكما ادعوا أن الوجوب نفس حقيقة الواجب، كذلك أجمعوا على أن الوجود نفس ماهيته وال يذهب عليك ّصح ّ ة اعتبارهم كل واحد منهما عني الواجب. فيصح أن يقال في الوجه األول لو وجد واجبان لتمايزا بالتعّنّي، ألن الوجود يكون **حينئذ** حقيقة مشتركة بينهما، فما لم يحصل االمتياز بالتعّنّي ّ لم يتحقق **[a18 [**االثنينية بالضرورة، فيلزم احملذور أعني التركيب. وفي الوجه الثاني الوجود هو املقتضي للتعّنّي إذ لواله فإما أن يقتضي التعّ ُنّي َ الوجود، فيلزم الدور، أوال يقتضي، فيجوز االنفكاك بينهما بال تعّنّي وإنه محال. These are united outside in essence, in making, and in existence, being distinguished only in the mind. **[16b]** So, there is no quiddity existent in the extramental world, and an existent is a distinctive individual (*shakhṣ*) such that an isolated unit (*fard*) is composed from both (nonetheless it is not correct to predicate quiddity with its individuals). Yet, there is nothing here except a single existent, that is, an individual haecceity – with the exception of the mind breaking both into a species' quiddity and an individuation, which is like breaking the species' quiddity into a genus, a differentia, and a mental composition under the truth of Almighty God's reality. And no evidence [of this] has ever been refuted. The Glossator explains this in his discussion of necessity insofar as saying "as for the contradiction (i.e. the contradiction of necessity), the need of an intellective particular (*juzʾ ʿaqlī*) would not be then apparent". And this cannot be proven since what is needed [here] is its conceptualization (*taṣawwur*), not its existence in the extramental world.

The Glossator said that each of these aspects relies on existence's being a species' nature (*ṭabīʿa nawʿiyya*). **I say that** there is a disagreement [here] since if we were to assume the validity of both aspects, then [the aspects of] "necessity's being a nature pertaining to species" and "its relying on a thing (*shayʾ*)" would be invalid. It is certain that this is true and evident according to the validity of this thing. As for that, there is a contradiction between [the statement about] necessary concomitances [with regard to] the validity of these aspects and [the statement about] existence's being **[17a]** a species nature. This is because the validity of both [of these statements] requires the negation of multiplicity absolutely, and necessity's being a species' nature requires [the aspect of] multiplicity. At least, this [aspect] is in the mind, and one should beware of, so to speak, the composition of species nature and entification necessarily.

**So the correct answer is** the position in the first sense, which states that necessity's reliance [on a thing] is [due to] necessity's being a species' nature, not absolutely, but with respect to the assumption of multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent or its being the same as the Necessarily Existent [itself]. These are required for the position, and it is no secret that this reliance does not refute the assumption of the aforementioned aspect's validity. As for the second aspect, it relies on necessity's being the same as the Necessarily Existent, not on the species nature that it has. This is because if the statement that is based on "necessity's being the same as a species' nature" here follows that the Necessarily Existent is composed of both [necessity and nature pertaining to species] **[17b]**, as well as an entification that is not observable, then the occurrence [here] would imply a difficulty (*maḥdhūr*). Let's think about this! **It is no secret that** even if the reliance of these two aspects were to be correct with regard to necessity, but not with regard to a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), [this is] because, according to the assumption of multiplicity, their reliance in reality would be based on the immutability (*thubūt*) of a thing's being the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, as well as on the immutability of this thing being a common species' quiddity. Just as [the philosophers] claimed that necessity is the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, they, likewise, also agreed that existence is the same as its very quiddity. This does not validate their consideration that each of these things would be the same as the Necessarily Existent. In this way, what is said about the first aspect is correct: if there

#### **[Day four]**

ّ قال املصنف، رحمه اهلل: فإما أن يستلزم التعّنّي الوجوب، فيلزم تأخره ويلزم ّال بالتعّنّي. **قال** ّ احملشي: اعترض عليه بأن اقتضاء الدور. **أقول**: وكون الواجب معل التعّنّي الوجوب على تقدير عدم اقتضاء الوجوب التعّنّي ال يستلزم الدور. وإمنا ً يلزم لو لم يفرض أوال ذلك العدم. **وأجيب** بأن ذلك الفرض ال مينع لزوم الدور ّة جلميع ما في نفس األمر، لكونه غير **[b18 [**مطابق للواقع، ألن الواجب عل عداه في نفس األمر.

أقول: "ال يخفى أن هذا اجلواب في غاية البشاعة، ألن الفرض الثاني التعّنّي ّ مترتب على الفرض األول للوجوب. فلو اعتبرت احلالة احلقيقية للوجوب أعني ّة. فيبطل ّ ّ ة، ال شك أنها ال جتامع الفرض املذكور له، أعني كونه غير عل كونه عل ً الفرض األول ويفسد الثاني أيضا ّ لكونه مترت ً با عليه. فال يلزم الدور أصال. **وقد** ّ تقدم من احملشي شبيه هذا في مبحث الصفحة امللساء، لكن كان له وجه ّثمه.

ّ ِ ة يوهم عدم الكفاية،" لكن إذا كان قوله: بعد تسليم كفاية مجرد العلي ّ ّ ة تامة، كما هو الظاهر عند كونه **[a19 [**نفس الواجب، ال شبهة الوجوب عل ّ في كفاية هذه املقدمة. **وأجيب** ً أيضا ّ عن ذلك االعتراض بأن قول املصنف الوجوب هو املقتضي للتعّنّي يفيد انحصار االقتضاء في الوجوب، وإذ لواله أي هذا القول نفي لذلك االنحصار، ال ألصل االقتضاء. فيحتمل اقتضاء الوجوب وعدم اقتضائه ولزوم الدور مبني على االحتمال األول وجواز االنفكاك على ً الثاني، وفي هذا اجلواب أيضا نظر.

ّ ّ م. وما يتوهم من أن النفي قوله: فيحتمل اقتضاء الوجوب وعدم اقتضائه مسل لالنحصار ال ألصل االقتضاء، فكيف يحتمل عدم االقتضاء، ليس بشيء قوله: لزوم الدور مبني على االحتمال األول وجواز االنفكاك على الثاني ليس بظاهر، **[b19 [**ألن مدار الكالم في امثال هذه املواضع إمنا يكون اعتباراً واحدا.ً قوله: واألوجه يشعر بوجاهة الوجهني األولني. وقد سبق حالهما وقد اختلج ّ هذا السؤال وجال بالبال مع اجلواب الصحيح الذي ذكره احملشي بقوله واألوجه أن يقال الخ. were two necessary beings to be distinguished by entification – **because** existence is, in this case, a shared reality between the two – then the differentiation does not acquire an entification, which does not necessarily verify **[18a]** a dualism. Thus, the difficulty [here] implies composition. For the second aspect, existence is what is required for entification, so if it were to be as such, then existence would either require entification (hence circularity follows), or not. As follows, the separation of both would be permissible without entification, and this would be absurd.

#### **[Day four]**

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that if entification requires necessity, then it requires to be posterior, and this is circular. **I say that** [this is] necessity's being justified by entification. **The Glossator said** that an objection could be raised [here] such that entification's requiring necessity with respect to the privation (*ʿadm*) of necessity's requiring entification does not bring circularity. This is because entification would only require necessity if it were not to assume this privation first. **It is responded that** this assumption does not prevent the necessity of circularity as the fact of matter (*nafs al-ʾamr*), not **[18b]** corresponding to the occurrence [itself], since necessity is [in fact] a cause for everything else as in reality (*nafs al-ʾamr*).

I say that it is no secret that this answer [here] is terrible since the second intention is an entification that is based on the first intention for necessity. Thus, if entification is considered to be a real characteristic (*ḥāla*) for necessity, i.e. its cause, then there is no doubt that this real characteristic would not come together with the aforementioned intention, meaning that it will not be a cause. Then the first intention is invalidated and the second [intention] is corrupted for its being based on it; hence, there is no circularity. A similar statement also precedes the Glossator in a discussion about smooth surfaces (sing. *ṣafḥa mulassaʾ*), but he [also] had a [different] position there.

[Jurjānī] states thatafter accepting the sufficiency of 'pure causality (*mujarrad al-ʿilliyya*), the privation of sufficiency is [now] imagined; however, if necessity were to be a complete cause – just as it is apparent in [the case of] necessity's being **[19a]** the same as the Necessarily Existent – then there is no doubt about the sufficiency of this premise. It is also objected to this by the author in such a way that necessity is a requirement for an entification useful in limiting it, since, otherwise, this statement would be a negation of this limitation not due to a principle of requirement. As follows, it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement, as well as the implication of circularity, are based on the first possibility, and the permissibility of separation (*infikāk*) on the second. And this is subject to debate in this answer.

[Jurjānī] states that it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement are conceded. What is imagined from this is that the negation for limitation is not due to a principle of requirement. How is it then conceivable that the lack of requirement is nothing more than this? [Jurjānī] states that the implication of circularity is based on the first possibility and the permissibility of separation from the second is not apparent **[19b]** since the center of discussion in the examples of these cases is one only in mental consideration. [Jurjānī] states that these aspects are aware of the soundness of the first two ways. Both have preceded their states and **[Day five]**

ّ قال املصنف، رحمه اهلل: وهو مبني على أن الوجوب وجودي. **ّ قال احملشي** مع أنه ليس كذلك، ألنه إما اقتضاء الذات الوجود أو االستغناء عن الغير. **أقول** وجه احلصر فيها ما قد سبق في مباحث الوجوب واإلمكان من أن الوجوب في املعنى الثاني ليس بحقيقة، بل اطالقه عليه إما بتأويل الواجب أو بتأويل مبدأ الوجوب. **[a20 [**ّ وهذا الذي ذكره احملش ّ ي إقامة الدليل على املقدمة املمنوعة وال ّ بأس به فيه. واملقدمة املمنوعة ال سبيل إلى إثباتها وما أقاموا إلثباتها من األدلة ً ال يجدي شيئا ّ ، لكن ميكن أن نتعرض للدليل الذي أقام احملشي على بطالنها ّ مبا تقد ّ م من أنه لم ال يجوز أن يكون اخلاص وما صدق عليه من هذين املفهومني عني ما استحال عدمه على طريقة كون الوجود عينه عندهم. فإن الوجود، وهو ّ كون الشيء في األعيان، ال شك ّ أن ّ ه أمر اعتباري ال حتقق له في اخلارج واحلال أنهم أثبتوا كون اخلاص منه وما صدق عليه عني حقيقة الواجب. وأما احلمل االشتقاقي، **[b20 [**ً فواقع في الوجود أيضا. فاجلواب عنه جواب فيه. **وقوله** )غير املعقول( غير معقول، لكن الكالم فيه ليس في املعقول الذي هو أمر اعتباري ّعام ّ ، بل في اخلاص ً وكونه معقوال بكنهه ممنوع.

#### **[Day six]**

ّنه قال ّ صاحب احملاكمات: فإن قلت ال نسلم أن واجب الوجود لو كان تعي لذاته، انحصر في ذلك املعّنّي. وإمن ً ا يكون كذلك لو كان واجب الوجود ذاتا ً واحدة وهو ممنوع جلواز أن يكون عرضا ّ عامًا أو طبيعة جنسية ]فيه نظر، ألن <sup>3</sup> يلزم أن يكون متايز األنواع املندرجة حتته الوجوب إذا كان طبيعة جنسية[، ّ بالفصول املقد ّ مة لها، فيلزم احملذور املترتب على التركيب من الطبيعة النوعية ّ والتشخص، إذ ال فرق بينهما في أن كال **[a21 [**ّ منهما تركب ذهني على ما سبق ذكرهما.

ّني الذي ينضم إليه." **أقول:** "هذا يشعر بزيادة قال الشارح: "املقتضي للتعي التعّنّي ولزوم التركيب." **ّمتت.**

Added to the marginalia as a correction (صح, *ṣaḥḥ*) to the text. 3

this question has been [further] inquired. He has taken this as the correct answer, which is mentioned by the Glossator after taking his statements and positions into account so that it is responded to this as such etc.

#### **[Day five]**

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that [this statement] is based on necessity's being an existent. **The Glossator said that** even if this is not necessarily so, it will be because necessity [here] is [defined as] either "essence's requiring existence" or "that which has no need of others in existence". **I say that** the aspect of limitation in this is [similar to] what was mentioned previously in the discussion about necessity and possibility, such that necessity in the second meaning is not in reality but unrestrictedly applied to it either by the allegorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*) of necessity, or by that of the principle of necessity. **[20a]** This (i.e. what the Glossator mentioned) is the foundation of proof for the invalid premise, and there is nothing wrong with it. There is no way to prove this invalid premise, and the proof that they have established does not work. Yet, it is possible that we can object to the proof, as the Glossator has also invalidated this, by questioning why it would not be permissible according to them that necessity would be a specific case (*khāṣṣ*), and what falls under these two intensions would be the same as what makes [the specific case's] non-existence inconceivable by way of equating existence to necessity. Thus, existence is a thing *in concreto* (*fī al-aʿyān*). There is no doubt that [necessity] is a thing in mental consideration that cannot be verified in the extramental world, and the position is that they proved that the specific [case] and what falls under it would be the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent. As for [the case of] derivative predication (*ḥaml ishtiqāqī*), **[20b]** this occurrence is also in existence (*fī al-wujūd*). The answer lies in the answer of this point. **[Jurjānī] states that** an unintelligible thing is intelligibly unintelligible, yet the statement here is not about something intelligible, which is a generic thing in mental consideration, but rather about the specific, and a specific thing's being an intelligible thing by its true nature is prohibited.

#### **[Day six]**

The author of *al-Muḥākamāt* said that if you say that we do not accepted that if the Necessarily Existent were to be an entification of its essence, then this would be limited by that auxiliary principle; indeed, this would be likewise if the Necessarily Existent were a singular essence. This [point] would prevent the permissibility of the Necessarily Existent being a generic accident or a genus' nature. Also this [aspect] is subject to debate because if necessity were a genus' nature, then this would be correct. Distinguishing species that are classified under the Necessarily Existent from differentia follows from this. This [point also] brings a difficulty for the Necessarily Existent since He would be dependent on the composition of a species' nature and an individuation. There is then no difference between them such that **[21a]**  each of them has a mental composition, as we have mentioned previously.

The Commentator said: "What is required for entification that superadded to it […]". **I say that** this requirement is in line with [the points concerning] the addition of entification and the requirement of composition. **FINIS.**

#### **The** *Urtext* **of the Debate: Position Five, Observation Three on God's Unicity in al-Jurjānī,** *Sharḥ al-mawāqif***, 8: 45-51**

The author examined the question of God's unicity separately from His deanthropomorphism due to the former's significance. There is one intention in this proof, and it states that there cannot be two gods at the same time.

The philosophers argued that the existence of two [Necessarily] Existents, each of which is necessary by their existence, is impossible, and this has two reasons: *First*, if there were to be two Necessarily Existents, then these two existents would have been differentiated by entification, since, as we said before, necessity is the same things as [God's] quiddity. Rather, these two things that are one in quiddity would not be able to exist without being differentiated by entification that penetrates into each of these haecceities. In this case, the identity of both would be composite of a common quiddity and a differentiating entification, and this would be impossible.

This reasoning relies on the fact that necessity is externally existing (*wujūdī*), because necessity is the same as quiddity, and if the philosophers prove the validity of this statement, then the competition would end, as in the case of a horseman whose hands gain mastery in positioning and movement, meaning that then, the inferences (sing. *istidlāl*) will be complete and the philosophers acquire what they wish. In this way, no one can refute that necessity, especially when certain and immutable, is identical to [God's] quiddity; and in this way, no one can argue that entification is an immutable thing that does not require composition. It was not possible to refute these two inferences before, and I have previously explained and proved these two premises [elsewhere].

Second, necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent's quiddity, requires an entification that is superadded [to it]. As follows, the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent will be impossible. The reason why necessity requires entification is as such: If this were not to be the case, then entification would require necessity; and due to the rule of the priority of a cause over its effect, necessity would have to be posterior to entification. This [position] implies circularity. Rather, an essential necessity that is the same as the essence will require that necessity is prior to the other things and a cause for them, or both of these would not require one another. In this regard, each could be separated from one another (*infikāk*). This is because there cannot be a third thing that would require both, as well as each of them; and in this case, we would acquire necessity without entification, which is impossible.

In other words, it is impossible for a thing to exist without entification, which means that entification is required without necessity. Thus, this entification would not be an existent and would, on the contrary, be [the same as] the Necessarily Existent by essence due to the impossibility of a Necessarily Existent without [the concept of] necessity. This [aspect] is also based on necessity's being immutable (*thubūt*) so that it could verify its existence's being the same as quiddity. As for the second reasoning, that is, the impossibility of necessity's being more than one when it requires entification, this is due to a thing that you have learnt before: the quiddity that requires its entification restricts the species of that quiddity by an individual. Due to this conclusion, [the author] Ījī did not raise an objection to this [aspect].

#### Facsimile of Mollā Zeyrek's Treatise

## Facsimile of Ḫocazāde's Treatise

**Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms** Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazāde (d. 893/1488) Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu

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## Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World

1. Omodeo, Pietro (2020). *Amerigo Vespucci: The Historical Context of His Explorations and Scientific Contribution*. Edited by Pietro Daniel Omodeo.

Per acquistare | To purchase: https://fondazionecafoscari.storeden.com/shop This book is a reconstruction of a previously unedited fifteenth-century court debate between two prominent Ottoman scholars, Molla¯ Zeyrek and H˘ ocaza¯de, on the philosophers' formulation of God's unicity. The debate was a celebrated court event organized around the year 871/1466, which continued for a week in the presence of the Ottoman Sultan Meh˙ med II, his grand vizier Mah˙ mu¯d Pas¸a, and the jurist Molla¯ H ˘ üsrev, most probably at the Sultan's palatine library. This study includes the first annotated edition of this debate in Arabic along with its translation, analysis, and contextual significance in post-classical Islamic intellectual history, covering a wide range of perspectives on Arabic disputation etiquette, the method of scholarly verification, Meh˙ med II's patronage and universalism, and Ottoman philosophical discussions on unicity, existence, and necessity.

**Efe Murat Balıkçıog˘lu** is a lecturer in Islamic History at Wellesley College's Department of Religion, teaching various courses on Islamic intellectual, political, and cultural history. He holds a BA degree in Philosophy from Princeton University, and AM and PhD degrees in History and Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University. His research centers on the intersections of philosophy, theology, and Sufism in the early modern Ottoman Empire with a specific focus on topics such as causality, existence, and necessity.

Università Ca'Foscari Venezia