Memory of Ephemeral
The New Problems of Intangible Cultural Heritage

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Abstract  This essay deals with the topic of the juridical and conservative problem of an ICH. In the last years, a significant interest has grown for this and for cultural diversity as a form of enrichment. This led to the birth of two UNESCO Conventions (2003 and 2005). The aim is analysing how these Conventions have been incorporated in Italy and the problems that are arising with this incorporation. The example that will be addressed is the one of dance - especially folk - and the difficulty of its classification (ICH, cultural expression) and its subsequent safeguarding (is it better a museum or an archive to preserve the ‘memory of the ephemeral’?).

Summary  1 Introduction. – 2 The Intangible CH and Its Dynamism. – 3 The Definition of CH in Italy and the Problems of Reception of the UNESCO Convention. – 4 Dance as ICH and the Problems of Conservation. – 5 Museum or Archive: How to Preserve an Ephemeral Heritage? – 6 Conclusions.

Keywords  Memory. Intangible. Dance.

1 Introduction

Memory is what characterises and identifies the human being and each of us is an heir and a creator of memory. It is generally associated to ‘materials’– as the historian Jacques Le Goff said (1982, 443) – such as documents (chosen by the historian) and monuments (heritage from the past). Both make sense only if their value and connection to time are recognised.

Today we assist to the passing of the concept of linear time because the present is constantly run over by a continuous chase of the future, and the future becomes too soon the past. On the contrary, memory becomes weaker and weaker, whereas despite the opportunity of conservation in many ways. This aspect is part of the more complex phenomenon of globalisation, which produces many dichotomies in the current era, such as oblivion caused by the overabundance of conservation, but also a deep cultural crisis and an
increasing homologation¹ (Lipovetsky 2013; Adorno, Horkheimer 1966).

Maybe in response to all of this, in the last years, a significant interest has grown for the ICH and for cultural diversity as a form of enrichment. This led to the birth of the 2003 UNESCO Convention – born from the observation of the absence on the world map of the masterpieces of the world’s southern cultures, mostly characterised by immateriality – and the 2005 UNESCO Convention. It is possible to notice how these two Conventions are strictly connected, being the ICH a main factor of cultural diversity. Both are of great importance, as they are rooted in the UDHR of 1948. Cultural diversity sprouts after all from a framework of democracy, tolerance, social justice and mutual respect between different cultures and populations and is an essential factor in ensuring peace and security on the local, national and international scale, honouring the importance of cultural diversity as part of the fulfilment of human rights and freedom proclaimed in the UDHR. These same principles are increasingly being challenged by forms of racism expressed in various ways, including questionable political choices.

In this paper, I analyse how these Conventions have been incorporated in Italy and the problems that are arising from this incorporation. The example that will be addressed is the one of dance – especially folk – and the difficulty of its classification (ICH, cultural expression)² and its subsequent safeguarding.

The 2003 UNESCO Convention offers a specific definition of safeguarding (art. 2):

‘Safeguarding’ means measures aimed at ensuring the viability of the ICH, including the identification, documentation, research, preservation, protection, promotion, enhancement, transmission, particularly through formal and non-formal education, as well as the revitalization of the various aspects of such heritage.

In Italy, we talk more often about preservation and conservation, giving a limiting connotation to the term and in some cases even a negative one. The word ‘conservation’ may be perceived as an operation of freezing/enclosing, therefore negative, which then reflects into the biased topic of museums and in general of ‘places of conservation’.

¹ Many scholars speak about cultural disorientation (Lipovetsky 2010), age of oblivion (Judt 2009), cultural industry creates by the changes of the new technologies (Lyotard 1981). The debate is extensive but these few examples are already sufficient to understand the scope.

² Identifying this category is not easy (Tarasco 2004; 2008), but in this context I would consider dance as ICH. The plain identification as activity seems simplistic and in our juridical system there is not clarity on this term, although defined by the UNESCO Convention of 2005 (art. 4(4)) and even included in the name of the corresponding Ministry: MIBACT.
2 The Intangible CH and Its Dynamism

Since many years some Countries, particularly those founded on oral culture or having a big component of intangible heritage, have dedicated before others particular attention to this kind of heritage (especially after armed conflicts that had threatened their cultural identity). For instance, Japan in 1950 had laws for the protection of CH, ICH and for people defined as ‘living treasure’ (Isomura 2004).

The expression ‘intangible heritage’ was used officially for the first time in a conference held in Mexico in 1982. Through the years various interventions followed (Le Scouarnec 2004, 26-40), where the focus on this type of heritage increased, until 17 October 2003, when the adoption of the 2003 UNESCO Convention by the UNESCO and by the GA during its thirty-second session in Paris took place. 137 Countries signed this agreement, including Italy.

Every State had to adopt this agreement into its own legal system, with many difficulties. Some problems arose from the definition of ICH, in fact some States did not consider the Convention adequate and refused to even sign it.

The ICH is defined in art. 2:

1. ICH means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, know-how – as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their CH. This ICH, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and gives them a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting so the respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this Convention, it will consider such intangible CH only to the extent that it is compatible with existing instruments relating to human rights and the requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals as well as sustainable development.

2. The ICH as defined in paragraph 1 above, is manifested *inter alia* in the following areas:

   a. oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of the ICH;

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3 On a terminological question linked to this kind of heritage, see Cirese (2002, 66-9). There is less homogeneity of terms for the word ‘heritage’. Someone speaks about property, some of tradition, etc. In general, on the importance and the difficulty of finding a standard terminology, see van Zanten (2004, 36-43).
b. performing arts;

c. social practices, rituals and festive events;

d. the knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe;

e. traditional craftsmanship.

Indeed, the definition of ICH is too wide, without any specifications. This was however done in order to include more possible variations, although there are different opinions on the subject.

Scovazzi (2012, 6) identifies three essential components in the formulation: the manifestation of a practice (as expressed in the first two paragraphs of art. 2), the custodian community and a cultural space. We immediately notice how fundamental are for the first two aspects – the people and the community – and how an overlap between object and subject on the protection process can be created (Maguet 2011).

The object of protection corresponds in many cases to the people and their knowledge, therefore in some way the safeguarding of the heritage depends on them. However, they are also the subject who owns the heritage and often it is not about a single person, but a plurality. Therefore the consideration of a collective right appears within the identification of the subject of law; not surprisingly the participation of the community in the management and enhancement of the ICH is fundamental (As.pa.c.i. 2013).

Another problem is linked to the time, because the protection of this heritage is projected into the future, that is to say that future generations will become its ‘owners’ and guarantee its survival. It is as if these future generations, heirs of the tradition, had an unwritten obligation, a strict liability; there is therefore a succession of times and rights. It is said that only the silence of a generation may determine the vanishing of a tradition.

The main problem is the identification of the object of conservation and of its nature. It can have a material manifestation, but its essence is not generally in the material form, but into something of intangible nature such as knowledge, a savoir faire kept within a person. So, there is an overlapping between the material and the intangible, and between the subject and the object of law.

Usually one can speak about a community that, in some way, is responsible for the survival of a heritage and of passing it to future generations. So there is also a problem linked to the time.

Finally, a significant problem is the changeability of this ‘heritage’, because it is a living thing.

All of this generates many juridical problems because it puts at risk a based principle of law: certainty.

However, there are theories according to which, on the contrary, pro-
vocatively, the immateriality sometimes can be a strength point. The intangible heritage cannot suffer from physical destruction and, being transmitted from generation to generation, would have a greater longevity. An interesting metaphor used in this regard by Ahmed Skounti (2011, 25) compares this transmission from generation to generation to genes passing from one descendant to another. This would also imply an ‘evolutionary’ change involving adaptation to time.

The subject is therefore in evolution, as well as the object.

We are facing a dynamic heritage, since it is alive, varies and changes. In this regard, it is interesting to notice the quote by an American writer of the Indian newspaper Pueblo, Leslie Marmon Silko (quoted in Portelli 2007), who says:

Today people think that ceremonies must be performed exactly as we have always done, and just a slip of the tongue could cause the ceremony to be discontinued or the sand pattern destroyed [...] But long ago, when people received these ceremonies, a pattern of change began immediately, either for the ruining of the yellow gourd rattle or the shrinking of the skin on an eagle’s claw, or just as the voices of the singers changed from generation to generation. You see, in many ways, the ceremonies did nothing different from changing.

The changeability and mutability are therefore elements to be taken into consideration. Also from the legal point of view, one assists to a dynamic and under construction heritage, which would paradoxically lead to absurd, having to protect all that contributes to the asset of heritage and its definition. This would also undermine the basic principle of law that is certainty.

It is understandable, therefore, that the difficulties on the level of protection are not few, as specifically mentioned in the UNESCO Convention. It applies to all levels (local, national and international) and to all contexts, and concerns the creation of inventories, administrative and financial measures to ensure the continuity of distinct practices.

Therefore, preserving does not mean making a material object last, but keeping the gesture, the movement, the songs that involve the body of

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4 Tornatore notices how an inventory is an attempt to neutralise, because it allows you to abstract the practices inventoried by the effects and emotions, but paradoxically this action to inventory increased the interest of researchers (Grenet; Hottin 2011, 17). It is not easy to create an archive/inventory, the risk of ‘freezing’, to make something aseptic is high, but if someone takes the first step, it is important for the future and for the conservation. It is important, however, not to distort the heritage with these actions of conservation and thus transform the CH ethnographic find into a kind of victim to cannibalise (to borrow the title of a French exhibition Le musée cannibal to Ethnographic Museum in Neuchâtel, 9 March 2002 – 2 March 2003, which criticised these possible distortions of the research).
practitioners, so that the physical body is a metaphor for the community, as well as the object of protection.

Here a further issue arises regarding the fine line between material and intangible.

One example that often arises in this regard is that of the Ise Temple in Japan. It is rebuilt, every 20 years, from scratch using techniques handed down from generation to generation (Munjeri 2004, 13-21); it is true that the temple is not the original one, because the materials are new and the manufacturers are different, but in this case the technique has remained the same for centuries: it is the intangible element that counts and that must be protected.

In Italy, these same questions were first presented with the DEA heritage, the determination of which is not easy. The concept of culture causes frequent confusion and is extremely subjective, deciding each time what is heritage and what is not. Fundamentally it is the context; here lies the difference between the artwork and the DEA heritage, because an object of folklore has no aura that makes it unique. It is not important to the object itself, but to its use and everything that relates to the world around it; in other words, the meaning that a community gives to that object, in a particular time and/or space. It can then be rightly said that the ICH “does not consist of objects or text, but in the socially widespread possibility to create them or recall them” (Portelli 2007).

According to that, this new category of heritage is strongly linked to memory, the evocation of which allows certain traditions to continue existing. Portelli (2007) emphasises that it is not possible to repeat the same songs and music as most of the popular expressions are related to improvisation and subject to the irruption of the present. On the other hand, memory itself is primarily a process, consisting of research and revisions related to depositaries ability to recall them and update them.

3 The Definition of CH in Italy and the Problems of Reception of the UNESCO Convention

The boundary between the material and the intangible is very thin, not only about the concept of intangible heritage itself, which has material expression, but also of CH. This fact has a number of ‘values’ that go beyond its materiality, which would flee even any economic evaluations, but are intended to be protected by the legal system because of what they represent (Giannini 1976; Morbidelli 2014).

Definitions that are too related to material outward expressions are, therefore, to be avoided, and this was clear by the end of the nineteenth century, when it began to reflect on the CH. Bronislaw Malinowski ques-
tioned the ‘closure’ towards those aspects that named material culture (Malinowski 1931, 621-45).

Then it is no coincidence that today there are more and more theories exploring new ways for understanding the nature of heritage and artworks, looking for solutions that include more possible variants. Smith, for example, sees CH as a ‘cultural process’ linked to human actions and therefore linked to the social identity (2006, 44 and ff.); whereas other theories favour a holistic definition of cultural CH by bringing them together under the concept of resource (D’Alessandro 2014, 217).

In Italy, the definition of CH is provided in art. 2 of the 2004 Code, whose second paragraph states:

CH includes in its definition the immovable and movable things which, under Articles 10 and 11, have artistic, historical, archaeological, ethno-anthropological, archival and bibliographic and other things identified by law or under the law as evidence of civilization.

The term “testimonianza avente valore di civiltà” (evidence of civilization) is a result of numerous discussions and changes, seeking to encompass the greatest number of possible meanings. However, the reference to arts. 10-11, containing a list of objects under protection, seems to show a substantial closing to our intangible heritage.

This is partly confirmed by different judgments⁵ that, in addition to underlining this problematic distinction between the material and the intangible as part of the same heritage, reaffirm how the cultural values, in order to be preserved, must be “embodied or incorporated into structures and these structures should in somehow be perpetual or stable” (Assini, Francalacci 2000, 46).

This need for a material manifestation is repeated in the same art. 7bis of the 2004 Code, implementing the 2003 UNESCO Convention,⁶ which reads:

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⁵ See for instance the case of Fiaschetteria Beltrame in Rome, whose constraint was considered legitimate by the decision of the State Council s. VI, 10 October 1983, no. 723 (Cons. Stato, 1983, 1, 1074) but it was considered illegitimate constraint for the library Croce, State Council, s. VI, 5 May 1986, no. 35 (Rivista giuridica dell’edilizia, 1986, 1, 585). Numerous other examples are possible: the Ancient pharmacy of Piazza del Campo in Siena, State Council, s. VI, 18 October 1993, no. 74 (Rivista giuridica dell’edilizia, 1994, 1, 133); the Library of Teatro of Reggio Emilia, State Council, s. VI, 23 March 1998, no. 358 (Cons. Stato, 1998, II, 454); the Caffè Genovese in Cagliari, State Council, s. VI, 28 November 1992, no. 964 (Cons. Stato, 1992, 1725).

⁶ Italy ratifies the Convention through Law no. 167, 27 September 2007, and, in the same context, the Parliament ratified also the 2005 Convention UNESCO, adopted on 20 October 2005, by means of Law no. 19, 19 February 2007. For this, with D. Lgs. 26 March 2008, no. 62, the art. 7bis is added to the 2004 Code.
The expressions of collective cultural identity covered by the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the ICH and for the protection and promotion of cultural diversity, adopted in Paris, respectively, 3 November 2003 and 20 October 2005, qualify for the provisions of this Code if they are represented by material evidence and the conditions are fulfilled and the conditions for applying Article 10.

As we can see, this article underlines the rejection of our legal system to this kind of heritage, because the legal concept recognised the necessity of materiality. Abroad, however, there are openings in this regard, seen in Spain, where there is a coherent and integrated law for the protection of the Spanish CH in all its forms, regardless of its Material substrate, or the Portuguese or of Latin America, which mostly refer to the aforementioned Spanish. In Italy, when the Convention is signed, the only legislation that really protected an intangible heritage was the law 482/1999 on the protection of historic linguistic minorities. An extended notion of CH, including the ‘folk’ and ‘folklore’ and connotative of communities regional or local cultural identities, is found also in the Italian Regional legislation.

The 2004 Code seems to almost set aside this type of heritage. It seems to be in full agreement with that part of the doctrine that would consider them all included in the so-called ‘cultural’ one, or in the ‘intellectual property’. However, the international law does not consider as ICH those which, from the point of view of civil law, are considered objects of intellectual property (Cosi 2008, 161, 166 and ff.).

7 Then there are further specifications for each Region of Spain. In general sorting Portuguese, as well as that of Latin America, are highly influenced by the Iberian (Tarasco 2008, 2261-87; Vaiano 2011, 50).

8 Cf. also Tarasco 2008. For a list of regulations for each Region, refer to Gualdani 2014.

9 Liguria: art. 2(g) of new Statute and L.R. no. 32/1990; Molise: L.R. no. 9/1997 e no. 19/2005 Patrimonio culturale immateriale: etnologico, sociale, antropologico, produttivo (ICH: ethnological, social, anthropological, productive); Puglia: art. 2 Nuovo Statuto/New Statute (tradizioni regionali/ Regional tradition); Sardegna: L.R. no. 14 del 2006 (Patrimonio culturale materiale e immateriale/Material and ICH), cf. Cosi (2008, 162). Also there have been legislative proposals, such as 123A-IX presented by the Puglia Regional Councilor Sergio Blasi, which later became the R.L. 22 October 2012, no. 30, which governs the ‘Regional interventions for the Protection and Enhancement of music and folk dances and oral tradition’. The law’s aim is to safeguard the ‘musical memory’, supporting research and the publication of ‘originals’, i.e. records of ‘performance of older singers’, and finally creating ‘a network of multimedia archives’ where conserve and make the collected materials usable.

10 For the Constitutional Court, the CH activities are a different thing, i.e. “concerning all activities related to the development and dissemination of culture” (Corte Costituzionale, sentences 7-9 July 2005, no. 285 and sentences 21 July 2004, no. 255).

11 Gualdani (2014) underlines – through the example of Palio of Siena – also “while the protection of copyright is of the manor, the one designed for the intangibles is kind of public
The topic of ‘intellectual property’, copyright, is meaningful when it comes to dance, which is the example that I will bring here with particular attention to the folk area.

There is no doubt that in a dance can be expressed the culture and identity of people, a number of other elements flowing in it, such as social relations, tradition, music etc., not surprisingly different dances were recognised as an ICH of humanity (as flamenco, tango, etc.) for their characteristics of identity. Protecting a dance, however, is even more complex because of its ephemeral nature. Surely every type of dance presents different problems and therefore there are many general considerations to be done (Anzellotti 2016).

Firstly, we must point out that dance is an art of the body – one of the first means of man’s expression – whose transmission has been always occurred from Master to student. Until a short time ago no codifications or universal forms of writing as for music existed.

Today there are various resources which can provide valuable assistance to this aim, as notation and in general new technologies, in particular video, but also the 3D or various forms of motion capture.

Certainly the video is an effective tool, but full of subjective viewpoints, from that of the cameraman or the field framing. Not to speak about the ‘screening’ of emotions that takes place in the following way. Emotions, which can be elicited by dancing and make it special, make the difference. It is certainly one of the main variants so much that the same dancer will not repeat the same exact performance twice. This has earned dance the title of ephemeral art par excellence, but today many scholars are no longer of this idea.

The ephemeral distinguishes increasingly the present century and also other contemporary art expressions that are characterised ever more by this feature. Therefore, the base of new aesthetics and conservative questions are posed. It is not strange to find applications, which are usually applied today in contemporary art, with the same way of thinking and similar conservative solutions in dancing too. For instance, also in this case we recognise the same attempt to give greater voice to the artist, who is involved in interviews, creation of archives or drafts about his ‘will’ on future works, including a possible ‘right to euthanasia’.

If arts are a mirror of their time, which is the reason why it is ephemeral and volatile, nonetheless we must respect its own will by documenting this choice so that a trace of it remains.
Another important choice is what is needed to leave aside, rather than distorting it and bringing it against his own nature. Obviously in this field the positions of scholars are different. Someone says that performances are unrepeatable – such as Peggy Phelan – and argues that it is necessary to repeat them, as well as restore them – such as Richard Schechner – (as quoted in Formis 2015, 98).

In my opinion, the most important thing is to prevent arts from being treated as an exclusive good for the market, only related to money.

Like any other ICH, dance is extremely sensitive to the phenomena of globalisation in all its aspects. So there are many fusions and this is certainly a possibility of enrichment and creation (think of, for example, the fusion between flamenco and contemporary dance or flamenco and Indian dance, in this case because you are having affinities and possible ‘kinship’ between the dances). However, if you are not aware of the dances that are subject to fusion, you can create abnormal hybrids and so much confusion that threatens to also lose the ‘genuineness’, to lose the roots. On the contrary, even the ‘freezing’ is dangerous. Some scholars believe that, sometimes, the researchers create ‘anomalies’ excessively schematising dances rather than identifying them as changing and tied to the personal style of each individual. The dance is a living art so some change is normal. You cannot reduce the dance (or any other intangible heritage) to a wreck destined to dusty windows of museums, therefore, no longer corresponding to the changes in society, to which it is subject.

Certainly, it must be assumed that in this body art the main element is the dancer, who is at once the source, the archive and the work, just like many other intangible traditions. That is why there are important interviews, a direct contact with the ‘custodians’ materials’ of this intangible, dancers in this case.

At this point we might be able to understand the complexity of the discussion on how and what to preserve.

Returning specifically to folk dances, like other ICH, they mutate, evolving and are linked to the style of each performer and no schematisations or masters exist. It is said that one should ‘steal’ any dancing step, which will be learned by observing with no technical explanations. It is in fact necessary for dancers to be spontaneous and put talent on their own.

It follows that any form of ‘conservation’ corresponds to freezing; for someone might say that the notation is not applicable to folklore dances.

The same issue is valid for videos, as some scholars believe that their use is risky since it would end up harnessing dancing into a specific person’s style or a group of people who are taken. The beauty and vitality of these dances, however, is often the variety and free interpretation which everyone can apply.

Despite all, choices are necessary and today many types of technologies offer different opportunities. Let us see how all the technological in-
novations and globalisation processes may be poison and medicine at the same time, since they can help to spread the heritage, but also to distort it (Scovazzi 2012, 5).

This is the case of the *pizzica pizzica* and the *Concertone della Notte della Taranta*. Here there are several contaminations and drifts, but thanks to this media and marketing process, *pizzica* has undergone an unprecedented boom.

It is therefore necessary to keep the root in the most scientific and correct way possible, but at the same time to let the ‘evolution’ take its course.

Interesting, I think, is the approach adopted in Greece for their traditional dances. In Athens, there is a Living Museum Dora Stratou which is a combination of museum, archive and research center. The key aspect is the documentation of the dances in the villages and their spread from person to person, without the establishment of a master. Then there is the entire documentary support made of writings, pictures, video, audio etc. which supports research for maintaining the root.

This example leads to the other issue on where to keep dance (but also any ICH): a museum, an archive, a research center? These sites are subject to the upheavals of this century and the fluid-soaked dichotomies.

5  **Museum or Archive: How to Preserve an Ephemeral Heritage?**

New technologies are dematerialising documents, objects, art and so on. This leads to a disruption of memorial sites, often in crisis because of their ‘static connotation’.

Today a new idea of museum is coming, because this place is strongly in crisis, more and more often likened to a cemetery. The initiatives to revive them are multiplying, giving space for action.

The art increasingly comes out of museums, but the museum is transforming into theatres and it accommodates performing arts and dance, increasingly present during opening ceremonies and other events.

Meanwhile, the museum is hybridised. There is talk of White box – Black cube (Foster 2015, 25-6). By this we refer to the different space that should be on the basis of the work of art exposed. It goes from the necessity of a dark space – especially for the video installations – characterised by a classical approach of the public, as if you were in the theatre, in one instead open, where you have a neutral space-time dimension (the MoMa of New York responds to these criteria).

For dance it is possible to think of something situated between these two realities. We should also consider a museum without objects, not just because of the intangibility of the heritage, which is not based on the object itself, but due to the fact that dematerialisation hits also material heritage through new technologies when they are digitised, as well as it is virtualis-
These same questions arise in general for other intangible heritage, such as those related to folklore. We have already seen that in these cases the aesthetic norm is subject to extra aesthetic rules, and therefore, ethnographic museums, which are educational in nature, cannot be reduced to mere exhibition for only objects (Assini, Francalacci 2000, 191-3).

Thus, on one hand, it is necessary that the practical element becomes a fundamental ritual, supported by proper scientific documentation that allows studies and maintenance of the original roots. While, on the other hand, it has to keep room for a new evolution which characterises this heritage.

For a long time, the museum was regarded as a place of exhibition, preservation and conservation of cultural materials from the past. In this view, it seems that the museum does not have much to do with the contribution to the safeguarding of ICH, and in fact there were expositions to underline the negatives drifts of musealisation, like the EXPO of 2002 at MEN (Musée d’Étnographie de Neuchâtel), with an eloquent title Le musée cannibal (Bonavita 2004). In reality, all depends on how the problem is approached (Yoshida 2004, 112, 114-15).

Formalisation of the intangibility is given by the more widened definition of museum issued by ICOM with the inclusion of the term ‘intangible’. We read that the museum “performs research concerning the tangible and intangible evidence of people and their environment; acquires, preserves, communicates and, above all, the exhibits, for purposes of study, education and enjoyment”.13

Obviously, new challenges arise for museums to adapt themselves to this dynamism that characterises the intangible.

According to Patrix (2015) an example that responds to the recommendations of Kurin (2004), which can be applied for a good ICH museum, is the Fado Museum in Lisbon because it renews the museum habits and lies in the community bosom as well as actual practices. Moreover, it invites actors to present their art outside of living exhibition.

There is also the delicate issue of the archives. If safeguarding means creating inventories it means to be the need of a stock then. However, how can anything be stored in a living process? Apparently, it is necessary to start from the living thing and to get then to the store.

It is also true that the disappearance of something can leave traces,


13 Extract from the Statute of ICOM (art. 2 on definitions), adopted by the 16th General Assembly of ICOM (The Hague, Netherlands, 5 September 1989) and amended by the 18th General Assembly of ICOM (Stavanger, Norway, 7 July 1995) and by the 20th General Assembly (Barcelona, Spain, 6 July 2001).
and on this is based the archive, as said by Derrida (2014): he underlined also the negative aspects of the archive, often linked to political control (Derrida 1995).

6 Conclusions

In conclusion, I can say that the memory of the ephemeral involves various problems, from the legal to the more strictly conservative one and that many pitfalls may arise. The greatest paradox is that new technology, although it seems to have offered some solutions, actually gives us new challenges and risks, like the above mentioned ‘freezing’ – *i.e.* through the video – or oblivion caused by an overabundance of memory – remembering all means to not remember anything – (cf. Borges 1997). Furthermore, technology gives one an ephemeral materiality (virtuality), creating other forms of immateriality.

How to store an intangible heritage? Giving it an intangible/virtual materiality?

But another question may be even when to store it: if the practice is not necessary to safeguard life, if it is not dead safeguard, it is not helpful (Barbèris 2015).

The main risks are of marketing and folklorisation and of contextualisation and reification. However, it seems to be not disregarded by an alteration which in any case would be created. As anthropologists write, also the transcripts of songs are not neutral acts (Goody 2004). In the same way any form of transmission, as it is inherent in the word itself, involves a form of betrayal.

Musealising an object of performance means somehow faking it, because it is decontextualised. There is some sort of reference to “historical instance” mentioned by Cesare Brandi (1963, 34). The authenticity of an object depends on the use and history forming its identity. As previously assessed, a museum of objects makes no sense and the object itself does not have a folkloric value, neither material nor aesthetic, but the difference lies precisely in its use.

Certainly, we cannot remain closed in one subject area, but a dialogue between the various fields of knowledge is fundamental to meet and compare various points of view. It is also important to put at the center of reflection the artist/the person holders of knowledge and to spread interest, culture, starting even from schools.
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