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Brazilians in Motion: Migration, Labor, and Social Reproduction in Japan

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Abstract The article analyzes migratory flows through the articulation of the categories of gender, race, and social class. In light of the continuous growth of international migration, taking the Brazilian case as an example, it is argued that this phenomenon cannot be understood solely through individual motivations or isolated labor market imbalances, but must be situated within the contradictory articulation of capital's social reproduction. Drawing on Social Reproduction Theory, the text examines how the demographic crisis – marked by low fertility rates and population aging in core countries – drives the demand for immigrant labor, while simultaneously relying on historically constituted gendered and racialized inequalities. The case of the migration of Brazilian descendants of Japanese immigrants to Japan is analyzed as a paradigmatic example, demonstrating how immigrant labor is incorporated under precarious conditions, detached from the costs of its social reproduction, and subjected to specific forms of exploitation, racial discrimination, and xenophobia. The article concludes that international migration functions as a partial response to the crises of capitalist social reproduction, while at the same time intensifying class, gender, and racial inequalities in both countries of origin and destination.

Keywords Labor. International Migration. Oppression. Social Reproduction Theory. Japan.

Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 International Migration: Labor, State, and Inequalities. – 3 Migration and the Population Question. – 4 Migration and Social Reproduction. – 5 Closing Remarks.

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1 Introduction

According to estimates by the United Nations (UN), in 2024 there were approximately 304 million international migrants worldwide. Naturally, this figure is not limited to movements associated with labor mobility. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, internal conflicts and the consequent production of refugees, among other factors, also contribute to migratory flows. In 2000, there were 173 million migrants, and in 2010 the number reached 211 million. Nevertheless, international labor migration remains significant, and the continuous growth in the number of international migrants constitutes both a consolidated trend in the global context and a symptom of dynamics originating in the world of work.

In Brazil, a similar scenario can be observed. The country has recorded an increase in the presence of immigrants, as well as in the number of Brazilians leaving the country, in line with this broader trend. According to the International Migration Observatory (Observatório das Migrações Internacionais), there was a significant rise in applications for residence in the country, increasing from 105,000 in 2013 to 1.2 million in 2023 – an increase of more than tenfold in volume (Oliveira 2024). Brazilians have also been migrating in greater numbers, with 4.9 million Brazilians living abroad in 2023, compared to 1.9 million in 2012 (Brasil 2024).

In this context, in our view, the migratory phenomenon proves to be paradigmatic in that it reveals certain assumptions and tendencies of contemporary capitalism, such as: inequalities internal to national labor markets; the persistence of the sex-racial division of labor under capitalism; the intensification of this division through the migratory process; the continued relevance of Marx's concept of the relative surplus population;[1] and the instrumentalization of migration for far-right political agendas, among others. For these reasons, an analytical framework focused on migratory flows becomes particularly insightful. From the perspective of labor relations and working conditions, and considering the immigrant worker as

1 We understand that immigrant workers play the role of compressing local wages, while also experiencing economic fluctuations earlier than the rest of the population, thus fulfilling the function of a relative surplus population, according to Marx's formulation, who argues that "surplus population of workers is a necessary product of accumulation or of the development of wealth on a capitalista basis, this surplus population also becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalist accumulation, indeed it becomes a condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, which belongs to capital just as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost. Independently of the limits of the actual increase of population, it creates a mass of human material always ready for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital's own changing valorization requirements" (Marx [1867] 1976, 784).

a "prototype of the flexible worker" (Basso 2013), the analysis of immigrant labor sheds light on recent transformations, including increasing informality, overrepresentation in platform-based work,[2] and the intensification of multiple forms of oppression, among other mechanisms through which inequalities are produced.

Thus, in this article, we analyze how immigrant labor is intertwined with gender and racial oppression, considering that such forms of oppression both shape and are intensified by the migratory process. To this end, we draw on Social Reproduction Theory, which helps us to understand how the social reproduction of capitalism makes use of international migration as a source of labor at virtually no cost (McNally, Ferguson 2015). We therefore present examples of Brazilian migration to Japan, among other cases, in order to examine how the production of labor power – an element central to the reproduction of capital – is placed at the core of the debate. The guiding questions of this article include how social reproduction functions as a determinant driving international migration, and in what ways racial and ethnic inequalities are intensified through the migratory phenomenon.

2 International Migration: Labor, State, and Inequalities

Sayad (1998) reminds us that, historically, the migratory phenomenon has been treated as a question or a problem to be solved, frequently associated with issues such as housing, labor, crime, or other social adversities. Expressions such as the immigrant housing question, the immigrant labor question, or the immigrant education question illustrate this framing, which has repeatedly been approached as an obstacle. In recent years, the rise of conservative and far-right governments in various countries has further emphasized this character by criminalizing and persecuting undocumented immigrants. Similarly, the immigrant question has become a prominent feature of political discourse during periods of economic recession. It is worth noting that the relationship between economic crises and the spread of nationalism is by no means new in history (Anderson 2015).

In the case of Brazil, there exists a narrative directed both inward and outward that presents the country as a receptive and welcoming nation for foreigners. Nevertheless, to cite a few examples, the Foreigner's Statute [Estatuto do Imigrante], which remained in effect

2 For an overview of the debate on the platformization of work and immigration, see: *Migrant labour in the gig economy: The intersection of migrant labour, platform capitalism, and resistance* (2025).

from 1980 to 2017, reproduced exclusionary and punitive principles toward immigrants (Quintanilha 2024). This law established a broad set of circumstances that authorized the compulsory removal of foreigners, such as threats to national security, political or social order, public morality and tranquility, as well as to the popular economy, among other forms of control and surveillance (2024, 232). Practices such as vagrancy, begging, or violating specific legal prohibitions were also subject to sanctions (232). From a legal perspective, there is a normalization of unequal treatment directed exclusively at immigrants.

When examining the labor market, immigrants positioned in the low-skilled segment – which is the predominant condition among the foreign population in Brazil – often find employment with limited social protection, much of it characterized by informality and precariousness, particularly when they are in an undocumented migratory status (Villen 2015).

In general, the racism inherent to the capitalist mode of production in Brazil manifests in an intensified form, segregating, oppressing, and precarizing the living conditions of the Black population as a whole. Focusing solely on the labor dimension, in 2024 Black women earned 47.5% less than non-Black men (Brasil 2024), highlighting the persistence of racism as an "ideological weapon of domination", as noted by Clóvis Moura (1994). Thus, while it is true that the Brazilian labor market is structurally polarized, unequal, and highly informal, immigrants face additional layers of discrimination, racism, and xenophobia – or xeno-racism (Faustino, Oliveira 2021) – on top of the stereotypes and prejudices directed specifically at them, especially when originating from peripheral countries.

Parallel to the inflow of immigrants, the emigration of Brazilians to other countries has intensified, driven by labor market inequalities and a sense of social insecurity in the country. Regarding the history of migration in Brazil, it can be said that it has gone through different periods and assumed diverse characteristics over time. During the first half of the twentieth century (and part of the nineteenth century), Brazil was characterized as a receiving country for immigrants, as a result of racist policies (Seyferth 2002) aimed at whitening the population during a period of economic industrialization.

Between 1950 and 1980, from a demographic perspective, Brazil could be characterized as having a closed population (Patarra, Baeninger 2006), with population growth depending on internal factors. This scenario only began to change from the 1980s onward, when Brazil started to experience a significant outflow of emigrants. According to Patarra and Baeninger (2006), the economic recession experienced by the country during this period, among other factors, significantly affected the number of Brazilians who went abroad. For them, these emigrants sought "a form of social mobility truncated

within the country during the years of the so-called lost decade, primarily heading to First World countries" (2006, 86).

The factors that attract and push immigrants – although embedded within the very sociometabolic system of capital (Mészáros 2002) – undergo changes, gaining significant momentum with the rise of neoliberalism. In the 1990s, Brazil's high rate of informality (IPEA),[3] declining real wages, and the flexibilization and precarization of work worsened the conditions for the production and reproduction of life for the vast majority of Brazilians, particularly affecting the impoverished working class, with an even greater impact on women and the Black population.

The main destinations for Brazilian emigration have been the United States, Portugal, Canada, Italy, and Japan. Since the 1990s, Japan has become one of the countries most in need of immigrant labor and has looked to Brazil as one of its primary sources. Brazil is home to the largest *Nikkei* population (people of Japanese descent) outside Japan, totaling around 2 million individuals. Thus, the combination of Brazil's economic recession in the 1990s, Japan's labor shortages, the country's aging population, and other factors – each rooted in structural inequalities – created favorable conditions for the emergence of a migratory flow that has persisted for over three decades.

In our view, the Japanese case becomes paradigmatic because it links the state's efforts to meet an economic demand – that is, the shortage of labor resulting from a crisis of social reproduction – with the consequences of this migration, which ultimately intensify gendered and racialized oppressions. We understand that analyzing the genesis and constitutive mechanisms of migratory processes reveals the centrality of gender and race in these phenomena, making it essential to understand the dynamics of social production and reproduction, thereby explaining the persistence of inequalities both within and between countries.

3 Migration and the Population Question

In 1990, Japan amended its Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (*Nyūkanhō Kaisei*, 入管法改正), allowing the entry of descendants of Japanese nationals up to the third generation. This move initiated the *dekasegi* phenomenon, characterized by the migration of Brazilian individuals of Japanese descent (*Nikkei*), which currently exceeds 211,000 residents in the country. The opening of the borders coincided with Japan's so-called population issue, marked by low fertility rates, an aging population, and difficulties in

3 Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA).

generational replacement, resulting in labor shortages across several strategic sectors of the economy.

Compared to other core capitalist countries, Japan has historically had a limited tradition of immigration, with the foreign population never exceeding 2% of the national total (Morris-Suzuki 2006). Nevertheless, the growing difficulty in replenishing the labor force necessary for the reproduction of its capitalism has brought the migration issue to the center of public debate, both within parliament and among Japanese businesses and civil society. In this context, migration policies have been progressively adjusted to the demands of local capitalism, while also engaging with public opinion, which is shaped by competing liberal ideologies, progressive currents, and varying degrees of nationalism.

Regarding these flows, Ursula Huws asserts that "[…] there are both barriers to and bridges for the free flows of capital investment, goods and services across borders just as there are barriers to and bridges for the free movements of labour" (2012, 2). This statement is insightful for understanding that both barriers and bridges in the movement of people are directly linked to capitalism's central triad: class, gender, and race. The demand for immigrant labor is closely related to the economic context of the receiving country, as well as to the conditions of social reproduction in the country from which migrants depart. It is important to note that by economic context, we refer not only to the economic indicators of the sending and receiving countries but also to the conditions of social reproduction that directly influence the need to attract or expel workers.

In Brazil, as mentioned earlier, around 2 million descendants of Japanese immigrants live in the country, encompassing up to the fifth generation. The history of the relationship between Brazil and Japan began in 1908 with the arrival of approximately 800 Japanese immigrants aboard the ship *Kasato-Maru* at the port of Santos, in the state of São Paulo. Over more than a century, Japanese communities were established in various regions of Brazil, preserving a cultural heritage originating from the *Meiji* period (1868-1912), expressed in specific everyday practices such as dietary habits, bodily postures, and linguistic forms of expression. These elements confer upon the Nikkei the status of bearers of a presumed "cultural code" (Ocada 2006, 148), which, as we will see, became a determining factor in the Japanese government's decision to recruit these workers.

These practices make them socially recognizable and, in certain contexts, perceived as distinct from Brazilians, often being identified simply as Japanese within Brazil. It is within this group that the segment of the *Nikkei* community who emigrates to Japan is situated, composed of individuals belonging to specific fractions of the working class in Brazil, whose trajectories are shaped by subjectivities,

motivations, and choices related to their social origins, among which Japanese ethnicity stands out as a central element.

On the other hand, in Japan, since 1990 the so-called population issue has emerged, in which a myriad of indicators related to social reproduction have created a scenario where the generational replacement necessary for the functioning of capitalism is not occurring. Over the past decade, the number of marriages has decreased by approximately 20%, while the average age at first marriage has increased for both sexes. At the same time, Japan's fertility rate continues to decline, standing at around 1.15 children per woman, despite several governmental attempts to encourage higher birth rates. As a result, the country's total population has been declining for fifteen consecutive years. In 2025, the economically active population represents 63% of the total, a proportion considered insufficient to ensure the proper functioning of the labor market. In the same year, the population aged 65 and over reaches 36 million people, accounting for 29.3% of the entire population (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2025).[4]

Estimates indicate that, in Japan, ensuring generational replacement would require raising the fertility rate to at least 1.8 children per woman – a level that has not yet been achieved. It can therefore be observed that changes in reproductive patterns have occurred independently of the needs of capital, as the current population deficit directly impacts the Japanese economy, highlighting the absence of any natural population law capable of resolving this contradiction. Despite state incentives aimed at increasing fertility, the material conditions and cultural transformations experienced by women have prevented them from contributing to the generational replacement demanded by capital. In other words, gender inequalities have influenced individuals' reproductive choices, significantly altering fertility rates, demographic patterns, and, consequently, affecting the country's economy.

In this context, immigrant labor assumes a central role, and migratory flows become fundamental elements of each country's population dynamics. This demographic issue is not limited to Japan but is also present in much of Europe, particularly in Italy, Germany, and Spain, as well as in Canada and other core economies. This convergence of factors increases international migratory flows and simultaneously expands the relative surplus population on a global scale, which feeds back onto native populations, driving significant transformations in the composition of – and inequalities across – race, ethnicity, gender, and class.

4 https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/2024np/.

Since the 1980s, the demand for immigrant labor had already been present in Japan, particularly in the automotive, electronics, and construction sectors. However, it was only in 1990, through the aforementioned amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, that descendants of Japanese nationals up to the third generation were granted authorization to enter the country via residence visas. As analyzed by Ocada (2006), Japanese employers sought to attract a large, participatory, productive, and persevering immigrant workforce. According to the author, the so-called *gambarê ethos* was instrumentalized – understood as a Confucian-derived work ethic that Brazilian *Nikkei*, as descendants of Japanese nationals, were supposedly carriers of. This ethos would confer upon the *dekasegi* a habitus characterized by effort and persistence, traits considered functional and highly demanded in the context of immigrant labor in Japan (Ocada 2006).

It is worth noting that the modification of immigration legislation did not entail a formal opening of Japan's borders to unskilled immigrant workers. Although there was a concrete need to fill these positions, by directing immigration policy toward attracting the *dekasegi* population, Japan incorporated unskilled labor through residence visas without explicitly establishing visa categories for such occupations. In this way, the country ensured the entry of workers considered culturally and phenotypically closer to the native population, while simultaneously avoiding the direct and unregulated admission of unskilled immigrants.

Regarding the working conditions of the *dekasegi*, they are predominantly employed in job niches rejected by Japanese workers, known as the 3 Ks, referring to the first letters of the three adjectives: *kitsui* (hard), *kitanai* (dirty), and *kiken* (dangerous) (Hosokawa 2011, 155). These jobs are concentrated in the automotive industry and companies producing electronic components, all considered flagship sectors of the Japanese economy. In general, *dekasegi* hold flexible employment contracts, often work informally, and have limited social protection.

The integration of *dekasegi* workers into the Japanese labor market is characterized by long working hours, typically six days per week, with daily shifts ranging from 10 to 12 hours, often extended according to production demands. Unlike the majority of Japanese workers employed under stable contracts, hourly wages compel *dekasegi* to work frequent overtime to secure subsistence, with limited opportunities for savings. The precariousness experienced by Brazilian immigrants in Japan extends beyond working conditions, manifesting in various forms of oppression and xenophobia encountered in their daily lives (Roncato 2020).

Although the aspects discussed thus far are fundamental for understanding the migratory phenomenon and the living conditions

of the Brazilian population, the aim of this text requires a deeper exploration of some central questions that have not yet been addressed: What factors explain the emergence of the so-called population issue within a nation? In what ways do gender and race function as structuring categories in the analysis of labor mobility? To pursue this analytical path in the study of migration, it is essential to focus on the dynamics that link social production and reproduction. In this regard, the case of Brazilian migration to Japan serves as a useful example.

4 Migration and Social Reproduction

Contemporary international migrations, often the subject of intense political debate, are frequently interpreted as phenomena with predominantly economic origins. Destination countries – typically core economies – face labor shortages resulting from demographic challenges, or crises of social reproduction, which they seek to address through the importation of immigrant workers. However, from the perspective of Marxist feminist theory,[5] it is essential to problematize the structural causes leading to this situation, investigating the processes that produce labor scarcity and, ultimately, the need to attract immigrants. It is at this point that gender assumes central analytical importance in the migration debate.

In an attempt to develop a materialist response to gender oppression under capitalism, Lise Vogel, one of the pioneers of what is known as Social Reproduction Theory, proposed that investigating the relationship between production and reproduction could reveal fundamental analytical insights. Drawing on Marx, she sought to understand how the labor-power commodity was determined. However, as an analytical path for this inquiry, Ferguson and McNally explain that

> if we follow Marx too quickly here, we run the risk of failing to ask an equally powerful – and, for present purposes, more crucial – question: how is that special commodity itself produced and reproduced? Marx senses that there is an issue, here, but he does not get to the heart of it. Vogel's critical insight involves interrupting Marx's argument at just this point, by asking: what are the *conditions of possibility* of this 'special commodity', labour-power, the very pivot of the capitalist economy? (2013, XXIV)

The "interruption" in Vogel's argument, when applied to the issue of migration, proves relevant as it allows us to question the

5 See, for example, Davis 1981; Vogel 2013; Bhattacharya 2017; Ferguson 2020.

reasons behind low fertility rates, while simultaneously observing population aging and the resulting generational replacement deficit. That is, it becomes important to denaturalize the processes of social reproduction, particularly biological reproduction and its ongoing demographic crisis, and to examine, as Vogel (2013) does, the conditions of possibility and impossibility for generational replacement to occur.

The crisis of social reproduction and low fertility rates are not natural phenomena. Biological reproduction, a socially determined phenomenon, depends on human, social, political, and economic factors that shape it. By social reproduction, it should be understood not as the reproduction of capital in a broad sense, but rather the physical, generational, material, and psychological reproduction of the labor force (Arruzza, Bhattacharya 2020), whether waged or unwaged. In other words, it refers to the reproduction of the working class as a social class.

For biological reproduction to occur, there must be favorable conditions for the production of life, such as an equitable sexual division of labor, wages that allow for a decent standard of living, public childcare, social protection, public policies supporting motherhood, career plans for women after pregnancy, climate security, and other infrastructures. However, the reality experienced by women – beyond the Japanese case – demonstrates a situation contrary to an ideal scenario for social reproduction.

From an analytical perspective on social reproduction and inequalities, there are similarities between the Enlightenment ideal, with its assumption of equality, and perspectives critical of capitalist exploitation, which focus on inequalities strictly in terms of class, thus adopting a stance "indifferent to sexual diversity" (Anderson 1985). In social theory – whether from a liberal perspective or incorporating a Marxist viewpoint – there remain interpretations suggesting that, under capitalism, "classes may still exist, differently related to the means of production, without nuclear families or sexual barriers within them" (Anderson 1985, 104). However, the history of capitalism has demonstrated dynamics that not only incorporate but also produce and amplify gendered and racial inequalities.

In the Brazilian context, considering only wage inequalities, women have historically earned between 20% and 30% less than men, with a 21% gap recorded in 2025 (Brasil 2025). Despite earning less, they work more, as in addition to their paid labor outside the home, women spend 9.6 more hours per week than men on domestic tasks (PNAD 2022). White people, on average, earn 61% more than Black people, demonstrating the persistence and structural nature of racial inequality in the country (Brasil 2023). These inequalities are not limited to Brazil, manifesting similarly in nearly all countries throughout the history of capitalism.

In the Japanese case, inequalities are numerous, with Japanese women earning 22.5% less than their male counterparts (Gender Equality Bureau 2023) and being responsible for almost all domestic work. This historical sexual division of labor – assigning care work exclusively to women – combined with the lack of full-time public childcare for newborns (Roncato 2020), reinforces the necessity for Japanese women to leave the labor market when they become pregnant.

This phenomenon, known as the M-curve, describes a labor trajectory in which women enter the workforce for a few years after completing their education but leave it following the birth of their children, dedicating themselves primarily to unpaid domestic work. Later, this group returns to the labor market, usually between the ages of 40 and 55, when their children's age allows for such reintegration. The M-curve thus represents a pattern characterized by women's entry, exit, and reentry into the workforce, constituting a specific feature of the Japanese context.

However, in recent decades, wage contraction across the Japanese working class, increasing informal employment, rising costs for the material reproduction of life, as well as subjective factors and cultural changes, have led to a significant decline in fertility rates. In other words, those "conditions of possibility" (Ferguson, McNally 2013) are not being fulfilled. How could people be expected to have more children in a context of economic, social, political, and climatic crisis? This set of factors demonstrates that, although capitalist social production plays a decisive role in value creation, it is intimately connected, in a dialectical reciprocity, to social reproduction. That is, the genesis of international migrations has gender as one of its central elements.

In light of the previous reflections, it is understood that contemporary migratory flows assume a central role in the population dynamics of capitalism (Ferguson, McNally 2014, 8), insofar as the current phase of its expansion is structured around the globalization of production and labor circulation. In this process, relative overpopulation is amplified on a global scale, significantly reshaping the determinations of class, gender, and race across different national contexts.

Following Seccombe's line of reasoning,

> If modes of production shape family forms, the obverse is also true. Family forms are active elements in the constitution and development of modes of production, above all because they are central in the production of people and their capacities for work, compliance and resistance. These causal dynamics operate in an intricate and dialectical fashion. (1992, 9)

Social reproduction, understood as a site of struggle, is manifested in women having fewer children in response to the devaluation of

reproductive labor, social isolation, and the shrinking of public resources allocated to this sphere, thereby increasing the demand for immigrant labor.

For receiving countries, immigrant labor largely comes detached from the costs of social reproduction, since the processes of upbringing, education, healthcare, and other necessary investments were carried out in the country of origin (Ferguson, McNally 2014). In the case of *dekasegi* migration, these costs were socially borne in Brazil and later appropriated by Japanese society. Upon entering the local labor market, however, the immigrant population tends to be incorporated under less favorable conditions, characterized by lower wages, limited or nonexistent social protection, and placement in significantly more precarious class fractions compared to native workers (Rocha, Roncato 2023).

When placed in subordinate positions in the labor market, immigrants experience intensified oppression, which not only deepens class inequalities but also amplifies racial and gender disparities in the destination country. Brazilians who emigrated to Japan, while leaving Brazil due to inequalities exacerbated by neoliberalism, simultaneously occupy the most precarious jobs in the Japanese labor market.

In the factories where they work, a structured duality can be observed: on one side, a core of Japanese workers with stable contracts; on the other, a contingent of immigrants in informal positions, whose precariousness is functional to the system, allowing for their replacement or dismissal according to fluctuations in production demand (Roncato 2013). Racial and ethnic discrimination against immigrants takes on particular characteristics due to their foreigner status, legitimizing and restricting their rights and social protection.

5 Closing Remarks

In the analysis of international migrations, they are sometimes interpreted as resulting from individual motivations that lead people to move spatially, while at other times they are conceived as the outcome of economic disruptions in the labor markets of origin and destination countries, understood as the main causes. Both perspectives are not incorrect, but they are incomplete and obscure the primary causes that explain the genesis of contemporary migratory flows.

As demonstrated in this article, the Brazilian labor market exhibits economic inequalities that, especially in the neoliberal context, have resulted in the deterioration of living standards for large segments of the working class, including Japanese descendants in Brazil.

Individual motivations, such as the desire to "improve one's life" (Roncato 2013, 2020), or the search for stability and security absent in Brazil, are part of personal incentives. Nevertheless, these realities do not escape the underlying causes that generate these labor market disruptions in the receiving country, ultimately creating the need to attract immigrants as a solution.

The labor shortage in Japan is fundamentally rooted in the ongoing demographic crisis, resulting from the inability to achieve generational replacement due to low fertility rates. By bringing gender to the center of this issue, one can observe a (conscious or unconscious) reluctance regarding the fact that people of reproductive age are having fewer children. This analysis, through an integrative conception of the production of the labor-power commodity and the reproduction of capital, allows for the articulation of social class, race/ethnicity, and gender in a unified perspective, capable of explaining both the processes of production and reproduction of the working class and the ongoing migratory flows.

Regarding the crisis of social reproduction, Nancy Fraser argues that

> every form of capitalist society harbours a deep-seated social-reproductive 'crisis tendency' or contradiction: on the one hand, social reproduction is a condition of possibility for sustained capital accumulation; on the other, capitalism's orientation to unlimited accumulation tends to destabilize the very processes of social reproduction on which it relies. (2016, 100)

In this context, on the one hand, if one of the responses to this crisis is migration, partially addressing the crisis of capital, such a measure inevitably generates consequences for the social reproduction of immigrants' lives. The contradictory elements associated with immigrant labor are manifold: while it functions in favor of capital, it simultaneously contributes to lowering the cost of local labor, intensifies competition among workers, fragments the social class, legitimizes repressive and population-control policies, and exacerbates inequalities in multiple ways.

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