Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms
Ottoman Philosophical Culture and the Court Debate
Between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḫocazâde (d. 893/1488)
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“If Only Necessity Were God’s Quiddity”
Analysis of the Debate

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According to the Ottoman biobibliographical sources, the debate between Zeyrek and Ḫocazâde continued for five days and, on the sixth, the Sultan asked the scholars to prepare copies of their responses for further evaluation on the next day. The extant texts reproduced in the Appendix below include these accounts from the last day of the debate. Due to the fragmented nature of both responses, it is hard to determine which objection followed which response exactly. Given that post-classical disputations followed a standard of specific sets of objections and explanations along with rejoin-
ders and counter-objections in reply, the analysis below intends to include a possible timeline of the debate, matching each scholar’s lemmata on a given day, and thereby showing how the debate evolved over the course of one week. The blow-by-blow reconstruction, in this sense, provides us with fresh insights about how the Ottoman scholars defended their points within the formal framework of debate etiquette and how the method of verification and referencing past scholarship were further utilized.

There are certain other hardships in reconstructing the event from extant texts. Both sides adamantly repeated their positions during the debate, having resisted any concessions to each other’s arguments. This insistence was to such a point that they sometimes ended up repeating the same points over and over again. In their restatements each scholar also resorted to several points included in past texts, having digressed into various other aspects and positions in philosophy and theology, and this must be the very reason why the debate extended over a week with no resolution.

By referencing some key points and contexts related to the debate, my analysis divides the exchange into six days, assuming that the seventh was the final day of review based on the treatises prepared on the previous night. The name of scholars and some common terms below will be given in abbreviations, as in Zeyrek (Z), Ḫocazāde (Ḫ), Ījī (Ī), Jurjānī (J), Hasan Çelebi (HÇ), and the Necessarily Existent/God (NE).

The terms ‘quiddity’ (māhiya) and ‘essence/quintessence’ (dhāt) were often used interchangeably during the debate: the philosophers’ ‘quiddity’ was an ontological term used by Avicenna, denoting ‘whatness’ or ‘what a thing is [by essence (biʾl-dhāt)]’, whereas ‘essence’, a term most commonly employed by the theologians, denoted the real underlying nature of a thing. The preference and use of these terms signified each scholar’s tendency in arbitration, thereby Ḫocazāde, as a scholar with a background in ḥikma/falsafa, mostly employing the former definition, and Zeyrek, who was more prone to the theological literature, the latter. To avoid confusion, I used both terms interchangeably as in ‘quiddity/essence’.

Demir, “Zât”, 148-9. Quiddity or essence (māhiya), which arguably corresponds to ‘whatness’ or, arguably, ‘pointability’, is the result of conception and, in certain contexts, may be used as a synonym for ‘quintessence’ (dhāt) or reality/true nature (haqīqa) (Arnaldez, “Māhiyya”, 1261). Yet, technically speaking, there exists a distinction between the philosophers’ māhiyya and the theologians’ dhāt, such that the latter group considers dhāt as ‘unoriginated’ (aqrī mag’ūl), criticizing that the former considers the concept of māhiyya originated due to their wrong reasoning. In a treatise that dispels the assumptions of quiddities’ origination (jaʿl), the Ottoman scholar İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) writes that the theologians like Ījī and Jurjānī mistake the philosophers’ term for the Muʿtazilite concept of a “non-existent essence” (dhāt maʿdūm), such that the philosophers never claim that quiddities are originated. What they, instead, meant is that quiddity is not originated through the Originator’s (hence God’s) origination/making (jaʿl al-jāʾil, the Creator’s creation) directly, but takes on the attribute majʿūl as an external and mental accident, which can well attach to a haecceity (huwiyya). It is in this sense for İbn Kemāl that quiddity is originated in their doctrines (Demirkol, “Kemalpaşazâde’ye Göre Mahiyetin Mecʿuliyeti”). For the Arabic text of the treatise, see İbn Kemāl, “Risāla fi bayān ma’n al-ja’l”. For the Turkish translation, İbn Kemāl, “Yaratmanın (Ca’l) Anlamının Açıklanması”.

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5.1 Outline of Zeyrek’s (Z) Position

**DAY ONE:** In Response to Ḫocazāde’s (Ḫ) Initial Written Question (Suʾāl) on the Philosophers’ Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in the Necessarily Existent (NE)

**Z’s thesis and initial objection:** Necessity and quiddity cannot be the same for the NE because a commonality in both aspects would undermine God’s unicity.

**Ḫ’s written response:** The philosophers’ argument is true based on the fact that necessity has three meanings, which are (1) “essence’s requiring existence”; (2) “that which has no need of others in existence”; and (3) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”. And the third affirms the meaning of necessity in their argument. This statement neither implies change nor diversity since both necessity and quiddity are mental considerations (iʿtibārāt).

**Zeyrek’s further objection to Ḫ’s premise:** The third meaning of necessity does not exactly support the philosophers’ statement since it cannot be an ‘intension’ (mafhūm) but only ‘what falls under’ (mā-ṣadaq) the third meaning, i.e. its extension. That is why, necessity has to occur to God’s quiddity/essence externally as a superaddition accidental to it.

**DAY TWO:** On Whether Any of These Three Meanings Can Prove That the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God’s Quiddity/Essence

**Z’s two counter-objections:** (a) Even if the third meaning corresponds to the intension of their argument, there is no guarantee that God’s quiddity/essence will be singular in this case. Necessity has to occur to quiddity externally as an attachment; therefore, such meanings cannot be affirmed with certainty. (b) There is no certain proof that the first two meanings, which Ḫ claims both to be connected to the third, do not necessarily imply compositeness in God.

**DAY THREE:** On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

**Z’s objection to Avicenna:** As a response to Avicenna’s statement that the NE is the same as ‘pure existence’, Z asks why one should assume that God would be equal to ‘pure existence’ just because it is singular. Here Z might have been mistaken ‘pure existence’ for ‘absolute existence’ – a debated distinction in Avicennan philosophy. Next, Z resorts to the theologian’s position that existence has to be superadded to God’s quiddity.

**Ḫ’s repeated counter-objection to Z in defense of the philosophers:** Necessity’s being the same as ‘pure existence’ in reality corresponds to the intension of necessity’s third meaning. Then Ḫ turns the table, asking how his opponent could hinder this fact.

**Z’s repeated reply:** All three meanings of necessity are accidental superadditions with no implications in reality. Far from being this statement’s intension, the third meaning can only be regarded as a mental consideration that
falls under this meaning, with the condition that necessity is something that occurs to God’s reality externally. And this case does not even demonstrate certainly that necessity has to be a single reality.

**DAY FOUR: On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (Wujūdiyya)**

**Z’s provided proof and two objections:** First, Z states that Ḥ may define necessity as “that which distinguishes the NE from others”; yet God’s quiddity/essence can also be defined as such, and there is no certain proof that this meaning is only restricted to necessity. Second, necessity’s being without extramental existence means that it is ‘relational’ (nisbī), a term that does not denote an existential notion. Relational aspects can get into interaction with possibly existents by attaching to them externally, and there is again no certain proof that necessity here does not refrain from such relational qualities that lead to multitude. Z further follows the position shared by ʿIjī (Ī), Jurjānī (J), and Hasan Çelebi (_HC_), which states that necessity may well be considered ‘non-existing’ (negational, _ʿadamī_) for possibly existents. Necessity does not have to be externally existing as an accidental quality, and it may well be used in the context of contingent beings. Zeyrek might be misattributing absolute or specific existence here to the philosophers’ ‘pure existence’.

**Z’s rebuttal and conclusion:** Necessity does indeed denote an existential notion/existentiality (wujūdiyya) as in the case of possibility. This means that necessity, like possibility, is an accident that could occur to things externally and, therefore, cannot be equal to God’s quiddity/essence, which is beyond existence. Z’s tries to point to a contradiction in the philosophers’ thesis but arguably conflating absolute or specific existence again with ‘pure existence’.

**DAY FIVE: On Whether Necessity Necessarily Denotes a Single Essence**

**A possible objection by the philosophers:** Both Z and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī are wrong in asserting that according to Avicenna, God’s essence can acquire a generic accident (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm) or a genus’ nature (ṭabīʿa jinsiyya). Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī attributes this criticism to Rāzī’s misinterpretation of Avicenna.

**Z’s rejoinder:** Existence in general cannot be the same as the NE because it can be applied to other existents which may take on species. Species is simply a logical category to be avoided in God. Due to the univocity of this word, the existence of the NE may be applied to possibly existents, and hence Z also regards existence as an accidental superaddition that avoids change/diversity. By referencing J, Z denies that the philosophers’ so-called ‘pure existence’ is different from the generic category of ‘absolute existence’ since the word ‘existence’ may reference a wide range of meanings.

**DAY SIX: On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis**

**Z’s conclusion:** The definitions of necessity do not demonstrate whether necessity has to have a single essence or can be attached to multiple essences, a point ironically mentioned in Ḥ’s adjudication on the _Tahāfut al-falāsifa_
(see Conclusion). Z’s implied conclusion is that both necessity and existence are generic concepts that occur to essences externally as accidental super-additions, thereby following the post-classical theologians’ position as represented in (iii) (see § 3.3). This means that both of these concepts should be avoided when proving God’s unicity, and the philosophers’ proof is neither complete nor proven to be certainly true.

5.2 Outline of Ḫocazâde’s Position

DAY ONE: Ḫ’s Initial Response to Two Common Objections to the Philosophers’ Thesis Addressed by J/ḤÇ

Ḩ’s thesis and argument: The third meaning of necessity corresponds to the meaning of necessity in the philosopher’s initial statement about God’s unicity.

ḨÇ’s two objections: ḤÇ invalidates the philosophers’ version of burhân al-tamānuʿ, by questioning (a) whether the denial of a partner in species could be applicable to the case of divine metaphysical principles (i.e. God), and (b) whether the existence’s necessity has to refrain from receiving a haecceity (huwiyya). For ḤÇ both imply individuation and multiplicity.

Ḩ’s response: Rather, the thrust of the debate is whether the negation of an equal partner is required for God’s unicity when necessity is the same as His quiddity, not existence. Hence ḤÇ’s above-mentioned objections are invalid.

DAY TWO: On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers’ Thesis and On Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular

Exposition of Ḫ’s thesis: There are three meanings associated with necessity, which are (1) “essence’s requiring existence”, (2) “that which has no need of others in existence”, and (3) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Exist-ent from others”. The first two meanings are not directly related to the nature of the NE but the third corresponds to the meaning of necessity that appears in the initial premise of the philosophers’ proof. This is true only if we assume that necessity is a mental consideration that has no reality in the extramental world.

Restatement of Ḫ’s thesis vis-à-vis ḤÇ: The third meaning of necessity here appears more in the sense of ‘specification’ (in the sense of ‘differentiation’ only reserved for the NE), and ḤÇ does not disagree with this point.

Ḩ’s textual proof from J: By referencing various passages from Sharḥ al-mawāqif’s section 2.1.3, a passage devoted to various positions on God’s quiddity and existence, Ḫ shows that Ī/J also follow his position, by implying that the third meaning of necessity is valid and widely accepted.

Ḩ’s critique of J: Unlike J, Ḫ states that the first two meanings of necessity may not be directly related to the third but they are also true and relevant in its demonstration. Ḫ also wants to establish a relationship between the first two and the third meanings.
Ḫ's additional textual proof from J: A note in the marginalia probably added by the author or a later commentator verifies that J sees the third meaning in a restricted sense as an extension (mā-ṣadaq) – not as an intension (mafhūm). Afterwards, Ḫ repeats a previous comment, noting that it will be inconceivable that necessity constitutes multiple essences or individuals since these will ultimately need to be differentiated from one another, which is impossible given that necessity is singular.

Ḫ's additional textual proof from J: The first two meanings imply a limitation in participation for two equal partners, and the same limitation should be considered in the case of the third. Otherwise, necessity here will imply accidentality, i.e. an ʿārid-maʿrūd relationship.

Şeyḥ Şücāʾ’s argument: According to the philosophers’ proof, there is no guarantee that necessity has to be a singular entity with regard to God. One cannot be set for sure what meanings of necessity are appropriate here and, therefore, necessity here cannot correspond to existence as the philosophers claimed.

Ḫ’s response to Şeyḥ Şücāʾ: Necessity should be taken as ‘singular by default’ when discussed in relation to the philosophers’ God, especially because the third meaning (necessity as a differentiator of essences) does not undermine the singularity of the NE. It is because of this reason necessity can be equal to ‘pure existence’ in God as Avicenna claimed. It should be noted that Avicenna distinguishes ‘absolute existence’ from ‘pure existence’. The former could be shared by multiple entities and linked to particular existences upon individuation, yet not the latter since, according to Avicenna, it corresponds to God’s quiddity/essence.

DAY THREE: On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

Ḫ’s disclaimer from Ī/J: Necessity is neither universal nor particular, so it can correspond to quiddity, which also has similar features and no real existence in concreto.

Ḫ’s point: Each individual may well be composed of quiddity and entification, but this does not mean necessarily that both imply multiplicity or superaddition due to their mental nature.

Ḫ’s reply to Ī/J: Each individual may need entification to be able to come out by distinguishing their natures, yet this does not mean that entification, which is also required for the NE’s necessity to distinguish itself from others, denotes multiplicity. Thus, there is no question of unbelief here when entification is used in the context of the NE (this point is probably in reference to Z’s claim of Ḫ’s unbelief [kufr]).

Question of entification: Every individual might be composed of quiddity and entification in the philosophers’ exposition, yet these are similar to genus and differentia, which do not really exist and only distinguished by the mind, as the term ‘mental considerations’ (iʿtibārāt) suggests. Ḫ here wants to show that the post-classical iʿtibārāt could be reconciled with Avicennan philosophy.
Ḫ’s further analogy regarding species’ quiddities (sing. \( māhiyya \) \( nawiyya \)): Likewise, individuation and species’ quiddities are mental capacities in consideration. The Glossator ḤÇ is wrong in thinking that necessity will be in need of intelligible parts (sing. \( juzʾ \) ‘\( aqlī \)) since necessity, as mentioned above, has neither universal nor particular existence for the case of the NE.

\( \text{ẗabīʿa nawiyya} \)

ḴÇ’s counter-evidence: ḤÇ, similar to Shahrastānī/Rāzī and other Ottoman contemporaries like Ḥayāli\(^2\) and Ṭūsī,\(^3\) claims that the philosophers regarded necessity and existence as ‘species’ natures’ (sing. \( ṭabīʿa nawiyya \)). This point takes him to the conclusion that both concepts lead to multiplicity and contingency; therefore, cannot be used when providing a proof for God’s unity. In this context, ḤÇ points out two possible contradictions in the philosophers’ thesis that (a) existence and necessity are ‘species natures’, and (b) necessity relies on another thing due to its being a ‘species nature’. Based on these, ḤÇ aims to show that, contrary to their claim, necessity and existence are accidents that are superadded to quiddity by occurring externally.

Ḫ’s reply: J divides the philosophers’ version of \( \text{burhān al-tamānuʿ} \) into two aspects: the first aspect affirms the requirement of entification for necessity, whereas the second aspect states that entification has to be superadded to necessity and quiddity. Ḥ seems to affirm the validity of the first as long as necessity is not regarded as a ‘species’ nature’ in the absolute sense, and argues that the second aspect supports the fact that entification is a superaddition. Ḥ’s position here, different from the philosophers’ argument, follows Taḥtānī’s \( \text{al-Muhākamāt} \).

DAY FOUR: On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification

\( \text{屺 } \)

ḴÇ’s critique of entification: Ī/J argue that if the philosophers assume that entification requires necessity, then there will be circular reasoning. This is because necessity already requires the former by default. ḤÇ notes that there is no circularity here since entification’s requiring necessity, which is based on the necessity’s lack of requiring entification, does not imply circularity.

Ḫ’s response: ḤÇ is misinformed since, as J explains in some other text, necessity is a cause for entification – not the other way around. It does not follow that entification requires necessity; and only if the latter statement is taken to be true, then there will be circularity. A similar analogy could be made with regard to first and second intentions, such that entification as a second intention cannot be a cause of a first intention.

Ḫ’s further citation from J: Necessity is associated with ‘pure causality’ (\( \text{mu-jarrad al-ʿilliyya} \)); and entification, as argued by Taḥtānī, is only a superaddition to necessity. Ḥ does not follow Avicenna’s view that entification is a ‘(necessary) concomitant’ (\( \text{lāzim} \)).

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\(^2\) Ḥayāli, \( \text{Sharḥ al-ʿallāma al-Ḥayāli ʿalā al-nūniyya} \), 164.

\(^3\) ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, \( \text{Tahāfut al-falāsifa} \), 220-1.
Ḫ’s further citation from J: The definition of necessity depends on neither its requirement nor lack of requirement by entification or any other entity. That is, necessity is not bound by entification, and both terms are non-entitative, that is, mental considerations that are distinguished in the mind; therefore, they do not exist in the outside world as two separate entities at all. Here Ḫ uses a quote from J to strengthen his hand.

DAY FIVE: On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (Wujūdiyya)

Question of existentiality: The questions of whether necessity is externally existing and how it is further related to existence are begging for an answer in the eyes of certain theologians, such as Razî, Ī, Z, and ḪÇ. Due to these questions, ḪÇ deems that only the first two meanings may fall under ‘necessity’ in the philosophers’ initial thesis. Ḫ rebuts ḪÇ’s claim, stating that what is mentioned here as existence refers to the ‘special existence’ of God, a nuance which should not be confused with existence’s absolute or particular senses. Given this fact, the third meaning, for Ḫ, matches with the very sense of necessity in the initial thesis.

DAY SIX: On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence According to Their Thesis

Ḫ on the nature of the NE: The terms related to the NE can neither be regarded as ‘generic accidents’ nor ‘genus’ natures’, since these suggest multiplicity. And none of these terms makes the NE a composite being due to their iʿtibārī nature as mental considerations.

Ḫ’s conclusion regarding the nature of entification: Ḫ signals that even though he is defending the validity of the philosophers’ statement in their own paradigm, he follows Taḥtānī’s al-Muḥākamāt in certain aspects, especially with respect to entification’s being an accident to necessity and quiddity. Ḫ suggests that as long as entification is taken as a superadded quality, the question of multiplicity in God is resolved. Ḫ’s enthusiastic support of certain aspects of the philosophers’ view could simply be for the sake of the debate. In conclusion, Ḫ is in agreement with Z as long as necessity is mental (iʿtibārī) but not accidental (ʿaraḍī), since iʿtibārāt do not go against the philosophers’ version of unicity.
5.3 Analysis of Zeyrek’s Position. Necessity Occurs to God Accidentally

The main framework of the debate is based on the problem of commonality in necessity, which is a consequence for Z to be avoided in proofs from reciprocal hindrance (burhān al-tamānuʿ). The philosophers based their version of the proof on the assumption that necessity is identical to God’s quiddity/essence of the NE. On the contrary, Z’s intention here is to show that this premise cannot be validated with certainty as none of the stated meanings (sing. ma’nā) of necessity can be equal to God’s quiddity/essence or existence, thereby deeming the philosophers’ overall proof incomplete. Later on, Z brings certain vexed aspects of Avicennan philosophy, such as ‘pure existence’ (mujarrad al-wujūd), existential notion/existentiality (wujūdiyya), privation/non-existence (‘adm), genus/species’ nature (tabīʿa jinsiyya/nawʿiyya), and entification (taʿayyun), into discussion in order to demonstrate that there are certain irreconcilable aspects of the philosophers that contradict God’s singularity. As a reply to Z’s objections, Ḫ will show that these aspects (with the exception of entification and species’ nature) are in line with their views and do not implicate composition in God’s essence.

5.3.1 Day One. On the Philosophers’ Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in God

As the first lemmata of the extant texts suggest, Z objects to the philosophers’ proof of God’s unicity on the grounds that its consequent cannot be true because, otherwise, a commonality in necessity would imply a commonality in quiddity, by asserting multiplicity in God. Z disregards the reducibility of necessity and quiddity into one as in their description, by pointing out that this would imply differing commonalities for each of these concepts (necessity and quiddity) in God. On the first day, Z formulates his initial objection as follows:

If necessity (wujūb) were [to be] the same thing as quiddity (māhiya), a commonality (ishtirāq) in necessity would also participate in this very quiddity. The poor soul [Ḥocazāde] states that necessity (wujūb) here cor-

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4 As Damien Janos observes, ‘meaning’ (ma’nā) here is a generic Avicennan term “employed to describe the quidditative meaning itself, as well as the internal or constitutive elements that compose it and, finally, to the concomitants that are entailed by it” (Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity, 655). That is to say, meanings may correspond to the quidditative meaning itself, the intension of a composition, or its external concomitants. In Avicennan philosophy, the term ‘meaning’ may suggest a variety of connotations based on logical, psychological, and metaphysical contexts. In Arabic logic, ‘meaning’ designates a notion in abstraction from any ontological consideration. In metaphysics, similar to the term ḍabīr, it is often associated with the conceivable and enunciable aspects of quiddity, whereas different from the former, ‘meaning’ has a emphasis on the intrinsic intelligibility of pure quiddity (rather than those of generic quiddities associated with the universals). Furthermore, ‘meaning’ in metaphysics may also describe the quiddity in itself (see “1.3. Quiddity in Itself as a Meaning or Idea (ma’nā)”, in Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity, 128-52; esp. 132, 137, 143, 656). In the context of Avicenna’s al-Ibāra (De interpretatione) in al-Shifā’, meaning does not necessarily fall under a fixed ontological category (i.e. neither mental nor extramental) with a sense of the signification of an expression (Mousavian, “Avicenna on the Semantics of Maʿnā”). In the context of Abu’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Pines defines ma’nā as ‘thought-content’, which is an attribute of mental forms (suwar dhīhniyya) linked to the medieval intentio (Pines, “Studies in Abu’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s Poetics and Metaphysics”, 279) – though Gutas will later distance ‘intention’ from the Avicennan ma’nā (Gutas, “The Empiricism of Avicenna”, 430-1).
responds to three meanings (sing. *maʿnā*): necessity defined as (i) “essence’s (*dhāt*) requiring existence”; (ii) “that which has no need of others in existence”; and (iii) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others”. There is no doubt that neither of the first two meanings assumes that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent since both meanings are only mental considerations (sing. *al-ʾiʿtibārī*). Then what is intended by the philosophers’ statement about necessity’s being the same as the Necessarily Existent’s quiddity only falls under the third meaning (*mā yaṣdiqu ʿalayhi*), but it is not [the same as] the very meaning itself. Then [there is] no doubt for a rational man that the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is not the intension (*mafhūm*) of what distinguishes essence [as in (iii)] but, rather, this intension is accidentally superadded to (*ʿāriḍ lahu*) essence.

Z begins his initial objection by quoting his opponent’s initial written response ordered by the Sultan, which includes three historical meanings of necessity purported by the philosophers. These definitions are: (1) “essence’s requiring existence”, (2) “that which has no need of others in existence”, and (3) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”. Based on these, necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the NE, not only because the third meaning listed here validates this statement, but also this statement would not insinuate multiplicity in reality. Necessity and quiddity can be regarded as two separate entities only mentally. Ḫ, in turn, will base his position on the premise that one of the definitions of necessity directly fulfills the meaning included in the initial statement.

As an immediate objection to Ḫ’s premise, Z then asserts that the first two meanings of necessity do not support its being the same as quiddity. Instead, the only possible case could be that this statement may only fall under the third meaning as its extension – not exactly corresponding to its meaning per se. To show that none of the meanings of necessity can correspond to the philosophers’ usage, Z here resorts to a distinction based on ‘what a term designates’ (extension) versus ‘what it means’ (intension). In post-classical logic, *mā-ṣadaq* is often contrasted to *mafhūm* such that the *mafhūm* of a concept is the meaning or intension, and its *mā-ṣadaq* is what it is true of and what falls under this concept as extension. Thus, *mafhūm* gives the universal meaning. The *mafhūm* of a human being, for instance, is rational animal, whereas its *mā-ṣadaq* includes an ostensive definition, as in individual human beings that fall under this concept – a term that ultimately suggests multiplicity and diversity. If two things are said to have different intensions but the same extension, then it means that they convey distinct meanings, referring to the same set of entities.

This point takes Z to the conclusion that necessity cannot be the same as quiddity – due to the fact that the third meaning corresponds to the extension of quiddity, not to its intension. This resolution suggests that necessi-

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5 In intensional logic these terms distinguish an expression’s intension (roughly, its ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’) from its extension (‘reference’ or ‘denotation’). See Garson, “Intensional Logic”. In the context of the ninth-century dispute on the consubstantiality of God between the neo-Arian Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Arabic philosopher Kindī, intension and extension were defined as “undistributed and distributed commonness” in the context of philosophy and logico- semantics (see Schöck, “The Controversy”).

Day Two. On Whether Any of the Stated Meanings Can Prove that the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God’s Quiddity/Essence

In that case, we say that what you claimed about compositeness (tarkīb) with respect to multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent follows that if ‘what falls under’ this statement were to be \( \text{[120b]} \) the intension of necessity, then the veracity of an ‘accidental affection’ (ʿārid) occurring to an ‘object of accident’ (maʿrūḍ) would be a single reality with two isolated constituents (sing. fard). This is impossible because why would it not be permissible that two different essences that distinguish themselves [from one another] would not resort to the need for the first two meanings without the implication of compositeness (luzūm al-tarkīb)? Consequently, the unicity of the Necessarily Existent, in that case, cannot be established by the meanings of “essence requiring His existence” and “that which has no need of others in terms of His existence”.

On the second day, Z provides two counter-objections. The first is a counter-objection to Ḫ’s possible answer by repeating that the meaning of necessity addressed in the philosophers’ statement cannot be the exact meaning/intension of the third. For Z, avoiding the accidentality of necessity will undermine God’s singularity since, by this way, God can be also denoted as a single reality with two separate constituents. In his first counter-objection, the headstrong Z repeats this previous point that an ʿārid-maʿrūḍ relationship is the best way to describe the attachment of necessity to God’s essence/quiddity without undermining His singularity. This is because ʿārid and maʿrūḍ are just two accidental units in a single reality of God that occur externally – without directly affecting His quiddity/essence.

Second, Z objects to Ḫ’s other claim that all three definitions of necessity has a role in the philosophers’ initial statement since the first two meanings provide support for the third. Z here challenges Ḫ to demonstrate that the ‘differing essences’ mentioned in the first two meanings of necessity would not imply compositeness in God. Z’s precipitate attack seems to ignore Ḫ’s earlier comment that the first two meanings are already mental conceptions (iʿtibārāt) with no implications on His singularity. Z’s main intention is to show that necessity, as defined by the philosophers, can come across as an accidental entity and this, in turn, undermines its essentiality vis-à-vis God. Yet, as Ḫ suggests, necessity’s being a mental conception does not still undermine this, and the post-classical designation of iʿtibārāt could be reconciled with the paradigm of classical Arabic philosophy.

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\footnote{The expression ʿārid lahu denotes an external additional or attachment to something. Izutsu translates the term as “that which occurs or happens to externally” (Izutsu, \textit{The Concept and Reality of Existence}, 91).}
5.3.3 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

On the third day the discussion moves to another relevant question, whether necessity is the same as existence as the philosophers claimed. Avicenna is known to have arguably equated the Necessarily Existent (God) with ‘pure existence’, and this controversial formulation incurred the criticism of the theologians in the centuries to come. As H makes a reference to Avicenna’s enigmatic passage to demonstrate the link between necessity and existence in God, Z sees this as an opportunity to evince the inconsistancy of the philosophers’ thesis. H deems Z’s point to be a digression moving away from the main point of contention, yet to demonstrate that this statement is valid on their own terms, he refers to the discussions in al-Shifāʾ’s Book Eight, Chapters Four and Five (VIII.4-5), which concern the primary attributes of the One that is necessary in its existence, as well as the unity of the NE and His attributes. Before asserting that the NE is equal to ‘pure existence’, Avicenna gives an overview of the definition of the One with regard to necessity, quiddity, essence, and individual existence.

The Necessary Existent is one, nothing sharing with Him in His rank, and thus nothing other than Him is a Necessarily Existent, He is the principle of the necessitation of existence, necessitating [each thing] either in a primary manner or through an intermediary. [...] The Necessary Existent does not become multiple in any respect whossoever and that His essence is utterly unitary, pure truth [...]. He is one in essence and does not become multiple is that He is as such in His essence. [...] The First has no quiddity other than His individual existence. [...] It would not be true [to maintain] that the Necessary Existent has a quiddity of which necessary existence adheres as a necessary concomitant.

One of the most important points in this passage is that Avicenna does not assign a specific quiddity to the Necessarily Existent as he does with created beings, since, for the case of God, quiddity here will correspond to God’s being the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) or His very individual essence (anniyya) that does not depend on any other being for existing (rather than a specified quiddity which opens some leeway for contingency).

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10 See VIII.4.13: “[T]here is no quiddity for the Necessary Existent other than its being the Necessary Existent. And this is [the thing’s] ‘thatness’, [its individual essence].” Also see VIII.5.3, which states that necessary existence has no quiddity that connects with it other than necessary existence (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 276 and 279 respectively).

11 Also VIII.4.3: “The First has no quiddity other than His individual essence (anniyya)” (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 274). Anniyya refers to the essential characteristics of a thing that identify it as an individual, which is distinct from quiddity, such that the former refers essentially to the question of which (ayy) thing it is, whereas the latter pertains essentially to ‘what’ (mā) a thing is (see Marmura’s note in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 383). For the term anniyya, which is associated with the Latin anitas ‘whether-ness’ or esse ‘being’, see Frank, “The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term anniyya”, and, for other recent studies, Lizzini, “Wuğūd-Mawjūd/Existence-Existent in Avicenna”, 112; esp. fn. 5.
The First, hence, has no quiddity. Those things possessing quiddities have existence emanate on them from Him. He is ‘pure existence’ (mujarrad al-wujūd) with the condition of negating privation and all other description of Him. Moreover, the rest of the things possessing quiddities are possible, coming into existence through Him. The meaning of my statement, “He is pure existence with the condition of negating all other additional [attributes] of Him”, is not that this is the absolute existence (wujūd mutlaq) in which there is participation [by others]. If there is an existent with this description, it would not be the pure existence with the condition of negation, but the existent without the condition of positive affirmation. I mean, regarding the First, that He is the existent with the condition that there is no additional composition, whereas this other is the existent without the condition of [this] addition. For this reason, the universal is predicated of anything that has addition. [And] everything other than Him has addition (ziyāda).\textsuperscript{12}

Avicenna defines God as ‘pure existence’ (mujarrad al-wujūd), yet with the condition of negating privation and all other descriptions of Him, warning his readers that ‘pure existence’ should not be mixed with ‘absolute existence’ (wujūd mutlaq), the latter of which participates in others. This means that the First is a Necessarily Existent with the condition that there is no composition, diversity, or change in Him, that is, being refrained from any sense of addition (ziyāda). On the other hand, the universal properties are predicated of anything that has addition; for this reason, it is only everything other than Him that has composition, diversity, change, and addition.

By referencing this passage, Ḫ provides a further answer for Z’s point by showing how necessity can be equal to existence according to Avicenna’s paradigm:

\textbf{It cannot be said} that necessity is not a thing other than ‘abstracted existence’ (mujarrad al-wujūd) just because there is no change/differentiation (ikhtilāf) in abstracted existence. Indeed, an existence conjoined (muqārin) with quiddity changes in accordance with its attachment (iḍāfa) [to that quiddity]. As for ‘mere existence’ (mahd al-wujūd), it is a single concept in itself which has no diversity, because we say that what is demanded here is that the true nature/reality of necessity (haqīqa al-wujūb) is the same as the intension of ‘sole existence’ (wujūd baḥt), which is different from existence’s occurring to quiddity; and this would be absurd. If what is meant here is that the reality of necessity’s being true for ‘pure existence’ (wujūd sirf) denotes “an accidental affection’s occurring to its object of accident”, then this is conceded. However, we do not concede that what falls under ‘pure existence’ does not contain in it any. Then, why would it not be permissible that pure existence could be two different realities such that both are not being distinguished from quiddity?

theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī). Now the tables have turned, not only Z has to refute the philosopher’s point but also prove that existence occurs to God’s quiddity externally.

As a follow-up, Z objects to the claim of Ḫ and the philosophers, arguing that the NE cannot be just the same as ‘abstracted existence’ because ‘pure existence’ is singular and devoid of composition. In line with the theologians’ common position quoted in J’s Sharḥ al-mawāqif, Z resorts to a similar argument that he previously employed with regard to necessity and quiddity, pointing out that existence should also be externally added to quiddity. Opposing Avicenna, he underlines the distinction between two ontological states, i.e. ‘being conjoined with something’ (muqārin) and ‘being added to something’ (iḍāfa), to further restate that the reality of necessity cannot be the same as the intension of ‘sole existence’. This is because, for Z, existence is an added quality that already occurs to quiddity/essence, making the latter come out in the extramental world.

In defense of the philosophers’ thesis, Ḫ insists that necessity’s third definition meets the intensity of their statement. Here the philosophers are portrayed as having an ontologically realist point of view, in which they argue that the true nature of God’s necessity is the same as that of His ‘pure existence’, hence His quiddity. Ḫ’s emphasis on the post-classical term iʿtibārī (‘mental conception’) here is a result of his conceptualist interpretation of Avicennan realism, a post-classical rapprochement between Avicennism and philosophical theology.

Z continues to defend his position with a further counter-objection:

If you say that what is mentioned previously proves the sufficiency of the intension of necessity’s being the same thing as quiddity, then how would you negate this fact? I reply to this that we verify that we necessarily know that the first two meanings are only mental considerations with no extramental existence. We also know necessarily that the very intension that distinguishes essence (dhāt) is a mental consideration occurring to the accidents of the Necessarily Existent’s reality. Thus, it is claimed that the Necessarily Existent is one (wāḥid) in the sense that, as mentioned previously, the Necessarily Existent is the same thing as quiddity. Therefore, this [point] is abolished totally as a rejoinder never heard [before], even

13 Quoted in al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif as the theologians’ view, Rāzī posits that existence is superadded to both necessarily and possibly existents, arguing for the later Ash’arite position that existence is an accident superadded to God’s quiddity: “This answer [i.e. existence is equal to God’s essence] is not a remedy for us since it confesses that the share of being in the extra-mental world is accidental to God’s quiddity, as in the case of its being accidental to the quiddity of the possibly existents”. Quoting from al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya, J also references the following point regarding the univocity and superaddedness of existence from Rāzī: ‘If you were to say that [a sense of] existence that is common among the existence of the possibly existents in conception is concomitant to the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, then the making of existence in the truth of the Necessarily Existent would be conjoined with His quiddity […]. There is no difference between the necessarily and possibly existents in terms of existence since in both cases existence is added as an accident to the quiddity’ (al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 2: 159-60).


if one claims that what falls under the third meaning is the same thing as quiddity. Then this is conceded; yet, this does not [still] require that necessity is a single reality, so what is demanded is not established here.

Just as the first two meanings of necessity are mental considerations with no real existence in the extramental world, Z replies his opponent that the third meaning also denotes a mental consideration but in the sense of an attachment that occurs to the reality of the NE, not in a way applied to God essentially. Therefore, for Z again, none of these meanings supports the reality of necessity’s being the same as quiddity – maybe with the exception that necessity may only ‘fall under’ the third, as passed previously. Even if this is the case, the third meaning’s extension does not necessarily demonstrate that necessity has to be a single reality, because necessity, in the eyes of the theologians, is an accidental mental consideration that denotes externality. This point hinders the fact that necessity has to be a single reality, further suggesting the possibility that necessity can still take on multiplicity.

5.3.4 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (Wujūdiyya)

Starting with the fourth day, Z digresses into other controversial aspects of Avicennan philosophy, compelling Ḫ to resolve them in light of the philosophers’ doctrines. On the last two days, Z tends to repeat his arguments through restatements, with the hope that his adversary and the arbitrators of the debate will acknowledge the superiority of his point of contestation.

Hocazāde, may Almighty God have mercy on him, exercises little much patience in discernment, such that he says that necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent, is what distinguishes essence. Why would it not be that what distinguishes one from another is an essence for each one of them? This intension is accidental to both of these aspects without deliberation. In the statement of the author of al-Mawāqif: it cannot be said that necessity opposes an isolated constituent, and necessity’s being relational (nisbi) contradicts with the aforementioned purpose, that is, necessity’s [121a] being an existent. For this, we say that [this is] because one cannot say that the quest to know this expression is conveyed by the statement of the author of al-Mawāqif. If necessity were to be an existential notion (wujūdiyya), then it would not be added to quiddity such that what is meant by necessity here would cast doubt on its being externally existing. Yet, it should be that necessity is related to non-existence (ʿadamī), as it was previously proven by the word of al-Mawāqif, in such a way that if this were to be true for them, then the competition has ended.

The outcome is that there is no doubt for the rational ones that this statement about necessity, which was claimed to be true by some, concerns necessity’s external proposition together with that of possibility. And there is no doubt that possibility is a single thing. Likewise, necessity, yes, this very necessity in terms of its externally existing, is what distinguishes essence from others. Whoever discerns this position is marveled at this argument by Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.
After having an *ad hominem* attack on Ḫ’s ability to reason, Z states that Ḫ, equating necessity with the NE, ends up defining God in the third sense (“that which distinguishes essence”). However, for Z, this does not again hold true for two reasons: *first*, as repeated early on, God’s quiddity/essence can still be defined as such and there is no certain proof that this meaning is only reserved for necessity. And *second*, based on Rāzī’s assertion, necessity must be relational (*nisbī*), rather than essential (*dhātī*).16

As for the second point, Ī/J rule out the possibility that necessity is relational, yet the glossator ḤÇ, along the same line with Z, opens leeway for this possibility by stating that what falls under a relation may fall under necessity as well.17 ḤÇ’s leeway for relationality depends on the following condition: necessity’s being relational does not rule out the possibility of an individual (an isolated constituent) in necessity, as well as its being non-existent for contingent beings, thus linking necessity with contingency by disassociating it from God. This point makes Z’s hand stronger since, proving a negative, he wants to establish that if necessity is taken as a non-existent quality, then it can never be connected to existentiality through its absence. In other words, necessity’s being a relational quality via non-existence provides some leeway for contingency, precluding that the philosophers’ necessity is directly equal to God’s quiddity/essence.

The support for necessity’s being non-existent (hence relational) is present in J, which is outlined in Z as follows: if necessity were to denote an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), that is, if it were to exist externally, then it would not be an added quality, which is, as claimed in J, impossible. This means that necessity’s being non-existent could be related to its being relational essentially.

The question whether or not necessity can be qualified as an existential notion was a common topic discussed by post-classical commentators. For instance, if A denotes B, then there is no B that we cannot refer to as A, but it is observed that necessity does not exhaust all existential notions, meaning that it is only one among many existential notions.

To refute Ḫ’s (and Avicenna’s) point about necessity’s being existential, Z further cites Ī’s passage on unicity, arguing that necessity can be well regarded as ‘non-existent’ (*ʿadamī*), a line of thought that insinuates that if a term has connections to non-existence, then it cannot be an existential notion. That is, if necessity’s non-existentiality provides that existence does not need to exist externally, necessity, for Z, cannot be on a par with existence either.18 In this text, Ī also brings a similar point as a counter-argument to the philosophers’ argument by questioning whether necessity has to be an existential notion.

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16 Another figure who argues that necessity is a relational attribute is Rāzī. Yet, given the number of books that he composed, Rāzī seems to have changed his mind regarding the nature of necessity in different passages. In *Nihāya al-ʿuqūl*, he is recorded as having considered this and, in *Muhassal*, he seems to have accepted necessity as a *wujūdi* aspect with external existence (Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 144).

17 According to J’s Position Two, Observation Three, Intention Two (2.3.2) in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, necessity is the very quiddity itself, not a relation (*nisba*) – especially if one considers the third meaning of necessity as valid. Yet, ḤÇ criticizes J’s point, arguing that necessity’s being an existential does not rule out that it could be a relation as well (see the lemma “ʾannahu nisba”, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 116).

18 This apophaticism in handling necessity is included in Rāżī’s criticism of Avicenna: as Rāţī puts it, the fact that multiple things share in necessity does not follow that there is multiplicity. These qualities may also share in their negation of everything else, and sharing in negativity also implies multiplicity (Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 210).
As not to fall afoul of God’s unicity, an influential historian and scholar Abū al-Fatḥ al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153), basing some of his views on Avicenna, brings an alternative solution to the problem of composition, in which he deems all attributes of God, including necessity, as non-entitative by way of either relation or negation. Necessity may signify that God’s existence does not depend on anything else. Yet, there are specific other ways to describe God, as in the case of First Cause or the First Principle of Graeco-Arabic philosophy. Taking all these attributes as ‘relational’ or ‘negational’ with regard to other beings would not add anything entitative to God, hence avoiding multiplicity. This view is also present in Ghazālī, such that God’s essence is one, and the names associated with it become many by “relating something to it”, “relating it to something”, or “negating something of it”. And, for him, neither relation nor negation in this context can denote multiplicity in the NE.

Referring back to Ī’s position, Z still insists that the philosophers never demonstrate the existential quality of necessity with certainty. The same point is also repeated by J and ḤÇ on the grounds that accepting that necessity is an existential notion contradicts the philosophers’ point that quiddities do not exist. So, for Z, if quiddity is not an existential notion that exists outside (Ī, in fact, establishes its being non-existent), then how can existence be equal to it? This rather shows that existence has to be a non-entitative relational quality superadded to a quiddity that is beyond existence.

Resorting to non-existence, Z follows a similar line of reasoning here as in Rāzī’s objection to Avicenna’s equating God’s quiddity with ‘pure existence’. Rāzī aims to prove the univocity of existence since it is a concept that may seem to be shared by all beings, yet its applicability to the cases of both necessarily and possibly existents brings in the question of its ambiguity in meaning and its consequent disassociation from existence.

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19 Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 140.
20 Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 89-90. Yet could it be said that quiddities do exist? It is a vexed question that has been recently tackled by Damien Janos who concluded that there are different modes of existences, and quiddities do ‘exist’ in God in a special mode - not in a different mode from essence - as well as being a necessary concomitant to ‘pure existence’, without producing any multiplicity (Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity, 648, 712-15).
21 See ḤÇ’s lemma “mabnī ʿalā ʾanna al-wujūd wujūdī”, which argues for the irreducibility of quiddity and existence into one due to the latter’s being an existential notion: “If necessity were to be a non-existing thing superadded to quiddity, then the way that the philosophers constructed these two proofs here would be based on the existentiality of existence; therefore, the latter’s being the same thing as quiddity would be terminated” (al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 8: 46).
22 Avicenna argues that existence cannot be superadded to quiddity in the NE since this will imply need, priority/posteriority, or cause/effect, which are only reserved for contingent beings. As an objection to Avicenna’s proof in his Muḥaṣṣal, Rāzī brings the counterevidence that a quiddity cannot be negated by way of existence, since non-existence itself is also a quiddity. Thus a quiddity must be a separate essential entity, and Rāzī argues that the philosophers contradict this aspect by equating it with existence. For Rāzī’s argument and Tusi’s rejoinder, see Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tusi, Tulkhīs al-muḥaṣṣal, 97 and also mentioned in Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 210 and Altaş, Fahreddin Râzî’nin İbn Sînâ Yorumu, 399-400.
5.3.5 Background to Z’s Position on the Univocity of Existence. An Overview of Univocity, Equivocity, and Analogicity Among the Early Verifiers

The nature of existence vis-à-vis God and His created subjects is one of the most debated aspects in metaphysics. The main question remains, which Z also instrumentalizes in the debate, is that if created beings do also exist like God, in what ways will He be different? Or, in other words, if absolute existence is a universal capacity that is applicable to all beings, then in what ways can God’s existence be perceived as ‘special’? Moreover, does this suggest that existence is a relational or a contingent faculty, thereby making it impossible that it can be equal to God’s quiddity/essence? Based on a critique in Rāzī’s Ishārāt commentary, these questions make Z’s hand stronger by compelling H to make some clarifications.

The status of existence concerns whether an existent is predicated with existence in a similar or different way, that is, by way of equivocity or univocity – a point of contention closely linked to the status of existence and quiddity vis-à-vis God and created beings. How could God be necessary existence if existence is an accident superadded to His quiddity? Or what are the ways in which one could separate “God qua existence” from that of contingent beings if it is observed that existence inheres in the divine essence. Along with health (ṣīḥḥā) and others, there are various other modulated terms in Avicennan philosophy, most importantly two paradigmatic cases which concern the present debate, i.e. oneness (wuḥdā) and existence (wujūd). In this case, Avicenna’s ‘modulation’ applies mostly to external and non-constitutive concomitants (sing. lazīm) of quiddity, whereas strict univocity is reserved for the quiddities of natural things (such as ‘horse’ or ‘human’) that are constitutive of essence and associated with genera.

Asserting the “superaddedness of existence to essence” (ziyāda al-wujūd ‘alā al-māhiyya), Rāzī reformulates Avicenna’s position in a way that existence and essence are regarded as indistinguishable extensionally while remaining distinguishable intensionally. This means that existence is a univocal entity (i.e. in one meaning) that can be shared between all things including God, hence quiddity/essence and existence have to be distinguished in God and contingent beings. There are several reasons for Rāzī’s position. The first, according to Robert Wisnovsky, is to conform to the Kullābites.

For the case of existence, see Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)’s The Metaphysics of “The Healing”, I.5, 24.11-12 and, for that of oneness, III.2, 74.4. In addition to health, existence, and oneness, Avicenna also includes form (ṣūra), possibility (imkān), strength (quwwa), soul (nafs), and medical condition (ṭibb) among modulated concepts (Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation”, 54). Also see Druart, “Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity”, 19-22. For Avicenna, primary notion of ‘one’ notionally amplifies the intension of the notion of ‘being’, without affecting its extension (De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 268-70).

Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation”, 50-1. On the other hand, Druart interprets that oneness is a concomitant of mawjūd which is univocal (Druart, “Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity”, 21). Strict equivocity concerns names that do not possess the same intension, that is, there is no intensional similarity among diverse meanings, whereas pure univocity requires that a name is predicated of some object with a universal meaning that is perfectly unified in its intension and extension (De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 268-70).

According to Rāzī, existence and essence are regarded as strictly distinct from one another and could be distinguished in terms of necessary concomitant (lāzīm), relation (mudāf), concomitant/consequence attribute (lāḥiq), accidental attachment (ʿāriḍ) (Wisnovsky, “On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism”, 206, 275).
view that the divine attributes are meaningfully distinct from the divine self and that there is a non-identity between the divine self and His attributes.26 Second, God’s essence has to be also distinct from His existence since, for Rāzī, if existence and essence are the same, there will be then no causation (thus God’s existence must be concomitant to its existence being causally followed by Him).27

Avicenna identifies the quiddity in itself as a distinct and fully legitimate consideration, as an existing form and intelligible in the mind, which is considered abstractly and prior to its particularization in nature or the universalization that occurs when expressed in a universal proposition.28 On the other hand, Rāzī disregards this, arguing that existence has to be an external and a non-constitutive concomitant of quiddity (quiddity in abstraction from existence: existence is simply a predicate that cannot be understood as an entity by itself.29 In order to bridge the difference between essence and existence, Rāzī uses the Avicennan notion of (necessary) concomitant (lāzim) to make sure that God’s existence is not only separate but also concomitant to His essence (based on essence’s priority).30 This means that existence is construed as univocal, remaining distinct from quiddity as a superaddition.31 It should be noted that this view is in direct opposition to Ash’arī who argued that both quiddity and existence are intentionally and extensionally the same.32

In defense of Arabic philosophy, Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī is often known to have clarified and amended Rāzī’s so-called oversights in favor of the philosophers’ doctrines in his famed commentary on the al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt, a work that dispels the quals about the intricacies of Avicenna’s terminology. It is, in this context, that Ṭūsī criticizes Rāzī of misattributing ‘absolute existence’ (wujūd mutlaq) to ‘pure/abstracted existence’ (mujarrad al-wujūd).33 The former is a universal category, a conceptual matter that falls under the secondary intentions/intelligibles (maʿqūlāt thāniyya), whereas Avicenna’s ‘pure/abstracted exis-

26 This view is rejected by ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī via Ṭūsī such that this is only possible in the possible beings, not intrinsically in necessary beings. Both identify God’s essence with existence (as in “His essence is identical to His existence”), and Hillī was said to have reverted the Il-Khanate historian, vizier and scholar of the Rāzī lineage Rashīd al-Dīn al-Hamadānī (d. 718/1318) to the Ṭūsīan position, by convincing him to accept the position of “soft univocity” (Wisnovsky, “On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism”, 277-8, 294, 302).
29 Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity, 239-45, 394.
31 It should be noted that Rāzī is not consistent with this view in all works. In Sharḥʿuyūn al-hikma, he writes that God’s reality (ḥaqīqa) is equal to His existence (Wisnovsky, “Essence and Existence”, 43).
33 In his commentary on Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt, Ṭūsī makes a distinction between ‘absolute existence’, which is intelligible, and God’s ‘necessary existence’, which is called the philosophers’ ‘pure existence’ that goes beyond intellection (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt, 3: 461). Mujarrad is an ambiguous term, which could be applied to both pure and universal quiddities. Avicenna arguably uses this expression for universal quiddities that are abstracted from matter, whereas his post-classical critics often (mis)interpret the term arguably by extending to Avicenna’s “pure quiddity” (Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity, 236).
tence’ denotes something that is beyond universality and particularity, an expression only reserved for God. Rāzī’s reading, on the other hand, unduly paves the way for associating God with contingent beings, which instigates Ṭūsī to clarify that Avicenna is not saying that God is existence, rather He is identical to His own ‘special existence’, i.e. the highest grade of existence, which is neither absolute nor specific but only in its purest form. In opposition to Rāzī’s view that existence is a real accident superadded to quiddity, he furthermore argues that the being of quiddity cannot be mentally separated from existence. For Ṭūsī, pure quiddity is not disconnected from existence but only exists abstractly in the mind, contrary to his opponent, who sees pure quiddity as being fully abstracted and distinct from existence. As a further response to Rāzī, Ṭūsī brings the interpretation that God’s essence is identical to His perfect existence, which is also predicated of it. It is in this sense that existence can neither be, as Rāzī claims, predicated in a strictly univocal way, nor equivocally to God and contingent beings following Shahristānī – but with a specific way called ‘by modulation’ (bi‘l-tashkīk), which denotes a sense of gradated differentiation in meaning. According to Ṭūsī’s Avicennan thesis of ‘modulation of existence’ (tashkīk al-wujūd) in response to Rāzī’s univocality, even if it is agreed that existence is predicated of the necessarily and possibly existents, it will apply to different objects in different degrees (a view probably influenced by Suhrawardī), making God’s existence distinct from that of others. In another work called Taḥṣīl al-muḥaṣṣal, which is a critical commentary on Rāzī’s Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn, Ṭūsī brings more objections to Rāzī’s designating existence as a superaddition to God’s quiddity as well as a univocal term, by arguing that if existence is superadded to His quiddity, then it will be in

34 This view is also mentioned in Iṣfahānī’s Tajrīd iʿtiqād commentary as a proof that the NE’s existence depends on the negation of an equivalent partner to Him, such that the NE’s ‘special existence’ can only be described with respect to necessity in itself. This implies that ‘special existence’ cannot be shared by two such beings (see the section on the negation of a partner – nafī al-sharīk – in al-Iṣfahānī, Tāsīlīd al-qawāʿid, 2: 945). For God’s ‘special existence’, see Benevich, “Die ‘göttliche Existenz’”, 125 and Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 214.


37 For Ṭūsī’s sense of ‘modulation’, see Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 150. There are several English terms that have been used interchangeably for tashkīk, such as “ambiguous/amphibolous” (Wolfson), “analogicity” (Vallat, De Haan, McGinnis) and “modulation” (Treiger). See Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocality and Modulation”, 23; as well as the studies by aforementioned scholars: Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms”; Vallat, Farabi et l’école d’Alexandrie; Ibn Sinā (Avicenna), The Physics of The Healing; De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”; Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”.

38 In a series of letters exchanged between the Akbarī Sufi Qūnawī and Ṭūsī, the first inquiry is devoted the issue whether existence in the Necessarily Existent is extraneous (zāʿid) to its reality (ḥaqīqa) or identical with its quiddity. While Qūnawī goes with the first view (arguing that existence is simply a superadded attribute (ṣifa), Ṭūsī goes with the latter view because, otherwise, the quiddity’s priority to existence will be absurd, deeming quiddity neither existing nor non-existing. For Ṭūsī, the relationship between existence and quiddity is by way of ‘modulation’ (tashkīk) such that existence, like light, becomes related to different realities in differing degrees (Chittick, “Mystic versus Philosophy”, 101; Konevî, el-Mürâselât, 114-15). For a study of the extant manuscripts of this correspondence: Schubert, “The Textual History”.

39 Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 134-5. While holding the ontological primacy of quiddity, Suhrawardī states that quiddity/essence in itself is a conceptual and an unreal notion like existence, which has no correspondence to reality or real value. And this is due to the fact that all reality is seen as a hierarchy of lights (Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?”, 222-4).
need of it, making God a contingent being in essence.\(^{40}\) On the contrary, this sense of existence can only be in need of a haecceity (\textit{huwiyya}) among the contingent beings.\(^ {41}\)

The notion of \textit{tashkik} goes back to Avicenna who arguably devised the notion in order to distinguish God’s existence from other modes of existence. According to one reading, the basic sense of being for Avicenna extends to all concrete and mental entities, to all substances and accidents, albeit according to a gradation or modulation of meaning. By virtue of this, the modulation of existence explains how existence applies exactly to each instance as an external concomitant of essence. The special modulated version of existence belongs exclusively and irreducibly to ‘pure quiddity’, which finds its originative source in God’s ‘special existence’.\(^ {42}\) Whether Avicenna’s \textit{tashkik} could be interpreted as ‘soft-univocity’ or ‘soft-equivocity’ is a still debated topic among contemporary scholars who offered differing propositions to the problem. \(^ {43}\)

Another view which argues for the equivocity of existence appears in Shahrastānī’s \textit{Kitāb al-muṣāraʿa}, namely \textit{Wrestling with the Philosophers}, a work that aims at modifying Avicenna’s positions rather than rejecting them outright. The third chapter of the book concerns how Avicenna proves God’s unity and simplicity, in which he argues that existence only applies to all created things, establishing the absolute transcendence of God by distancing His existence from a Rāzīan sense of univocity.

For Shahrastānī, defining God as the Necessarily Existent, i.e. as a necessary being on which the existence of other contingent beings depends, is problematic because existence here is being postulated as if it is a genus of existents, that is, subdivided into two species by the differentiae of ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ (thereby turning the Necessarily Existent into a species). And Avicenna’s modulation does not solve the problem. Likewise, this will imply that God’s essence will be composite such that it will be dependent on the notions of existence and necessity (as constituents of the Necessarily Existent), violating the principle of oneness.\(^ {44}\) Shahrastānī might have proposed the category of ‘modulated terms’ (\textit{asmāʾ mushakkika}) in or-

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\(^{40}\) Al-Ṭūsī, \textit{Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal}, 98. Also in the next lemma, Ṭūsī states that necessity (\textit{wujūb}) is never part of the ‘objects of accident’ (sing. \textit{maʿrūḍ}), and hence it should be taken as a mental quality (\textit{kaifikasiya} ‘\textit{aqliyya}) (not extramentally). In the case of two NEs in the philosophers’ version of \textit{burhān al-tamānuʿ}, necessity is an intelligible (\textit{maʿqūl}) equivalent to the case of a homonym (not a synonym) (al-Ṭūsī, \textit{Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal}, 100, 102). So, similar to existence, necessity can neither be univocal nor common (\textit{mushtarak}) in the case of the philosophers’ two NEs (101).

\(^{41}\) Al-Ṭūsī, \textit{Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal}, 100.

\(^{42}\) Janos, \textit{Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity}, 449, 497, 712.

\(^{43}\) As for recent arguments that vie for the Avicennan \textit{tashkik al-wujūd}’s denoting a sense of univocity, which are mostly based on his \textit{lāhīhiyāt} I.2 and I.5, see Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”; Druart, “Ibn Sinā and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity”, 15-24; Menn, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics”, 163; De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 261-86. Based on various discussions scattered in different works of Avicenna, including \textit{al-Shifā’}, along with certain passages in the philosopher’s letter to the vizier Abū Sʿad, Damien Janos, alternatively, argues that Avicenna’s modulation connotes a moderate sense of equivocity. See Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation”, 1-62; esp. “Avicenna’s Distinction between Univocal, Equivocal, and Modulated Terms”, 6-16. Contrary to Janos’ claim, Kaukua argues that his designation of “moderate equivocity” still falls under “a modulated univocity of being” (Kaukua, “Review Article”, 162-3).

\(^{44}\) Genera always apply to their species equally (not in a modulated way), and the NE cannot be a genus since, otherwise, God’s essence will imply a composite nature of a genus and a differentia (Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”, 329-30).
der restrict the univocity and equivocity of being; however, he was not able to successfully accomplish his task since, in the end, Avicenna had arguably to vie for upholding a univocity making existence a single genus for all things whose species would be necessary or possible. As a way of conclusion, the question whether existence is ‘univocal’ (Rāzī/Zeyrek), ‘equivocal’ (Shahrastānī), or ‘modulated’ (Avicenna/Ṭūsī) is a highly contentious subject for the post-classical world. The common questions are: in what way can existence predicate others? Does this predication suggest contingency and multiplicity? And if it suggests these aspects, in what ways could we say that existence is related to God’s essence?

For the late medieval theologians, ‘predication’ suggests something beyond a logical relation. It was a reference to metaphysical entities and theological consequences about the nature of God and His creatures. The predication of a term (let it be an animal or an abstract concept, such as health) indicated a term’s relation to others and gives clues about its very nature and meanings. There were three common ways to predicate a term in medieval theology, as in ‘univocally’, ‘equivocally’, and ‘analogously’ (analogia entis); and the predication of existence was equally central in many post-classical Islamic and medieval Latin scholarly disputations.

For instance, the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas Aquinas defined these three terms as follows: ‘Univocally’, which is predicated according to the same name and reason; ‘equivocally’, which is attributed to some things; and ‘analogously/by modulation’, which is predicated of many whose reasons/definitions are different from each other. Going back to the thirteenth-century Islamic context, existence in the sense of God and His creatures fits with the third case in Ṭūsī, since existence in the same line here could be applied to distinct entities due to different reasons.

47 It should be noted that the univocity of existence in its application to God and created beings opens some leeway for religious monism. Even though Ghazālī would be in agreement with Rāzī, he does not give an opinion in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifā* whether existence is univocal or equivocal since neither view violates his Ashʿarite convictions. See Griffel, “Ismāʿīlite Critique of Ibn Sinā”, 223, 229.
48 Ṭūsī is known to have vied for “soft-equivocity” and it is still debatable whether Avicenna’s sense can be regarded in the framework of Ṭūsī’s interpretation, or denotes a sense of “soft-univocity” closer to Rāzī’s reading, or not.
49 The fifteenth-century Italian Ockhamist theologian Alessandro Achillini, also a contemporary of Ḥ, defended the case of existence’s analogicity based on certain interpretations of Aristotle and Averroes (Matsen, *Alessandro Achillini*, 119-21). What distinguished Achillini from Ḥ was that he was an anti-realist, but with a moderate nominalist bent inherited from Ockham.
50 Achillini, known for his *dubia* on key theological aspects, based his argument concerning the analogicity of existence in Thomas Aquinas’ description. Having famously employed by Aristotle and Avicenna, health (ṣiḥḥa), in the words of Aquinas, was a great example of this aspect, since health is said of an animal body and of urine and of a medicine but it does not signify the same entirely (i.e. meanings of ‘health’) in all these instances. Existence like health is analogical (Matsen, *Alessandro Achillini*, 102-5).
5.3.6 Day Four. Concluding Remarks

By overseeing ‘pure existence’ as ‘absolute existence’ as Rāzī does, Z falls into the same pitfall; he does not regard that ‘pure existence’ is a special term only reserved for God and this leads him to assume that existence is univocal, thereby making God’s existence comparable with that of the possibly existents.51 Z seems quite confident that if his opponent cannot prove otherwise, he has won the debate. Used in J’s discussion on unicity as a polemical utterance against the Dualists, tamma al-dast (also passes in HÇ’s gloss) is a rhetorical expression in Islamic dialectics, which implies that a contestant has silenced his opponent by providing certain refutations and proofs, and that the competition is over in his favor.52

At the end of the fourth day, Z concludes that the reason why necessity has to be taken as an existential notion is only because its binary term ‘possibility’ is also existential. In other words, if possibility is a single thing superadded, how will then necessity’s singularity be different? The possibility has a capacity to exist externally, and this may easily apply to the case of necessity. Z also provides proofs backing necessity’s being non-existent in order to show that the philosophers’ point about necessity’s being an existential notion is not justified. If and only if necessity is defined as an existential notion, it may well correspond to the third meaning since only an ‘externally existing’ necessity can ‘fall under’ the third meaning. Apart from this condition, we cannot say that the third meaning meets the exact intention of necessity in the philosophers’ initial thesis. Again, Z overlooks the distinction between ‘pure existence’ and other types of existence, including universal and absolute.53

5.3.7 Day Five. On Whether Necessity Necessarily Denotes a Single Essence

If you say that we do not concede that the Necessarily Existent is entified (muta‘ayyan) by His essence, [because] then there would be a limitation in that meaning. The reason why this is as such is that only if the Necessarily Existent were of a single essence, then this would have followed; but it is impossible since it would be permissible that it could be a generic accident (‘araḍ ʿāmm) or a genus’ nature (ṭabīʿa jinsiyya or lit. ‘the nature pertaining to genus’). There are species under Him and every specie requires its essence being entified (taʿayyun). What follows is that [while] every specie (naw’) is limited to an individual (shakhṣ), the Necessarily Existent is not [limited to an individual]. It is replied to this such that the Necessarily Existent cannot be existence itself, since if it were to have

51 Z’s support for the univocity of existence may have had some parallels with Duns Scotus’ view based on the assumption of natura communis (Matsen, “Alessandro Achillini (1463-1512) and ‘Ockhamism’”, 444-5).
52 See the lemma “wa-dhālik li-wajhayn” in al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 8: 45.
53 Dast is a game or a single act of a game, and the rhetorical expression tamma lahu al-dast can be translated as “the game ended/has ended in his favor” (Lane, The Arabic-English Lexicon, 878).
54 Shahrastānī also overlooks this distinction in Struggling with the Philosophers, 52-3 (Arabic) and 48-9 (English).
species, it would then have various realities (ḥaqāʾiq mukhtalifa). Existence would have a commonality in utterance [i.e. equivocal as in homonyms], and this is false. There is a weakness in this [statement], because the Necessarily Existent is not the same as ‘absolute existence’ (wujūd mutlaq), but as ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ). The purpose in this chapter is that various realities have specific existences, so the absolute commonality of existence is not required in utterance [i.e. not univocal].

On the fifth day, the discussion moves to another central question: whether or not necessity has to denote a single essence. Z directs pointed questions at Ḥ by asking how come Avicenna’s designations of genus’ and species’ natures would be in line with the philosophers’ initial thesis.

The philosophers are known to have objected to necessity’s being relational or accidental, thus holding that necessity signifies a single essence with no implications of multitude. Their answer to a possible counter-thesis by the theologians is the following: God’s necessary existence can neither be entified nor added to God’s essence since the NE then will not qualify to be a single essence – meaning that He can acquire a genus’ nature that leads to multiplicity and individuation. The NE, therefore, has to be one and equal to His quiddity. If the NE were to have a species or a genus that is normally necessary for an individual thing to come out, then God would be individualized, which is impossible.

Genus’ and species’ natures are generic accidents applied to the existence of contingent beings, and the philosophers here, therefore, want to avoid their direct involvement with God. In various works, Avicenna repeatedly states that the NE does not have a genus or a species, so it cannot be defined, and is neither generic nor specific. In his al-Shifāʾ, the genus’ nature (sing. ṭabīʿa jinsiyya or lit. ‘the nature pertaining to genus’) primarily refers to the nature or quiddity considered in itself, a nature that when so considered is neither particular nor universal, neither one nor many. Yet, due to Avicenna’s ambiguous use of the term, it is easy to misinterpret the genus’ nature as, similar to what Z does in the debate, something that exists individuated in external reality. This interpretation led some later commentators to identify existence with multiplicity.

The common misconception of associating a genus’ nature with existence also resonates with Rāzī’s misattribution of existence having a ‘species’ nature’ (ṭabīʿa nawʿiyya or lit. ‘a nature pertaining to species’). Basing on Avicenna’s statement that a species’ nature is applied to all its individu- als on equal footing, Rāzī observes that the same thing can be said for existence as well, insinuating that existence has a connection to multiplicity and individuation, i.e. aspects to be avoided for God. Ṭūsī detects that Rāzī again bases this view on an inaccurate representation of the philosophers. Based on Ṭūsī’s interpretation, the philosophers rather argue that

55 For the definition of the NE, see Ṭūsī’s commentary on al-Ishārāt, 3: 472-4, 479-81.
57 Marmura, “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals”, 42.
58 In one of many objections directed at Avicenna in his commentary on al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbihāt, Rāzī questions how existence can be both applied to the necessarily and possibly existents, by making the incorrect assertion that existence is among natures pertaining to species (Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 213; Altaş, Fahreddin Râzî’nin İbn Sînâ Yorumu, 407).
existence is not directly applied to the possibly existents but only ‘by modulation’ (biʾl-tashkīk). 59

Similar to Z, the Perso-Ottoman theologian ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī also maintains that a certain number of great verifiers have found the philosophers’ equating existence with God’s quiddity to be equally valid, yet adding that he, nonetheless, firmly holds that existence is an accident superadded to quiddity following the theologians’ position (especially Rāzī’s). Ṭūsī believes that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s proposed solution by way of introducing modulation is invalid for it does not deter the fact that existence might be an accident. 60 Reiterating Avicenna’s point as mentioned in Taḥtānī’s adjudication, 61 Z, in line with ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, follows Rāzī, by firmly settling on the theologians’ position as outlined in (iii) as a way of consensus (see § 3.3). 62

The truth in this answer is that what is mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in his al-Shifā’ is that the Necessarily Existent is not something other than ‘pure existence’ (mujarrad al-wujūd), and there is no change in it. Indeed, an existence conjoined with quiddities changes in accordance with its attachment [to them]. As for ‘mere existence’, it is the same thing as existence that there is no real change [in it] with respect to the veracity of al-Muḥākamāt by Mawlānā al-ʿAllāma [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī], Peace be upon him.

In closing, Z reiterates his points one more time: indeed, for Z, the NE cannot be the same as existence just as He cannot have any genus or species; otherwise, He will be constituting varied realities that denote multiplicity and composition. Existence here nevertheless has the problem of equivocality simply because it denotes a commonality in utterance as in homonyms in languages. Aristotle distinguishes words applied to different things with a single meaning (i.e. synonyms/univocals) from those that applied to different things but with different definitions (i.e. homonyms/equivocals). 63 In a similar way, the Neoplatonic tradition defines homonymous predication as “inhering in a subject”, a term in opposition to synonymous predication, which denotes “being said of a subject”, an essential predication. 64 For Z, if existence is the same as necessity, it will then only imply a sense of commonality in utterance (like homonyms) with regard to the modes of participation (mushārakāt), which is impossible. In Avicenna, on the other hand, homonyms share the name only, whereas synonyms share both the name and the...

59 For a reference that existence is applied to other things by modulation, see Rāzī’s concerning existence in terms of a species’ nature in al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 2: 161, 167. Similarly, Iṣfahānī writes that existence is superadded to quiddity but only by modulation, i.e. different from other types of attachments (al-Iṣfahānī, Tasīd al-qawāʿid, 1: 199). See Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 203, 212; and on how perfections are predicated of God by modulation in later medieval Latin tradition via Avicenna: Acar, Talking About God, 50-5.

60 Al-Ṭūsī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 220-1.

61 This fact may indicate that Z gathers most of his information about Avicenna’s philosophy from later handbooks of kalām, not specifically from Avicenna’s original writings.

62 For the theologians’ position which states that existence is superadded or occurs externally to essence both in the necessarily and possibly existents, see § 3.3, “Background in Philosophy II”.


64 Kalbarcyzyk, Predication and Ontology, 74-5, 82.
such that the philosophers’ formulation (as well as Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and ʿH’s points) rather perceive the relationship between existence and necessity as in the case of homonyms.

Z is resistant to accept his rival’s explanations: ʿH’s position is arguably mistaken since, for Z, Avicenna, on the contrary, might have regarded existence as ‘univocal’. As mentioned earlier, Z’s oversight might rely on the assumption of equating the NE’s special existence with absolute (or generic) existence, thereby assigning God an unfounded capacity for receiving a genus/species and an individualization. For Z, existence, in line with the above-mentioned theologians’ view in (iii), has to be an externally added entity with a capacity to receive a genus and a species, which are universal logical categories indispensable for particular existences and individuals to emerge in the extramental world.

Reducing existence to a homonym restricts this term to a generic category for all existents. Absolute existence, in this case, is an unqualified aspect of existence common to all contingent beings but significantly different from ‘pure existence’. The philosophers will hypothetically object to Z’s designation of ‘pure existence’ as a commonality of existence in utterance since he seems to anachronistically apply something that is true for the possibly existents to the ontological category of the Necessarily Existents, by equating God with contingency without any foundational basis.

Another possible answer to Z’s argument in favor of the univocity of existence among the necessarily and possibly existents, which follows Rāzī, could be by demonstrating that these divisions are only lexical (lafḍī), that is, equivocal in meaning (biʾl-ishtirāq al-lafḍī), which is in direct opposition to univocity (biʾl-ishtirāq al-maʿnāwī). When describing the commonality between two partners, Ghazālī’s second point in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa about the philosophers’ inability to prove God’s unicity, i.e. the argument from commonality, similarly resorts to nominalism, which could be summarized as follows: if there are two hypothesized NEs, then these must be either similar in every way or totally different. The first is absurd (muḥāl) since two things cannot be separate and be similar in every way. Even if the NEs differ from another, it must be that they either share in something or not share in anything. The latter is impossible due to the shared necessity of existence within the NE’s characterization, and the former implies that there will be composition and lexical division.

Based on this thought experiment, necessary existences cannot have composition due to their being qualitatively indivisible. The composition will, otherwise, dictate that they either share in something or not share in anything. The latter is impossible due to the shared necessity of existence within the NE’s characterization, and the former implies that there will be composition and lexical division, thereby not implying a real one. Thus, both

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65 Kalbarczyk, Predication and Ontology, 138.
67 As Avigail Noy suggests, the term muḥāl, which is found in Islamic texts in linguistics, literary theory, and philosophy, denotes a “co-occurrence of two contradictory [things] within the same object at the same time, in the same element [or] the same relative state”, such as describing an object as being both black and white at the same time. Muḥāl is not only non-existent but also inconceivable; and the philosophers make a distinction between “that which does not exist but is imaginable” and “that which does not exist and is unimaginable” (Noy, “Don’t Be Absurd”, 29).
cases are impossible. Ghazālī sees existence ontologically one with essence in God, yet, different from Z’s accidentality of existence, he regards existence as a ‘necessary concomitant’ (lāzīm) due to the nominalism of lexicality – not as ‘subsisting in essence’. Regardless, Z neither seems to entertain this counterposition in his evaluation nor comments on the nature of concomitants vis-à-vis different shades of existence.

5.3.8 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis

I say that if the utterance ‘necessity’ were to be valid for a single mental consideration and this mental consideration is dislodged from being existing externally, then there would not be any competence (majāl) here, [121b] since one could respond [to this] by the permissibility that this intension would be attached to two differentiated essences, one differing from the other in essence. If the author of al-Mawāqif says “thus, the existence of the Necessarily Existent is true for philosophers”, then the competition has ended in favor of Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

The last day of the debate concerns the question whether the NE has to conform to singularity according to the philosophers’ proof. Since now Z applies existence in utterance to necessity, maintaining that necessity is an accidental superaddition, he is certain that the commonality here would be only in utterance, as in the case of homonymous expressions. Upon this point, Z further argues that the necessity’s intension, in this case, does not again provide the certain proof that necessity has to be a single essence that does not attach to multiple essences.

In conclusion, neither existence nor necessity, for Z, can be specifically defined for God. Both are generic univocal categories that may be shared by all existents and, therefore, should be regarded as superadded accidents that occur externally to the quiddity, that is, with no direct involvement with God’s quiddity essentially per se (a point that he follow Rāzī). This contingency, for Z, proves that the concepts of necessity and existence are non-essential relational qualities that are not suited for providing proof in support of God’s unicity. Also Z questions the certainty of the philosophers’ proof, trying to demonstrate that there is no guarantee that necessity must be the same as God’s quiddity/essence. It could be easily argued that necessity can be construed as, let’s say, relational (nisbī), non-existent (ʿadamī), or super-added accidentally (ʿaraḍī) etc. Most importantly, the philosophers’ proof cannot rule out the possibility that necessity can be a superadded accident. Thinking that he has refuted his opponent by showing the contingency and imprecision of the philosophers’ proof, Z, at the end of the debate, declares himself victorious for the second time.

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**68** Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 86-7.

**69** For Rāzī’s statement about the linguistic commonality with respect to the necessarily and possibly existents, see al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 101.
5.4 Analysis of Ḫocazāde’s Position. Making the Philosophers’ Proof Cohere with Post-Classical Scholarship

The philosophers give a central role to necessity in their version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* and, to achieve this end, they resort to the reducibility of necessity to quiddity/essence in God – a view regarded in line with their premise that He is the same as ‘pure existence’. This is the main point of contention between them and the theologians, and the latter group represented by Z, as shown, denies this by claiming that necessity is a superadded accident denoting no essentiality. On the other hand, Ḫ defends the validity of the philosophers’ statement as the main thrust of his reply, arguing that necessity at least corresponds to one of its stated meanings in philosophy, especially the third (“what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”). Ḫ’s defense of the philosophers is closely linked to a passage in J’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* on God’s unicity in Position Five, Observation Three (5.3). Here he follows J’s expositions on this point, critiquing his academic adversaries Z and ḪÇ on the same subject matter who, instead, prefer the theologians’ view indefinitely due to the philosophers’ inability to demonstrate their claim.

Both Z/ḤÇ assert that the philosophers’ proof is incomplete due to their unsubstantiated premise that necessity is the same as God’s quiddity/essence, a statement which, according to ḪÇ, contradicts with their claims about (a) quiddity’s not being an existential notion, and (b) entification’s implying individuation and multiplicity (see the analysis below). To refute ḪÇ/Z, Ḫ provides more citations from J, evidencing that at least one of the stated meanings of necessity can be taken in the philosophers’ sense. He also insists that ḪÇ might have misrepresented J’s line of thought in certain lemmata: for instance, the commentator J does not seem to reject the philosophers’ proof outright, only mentioning his concern with (a), but found no fault in (b), adding that the author Ī does not raise any objection to the latter either.

Ḥ’s defense concerns the validity of the philosophers’ contested premise. Setting J’s expositions as evidence, he demonstrates his opponents that not only this meaning of necessity is true on their own terms but also widely conceded by later post-classical commentators and critics as a term that does not suggest multiplicity. Throughout the debate, Ḫ sets out to verify Avicenna’s ‘many-in-the-one’ approach, determinedly providing counter-arguments and additional textual proofs from past masters against those of Z and ḪÇ. Bringing out learned expositions to the counter-arguments from past and contemporary scholars, Ḫ further clarifies in the second half of his defense how certain controversial philosophical terms – such as ‘entification’ (*taʿayyun*), ‘individuation’ (*tashakhkhus*), ‘specification’ (*takhṣīṣ*), and

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70 There are three levels to ‘meaning’ (*maʿnā*) in the scholarly context: the lexical meaning, the intention of the speaker, as well as the meaning or function of a particular word as discussed by the grammarians (Versteegh, “The Debate Between Logic and Grammar”, 59).

71 See ḪÇ’s lemma “fa-yalzimu tarkībuhumā”: “I will, therefore, suggest that what we have pointed out here as an answer (i.e. necessity and existence are accidental qualities superadded to God’s quiddity) is established based on the principles of the theologians, just as we alerted you about it before” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45).


‘genus/species’ nature’ (tabi‘a jinsiyya/naw‘iyya) – do not overall contradict with the philosophers’ thesis. In most instances he closely follows their exposition for the sake of the debate. Only in one point, though, he disagrees with them, favoring that entification and species’ nature are rather super-added accidents. Except these, Ḫ argues as a way of conclusion that the philosophers’ doctrines are coherent in their own paradigm and they can even be reconciled with the current trends in post-classical Islamic scholarship.

5.4.1 An Invocation on God’s Unicity. “He Neither Begets Nor Is Born”

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Glory be to Him who is one and who neither begets nor is born, nor is there to Him any equivalent. [al-Ikhlās 112:3-4] Pray on Muḥammad and on the family of Muḥammad.

Ḫ’s defense of the philosophers begins with verses from the Meccan sūra of al-Ikhlās [112:3-4], which was included as a literary topos, implying the central subject matter of the debate (tawḥīd). Invocation sections have a key role in defining a locus for the central argument of a text, and here the quotation from the Qurʾān sets the main thrust as God’s singularity. The verse “He neither begets nor is born” implies that God neither has a partner nor is caused by another, that is, the intended conclusion of the debate.

Having studied the exegetical texts included in Ottoman scholar and librarian al-ʿAtūfī’s (d. 948/1541) recently edited inventory of Bāyezīd II’s royal library, Mohsen Goudarzi highlights the centrality of al-Zamakhsharī’s al-Kashshāf and the prevalence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s voluminous exegesis Mafāṭīḥ al-ghayb in the fifteenth-century Ottoman intellectual world. Indeed the connection between the debate’s subject-matter (burḥān al-tamānuʿ), and the quotations from al-Ikhlās can be traced in these popular works: for instance, al-Kashshāf writes that the verse “He neither begets nor is born” is significant in negating partners to God since the concept of one (aḥad) implied here is a property of His singularity. Likewise, according to Rāzī’s voluminous Qurʾānic exegesis also known as al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, sūra al-Ikhlās is referred as the “Chapter on [Divine] Unicity”, a verse which, for him, not only uses God’s singularity (waḥdāniyya) as a proof of unicity (especially due to the first verse “Say, He is Allah, who is, One”), but also provides a direct revelation (naqlī) for God’s singulari-
ty, without making Muslim scholars resorting to reason (‘aql) and rational inference (istidāl).\(^7^9\)

There is, however, another context of evaluating God’s unicity in the Meccan sūra of al-Anbiyā’ [21:22], which states “Had there been other gods besides Allah in the heavens or the earth, both realms would have surely been corrupted. So Glorified is Allah, Lord of the Throne, far above what they claim”. A century after the debate, a Persian émigré scholar Muṣliḥuddin al-Lārī (d. 979/1572) pens a treatise on burhān al-tamānuʿ,\(^8^0\) in which, debating the ideas of past masters, such as Jurjānī, Taftāzānī, and Dawānī, he argues that the mentioned verse presents a sound rational proof of God’s singularity.\(^8^1\)

5.4.2 Day One. Ḫ’s Response to Objections to the Philosophers’ Thesis by J/ḤÇ

The author [ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī/al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī], may Al-mighty God have mercy on him, said in Observation Three [of Sharḥ al-Mawāqif] on God’s unicity (tawḥīd), a discussion also mentioned in the Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi], that the denial of a partner to God is required for His unicity; and there is no need to pursue this further. [With regard to God’s unicity] Hasan Çelebi replied that the negation of an equal partner (sharīk) in species (nawʿ) does not require the negation of a partner in divinity (ulūhiyya), and that the existence’s necessity literally permits each partner’s requiring a haecceity (huwiyya).\(^8^2\)

I say that if the necessity (wujūb) of existence (wujūd) were to be the same thing as essence (dhāt), as this is the basis for the proof here, then an equal partner would be eliminated in terms of species. There is no doubt that the reverence [of God] is required [to be refrained] from a partner that shares [the same] divine attributes, as well as the necessity of [12b] existence – unless it is claimed that the course of the argument in the competition just concerns the negation of an equal partner and existence’s being the same as necessity (or not) is never noted.

As outlined in the first lemmata, Ḫ’s thesis included in his initial written response is as follows: according to the philosophers, necessity has to be equal to God’s quiddity/essence since the third meaning of necessity (i.e. “what distinguishes the NE from others”) corresponds to the meaning in the initial statement. Ḫ notes that the denial of a partner is an indispensable element of burhān al-tamānuʿ, an aspect conceded by all scholars in the religious community, further adding that there are certain objections to the various aspects of this proof.

Most notably, his contemporary ḪÇ objects to this thesis in his gloss on the Sharḥ al-mawāqif, by questioning (a) whether the denial of a partner in species can be applicable to the case of metaphysical principles, and (b)

\(^7^9\) Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-kabīr, 177-8.
\(^8^0\) Akay, “Muslihuddin el-Lârî’nin”.
\(^8^1\) Tezcan, “Muslihiddin Lari (d. 1572)”, 619.
\(^8^2\) Al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 8: 45.
whether the existence’s necessity can refrain from receiving a haecceity.\(^83\) Both cases imply individuation and multiplicity; therefore, for HÇ, taking necessity as an essential aspect of God must be avoided.

It is ironic that Ḥ starts his defense of the philosophers by quoting two objections from HÇ, who, having allegedly incorporated certain sections of Ḥ’s gloss on the *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* into his own, was accused of plagiarism during the early years of his teaching in the city of Brusa. Ḥ’s targeting HÇ at the beginning of his text may echo the purported bad blood between two scholars and, most probably, was not a coincidence.

Ḥ’s reference here is a passage that passes in HÇ’s gloss on the *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*. The full text of HÇ’s objections addressed here are as follows (see the main point in italics):

**HÇ’s gloss on Jurjānī’s statement “with regard to God’s unicity [...]”**: Unicity here refers to all meanings included under the conviction of unicity, that is, those denoting a lack of commonality (*mushāraka*) with others in divinity; and this is what is intended here. A commonality in divinity requires a commonality in necessity, such that the latter of which is the source of each perfection and the temple of each deficiency. That is why, the philosophers are content with negating the [option of] a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*) [for necessity, but argued for its equivalence to quiddity]. If one is to say that negating the equivalent partner (*mathl*) is required, then there is no need for what J discusses. *Then I will say that negating an equivalent partner (shārik mumāthil) in species does not require that in divinity – adding that the necessity of existence here is taken literal due to the permissibility that each would require a haecceity. If this is conceded, then it will be accepted that what is understood by this implication also appears in the section about God’s deanthromorphism, which is of importance.*\(^84\)

HÇ’s objections (a) and (b) point out the most problematic aspect of the philosophers’ proof, which is, in the words of HÇ, “refuting an equal partner to God in *species* implies refuting a partner in *divinity*”. This statement highlights the discrepancy between the necessarily and possibly beings and, as an objection, questions whether particular conclusions can be reduced to divine aspects, and if so, on what basis this must be.

The philosophers argue that the necessity of a partner’s existence may not permit its requiring a ‘haecceity’ (*huwiyya*). Haecceity here refers to an individualized aspect of quiddity in the outside world that leads to multiplicity. However, this does not mean that this same principle can be applied to divine or metaphysical realities since haecceity may well be associated with contingency.

For HÇ, to negate a commonality among partners in *divinity*, a scholar needs to first negate the commonality in *necessity*, not in *species*. Similar to Z’s point in the debate above, his lemma suggests that due to its univoc-

\(^83\) See J’s passage related to quiddity in Discussion Two, which asserts the following: “Whether it is general or particular, every being has a reality (*ḥaqīqa*). If it is a particular reality then it is ‘identity’; if it is a general reality; then it is ‘quiddity’” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 18-21; esp. 18).

\(^84\) See the lemma “qawluhu: fī tawḥīdihi taʿālā”, which is quoted by Ḥocazāde verbatim during the debate, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.
ity, necessity is a concept that may also interact with the possibly existents that are defined – unlike the Necessarily Existent – as beings that are only necessary by another. ḤÇ implies that there is no guarantee that necessity has to be absolved from multiplicity and plurality in the philosophers’ case. This is simply because necessity may be regarded as attaching to multiple essences and, more importantly, receiving a haecceity, leads him to the conclusion that it will be better to consider it as ‘accidental’ (instead of ‘essential’). Or else, if necessity is defined in terms of a ‘necessary concomitant’ (lāzim) or as identical to God’s quiddity/essence, then this will indeed open some leeway for multiplicity in God. In order to bridge this gap, ḤÇ mentions that the philosophers are ready to negotiate that necessity is a concomitant rather than being equal to God’s quiddity/essence.

According to ḤÇ’s conceptualization, receiving a haecceity means that it is possible for the necessity of the partner’s existence to be individualized among species via the philosophical term ‘entification’ (taʿayyun), and these aspects applied to the possibly existents (as in haecceity, individualization, and entification) should not be used in proofs defining God’s singularity.

**ḤÇ’s gloss on Jurjānī’s statement “so the compositeness of both is required [...]”:** If you were to say that entification’s being an accident is a possibility – as mentioned in Sharḥ al-mawāqif’s Intention Two, Observation One – then compositeness would not follow. Thus, I say that we point to an answer here in the sense that what we mentioned is established based on the principles of the theologians – just as we alerted you about this before [i.e. regarding the theologians’ view that necessity and existence are superadditions]. As for the philosophers, they said that entification superadded to quiddity does not defend the implication of a haecceity’s compositeness. *As for its being superadded to quiddity, this is not intelligible because haecceity is a particular individual, in which the very conceptualization of its intension (mafhūm) refrains from the occurrence of a partner that would participate in it.* If the way of the universal quiddity were to be regarded as something either by itself (biʾl-ʿayniyya) or by another particularity (biʾl-juzʾiyya), then the very intension could not be imagined insofar as its being hindered from the occurrence of commonality in it. That is why, quiddity cannot be a particular individual [and there is no composition in it].

ḤÇ’s objection in (b) is related to the term ‘entification’ that is often defined as “what distinguishes a thing from another without being participating in another”. Entification is closely associated with necessity, since both terms denote how beings could be distinguished from one another: the latter in terms of ontology, and the former by way of extramentality. Along with Z, ḤÇ takes entification as a superadded accidental quality following the theologians, further suggesting that if entification is a necessary concomitant as in the philosophers’ sense, then it cannot be used in Avicenna’s proof for unicity (because it will still denote multiplicity).

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85 See the lemma “fa-yalzimu tarakkubuhā”, in al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 8: 45.

Entification is an aspect mentioned in the philosophers’ formulation of *burhān al-tamānuʿ*; and the NE, by default, is expected to require an entification by essence to be able to distinguish Him from other beings. Unlike ḤÇ’s gloss though, J seems to acknowledge this premise as true in the philosophers’ paradigm, suggesting that entification does not necessarily contradict with God’s singularity, as well as their initial premise.

In short, ḤÇ’s and Z’s points, for Ḧ, are not valid objections since the thrust of the debate (as in Samarkandi’s principle *taʿyīn maḥall al-nizāʿ*) is whether or not the negation of an equal partner is required for God’s unity, and this thrust is based on the philosophers’ initial premise that necessity is the same as God’s quiddity, a case which is coherent. Thus, probably knowing that Z, similar to the theologians of the past like Rāzī, would likely bring up the philosophers’ oft-misrepresented thesis that God is the same as ‘absolute existence’, Ḧ comments that Z’s last contention is not directly relevant and should, instead, be treated as a digression. Despite Ḧ’s disclaimer, the third day of the debate will cover the exact status of existence with respect to God’s quiddity/essence, hence their relationship to necessity.

5.4.3 Day Two. On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers’ Thesis and on Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular

On the second day, Ḧ provides a set of answers for his opponent’s thesis that none of the stated meanings of necessity corresponds to the philosophers’ sense. Z’s view is based on the common fact that necessity is construed as accidental and suppositional, not suited for God’s case essentially. Ḧ’s detailed reply is as follows:

The author, may God have mercy on him, said that you have set forth beforehand that necessity is the same as quiddity. The unique mind of his time [ハウスァデ] said concerning the refutation of this premise: “I know that necessity corresponds to three meanings (sing. *maʿnā*): [necessity defined as] (i) “essence’s (*dhāt*) requiring existence”; (ii) “that which has no need of others in existence”; and (iii) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others”. There is no doubt that one thing that is not mentioned in the first two meanings is that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, which refers to the third meaning. Indeed, in this case, as for the assumption about the Necessarily Existent’s multiplicity, it is objected that the Necessarily Existent requires composition if necessity is a single reality that has two isolated units (sing. *fard*) etc.

I say that there is no doubt why this question appears, and you should not worry about its answer – but [know that] the statement about the term

87 For the relationship between the NE and entification, see Ibn Sinā (Avicenna), *al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt*, 3: 464.

88 In the marginalia Ḥozazde is noted as the subject of this argument, which might have been added by a later copyist.
specification’ (takhṣīṣ) in the third meaning denotes necessity. The Glossator [Hasan Çelebi] expressed this view insofar as specification is not objected.

As a reply, Ḥ further defends his point by arguing that the post-classical term iʿtibār could be applied to the very cases of necessity without undermining the validity of the philosophers’ initial thesis. Ḥ’s defense is stated as follows: in section 5.3, J defines necessity as iʿtibārī, i.e. a conceptual/mental consideration with no real existence in the outside world, thus not lacking multiplicity.99 This aspect does not undermine the philosophers’ unicity since Ḥ notes that there are three meanings associated with necessity as passed: (1) “essence’s requiring existence”, (2) “that which has no need of others in existence”, and (3) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”. In the first two meanings there is no direct allusion to the nature of necessity and quiddity in God, yet the third, for Ḥ, meets this condition, since both concepts are taken here as equivalent mental considerations with no real existence in the extramental world. This means that necessity cannot be a single reality that constitutes multiple units at the same time, as, otherwise, the NE would be perceived as composite. Following J, Ḥ here appeals to the position that necessity and existence are simply non-entitative, meaning that they do not constitute a distinct entity in the extramental world. This new designation in the post-classical world, for Ḥ, does not necessarily contradict with the view of classical Arabic philosophy, so making it valid within the limits of the philosophers’ paradigm.

After arguing that the iʿtibārī nature of necessity can be reconciled with necessity’s third meaning in Arabic philosophy, Ḥ expands his argument to other confusing cases of Avicenna metaphysics. For instance, the third meaning of necessity may have the sense of ‘specification’ (al-takhṣīṣ), an ontological term that denotes ‘differentiation by limitation’. This term may well correspond to the meaning of necessity in the philosophers’ thesis and, as Ḥ suggests, the glossator ḤÇ appears to have agreed with this point.90

In the later lemmata of Day Two, Ḥ uses extensive citations from Sharḥ al-mawāqif to prove that J’s position does not necessarily clash with the philosophers’ initial premise. Ḥ wants to show his opponent Z that the third meaning of necessity has been already in use among the theologians as well.91 Then the conversation moves on to consider the question in what sense the third meaning is linked with the first two, and Ḥ continues to demonstrate, on the second day, how the third meaning is indirectly related to other two meanings by further referencing J’s Sharḥ al-mawāqif.

Jurjānī states that this is because both [necessity and quiddity] are mental intelligibles (sing. iʿtibārī ʿaqli) which do not have existence in the extramental world; and this is accepted such that both are taken absolutely (alā al-ṭālāq); otherwise why would it not be permissible that the specific one [of the two] is a real entity different from the quiddity of the Neces-

89 Al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 3: 112.
90 The closest reference to ‘specification’ is probably the lemma about ‘specificity’ (khusūṣiyya), used in reference to the specificity of the NE’s essence in relation to other existents (see ḤÇ’s lemma “mabnī ʿalā anna al-wujūb wujūdī”, in al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 8: 45-6).
91 See Ī/J’s mentioning the third meaning as a valid definition of necessity in section 2.3.2 on necessity in al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 3: 116.
I say that this limitation\textsuperscript{92} is an opinion of [13b] this virtuous scholar [Jurjānī] himself, and this claim has been put forth in some books. So there is no need for a thing to be contrary to what the evidence testifies, and this is noted in Discussion Three concerning necessity – especially in the later sections of this proof – such that the first or second meaning of necessity is and was the same [thing] as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, God bless him. Their statement did not pay attention to the fact that it is obligatory for these two meanings to exist among all externally existing things and to be the same as the Necessarily Existent. [This is] due to the weakness of their statement about this subject. The limitation of their statement does not depend on the question; rather it is just based on the demonstration of [its] occurrence. Whoever addresses an answer with a statement lacking the philosophers’ intention [also] has the third meaning according to their statement, in which necessity is the same as [His] reality [ḥaqīqa]. Rather [14a] the intention of one of the first two meanings does not bring anything to support the advent of the question by this virtuous scholar, because its advent, in that case,\textsuperscript{93} is more obvious and clear. Upon my life, the answer remarked by some of the virtuous scholars accompanied by certain additional points is more exalted than those that stand on the horizon of the heavens of my thought, but when the headstrong intentions of this verifier [Jurjānī] manifests, then the answer is concealed and becomes impossible [to refute].

According to the lemmata above, H’s first textual proof from J is the following: the philosophers suggest that the exact logical intension (mafhūm) of their initial premise only corresponds to the third definition of necessity, a view which can be traced in J’s passage about the definitions of necessity,\textsuperscript{94} as well as the early theologians’ position quoted by I.\textsuperscript{95} In his Mashriqiyyūn, Avicenna identifies a defined quiddity with an intension, as a real definition of quiddity sought through conceptualization.\textsuperscript{96} If a meaning corresponds to the intension of a term, then it will be identified as a real definition of its quiddity, a case which may well correspond to the third meaning of necessity in this statement.

As a determined realist, Avicenna arguably assumes that this correspondence is a real case, so his initial suggestion is different from the nominalist tendencies of the post-classical context. The post-classical verifiers, such

\textsuperscript{92} “A notional constriction consists in adding an intensional layer to some notion, thereby constricting or limiting the scope or extension of the initial meaning of a notion” (De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 264).

\textsuperscript{93} In the marginalia: “Its purpose is to express the meaning only in a more informed manner and no more”.

\textsuperscript{94} Al-Jurjānī, \textit{Sharḥ al-mawāqif}, 2: 163.

\textsuperscript{95} I\textsuperscript{f} cite the Muʿtazilite theologian AbūʿAli al-Jubbāʾī’s (d. 303/915) view that God’s essence is distinguished from others in four ways, and necessity is considered among the four distinguishing marks of the NE outlined by him (al-Jurjānī, \textit{Sharḥ al-mawāqif}, 8: 17).

\textsuperscript{96} See the translation and analysis of \textit{al-Mashriqiyyūn}’s section on Logic 39.8; 45.1-2. Benevich, “Meaning and Definition”, 34.
as J and Ḫ, on the other hand, try to make sense of this case through their conceptualization of *iʿtibārāt*, affirming that both necessity and quiddity are mental considerations with no real extrametnal existence. Both entities here are taken in their most absolute/generic sense (i.e. not as existing physically) as opposed to Avicennan realism, since, otherwise, they both have to be acknowledged as God’s real entities, which will ultimately imply multiplicity in Him. It is in this context that Ḫ, following J, asserts that one of the ways to make the philosophers’ thesis consistent is to acknowledge that all these entities are *iʿtibārī*. In this way, even if necessity is taken as a single reality with more than two individuals, this will not imply diversity due to its being a mental consideration.

As passed in section 3.5 of this book, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* is devoted to the exposition of three common positions concerning the nature of existence and quiddity among the necessarily and possibly beings. And Ḫ’s conclusion is that the theologian’s view here refers to the third meaning of necessity as a limitation, but still affirming the philosophers’ sense.

Even though Ḫ provides evidence from J to support his point, this does not prevent him from critiquing the past master. Ḫ further comments that J acknowledges the validity of the third meaning, yet conceding that the first two meanings of necessity may not correspond to the meaning in the philosophers’ premise exactly. This is because both meanings imply external existence, as well as a relationship of need and priority/posteriority, that is, aspects to be avoided when necessity is taken as a distinguishing mark. J underlines that the philosophers’ initial thesis does not correspond to the intensions of the first two meanings completely, and he further eliminates these two options for a sound designation of necessity.

As a response, Ḫ critiques the second half of J’s point, writing that the first two meanings may not be directly related to the debate at hand, but they are true and relevant only with regard to the demonstration of necessity’s occurrence in the third sense. In other words, the first two meanings are indispensable to derive the third and, that is why, still relevant to the philosophers’ proof. It is in that sense that Ḫ defends the validity of the philosophers’ oft-critiqued ‘argument from entification’ (i.e. the NE can be distinguished from others via entification) as still suitable to affirm God’s unicity. This argument, for Ḫ, is correctly based on necessity’s third meaning directly.

[Jurjānī] states that what is intended by their statement is that necessity’s being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is the third meaning, which comes from this statement such that what is intended is the third meaning’s being the same as quiddity by itself, and likewise their intention here is rather such that ‘what falls under’ this statement (*mā-ṣadaq ʿalayhi*) is not [necessity’s being] the same as quiddity. Otherwise, this would not be correct. [Jurjānī] states that consequently what

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97 For a summary of the views in this discussion, see section 17.2 on “Essence and Existence” in Dhanani, “Al-Mawāqif fi ʿilm al-kalām”.

98 “Essential necessity implies two sides in the NE, one side is existence and the other is quiddity. This is because necessity is what distinguishes the NE from others [which is also the definition that is supported by the philosophers and Ḫ in the debate]. And this thing corresponds to the NE’s essence because the NE has to be distinguished from other essences” (al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 2: 163). For essential necessary concomitants that are *min baythu l-māhiyya* in Avicenna, Benevich, *Essentialität und Notwendigkeit*, 349-54.
I claimed to be composition (tarkīb) in relation to the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent [14b] will be rather required if necessity is a reality with two isolated units. Yet, whenever necessity has two different essences, each being differentiated from one another, then it is no secret that one meaning cannot be conceivable since two different essences would be distinguished from each other essentially.

Upon this short digression, Ḫ continues to cite other additional textual proofs from J. In the next lemma, Ḫ insists that the validity of the third meaning already appears in J – albeit with a later correction in the manuscript: a curious marginal note⁹⁹ that might have been added by the author or a later commentator notes that he checked J once again verifying that J (ironically similar to Z) only saw the third meaning in a restricted sense as the extension of the philosophers’ thesis (that is, as neither its exact equivalent nor intension). It is still a question how one should make sense of this later addition: could we see this as a correction on Ḫ’s behalf? Or does J, as Ḫ claims, support the fact that the third meaning of the philosophers is an intension of their thesis? The authorship of the note could give us a perspective about J’s verdict.

Ḥ might have corrected one of his attestations to J but, later during the day, he continues to cite other passages in support of his position, affirming that, for J, the third meaning never implies multiplicity. Even if it is assumed that necessity is a reality with two individuals, it will be still inconceivable for J that necessity has two essences simply because these two essences can be differentiated from one another essentially, a case which is evidently impossible, and hence not violating simplicity.

Ḥ’s main intention in providing proofs from J is to show that none of the stated meanings of necessity assigns it multitude, settling that necessity has to be singular in nature. After these points, the exchange briefly moves on to discuss another question regarding how the limitations on the meanings of necessity are related to God’s quiddity/essence. Ḫ includes another textual support from J, warning that the meanings mentioned here still have restrictions: if all three meanings are used in an unrestricted way, then they may suggest, as Z claims, an ʿārid-maʿrūd relationship, so that they cannot be directly associated with God. The emphasis on restriction here seems to be a precaution against further counter-objections by Avicenna’s critics.

[Jurjānī] states that the two partners mentioned in the first two meanings suggest a limitation in participation, and this is not as such [for the third meaning], since the unrestricted application of the third also [implies] a shared accidental affection, occurring to both [meanings externally] in this respect. This is apparent for those who paid attention and

⁹⁹ In the marginalia: “After writing this we found out a detailed version of this book to verify this matter. He explained here that, as we mentioned, what is intended is not the same as the third meaning (i.e. its intension), rather [it is] a judgment that falls under (mā-ṣadaq ʿalayhi a particular question (i.e. its extension)”. This note maybe added by Ḫ who was known to have glossed J’s text. In a discussion about the undulation of tidal waves with ʿAli Kuşçu (upon the latter’s arrival to Constantinople), Ḫ asks one of his assistant to bring his gloss to J in order to refresh his memory about the exact place of his gloss on the past master’s text (Taşköprizâde, al-Shaqiq, 161; Hoca Saʿeddin, Tācüʿt-tevârîḫ, 2: 490-1; al-Laknawī, al-Fawā'id al-bahiyya, 352; Balıkçıoğlu, A Coherence of Incoherences, 94-5). Ḫ may have later added this point upon the perusal of his notes.
thought about this. Mawlānā Shujāʿ’s (d. 929/1523) statement, which we consider to be evidently invalid, responds to this question with the third meaning, such that if the third meaning were to have two different realities, then the meanings of [15a] necessity would not be equipollent with the [concept of] existence in the first two senses – without each of these realities being in the other. Then, it would be necessary that the third meaning is a single reality, and the likely diversity needed to be refuted corresponds to the multiplicity of an isolated unit. So, if a multiplicity accompanied by oneness in reality requires composition, which is impossible, then the way of its appearance will be that the implication (talāzum) here corresponds to nothing other than [something] between the first two meanings and the absolute sense of the third. This is because absolute-ness was common in this respect, not distinguishing any of these three meanings from one another. **What is obtained** [from this discussion] is that the answer depends on the proof that a single entity is the same as the Necessarily Existent – regardless of whether this entity is necessity or some other thing. [15b] What they said is that ‘sole existence’ (wujūd baḥt) is the same as the Necessarily Existent, only if Ibn Sīnāʾ’s answer is correct in his *al-Shifāʿ*, which was excerpted in [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī’s] *al-Muḥākamāt*.

In the last lemmata of the second day, Ḫ cites a counter-objection from a fellow scholar, ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s student Şeyḫ Şücāʿ (d. 929/1523), who was also said to have upheld J as more virtuous than his peer Taftāzānī like Ḫ. Şücāʿ’s argument assumes that necessity does not need be a single reality and, for this reason, it cannot be equal to ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ) in Avicenna’s famous formulation that equates ‘pure existence’ with

100 Al-Taḥtānī, *al-lāhīyat min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

101 Due to the epithet şeyh, the scholar referred here should probably be Tūsī’s brilliant student Şeyh Niyyāz Şücā’uddīn-i İlyās, not Ḫ’s student with the same name, who also held a post at the prestigious Şah-ı Semān at the time that Şeyh Şücāʿuddīn İlyās was Tūsī’s assistant, he also became Eşrefzāde-i Rūmī’s (d. 874/1469-70 [?]) close associate in Sufism. Eşrefzāde considered him better at solving puzzles than his master Tūsī (Ḫoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācüʾt-tevārīḫ*, 2: 567). As a great admirer of Ḫ, Şücāʿuddīn-i İlyās also contemplated to study with the master in Brusa but did not go against the will of his mother who did not want him to study in peripheral Anatolian cites (*Taşḳöprizāde, al-Shaqāʾiq*, 318; Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 330-1). Having taught for many years in cities, such as Edirne, Brusa, and Constantinople, Şücāʿuddīn also wrote glosses on J’s gloss on the *Taṣjud al-ʾiʿtiqād* (*Süleymaniye, MS Fatih 2939*), as well as Ḫayālī’s gloss on Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid* (*Süleymaniye, MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513*). Taftāzānī’s work briefly refers to birhān al-tamānuʿ with regard to the arguments from power, free will, unity and contradiction, incipience, need, and possibility – without dwelling much on arguments from necessity and existence (al-Taftāzānī, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, 37-9). One possible place of this argument might be in Şücāʿ’s gloss on Ḫayālī where he argues that quiddities do not imply diversity in God since they do not come from the genus of things, which would, otherwise, require the Necessarily Existent to be composite. See the lemmata “kawnuhu taʿālā min jins al-ʾashyāʾ” and “fa-lā yalzimu al-tarkīb, naʿm, yalzimu mushārakatahu taʿālā liʾl-ʾashyāʾ fī tamām al-māhiya, fa-yalzimu al-imkān wa-hādhā muḥāl”, in Şücāʿuddīn-i İlyās, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā ḥāshiya ʿalā sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid*, MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513, f. 26b).

102 The text in *al-Shaqāʾiq* implies that Şücāʿ found J more virtuous than Taftāzānī since, though the latter was a noble man, [some of his views] were troublesome (*Taṣḳöprizāde, al-Shaqāʾiq*, 318; Mecdī adds that the latter was stricken with a junk of unfounded apprehensions, delusions, and doubts (“ḫis ū ḫāşāk-ı tevehhümāt ve şükūk u sûbāt ile mükedderdür”, in Mecdī, *Ḥadāʾiḳüʾş-şaḳāʾiḳ*, 330). This is also apparent from the fact that Şücāʿuddīn provides specific references from J’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* on many instances in his gloss in comparative perspective with Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid* (see MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513, ff. 20b-21a, 30a, 40a, as well as 36b, the latter of which also refers to J as a virtuous “verifier” [muḥaqqiq]).
the NE. In other words, if the philosophers cannot guarantee that the third meaning is not composite of multiple realities, that is, if necessity here has two realities, then, for Şücā', it cannot be equivalent to existence as in the first two meanings.

As the text indicates, Ḫ responds to Şeyḥ Şücā’s counter-argument in the following way: necessity can never have multiple essences in the context of the NE, because the third meaning already guarantees that necessity is a differentiator of essences that ensures that the NE is singular. For Ḫ, avoiding multiplicity is a must, and here it precisely refers to the multiplicity of isolated units that necessity may constitute. As follows, the necessity in the third sense has to be taken as a single reality in any case with regard to God.

As an answer to both Şücā and Z, Ḫ then concludes that this case is still in line with Avicenna’s argument concerning ‘pure existence’. Otherwise, there would be no way to pinpoint necessity’s exact meaning here for it may denote anything from the first two meanings to the absolute sense of the third. Ḫ notes again that this cannot be the case, since absoluteness may also denote a commonality that is shared among multiple entities. In certain passages, Avicenna distinguishes ‘absolute existence’ from ‘pure existence’, and the former cannot denote God’s singularity but refers to a generic logical category shared by other entities. This distinction is in a passage excerpted by the celebrated post-classical theologian Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī in al-Muhākamāt. What Avicenna may mean here is that God has a special mode of existence called ‘pure existence’, which is perfectly consistent with his initial thesis.

5.4.4 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

Ḫ ended the previous day by linking necessity with the philosophers’ ‘pure existence’. Upon Z’s counter-arguments and denial of this claim, the thrust of the debate on the third day moves to the status of existence and necessity in the philosophers’ God and the question whether necessity can be equal to His ‘pure existence’.

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that this aspect has been preceded by the argument that necessity is the same as quiddity. This statement assumes that the universal quiddity here belongs to the Necessarily Existent, and this is not correct regardless of whether it directly has external multiplicity by what is required by this proof. Thus, what is intended by quiddity [here] is an individuated haecceity (huwīyya shakhṣiyā). The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that then this implies composition.

Ḫ continues his defense with a disclaimer from Ī/J: according to Ḫ, both scholars observe that the philosophers’ claim concerning ‘pure existence’ is preceded by the premise that necessity is equal to quiddity. However, in this

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103 In a discussion about the nature of entification, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī writes that the reality of the NE is ‘pure (or abstracted) existence’ that subsists in essence. See “wa-l-jawāb: ‘inna haqiqat al-wājib mujarrad al-wujūd al-qā’im bi-dhāṭiti, wa-laysa nafs al-wujūd al-muṭlaq”, in al-Taḥtānī, al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muhākamāt, 77.
context, necessity, like quiddity, can neither be universal nor particular.\textsuperscript{104} So this premise contradicts with their thesis.\textsuperscript{105} This is because quiddities, for I/J, are never specific to universal categories or individuated haecceities; otherwise, they will undermine the singular nature of God, which cannot be conceived similar to the logical categories of universality and particularity.

Upon citing I/J’s view, H’s point here is to clarify certain philosophical vocabulary like individuation and haecceity in the face of God’s existence. According to the philosophers, each particular individual is composed of a quiddity and an entification at the very moment when each individualizes to distinguish itself from others. This hinders multiplicity, since both terms are only mental entities (and pure quiddities do not exist in the outside world unless they receive concomitants). Likewise, an existent is a thing with a distinctive individuality, and the unity of all these features does not imply multiplicity either. Again H emphasizes the status of \textquoteleft tibārāt\textquoteright to indicate that these terms are not real entities; necessity and existence defined as conceptual can well justify the Avicennan thesis.

Another possible reply to I/J can be phrased through the \textquoteleft tā‘ayyun\textquoteright term ‘entification’ (entification) (\textit{tā‘ayyun}), and the argument is as follows: each individual composed of quiddity is in need of an entification to be able to emerge externally; thus, there cannot be two Necessarily Existents because they will eventually have to distinguish themselves from one another.\textsuperscript{106} Contrary to the positions of Z and Rāzī, entification here denotes neither composition nor outside existence, since it is, as H underlines, simply “in relation to the mind” (bi-ḥasab al-dhihn) – with no implications in extramentality.

Blasphemy was a common accusatory rhetoric employed in court debates and theological exchanges, especially when a losing party had no grounds to argue further against his opponent other than desperately accusing him with blasphemy. Also served as a reply to Z’s claim of \textit{kufr} on the same day, H’s rejoinder underscores that entification is a mental consideration as in the cases of quiddity, existence, and necessity, which may be called ‘Avicenna’s trinity’.\textsuperscript{107}

What quiddity is to individuals here is like what genus is to differentiae, and all these terms are among \textit{iʿtibārāt}. This point also passes H’s gloss on Mullažâde al-Kharziyânî’s \textit{Hidāya al-ḥikma} commentary, which states that genus and differentia are only mental capacities that are one in making and

\textsuperscript{104} Marmura, “Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna”, 61. Marmura writes that Avicenna sometimes uses ‘universal’ in a broad sense to refer to quiddity/essence, which is not properly speaking related to ‘universality’. Also see Marmura, “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals”, 39.

\textsuperscript{105} Quiddities are described as being neither one nor many, neither particular nor general, and neither existing nor non-existing. These points also appear in J’s Position Two, Observation Two, Observation Two (2.2.2) on Quiddities (al-Jurjānî, \textit{Sharḥ al-mawāqif}, 3: 18-21). Also see Avicenna’s and Ŧūsî’s comments in \textit{al-ṭashābḥāt wa-l-ḥabībāt}, 3: 472-4, 479-81.

\textsuperscript{106} The first aspect regarding the philosophers’ proof is the argument from entification, which is as follows: “If there are two Necessarily Existents, these two existents will then be differentiated by entification, primarily because necessity, as we said before, is the same thing as quiddity” (al-Jurjānî, \textit{Sharḥ al-mawāqif}, 8: 45). In the same line with H, this argument defines necessity as that which requires to be distinguished from others by essence.

\textsuperscript{107} Ghazâlî asserted that the root cause of the philosophers’ unbelief (\textit{kufr}) was due to their emulation of the Jews and the Christians in thinking, which led their disregard for religious law and negligence of religious duties (Griffel, \textit{The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy}, 83). Provided that Avicenna’s formulation of simplicity and singularity went back to Yahyâ ibn \textquoteleft Adî’s formulations of simplicity in the Trinity, it could be arguably claimed that Z might have accused H of emulating a controversial Christian Orthodox doctrine.
existence, meaning that the relationship between quiddities and distinct individuals can be freely applied to the case of logical categories. His emphasis on the i’tibārī nature again is probably to silence Z, since, from the theologians’ perspective, mental conceptions can also conform to their assumption that necessity and existence are accidentally superadded to God’s quiddity/essence.

I say that the author has explained in the discussion about entification (taʿayyun) that an auxiliary individual (shakhṣ muʿayyan) is composed of quiddity [and entification], and the entification [here] is rather with regard to the mind with no [implications in] extramentality (khārij) since the author said that the relationship of quiddity to concrete individuatednesses (mushkhasat) is here like the relationship of genus (jins) to differentia (faṣl). It is that [16a] a genus is ambiguous (mubham) in the mind having a capacity for multiple quiddities, and there is no entification for any of them – except differentia’s attachment (indīmān) to genus. Both [quiddity and entification] are united in essence, in making, and in existence in the extramental world, and the genus [here] can be distinguished only in the mind. Likewise, this ‘species’ quiddity’ (māhiya nawʿiyya) has a capacity for multiple entities that do not have multiplicity for any of them – albeit individuation (tashakhkhus), which is conjoined with the quiddity pertaining to species. These are united outside in essence, in making, and in existence, being distinguished only in the mind. [16b] So, there is no quiddity existent in the extramental world, and an existent is a distinctive individual (shakhṣ) such that an isolated unit (fard) is composed from both (nonetheless it is not correct to predicate quiddity with its individu- als). Yet, there is nothing here except a single existent, that is, an individual haecceity – with the exception of the mind breaking both into a species’ quiddity and an individuation, which is like breaking the species’ quiddity into a genus, a differentia, and a mental composition under the truth of Almighty God’s reality.

To put Ḫ in a tight spot, Z then picks up on the philosophical terms ‘entification’ (taʿayyun), ‘individuation’ (tashakhkhus), and ‘species’ quiddity’ (māhiya nawʿiyya, lit. ‘a quiddity pertaining to species’), compelling his opponent...

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108 See Ḫ’s lemma “Qāla: ‘an law thabata [...]”, which investigates the ways in which the term ‘form’ (ṣūra) could be defined. See Ḫ’s gloss on Mullāzāde al-Kharzīyānī’s Hidāya al-ḥikma commentary housed in Süleymaniye, MS Carullah 1326, 98b (dated 889/1484): “He said: ‘If it is affirmed that [...]’. I say: Genus is an equivocal (mubham) thing which penetrates into existence only after acquiring a specified difference, and both are in agreement with respect to the extramental world in making and existence”. The next lemma states that form is a species’ quiddity. For the Arabic: “Qāla: ‘an law thabata [...]’. ‘Aqūlu: Al-jins ‘amr mubham lâ yadkhulu fī al-wujūd îllâ ha’d tabsilî bi-faṣl yu’ayanahu wa-humā muttaḥidān baʿd taḥṣīlihi bi-faṣl yuʿayyanahu wa-humā muttaḥidān bi-ḥasab al-khārij fī al-ja’l waʾl-wujūd”.

109 Criticizing Porphyry’s definition of differentia as being predicated of many items differing in categories, Avicenna redenfines differentia as “an [essential] universal that is predicated of a thing in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ with regard to its substance” in al-Ishārāt waʾl-tanbīḥāt (Di Vincenzo, “Avicenna Against Porphyry’s Definition”, 179).
to clarify how their involvement will not affect God’s singularity. During the rest of the day, Ḫ makes specific analogies between necessity and other mental considerations to show how necessity will not denote multiplicity in concreto. With one crucial difference from Avicenna, Ḫ does not see entification and species’ quiddity as ‘necessary concomitants’ (sing. lāzim), a term that denotes essential co-existence rather than accidental superaddition. For him, their existence does not limit the philosophers’ proof; none-theless, his own verified position is that the two are superadded entities.

As a way of clarification, Ḫ expands on the nature of entification as such: according to the philosophers and their later critics like I, entification is required for quiddity to come out in the extramental world, and is a key step before individuation. There are no real entifications extramentally, and this is true again for the similar case observed in differentia’s attachment to genus. For instance, if animal is a genus of human beings, then the differentia here, that is, the characteristics that distinguishes human beings from other animals, will be rationality, a term that gives haecceity to this quiddity.

Technically speaking, entification is a mental quality that only comes out when there is a differentia, that is, a universal distinguishing mark in relation to a genus, entifying one individual from another. Otherwise, a genus among individuals will have the capacity of receiving multiple quiddities only in the mind. The division among them is precisely mental, with no existence in the outside world. In short, for Ḫ, quiddity, entification, and distinctive individuals in this case are all one in essence, making, and existence, but only distinguished in the mind to overcome composition. This is the reason why the cases of genus and differentia are used as analogies in Ḫ’s text.

Moving along the same line, a similar analogy can be also applied to the Avicennann cases of individuation and species’ quiddity, both of which are among mental considerations. Individuation is an aspect that appears when predicating a quiddity of a subject in terms of particularity, and it is conjoined with a species’ quiddity only mentally and accidentally. As Ḫ states, both terms are united outside in essence, making, and existence, being only distinguished in the mind. Once an entity becomes distinct through quiddity’s receiving a species’ quiddity via entification, it becomes existent as an individual haecceity. Again, none of these terms entails multiplicity, since they are simply the mind’s apparitions that provide explanations for individuation. Quiddity’s acquiring individuation and entification simply belongs to our mental capacity.

It is observed that the same point also appears in Ḫ’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa, which is as follows: being composed of individuation and quiddity is like being composed of intelligible parts (sing. juzʿ ʿaqli), which are among intelligibles – not of extramental parts. Having argued that entification and individuation are mental qualities similar to the logical categories distinguished in the mind, Ḫ comes to the conclusion that the glossator ḤÇ is wrong in thinking that necessity is in need of intelligible parts. Necessity neither depends on anything to exist nor has any real existence in the outside world. Thus, the necessity’s dependence on mental particularities can-

111 Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 205.
not be true in reality. The only modification to Avicenna’s position that Ḫ brings is that despite the philosophers’ thesis that entification and species’ quiddity are necessary concomitants that coexist with quiddities essentially, both terms should be interpreted as ‘superadded accidents’.

The Glossator said that each of these aspects relies on existence’s being a species’ nature (tabī‘a naw‘iyya). I say that there is a disagreement [here] since if we were to assume the validity of both aspects, then [the aspects of] “necessity’s being a nature pertaining to species” and “its relying on a thing (shay‘)” would be invalid. It is certain that this is true and evident according to the validity of this thing. As for that, there is a contradiction between [the statement about] necessary concomitances [with regard to] the validity of these aspects and [the statement about] existence’s being [17a] a species’ nature. This is because the validity of both [of these statements] requires the negation of multiplicity absolutely; and necessity’s being a species’ nature requires [the aspect of] multiplicity. At least, this [aspect] is in the mind, and one should beware of, so to speak, the composition of species’ nature and entification necessarily.

In the next lemma, Ḫ entertains a possible objection by ḪÇ. Again to evidence that Avicenna’s sense of necessity connotes diversity, ḪÇ notes that, in certain passages, the philosophers identify existence and necessity with species’ natures, which are, in certain other passages, described as capacities applicable to particulars. 113 If necessity is a species’ nature, then it will rely on another quiddity, thereby becoming an existent with real existence in concreto – not mentally as previously suggested. ḪÇ’s original lemma that appears in J’s discussion on God’s unicity is as follows:

His statement “This has two aspects […]”. Each of these aspects relies on necessity’s being a species’ nature, and this is impossible due to the permissibility that the intension of necessity is a universal that occurs externally to what falls under it among the realities of necessity’s isolated units. There is no doubt that what is imagined by necessity’s being equal to the Necessarily Existent’s quiddity is not this generic intension but ‘what falls under it’; therefore, two Necessarily Existents will end up being distinguished [from one another] by essence. As a result, compositeness will not follow, and this special necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent’s quiddity, will require an entification. Thus, the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent is impossible, and what we have said shows that the Necessarily Existent is not dependent on the proof of the philosophers. The statement of the author is invalid, and the competition is over. 114

ḪÇ renders the philosophers’ point by interpreting that necessity is associated with a species’ nature; therefore, necessity cannot be the generic intension of God’s quiddity. ḪÇ does not, however, realize that the philoso-

113 The same misconception about the philosophers that they apply species’ natures to the Necessarily Existent, a debatable interpretation which makes God, in turn, predicated by many, also appears in Shahrastānī’s section on “On the Unity of Necessary Existence”, in Struggling with the Philosophers, 46 (Arabic/English).

114 See the lemma “qawluhu: dhālik li-wajhayn”, in al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 8: 45.
phers do not precisely say this. For them, the terms like quiddity, existence, and necessity (especially in relation to God’s essence), are concepts transcending universality and particularity. In fact none of these implies multiplicity in the philosophers’ paradigm by way of ‘species/genus’ natures’ (sing. tabī‘a naw‘iyah/jinsiyya). This oversight leads HÇ to conclude, similar to Z’s repeated point, that necessity cannot be the exact intension (the real meaning of its quiddity) since it is associated with a species’ nature only in the case of ‘what falls under it’.

Based on this, HÇ further points out two possible internal contradictions in Avicenna, which are also mentioned in Rāzī’s commentary on al-Ishārāt. If the philosophers’ doctrine is interpreted to be dependent on existence’s being a species’ nature, this will suggest the assertions that (a) necessity is a species’ nature and (b) relies on another thing. As a reply to Rāzī, Ṭūsī has rebutted such claims, noting that the philosophers never stated that existence and necessity are species’ natures. And Rāzī’s view might simply be picked up by HÇ.

The argument that necessity is a species’ nature was a common attribution to the philosophers, and many fifteenth-century Ottoman theologians, such as Ṭūsī and Hayālī, in a similar fashion to HÇ, seemed to have based their interpretations on this assumption. Remembered most notably for his famed gloss on the Sharḥ al-‘aqāʾid and a commentary on his tutor Ḫıżır Beg’s (d. 863/1459) al-Qaṣīda al-nūniyya, Hayālī penned a similar exposition in the latter work:

The philosophers said that if the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent were to be by His [own] essence and if the necessity [here] were the same as His quiddity, then both partners would be distinguished by entification. This is because there can be no dualism without differentiation (intiyyāz) by [way of] entification (taʿayun), and the compositeness of each of these two haecceities would require a common quiddity and a differentiating entification, which would be absurd. It is no secret that the basis [of this proof] is [related to] necessity’s being a species’ nature. For, otherwise, provided that necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, both partners will never differentiate [from one another] by essence without the need for entification. On the contrary, the Necessarily Existent is regarded as immutable, [but this is not guaranteed] in any respect. There is no proof of this. Rather, the verified view is that necessity is a mind-dependent attribute, so there will be no compositeness whatsoever. I know that this issue is almost bound by the necessity’s premises that are crucial for this proof. That’s why, you see that the wise ones do not adhere to the dispute other than the Dualists.

115 Mayer writes that Rāzī’s interpretation regarding the NE being a species’ nature is also implied in Avicenna’s argument (Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 203). Regarding Rāzī’s point on the existence being a species’ nature, see also Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 212.

116 One of the four inconsistencies that Shahhrastānī identifies in his Muṣāraʿa is related to the fact that the Necessary of Existence can be predicated by many, which makes God a species even though He cannot be (see al-Shahrastānī, Struggling with the Philosophers, 46 [Arabic/English]).

117 A similar (mis)attribution to the philosophers is also present in al-Ŷūsī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 220-1.

118 Hayālī, Sharḥ al-ʿallāma al-Ḥayālī ṣalā al-nūniyya, 164.
According to Ḫayālī’s commentary, the philosophers claim that if there are two NEs, then they will have to distinguish themselves from one another by *entification* in order to realize their respective necessary existences. This is absurd since, in turn, this will imply composition. Entification, for Ḫayālī, cannot be an essential aspect, and if it is, then cannot be used for God.

Again Ḫayālī oversees the fact that this proof derives from necessity’s being a species’ nature (an attribution to the philosophers by Shahrastānī and Rāzī). This is because, otherwise, both partners will not be able to differentiate one another due to Ḫayālī’s associating entification with a species’ nature since only contingent beings can get entified. He claims that the point about the nature of entification cannot be proven, yet based on this, it could be demonstrated that necessity is an accidental superaddition to quiddity since this is the only thing that will guarantee no composition in God’s nature. Due to necessity’s purported links to a species’ nature, there are other similar views in support of Z’s claims about the accidentality of necessity, a conceded view among Ottoman theologians.

The lemma above indicates that Ḫayālī conversely envisioned entification as evoking a sense of commonality due to its being associated with a species’ nature. Therefore, he thinks that there is no place for entification in certain proofs, including that of God’s unicity. Similar to Z and Rāzī, he simply follows the theologians’ view that necessity is solely superadded and accidental. After summarizing his opponent’s views, Ḫ ends the day with some concluding remarks as follows:

**So the correct answer is** the position in the first sense, which states that necessity’s reliance [on a thing] is [due to] necessity’s being a species’ nature, not absolutely, but with respect to the assumption of multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent or its being the same as the Necessarily Existent [itself]. These are required for the position, and it is no secret that this reliance does not refute the assumption of the aforementioned aspect’s validity. As for the second aspect, it relies on necessity’s being the same as the Necessarily Existent, not on the species’ nature that it has. This is because if the statement that is based on “necessity’s being the same as a species’ nature” here follows that the Necessarily Existent is composed of both [necessity and nature pertaining to species] \(17b\), as well as an entification that is not observable, then the occurrence [here] would imply a difficulty (maḥdhūr). Let’s think about this! **It is no secret that** even if the reliance of these two aspects were to be correct with regard to necessity, but not with regard to a necessary concomitant (lāzim), [this is] because, according to the assumption of multiplicity, their reliance in reality would be based on the immutability (thubūt) of a thing’s being the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, as well as on the immutability of this thing being a common species’ quiddity. Just as [the philosophers] claimed that necessity is the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, they, likewise, also agreed that existence is the same as its very quiddity. This does not validate their consideration that each of these things would be the same as the Necessarily Existent. In this way, what is said about the first aspect is correct: if there were two necessary beings to be distinguished by entification – because existence is, in this case, a shared reality between the two – then the differentiation does not acquire an entification, which does not necessarily verify \(18a\) a dualism. Thus, the difficulty [here] implies composition. For the sec-
ond aspect, existence is what is required for entification, so if it were to be as such, then existence would either require entification (hence circularity follows), or not. As follows, the separation of both would be permissible without entification, and this would be absurd.

As a possible reply to Z, ḤÇ and, indirectly, to Ḥayālî, Ḥ makes the following conclusion. In his discussion on God’s unicity, J divides the philosophers’ version of *burhān al-tamānuʿ* into two aspects via I: while the first aspect of the proof acknowledges the requirement of entification for necessity, the second aspect, which is also based on the same premises, asserts that entification is superadded (*yanḍimmu ʿalayhi*) as an accident to necessity and quiddity to prevent composition.

Ḩ acknowledges the validity of the first aspect, which is based on the assertion that necessity relies on another thing due to necessity’s being a species’ nature. The first aspect is correct for Ḥ, insofar as necessity is not taken here as a ‘species’ nature’ in the absolute sense since the requirement of entification by itself prevents the existence of two Necessarily Existents. The only difficulty here is the implication of multiplicity due to necessity’s being a species’ nature. Ḥ settles that necessity’s being equal to God’s quiddity/essence neither supports the first aspect nor acknowledges J’s point.

The second aspect, on the other hand, relies on the philosophers’ initial thesis concerning necessity – albeit without the implication of a species’ nature. For Ḥ, this leads J to the mistaken conclusion that the NE will then consist of species’ nature and necessity. He rather notes for the second aspect that entification requires existence, but it cannot be said vice versa or else there will be circularity, and the separation of both partners without entification will be impossible. Unlike the first there does not seem to any hefty objections to the second aspect by Ḥ.

As a way of conclusion on the fourth day, Ḥ suggests that the terms ‘entification’ and ‘species’ nature’ cannot necessarily signify composition according to the philosophers’ original thesis. Their proof may hold these terms to be ‘necessary concomitants’, yet, from the post-classical perspective, their existence is still problematic because they create multiplicity in quiddity and, to hinder this fact, both should be simply accepted as being superadded accidentally. And accepting them as necessary concomitants as the philosophers did in the past, will, nonetheless, make them unfitting for this proof for his contemporaries – a position of the philosophers that Ḥ ends up amending and modifying in the debate.

5.4.5 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that if entification requires necessity, then it requires to be posterior, and this is circular. I say that [this is] necessity’s being justified by entification. The Glossator said that an objection could be raised [here] such that entification’s requiring necessity with respect to the privation (*ʿadm*) of necessity’s requiring entification does not bring circularity. This is because entification would only require necessity if it were not to assume this privation first. It is responded that this assumption does not prevent the necessity of circularity as the fact of matter (*nafs al-ʾamr*), not [18b] correspond-
ing to the occurrence [itself] since necessity is [in fact] a cause for everything else as in reality (\textit{nafs al-amr}).

The fourth day continues with a discussion on the status of entification. Ĥ first outlines ĤÇ’s points in the latter’s gloss and then argues for their insufficiency by providing further references from Ĵ’s \textit{Sharḥ al-mawāqif}. ĤÇ’s initial critique of entification along with a summary of Ĵ’s line of thought is as follows: Ĵ writes that if entification requires necessity, then it is assumed that entification is obtained by necessity as well – a position that may lead to circularity since necessity is already a cause for entification. Following Ĵ, the issue here, for entification may be perceived as a cause for necessity. This is simply impossible because entification will still need to be acquired by necessity in the first place.

Based on these two comments about circularity, ĤÇ takes the contrary view, writing that entification’s requirement of necessity is based on necessity’s lack of requiring entification. For him, Ĵ is wrong in saying that there is circularity here, because entification’s requiring necessity with respect to the privation of necessity’s requiring entification will imply neither complementarity nor circularity. As a follow-up, one possible response to ĤÇ’s denial of circularity could be that necessity is a cause for everything else including entification; so if entification requires necessity, then the other way around is also true, a fact leading to circularity.

Contrary to ĤÇ, Ĥ denies that there is no circularity here, arguing the following: entification cannot be a cause for necessity since the latter is already the cause of the former, preventing entification to require necessity. In the lemmata above, Ĥ defines entification as a second intention in relation to the first intension of necessity, not vice versa. The distinction between first and second intentions can be traced back to Avicenna, who speaks of logic as a science dealing with second intentions as applied to the first. Entification cannot be a cause of necessity, since, deriving from first intentions, second intentions act as causes to them. As follows, necessity does not necessarily need entification; therefore, there is no evident case of circularity.

\textbf{I say that} it is no secret that this answer [here] is terrible since the second intention is an entification that is based on the first intention for necessity. Thus, if entification is considered to be a real characteristic (\textit{ḥāla}) for necessity, i.e. its cause, then there is no doubt that this real characteristic would not come together with the aforementioned intention, meaning that it will not be a cause. Then the first intention is invalidated and the second [intention] is corrupted for its being based on it; hence, there is no circularity. A similar statement also precedes the Glossator in a discussion about smooth surfaces (sing. \textit{ṣafha mulassa’}), but he [also] had a [different] position there.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{119} For the quote verbatim, see the lemma “qawluhu: wa-yalzimu al-dawr li-ʾanna al-wujūd”, in al-Jurjānī, \textit{Sharḥ al-mawāqif}, 8: 46.
  \item \textbf{120} See the quote verbatim in al-Jurjānī, \textit{Sharḥ al-mawāqif}, 8: 46-7.
  \item \textbf{121} First intentions are concepts of extramental things, such as horses, while second intentions are ‘concepts of concepts’ (for example, species which includes horse and human). See Amerini, “Intention, Primary and Secondary”, 555.
\end{itemize}
Ḫ supplements his answer with three further references from J’s same work showing that the past master already speaks of the philosophers’ sense: as for the first reference, Ḫ makes an analogy between necessity/entification and the case of smooth surfaces (sing. ṣafha mulassa). The latter example passes in J’s passage on place (makān), which is as follows: the philosophers argue that two equal smooth surfaces that perfectly correspond to one another will not be separated (like entification does with necessity), whereas it is the theologians who argue that they are two different things that can be distinguished. What J indicates here is that the philosophers’ case of smooth surfaces could be applied as an analogy to that of entification.

[Jurjānī] states that after accepting the sufficiency of ‘pure causality’ (mujarrad al-ʿilliyya), the privation of sufficiency is [now] imagined; however, if necessity were to be a complete cause – just as it is apparent in [the case of] necessity’s being [19a] the same as the Necessarily Existent – then there is no doubt about the sufficiency of this premise. It is also objected to this by the author in such a way that necessity is a requirement for an entification useful in limiting it, since, otherwise, this statement would be a negation of this limitation not due to a principle of requirement. As follows, it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement, as well as the implication of circularity, are based on the first possibility, and the permissibility of separation (infikāk) on the second. And this is subject to debate in this answer.

[Jurjānī] states that it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement are conceded. What is imagined from this is that the negation for limitation is not due to a principle of requirement. How is it then conceivable that the lack of requirement is nothing more than this? [Jurjānī] states that the implication of circularity is based on the first possibility and the permissibility of separation from the second is not apparent [19b] since the center of discussion in the examples of these cases is one only in mental consideration. [Jurjānī] states that these aspects are aware of the soundness of the first two ways. Both have preceded their states and this question has been [further] inquired. He has taken this as the correct answer, which is mentioned by the Glossator after taking his statements and positions into account so that it is responded to this as such etc.

As for the second reference, J associates necessity with ‘pure causality’ (mujarrad al-ʿilliyya), concluding that necessity requires entification as a quality that limits, in some ways, the extent of necessity (not the other way around). And for the third, which is supplemented by two additional short glosses by J, the definition of necessity depends on neither its requirement nor its lack of requirement of entification and any other entity. The circularity in the third reference is due to entification’s requiring necessity, which cannot be true. Otherwise, if entification and necessity are taken as separate entities from one another, then there will be no circularity due to the fact that these aspects are distinguished only mentally.

122 Al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 5: 142-3. ḤÇ further comments that the possibility of two smooth surfaces touching one another is evident (see the lemma “wa-illā lam yakun al-tamāss”, al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-mawāqif, 5: 142-3).
H concludes on the fourth day that the question whether necessity requires an entification, hence circularity is directly related to the first aspect mentioned above, which requires necessity to take on entification. Yet the permissibility of separation between necessity and entification is, in fact, associated with the second aspect, which can be further interpreted as having vied for entification’s being a superaddition, a view that departs from the philosophers.

5.4.6 Day Five. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (Wujūdiyya)

The fifth day is devoted to the question whether, as the philosophers claim, necessity can be regarded as an ‘existential notion’ (wujūdiyya). Given the fact that Ḫ, along with the most post-classical theologians, see necessity, as well as existence, among iʿtibārāt, it cannot be said that necessity can be externally existing by way of wujūdiyya. The problem of associating necessity with existential notion has been addressed before in the context of al-Ishārāt and its commentaries on Z’s fourth day, and Ḫ provides a possible answer to him through referencing Ī and HÇ in critical light.

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that [this statement] is based on necessity’s being an existent. The Glossator said that even if this is not necessarily so, it will be because necessity [here] is [defined as] either “essence’s requiring existence” or “that which has no need of others in existence”. I say that the aspect of limitation in this is [similar to] what was mentioned previously in the discussion about necessity and possibility, such that necessity in the second meaning is not in reality but unrestrictedly applied to it either by the allegorical interpretation (taʾwīl) of necessity, or by that of the principle of necessity. [20a] This [i.e. what the Glossator mentioned] is the foundation of proof for the invalid premise, and there is nothing wrong with it. There is no way to prove this invalid premise, and the proof that they have established does not work. Yet, it is possible that we can object to the proof, as the Glossator has also invalidated this, by questioning why it would not be permissible according to them that necessity would be a specific case (khāṣṣ), and what falls under these two intensions would be the same as what makes [the specific case’s] non-existence inconceivable by way of equating existence to necessity. Thus, existence is a thing in concreto (fī al-aʿyān). There is no doubt that necessity is a thing in mental consideration that cannot be verified in the extramental world, and the position is that they proved that the specific [case] and what falls under it would be the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent. As for [the case of] derivative predication (haml ishtiqāqī), this occurrence is also in existence.

123 Does Ḫ refer to compositional or attributable predications by the term ‘derivative predication’ here? Different from homonyms (identifying “inhering in a subject”) and synonyms (identifying “being said of a subject”), another category of predication, paronyms, which share a ground with homonyms, can be associated with derivative predications that denote composition and accidentality. Among none of the genera the predication is paronymous, which rather needs to be predicated univocally, since they are predicated synonymously with species. Going back to the Baghdad Peripatetics, there are two types of predications that inhere in a subject, i.e. homonymous and paronymous predications, the latter of which stresses “having mode of attribut-
(fī al-wujūd). The answer lies in the answer of this point. [Jurjānī] states that an unintelligible thing is intelligibly unintelligible, yet the statement here is not about something intelligible, which is a generic thing in mental consideration, but rather about the specific, and a specific thing’s being an intelligible thing by its true nature is prohibited.

In a passage in his al-Mawāqīf, Ī writes that the philosophers’ initial thesis relies on necessity’s being an existent, which is not true for their doctrine because, like quiddity, necessity is not an existent that has a real existence in concreto, only conceptually superadded. The glossator ḤÇ agrees on the view of the author Ī by stating that if it were not to be the case, it would still be due to the first two meanings of necessity mentioned above, i.e. (a) “essence’s requiring existence” and (b) “that which has no need of others in existence”.

In a later lemma on ḤÇ’s objection against necessity’s being an existential notion, Ḥ argues that the second meaning may only imply this but ḤÇ’s objection about the first is far from valid. As a more correct way to address this issue, Ḥ further suggests that ḤÇ could have directed his critique in a different way, maybe by asking why the proof here do not relate to a specific case or what falls under the first two meanings of necessity. It should be further noted that one of Ḥ’s contributions in the debate is to set necessity as iʿtibārī (not wujūdī) in order to conform to the position that it can be equal to God’s quiddity/essence rather than being superadded.

After this comment, Ḥ concludes that necessity’s being an existential notion is widely accepted in post-classical scholarship, and that the philosophers has successfully articulated that the special case of existence, as well as what falls under the meaning of necessity, is identical to God’s quiddity/essence. Thus, Z’s objections are not valid.

5.4.7 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence According to Their Thesis

The last day of the debate concerns whether it could be proven that the NE has to be a singular essence in light of the philosophers’ formulation. In order to prove that there is no instance of multiplicity in God, Ḥ has to further reconcile certain philosophical terminology like entification, individuation, and genus’ natures, by referring to the post-classical scholar Taḥtānī’s famed book of arbitration al-Muḥākamāt.

The author of al-Muḥākamāt said that if you say that we do not accept that if the Necessarily Existent were to be an entification of its essence,
then this would be limited by that auxiliary principle; and, indeed, this would be likewise if the Necessarily Existent were a singular essence.

This [point] would prevent the permissibility of the Necessarily Existent being a generic accident or a genus’ nature. Also this [aspect] is subject to debate because if necessity were a genus’ nature, then this would be correct. Distinguishing species that are classified under the Necessarily Existent from differentia follows from this. This [point also] brings a difficulty for the Necessarily Existent since He would be dependent on the composition of a species’ nature and an individuation. There is then no difference between them such that [21a] each of them has a mental composition, as we have mentioned previously.

The Commentator said: “What is required for entification that superadded to it [...]”. I say that this requirement is in line with [the points concerning] the addition of entification and the requirement of composition. FINIS.

Elaborating on a previous point, Ḫ brings evidence from Taḥtānī’s al-Muhākamāt, noting that mental conceptions like necessity, quiddity, and existence, which are all equal to the NE according to the philosophers’ formulation, cannot again be considered as ‘genus’ natures’ due to these terms’ connotating contingency. Avicenna notes that the Necessarily Existent has no differentiating factors additional to His quiddity, such as entification or individuation, which are parts of a thing’s haecceity.125 If the NE is accepted to be an entification of its own essence, then it is of a singular essence, demanding neither universality nor particularity. Otherwise, if necessity is taken as a species classified under the NE, then it will be requiring a differentia to emerge distinctly. This is impossible because this case will imply that the NE is composite of a species’ nature and an individuation. Affirming Taḥtānī’s position, Ḫ makes the conclusion that there is no problem in this statement as long as all these terms are one, only being distinguished mentally.

While Ḫ defends the philosophers’ version of burhān al-tamānuʿ, he also adheres to Taḥtānī (and Rāzī) in other aspects, like the nature of entification vis-à-vis that of necessity.126 Upon following the post-classical verifiers who accepted that entification is an accidental superaddition, Ḫ ends the debate amending the position of Avicenna (and Ṭūsī), such that if and only if entification is prevented from being a necessary concomitant as the theologians have claimed, then the problem of entification’s constituting composition in God will be solved.

In conclusion, the nature of entification is the only part on which Ḫ seems to disagree with the philosophers. In other occasions, he follows them very closely in the nitty-gritty of their unicity proof, especially with regard to the stated meanings of necessity. Yet, when the discussion is extended to other tangential topics, he does not also refrain from stating his own view, such that entification and species’ natures, contrary to Avicenna, are accidental superadditions (rather than necessary concomitants). Ḫ’s main aim in his defense is to show that Z is mistaken in his evaluation of the philos-

126 Al-Taḥtānī, al-ilāhīyāt min al-Muhākamāt, 79. Rāzī states that entification cannot be a concomitant since first it denotes commonality and, second, it ultimately leads to multiplicity (al-Rāzī, al-ilāhīyāt min al-Muhākamāt, 80).
ophers’ doctrine, and the nuances of their exposition are coherent in and of themselves. As a post-classical scholar who is skeptical about Avicennan realism, Ḫ argues that the Avicennan model can also be translated into the conceptualism of post-classical thought with certain modifications – especially through the conceptualization of mental considerations. In either case, necessity is taken as an ontological term that is conceptually distinct but the same as God’s quiddity/essence, as well as ‘pure existence’ in reality, a view for Ḫ that does not affect God’s singularity. While most theologians take necessity as a superadded accident, Ḫ argues that as long as necessity (as well as existence and entification) is taken as an iʿtibār, a non-entitative term that can only be distinguished in the mind, the philosophers’ thesis that necessity and existence are the same as God’s quiddity/essence can still be verified.