

The Bridge from Language to Mind: PI, §§ 240-56

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Abstract This article is an examination of a remarkable set of 16 passages that mediate Wittgenstein's treatment of language in the *Philosophical Investigations* prior to these remarks and his turn to mind, beginning with his two private language arguments of PI, § 258 and PI, § 293. The intervening remarks, PI, §§ 240-6, function to identify six central lessons concerning the nature of language that are essential to mind as well. These six stages are linked by what Wittgenstein considers the two fundamental philosophical problems for language, and now for mind: the Problem of Reference (or Identity) (PI, § 239) and the Problem of the Criterion of Identity. The general conclusion is two-fold: ordinary language is necessary to the human mind; and neither are reducible nor eliminable in favour of literally inner events.

Keywords Wittgenstein. Language. Mind. Reference. Criterion of Identity.

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1 Introduction

This article is an examination of a remarkable set of 16 passages that mediate Wittgenstein's treatment of language in the *Philosophical Investigations* prior to these remarks and his turn to mind, beginning with his two private language arguments of PI, § 258 and PI, § 293. The intervening remarks, PI, §§ 240-6, function to identify six central lessons concerning the nature of language that are essential to mind as well. These six stages are linked by what Wittgenstein considers the two fundamental philosophical problems for language, and now for mind: the Problem of Reference (or Identity) (PI, § 239) and the Problem of the Criterion of Identity. The general conclusion is twofold: Ordinary language is necessary to the human mind; and neither are reducible nor eliminable in favour of literally inner events.

It is well known that Wittgenstein binds the case for his positive views with the philosophical theories he seeks to eliminate. This is certainly true of his treatment of mind. The target here is the picture of the individual mind as the inner arena of objects and events that are private and knowable directly only by that individual mind or self. Their metaphysical and epistemological properties mark them off from ordinary physical objects and events. These include sensations, perception, imagination, intentions, belief, thought among other mental states. We owe the classical account of this picture to Descartes' theory of mind. Though there are many who hold that the inner mental arena is the brain, this is typically described as the mind-brain in an effort to forestall the problems that arise with attempts to identify mental states either directly or indirectly with brain states or functional neural roles. For others, the computer is the arena of mental activity, taken as systems of representations manipulated in accordance with algorithm and/or other formal structure. But it is our ordinary ways of attributing and explaining our actions and mental states are the indispensable housing for both the mind-brain and computer that creates the illusion that our sensations, intentions, imaginings and so on are actually 'in there'.

Wittgenstein does not repudiate the relevance of neural activity to the functioning of mind and body, but it is not mental activity. He would acknowledge what a computer contributes to our world, but he would deny that its inner Turing machine is a mind. What he would hold, in this philosophical context, both of the brain and the computer is that our ordinary ways of talking and acting are the cocoon within which each is thought to house the mind. The cocoon is the necessary projection of our ordinary ways of attributing and explaining our actions and mental states onto the brain and the computer that creates the illusion that our sensations, intentions, imaginings and so on are actually 'in there'.

The point of this paper is not to take on these reductionist accounts of mind, but to look carefully at a remarkable set of 16 passages that mediate Wittgenstein's treatment of language in the *Philosophical Investigations* prior to these remarks and his turn to mind, beginning with the two private language arguments of PI, § 258 and PI, § 293. His overall position is that language, ordinary mental language, is integral to our mental life. The intervening passages, PI, §§ 240-56, function to identify the central lessons concerning the nature of language that Wittgenstein has already defended. These identify six major features that belong not only to language, but to mind as well. It is for this reason I call the set of 16 passages 'The Bridge Passages'. They take us from the lessons of language to a defence of Wittgenstein's conception of mind.

The Bridge is bookended by PI, § 239 and PI, § 257. Together these introduce what Wittgenstein takes as the two fundamental philosophical problems for language, and now for mind: the Problem of Reference (or identity) and the Problem of the Criterion of Identity, or, as I prefer to express it, the Problem of Normative Similarity. Wittgenstein marks the beginning of the Bridge by asking what a colour word means to an individual person:

How does he know which colour he is to pick out when he hears "red"?—Quite simple: he is to take the colour whose image occurs to him when he hears the word.—But how is he to know which colour it is 'whose image occurs to him?' Is a further criterion needed for that?... "'Red' means the colour that occurs to me when I hear the word 'red'—would be a *definition*. Not an explanation of *what it is* to use a word as a name". (PI, § 239)

For the cartesian, what 'red' means to me would be given by an ostensive definition of the word. But that definition cannot by itself determine whether the colour I experience answers to the word 'red', whether the colour I experience is the colour to call 'red'. What is needed is an explanation of '*what it is* to use a word as a name'. The core problem of any version of mind as interior or inner is that it cannot explain the meaning or meaningfulness of mental states, e.g., that this state is red. I shall call any such inner theory of mind a 'cartesian theory'. Any cartesian theory hypothesises that mind is an interior system of episodes and events. The price of this achievement is the elimination of meaning or content from the interior system. The major contemporary cartesian accounts are formal logical theories, syntactic theory, computational theories, and mind-brain theories. Any of these might be important contributors to our understanding of human life, but they are not theories of mental states. They use mental concepts for constructing their hypotheses, but in doing this, they do not replace mind with their hypothesised systems.

The second bookend addresses the problem of the *criterion* for identity, or normative similarity. An answer to this philosophical question must provide ‘an explanation of *what it is to use* a word’:

[...] But what does it mean to say that he has ‘named his pain’?—How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose?—When one says “He gave a name to his sensation” one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone’s having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word “pain”; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. (PI, § 257)

Certain philosophical tropes have come into play that support the notion that ostensive definition or naming can be used, not only to provide a definition for a word, but also an explanation of how the word is to be used. The latter is possible because we know, individually and privately, the colour-image we have or the pain we experience. Knowing one’s conscious states provides the criteria for use. Wittgenstein’s idea of a logical grammar is thus unnecessary. It is at best, a critic might hold, the emergence of what is secondary to the primary foundations of individual knowledge and meaning. Wittgenstein’s explanatory reversal of the picture of the cartesian mind and that of logical grammar is the primary target of the six stages of the Bridge. As he says in PI, § 257 just before introducing the private diary argument, giving a name to pain presupposes the grammar of the word ‘pain’. What the Bridge provides is a summary of the arguments that take us from inner naming of objects and events as the fundamental semantic capacity of the mind to the logical grammar of mental concepts, realised through the use or role of mental terms within language games.

Wittgenstein’s aim is thus to show that the cartesian theory, though a revolutionary picture of the mind, linked to the seventeenth century Scientific Revolution, persists into present-day conceptions and theories of mind. And yet the cartesian theory cannot replace our ordinary concepts of mental activity either methodologically or explanatorily. Wittgenstein’s method is to link powerful criticism of philosophical theories of mind as an inner arena to his presentation of an alternative conception of mind, which is the one we all work with ordinarily.¹ The kinds of criticism Wittgenstein develops open the way themselves to Wittgenstein’s logical grammar picture of mental activity. The critique points to the human mind as systemically informed by *ordinary* language.

¹ For a fuller discussion of Wittgenstein’s method used in the *Philosophical Investigations*, see Williams 2010, ch. 1.

Wittgenstein's conception of language as having a logic is not a formal logic, but a logical grammar. Mind too is thus informed by logical grammar. The Bridge passages provide reminders of the elements of logical grammar that are as essential to mind as they are constitutive of language. The idea that language has the structure of a formal logic like the propositional calculus, though intended to explain the systematic features of speech and rational activity, *eliminates* what Wittgenstein calls our form of life. In fact, our form of life is the indispensable background to the use of language of any kind –

to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. (PI, § 19)

the speaking of language is part of an activity, of a form of life. (PI, § 23)

– and so too our human minds:

Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the manifestations of hope are modifications of this complicated form of life. (PPF, § 1)

“Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the tapestry of life.² (PPF, § 2)

The aim of Wittgenstein's later work is to recall and restore that human form of life to our understanding of mind. To do this, he develops his own method of argumentation and persuasion. To find ultimately the certainties that bring that form of life into focus once more, Wittgenstein constructs simple language games that involve our form of life even as they are used to diagnose and criticise the philosophical theories other philosophers endorse. The language games are simple pictures that identify the essence of misleading philosophical theories though without the typical use of technical vocabulary. Reference and the criterion of identity are the two great problems that Wittgenstein seeks to understand. The opening passage of the *Philosophical Investigations* gives us what we need to understand these two problems. The first is the grocers' language-game (PI, § 1). A orders five red apples from the grocer by saying: “I want five red apples”.³ Wittgenstein shows what the grocer is to *do* in order to comply with this request. He must proceed in different ways in order to

² Passages like these are especially emphasised by Cavell 1979.

³ In conversation, Michael Williams has repeatedly urged that the opening grocer's language-game has all the key features that Wittgenstein aims to establish in the *Investigations*.

respect each element of the order. Apples are to be found in a bin labelled “apples”; “red” apples are to be compared with a colour chart; and “five” apples require counting “1-2-3-4-5 stop” red apples. The uses of the words occurring in the request are what give the words meaning. This requires underlying mastery of techniques that consist not only in the utterance of these words narrowly construed, but in the relation between the buyer and the grocer and the actions that are appropriate within a greengrocer’s store. Language games are an integral part of his method for both displaying his picture of language and using it as a critical tool. The Bridge passages are no exception.

The Bridge passages consist of six stages, listed here with indications of where similar discussions take place earlier in the *Investigations*:

- PI, §§ 240-1. Framework of Language: Truth [PI, §§ 136-7]
- PI, § 242. Form of Language: Measurement [PI, §§ 49-50]
- PI, § 243. Interpretation: Three Voices [PI, §§ 201-2]
- PI, § 244. Problem of Reference: Private Naming [PI, § 2 ff.]
- PI, §§ 245-9. Problem of Identity: Possibilities and Necessity [PI, §§ 90-104]
- PI, §§ 250-6. Criterion of Identity: Logical Grammar [PI, § 253, § 288, §§ 370-3]

These six stages have been discussed in connection with language in earlier passages of the *Investigations*. The point here is not to *establish* these points again, but to examine mental concepts and words in the light of these earlier arguments. The reason for this repetition is to inform the reader that the six stages are a preparation for Wittgenstein’s picture of the *human* mind and its episodes, functioning and activities, all of which are informed by our mastery of language. It does not provide an empirical theory of mind and its capacities and functioning. But it does provide the logical grammar that is indispensable for the human mind. Mental states and mental functioning are thus not eliminable in favour of physical states nor are they reducible to physical states or functions nor are they identical with such states. Mental states have their own logical structuring and functioning, but only as states and events of individual human beings as members of a community. Never to have had a community is never to have had a full human mind. To lose one’s community is to live in perpetual grief, a virtual retaining of that lost community. Again, ‘logical structure’ is not that of a formal logic, say that of Frege or the *Tractatus*, nor of a computational system. The relevant logical structure is that of logical grammar, which will be discussed more fully below.

2 PI, §§ 240-1. Framework of Language: Truth

Wittgenstein begins with a few remarks that identify essential features of language: agreement, truth, framework, and form of life.⁴ As we have already seen, the need for the bridge is introduced by the classic philosophical problem, how does an individual know *what* colour is referred to by a particular colour word in a language (cf. PI, § 239). Wittgenstein presents this problem as a problem of reference (or ostensive definition) when it must be solved by the individual alone: “How is [an individual] to know what colour he is to pick out when he hears ‘red’?”. Left to the individual alone there is no way for that individual to pick out knowingly the correct colour, namely, that the colour he experiences now is called ‘red’ in English. PI, § 240 begins by identifying agreement among speakers as essential to following the rules of language. The agreement that is essential to us all as language users is not that of our opinions or hypotheses or speculations. Where disagreement is common to political debate or whether chocolate tastes better than raspberry, Wittgenstein contrasts these areas of speech with that of mathematicians. Mathematics is an exemplar of agreement precisely because the rules of mathematics, of *how to do* mathematics, do not tolerate disagreement. The rules of counting require and receive complete agreement. The application of mathematical procedures is a necessary part of mathematics itself. Agreement among participants following a rule is essential because it, the agreement, belongs to the framework/scaffolding of language that fixes the application of the rule that underwrites its necessity. Whether we are teaching a novice the colour palette or building a bridge or discussing a film, agreement in the tacit rules of each project is taken for granted by all discussants. Agreement in application belongs to the framework/scaffolding of language and so stands independent of the opinions or hypotheses entertained by the participants of the game or project. Language must have rules to which we are blind in our shared behavioural respect for these rules or norms. We are unaware for the most of that which secures our agreement. We may not even see ourselves as in agreement with our interlocutors. This raises the question, what secures the scaffolding? Is it the tacit agreement? Or is it something else?

The importance Wittgenstein assigns agreement can be met with the objection that, if agreement is a necessary part of the framework

⁴ In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein modifies the notion of a framework or scaffolding for language in his discussion of the structure of belief. There he says that “[t]he truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference” (OC, § 83). The expression “frame of reference” is the translation of the German word *Bezugssystem*. But, as I shall discuss later, this German word is better translated as ‘coordinate system’ or ‘axial system’. It gives us a far better understanding of what Wittgenstein has in mind.

for language, it looks as though “[...] human agreement decides what is true and what is false” (PI, § 241), and this cannot be acceptable. What is true or false must be a matter of reality, of the way things are, whether or not we agree. Wittgenstein responds to this objection by holding that “[w]hat is true or false is what human beings say” (PI, § 241). By this he means, once again, that our opinions or our hypotheses, our assertions that we make are true or false, and are subject to epistemic principles of evaluation. But even when engaging in disagreement and discord in the opinions we hold, we nonetheless agree in the language we use. ‘Language’, as Wittgenstein uses it here, is agreement in form of life. This distinction between what can be true or false and truth, although it evolves in his writing, most particularly in *On Certainty*, is one that he never gives up. An important passage in *On Certainty* is the following:

The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference. (OC, § 83)

Two important points are made here: first, certain *apparently* empirical propositions belong to our frame of reference, our form of life; and second, these propositions are not true or false like ordinary empirical propositions; they belong to truth. Here Wittgenstein distinguishes between that which is true or false, and so subject to possible dispute, and truth, which is our frame of reference, our logical grammar and form of life. Putting those two points aside for the moment, we can see that Wittgenstein is committed to the distinction between the *uses* of language as applied in different situations or language games; and the logical grammar of language games in terms of how they are used given our form of life. Agreement must exist at the level of logical grammar; otherwise agreement as to what is true and what is false is unreachable. What is language at the level of logical grammar? This is the level of truth, agreement, and form of life: the framework that is necessary for the functioning of our language games, whether political, mathematical, culinary, or any other language game.

3 **PI, § 242. Form of Language: Measurement**

Given the necessity of agreement within “the framework on which the working of our language is based”, it may seem “to abolish logic”. Not only must we agree on definitions of words (like names), we also must agree on how to use words. A form of life is a way of acting and engaging with others in relation to the world. The human form of life is a non-reflective or blind way of acting through and with language in relation to others and to the world. This involves judging

with others, counting as others do, and virtually any other use of language. The grocer must choose the fruit from the 'apple' bin, compare colours with the colour of the apple, and he must count out '5' apples, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 STOP. The procedures used to apply to the individual words of the order are distinct. Merely naming the objects indicated would not enable the grocer to fulfil the order. He must not only know the object each of the three words denotes, he must know how the words are to be used. The former associations might be called 'definitions', but that could be determined only through the proper use of those words in making judgments. If we cannot construct assertions out of those words, we do abolish logic from language. That is to say, we abolish language as assertion or judgment in favour of stimulus-response couplets. So, how are use and rules of use to be added to names, which otherwise are mere words in a list?

Agreement must extend not only to definitions but to judgments as well. We need to be able to say not only 'red' in the presence of red, but also 'roses are red'. In other words, behind the problem of naming is the problem of the unity of the proposition or judgment. Just as the mere association of the word 'red' with a colour is problematic, so a particular string of words need not establish the connection of predication of a subject. What these problems clearly indicate is the need for a very different model of how names and use of names relate. This is what Wittgenstein provides in PI, § 242, using the metaphor of measurement:

It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in the results of measurement. (PI, § 242)

At this stage of the crossing, we have established that agreement is essential to language on the grounds that without agreement, communication and truth are impossible. This requires that language must have two levels, the first is our ordinary linguistic interactions, opinions, hypotheses and the like: the use of language is volatile, in dispute, and changeable. The second is language as a foundational framework (or scaffolding) which is the base for 'the workings of our language', for which agreement is essential, and there is no room for falsehood. All judgments of the second level are part of truth. Truth is a necessary part of the foundation for falsehood, error, and disagreement as well as what is subject to being true or false.⁵ Language in this sense is agreement in form of life. The two levels of language

⁵ I shall turn to this two-fold level of language when I focus on the structure of belief, which will focus on Parts 2-3 of *On Certainty*.

are separated for analytic purposes. They 'live' inseparably in our lives. The distinction does not answer the two problems we face: naming and unity of judgment and thought.

It is with these problems in mind that Wittgenstein introduces one of his important metaphors for language and so for the idea of language being embedded in a form of life. Language is a form of measurement (PI, § 242). To provide a clearer picture of this idea, we will first consider a far simpler case, namely, that of the standard meter stick stored in a vault in Paris (PI, § 50).⁶ The meter stick is the rule or standard for the meter length. The stick is neither one meter long nor not one meter long: it is the standard that fixes the one meter length. There are three components of such a standard, and all are necessary. The first is a physical element. Something physical is necessary; moreover, it must be rigid and immune to easy deterioration. The bar or stick situated in the vault is made of steel, which is rigid and protected from material processes that might undermine the integrity of the stick. Secondly, though the stick is hard and rigid, it must be amenable to calibration, that physical marks can be engraved on the surface of the stick that regulate sublengths. It must be accepted socially with a shared understanding of the procedures for using it. The meter stick is a hard and rigid bar that can be calibrated for the shared use as the standard for one meter. Once calibrated and designated as 'one meter', the metal bar fixes, in a permanent and unchangeable way, the length that is one meter.⁷ This standard or norm is protected in its role as one meter by placing the calibrated metal bar into the sealed vault.

The metal bar designated 'one meter' is thus a means of representation; it is not an object itself being represented. Using the metal bar to measure meter lengths in the world is to judge the world in relation to this standard. Using this standard successfully requires a rich physical and cultural domain in which to act. A similar strategy can be used for fixing shades of colour. Such fixed colour shades are, for Wittgenstein, also a means of representation and not that which is represented (PI, § 48, §§ 50-1). Saying the 'standard meter stick' is a means of representation is a special way of saying that it is a name. The difference is, as the representation of one meter, it acquired that 'name' through its having been assigned its role to play. Names are static, simply attached to some object. Good enough for saying of that object that it is a such-and-such, and nothing more.

6 The item that is used to measure meter length has undergone several changes since the first introduction of the meter stick which was placed in a vault in Paris. But this fact is irrelevant, as the reader shall see, to the point that Wittgenstein is making in the *Investigations*.

7 It is a mistake to think that the replacement of the Parisian standard meter with other devices in any way makes a difference to the philosophical point being made here.

An exception to this is the name of a person, one who can claim the name for him or herself.

Language too is a measuring device to be used for certain purposes. If we carry out the analogy with the standard meter stick, we must ask what counts as the calibration and use of language *qua* measurement. "Agreement in judgments [...] is required for communication by means of language" (PI, § 242) just as the rigidity of the metal stick is required of the standard for one meter. Judgments calibrate language. As Wittgenstein says elsewhere "judgments can be standards for judging". But this then also "seems to abolish logic, but does not do so" (PI, § 242). Judgments as standards for judging seem to abolish logic since they do not have the *kind* of objectivity that is assigned assertoric sentences or propositions. Propositions are the form of assertoric sentences that enable them to stand in formal relations to other propositions, without regard to their meaning: assertion, negation, conjunction, and the conditional. Judgments are evaluated for nuance, sensitivity, appropriateness, correctness, wisdom, and other normative properties. One cannot identify a judgment in purely formal terms. It is critical to their use that are meaningful. Yet Wittgenstein tells us that judgment does not abolish logic. What can this mean? There is an ambiguity here. It can mean that the sentences that comprise judgments, like the metal bar of the standard meter stick, can be assigned logical properties – calibrations – that fix the propositions into a system of formal relations of same as, shorter than, longer than. These are identified solely in terms of the calibrations being identified with marks along the length of the stick. This creates a kind of formal calculus. Calibrations of length, like propositions, belong to a calculus. The calculus provides the procedures of use of the propositions or calibrations. Judgments as standards are not rigid in these ways. They do require a 'certain constancy' in their use in the world. So judgments as standards are embedded in the world as are meter sticks. Judgments are calibrated much in the way that the assertoric sentences that express propositions are calibrated, by way of the words used in constituting a sentence. But the use of this calibration is, however, not identical. The meanings of sentences that belong to the propositional calculus, that is, propositions, are given in terms of truth conditions. The meanings of judgments, on the contrary, are embedded in the social world as the procedures by which we act correctly or rationally or wisely. The use provides the meanings or 'methods of measurement' which, when so used, enable us to 'obtain and state results of measurement'.

This then is Wittgenstein's summation of those features of language, discussed and defended in detail earlier in the *Investigations*, that have significance for the discussion of mind. The method of measurement shows the difference between the picture of proposition and the picture of judgment or thought. The analysis of propositions

presents them as having an assertoric form of the subject-predicate sort whose semantics corresponds to truth conditions as fact-stating conditions. The picture of such assertions, or propositions, shows their place in a logical web of formal relationships among propositions. According to the Tractarian interpretation, the assertoric sentence 'the dress is blue' shows that the object named by 'the dress' and the object named by 'blue' relate as the fact that the dress is blue. A central difficulty for this account is how the two objects relate in a single fact. This problem must be solved before we can understand the relations among truth-conditions that accord with the truth-preserving operators of the propositional calculus, namely, negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditionals. The world is understood in a fact-stating way, as having a linguistic or assertoric structure itself.⁸ This is better understood as the world having a factual structure that harmonises with the assertoric structure of the calibration of language. Agreement is possible, then, so long as we attempt to state facts about the world. Nothing else can be seen through language though the world may be able to affect us in ways without any awareness on our part.

Wittgenstein's picture of judgment, on the other hand, removes the dominant role assigned names and naming; and replaces the strictures of the propositional calculus with rules of judging. There may be judging that is not fact-stating as when we make normative ethical, aesthetic, or intentional judgments by which to measure human actions and reactions. Agreement underwrites our capacity to understand the world and human minds. On this picture, it might seem that there is no way that a solitary mind could be understood. It is at this point (PI, § 243) that Wittgenstein refines the notion of agreement by considering three cases of possible monologists.

4 **PI, § 243. Interpretation: Three Voices**

There are three voices⁹ that can be heard in this passage, not counting Wittgenstein's voice as the moderator for the other three. Each one imagines "human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves". His aim is to identify

⁸ This is, of course, a highly truncated account of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. It is meant only to highlight the fact that meaningful language to the factual structure of reality. Meaningful language is given only in fact stating sentences 'propositions'; and truth only obtains with object-related states of affairs. See TLP, sections 1-3 and 4.2-4.5.

⁹ I am following David Stern's (2004) recommendation to identify the distinct voices (or philosophical positions) that 'name' positions in the discussion of a passage (or set of related passages). It is an excellent device for following the dialectic movement within the passage(s).

three distinct cases of monologic speech of which the cartesian monologist is the third. This longer discussion enables us to get a clear picture of the relation each such form of language has to the world and other people. I shall represent each monologic language with the name of a philosopher placed in scare quotes. The first is ‘Wittgenstein’ speaking for the conception of ordinary language he has introduced at the beginning of the Bridge. The second is ‘Quine’¹⁰ speaking as an explorer who aims to translate a monologist who speaks a radically foreign language; and finally ‘Descartes’ speaks for a private language of sensation.¹¹ The point of drawing these distinctions is to isolate just what is clearly unique to a cartesian monologist. The Bridge lays out the issues that must be discussed in detail, thus preparing the way for Wittgenstein’s own conception of the mind.¹²

All three voices aim to understand those who speak only in a monologue. Yet at the beginning of the Bridge, Wittgenstein emphasised that background agreement is a condition of meaningful language. Is not all monologistic speech therefore meaningless? In restricting the use of language to self-talk, how is agreement achieved? First, what would it be for one of us to speak to himself or herself? asked

10 Quine (1960) introduces his own ‘explorer’ who seeks to translate the language of a wholly alien language. The point is to identify the elements that are necessary to such translation. In this case the native says: “Gavagai”. Quine’s simple language game requires repeated use of ‘gavagai’, some common or similar object within the environment, and the capacity to say ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in gavagai-language.

11 See Stephen Mulhall’s discussion of this passage in his interesting book *Wittgenstein’s Private Language*. There he argues that passage 243 is more complicated than I have presented here. In particular, he holds that there is a debate among the monologists over whether the correct interpretation is substantive or resolute. Indeed his chapter ends with Mulhall asking: “Can we explorers of [Wittgenstein’s] texts ever really succeed in translating his language into ours?” (Mulhall 2006, 22). The implication of this question is that Wittgenstein is himself a private monologist. Yet Wittgenstein says of one who holds that only he knows his sensations that “in one way this is false. And in another this is nonsense” (PI, § 246). Certainly treating Wittgenstein’s words as Mulhall recommends will guarantee that he is speaking nonsense.

12 Mulhall (2006) and I have both recognised the importance of PI passages 243 to 293 with a new special emphasis on § 243 to § 255. Mulhall’s excellent treatment of these passages was published before my own and there is some overlap in how they are interpreted, I would say necessarily so. One of the most important differences in the two interpretations is the structure of these passages and their relation to the private language arguments. Where Mulhall treats them as flatly continuous, I show that there is important structure in the occurrence of individual passages and their relation to the private language arguments. They are not meant to be continuous. First there is a parallel only hinted at here to the order in which the passages 240 to 253 occurs and Descartes’ application of the method of doubt. Second, three monologists introduce the problem of reference and how it can be solved by Wittgenstein’s conception of language. The problem of the criterion of identity follows that of reference as it has occurred in earlier discussions of reference and identity in the Bridge. A treatment of illness is called for and that takes us to the private languages arguments and a preparation for a full analysis of mind. This is why this is a treatment of language bridged to an understanding of mind.

‘Wittgenstein’. There is no difficulty here, according to ‘Wittgenstein’. An individual can “encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself”. But these acts do not require the individual to relinquish agreement in our form of life and the way that the self-talker uses words in his self-talk: that is the same. Self-talk does not entail that he means something different by ‘order’ or ‘blame and punish’. On the contrary, it is important that these words retain their ordinary meaning when he applies them to himself alone. Were the subject to speak openly about these matters, there would be no difficulty for another, who spoke the same language, to understand him. Otherwise, if he could not be understood by another, he would be muttering nonsense to himself. Ordinary self-talk carries no interesting philosophical consequences. It is just a person talking to himself.

But what would it be for someone to speak a very different language from our own such that we could not hear the vocalisations as meaning anything? And though his actions seem to be related in regular ways to his environment, there is no community visible of like speakers of the alien language. Wittgenstein argues that not even in these more extreme situations is the intelligibility of the speaker impossible to understand. ‘Quine’ develops a distinctive thought-experiment that is comparable to Wittgenstein’s language-game of the explorer who comes upon a person, one who is alone and speaks only to himself (see Quine 1960, ch. 2). The explorer does not recognise the vocables and so must find some technique for rendering the vocables intelligible by relating them to salient objects in the environment, objects assumed to be visible to both native and the explorer. This is part of the form of life we human beings share. ‘Quine’ must go much closer to the native at which point he can hear the speaker calling out ‘gavagai’ from time to time. With this he has a concrete problem to solve: how to translate *gavagai* into some English word or phrase. How is this to be done? ‘Quine’ adopts the simplest way available. He makes himself known to the speaker, and then, pointing to a salient object, asks: “Gavagai?”. This strategy requires that ‘Quine’ not only knows the apparent word ‘gavagai’ but also the words for ‘yes’ and ‘no’. In this case, he has discovered somehow that ‘yes’ is *evok* and ‘no’ is *yok*. As a methodological principle, he assumes that certain kinds of salient objects are most likely to be named by the native. ‘Quine’ therefore names a living moving animal. He picks out a rabbit hopping by and calls out: “Gavagai!”. The native speaker calls back: “Evok!”. ‘Quine’ treats this as supporting the hypothesis that *gavagai* means ‘rabbit’. In other words, he must make a large number of tacit assumptions that strike him as obvious objects for any human being to see. If a living moving animal, it is also taken to be obvious how it acts in the environment. This and much more is taken by ‘Quine’, the native speaker, and most other human beings as obvious, so obvious it need not be spoken.

Of course, this is not what the real Quine concludes on the basis of this thought experiment. He rather thinks that it shows that meaning is indeterminate, that meaning is not obvious. There are many other words and phrases that are extensionally equivalent to the word 'rabbit'. For example, 'undetached rabbit parts'. This phrase is extensionally the same as for the word 'rabbit', but the two terms do not mean the same thing. But for the purposes of this thought experiment, there exist a methodology for translating the words of an unknown language into one that is known. Even an unknown language apparently spoken by a single individual can be translated. This is because the native is a human being who shares our susceptibilities, basic desires and interest in certain living things. It is our shared human form of life that enables the explorer to form hypotheses that have a high probability of being relevant to the native's interests as well as to our own. It is at this level that Wittgenstein finds the agreement that is necessary for translation and meaningful language.

Quine's own thought that the native might mean 'undetached rabbit parts' by 'gavagai' tries to make use of extension as the basic principle of identity. But this clearly will fail in this context. First, the phrase 'undetached rabbit parts' can only be taken to be identical with 'rabbit' and 'gavagai' if the elements of the English phrase mean the same in English in which case there can be no identity of meaning. Quine accepts this point: indeed it is crucial to his argument for the indeterminacy of *meaning*. Second, the identity of the object that is secured through the use of the phrase and words is the living hopping animal. 'Living hopping animal' is not to be understood as yet another descriptive phrase, but as the animal itself. The animal itself is the extension of the phrases and words. Unlike the phrases and words, the animal itself does not mean anything. It just exists. But as an existent object, it can be referred to. The argument uses the two semantic values of words and phrases, which Frege calls sense and reference and which we are calling meaning and reference (see Frege 1997). Translation exploits objects as referents of meaningful words. To do this requires constraints on which objects are relevant to reference in the situation; and the existence of regularities in the linguistic activity of the human being under observation. The explorer must recognise repeated vocalisations co-occurring with the presence of an object in the environment. The key presumption is that objects as possible referents are shared though the names need not be shared; and that the vocable of the native shares reference with the word of the explorer. This means that referent and sense are separable, and must be for Quine's argument to work. What are needed then are hypotheses that link referent, sense, and object, all separable, together under a single banner-word; or in the case of translation under two organising banner-words, 'rabbit' and 'gavagai'.

Having considered these first two cases of monologism, Wittgenstein is enabled to identify what is special and different about the language of the cartesian thinking self. Passages 240-2 emphasised two important points about language. First, agreement as part of shared social background is necessary for language; and, second, language as “methods of measurement” requires “a certain constancy in results of measurement”. In short, language use by human beings requires basic agreement that is a function of being human living in the world and displaying regularity in what they do, in their effects on the physical world and other speakers and vice versa. Meanings are not objects that can be separated from the human form of life. There is no separable meaning per se to be grasped. These requirements, it might be thought, should show that monologues could not be meaningful. The real Quine, as noted above, argued that these different words and phrases do not mean the same thing. Both claims would be a mistake. We saw of ordinary self-talk and self-talk that is unrecognisable fall foul of these claims by looking in the wrong place. Once we understand what ‘Wittgenstein’ and ‘Quine’ are saying, there is no conflict between the general requirements of language and the monological speech of the single speaker. Yet Wittgenstein’s explorer cannot have access to the native’s ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The whole language belongs to the native alone. Suppose that ‘Quine’ is confronted with *gavagai evok*. Can it be translated? *Evok* must be ‘yes’ if it is to be translated. ‘Quine’ translates *gavagai* = ‘rabbit’ where there has occurred many rabbits coordinated with many tokens of ‘gavagai’. But if a duck came by and the native said to himself ‘gavagai evok’, ‘Quine’ would have to say “yok” meaning ‘no gavagai’. Whereas *evok* is tied to concrete cases that are similar, *yok* is tied to possible cases of no similarity. So the native would have to solve the problem of the criterion of similarity. In his monological language, the native must be able to recognise that many hopping rabbits are all similar and so all *gavagai* whereas the passing duck, badger, and are all dissimilar. The ‘evok’ group and the ‘yok’ group are dissimilar, so what exactly is the criterion for the sameness of identity? How does the single native solve that problem? If we, having a shared language, solve the problem of the criterion of similarity and possibility, there seems to be no special problem for the native who speaks only to himself provided what he says is translatable by another. Quine’s requirements for translation would satisfy Wittgenstein’s hypothesis that such a monologue could be shared and understood. The translator would take himself to be the arbiter of similarity, a position he acquired only by being raised in a language speaking community. To impose extension as the determinant of meaning remains to be discussed, though the pressure is great already on its direct relevance to the meanings of our language.

But are there any languages like this that support a single speaker whose words cannot be translated? ‘Descartes’ presses this problem further by asking if such a self-directed language could be used for our inner sensations and feelings. We do this using our ordinary language without difficulty. But ‘Descartes’ replies that this is not what he means when he speaks of a monologue. He means a language ‘that only the speaker can know [...]. So another person cannot understand the language’. Now we have the philosophical problem identified. This is a language that only one person can use; that cannot be translated; that cannot put ordinary language to a private use. This is a private language. The meaning of this language is given by what the words refer to, and what they refer to are ‘immediate private sensations’.

The privacy of this language is inherited by the privacy of our inner sensations. Surely, it is held that no one can know the private inner sensations of another. What strategy could Wittgenstein use to reject such a language of inner sensations first, and inner thoughts secondly? One might think that the Quinean method of translation might enable our explorer to grasp the inner experience of the monologist. The structure of shared linguistic reference is triangulation (see Davidson 2001). To take a paradigm of this, consider an event of a child just learning the word ‘table’. The child and adult form two corners of an abstract horizontal bottom line. At the apex above this horizontal line is a third object, namely, the object whose name is being learned. The adult looking at the child says ‘table’ and looks at the table. The child looks at the table and utters ‘tab’ and looks back at the adult. And so it can continue. Triangulation thus requires two human beings and an object. Translation also can be understood as involving triangulation: Explorer looking at rabbit and saying ‘gavagai?’ to native; native looking at rabbit and then explorer, saying ‘evok’ to explorer; both looking at rabbit.

Let us see how triangulation would work with Descartes’ private language of sensation. Call the private language user ‘Adult1’ and the third party ‘Adult2’. Adult1 cries out and squeezes his hand. Adult2 looks at Adult1 and says: “What hurts?”. Adult1 says: “This hurts”. In a standard triangulation, ‘this’ would point to the object at the apex, but the object at the apex is nowhere to be seen.

The problem with this is that the most important element of the triangulation whereby words and objects converge is simply left out of consideration altogether. To ensure that it remains the most important element requires, at a minimum, that it is left out of the picture of the conscious mind. There is nothing to be seen. The explorer is faced with a mystery. There is just a blank spot where the apex-object should be. What is needed is reference. Just how is either the cartesian self or the explorer to *refer* to the mystery apex-object? Indeed what are the self and the explorer supposed to look

at together? Triangulation is impossible. Singular 'triangulation' is not possible. There is no way to introduce reference to a common objective object. So there must be something that is private referring, understood only by the monologist.

5 PI, § 244. Problem of Reference: Private Naming

Wittgenstein opens this passage with the question: "How do words refer to sensations?". This question can be expressed in a more pragmatic way as "how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up?". The place to look to get the clearest picture of just that is the initiate language learning situation. Here the child is just learning individual words. In the section above we described initiate learning in terms of triangulation. It applies to sensation words, but with a twist since it must respect the asymmetry between the child in pain and the adult reacting to the child. This asymmetry must be respected within the structure of triangulation if shared reference to the same thing is realised within initiate learning. How is that to be done? Child, who has cut himself, cries and looks at his hand; Adult looks at Child, and says: "Booboo"; Child looks up to Adult. This completes the horizontal line of triangulation. Child looks at his bleeding hand, and says: "Booboo"; and Adult looks at Child's bleeding hand and says: "Booboo". Now we have the complete triangulation: the apex-object referred to is the hurt bleeding hand. The Child *has* the pain of a cut on his hand while the Adult *sees* the pain in the bleeding hand and tears of the child. As Wittgenstein says, "the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it". Without Wittgenstein's reply, we are left with the illusion that the Child has a way of privately referring to the propertyless pain as apex-object while Adult can only refer to publicly available physical and behavioural coordinates. So the two lines of referring do not pick the same object, and thereby do not refer to anything. The Child refers to pain without regard to his own behavioural reactions or to the environment that contains many dangers for causing pains. A new problem arises. What then are the identity conditions for sensation? Again, the behavioural squeezing of the hand and crying as well as the bloodied knife on the table are irrelevant to the identity of the sensation. The sensation must be identified first before one can hypothesise correlations between the sensation (careful here or one is importing our ordinary ways of identifying sensations) and behavioural and environmental phenomena. So what is the way that pains can be identified as such.

The response that most find intuitive and obvious is that "[...] only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only

surmise it" (PI, § 246). This epistemological reply to the problem results in an epistemic gulf between any given individual and any other human being. We are always inevitably kept at a distance from each other. But this epistemic solution to the problem is, according to Wittgenstein, "[i]n one way [...] wrong, and in another nonsense" (PI, § 246). In the first way, it is false that other people cannot know when I am in pain. That is a human reality. But why is it nonsense? "It can't be said of me at all [...] that I *know* I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I *am* in pain?" (PI, § 246). If we make a false claim, the words we use are meaningful, but if we are using words nonsensically, then the words we use are either meaningless, a kind of gibberish, or do not mean what they ordinarily mean. What is most important to notice in this reply from Wittgenstein is that meaning is prior to any other question or use that we can put to language. The problem of identity, even of pain, cannot be solved prior to the meaningfulness of the language that is used to solve it. The classic cartesian reply is a non-starter. Either the language used to refer to pain is meaningful, in which case there is no problem of identity; or it is just a kind of gibberish used to hide the fact that there is no solution to the problem of the identity of sensations under the assumption of radical privacy.

The problem of reference is fundamental to this emerging picture of the language of sensation since there is no sharing with others, no inherited way of going on correctly, and apparently, no background form of life. There is just a bare sensation in the void. This is the same set of issues dominating the opening passages of the *Philosophical Investigations*. There Wittgenstein introduced the builders' language-game (PI, § 2) as his tool for investigating the tripartite relation among a finite set of words, corresponding objects, and human builders. In the Bridge (PI, § 244) he reshapes the problem for inner sensations, and holds that it is most illuminatingly solved by the initiate learning situation, when the child is just acquiring language. How sensation words refer to sensations can be shown by how a child first acquires sensation words, like, 'pain'.

Consider how a child can be taught the word 'pain': "[W]ords are connected to primitive, natural expressions of sensation and used in their place". Suppose the child touches a hot stove. His natural spontaneous reaction is to scream and cry. These are the primitive, natural expressions of burning pain. As such natural expressions, we share them with all other human beings. The parent, who knows pain, tries to soothe the child by, in effect, teaching it new words, that is new pain-behaviour: 'ouch!' 'booboo', 'pain'. On the next occasion on which he is in pain, the child will come to utter 'booboo' or 'ouch' or even 'pain'. When he does so, he replaces his cries with words, and thereby refers to, the experience of pain, through his natural pain behaviour. That is the genesis of the word's referring to the experience.

The sensation word subsequently gains autonomy from the natural pain behaviour in its meaning pain. The expression 'It hurts' replaces the crying. When the expression 'it hurts' is mastered, it need not require the presence of the natural expression of the inner sensation in order to meaningfully refer to that sensation. The natural pain behaviour directly expresses the sensation. In replacing that naturally expressive behaviour, the learned verbal behaviour refers to the sensation *without* the mediation of thought. Expressive behaviour does not describe the link between the sensation and the word. According to Wittgenstein, primitive expressive behaviour does not refer in and of itself. It does not have semantic properties. Reference comes within acquisition of a socially shared language-game. Acquisition of reference requires the two-party linguistic learning of words. Precisely what the cartesian conception of language cannot provide. The child cannot teach itself what the word for pain is. He does not even know what pain is: he experiences pain.

Wittgenstein will use this expressive conception of sensation as a model for many more states of mind, for feelings, emotion, sensations and the like. Descartes by contrast can only teach himself, which means that he must wait, in his own words, until he is fully mature and can form the appropriate mental concepts. The consequence of this view is that much of a person's intellectual and conceptual mental life awaits inner innate development. Such concepts must be independent of ordinary public language, primitive behavioural expressions, and so are not embedded in a shared form of life, subject to a logical grammar. As we have seen the meaningfulness of the words of a language is not acquired through brute acts of naming. Words are meaningful as instruments of measurement within logically structured systems of activity. The reason that the problem of reference is stymied is because it is thought that meaningfulness derives from reference but in fact, as Wittgenstein has argued, successful reference depends upon its being situated within a meaningful language game. Identity questions require logical grammar.

Wittgenstein challenges the cartesian approach by asking: "How can I even attempt to interpose language between the natural expression of pain and the pain?" (PI, § 245) When the child uses 'booboo' or learns 'booboo', he cannot reserve such use to the pain independently of his tears. I cut my hand when cooking. In what sense is that pain separable from my hand, 'it hurts'? Wittgenstein asks, in light of these considerations, "in what sense are my sensations private?" (PI, § 246). To which Descartes answers by appeal to his epistemological goal: "[W]ell, only I can know whether I am really in pain" (PI, § 246). I know my pains I do not just express them. But how I state what I know is left obscure. How do I even come to know that I have pain as opposed to merely having sensation or a tongue? The full development of what is nonsensical about this epistemological strategy is developed

in the private language arguments.¹³ But however the question of identity can be answered, pure reference achieved through an act of naming, cannot provide the answer.

6 PI, §§ 245-9. Problem of Identity: Possibility and Necessity

From having focused on the relation between individual private sensations and words, Wittgenstein turns to the role that imagination might play in our understanding of sensations and mental privacy. If the epistemological account of privacy is false or nonsensical, what sort of account can be given? It is perhaps a grammatical proposition, like: “[T]he sentence ‘Sensations are private’ is comparable to ‘One plays patience by oneself’” (PI, § 348). There is a temptation to construe the second sentence as an analytic proposition, true in virtue of the meanings of the words. But this will not capture Wittgenstein’s notion of a grammatical proposition. He gives his readers two hints as to how to understand this obscure notion. The first is that it “belongs to the scaffolding from which our language operates” (PI, §

13 Here we can briefly review how Wittgenstein uses this double-barreled argumentative method - false or nonsense - to successfully critique philosophical theories of language and mind that he rejects. The first of the pair of arguments is a conflation argument in which the philosophical theory under scrutiny conflates the means by which the theory represents its subject matter with that subject matter itself (cf. PI, § 246). The second argument shows that the theory is self-defeating. It is a paradox because the theory eliminates the very phenomena to be explained. Wittgenstein makes three such arguments in Part I of the *Investigations*. The first theory is informed by Frege’s idea that formal logic actually structures natural language. Wittgenstein argues that logic is a means of representing natural language, but logic is not what gets represented. In other words, the advocate of Frege’s idea conflates formal logic and natural language. The stronger argument is the paradox argument. Taking an individual thought to mean: this - is - so creates a paradox. In meaning this, a thought cannot be of what is not the case (PI, § 95). But the point of a thought is precisely to be meaningful in a way that is independent of whether it is true or false. Imagination for example would be eliminated on this account of thought. Imagination is meaningful and yet is typically false. The source of the problem lies with Frege’s idea, his picture of the relation of logic to reality (see Williams 2010, ch. 4). The second philosophical theory Wittgenstein examines in this way is a theory of rule following. This is a variation of the idea of the question of the identity over time. In this case, causal determination over time is conflated with idealised logical continuity. A metaphor Wittgenstein uses is that of the causal action of a machine, like a watch, being conflated with an idealised machine-symbol which is conceived as determining all possible continuations (PI, § 194). There is no way out of this mistake while attempting to preserve the theory that interpretation determines the continuation of a rule: “[I]f every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here” (PI, § 201). The very thing we look to the rule to establish, what is correct and what is wrong, would be eliminated (see Williams 2010, ch. 5). The third pair of conflation-paradox arguments is Wittgenstein’s close examination of sensation and consciousness (see Williams 2010, ch. 8).

240); and secondly, briefly introducing the word ‘intention’ as it occurs in the sentence “Only you can know if you had that intention”, a word quite removed from ‘sensation’, and yet it too seems to name something private like sensation. Wittgenstein offers in place of that claim the claim that ‘intention’ “means: *that* is how we use it” (PI, § 247). In other words, he offers a reminder that words are like measurements. It is essential to them that we know how to use words just as we know how to use a measuring stick. Whereas analyticity is understood in terms of truth conditions, not human action, grammar is understood in terms of the word’s role or use within a living language. That involves that we share the procedures by which we use words in action. The procedure for private reference is empty of meaningful use. It is nonexistent. It might be thought that triangulation cannot be used for private reference, as has been shown already. It might be thought that we should look to the modalities – possibility or necessity – to find the link between word and private object. What would this mean?

The critiques¹⁴ Wittgenstein has already applied against Frege’s idea of a propositional logic and the interpretationist theory of rule-following, as providing the scaffolding of language, open space for seeing Wittgenstein’s logical grammar. The logical grammar of a language or language-game imposes constraints on how expressions are to be used in providing the background foundational procedures for engaging in our ordinary social and normative use of language which is intertwined with our social and environmental activities. They are procedures of use much in the same way rules of ordinary games open possibilities through constraint. Is there some way that judgments of privacy of object or privacy of reference can be identified through patterns of modality. For this task, it might be thought that imagination, in its liberality, might impose the relevant divide between what is possible (or thinkable) and what is not merely possible but necessary, the region in which a proposition cannot but be true. Wittgenstein rejects this crude account of how the modalities are to be understood. The cartesian private inner arena has been imagined as real for centuries. Does this not make it possible and further that we cannot but imagine it to be so? Taking this view seriously, possibility reaches as far as the imagination takes us. But that is way too far to impose the constraints that are necessary for the limits of language or for truth. Even Descartes repudiates imagination as the source for fixing identity over time.

14 Here briefly are Wittgenstein’s arguments against assigning the formal propositional calculus the role of scaffolding in the human form of life and his arguments against treating interpretation theory as powerful enough to impose the procedures that govern rule following.

Descartes uses as his example for showing that imagination cannot be the means for determining the identity of an object whose range of possible properties can vary over time, in other words just about anything that exists. Descartes shows the inadequacy of this through a simple thought experiment. Consider a piece of wax taken freshly from the bee hive. It smells and tastes sweet; it is hard and cold; it is sticky to the touch. At a later time, it is melted: it is black and acrid smelling and tasting; it is hot to the touch; it is an irregularly shaped puddle. All of its properties of that earlier time are gone as a result of being melted. We cannot determine its particular identity by its surface properties. But could we determine its identity through the imagination, it is suggested. Imagining the changes along the way to mark its slow transformation from the former condition to the present puddle of black liquid. It is impossible to imagine that the cold hard piece of wax had become this very hot and blackened puddle of an irregular shape. It could have had, just as well, any number of other shapes. How does imagination sort out the path that leads to this shape when it could have been easily imagined to have been different. Imagination cannot be the faculty for deciding this.

Consider now some additional examples of what is possible if imagination were our guide. Imagination, as we shall see, is not freedom to go in any direction it can take us, and so it is irrelevant to the problem of identity of pain that faces us now. And if Grammar imposes restrictions on imagination, then again imagination is irrelevant to the problem of identity. It presupposes identity, it does not determine it. We cannot take the smile of a baby to be pretence (PI, § 249) nor can a dog simulate pain (PI, § 250). The baby must learn to lie before it can pretend. And the dog cannot simulate pain because it lacks “the right surroundings for this behaviour to be real simulation”. It needs motivation for simulation and the right sort of audience to witness it and be taken in by this behaviour. This does not mean that babies cannot smile or that dogs cannot feel pain. But we cannot imagine a baby to be capable of pretence or lying. To imagine this would be to attribute sophisticated cognitive capacities and motivations to the infant. Though we can imagine a dog being in pain in many different situations, we cannot imagine him to be motivated to simulate the complex behaviour of actually being in pain. Another way to put this point is that we may observe babies speaking a sophisticated adult language with the facial expressions to go with it, but they are computer generated babies of the imagination that everyone knows are not real. Cartoons are filled with dogs and other creatures who speak, pretend, lie, simulate pain and many other sophisticated acts. But these are cartoon characters. No one, not even a child, would take these as real living dogs. What is required of both babies to pretend and dogs to simulate are second-order linguistic capabilities which require full command of first-order speech.

Philosophically, as Michael Williams has repeatedly argued, epistemological thought-experiments, like Descartes' suggestion that each of us might *just as well* be dreaming our lives away or that any one of us might be an isolated brain in a vat *so far as we know*, are equally fairy tales of the imagination (see Williams 1995).

Giving up the idea that a range of imagined possibilities might fix private reference and so the identity of the private object, Wittgenstein goes on to consider the idea that necessity, not possibility, might fix the relation between reference and the private object. We use a special form of words to appeal to such necessity, namely, 'I cannot imagine the opposite'. Wittgenstein's concern with this way of trying to express the necessity of certain states of affairs through the lens of imagination is that the phrase 'I cannot imagine the opposite' provides, not a standard for necessity, but "a defense against something whose form makes it look like an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one" (PI, § 251). To avoid confusion over this misidentification of the cognitive limitations of babies and dogs, and so the grammatical limits of imagination, Wittgenstein introduces a very simple example of a grammatical proposition: "Every rod has a length" (PI, § 251). This has the look of a general empirical proposition, like 'every squid squirts ink'. The difference between the two propositions is that there could be squids that do not squirt ink while no rod can fail to have a length. Furthermore, and this is emphasised by Wittgenstein, there is nothing that we would call 'the length of a sphere'. These inferences, especially those constituting a negative inference, are part of a 'picture' belonging to the grammatical proposition in question. We cannot picture a rod without a length and we cannot picture a sphere with a length. There is an inferential structure associated with the grammatical proposition. This is a holistic structure that has no room for atomistic elements that are nonetheless meaningful.

The cartesian view, on the other hand, does permit or even require an atomistic treatment of particular propositions and individual as well as general versions of the same proposition. Wittgenstein's example of a cartesian claim that is atomistic as well as individual is saying "This body has extension" (PI, § 252). We could respond by saying "Nonsense!" but typically we do not. To understand what a grammatical proposition is for Wittgenstein, we need to understand the rationale for both responses. The generalised version of this proposition is 'Every body has an extension', a proposition that is necessary. The use of 'every' or 'each' does not render it necessary. Rather it is the use of 'body' that requires 'every' or 'each'. This is what it is to specify the identity of 'body'. Though it looks like an empirical proposition, it is not. It plays an a priori role in numerous language games; that role can be foundational just because it has an inferential structure that cannot be broken without rendering the proposition or

proposition fragment in which it occurs nonsensical. So what changes with the individual version “This body has extension”? ‘This body’ implies only that this one has extension, but that is ludicrous. If this were the fundamental notion of ‘body’, it would become impossible to express the general proposition ‘Every body has an extension’ or ‘All bodies have extension’. To get the general notion of body, we would have to identify each particular body and conjoin them to make a general proposition.¹⁵ But we have no idea how to construct this proposition nor how to use it. An indefinitely long conjunction would have to take the place of the universal grammatical proposition. It would have to become irrelevant to our language games, and so, it could not play the role of giving the identity of ‘body’.

This same diagnosis applies to sensations and other mental states. Mental states also occur in language games as part of our form of life, and for which there are foundational grammatical propositions. We have looked at one of them: ‘crying expresses pain’. This is not an empirical proposition though the cartesian treats it like a contingent empirical one. Pain is treated as separable from crying or any other expressive feature of being in pain. This separation is what enables the cartesian to raise the question of the identity of pain as independent of crying or being cut with a knife or any other pain-behaviour. Once the connection is severed, the identity of the private sensation is lost. Wittgenstein’s point is that the problem of the criterion of identity cannot be resolved unless it is, in a sense, an *a priori* one (as understood by Wittgenstein),¹⁶ a grammatical proposition. It is foundational to our language game of sensations. It is important to note that it is an empirical matter for adults whether their pain is actually accompanied by crying. Nonetheless it remains the case that crying necessarily expresses pain. What is needed now is an understanding of what the criterion of identity for pain is. Neither the imagination’s possibilities nor reason’s necessity can identify what pain is or what ‘pain’ means. As we shall see, the criterion for the identity of pain is entwined with the meaning of ‘pain’.

15 This is the method that Wittgenstein describes in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Everything that exists is particular and atomistic in its essence. General propositions can only be constructed by conjoining individual propositions *ad infinitum*. This is, of course, a hopeless project.

16 The primary point in putting the proposition of identity as *a priori* is to underscore that it is not an empirical proposition that may be true or false even though how the child learns the word ‘pain’ is contingent.

7 PI, §§ 253-7. Criterion of Identity: Logical Grammar

Wittgenstein raises the problem of the criterion of identity for pains, and by extension, for other mental states. He does so by reminding the reader that the statement “This body has extension” is one that we are inclined to reply with “Of course!” as though it might not have had extension (PI 252). The very suggestion that this body might not have had extension makes nonsense of the emphatic agreement. Particular bodies have extension, with the same implications that are carried by the general form “Bodies have extension”. Insofar as Descartes is interested in such propositions, the general form would express a metaphysical necessity. Extension is the essence of particular bodies (Descartes 1996, IV), God be willing, since body as extended is the creation of God who thereby fixes the criterion of identity for body, its extension. Wittgenstein’s reply to this theistic solution to the problem of the criterion of identity for body would be ‘Nonsense!’. ‘Body is extended’ is necessary in the same way that ‘patience is played by oneself’ is necessary. It is one of the fundamental rules of the game played with ‘body’. It provides the criterion of identity for bodies. The relation between ‘body’ and ‘extension’ cannot be broken without destroying bodies. An image of a body in one’s imagination or dream is not a body. It is an image of a body.

Now the question of the criterion of identity is raised for pain, and in a particular way: “‘Another person can’t have my pains.’—Which are my pains? What counts as a criterion of identity here?” (PI, § 253). A familiar suggestion is to strike oneself while saying “But surely another person can’t have THIS pain”. In other words, what I alone am able to feel or know is the criterion for the identification of pain for me, and likewise for anyone else. But Wittgenstein thinks that to take such a feeling - THIS - as the criterion of identity for, what else THIS, can only be a way of reminding ourselves of what the criterion of identity for pain really is. So, what is the criterion of identity? Wittgenstein presents a dilemma for the individual who is trying to use words to stand for his sensations. First, he may use words for his sensations as we ordinarily do, but then “my language is not a ‘private’ one. Someone else might understand it as well as I” (PI, § 256). Using words for sensations as we ordinarily do involves recognising natural expressions for sensations in which case the fact that another cannot have my pains does not entail that another cannot recognise when a person is in pain. Such recognition is an ordinary and essential part of our grasp of the *criterion* of identity for pain.

If we take away our ordinary criterion of identity of pain, especially as it is tied up with the natural expressions of pain and we have only the sensation itself, all that I as an individual could do is to “associate

names with sensations and use the names in descriptions". I would have to do something like the following: Whenever I felt something 'inner' as it were, I would associate it with a name (maybe, 'pain' or 'Fred' or 'sensation') and use that name in description ('Fred' came today). To develop the second half of the dilemma, Wittgenstein invites us to consider a world in which "human beings shewed no outward signs of pain" (PI, § 257). How then could a child be taught the word for 'pain'? Wittgenstein's sarcastic response is that perhaps the child is a genius and invents a name for pain. No matter what the cognitive strengths of the child-genius might be or might become, he cannot discover sensation language for himself and he certainly cannot fix the criterion for identity. It cannot consist in the association of a name with a sensation. How would the child reidentify the sensation? By what criterion? Perhaps he thinks that a pain in the leg is not the same as a pain in the hand or in the tooth. Nothing constrains his choices of names nor the principles of reapplication of those names. Another might see no regularities in the names uttered; the possibility of communication is nonexistent. So where do we look for the criterion of identity?

And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word 'pain'; it shews the post where the new word us stationed. (PI, § 257)

The logical grammar of our words provides the foundational rules or structure in relation to which words are meaningful tools of measurement. They are not mere elements of association. The use of words must involve more sophisticated procedures that enable us to live, create, and maintain the human form of life we occupy.

This completes the bridge to PI, § 258: the private diary argument. At the end of the Bridge, Wittgenstein tells us where we can find the criterion of identity for pain and other sensations: it is the logical grammar of our language games. The arguments to come are his most powerful arguments against the cartesian theory of sensations. Methodologically, they use imagined scenarios that provide a context in which a private diary can be written (PI, § 258), and a context in which private objects can be located (PI, § 293). In providing such contexts, the scenarios give the illusion of supplying the necessary logical grammar that is foundational for the use of sensation-words. But Wittgenstein's arguments overwhelm this illusion and show it for what it is. The private diary rests on a conflation of the means of representation with the object of representation. The beetle in the box is enmeshed in a paradox. There is no further place for the cartesian theory to go.

8 Concluding Remarks

This is what any bridge must be: a truncated route to a new region. There is much that is drawn upon that requires further explanation and development. The most important are logical grammar and the human form of life.¹⁷ Both are involved in what is foundational to language (a framework of logical grammar) and mind (that intersection of our causal situatedness, expressive behaviour, natural activity, and, of paramount importance in making the human mind unique, language through-and-through (our human form of life). Wittgenstein hopes to secure two important philosophical points before he begins his careful examination of mind and mental concepts. The first is the primacy of meaning over any epistemological or metaphysical principle or mode of explanation. If the words used in articulating and defending a philosophical view or theory without an understanding of how words mean and maintain their meaning, the risk is confusion. Secondly, it is equally important to recognise the import of grasping the problem of the criterion of identity for objects. Objects cannot have the requisite identity needed for learning and using unless they already involve a conceptualised identity. The ‘this’ inside me does not naturally have the label of ‘pain’ attached to it. It is terribly misleading for Cartesians to simply describe objects of reference in their ordinary English or French terms as though this were neutral in characterising, for example, what the toddler already knows when given an ostensive definition, or any of us know when introduced to a new object. Objects are not conceptualised on their own, not even as ‘objects’. Language makes them recognisable. Now that we no longer live in a theistic philosophical world, there is no other way to identify the objects of our interest.

17 I recommend two excellent Cambridge elements that are directly pertinent to enhancing understanding of logical grammar and the human form of life. These are: Bronzo (2022) and Boncompagni (2022).

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