

The Border is the Violence

War, Empire and Migrants in the Making of the US-Mexico Border

Alexander Aviña

Arizona State University, USA

Abstract This text contextualises the weaponisation of public health laws during the COVID-19 pandemic by the Donald Trump administration within a longer history of the United States waging war, violence and torture on migrants in its southern borderlands. The use of Title 42 to refuse asylum requests – requests legally mandated by US and international laws – represents the rule, not the exception, within a violent border regime that continues to brutalise migrants.

Keywords Border. Violence. COVID-19. Public health. Migration. Migrants. War. Title 42.

Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 A Line in the Sand. – 3 Revolution at the Border. – 4 Cold Wars, Drug Wars, and Terror Wars. A Singular War Against the Poor. – 5 Do not Come. Title 42 and Public Health in the Time of COVID-19. – 6 Conclusions. No Human Is Illegal.

Nos han hecho la guerra patrullando fronteras
(Los Tigres del Norte 2002)¹

1 Introduction

In our current moment of emergency, a ‘hauntological’ reading of United States’ history reveals a series of spectres that still haunt this ongoing settler colonial project (Derrida 1993). These spectres remind a country that mythologises itself as an ‘end of history’ universal model for humanity that violence, conquest, exploitation, and dispossession made (and make) it possible. Written into the very document that declared US independence as enemies, “the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages” (United States Declaration of Independence, 1776) and black slave ‘domestic insurrections’ testify to the conditions of nation-State possibility that began prior to and during what historian Gerald Horne (2014) refers to as the ‘Counter-Revolution of 1776’: the genocidal structures and practices of indigenous territorial dispossession and black subjugation. Nineteenth-century Mexican and Chinese ‘nomadic proletarians’ recall histories of imperial expansion and capitalist exploitation justified by scientific racist ideologies, sustained by military violence, pogroms and lynching (Nail 2019). Similarly, in our time, Central American refugees form part of what we can call the harvest of US settler empire as they flee the consequences of US-supported death squad regimes and so-called free trade treaties (González 2011; Rana 2010).

These spectres haunt because they reveal the contingency of an violent settler colonial project that produces the very anxieties and disorders it seeks to control and subjugate (Kaplan [2002] 2005, 10-15). Most intensely, through resistance and sheer survival, they remind the US that it too is subject to limits, to consequences, to history. The past is never past and sometimes the chickens come home to roost, as Malcolm X once remarked. The ‘freedom dreams’ and repertoires of popular protest that harness memory, indignation, and rage to fuel quotidian resistance and outright rebellion in the present also suggest radical alternatives for the future (Kelley 2003). Even when such instances fail splendidly, to paraphrase W.E.B. Du Bois, they generate critical diagnoses of power that point out locations of State weaknesses and contradictions while poking holes in legitimising foundational myths (Du Bois [1935] 1998, 708).

The US-Mexico border is one such location; the frontier one such myth. A frontier that conceptually once served to signify the promise of endless growth and white settler freedom – a “proxy of liberation” as historian Greg Grandin (2019, 3) argues – has *again* become

1 “They’ve waged war on us by patrolling borders” (Author’s transl.).

in a recent era of border militarisation a “monster, growing, feeding on itself” in need of securing, control, and containment (Brinkley 1986a).² This ‘monster,’ Donald Trump announced in July 2015, necessitated the building of walls to keep out Mexican migrants responsible for introducing both illicit drugs and “tremendous infectious disease” into the US (Neate, Tuckman 2015). A year later, he added yet another element to the list of dangers that migrants allegedly trafficked into the country: subversive, ‘un-American’ ideologies that required “extreme vetting” and “ideological tests” (Lind 2016). The coupling of migrants with crime and contagion – epidemiological and ideological – would not only structure Trump’s immigration policies during his presidency but also his response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, the issuance of Title 42 in March 2020 by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) justified the expulsion of people who had crossed the US-Mexico border seeking asylum in accordance with US and international law on the grounds of a public health emergency.

To understand the weaponisation of public health law in the form of Title 42, we must go back in history to delineate how various forms of war-making created the physical, legal, and medicalisation infrastructures of the US-Mexico border – forms that enabled the creation of infrastructures that then systematised the practices of violence and torture of migrants. Violence at the border represents a structural rule, not an exception; the border is the violence. Based mostly on secondary literature, this article is an exercise of historical interpretation in selectively charting the long history of the US-Mexico border. Building on historian Ellen Wu’s suggestion on “centering war in US immigration policy”, it argues for placing myriad forms of war-making and war-making technologies at the centre of historical analysis of US borders, empire, and the creation of migrants (Wu 2019). Medicalisation and the association of migrants with contagion – criminal, racial, ideological and/or epidemiological – constitutes one such key technology. Title 42 represents its most recent iteration, a chapter in the longer history of border-making and border-maintenance made possible by imperial violence. Social wars make States, to riff off Michel Foucault and Charles Tilly, and the long war against migrants has played a key role in US State formation (Foucault 2013, 22; Tilly 1985).

This article thus explores how migrants are made historically and the role that borders play in that process from the US-Mexico borderlands in order to contextualise current State responses to the

2 My historical reading of the frontier/border – endless imperial expansion serving as a ‘fix’ for domestic contradictions and conflict – is heavily influenced by Grandin and Aziz Rana’s conception of ‘settler empire’ that argues for grounding white settler liberty and ‘self-rule’ in imperial conquest and the subjugation/control of subaltern populations (Rana 2010).

COVID-19 pandemic. This is partly a story of violence, particularly since borders are made and remade through US settler colonialism, imperial expansion and quotidian borderlands policing. As a relational, State-imposed category that uses racial difference to define US citizenship and national identity, and structure labour exploitation, the story of the migrant is also one of violence. But this is also a story of resistance to that violence. I conclude by thinking about what this history of borders, medicalisation as social containment, and migrant mobility can teach us during our current state of emergency.

2 A Line in the Sand

Quiero recordarle al gringo: Yo no crucé la frontera,
la frontera me cruzó

(Los Tigres del Norte 2001)³

If on paper the US claimed nearly half of Mexican national territory after its imperialist war of conquest in 1846-48, American cartographers sent to survey and draw the new border in 1851-53 often had to ask indigenous polities for protection and safe passage (St. John 2011, 21-3, 31-43). Even during the US-Mexican War, the border existed mostly as fictitious, aspirational renderings of State power – a feature both countries shared with prior Spanish colonial rule in its northern territories before Mexican independence in 1821. Quite simply, the area that we know today as the US-Mexico border – nearly 2,000 miles stretching from the Pacific Ocean, crossing deserts and mountain ranges before following the Rio Grande to the Gulf of Mexico – remained outside of settler State control. For an assortment of indigenous polities like the Apaches, Yaquis and Mayos wielded actual power in the borderlands well into the 1880s and 1890s. Waging periodic rebellions to protect their land and autonomy, such groups represented major threats to both Mexican and American claims of sovereignty. Conquering the borderlands thus required binational State cooperation.

Such cooperation, during the last decades of the nineteenth century, took the form of ‘Indian wars,’ settler colonialism, and capitalist development. Creating an industrialising US-Mexico border required the genocidal displacement of indigenous peoples and the commodification of their lands: an army war and a commodity war to borrow from historian Adolfo Gilly (2005, 11). Capitalist development arrived in the form of guns, horrific massacres, ethnic cleansing, plunder, railroads and barbed wire to transform an entire region conceptualised as a “mythical ‘barren’ wasteland awaiting development” (Lim

³ “I want to remind gringos: we didn’t cross the border, the border crossed us” (Author’s transl.).

2017, 33). When railroads arrived in border cities like Nogales, Arizona and El Paso, Texas in the early 1880s, the expansion of mining, livestock ranching, commerce and (in some irrigated regions) the beginnings of commercial agriculture followed suit (Lim 2017, 35-6). Aside from generous government concessions provided by both the US and Mexican governments to capitalists, this 'capitalist revolution' also required labour (St. John 2011, 65-7). On the Mexican side of the border, smallholding peasants who lost their lands during the legalised land plunder regime of President Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910) joined the ranks of a mining and agricultural working class.

Migrants from around the globe, often following the networks created by commerce and capital, also arrived. For the global 'Age of Empire' (1875-1914) was also the age of mass mobility (Hobsbawm 1989). Fleeing imperial wars, violence, famines and/or simply seeking a better life, "25 million Europeans and hundreds of thousands of Asians and Latin Americans" moved to the United States from the 1880s to 1920s (Goodman 2020, 10). They made US industrialisation possible; they built the American 'Thebes of the Seven Gates' that had begun an imperial expansion into the Pacific and Caribbean after the end of the Civil War while it waged its genocidal war against indigenous communities in the Plains and West (Brecht 1935). Employers and labour recruiters brought a transnational motley assortment of workers to the borderlands - Mexicans, black Americans, Chinese and Europeans - that quickly inspired a series of anxieties over race, labour and sovereignty that unfolded according to both local and national conditions. At the very moment that capitalism demanded mobile armies of labour, white settler societies like the US moved to create "regimes of immobility and enclosure in response to the real and imagined mobility of Asian migrants" (Atkinson 2016, 2). Chinese migrants became the main target.

The modern US immigration regime of regulated movement, surveillance, exclusion, detention and expulsion traces its foundational roots to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act that banned Chinese migration to the US. This regime began by practicing its system of racial differentiation and border-making on deportable Chinese bodies, fuelled in part by decades of Orientalist fears that associated Chinese migrants with the spread of diseases like cholera and plague (Goodman 2020, 10-15; Shah 2001). Exclusionists in California claimed that Chinese prostitutes spread more dangerous forms of venereal disease that threatened to 'poison Anglo-Saxon blood' and even cause the downfall of US society (Lee 2003, 33). The demand for exclusionary borders directed outwardly - shaped partly by imagined epidemiological fears - reflected white internal anxieties over shifting race, class and gender relations.

Pushed by a white settler class alliance composed of capitalists and workers, the anti-Chinese legislation revealed an additional anxiety to

match the racialised labour one: an imperial spatial anxiety derived from settler colonialism (Goodman 2020, 24). For the very Supreme Court rulings that established the doctrine of federal ‘plenary power’ over immigration law after the 1882 Act (*Chae Chang Ping v. United States 1889*), based on the concept of national sovereignty in the face of perceived ‘outside’ threats, depended upon earlier court rulings that legally justified the treatment of Native Americans as ‘internal foreigners’ (*United States v. Kagama 1886*). Such rulings enabled subsequent Congressional legislation that stripped Native political and territorial sovereignty – the Dawes Act of 1887 (Lim 2020). This tandem forging of plenary power at the expense of *certain* immigrants and Native Americans, as historian Julian Lim argues, revealed deep anxieties about US territorial expansion during the late nineteenth and whether the federal government actually exercised power in the Far West. In the context of the mass migration of racialised Others and sustained indigenous resistance and survival, the borderlands remained illegible from the standpoint of US sovereignty and would need ‘securing’ (Lim 2020, 221-3). Such securing required the exclusion of Chinese migrants (and eventually all Asian migrants with the exception of Filipinos) and the extermination of indigenous sovereignty.

The immigration regime thus expanded in scope and power to help ‘secure’ the US-Mexico border during the 1890s and early 1900s as US borders expanded extra-continentially with colonial possessions after the 1898 Spanish-American War. With plenary powers, the federal government determined which migrants to welcome, exclude, or deport with little to no judicial overview based on racialised and ideological prerequisites. In 1891, a new Immigration Act included new categories used to exclude and deport migrants: “individuals with contagious diseases”, those “likely to become public charges”, and women accused of immoral (read: sexual) acts (Goodman 2020, 21-3; Lee 2003, 37). A newly formed federal Bureau of Immigration was charged with screening migrants and putting into practice immigration legislation. Twelve years later, an additional act permitted the barring of entry for migrants suspected of harbouring radical political ideologies, in particular anarchism (Tilner 1987). The US had become a “gatekeeping nation [...] largely based on race and nationality”, along with gendered and ideological prerequisites (Lee 2003, 16). Its southern border thickened, became something more than just “a line in the sand” (St. John 2011, 9).

3 Revolution at the Border

The 1910 Mexican Revolution helped materialise the US-Mexico border as a physical barrier. Thousands of Mexican labourers and agricultural guest workers, matched by refugees fleeing the violence

of the 1910 Revolution, encountered a gradually built physical infrastructure and legal apparatus that included fences, checkpoints, tens of thousands of soldiers and State police, customs houses, detention/deportation and even patrol planes (Goodman 2020; *New York Times* 1916; *Los Angeles Times* 1919).⁴ The first fences erected in California and Arizona in 1909 and throughout the 1910s responded to US concerns over enforcing neutrality laws, preventing the cross-border spillover of violence and arms smuggling, and waging borderlands counterinsurgency to ‘quarantine’ against transnational political radicalisms and revolutionary movements.⁵ Mexican revolutionary leader Pancho Villa’s 1916 cross-border raid on Columbus, New Mexico and World War I further intensified US concerns over ‘securing’ its southern border. Such securing translated into increased policing for border communities long accustomed to a sort of transnational fluidity, at times devolving into the sort of racial pogroms and horrific extralegal State violence experienced by Mexicans in the Texas borderlands from 1915-20 (Muñoz Martínez 2018).

Medicalisation matched the militarisation of the border during the 1910s; concern over epidemiological pathogens paralleled worries over political ‘pathogens’. Indeed, both represented two sides of the same counterinsurgent coin, as historian Alexandra Minna Stern (1999) demonstrates. Using medical knowledge and public health experiences gained in US colonial wars and nation-building waged in places like the Philippine Islands and Cuba, military officers, Public Health Service (USPHS) doctors, and federal immigration officials used medical quarantines and coercive sanitation practices against working-class Mexican migrants and Mexican-American border communities during and after the 1910 Revolution. Beginning in El Paso, Texas, in 1917, public health officials launched a quarantine ostensibly against typhus fever that subjected border-crossers from Mexico crossing the Santa Fe Street Bridge into the US to a humiliating and toxic process of medical inspection in a ‘disinfection plant’. Working from the premise that “all persons coming to El Paso from Mexico, considered as likely to be vermin infested” (Stern 1999, 45), US officials put migrants through an exhaustive delousing process that included: stripping them naked; “chemically scouring” their clothes; sex-segregated showers that used a combination of water and toxic chemicals like kerosene and even Zyklon B according to historian David Dorado Romo; and,

⁴ Goodman (2020, 32) lists 1907 – the year of the Gentleman’s Agreement between the US and Japan that essentially ended all Asian labour migration to the former – as the beginning of this mass migration.

⁵ For example, the labour organising of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), the 1915 Plan de San Diego revolution in southern Texas and the 1917 Bisbee Deportation. For a list of violent, migrant expulsions carried out in the Southwest by local police forces targeting IWW labour organising during the 1910s, see Goodman 2020, 235 fn. 76.

smallpox inoculation “if deemed necessary” (Stern 1999, 45-6; Romo 2005, 221-8). And even if migrants passed, a final screening – “a general medical examination, cursory psychological profiling, and an interrogation about self and citizenship” – could still establish grounds for their exclusion (Stern 1999, 46). Workers who lived in Mexico but worked in the US experienced this process once a week.

That only four deadly cases of typhus fever in two months in 1916 provoked this medicalisation regime raises questions about intent and purpose. As Stern (1999) argues, this border quarantine – that inspected hundreds of thousands of Mexican bodies, lasted well into the 1920s and spread to other border points of entry – represented the exercise of biopower at the border (Foucault [1978] 1990, 140-3). The disciplining of Mexican bodies and the regulation/management of Mexican populations in El Paso, inspired by eugenicist and medical discourses, contributed to the racialisation of migrants whose labour US agro-capitalists needed (Stern 1999 50-3). By imagining Mexicans as living in unsanitary conditions and therefore making them the carriers of diseases like smallpox and typhus, these American medical officials helped make the US-Mexico border into a *racialised* boundary – and differentiated Mexican identity from a national to a *racial* one, neither white nor black. “Only after being cleansed – and, in turn, racialised”, Stern writes, “were Mexicans allowed cross the threshold from diseased body to desired labor” (1999, 73).

Such racial thinking and ‘desired’ Mexican labour impacted national debates in the 1920s over immigration. By 1919-20, the medicalised war-making on Mexican migrants at border points of entry was matched by a “deportation machine” that made Mexicans who entered the country without inspection the “typical deportee” (Goodman 2020, 32-4). The federal prohibition on alcohol and narcotics enacted in the 1910s subsequently allowed anti-migrant politicians to conflate migration with the smuggling of illicit substances when demanding the placement of police and military forces on the southern border (*New York Times* 1922a; 1922b; 1925). Indeed, the creation of the US Border Patrol in 1924 reflected the influence of eugenics-minded, nativist restrictionists who only partially won the migration debate with the 1924 National Origins Act. Though the Act continued the ban on Asian migration and created a severely restrictive national origins quota system for Southern/Eastern Europeans, it exempted the Western Hemisphere due to intense pressure from southwestern agricultural capitalists who needed Mexican migrant labour. The Immigration Act of 1929 made unauthorised entry a misdemeanour and subsequent attempts after deportation a felony punishable by fines and prison (Lytle Hernández 2010, 92). These acts collectively “created a new class of persons within the national body – illegal aliens – whose inclusion in the nation was at once a social reality and a legal impossibility”, as historian Mae Ngai argues (2004, 57).

While the law - and the Border Patrol as its policing arm - violently ensured that legal impossibility, US capitalism generated the social reality it needed (and profited from): workers deemed illegal or temporary and thereby more exploitable. In moments of crisis, as during the Great Depression of the 1930s, such workers became disposable and 'deportable'.⁶ To note one example from 1940: Border Patrol agents in California's Imperial Valley seized Mexican workers' health records in order to issue deportation warrants based on the affliction of "a loathsome and dangerous contagious disease" (Molina 2014, 100). When the outbreak of World War II helped end the Great Depression in the 1940s, agricultural capitalists needed labour and similarly counted on State officials to help in the form of the Bracero Program (1942-64): a binational US-Mexico labour agreement that provided nearly 5 million short-term contracts to more than 400,000 Mexican men to work in the United States (Goodman 2020, 46-7; Sifuentez 2016, 10-35). This programme reflected the type of racial logics and anxiety that earlier animated congressional commissions and debates over legislation that culminated in the 1924 Act. Mexicans represented a more ideal labour source because they generally wanted to return to their Mexican homes, not stay in the US. "In the case of the Mexican", the 1911 Dillingham Commission wrote, "he is less desirable as a citizen than as a laborer" (Denvir 2020, 23). Decades later, a Florida sugar planter expressed this crudely, if not more honestly: "we used to own our slaves; now we just rent them" (Grandin 2019, 182).

4 Cold Wars, Drug Wars, and Terror Wars. A Singular War Against the Poor

By the mid-1940s, expelling Mexicans had "emerged as the central project of the US Border Patrol" in which local agents wielded significant discretionary power in the application (or non-application) of immigration law with little juridical oversight (Lytle Hernández 2010, 148). In 1945, two anti-migrant physical spaces symbolised the US legacy of unjust detention and portended its massified future. Government authorities built chain link fencing near Calexico on the Mexico-California border from materials used in the Crystal City Internment Camp that caged Japanese Americans during World War II. Nearly 12 miles north in El Centro, immigration agents opened a detention camp for undocumented migrants. The death of five mi-

⁶ In 1930, the US Census listed 'Mexican' as a racial identity, followed by congressional legislative attempts that sought to limit birthright citizenship for the children of migrants in 1933. See Molina 2014, 79-98.

grants who died of dehydration in 1952 after the border fence forced them to cross through isolated, inhospitable terrain signalled an additional, deadly presage: the necropolitical weaponisation of landscapes by the US State officials to deter migration (Grandin 2019, 200, 327 fn 29; Ordaz 2021).

With the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the tripartite project of militarised border policing, detention and expulsion expanded, justified by an anticommunist logic that deemed the ‘porous’ southern border as a national security threat. “Aliens of the most dangerous subversive classes” could take advantage of this border porosity, US Attorney General Herbert Brownell argued in late 1953 (Goodman 2020, 52). A year later during the summer months, government officials launched ‘Operation Wetback’: a series of mass deportation campaigns along the US-Mexico border, Chicago and even in the Mississippi Delta that sought to cut down on unauthorised border entries. Through a combination of formal deportation, voluntary deportation, and self-deportation, more than a million mostly Mexicans were expelled before and during the operation. Yet, as historian Kelly Lytle Hernández argues, ‘Operation Wetback’ also represented a broader effort by the Border Patrol to “reinvent” border security and immigration control as “a site of crime control” (Lytle Hernández 2010, 156; see also Goodman 2020, 52-72). Drugs would come to represent a primary transnational element in that site.

As US politicians demanded that rival Cold War States elsewhere tear down walls, the ‘monster’ in the Southwest required new walls. Two ‘monstrous’ progeny thus helped shape the gradual emergence of a national political bipartisan consensus that agreed on the need for militarised border policies as an urgent matter of national security by the 1960s: the exponential rise of undocumented migration in the years after immigration reform in 1965 and the so-called War on Crime officially declared by President Lyndon Johnson that identified Mexico as the main supplier of marijuana to US consumers (Goodman 2020, 109-10).⁷ In a 1967 government report entitled *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, the authors argued that since most marijuana came from Mexico, a logical solution should consist of increased inspection and interception of “both drugs and people” at the border (Timmons 2017, 20). The transborder metropolis of Ciudad Juárez-El Paso was once again thrust into the vanguard of border control and wall-building – the site where wars on crime, drugs, and border-crossing people collapsed into one.

7 The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act removed the racist national origins quota system set in 1924 while also placing caps on migration from the Western Hemisphere for the first time. Such caps, plus the end of the Bracero Program in 1964 and additional caps in 1976 specifically targeting Mexico, forced Mexican workers long accustomed to legally seek work in the US to do so illegally.

In September 1969, President Nixon ordered ‘Operation Intercept’: the unilateral closing of the entire US-Mexico border and the inspection of all cross-border traffic to prevent the smuggling of illicit drugs into the country. Having won the presidency in 1968 promising to increase border policing and surveillance to deal with the ‘marijuana problem’, Nixon worked from and expanded Johnson’s border policy. A militarised crackdown across all major border crossing points, the operation resulted in massive automobile ‘border bottlenecks’ and economic distress in major binational urban spaces like Juárez-El Paso. As historian Patrick Timmons shows, the recommendations that Nixon received for ‘Operation Intercept’ materialised in later years as official border-making policy: racially profiling “the kind of person who smuggles contraband articles”; the use of radar, aerial reconnaissance, pursuit planes, ‘perimeter detection’ technology and the proliferation of fencing to prevent unauthorised crossings; and the collaboration between expanded Border Patrol forces and anti-narcotics agents throughout the borderlands (Timmons 2017, 20-1). While Mexican officials vigorously protested this operation, they ultimately succumbed to this form of border blackmail.

As undocumented migration from Mexico exponentially increased during the 1970s - along with marijuana and heroin smuggling spurred by American demand - politicians and policymakers began to deploy a political script that conflated drug trafficking with the ‘illegal alien’ - a dehumanising political construction of migrants that drew on a long American tradition of imagining migrants as simultaneously impoverished ‘public charges’ and ‘job thieves’ willing to tolerate hyper-exploitation (Hirota 2017). By the mid-1970s, the term had become common in television news clips and printed media (Dunn 1996, 18-19).⁸ Towards the end of the decade, ‘illegal alien’ was discursively accompanied by warlike language that spoke of ‘silent invasion’ coming from uncontrolled, insecure southern borders described as a ‘combat zone’ (Williams 1978). The southern border, in the words of one politician in April 1977, constituted “our Maginot Line [...] [where] the enemy is continually outflanking us and infiltrating our country [...]. And you know what happened to the French” (Sterba 1977; see also Wald 1977).

Cold War logic and the spectre of Vietnam further contributed to the militarisation of the borderlands after the presidential election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Previous efforts to create an ‘electronic fence’ along the border during the early 1970s, using the same technology from the ‘McNamara Line’ that failed to stifle North Vietnamese movement into South Vietnam, failed once again (Andelman 1973; Chaar-López 2019, 508). Rather than leading to critical reassess-

⁸ Julian Lim and Adam Goodman, personal communication, 19 May 2021.

ment, more Vietnam technology arrived in the borderlands during the 1980s – including infrared “viewing devices introduced by Marine Corps snipers developed by Marine snipers in Khe Sanh” – along with many Vietnam War veterans who joined a rapidly expanding Border Patrol now armed with military-grade weaponry (Harris 1980). When combined with the presence of anti-communist, white power paramilitary organisations (that also included Vietnam veterans, some with mercenary experience in 1970s-1980s Central America and Rhodesia) on the border in July 1986, it seems that the Ho Chi Minh trail had led all the way back to the borderlands (Belew 2018, 77-100). Empire returned home – to where it all began.

At the same time, in a moment of imperial psychological projection, Reagan’s support for death squads and genocidal dictatorships in 1980s Central America produced a third ‘monstrosity’ that stalked and thrived in an allegedly out-of-control US-Mexico border: Latin American Communist revolutionaries seeking the US’ destruction via military invasion and, according to congressional reports, drug trafficking. In multiple 1980s congressional hearings, politicians and expert witnesses alleged that the Soviet Union and its allies in the Americas used the trafficking “of illegal drugs to attack this [US] country” (US Congress, Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary 1985, 1). A useful porosity thus characterised the discursive and material boundaries between the War on Drugs, the War on Communism and the War on ‘Illegals’. Indeed, they converged in the figure of ‘narco-terrorism/narco-guerrilla’ that by 1986 had become, according to death squad enthusiast Elliott Abrams, “the hemisphere’s greatest security threat” (*New York Times* 1988; Ehrenfeld 1986; Brinkley 1986c). Reagan’s immigration reform in 1986 not only doubled the number of Border Patrol agents but was also matched by an anti-drug bill that gave such agents expanded powers in drug interdiction efforts (Brinkley 1986b; Human Rights Watch 1992, 4-5; *New York Times* 1986).

US empire continued its tradition of generating the very things it claimed to fight as it exported violence abroad and continued to militarise the borderlands at home. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the wars on drugs and migrants only intensified, becoming a form of governmentality during an era of globalisation that celebrated interaction, integration and movement across national borders – for capital. For labour, for undocumented migrants and refugees across the globe fleeing the wreckage of sovereign debt crises, the consequences of so-called ‘free trade’ treaties and ‘humanitarian interventions’, they experienced not a flattening world in the 1990s but an increasingly global regime of border walls, weaponised land and seascapes and mass incarceration. While elites celebrated the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, they quietly predicted the agreement’s displacing impact on poor

farmers and workers in Mexico (Nevins 2013, 114). The US-Mexico border thus experienced the fortification and militarisation of binational 'twin city' crossing points in California, Arizona and Texas. As part of a broader Border Patrol policy of 'prevention through deterrence' (PTD), such efforts worked to channel undocumented migration routes away from border cities to more isolated, dangerous physical landscapes that included deserts and mountain ranges. "Raising the risk of apprehension" at cities, "illegal traffic will be deterred or forced over more hostile terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for enforcement" (US Border Patrol 1994, 7).

These bureaucratic euphemisms muddled the intent of PTD. In the Arizona borderlands, it weaponised the Sonoran Desert and redirected culpability of harm to migrants themselves who risked all to cross through dangerous landscapes. It turned the region into what anthropologist Jason de León (2015) termed a "land of open graves" where thousands of desperate migrants pushed away from border cities - walled off by repurposed helicopter landing pads recycled from US imperial wars in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf - have died in the crossing attempt (de León 2015, 30-7; Miller 2016). Some disappear in the desert leaving behind pieces of clothing; the bones of others have been recovered by humanitarian groups. The Border Patrol used - and continues to use - those migrant deaths as a metric of PTD's effectiveness (Dickerson 2020). President Bill Clinton's broader policy of more walls, more criminalisation of migrants (through the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, IIRAIRA), more incarceration, and bigger Border Patrol budgets turned the borderlands "into a carpet of human remains" (Ortigoza quoted in Bogado 2018).

After 2001, the War on Terror joined the War on Drugs and War on 'Illegals' - a structure that, in practice, amounts to a singular global war against poor people that uses borders as "an ordering regime, both assembling and assembled through racial-capitalist accumulation and colonial relations" (Walia 2021, 2). Since 2001, the US-Mexico borderlands have gone global, both exporting its logics and practices of violence while also importing border knowledge and 'virtual wall' technology from other settler colonial entities like Israel (Schivone, Miller 2015). Ever beyond security and control, the borderlands are now constituted by layer upon layer of militarised police agents, walls and advanced technology - a "border-industrial complex", as termed by journalist Todd Miller (2019), that both continues to brutalise migrants and generate profits and political benefits for private security corporations and US politicians, respectively. As the US waged wars of conquest and occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US-Mexico border continued to shape the imperial outlook of politicians and military officials. In the 2011 operation that killed Osama bin Laden, military officials code-named him 'Geronimo', af-

ter that original border crossing Apache rebel who challenged US and Mexican sovereign power throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century (Westcott 2011). He still haunts US empire.

5 Do not Come. Title 42 and Public Health in the Time of COVID-19

The histories recounted thus far help contextualise the issuance of Title 42 by CDC Director Robert Redfield in March 2020 during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic (US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2020). An obscure public health directive that ordered the immediate expulsion of migrants arriving at US-Mexican and US-Canadian land Ports of Entry (POE) or Border Patrol stations, the order that invoked Title 42 is justified by a legal scaffolding of immigration legislation and laws shot through with the historical legacies of settler colonialism, eugenics, racism, and social control. It also violates international laws that guarantee the right of migrants to seek asylum. That the order targeted only those who attempted to enter the US through land POEs – overwhelmingly impoverished persons from throughout the Global South fleeing violence and seeking asylum – signals that the public health emergency order is yet another instance of State war-making against migrants at the US-Mexico border (Pillai, Artiga 2022). Arguing that migrants are coming from and travelling through countries ‘where a communicable disease exists’, Title 42 deploys the trope of migrants as ‘contagion’ threatening to ‘contaminate’ US society. Yet public health experts argue that it has few, if any, legitimate public health justifications (American Immigration Council 2022). Like El Paso in 1917, or the treatment of Haitian refugees as potential carriers of the AIDS virus during the early 1990s, the border is once again medicalised and quarantined for reasons other than public health (Pak 2013).

Indeed, Title 42 forms part of the most recent iteration of the long bipartisan war on migrants and undocumented communities that since at least 2010 includes the following practices: an array of State-level laws that persecuted undocumented persons; systematic US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids; mass deportations of over 3 million people; horrific family separation at the US-Mexico border; and the caging of migrants in a constellation of privatised and State prisons (Denvir 2020, 189-251). In its vicious persecution of migrants, the Trump administration (2017-21) wielded repressive tools, practices, and institutions forged and implemented by previous presidential administrations. Title 42 constitutes one such tool that, as journalists have demonstrated, emanated first from anti-migrant ideologues in the Department of Homeland Security and Trump’s

closest advisors and allies who long sought to ‘close the border’ – not the CDC and Director Redfield who initially refused to issue the order (Dearen, Burke 2020). With the collaboration of the Mexican government – acting as sort of colonial gendarme in helping to execute US migration policy – the US has expelled hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers, mostly to Mexico, since March 2020 (Hesson 2021). After expulsion and then stranded in Mexico, at least 3,300 migrants “were kidnapped, raped, trafficked or assaulted” as of June 2021 (Hesson 2021).

Despite the election and inauguration of a new president in 2021, Title 42 remains in place – albeit in modified form – at the time of writing. It seems that the ‘progressive’ politics of President Joe Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas stop where the US-Mexico border begins. “Do not come”, Harris, the daughter of migrants, told Guatemalans in June 2021 (quoted in *BBC News* 2021). Mayorkas, once a refugee from Cuba himself, told Haitians and Cubans in July 2021 that “if you take to the sea, you will not come to the US” (quoted in Rodriguez 2021). That the US empire currently has an assortment of multiracial operators with migrant backgrounds at its highest levels is not the biggest scandal. Perhaps the biggest scandal is that US empire, past and present, continues to fuel the very processes of structural and political violence, exploitation and climate change that transform people into migrants. Forced to flee their homelands, they arrive at the gates of the very country most responsible for their condition, only to be told, ‘do not come’.

6 Conclusions. No Human Is Illegal

Si con mi canto pudiera, derrumbaría las fronteras
(Los Tigres del Norte 2002)⁹

Placing war at the centre of border-making and migration history offers a radical point of departure for diagnosing what power looks like today. In confronting the outward physical manifestations of State power – borders, fences, border police, cages – migrant mobility exposes the exclusionary and exploitative logics that underscore US sovereignty and internally organise US society today. In a sense, borders historically work to racially differentiate and structure exploitative social relations within the US by demarcating externally who does not belong, who suffers deportation, who is policed, who is incarcerated, who dies in the crossing attempt. Moreover, this border work takes place on stolen indigenous land through the (attempted)

⁹ “If I could, I would demolish borders with my singing” (Author’s transl.).

elimination of indigenous communal sovereignty. Analysing migration through the lens of settler colonialism reveals an ongoing 'logic of elimination' that made and makes the US possible (Wolfe 2006, 387). Violent systematic efforts to accomplish 'native elimination' created a white settler society that simultaneously depends simultaneously on 'racialised workforces' and the ability to revoke "the right of racialised outsiders to be within the invaded territory" (Lytle Hernández 2017, 7-8). Settler colonialism structures US society for all, historically and currently. How, then, can someone be considered illegal on stolen land?

Migrant movement thus points towards thinking about migration not as a crisis itself but as the outcome of broader, systemic crises generated within and without, to paraphrase Cuban revolutionary José Martí (1895),¹⁰ the entrails of the monster: US settler empire. The crisis does not begin at the US-Mexico border or the Mediterranean Sea when migrants suddenly appear, living and dying, in the scope of global north States and politicians. In a variety of different ways, the crisis began more than five hundred years ago when that entity referred to as 'the West' started to materialise and expand through conquest, slavery, imperialism, settler colonialism, and capitalism. Migrants today fleeing war, poverty and climate change are paying the bill for debts incurred in the past and present by European and US colonial powers. To borrow the aphorism coined by the late Sri Lankan writer A. Sivanandan, "we are here because you were there" (2008, xi). As such, following E. Tendayi Achiume's (2019) compelling argument, migration represents a form of decolonial political agency that demands the repairing and restitution of historical injustices through unfettered global mobility in search of a better life.

If today national borders fuel a resurgent, far-right revanchist nationalism across the globe and help global capital decouple from its pretension for 'liberal democracy', then perhaps migrant mobility and solidarity movements can point us towards different, more egalitarian, and radically just futures. Dismantling borders, as activist and writer Harsha Walia (2021, 215) argues, would disrupt a primary mechanism by which difference - citizenship, race, gender, class, sexuality, caste - is organised and used to legitimise myriad forms of violence. Adopting what Walia (2021) refers to as a "leftist politics of no borders", combined with historian A. Naomi Pak's (2020) call for "abolitionist sanctuary" in the US that "seeks to eliminate the need for sanctuary altogether", essentially entails an exercise of radical homemaking for all (Pak 2020; see also Achiume 2019). "The world, which is the private property of a few, suffers from amnesia", the

10 Reproduced in *Counterpunch* (May 2006). <https://www.counterpunch.org/2006/05/19/letter-to-manuel-mercado>.

Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano once suggested. “It is not an innocent amnesia”, he continued. “The owners prefer not to remember that the world was born yearning to be a home for everyone” (quoted in Seghal 2009).

Bibliography

- Achiume, T.E. (2019). “Migration as Decolonization”. *Stanford Law Review*, 71(6), 1509. <https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/migration-as-decolonization>.
- American Immigration Council (2022). *A Guide to Title 42 Expulsions at the Border*. <https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-title-42-expulsions-border>.
- Andelman, D. (1973). “U.S. Implanting an ‘Electronic Fence’ to Shut Mexican Border to Smuggling”. *New York Times*, 14 July. <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/14/archives/us-implanting-an-electronic-fence-to-shut-mexican-border-to.html>.
- Atkinson, D. (2016). *The Burden of White Supremacy. Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States*. Chapel Hill (NC): University of North Carolina Press.
- BBC News (2021). “Kamala Harris Tells Guatemalan Migrants, ‘Do not Come’”. *BBC News*, 8 June. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57387350>.
- Belew, K. (2018). *Bring the War Home. The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Bogado, A. (2018). “Lost on the Border. A Decade Later, a Man Finds His Father’s Remains on Facebook”. *Reveal News*, 23 August. <https://revealnews.org/article/lost-on-the-border-a-decade-later-a-man-finds-his-fathers-remains-on-facebook>.
- Brecht, B. [1935] (1998). “Questions From A Worker Who Reads”. *Los Angeles Times*, 8 February. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-feb-08-bk-16658-story.html>.
- Brinkley, J. (1986a). “U.S. Set to Act on Mexico Border Drug Flow”. *New York Times*, 26 June. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/26/world/us-set-to-act-on-mexico-border-drug-flow.html>.
- Brinkley, J. (1986b). “U.S. Details Plan to Battle Drugs at Mexico Border”. *New York Times*, 14 August. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/08/14/us/us-details-plan-to-combat-drugs-at-mexico-border.html>.
- Brinkley, J. (1986c). “Meese Links Drugs and Illegal Aliens”. *New York Times*, 18 September. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/18/us/meese-links-drugs-and-illegal-aliens.html>.
- Chaar-López, I. (2019). “Sensing Intruders. Race and the Automation of Border Control”. *American Quarterly*, 71(2), 495-518. <https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2019.0040>.
- de León, J. (2015). *The Land of Open Graves. Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Dearen, J.; Burke, G. (2020). “Pence Ordered Borders Closed after CDC Experts Refused”. *Associated Press*, 3 October. <https://apnews.com/article/>

- virus-outbreak-pandemics-public-health-new-york-health-4ef0c6c5263815a26f8aa17f6ea490ae.
- Denvir, D. (2020). *All-American Nativism. How the Bipartisan War on Immigrants Explains Politics as We Know It*. London: Verso.
- Derrida, J. (1993). *Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. New York: Routledge.
- Dickerson, C. (2020). "A Rare Look inside Trump's Immigration Crackdown Draws Legal Threats". *New York Times*, 23 July. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/us/trump-immigration-nation-netflix.html>.
- Du Bois, W.E.B [1935] (1998). *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880*. New York: Free Press.
- Dunn, T. (1996). *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992*. Austin (TX): University of Texas Press.
- Ehrenfeld, R. (1986). "Narco-Terrorism. The Kremlin Connection". Speech presented at The Heritage Foundation, 4 December 1986. <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/narco-terrorism-the-kremlin-connection>.
- Foucault, M. (2013). *The Punitive Society. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972-1973*. New York: Picador.
- Foucault, M. [1978] (1990). *The History of Sexuality*. Vol. 1, *An Introduction*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gilly, A. (2005). *The Mexican Revolution*. New York: The New Press.
- Goodman, A. (2020). *The Deportation Machine. America's Long History of Expelling Immigrants*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
- González, J. (2011). *Harvest of Empire. A History of Latinos in the United States*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Grandin, G. (2019). *The End of the Myth. From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Hansen, C. (2021). "U.N. Refugee Agency Urges Biden to Rescind Border Order, 'Restore Access to Asylum'". *U.S. News*, 20 May. <https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2021-05-20/un-refugee-agency-urges-biden-to-rescind-border-order-restore-access-to-asylum>.
- Harris, D. (1980). "Struggle over Mexican Migrants. Zone of War". *New York Times*, 17 February. <https://www.nytimes.com/1980/02/17/archives/struggle-over-mexican-migrants-zone-of-war-zone-of-war.html>.
- Hesson, T. (2021). "Nearly 3,300 Migrants Stranded in Mexico Were Kidnapped, Raped or Assaulted. Report". *Reuters*, 22 June. <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nearly-3300-migrants-stranded-mexico-were-kidnapped-raped-or-assaulted-report-2021-06-22>.
- Hirota, H. (2017). *Expelling the Poor. Atlantic Seaboard and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of American Immigration Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1989). *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*. New York: Vintage.
- Horne, G. (2014). *The Counter-Revolution of 1776. Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States*. New York: New York University Press.
- Human Rights Watch (1992). *Brutality Unchecked. Human Rights Abuses along the U.S. Border with Mexico*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Kaplan, A. [2002] (2005). *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Kelley, R.D.G. (2003). *Freedom Dreams. The Black Radical Imagination*. New York: Random House.

- Lee, E. (2003). *At America's Gates. Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943*. Chapel Hill (NC): University of North Carolina Press.
- Lim, J. (2017). *Porous Borders. Multiracial Migrations and the Law in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands*. Chapel Hill (NC): University of North Carolina Press.
- Lim, J. (2020). "Immigration, Plenary Powers, and Sovereignty Talk. Then and Now". *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, 19(2), 217-29. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781419000641>.
- Lind, D. (2016). "Donald Trump's Plan to Subject Immigrants to 'Ideological Tests', Explained". *Vox*, 16 August. <https://www.vox.com/2016/8/16/12491000/trump-extreme-vetting-test-immigrant>.
- Los Angeles Times* (1919). "Planes Start Border Patrol". *Los Angeles Times*, 20 June. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/160663289/D4D2F60A08C74029PQ/3?accountid=4485>.
- Lytle Hernández, K. (2010). *Migra! A History of the US Border Patrol*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Lytle Hernández, K. (2017). *City of Inmates. Conquest, Rebellion and the Rise of Human Caging in Los Angeles, 1771-1965*. Chapel Hill (CA): University of North Carolina Press.
- Miller, T. (2016). "No Need to Build the Donald's Wall, It's Built". *TomDispatch*, 23 August. <https://truthout.org/articles/no-need-to-build-the-donald-s-wall-it-s-already-built/>.
- Miller, T. (2019). "More than a Wall. Corporate Profiteering and the Militarization of US Borders". *Transnational Institute*, 16 September. <https://www.tni.org/en/morethanawall>.
- Molina, N. (2014). *How Race is Made in America. Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of Racial Scripts*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Muñoz Martínez, M. (2018). *The Injustice Never Leaves You. Anti-Mexican Violence in Texas*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Nail, T. (2019). "The Nomadic Proletariat. An Interview with Alain Badiou". *Philosophy Today*, 62(4), 1207-11. <https://doi.org/10.5840/philto-day2019312252>.
- Neate, R.; Tuckman, J. (2015). "Donald Trump. Mexican Migrants Bring Tremendous Infectious Disease to the US". *The Guardian*, 6 July. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-tremendous-infectious-disease>.
- Nevins, J. (2013). *Dying to Live. A Story of U.S. Immigration in an Age of Global Apartheid*. San Francisco (CA): City Lights Books.
- New York Times* (1916). "Aviators to Train for War at Once". *New York Times*, 25 June. <https://www.nytimes.com/1916/06/25/archives/aviators-to-train-for-war-at-once-government-leases-the-field-at.html>.
- New York Times* (1922a). "Mexico Supplies Drug Traffickers". *New York Times*, 15 January. <https://www.nytimes.com/1922/01/15/archives/mexico-supplies-drug-traffickers-smugglers-get-narcotics-in-to-texas.html>.
- New York Times* (1922b). "Ask United Force to Guard Borders". *New York Times*, 25 September. <https://www.nytimes.com/1922/09/25/archives/ask-united-force-to-guard-borders-representatives-of-federal.html>.
- New York Times* (1925). "New U.S. Police Force Now Combats Smugglers". *New York Times*, 10 May. <https://www.nytimes.com/1925/05/10/archives/new-us-police-force-now-combats-smugglers-special-constabulary.html>.

- New York Times* (1986). "U.S. Increases Armament for Its Border Agents". *New York Times*, 14 November. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/14/us/around-the-nation-us-increases-armament-for-its-border-agents.html>.
- New York Times* (1988). "A Hemisphere at Risk from Drugs". *New York Times*, 20 February. <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/20/opinion/a-hemisphere-at-risk-from-drugs.html>.
- Ngai, M. (2004). *Impossible Subjects. Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
- Ordaz, J. (2021). *The Shadow of El Centro. A History of Migrant Detention and Solidarity*. Chapel Hill (NC): University of North Carolina Press.
- Pak, A.N. (2013). "Carceral Quarantine at Guantánamo. Legacies of Imprisonment of Haitian Refugees, 1991-1994". *Radical History Review*, 115, 142-68. <https://doi.org/10.1215/01636545-1724751>.
- Pak, A.N. (2020). *Bans, Walls, Raids, Sanctuary. Understanding U.S. Immigration for the Twenty-First Century*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Pillai, D.; Artiga, S. (2022). "Title 42 and its Impact on Migrant Families". *Kaiser Family Foundation*, 26 May. <https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/title-42-and-its-impact-on-migrant-families/>.
- Rana, A. (2010). *The Two Faces of American Freedom*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Rodriguez, S. (2021). "Mayorkas to Cubans, Haitians. Do not Come to the U.S.". *Politico*, 13 July. <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/13/mayorkas-cubans-haitians-499531>.
- Romo, D.D. (2005). *Ringside Seat to a Revolution. An Underground Cultural History of El Paso and Juárez, 1893-1923*. El Paso (TX): Cinco Puntos Press.
- Sehgal, P. (2009). "Through the Looking Glass. Q & A with Eduardo Galeano". Transl. by M. Fried. *Publishers Weekly*, 27 April. <https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/authors/interviews/article/11635-through-the-looking-glass-q-a-with-eduardo-galeano.html>.
- Schivone, G.; Miller, T. (2015). "Gaza in Arizona. How Israeli High-Tech Firms Will Armor-Up the U.S.-Mexico Border". *Truthout*, 26 January. <https://truthout.org/articles/gaza-in-arizona-how-israeli-high-tech-firms-will-up-armor-the-us-mexican-border>.
- Shah, N. (2001). *Contagious Divides. Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Sifuentes, M.J. (2016). *Of Fields and Forests. Mexican Labor in the Pacific Northwest*. New Brunswick (NJ): Rutgers University Press.
- Sivanandan, A. (2008). *Catching History on the Wing. Race, Culture and Globalisation*. London: Pluto Press.
- St. John, R. (2011). *Line in the Sand. A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
- Sterba, J. (1977). "Open Border Strains US-Mexico Relations". *New York Times*, 3 April. <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/04/03/archives/open-border-strains-usmexico-relations-problems-of-aliens-and.html>.
- Stern, A.M. (1999). "Buildings, Boundaries and Blood. Medicalization and Nation-Building on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1910-1930". *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 79(1), 41-81. <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-79.1.41>.
- Tilly, C. (1985). "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime". Evans, P.; Rueschemeyer, D.; Skocpol, T. (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 169-87.

- Tilner, M. (1987). "Ideological Exclusion of Aliens. The Evolution of a Policy". *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, 2(1), 28-31. <https://m.heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/geoimlj2&div=7&id=&page=>.
- Timmons, P. (2017). "Trump's Wall at Nixon's Border". *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 49(1), 15-24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2017.1298238>.
- US Border Patrol (1994). "Border Patrol Strategic Plan, 1994 and Beyond". *Homeland Security Digital Library*. <https://www.hsd1.org/c>.
- US Congress; Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary (1985). *International Terrorism, Insurgency and Drug Trafficking. Present Trends in Terrorist Activity. Joint Hearings before the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary. 99th Congress*. <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/101116NCJRS.pdf>.
- US Department of Health and Human Services; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020). *Order Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act*. https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/pdf/CDC-Order-Prohibiting-Introduction-of-Persons_Final_3-20-20_3-p.pdf.
- Wald, M. (1977). "Letter from Washington. A Trip through Enemy Lines". *New York Times*, 3 April. <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/04/03/archives/long-island-weekly-letter-from-washington-a-trip-through-enemy.html?searchResultPosition=1>.
- Walia, H. (2021). *Border and Rule. Global Migration, Capitalism, and the Rise of Racist Nationalism*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Westcott, K. (2011). "Osama bin Laden: Why Geronimo?". *British Broadcasting Service News*, 3 May. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-13265069>.
- Williams, B. (1978). "Aliens Winning Third World Beachhead". *Los Angeles Times*, 3 September. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/158559729/665BEAD4F2E94D3APQ/1?accountid=4485>.
- Wolfe, P. (2006). "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native". *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8(4), 387-409. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240>.
- Wu, E.D. (2019). "It's Time to Center War in U.S. Immigration History". *Modern American History*, 2(2), 215-35. <https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2019.6>.

