6 Conclusion

Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms

Summary

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In baḥr-e wujūd āmade bīrūn ze nehoft,
Kas nīst ke in gowhar-e taḥqīq basoft.
Harkas sokhani az sar-e sowdā gofte ast,
Zānrūy ke hast, kas namīdāned goft.

This ocean of existence has come from the Obscure,
And none can verify the truth of this substance.
Each has uttered according to his humor,
None being able to define it from the surface level.¹

ʿOmar Khayyām

The present debate is a product of the tension between two widely studied disciplines at early Ottoman medreses, ḥikma (post-Avicennan philosophy) and kalām (philosophical theology), which, over the course of centuries, accumulated a great number of crossovers, valences, as well as discrepancies among various schools of thought. Each scholar present in the exchange

¹ The English version is based on Khayyām, The Ruba‘iyat of Omar Khayyam, 39. I modified the terms that appear in the quatrain, such as wujūd, jawhar, and taḥqīq, according to their philosophical meaning in Avicennan metaphysics. The Persian version is Number Fourteen in Furūghī and Ghānī’s selection published in 1941 and Number Eight in Hedāyat, Tarānahā-ye Khayyām. Also see Balıkçıoğlu, “Şair, Feylesûf ve Şüphe”, 114-15.
showcases their knowledge in past positions and objections by making references to various classical and post-classical authors. The texts that they refer to during the debate reveal their expertise in rational and religious sciences, especially their background in debates involving the discrepancies between falsafa/ḥikma and kalām. The current debate, in this context, addresses how prominent Ottoman scholars can respond to the antinomies of past schools and articulate their own take through referencing other contemporaries. It should be noted that the debate culture in the post-classical world followed the formal rules of debate etiquette, and the way that a scholar employed his own proofs and premises or objected to his opponent’s was granted more important than sometimes arriving at a certain conclusion. The ornate detailing in post-classical argumentation during the Ottoman age of scholarly debates particularly favored the deconstruction of the opponent’s method and argumentation style, as well as exactitude in referencing, which also interplayed a significant role in one’s scholarly arbitration.

The Sufi-scholar Zeyrek brings an initial rebuttal of the validity of the philosophers’ proof concerning the univocity of terms like necessity and existence when described with regard to God, by criticizing the Timurid verifier Jurjānī’s inability to refute it. As a response, even though he does not uphold the philosophers’ thesis as being true precisely, the verifier Ḫocazāde, for the sake of the debate, defends the philosophers’ doctrine concerning unicity, by proving Zeyrek that the philosophers’ version is coherent on their own terms. To convince the Sultan and the scholars present during the debate, Ḫocazāde justifies certain aspects of Avicennan metaphysics not only through referencing the philosophical corpus with scrutiny, but also referring to acclaimed post-classical critics, such as Jurjānī and Taḥtānī, concluding that the philosophers’ proof can also be upheld as true according the post-classical paradigm.

During the debate both scholars accept that necessity is a mental consideration (iʿtibār), a widely conceded position in post-classical philosophical theology, yet they are not in agreement with the ways in which necessity as an iʿtibār is linked to God’s quiddity/essence or whether its being an iʿtibār also entails its accidentality or, as Ḫocazāde claims, it can be said to have conformed to the philosophers’ position. The term iʿtibār chiefly refers to the rational operations of the mind and its ability to unite and divide intellectual/mental conceptions, as well as creating and multiplying relations and distinctions between them. Yet, different from accidentality, it neither implies extramental existence nor external occurrence as an accidental superaddition (see § 3.4). The term iʿtibār, in this context, seems to harmonize with the alternative views listed under ḥikma and kalām, such that it refers to the conceptual distinctness of existence in an agnostic way without particularly singling out one view (whether its being equal or superadded) over another.

Following Rāzī and other post-classical scholars who argued for the accidental superaddition of existence and necessity to quiddity/existence in necessary beings, Zeyrek argues that this mind-dependent concept, necessity, should be deemed as a separate superadded (zāʾid) accident, hence cannot be equal to neither God’s quiddity/essence nor His existence. Ḫocazāde, on the other hand, defends that the post-classical conceptualization of iʿtibār does not go against the philosophers’ thesis (i.e. that God’s quiddity/essence is equal to His existence and necessity), even cohering with it, since it conforms to God’s singularity. In this context, the main point of Ḫocazāde’s de-
fense of the philosophers is that he wants to demonstrate his opponent that Avicenna’s realist account of necessity can be successfully resituated in the new post-classical context of *iʿtibārāt* by regarding the term as non-entitative (without its connotations in accidentality). The diverse number of topics outlined, as well as the references to past and contemporary commentators, proves, as evidenced in this analysis, the breadth of Ḫocazâde’s knowledge and careful arbitration before settling his own position.

### 6.1 Summary of the Debate. Ḫocazâde’s Persistent Point on the Non-Entitativity of Necessity

Following the theologians’ view, Zeyrek objects to Jurjānī’s treatment of a premise on the philosophers’ formulation of *burḥān al-tamānuʿ*, by arguing that the premise “necessity is equal to quiddity/essence in the Necessarily Existent” cannot be true because the nature of necessity raises the problem of multiplicity in God. For Zeyrek, as a better option, not only does necessity need to be accidental to God’s quiddity, but also to His existence.

When Ḫocazâde brings the counter-evidence that the third meaning of necessity, a view that also appears in the fifteenth-century handbooks of philosophical theology including *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, corresponds to the meaning of necessity in the philosophers’ statement, Zeyrek counters that the meaning in the third sense cannot even be the intension of this concept, but what falls under it. Unlike intensions, extensions are identified as ostensive definitions according to which certain individuals are enumerated, and the use of necessity here as an extension implies that necessity may occur or attach to God’s quiddity externally. Post-classical thinkers often see God’s essence as a case of metaphysical necessity, yet the role of necessity’s modality in understanding the concept of essence has been recently contested since no modal account of essence seems possible.

Then Zeyrek moves to another aspect of the discussion, namely, the question of the philosophers’ equation of necessity with ‘pure existence’, in which he seems to equate ‘pure existence’ with ‘absolute existence’ following Rāzī,

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2 One of the later glossators of Ḫocazâde’s *Tahāfut*, Meḥmed Emīn el-Ūskūdārī (d. 1149/1736) will associate this position (i.e. that existence is not superadded externally to quiddity but only in the mind – *fi al-dhihm* – as a mental consideration – *ʿiṭībār ʿaqlī*) with Suhrawardī’s *Ḥikma al-ishrāq*. In the gloss, Ūskūdārī rules out this option arguing that existence will be characterized (*ittīṣāf*) by quiddity being in need of it – a fact that will undermine their being equivalent to one another (Ūskūdārī, *Telhîsu*, 168 [English] and 169 [Arabic]). Before describing Avicenna’s view that existence cannot be a superadded accident to God’s quiddity (since, otherwise, existence will be subsisting in it), Ūskūdārī starts the chapter by acknowledging that Avicenna’s position does not go against the principles of Islam. Even though he does not give a definitive answer, he outlines three historical responses to this proof which are listed along with their possible objections: Suhrawardī’s view that existence is a mental conception; Rāzī’s view that the cause of existence is not prior to its effect, i.e. making existence dependent on another thing; and Ghazālī’s view that existence is actually in need of an efficacious agent, hence cannot be the same as God’s quiddity. Ūskūdārī does not choose one position over another; he rather evaluates the later critics of Avicenna, finding certain faults in their proofs (Ūskūdārī, *Telḥîsu*, 168-75; also see Muḥyiddīn el-Ḳarabagī’s (d. 942/1535) gloss on Ḫocazâde, which states that no one can speak ill of the philosophers’ proof despite their imprecision since the theologians’ proofs are also incomplete (Güzel, *Karabağî ve Tahāfutʾü*, 108).

3 As Kit Fine suggests, “the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equal to a modal notion”, meaning that propositions about essences are irreducible to modal propositions (Fine, “Essence and Modality”, 1-3).
that is, overlooking pure existence’s ‘special status’ in God, as passed in Avicenna’s certain works. Here Zeyrek makes two objections, arguing that first, the term existence also has to be superadded to quiddity in God and, second, that all three meanings of necessity imply that it is an accidental aspect. As a result, he states that none of these meanings (which all suggest accidentality and contingency) can provide a substantial proof that the necessity here has to be a single reality with no diversity – and its being a mental consideration does not guarantee this. This point, in turn, deems the philosophers’ proof incomplete, and Zeyrek proclaims himself as the winner.

In his textual response, Ḫocazāde affirms the validity of the philosophers’ doctrine according to their paradigm, arguing that at least one of the three meanings of necessity (namely its third) corresponds to the exact meaning of God’s necessity. That is, as opposed to Zeyrek’s claim that the third meaning, at the most, can only fall under the philosophers’ sense of necessity, Ḫocazāde not only shows that the third is the intension of this term, but also the first two meanings are fundamental in the derivation of the third.

For the philosophers, necessity is the same as God’s quiddity/essence, which, likewise, is also identical to His existence. Yet, of course, this does not mean that God is each of these things. On the following days, Ḫocazāde has the harder job of defending the philosophers’ thesis, since even though the young scholar asserted that the question of ‘pure existence’ along with others would be perceived as a digression, Zeyrek is determined to bring the questions of ‘pure existence’, entification, and individuation vis-à-vis God’s singularity, demanding him to show that each of these Avicennan doctrines is consistent with the other.

The young scholar’s position in the debate is difficult for another reason: his defense of the philosophers does not mean that Ḫocazāde supports their views completely. As a post-classical scholar who follows the works of verifiers like Jurjānī and Taḥtānī, Ḫocazāde holds in his _Tahāfut_ that necessity and entification were superadded accidents to God’s quiddity/essence. This view is contrary to what he defended during the debate. While arguing thus, he did not outright accept the positions detailed in the handbooks of the philosophers of his time. He pursued further interpretations held in Sharḥ al-mawāqif with scrutiny, by especially refuting two objections to the philosophers’ proof by his long-time adversary Hasan Çelebi.

Ḫocazāde may not have held that the philosophers’ statement about ‘pure existence’ was true, but he does show that the philosophers’ position is valid in and of itself, since existence’s being an accident superadded to quiddity does not do justice to God’s necessary existence as it places existence secondary to the essential aspect of quiddity. And, at the end of the debate, when the question came to the status of entification or individuation vis-à-vis God, Ḫocazāde did also defend the philosophers’ thesis outlined in Avicenna’s _al-Ishārāt_, but also included his own view that if entification, a term closely tied to necessity, is taken as a concomitant in the philosophers’ sense: it may indeed imply multiplicity in God’s essence. Hence, different from the philosophers, he asserts that entification should be taken as a superadded accident that does not have any real existence in the outside world.

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4 Avicenna assigns a ‘proper mode of existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ) to God which is distinct from ‘realized existence’ (wujūd muḥaṣṣal), the latter of which reserved for universal and particular existences. The conceptualization of the term goes back to Yahyā ibn ’Adi (Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity, 498-531).
Hocazâde’s view with regard to the nature of necessity, quiddity/essence, and existence falls under the ‘conceptualist’ reading of these terms in post-classical philosophy.\(^6\) It has been argued that there are two such approaches in the philosophical corpus: one group asserts that essence and existence can be distinguished only conceptually, whereas objectively or extrametally they are identical; on the other hand, the rival view states that the distinction between the two is real.\(^6\) The philosophers’ view, as well as Ḫocazâde’s rendition follows the former position, which has been also posited by the famed thirteenth-century post-classical philosophers, such as Abharî and Ṭūsî, who were both instrumental in the transmission of Avicennan concepts through their commentaries and modified doctrines in the post-classical Islamicate world.\(^7\)

Zeyrek’s position depends on the problem of composition, according to which the presence of both existence and necessity in God, in relation to His quiddity/essence, may require diversity and composition in the Necessarily Existent. One of the most common ways to argue against God’s purported multiplicity in pre-Ottoman Islamic scholarship (e.g. theology of Fâkhîr al-Dîn al-Râzî) was to show that necessity and existence were *non-entitative*, by taking both terms as either *iʿtibârī* (‘with no distinct entitative metaphysical component’), or *ʿadamî/salîbî* (negational, or ‘simply ascribing some feature of extramentality which adds nothing to that entity’).\(^8\) Ḫocazâde here certainly follows the *non-entitative* position in the first case, not upholding the second, by concluding that the philosophers’ proof, which may not be the most sound formulation, is still true in and of itself, according to their paradigm (though he does not follow this thesis personally in his Tahāfut). On the other hand, Zeyrek, acknowledging both aspects of *non-entitativity* to a certain extent, concludes, also following the theologians’ view as in the third meaning, that necessity (and existence) should be considered as accidents that occur to quiddity externally; that is, that they are non-essential superadditions not identical to God’s quiddity/essence. Zeyrek deems that the philosophers’ answer can only be validated through accepting necessity as an accident – a view that goes against their provided assumptions.

### 6.2 Ḫocazâde’s Personal Opinion. His Perusal of *al-Shifāʾ*, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, and Beyond

Hocazâde’s main aim during the debate was not only to show that this line of thought was true according to the philosophers, but also the meaning of necessity in their sense was also present in various texts of philosophical theology studied at Ottoman medreses, including Jurjânî’s *Sharḥ al-mawâqif*. In his exposition of the subject, Ḫocazâde does not directly follow the past verifiers by reporting their views, but he corrects, comments, amends, and

\(^5\) Different from the case of extreme/absolute nominalism, Pines associates the conceptualist reading with the view that the universals are merely mental forms, which have a relation to many things in such a way that it may be said of each one of them that it is it; and this reading is a weaker form of extreme nominalism (Pines, “Studies in Abu'l-Barakât al-Baghdâdi’s Poet ics and Metaphysics”, 282-4).


\(^7\) Endress, “Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa”, 407-8, 416-19.

\(^8\) Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 136.
modifies them if needed in order to craft his own formulation depending on the nature of the disputation.

Indeed, Ḥocazāde’s defense was not new to the medrese curriculum, since one of the popular works in post-classical philosophy, Abhārī’s *Hidāya al-ḥikma*, already acknowledges that God’s existence, as well as the necessity and entification of His existence, is equal to His real essence in Chapters Two and Three of the *Metaphysics* by giving a summary of Avicenna’s views. In a polemical treatise concerning Jurjānī’s mistakes in six theological issues, the acclaimed Ottoman verifier Kaṣṭalānī (d. 901/1496) also argued, different from Jurjānī and Zeyrek, that existence and quiddity may even be the same among the possible existents, yet with one additional condition: the existent in question must be an essential (dhātī) quality.

Mollā Kaṣṭalānī was a contemporary of Ḥocazāde, who garnered the master verifier’s utmost respect as a tutor and a scholar. After having taught Jurjānī’s works for many decades, he penned a short *dubia* on six issues, each of which had the intention of revising Jurjānī’s points and showing that the scholar’s answers failed to verify the truth absolutely. The third question in Kaṣṭalānī’s *dubia* concerns Ījī/Jurjānī’s third corollary whether or not existence is superadded to quiddity among the possibly existents. Kaṣṭalānī observes that there are two types of existents (sing. *mawjūd*), one type is by way of essence (li-dhātihi) and the other being external to its essence but in conjunction with it (*khārij ʿan dhātihi muqāran lahu*), concluding that in the former case one cannot argue that quiddity is prior to existence. This means that, in the first case, once existence is removed from quiddity, the latter will be negated as well, hence there will not be an existent in the first place.

It could be said that the verifier Kaṣṭalānī does the same thing with his contemporary Ḥocazāde: in addition to a full-fledged restatement and defense, he also criticizes and modifies Jurjānī’s exposition of the philosophers in light of their views. In this lemma, he aims to show off his scrutiny in scholarship, by showing that Ījī/Jurjānī’s position here is not categorically absolute, and these scholars did not take distinct types of possibly existents into full account. In his objections to Kaṣṭalānī’s objections, the Sufi-scholar Sinān Paşa, on the other hand, points out that Jurjānī did mention this point in another work (i.e. his gloss on Iṣfahānī’s *Tajrīd*), and Kaṣṭalānī was simply unaware of this lemma, by questioning how come he could be called a ‘verifier’. This did not, however, stop the skeptical Sinān Paşa to point his arrows of criticism at the famed Persian theologians of the past:

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9 See “faṣl fī ʾanna wujūd wājib al-wujūd nafs ḥaqīqatihi” and “faṣl fī ʾanna wujūd wa-taʿayyanahuʾ ayn dhātihi” (al-Abhari, *Hidāya al-ḥikma*, 96-7).

10 For a short account of Kaṣṭalānī’s works, see Şen, “Molla Kestelî’nin Hayatı ve Eserleri”.

for him, neither Ījī nor Jurjānī brought a new perspective but simply copied the Ashʿarī position without adding any ingenuity.\footnote{For the Arabic text, “Hādha kalām ḥaqq lā yaḥūmu ḥawlahu shāʾiba shakk wa-inkār. Wa-ʿashāra ‘īlayh al-fāḍil al-sharīf fī hawāshī Tajrīd wa-ghayrihā. ‘Illā annahu aktīfā hahunā baḥl al-kalām al-muṣannif min ʿaraf al-ashāʿira ‘alā māhir daʾbihi kathīran fī ḥādha al-kitāb” (Yıldırım, Kestelîʾnin Es-Sebʾul-Muʿallaka, 45).}

In the fifteenth-century Ottoman world, Graeco-Arabic philosophy was mostly known through Avicenna’s compendia of philosophy prepared later in his life, such as al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt, as well as the verifier Taḥtānī’s adjudication on the two famed commentaries on the same text called al-Muhākamāt—not through his complex voluminous masterpiece Kitāb al-shifāʾ. This fact is also evidenced in Zeyrek’s and Ḥocazāde’s citing the philosophers’ thesis concerning ‘pure existence’ in the debate, since they, in every instance, choose to quote the philosophers via al-Muhākamāt instead of going back to the original sources (a practice that may also be observed in certain discussion in the Tahāfut debate).\footnote{For instance, Ṭūsī’s Discussion Thirteen in his Tahāfut adjudication, in which he summarized the philosophers’ position concerning God’s knowledge of the particulars via al-Muhākamāt only (al-Ṭūsī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 271).}

Ḥocazāde’s overutilization of Taḥtānī’s al-Muhākamāt is also evident in a heartfelt confession by him, who announced at a banquet in the presence of notable scholars, including Mollā Luṭfī and Ḫatībzāde, that he had never read Avicenna’s magnum opus Kitāb al-shifāʾ cover-to-cover, which may indicate that he knew its arguments through close readings of certain parts or from its later renderings. As a reply, the fellow Kaṣṭalānī proudly claims to have read the work at least seven times, and each time he was as enthusiastic as a novice studying the work as if for the first time.\footnote{During a banquet, blood gushed forth from Mollā Luṭfī all of a sudden, and some of the scholars around the table were amused by the scene and got intrigued by the possible medical reasons for this condition. Kaṣṭalānī explained Luṭfī’s condition by quoting from Avicenna’s al-Qānūn fī al-ṭibb, and Ḥocazāde was highly impressed with the scholar’s extensive knowledge about the Avicennan corpus. Upon Ḥocazāde’s astonishment, Kaṣṭalānī further claimed that, in addition to al-Qānūn, he had read al-Shifāʾ seven times from cover-to-cover, while the master confessed that he never did. As for the text: “Mevlānā daḫı didi ki tenhā Ḳānūnʾı değil belki Şeyḫʾüñ ʿāmme-i müʾellīfātını bā-cemʿuhā Ḫocazāde taʿaccub idicek eyütdi ki yā siz Şifāʾı ya tamām görmek vāḳıʿ olmamuş mıdur? Ḫocazāde idicek eyütdi ki tamām görmedüm emmā mevāżıʿ-ı mühimmesini ʿalā kadriʾl-ḫāce görüb diḳḳat üzre muṭālaʿa itmek vāḳıʿ olmuşdur. Mevlānā didi ki ben Şifāʾı biʾt-tamām yedi kerre muṭālaʿa idüb marra-ı sābiʿada ders-i cedid muṭālaʿa-asın ider yeñi dānişmend gibi muṭālaʿa idüb ıtדūm” (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ, 2: 482). It was due to this exchange, Kaṣṭalānī was one of the two scholars whom Ḥocazāde respected to an extent that he referred to him as mollā, and the other scholar was Ḫayālī (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ, 2: 482).} It may still be inferred that Ḥocazāde, who might have supported the philosophers for the sake of the disputation, did rather follow Taḥtānī in certain regards, including the position that entification, as evidenced here, is a superadded accident to God’s quiddity.

This piece of biographical information should not make us think that Ḥocazāde was misinformed about the philosophers’ point. In fact, one could find his ultimate position on unicity, in lieu of the philosophers’ critique, in his famed adjudication on Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa, a work that was writ-
ten soon after this debate. In this adjudication, not only did he repeat his position concerning differentiating factors, such as entification and individuation, that they are superadded accidents to quiddity,16 but also he argued the opposite of what he had defended against Zeyrek, that even necessity should be deemed as a separate accidental superaddition 17 as in the case of entification, hence not being directly equal to God.

In his Tahāfut’s Discussion Seven on the philosophers’ inability to prove God’s singularity, Ḫocazāde writes that terms such as ‘necessity’, ‘entification’, and ‘individuation’ should be taken as non-entitative in the sense of the first aspect above, that is, as i’tibārī concepts appearing to quiddity without extramental existence – yet adding that he neither holds that these concepts can be externally existing (wujūdi) nor non-entitative in the negational (‘adamī/salbī) sense, thereby suggesting their accidentality in several places.18 As a conclusion, he does not strictly follow non-entitativity, finding the philosophers’ formulation of unicity imprecise. Ḫocazāde’s acknowledgment of this thesis against Zeyrek should simply be for the sake of the debate.

As passed in the analysis of the text presented at the debate, the verifier Ḫocazāde does not hold that the philosophers’ designation of entification is true. By way of summary, the philosophers argue that entification is an existent with an existential notion (wujūdiyya), that is the same as quiddity in the external world, which can only be distinguished mentally. On the other hand, the theologians hold that entification is a non-existent being (with no existence in the outside world) but superadded accidentally to quiddity. In his Tahāfut, Ḫocazāde synthesizes both views arguing that entification is an existent that cannot be the same as quiddity in reality but must be superadded to it. Entification implies a ‘need-based’ relationship associated with identity and specification, such that God’s having His own special entification would still go against His necessary existence, and thereby deeming it to be a superadded accident (ʿārid).

In his Tahāfut, Ḫocazāde provides three proofs from the philosophers regarding the nature of entification, the first regarding what entification is and whether it is an existent (mawjūd) or not; the second regarding the view that it is impossible for two quiddities with necessary existence to be existents; and the third stating that the individuals of a single nature or quiddity dis-

16 “Rather, the outcome is that if necessity were to denote a sense of commonality between two partners, the entification of the Necessarily Existent could not be the same as His quiddity, and it is apparent [from this] that it would be added to the quiddity”. As for the Arabic: “Bal maḥṣūluhu huwa ‘annahu law kāna al-wujūb mushtarakan bayna ithnayn lam yakun ta’ayyun al-wājib nafs māhiyathih, wa-huwa zā’idan ‘ala’ayhi” (Ḫocazāde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 186). Or: “As an answer to this, it is apparent that we do not concede necessity’s being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, rather it is an accident among God’s accidents”. As for the Arabic: “Fa-jawābuhu: al-zā’idan ‘an wujūd nafs māhiya al-wujūb, bal huwa ʿārid min ‘awāridihā” (Ḫocazāde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 190).

17 “The answer is that according to the second position [as outlined by Ghazāli], what is intended by necessity is existence’s requiring essence. Thus we do not accept that necessity is the very reality of the Necessarily Existent, rather it is a mind-dependent thing with no existence in the outside world strictly speaking. So, how could necessity then be the same thing as the reality of the Necessarily Existent?” As for the Arabic: “Al-jawāb: ʿan al-maslak al-thānī annahu ‘in urid bi-l-wujūd iťiqdä’ al-dhāt al-wujūd, fa-lā nusallam ‘annahu nafs haqīqa al-wajib, bal huwa ‘amr i’tibārī lā wujūd lahu fī al-khārij qaṭ‘an. Fa-kayfa kāna nafs haqīqa al-wajib?” (Ḫocazāde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 184).

18 Ḫocazāde rules out the possibility of necessity’s existentiality (wujūdiyya) based on the philosophers’ statement (Ḫocazāde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 193), and argues that necessity cannot also be negational (salīb) in its non-entitativity (Ḫocazāde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 191).
tistinguish themselves through a superadded entification. He concludes that the philosophers contradict themselves regarding the nature of entification, since while their first proof upholds entification’s being equal to quiddity, their second proof, which hypothesizes about the possibility of two Necessarily Existents, employs entification’s being superadded in a possible line of thought. The rationale that Ḫocazāde bases his position is linked to the problem of the entification’s cause: if God’s entification has a cause of itself, then this will cause multiplicity in Him; similarly, if God has His own special entification, that is the same as His essence, then this would also hinder His singularity, which leads us to the conclusion that entification has to be a superadded accident.

In his gloss on Ḫocazāde’s adjudication, which chiefly concerns itself with critiquing the ways in which the authors of the Tahāfut lineage present and establish their proofs, the Ottoman verifier and religious scholar İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) has a passage regarding the nature of entification and its relation to quiddities. For him, all proofs present here could be used in support of the philosophers’ argument regarding entification that states that it is the same as quiddity in the outside world, only distinguishable mentally. He follows Ḫocazāde’s most points, arguing that in the first proof, entification does not necessarily show that it has to be superadded, but the second could be utilized to make a case for its accidentality. Nonetheless, for İbn Kemāl, as long as entification is taken as a mental consideration, it will conform to the philosophers’ doctrine.

In a partial commentary on the fifteenth-century Persian scholar Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī’s al-Risāla al-qadīma fī ithbāt al-wājib (“The Old Treatise on Establishing the Necessary”),21 as well as his epistle on verifying the necessity of the Necessarily Existent (al-Risāla fī taḥqīq wujūb al-wājib), İbn Kemāl also outlines his views regarding the logical and metaphysical status of existence and necessity with regard to God. Following the Avicennan definition of God’s unicity, he (via Dawānī)22 argues that God’s divine quiddity/essence is equal to His ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ), since

19 Ḫocazāde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 181-8. Also see Ahmet Arslan’s analysis in Haşiye Ala’î-Tehafüt Tuhhî, 259-60 and Ibn Kemāl, Tehâfüt Hâşiyesi, 394-5.

20 İbn Kemāl, Tehâfüt Hâşiyesi, 399-400. Additionally he addresses a third option for the case of entification with regard to Ḫocazāde’s synthesis, which is as follows: the philosophers regard quiddity as the reason for the existence of entification; by this way, they argue that entification may be construed as a necessary concomitant to quiddity. On the other hand, post-classical theologians are hesitant in associating entification, a term that denotes individuation and concretization, with quiddity, setting it as entification’s cause. In order to justify the philosophers’ view in the eyes of post-classical scholarship, İbn Kemāl offers a modification to their doctrine, by saying that if quiddity is taken as the reason for entification’s being superadded instead of the direct reason of entification itself, then entification will not be associated with the Necessarily Existent’s quiddity, not being able to penetrate into His essentiality. With this amendment to their proof, the philosophers can now justify the position that entification is a necessary concomitant (lāzīm) (İbn Kemāl, Tehâfüt Hâşiyesi, 392-3).

21 According to the colophon of MS Raqq Paşa 1457 in Süleymaniye, this work is dedicated to Bāyezīd II in 894/1489. For this work, Dawānī was said to have received a letter from the Sultan along with five hundred filori (Pourjavady, Philosophy in the Early Safavid Iran, 11-12).

22 See Dawānī’s old treatise Establishing the Necessary, which follows the classical Avicennan formula regarding God’s necessary existence: “God is equal to His ‘special existence’ which subsists through its essence that is free of relations and considerations with the necessity denoting the necessity of essence’s requiring existence” (in Bdaiwi, “Philosophia Ottomanica”, 324-5).

23 Unlike the theologians and the Akbarī Sufis, İbn Kemāl, seems to distinguish ‘absolute existence’ from ‘special existence’, such that the former is a conceptual matter or secondary in-
God’s essence should not be reduced to a secondary intelligible shared by all things.  

Several times in the _Tahāfut_, Ḫocazāde directs questions concerning the veracity of the philosophers’ point by stating that their doctrine does not provide certain proofs that, for instance, entification can be a concomitant (as supported in _al-Ishārāt_). This is because if entification is not an accident, then entification and necessity will indicate a cause-and-effect relationship as in the case of the possibly existents, thereby implying contingency and multiplicity in God.  

Similarly, Ḫocazāde also highlights one of the premises of the philosophers’ inference (i.e. necessity’s being the same as quiddity) as problematic. This is because, if we assume that necessity would be a commonality between two equally necessary partners, then their being distinguished from one another by a concomitant entification cannot be valid since the quiddity’s species that belongs to the Necessarily Existent here would be in need of a discrete thing (ʿamr munfaṣil), rendering it multiple. Ḫocazāde concludes in his _Tahāfut_ that entification should rather be super-added to fulfill the philosophers’ criterion.

### 6.3 For the Sake of the Debate. Verification in Defense of the Philosophers

The verifier Ḫocazāde’s unique synthesis in this debate is in demonstrating that not only was necessity verily identical to God’s quiddity/essence, and ‘pure existence’, according to the philosophers’ paradigm, but also, in line with the new trends in post-classical philosophical theology, the use of _iʿtibārāt_, a conceptualist interpretation of Avicennan ontological realism, did not undermine their formulation to a certain extent. He even wants to show that _iʿtibārāt_ can be used to modify their exposition, with the condition that the _non-entitativity_ does not suggest accidentality.
One perennial issue with Ḫocazāde’s synthesis is the question of coherence. Can we confidently say that a particular theory coheres when it is restated in a different paradigm? Or if a scholar reenvisions Avicennan ontological realism in the new framework of post-classical conceptualism, would that be still valid? It should be noted that each paradigm is true in and of itself, and applying one conjecture to another will result in a syncretic effort—not in a comprehensive system of thought that is necessarily coherent in and of itself. Dimitri Gutas has recently argued in a provocative article that the efforts of post-classical scholars should be deemed as “pseudo-philosophy”, since synthesizing different strands of thought does not necessarily mean that there is an encompassing rational basis justified scientifically in a systematic fashion. Ḫocazāde’s synthesis here falls into Gutas’ categorization in some ways, since necessity, as the philosophers define, fits in with God’s unicity only within the parameters of Avicennan realism; that is, turning it into a conceptualist position does not necessarily correspond to Avicenna’s initial framework. In certain other ways, Gutas’ designation of pseudo-philosophy is not exactly suiting for this case either. Since Ḫocazāde’s defense here is a rhetorical effort for the sake of the debate, and his main aim is to show his erudition through verification—not upholding the philosophers’ position, true in his own teachings. His other works reveal that he neither complies with the philosophers’ nor the theologians’ expositions precisely. Having his own unique position, Ḫocazāde only asserts the non-entitativity of necessity as a mental conception in the post-classical world, conforming to some commentators and going against some others.

Ḩocazāde was not interested in whether the philosophers’ proof remained valid as an actual argument in his time. Rather, he was keen to showcase his mastery in demonstrating what they had intended, what steps they had taken to realize it, and show whether their doctrines were compatible with the standards of his day. This does not mean that he never contested any of their points. On the contrary, there were cases in which he would follow their expositions in certain other adjudications or glosses. Ḫocazāde’s defense, in this sense, was a way of holding a mirror to his opponent Zeyrek, so that his opponent would realize how misinformed he was about Arabic philosophy and its reception in post-classical philosophical theology.

The method of verification was a way to digest past debates so that the new generations of scholars could address loopholes in past arguments by questioning their precision, certainty, and validity. Ḫocazāde’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa is a great example of this exercise. As in the philosophers’ first position outlined in Ghazālī, it might be true that, if there were to be two Necessarily Existents, both by nature would distinguish themselves from one another through entification, by making two equal Gods impossible. Again Ḫocazāde adds a question mark to this proof, arguing that even though it appears intuitive, there is no guarantee that there would be two different realities, rather than one as in God, so that each one of the partners would require an entification. In a similar vein, he continues to further his investigation in the Tahāfut, by questioning why we should think that there

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28 See the case of secondary causes in Balıkçöğlu, A Coherence of Incoherences.
29 Ḫocazāde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 181.
should be one existence, rather than different realities, each requiring an identification. Or an additional question that investigates the veracity of another point: why should it not be that there are multiple realities distinguished from one another, which fall under ‘pure existence’?30

The fifteenth-century Ottoman world was a period in which texts of Islamic philosophy had accumulated to an extent that the literature in philosophical theology was replete with a vast number of distinct positions on various topics. In order to compose a new argument, a competent verifier first had to demonstrate his erudition and pedantry in close textual readings of primary source materials by arbitrating among a number of schools and textual traditions. In that regard, the Ottoman medreses did not feed from a single source, and referencing the past in scholarly discussions encompassed a great variety of positions. It seems to me that Sultan Mehmed II’s choice of these scholars for the debate was deliberate, as both represented different backgrounds and choices of arbitration in such an essential topic.

For centuries many theologians found faults in the philosophers’ assertions, devising counter-arguments to demonstrate that the philosophers’ proofs did not reflect the absolute truth. A master Ottoman verifier, in this context, should be a scholar who traced all these lines of arguments and counter-arguments by heart, even making suitable amendments to bring in his own unique perspective. This debate is a testament to the Ottoman scholars’ skills in verifying different schools in order to demonstrate their syntheses of past masters. The time of Ḫocazâde was a period in the Ottoman world when the state was going through a definitive imperial restructuring, which was based on Mehmed II’s cosmopolitan and universalistic ambitions, as exemplified by the all-encompassing selection of books in his glorious palatine library, where this debate most probably took place.

Ḫocazâde put forth his unique position on God’s unicity in his Tahāfut adjudication, a view in which he did not follow the philosophers’ perspective. Though he seemed to have followed their thesis closely during the debate, he did not also accept it outright – he further modified and corrected their given thesis while justifying it. The nature of the present debate was fairly distinct from the context of his Tahāfut, and the main aim in this exchange was to demonstrate his opponent that even if he did not hold this to be true, the philosophers’ point was true in and of itself when one considered it within their own paradigm. If the nature of the debate demanded it, Ḫocazâde could pose as a philosopher in order to uphold the truth for the sake of debate, showing how the philosophers could be compatible with the post-classical context of philosophical theology. In this context, not only did Ḫocazâde ascertain the truth on the philosophers’ terms, but both scholars in the debate also verified their respective versions of God’s unicity on their own terms.

Ottoman court debates were combative at heart, not scripted imperial games.31 There were real losers or winners, and a respected scholar al-

30 Ḫocazâde, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 182.

31 There were no medals to be won in the Renaissance and so no dire enforcements on the losing party. There were no severe punishments, such as the humiliation of removing a senior scholar from his post (Azzolini, “There Were No Medals”, 264-5). A winner might boast for his argumentative skills as in the case of the Italian disputation master Achillini and the polymath Girolamo Cardano, but “victory rather than consensus” was the ultimate goal rather than the ravishing victory of one over another (Grendler, The Universities in the Italian Renaissance, 152-6).
ways had the mishap to lose his post and reputation, or to be humiliated in front of his colleagues. It is in this context that the efforts of the Ottoman verifiers should not be seen as futile scholarly attempts of mere apologetics since, as in the case of Ḫocazāde, these scholars had the courage and erudition to even argue for doctrines with utmost scrutiny that they did not actually hold to be true or complete.