

Do Counterexamples on the *Kāraka* Rules A. 1.4.33-36 in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* Serve Any Purpose?

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Abstract Ajotikar et al. (2016) claim that most of the counterexamples provided in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* conform to the distinctive feature of a counterexample, namely, having all the conditions stated in the rule except one (*ekāṅgavikalatā*). Ajotikar (2021) discusses how a variant reading for a counterexample helps understand the relation between two operational rules. This article adds one more aspect to the importance of counterexamples. However, there are some cases where the purpose of the counterexample of a complex semantic condition is not clear. In this article, I study counterexamples provided on the sūtras, A. 1.4.33-36, in the *kāraka* section, on which Patañjali did not comment. These sūtras are chosen for discussion because the counterexamples available on these sūtras are first provided in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*. When it comes to the issue of complex semantic conditions (*priyamāṇa*, *jñīpsyamāna*, *īpsita* or *uttamarṇa*) stated in A. 1.4.33-36, it is difficult to justify the usefulness of the available counterexamples. After carefully examining Bhaṭṭhari's views along with Helārāja's explanation, it is evident that these counterexamples must have been included in order to fulfil the criteria of a *vṛtti*. A *vṛtti* typically includes an example, a counterexample and a supplementary word, which are necessary to complete the meaning of the rule. However, these counterexamples fail to justify the significance of the semantic conditions stated in the rule for which they are provided. Hence they do not serve any purpose.

Keywords *Kāśikāvṛtti* counterexamples. *Kāraka* sūtras. Bhaṭṭhari. Pāṇini non-Pāṇinian grammars.

Summary 1 Introduction.–2 Technical Difficulty in the Counterexample on A. 1.4.33.–3 Bhaṭṭhari on A. 1.4.33-36.–4 The *Kātantra* and the *Cāndravākaraṇa*.–5 Conclusion.



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245

1 Introduction

Counterexamples are an important part of commentaries on rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Ajotikar et. al. (2016) conclude that the essential feature of a counterexample is that it have all the conditions stated in the rule except one (*ekāṅgavikalatā*). Ajotikar (2021) adds one more aspect to the importance of counterexamples, namely that they help determine the scope of the operation provided by the sūtra. The Author demonstrates that a variant reading for a counterexample provided in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* on A.7.2.8 *neḍvaśi kṛti* helps understand the relation between the two operational rules A.7.2.8 and A.7.2.35 *ārhdhadhātukasyeḍvalādeḥ*. However, it is difficult to comprehend the purpose of a counterexample of a complex semantic condition in a sūtra that introduces a technical term. Several of this type of counterexample occur in the *kāra* section, for example, counterexamples on the sūtras A. 1.4.33-36. These sūtras are chosen for discussion because Patañjali did not comment on them, and the counterexamples are first provided in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*.

This article is divided into five sections. After this introduction, the second section of the article deals with the technical difficulty regarding the counterexample given on A. 1.4.33 along with a survey of counterexamples provided in almost all the commentaries available in print form on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Then, in section 3, are discussed Bhartṛhari's views on A. 1.4.33-36, where it is examined whether the counterexamples provided in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* comply with Bhartṛhari's discussion. In section 4, I discuss counterexamples provided by pre-*Kāśikāvṛtti* non-pāṇinian grammars, namely, the Kātantra and Cāndra, where they have a sūtra equivalent to one among A. 1.4.33-36.

2 Technical Difficulty in the Counterexample on A. 1.4.33

Since Patañjali did not comment on rules A.1.4.33-41, the *Kāśikāvṛtti* is the source of all discussion on these rules in the Pāṇinian tradition. A glance at the subsequent transmission of the counterexamples on these rules will demonstrate this. Table 1 illustrates beyond any doubt that all the subsequent commentaries relied on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* for the choice of counterexamples. Hence analysis of counterexamples in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* is sufficient to settle the issue regarding their significance [tab. 1].

Table 1 Counterexamples on A. 1.4.33-36 given in pāṇinian commentaries

sūtra no.	<i>Kāśikāvṛtti</i> (Sharma et al. 1969)	<i>Bhāṣāvṛtti</i> (Chakravarti 1918)	<i>Rūpāvatāra</i> (Rangacharya 1916)	<i>Prakriyākaumudī</i> (Trivedi 1925)	<i>Siddhāntakaumudī</i> (Chaturveda, Vidyabhaskara 1961)
1 A. 1.4.33 <i>rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ</i>	<i>prīyamāṇa iti kim. devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi.</i>	No counterexample	<i>prīyamāṇa iti kim. devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi.</i>	No counterexample	<i>prīyamāṇa iti kim. devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi.</i>
2 A. 1.4.34 <i>ślāgha- hnuṅsthā-śapām jñīpsyamānaḥ</i>	<i>jñīpsyamāna iti kim. devadattāya ślāghate pathi.</i>	No counterexample	No Counterexample	No counterexample	<i>jñīpsyamāna iti kim. devadattāya ślāghate pathi.</i>
3 A. 1.4.35 <i>dhāreruttamarṇaḥ</i>	<i>uttamarṇa iti kim. devadattāya śataṁ dhārayati grāme.</i>	No counterexample	No Counterexample	No counterexample	<i>uttamarṇa iti kim. devadattāya śataṁ dhārayati grāme.</i>
4 A. 1.4.36 <i>spṛherīpsitaḥ</i>	<i>īpsita iti kim. puṣpebhyo vane spṛhayati.</i>	No counterexample	<i>īpsita iti kim. puṣpebhyo spṛhayati vane.</i>	No counterexample	<i>īpsita iti kim. puṣpebhyo vane spṛhayati.</i>

Table 1 shows that the counterexamples provided by the *Kāśikāvṛtti* on A. 1.4.33-36 are repeated by other commentators without any change wherever they are included. All the counterexamples in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* have a definite pattern. The sentence that constitutes one of the examples for the sūtra is used to form a counterexample with the addition of a locative singular form at the end. For example, the *Kāśikāvṛtti* provides a pair of examples on A. 1.4.33: *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ* “Devadatta likes sweat-meats”¹ and *yajñadattāya svadate ‘pūpaḥ* “Yajñadatta likes cake”. A counterexample is provided by adding just one word, *pathi*, in *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi* “Devadatta likes sweat-meats on the path”, in order to explain the significance of the condition *prīyamāṇaḥ* ‘being pleased’. The word *pathi* is a locative singular of the word *pathin* ‘path’. As is evident from Table 1, the same counterexample is repeated by the post-*Kāśikāvṛtti* commentators even if the commentator provides a different example for the sūtra. For example, the *Siddhāntakaumudī* provides the example *haraye rocate bhaktiḥ* “Hari likes devotion” (Chaturveda, Vidyabhaskara 1961, 644) whereas it does not change the counterexample sentence. This pattern of counterexample with a locative singular form is continued in the subsequent three sūtras, A. 1.4.34-36² (by addition of a locative singular word at the end such as *grāme*, *vane*). We observe one change in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* on A. 1.4.36, namely that the word *vane* is placed before and not after the verb (*puṣpebhyo vane*

¹ All translations are by the Author unless otherwise stated.

² The *Kāśikāvṛtti* provides counterexamples that include a word denoting an object termed *adhikaraṇa* in A. 1.4.25 *bhayaḥetuḥ iti kim? arāṇye bibheti. arāṇye trāyate*, and in A. 1.4.27 *īpsitaḥ iti kim? yavebhyo gā vārayati kṣetre*. A similar pattern is followed in the subsequent rules (A. 1.4.33 onwards).

spṛhayati). This sequence is copied in the *Siddhāntakaumudī*; however, in the *Rūpavatāra*, the regular pattern with the locative at the end is restored (*puṣpebhyo spṛhayati vane*).

All commentators follow the same pattern, with the exception of one, where we find variant readings. A. 1.4.34. There is a variant reading found in three different editions of the *Kāśikāvṛtti*: *devadattaḥ ślāghate* “Devadatta praises” (Mishra 1985, 552; Tripathi, Malaviya 1986, 148; Vidyavaridhi 1997, 74). In the Osmania edition of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (Sharma et al. 1969-70, 82 fn. 10), one additional variant reading is mentioned in the critical apparatus, i.e. *devadattam ślāghate* “he/she praises Devadatta” along with *devadattaḥ ślāghate*. These two variant readings deviate from the pattern of having a locative singular word added at the end of the example sentence. These two variant readings are known to Haradatta (Mishra 1985, 552). In the *Padamāñjarī*, he quotes *devadattaḥ ślāghate* as the main reading and notes the variant *devadattam ślāghate*. Interestingly, Haradatta does not show any awareness of the commonly available reading *devadattāya ślāghate pathi*. He discusses the counterexample *devadattaḥ ślāghate* as follows: *devadattaḥ ślāghate iti. jñiṣyamānavacanāt karmasamjñaiḥ bādhyate, na kartṛsamjñetyarthaḥ* “The purpose of mentioning the counterexample, *devadattaḥ ślāghate*, is to show that the fact that the condition *jñiṣyamāna* is mentioned in sūtra, the rule blocks only the term *karma*, not the term *kartṛ*”. He further states: *kvacit tu devadattam ślāghate iti pāṭhaḥ* “in some sources, there is a variant reading *devadattam ślāghate*”. These two counterexamples available to Haradatta are not recorded in any other post-*Kāśikāvṛtti* commentary.

2.1 Is the Given Counterexample Correct?

Let us discuss the correctness of one of the counterexamples with a locative singular. For example, consider the counterexample on A. 1.4.33 *rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ: devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi* “Devadatta likes sweetmeats on the way”. A. 1.4.33 means: “the technical term *sampradāna* denotes one who is pleased (*prīyamāṇa*) in relation to the action denoted by verbal roots meaning ‘to please’ (*rucyrtha*)”. The counterexample in question is provided for the condition to explain the need for stating *prīyamāṇa* (see **tab. 1**, row 1).

We noted at the beginning of our introduction that the essential feature of a counterexample is that having all the conditions stated in the rule except one (*ekāṅgavikalatā*) (Ajotikar et al. 2016). There is no other recurring term available in this rule other than *kāra* (from A. 1.4.23). Hence, when we apply this essential feature, it implies that in the absence of the term *prīyamāṇa*, the rule (*rucyarthānām*) would mean that any participant in the action denoted by a verb having the

same meaning as the verb *ruc* ‘to please’ would be termed *sampradāna*. Thus, *pathin* ‘path’ would be termed *sampradāna*. If not denoted (A. 2.3.1 *anabhihite*) by a verbal affix, *kṛt* or *taddhita* affix or a compound, the item termed *sampradāna* would get a fourth-triplet nominal termination by A. 2.3.13 *caturthī sampradāne*. Thus, in the sentence, *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi*, the word *pathi* would not be termed *adhikaraṇa* by A. 1.4.45 *ādhāro ’dhikaraṇam* and would not get a seventh-triplet nominal termination by A. 2.3.36 *saptamy adhikaraṇe ca*.

There is a technical difficulty in this counterexample. The *kāra*-section comes under the scope of the heading A. 1.4.1 *ā kaḍārād ekā sañjñā*: “Beginning with this sūtra and ending with A. 2.2.38 *kāḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*, only one (*ekā*) technical term (*sañjñā*) applies (to a given item)”. A. 1.4.2 *vipraṭiṣedhe param kāryam* is a conflict resolution metarule which means: “When there is a conflict (*vipraṭiṣedha*) (between two rules which can equally apply in a given domain), the operation provided by the subsequent rule (*para*) alone applies”. Hence, in any situation of a conflict between two rules, the term stated by the later rule overrides the one provided by the previous rule. Thus, any *kāra* term provided after the term *sampradāna* would override the term *sampradāna*. Therefore, it is not proper to posit that, in the absence of the condition *prīyamāṇa*, *pathin* ‘path’ would not be termed *adhikaraṇa* and would not get seventh-triplet nominal termination. On the contrary, the word *pathin* ‘path’ should be termed *adhikaraṇa* and should get seventh-triplet nominal termination because the term *adhikaraṇa* is stated by A. 1.4.45 *ādhāro ’dhikaraṇam* which is a subsequent to the rules (A. 1.4.32-41) that provide the term *sampradāna*. Thus, the counterexample involving the *adhikaraṇa* (*devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi*) fails to explain the real purpose of the condition *prīyamāṇa* in A. 1.4.33. The same is true for the counterexamples on the subsequent rules.

3 Bhartṛhari on A. 1.4.33-36

In the quest for the origin of these counterexamples, it is necessary to study Bhartṛhari’s views on A. 1.4.33-36. In the *Sādhanaśamuddeśa* (verse 130) of his *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari explains that these rules are exceptions to the provision of the term *hetu* (A. 1.4.55), *karman* (A. 1.4.49) and the provision of the sixth-triplet nominal termination (*ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti* A. 2.3.50). Helārāja elaborates on Bhartṛhari’s views. On the basis of their discussion, I present a list of those rules to which A. 1.4.33-36 are exceptions in table 2 [tab. 2].

Table 2 Sūtra and its exceptions according to Bhartṛhari

Sūtra	Exception
A. 1.4.33 <i>rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ</i>	A. 1.4.55 <i>tatprayojako hetuś ca</i> or A. 1.4.52 <i>gatibuddhipratyavasānār</i> <i>thaśabdakarmākarmakāṇāmaṇikart</i> <i>ā sa ṇau</i>
A. 1.4.34 <i>ślāghahnunsthāśapām</i> <i>jñīpsyamāṇaḥ</i>	A. 1.4.55 <i>tatprayojako hetuś ca</i> or A. 1.4.49 <i>kartur īpsitatamaṁ karma</i>
A. 1.4.35 <i>dhārer uttamaṇaḥ</i>	A. 2.3.50 <i>śaṣṭhī śeṣe</i>
A. 1.4.36 <i>spṛher īpsitaḥ</i>	A. 1.4.49 <i>kartur īpsitatamaṁ karma</i>

Bhartṛhari explains which rule would apply if the rules A. 1.4.33-36 did not apply:

hetutve karmasañjāyām śeṣatve vāpi kārakam.
rucyarthādiṣu śāstreṇa sampradānākhyam ucyate.. 130..

In the sūtras beginning with *rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ* (A. 1.4.33-41), it is the *śāstra* which gives the name of Recipient (*sampradāna*) to what would otherwise have been *Hetu*, *Karman* or *Śeṣa*. (Iyer 1971, 223)

Bhartṛhari focuses on explaining the semantics of the verbal roots listed in the sūtras that extend the provision of the term *sampradāna* to items other than the recipient in the action of giving (A. 1.4.32). According to Bhartṛhari, in a sentence like *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ*, Devadatta prompts the sweet-meat to be the object of his desire and is therefore termed *hetu* (agent of a causative action) by A. 1.4.55 *tatprayojako hetuś ca*. The meaning of the verbal root *ruc* is such that its agent is something other than the *kāra* who is pleased, that is, who is the substrate of desire. The sweet-meat (*modaka*) is the object of Devadatta's desire. Devadatta prompts the sweet-meat (*modaka*) to be the object of his desire. Because he is the agent who prompts (*prayojaka*), Devadatta would be termed *hetu*, and that would force the affix *ṇic* to apply after the verbal root *ruc* by A. 3.1.26.³ However,

3 *tathā hi devadattāya rocate modakaḥ ityatrānyakartṛko 'bhilāṣo rucyārtha ityabhilāṣa- viṣayabhāvam āpadyamānam modakam devadattaḥ prayuñkte laulyāt tadānugunyam ācaratīti hetusañjāyām prayojakasya devadattasya prāptāyām sampradānasamjñā kathayate* "For in this way in the sentence 'Devadatta likes sweet-meats' the meaning of the verbal root *ruc* is the desire by another agent. Thus (the sentence means), 'Devadatta prompts the sweet-meat to become the object of his desire, that is, because of his desire, acts in accordance with his desire.' So the technical term *sampradāna* is provided by A. 1.4.33 in exception to the technical term *hetu* which obtains to Devadatta because he is a prompter" (Tripathi 1979, 318)

the convention is to express an agent who prompts something to be the object of his desire, such as Devadatta, by the dative case rather than the nominative case in an active clause or instrumental in a passive clause. The term *sampradāna* is provided by A. 1.4.33 to such an agent who prompts something to be the object of his desire, Devadatta in this case; and, when not denoted by any verbal termination, such an agent gets the fourth-triplet nominal termination. Thus, *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ* “a sweetmeat is pleasing to Devadatta” is the valid expression; not **devadattaḥ modakam rocayate* “Devadatta prompts sweet-meat to become the object of his desire”. Thus A. 1.4.33 is an exception to *tatprayojako hetuś ca* A. 1.4.55.

If the meaning of *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ* is “a sweetmeat causes Devadatta to desire it”, and being pleased (*prīyamāna*) qualifies the direct object in the action of causing the desire then Devadatta is termed *karman* by A. 1.4.52 *gatibuddhipratyavasānārthas abdakarmākarmakāṇāmaṇikartā sa nau*. In that case A. 1.4.33 is an exception to A. 1.4.52.⁴ Thus *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ* is a valid expression; not **devadattam rocate modakaḥ* “Modaka makes Devadatta to desire it”. It is important to note that there is no reference to the *adhikaraṇa* in this discussion. So, the question concerning the source for the counterexample *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ pathi* remains unanswered.

Similarly, Bhartṛhari elaborates the meanings of the verbal roots listed in A. 1.4.34, namely, *ślāgh* ‘to praise’, *hnu* ‘to hide from’, *sthā* ‘to stand’ and *śap* ‘to curse’. Helārāja clarifies Bhartṛhari’s position only on the verbal root *ślāgh*, not on the others.⁵ With the help of this explanation we understand that A. 1.4.34 is an exception to A. 1.4.49 (which assigns the technical term *karman*) or A. 1.4.55 (which assigns the technical term *hetu*).

⁴ *yadā tu devadattāya rocate modakaḥ ity ayam artho devadattam modakaḥ prīṇayatīti tathā ca prīyamāna iti viśeṣaṇam tadā karmasañjñāyām prāptāyām sampradānasañjñārambhaḥ* “When the meaning of the sentence, ‘Devadatta likes sweet-meats,’ is ‘Sweet-meats please Devadatta,’ and so the word *prīyamāna* ‘being pleased’ is the qualifier, then the technical term *sampradāna* would be provided in exception to the technical term *karman*” (Tripathi 1979, 319).

⁵ *dhātorarthāntare hi vṛttau sakarmakatvam. evam devadattāya ślāghate iti guṇotkarṣeṇa devadattaḥ śasyamāno guṇavattayā tatsamarthācaraanād adhyaropitaprayojakabhāvo hetusañjñām prāpto guṇākhyānena vā jñāpayitum iṣṭo jñāpanenāpyamānatvāt karmasañjñāḥ iti ślāghhnuḥ ityādinā sampradānasañjñāḥ kathyate* “For the verbal root becomes transitive when the meaning of the verbal root changes. Thus in the sentence, ‘Someone praises Devadatta,’ The technical term *sampradāna* is provided by A. 1.4.34 either in exception to the term *hetu* which Devadatta, who is being praised because of his virtues, would obtain because the status of a prompter is superimposed on him because he behaves virtuously because of the fact that he possesses virtues, or in exception to the term *karman* which would obtain by virtue of the fact that he is the object of the desire to make him known by the means of description of his virtues” (Tripathi 1979, 319).

The essence of his discussion is as follows: the verbal root *ślāgh* is transitive (*sakarmaka*) here. There are two possibilities as far as the expression *devadattāya ślāghate* is concerned. (1) Yajñadatta gets encouraged to praise Devadatta because of Devadatta's extraordinary merits. In such a situation Devadatta's merits cause Yajñadatta to praise him. Thus, Devadatta would be termed *hetu* by A. 1.4.55 *tatprayojako hetuś ca*, and **devadattaḥ ślāghayate* "Devadatta causes someone to praise him" would be the expression. However, such a construction is blocked by A. 1.4.34 that provides the term *sampradāna* for Devadatta. (2) When Yajñadatta wants Devadatta's merits to be known then Devadatta would be termed *karman* by A. 1.4.49 *kartur īpsitamam karma*, and **devadattam ślāghate* "someone praises Devadatta" would be the expression. However, it is blocked by A. 1.4.34 that terms Devadatta *sampradāna*. Thus A. 1.4.34 is an exception to A. 1.4.55 and A. 1.4.49. Here also we do not find any discussion related to the locus that would be termed *adhikaraṇa* by A. 1.4.45 and condition a seventh-triplet nominal termination by A. 2.3.36. Hence the source for the counterexample *devadattāya ślāghate pathi* is not the *Vākyapadiya*.

This discussion is incomplete without the reading *devadattaḥ ślāghate* "Devadatta praises" which seems to be accepted by Haradatta as a valid reading. This reading merely points out that Devadatta is an agent of the action of praising. However, Haradatta (Mishra 1985, 552) explains this counterexample saying *jñīpsyamānavacanāt karmasamjñāiva bādhyate, na kartṛsamjñetyarthaḥ* "A. 1.4.34 blocks only [the assignment of] the term *karman* by A. 1.4.49 not the term *kartṛ* by A. 1.4.54 because the condition *jñīpsyamāna* 'desired to be made known to' is added". The statement that the term *karman* alone is blocked agrees with what Bhartṛhari and Helārāja argued, namely that A. 1.4.34 is an exception to A. 1.4.49. However, the example *devadattaḥ ślāghate* as read by Haradatta does not show this. Instead, it implies the opposite, namely that the term *kartṛ* would be blocked if the condition *jñīpsyamāna* is not stated in A. 1.4.34. Haradatta goes on to provide another counterexample *gārgikayā ślāgate sabhāyām* "He or she boasts of belonging to the family of Garga in the court". And he claims this example shows that the terms *garaṇa* and *adhikaraṇa* are not blocked by A. 1.4.34. However, this counterexample too shows just the opposite, i.e. these terms would be blocked by A. 1.4.34 in the absence of the condition *jñīpsyamāna*.

The variant reading *devadattam ślāghate*, as Haradatta states, is not in conformity with Bhartṛhari's and Helārāja's conclusion. They state that the term *karman* is blocked by A. 1.4.34. It seems that, according to Bhartṛhari and Helārāja, Pāṇini does not attest the expression **devadattam ślāghate* when the verbal root *ślāgh* means 'to praise'. Haradatta (Mishra, 1985, 552) explains this counterexample as follows:

yasmāy ākhyāyate sa jñīpsyamāna ity ākhyāyamānā dvitīyaiva nyāyyeti. ye tv ākhyāyamānam jñīpsyamānam vadanti teṣāṃ yasmāy ākhyāyate tataḥ ṣaṣṭhī bhavati. devadattāya ślāghate yajñadatto viṣṇumitrasya.

jñīpsyamāna means the one who is made known so it is proper to use the second-triplet nominal termination (after the word which is an object of the action of making know). Those, however, who explain that “*jñīpsyamāna*” = “*ākhyāyamāna*” (what is being related/spoken about), propose to add sixth-triplet nominal termination after the receiver of the information as is observed in *devadattāya ślāghate yajñadatto viṣṇumitrasya* (Yajñadatta praises Devadatta to Viṣṇumitra).

Here Haradatta points out that, in the sentence *devadattam ślāghate*, Devadatta is merely an object of the praise but neither him nor anyone else are made known of that praise. Moreover, when someone (Viṣṇumitra) other than the direct object (Devadatta) is made known of the praise, he gets a sixth-triplet nominal termination, not a fourth-triplet one. This discussion indicates that some grammarians allow the expression **devadattam ślāghate* when that praise is not intended to be known by Devadatta or anyone else. The probable source for this reading will be discussed in Section 4.2. Interestingly, at least five manuscripts of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* support the reading *devadattam ślāghate* which was known to Haradatta.⁶ It is surprising that the editors of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (Sharma et. al. 1969-70) never considered this reading seriously even though it had the support of a commentator as well as from the manuscript tradition.

In the case of A. 1.4.36 *spṛher īpsitaḥ* also, Helārāja, elaborating Bhartṛhari’s argument, states that it is an exception to A. 1.4.49.⁷ In the sentence *puṣpebhyaḥ spṛhayati* “He desires flowers”, flowers are the most desired objects so there is the possibility of being termed *karman* by A. 1.4.49. They are not so termed because A. 1.4.36 provides the term *sampradāna* for the object of desire. Thus A. 1.4.36 is an exception to A. 1.4.49. Here as well, according to Bhartṛhari as Helārāja explains, Pāṇini does not provide for the expression **puṣpāni spṛhayati*. Joshi and Roodbergen (1995, 111 fn. 11) also opine that **puṣpāni spṛhayati* is not allowed. Furthermore, in fn. 12, they say that there is no technical difference between *īpsita*

⁶ Manuscripts C4452 at the Banares Hindu University; IOL 4087 at the India Office London; 145-1K-145-2K at Shri Ranbir Prasad Research Institute, Jammu; VI 863 at Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur; 37926 at Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi.

⁷ *puṣpebhyaḥ spṛhayati iti puṣpānam īpsitatamatvāt karmasañjñāprasaṅgaḥ uktaḥ* (Tripathi 1979, 319).

and *īpsitatama*. So one should use the fourth-triplet nominal termination after the object of desire in the case of the verbal root *spṛh*. However later grammarians,⁸ disagreeing with Bhartṛhari, unanimously say that when the speaker intends to express that the desire for something is excessive, then A. 1.4.49 overrides A. 1.4.36 by the principle that the subsequent rule (*para*) alone applies. Here none of the commentaries provides **puṣpāṇi spṛhayati* as a counterexample. Instead they create optionality between A. 1.4.36 and A. 1.4.49. There is a lot of emphasis on the relation between A. 1.4.36 and A. 1.4.49; yet there is no reference to the relation of A. 1.4.36 to rules that provide any other *kāra* terms like *adhikaraṇa*. The expression *puṣpabhyaḥ spṛhayati* and other such expressions in which the object of desire appears in a case other than accusative are idiosyncratic.

Bhartṛhari states that A. 1.4.35 *dhārer uttamaraḥ* is an exception to A. 2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*. Helārāja explains the example *devadattāya śataṃ dhārayati* “He or she owes a hundred to Devadatta”, as follows: Devadatta, who is the creditor, is the cause of the action of owing because he is the one who gives a hundred. However, there is no explicit mention of the action of giving. In relation to the implicit action of giving, the agent would get a sixth-triplet nominal termination. But this is blocked by A. 1.4.35 by providing the term *sampradāna*. In short, **devadattasya śataṃ dhārayati* “He or she owes hundred of Devadatta” is not an accepted usage. Here also, we can observe that there is no mention of any other *kāra* term like *adhikaraṇa*.

It remains unanswered why the counterexamples on all of these sūtras include the *adhikaraṇa* in locative case. Bhartṛhari’s discussion revolves around clarifying how the term *sampradāna* provided by A. 1.4.33-36 is an exception to the two *kāra* terms *hetu* and *karman*, and to the sixth-triplet termination (*ṣaṣṭhī*). It is obvious that we cannot expect any counterexample that includes a word that denotes an object designated by either of these two *kāra* terms. It seems the commentators avoid using any hypothetical counterexample that does not actually occur in correct usage. Hence, they provide a counterexample that uses a word denoting an object that is termed *adhikaraṇa*. The rules that provide the term *adhikaraṇa* (A. 1.4.45) occur before the rules that provide the terms *hetu* (A. 1.4.55) and *karman* (A. 1.4.49-52). Because these rules occur in the section governed by the *ekasañjñā adhikāra* in which the subsequent rule applies (A. 1.4.1-2), the subsequent *kāra* term prevails over the previous one when there is a conflict. The term *adhikaraṇa* is provided

⁸ Jinendrabuddhi: *yadā tu puṣpādīnām īpsitatamatvaṃ vivakṣyate, tadā paratvāt prakrasañjñāiva bhavati - puṣpāṇi spṛhayatīti* (Mishra 1985, 553). Haradatta: *prakarṣavivakṣāyām tu paratvāt prakrasañjñāiva bhavati - puṣpāṇi spṛhayatīti* (Mishra 1985, 553). Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita: *prakarṣavivakṣāyām tu paratvāt prakrasañjñā* (Chaturveda, Vidyabhaskara 1961, 647-8).

after the term *sampradāna* and before the term *karman*. Therefore, sentences that include a word that denotes an item termed *adhikaraṇa* easily present themselves as uncontroversial candidates to be counterexamples that are neither hypothetical nor blocked by the term *sampradāna*. There is no other explanation we can think of for these counterexamples. Whether these serve as suitable counterexamples is a different question. In fact, they do not serve any purpose whatsoever, nor do they help one understand the relation of these special rules to other rules.

4 The *Kātantra* and the *Cāndravākaraṇa*:

Since the *Kātantra* (first century CE) and the *Cāndra* (fifth century CE) are pre-*Kāśikāvṛtti*, it is interesting to see how they deal with these special cases.⁹ Thereby we may find some trace of counterexamples with the counterexample that uses a word denoting an object that is termed *adhikaraṇa*.

4.1 The *Kātantra vyākaraṇa*

The *Kātantra* grammar states only one rule that deals with the term *sampradāna*: K. 2.4.10 *yasmai ditsā rocate dhārayate vā tat sampradānam* “the participants in the action to which one desires to give, the one to whom something is pleasing, and the one to whom one owes are termed *sampradāna*”. The *Kātantra* grammar deals here with only three of the several constructions treated by Pāṇini and covers all of them in one rule. This rule corresponds to A. 1.4.33, A. 1.4.34 and A. 1.4.35. *Durgasimha* (ninth-tenth century C.E), a well-known commentator of the *Kātantra* grammar, provides three examples (Eggeling 1874, 79-80):

1. *brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti* “he/she donates a cow to a brahmin”.
2. *devadattāya rocate modakaḥ* “sweetmeats are pleasing to Devadatta”.
3. *viṣṇumitrāya gām dhārayate* “he or she owes a cow to Viṣṇumitra”.

The remaining expressions like *devadattāya ślāghate* “He/she praises Devadatta” etc. dealt with by Pāṇini are covered under the category

⁹ As the chronology was recently summarised by Ben-Dor (2019), the *Jainendramahāvṛtti* and *Kāśikāvṛtti* were composed in the same time period. However the conclusion of this section equally applies to the *Jainendramahāvṛtti*.

of purpose (*tādarthya*).¹⁰ The *Kātantra* grammar does not term them *sampradāna*. So, it avoids any kind of detailed semantic treatment of the topic. It focuses merely on accounting for the *caturthī vibhakti*. Durgasimha does not discuss here any counterexample, nor does he mention any alternative expressions like **devadattam ślāghate* or **puṣpāṇi sprhayati*. Although the *Kātantra* sūtra-pāṭha is dated no later than first century CE, the available commentaries are dated after the ninth century CE. So, there is a gap of at least eight hundred years between the composition of the sūtra-pāṭha and the commentaries. Hence the discussion we find in Durgasimha's commentary or later commentaries can be traced to other commentaries like the *Cāndravṛtti* or *Kāśikāvṛtti*. It is difficult to state with certainty whether the author of the *Kātantra* sūtra-pāṭha accounted for both usages: *devadattāya ślāghate* and **devadattam ślāghate*, or merely for the former. Moreover, there is no counterexample provided that matches with any counterexample in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*.

4.2 The *Cāndravṛtyākaraṇa*

The *Cāndra* grammar states five different rules (C. 2.1.73-77) to cover the term *sampradāna*. Among them, C. 2.1.74 *rucimati* and C. 2.1.75 *dhāre uttamarṇe* correspond to A. 1.4.33 and A. 1.4.35 respectively. Interestingly, like the *Kātantra*, there are no rules that correspond to A. 1.4.34 and A. 1.4.36. While commenting on C. 2.1.74 *rucimati*, it is asked: "how do we provide for *devadattāya ślāghate*, *chātrāya hnute*, *chātrāya āśṛṇoti* etc.?" It is answered: "Those [usages] will be taken care by *tādarthya-caturthī*".¹¹ Further, the *Cāndravṛtti* elaborates as follows: when desired as a direct object of the actions denoted by the verbal roots *ślāgh* or *sprh*, the expressions *devadattam ślāghate* "he/she praises Devadatta" and *puṣpāṇi sprhayati* "he/she desires flowers" are valid.¹² This is very interesting because what Pāṇini seems not to approve of is accepted as a valid expression. Historically we can say that these expressions not accepted earlier were allowed by

¹⁰ Durgasimha states: *katham devadattāya ślāghate chātrāya hnute..... chātrāya āśṛṇoti. tādarthyaaturthyā siddham*. "How do we say *devadattāya ślāghate*, *chātrāya hnute*, *chātrāya āśṛṇoti* etc.? Those will be taken care by *tādarthyaaturthī*" (Eggleling 1874, 79-80).

¹¹ *katham devadattāya ślāghate devadattāya hnute..... puṣpebhyah sprhayatī. tādarthyē caturthī bhaviṣyati* "How is it the dative occurs in *devadattāya ślāghate*, *devadattāya hnute*, *puṣpebhyah sprhayati*, etc.? The dative will occur in the sense of purpose (*tādarthyē caturthī*)" (Chatterji 1953, 176).

¹² *vyāpyavivakṣyām tu devadattam ślāghate puṣpāṇi sprhayatī* "When the speaker has the desire to express (Devadatta, or the flower [*puṣpa*]) as the direct object, then *devadattam ślāghate*, *puṣpāṇi sprhayatī*, etc. are valid expressions" (Chatterji 1953, 176).

the fifth century CE. This change was also accepted by the Pāṇinīyas (footnote 6 and 8). The variant *devadattam ślāghate* for the counterexample *devadattāya ślāghate pathi* on A. 1.4.34 mentioned by Haradatta seems to account for the language change that is clearly accepted by the *Cāndravṛtti*. Alternatively, it is possible that *devadattam ślāghate* is an interpolation in the text of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* under the influence of the *Cāndravṛtti*. Even though there is no counterexample given in the *Cāndravṛtti* on C. 2.1.74, there is a counterexample on C. 2.1.75 *uttamarṇa iti kim? gām dhārayati devadattaḥ* “why the condition *uttamarṇa* ‘creditor’? ‘Devadatta owes a cow’”. Devadatta who is a debtor is not termed *sampradāna*. This counterexample is similar to the variant *devadattaḥ ślāghate* “Devadatta praises” in A. 1.4.34, which is noted by Haradatta and many printed editions of the *Kāśikāvṛtti*. In short, we can observe that there is no counterexample provided that matches any counterexample given in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* that includes a word denoting an object termed *adhikaraṇa*. Thus there is no historical trace of these counterexamples.

5 Conclusion

Ajotikar et al. (2016) claim that most of the counterexamples provided in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* conform to the distinctive feature of a counterexample, namely having all the conditions stated in the rule except one (*ekāṅgavikalatā*). But the counterexamples discussed in this paper do not comply with this general claim. When it comes to the issue of complex semantic conditions (*priyamāṇa*, *jñāpsyamāna*, *īpsita* or *uttamarṇa*) stated in A. 1.4.33-36, it is difficult to justify the usefulness of the available counterexamples. These must have been included in order to fulfil the criteria of a *vṛtti*. A *vṛtti* typically includes an example, a counterexample and supplementary words necessary to complete the meaning of a rule. However, these counterexamples fail to justify the significance of the semantic conditions stated in the rule for which they are provided. Hence, they do not serve any purpose.

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