Pakistan-Ukraine. Analogies in the Triangles of Regional Security Complexes

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Abstract The paper deals with two countries – Pakistan and Ukraine – that are located at the center of the following two interest triangles: India-Pakistan-Afghanistan (South Asia) and Russia-Ukraine-Moldova (post-Soviet regional security complex). Despite their considerable differences, they have similar problems with their geopolitical neighbours in the context of territorial conflicts. Existing issues with neighbouring countries give Pakistan and Ukraine the status of a ‘middle state’, which is characterized by threatening its territorial integrity and becoming an object of ‘penetrating’ into its RSC (regional security complex) for the states from neighbouring regions.


1 Introduction

With the end of bipolarity era, a tendency for the formation of separate regional systems increased. In many regions, interstate rivalry has become widespread, leading to an increased risk of local wars and territorial conflicts. Most of them are taking on forms of armed confrontation. Territorial conflicts imply confrontations at different levels of a frontier character, as well as armed clashes in a dispute over the seizure of a particular territory. Security becomes a determinant of interstate cooperation at the regional level. For this reasons, changes in the international system functioning at the present stage and approaches to their theoretical understanding could be discussed in the context of security factor.

One of the founders of the security complexes classical theory, a representative of neorealism and the Copenhagen School of international relations, Barry Buzan, considers the high level of interdependence in the security field, which is recognized by neighbouring countries, as the primary criterion for shaping specific international regions (Buzan 2003, 141). More precisely, Buzan’s ideas on regional security cooperation were embodied in the theory of regional security complexes (henceforth RSC), which is conceptually one of the greatest achievements of the neorealism school in the regionalism phenomenon studies.

The ‘security complex’ concept, according to Buzan, should be understood as a transnational region containing states and their constituent parts, which are united by a stable view of security and relations in the security sphere. Moreover, the security interests of these states are so close that none of them can consider its national security separately from the national security of geopolitical neighbours (Lukyn 2011, 8).

Such intertwining of the state interests in a region becomes a determining factor for the development of the regional security complexes’ principal parameters according to Buzan and Wæver. They consist of the following:

• borders, which separate one region from another;
• anarchic structure (a region must consist of two or more autonomous units, i.e. states);
• polarity, which characterizes the spread of power between the core actors in a region; social component, which determines the perception of neighbours within a region on the ‘friend-enemy’ scale (Buzan, Wæver 2003, 53).

In the 1990s, Northeast and Southeast Asian security complexes were merged into one – the East Asian complex. Besides this large complex, the South Asian one exists in the region as well. Highlighting the South Asian security complex, Buzan considers Pakistan as its
part and a state which has a security dilemma with India. In such context, Afghanistan is deemed as a ‘country-insulator’ that separates the South Asian complex from another regional system and embodies the above-mentioned level of interregional interaction (Buzan, Wæver 2003, 110). A substantial aspect of building the South Asian RSC is that only India has a common land or sea border with all other countries in the region. Pakistan, which in its turn has close ties with Afghanistan, remains separated.

Buzan’s theory stresses that the post-Soviet RSC, together with the West European RSC, forms a weak European supercomplex (Buzan, Wæver 2003, 350). According to Eyvazov (2011), in the early 1990s, the political space, which had been united within the Soviet Union, underwent a transformation – fifteen Soviet republics became independent states that changed key vectors of security relations between them. The post-Soviet RSC consists of the Russian Federation and the following sub-complexes:

1. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia;
2. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova;
3. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia;
4. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The polarity of the post-Soviet RSC is determined by the potential of Russia (the Russian Federation), which far exceeds the power potentials of other newly independent states. According to Eyvazov, in fact, Russia has retained its status as the sole centre of power in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, the processes taking place in the discussed space enhance the level of interference in the other states’ RSCs from the neighbouring RSCs. In turn, the European segment of the post-Soviet RSC (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) comes under an impact of countries from the neighbouring RSC, which are members of the EU (European Union): Poland and Romania (Eyvazov 2011, 21).

The purpose of the present study is to examine two countries, Pakistan and Ukraine, located at the centre of two interest triangles – the South Asian RSC (India-Pakistan-Afghanistan) and the post-Soviet RSC (Russia-Ukraine-Moldova) – which have similar problems with their neighbours in the context of territorial conflicts, despite their significant differences.

Considering ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity within a country, as well as internal turbulence in regional states with a colonial and post-Soviet past, it is substantial to distinguish internal and interstate conflicts. The first category includes the subjects, which are the state and non-state groups, organizations that have private interests and mechanisms for influencing the conflict situation. The second category involves participation of states as the subjects of international relations. However, the examples of the South Asian RSC
and the post-Soviet RSC demonstrate that the interdependence of internal and interstate conflicts, which determine each other’s dynamics, could be observed.

Pakistan is a country in Southern Asia that stretches from the Himalayas to the Arabian Sea and is bordered by the following four independent countries: Iran in the Southwest, Afghanistan in the West and North, China in the Northeast, and India in the East, with a coastline in the Arabian Sea. The country covers 880,254 km² and counts ca. 200 million inhabitants (making it the sixth most populous country in the world).

Pakistan has a rather diverse ethnic structure and has a number of internal conflicts on ethnic grounds. However, given the purpose of this study, the paper focusses on the conflict between Pakistan and India. Also, Pakistan has an inherent resistance to neighbouring India (including military methods), and inclination to overcome the effects of existing territorial conflicts.

Ukraine is a country of Central and Eastern Europe bordered by seven countries (Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland), has access to the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. In terms of size, population, and natural resource potential, Ukraine is one of the largest countries in Europe. Occupying an area of 603,700 km², it holds the second territory in Europe after the Russian Federation only and exceeds Germany by more than 1.5 times, Italy twice, the UK by almost 2.5 times. In terms of population (roughly 40 million people), Ukraine ranks sixth position in Europe (after Russia, Germany, the UK, France and Italy).

The updating of European vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy is linked to the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and the aggression of neighbouring Russia against Ukraine, foremost, the illegal annexation of Crimea and hostilities escalated in Eastern Ukraine (Donbass). Due to the events of 2014, Ukraine’s security policy was reformatted, and a military factor gained significance in the domestic and foreign policy of the country. The Ukrainian state has faced new problems and threats for itself: terrorist-oriented separatist groups and consequences of the neighbouring state aggression for both the social and economic spheres.

Thus, despite the fact that Pakistan and Ukraine are different states with their own histories, gains and miscounts, they deal with one similar issue (the threat of territorial conflicts), which unites the states in ways for searching a decision. Particularly, a unity of the nation in Pakistan (on the background of conflicts and threats, or the creation of a common identity in the state) can be justified in the following way. The results of opinion polls by the Pew Research Center (an American non-profit organization that is a subsidiary of the Pew Charitable Trusts in Washington) show the formation of Pakistani and Indian public perceptions of each other through the prism of ‘friend-enemy’ (Pew Research Center 2013).
A 2015 poll found that 61% of Pakistanis rated India as a very serious threat; particularly, the Taliban was detected as a threat by 55% of population. In a 2017 survey conducted by Pulse Consultant, 95% of respondents in Pakistan saw India as Pakistan’s worst enemy. The 2018 Pew poll found that 76% of Indians saw Pakistan as a threat and 63% described it as a very serious threat. In 2009, after the famous terrorist attack in Mumbai (India) and the aggravation of bilateral Pakistani-Indian relations, 69% of Pakistanis called India their greatest enemy. In 2012, among such threats to Pakistan as India, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 59% of Pakistanis chose India. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic country and, according to opinion polls, in 2009, 89% of the population identified themselves as Pakistanis, not as members of one or another ethnic group (Pew Research Center 2013).

Such triangles of interests as India-Pakistan-Afghanistan and Russia-Ukraine-Moldova have been chosen not by chance. The choice is conditioned by the purpose of study – to draw analogies between Pakistan and Ukraine in the context of their impact on security in the native geographical regions, considering these states as actors, which promote appropriate transformational changes in regional security complexes at the beginning of the XXI century.

2 The South Asian Interest Triangle. India-Pakistan-Afghanistan

The complexity of the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan interest triangle forms a certain axis of conflict in the region – ‘Pakhtūnistān (or Pashtunistan)-Kashmir’ (Tykhonenko 2017, 16). Both issues have a direct impact on Pakistan’s internal stability, turning the state into the ‘middle’ one between the two centres of contradiction. At the same time, in a comprehensive review, they affect the security of Afghanistan and India, contributing to the regional security system transformation.

At the beginning of the XXI century, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a nuclear-weapon state, thereby creating counteraction to India in South Asia, but may lose its territorial integrity if territorial conflicts escalate. Historically, Pakistan has border conflicts with India and Afghanistan based on ethno-confessional factors. If the Kashmir problem could lead to the escalation of a nuclear war between Islamabad and New Delhi, then the conflict around a ‘Greater Pakhtūnistān’, - that is, the unification of the ethnic group into a single state, - threatens the territorial integrity and fragmentation of Pakistan and, as a result, Afghanistan. The destabilizing factor in resolving interstate conflicts for Islamabad is becoming a variety of groups (separatist and terroristic ones), which have their own positions on how to settle the problems. In particular, it is worth mentioning that the polarity in the approaches of India and Pakistan to
the settlement of disputes and their positions dates back to the time when both were parts of British India. For example, the ‘father’ of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, formed the theory of ‘two nations’: dividing British India, Muslims had to form their own state, as well as Hindus. That idea was theoretically implemented. However, in practice, the religious factor was not taken into account and that led to the Kashmir issue (Majid 2014, 186-7).

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic country. There are five major ethno-linguistic groups in the country: Punjabi Muslims, Pakhtūns (or Pashtuns) divided into many tribes and clans (with most Pakhtūns living in Afghanistan), Sindhi, Baluchis (some Baluchs are living in Iran), Muhajirs (descendants of Muslims) from India, representing a conglomerate of dozens of different Indian ethnic groups, whose historical homeland has remained in India (Ihnatiev 2014, 38-9). Particular attention should be paid to Pakhtūns, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which ranks second after Punjabis in Pakistan (about 24 million people). Territorially, they reside in Khyber Pakhtūnkhwa and in the tribal zone. If the laws of Pakistan rule in the territory of Khyber Pakhtūnkhwa, then the rules of customary law – Pakhtūnwali (Pashtunwali) – are primary in force in the area of tribes. The Pakhtūn (or Pashtun) ethnic group is made up of a large number of tribal groups that address significant issues at an assembly of elders and tribal clans called jirga (Mili, Townsend 2009, 8).

The peculiarity of the Kashmiri conflict is the entry of two civilizational ecumenes into the collision zone. According to American political scientist, adviser and academic Samuel Huntington ([1996] 2007), Islamic and Hindu civilizations with different worldviews crossed in Kashmir. In the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir the majority of population are Muslims seeking to unite with the Pakistani province of Azad Kashmir. As a consequence, their entry into Pakistan will threaten India’s territorial integrity. The situation, in which the territorial integrity of India will be violated, can be defined as a breach of the balance of geopolitical positioning of India and Pakistan in South Asia. Due to this balance of power in the region and the India-Pakistan confrontation, it seems appropriate to use the division of Asia carried out by scientists East and Spate in the early 1950s. Asia was defined as the followings: 1) Southwest Asia; 2) India and Pakistan; 3) Southeast Asia; 4) the Far East; 5) Soviet Asia; 6) ‘High Asia’. It is noteworthy that India and Pakistan are no longer positioned as British India. In addition, the authors disagreed with the use of the name ‘India’ by other Western scholars as a geographical definition of the ‘Indo-Pakistani subcontinent’ (East, Spate 1951, 45). Therefore, while India is geographically central to South Asia, given the significance of the political factor, it is impossible to rule out Pakistan’s influence in the region. Moreover, regional security is being held hostage to the Pakistani-Indian confrontation.
The emergence of conflicts around Kashmir and Pakhtūnistān has a historical basis. The unwarranted division of British India with no regard to ethnic and religious factors has become a starting point for the Kashmir problem. It led to a military confrontation between the newly created states (Shaumian 2002, 15). The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan had established a ceasefire line by 1 January 1949, thereby dividing Kashmir into two parts – the Indian Kashmir and the Pakistani one. According to the UN decision, a plebiscite was appointed to determine the future of the state (United Nations 1948). Nevertheless, it was not held. Thus, the border between Pakistan and India is based on a ceasefire line established in the last century. The only thing that could be added is that according to the 1972 Simla (or Shimla) Agreement, the ceasefire line between Pakistan and India in Kashmir became known as the “line of control” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 1972).

A similar background is the problem of Pakhtūnistān, which is at the heart of defining the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Historically, the issue of Pakhtūnistān was linked to the Durand Line problem that arose from the signing of the Treaty establishing the State Border between Afghanistan and the British colonial possessions in South Asia as early as 1893. The problem was exacerbated with the appearance of a new state, Pakistan, on the world map in 1947. In July 1949, Kabul declared non-recognition of the treaty and, accordingly, the border strip (Belokrenytskyi, Moskalenko 2008, 302). Since then, the Pakhtūn tribal settlement zone has been an area of constant instability, and the Pakistani government has been nominated there through customary laws.

The problems of Kashmir and Pakhtūnistān are manifestations of asymmetric conflicts affected by the nuclear factor and the presence of non-state actors – separatist, terroristic and militaristic groups.

The Kashmir problem gained new status in the regional security system with the acquisition of Pakistan and India de-facto nuclear status in 1998. Since then, it has become not only a border and territorial conflict, but also a catalyst for the nuclear arms race in the South Asian region.

In the early 2000s, the problem of Pakhtūnistān also gained momentum. Initially, the territory of the Pakhtūn ethnic group became the object of dislocation for Talibans, Afghan refugees and development of illegal drug trafficking, and subsequently operations to counter terrorist threats. A number of ‘non-traditional’ security threats related to Pakhtūnistān have become a source of instability in the region. Afghanistan’s accession to the South Asian regional security system also contributed to that.

Therefore, both disputes give Pakistan the status of a ‘middle state’, which is forced to simultaneously respond to them: that is a prerequisite for changes in the South Asian RSC.
Considering these conflicts through the ‘Pakhtūnistān-Kashmir’ conditional axis, there are several unifying features to note.

Firstly, Pakistan’s position on maintaining its territorial integrity plays a significant role, but in quite different ways. It is thought that in the case of Kashmir Pakistan insists on holding a plebiscite. Thus, the population of Jammu and Kashmir is defined as purely Pakistani. The situation with Pakhtūns is diametrically opposite. The Pakistani side does not agree to grant Pakhtūns the right of self-determination and denies their existence as a nation (Serheev 2010, 29). It is worth noting that Pakistan is still pursuing a policy of rapprochement with Pakhtūns. Thus, in 2010, the North-Western border province, which is mostly inhabited by Pakhtūns, was renamed Khyber Pakhtūnkhwa.

Secondly, Pakhtūns and Kashmiris professed an idea of their own identity which should be embodied in the acquisition of statehood – the creation of the ‘Greater Pakhtūnistān’, united in an independent state of Kashmir. Based on the above-mentioned positions of Pakistan, a question regarding Islamabad’s confidence in joining Jammu and Kashmir objectively arises. In the case of the Pakhtūn people unification, not only the territorial integrity of Pakistan will be violated, but also the complete fragmentation of Afghanistan could take place. The authors of this study consider that such options do not suit India, which may also suffer territorial losses and the growing terrorist threat from Afghanistan-Pakistan territory, which has already become an objectively existing fact.

Thirdly, it is an involvement of terrorist groups in the problems. Such groups closely interact with separatists by using each other for pursuing the own purposes.

Such common features of both conflicts are prerequisites for defining the interests of the opposing states – India, Pakistan, Afghanistan – and of non-state actors, on which the security level in South Asia depends.

Considering the Kashmiri issue in Pakistani-Indian relations, it is worth emphasizing the existence of bilateral dialogue and attempts to resolve the conflict. States, in their turn, have opposite views on the final result. The official position of the Indian side is that Kashmir is an integral part of India and this problem is solved; thus, the control or occupation of the northern and northwestern regions of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan is illegal (Kalis, Dar 2013, 118). Instead, Pakistan insists on holding a plebiscite under international control that will give the Kashmiri people the right to self-determination and considers the issue unresolved (Ahtisaari, Al-Sabah 2003, 18).

In the case of Pakhtūnistān, the Taliban has become increasingly involved in Pakistani-Afghan dialogue. The Pakistani initiative for peace negotiations with the Taliban contributes to such developments.

Pakistan considers the established the Durand Line a state border. Afghanistan refuses to do so. This position of Kabul justifies its nation-
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Annali di Ca' Foscari. Serie orientale e-ISSN 2385-3042

56, 2020, 219-244 ISSN 1125-3789

al interests, namely, to attract the sympathies of Pakhtūns – the largest ethnic group in multinational Afghanistan. Since Pakhtūns have been usually at the head of the Afghan state, this course seems quite logical (Sarwar 2015). Moreover, Pakistani Pakhtūns and Baluchs – the influential national minorities in Pakistan – readily relied on Afghanistan, demanding broad autonomy and independence (Serheev 2009, 22).

Pakistan has slightly different national interests in this regard. There is no doubt that a stable Afghanistan is not in Pakistan’s interests, but Islamabad intends to ensure stability in the Afghan territory by forming ‘its’ government. According to experts, Pakistan is not interested in making Afghanistan a strong country. It is needed as a weak and dependent state, as a strategic advantage in the conflict with India. Afghanistan’s importance to Pakistan can be seen through the prism of the Pakistani concept of ‘strategic depth’ developed in Pakistan in the 1980s, which aims to involve Afghanistan more deeply in Pakistan’s foreign policy interests. In particular, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Richard Olson, has said in an interview that Pakistan uses the concept of ‘strategic depth’ in its relations with Afghanistan to control this latter and, thus, to manoeuvre in its relations with India (Gul 2012).

The formation of a new state union in the form of Pakhtūnistān will violate the territorial integrity of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Consequently, there is a significant threat to the Pakistan national security on the part of unresolved territorial issues. Islamabad must respond comprehensively in two directions. The first is the Kashmir conflict with India, which goes beyond the borders of states and affects the South Asian system of regional security. The second is the problem of Pakhtūnistān, which is actualized in the form of terrorist threat and the post-Afghan settlement. Both the Kashmiri issue and the Pakhtūnistān problem become prerequisites for the aggravation of bilateral Pakistani contacts with neighbouring states and affect polarization between the actors of the South Asian RSC (Tykhonenko 2015).

3 The Post-Soviet Interest Triangle. Russian Federation-Ukraine-Moldova

The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has deep historical roots. The absorption of Ukraine, its material and human resources is one of the key prerequisites for the deployment of the Russian imperial project. The origins of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war can be found in the period of forming of the Russian Empire and its confrontation with the Ukrainian state, known as the Hetmanate. The Konotop battle of 1659 became the starting point of an armed conflict, where Ukrainian troops of Hetman Ivan Vykovsky defeated the Moscow ar-
A substantial stage of the confrontation was the battle of Poltava in 1709. The victory of Tsar Peter I in that fight secured the Russian influence on the Hetmanate territory and accelerated the creation process of the Russian Empire (V’iatrovych 2019).

During the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-21, the Bolsheviks tried in every possible way to prevent the establishment of the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic. When attempts to fix control over Ukraine through the creation of puppet governments failed, the Bolsheviks resorted to armed aggression and occupation (V’iatrovych 2019).

The spread of the USSR to the territories of Western Ukraine during World War II caused widespread armed resistance by the local population in the form of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (V’iatrovych 2019). The confrontation lasted more than ten years after the end of the world conflict and weakened the USSR. Therefore, the ‘Banderites’1 are still the primary anti-heroes of modern Russian propaganda, remaining a symbol of the liberation movement for Ukrainians.

In 1991, Ukraine regained its independence. However, the Russian Federation has not given up attempts to renovate its impact on Ukraine by blurring national identity (members of Ukrainian society have not realized themselves as a certain unity) (Kotlyar 2017, 102-3), language manipulating, hyperbolizing the regional differences, rejecting the right of Ukrainians to restore national memory, funding and recruiting Ukrainian politicians, and implementing their agents in Ukraine’s defense structures (V’iatrovych 2019).

As Vadymyr Putin came to power in Russia, pressure on Ukraine intensified. In 2005, he declared that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical “catastrophe of the century”. Such thesis defines the goals of his presidency and the direction of the Russian Federation development – the restoration of the USSR (V’iatrovych 2019).

Russia tried to blackmail Ukraine on a number of issues. A striking example is a conflict around the Tuzla Island in autumn 2003. Political confrontation has hardly grown into an armed one, but the conflict has been resolved (Hai-Nyzhnyk 2017).

The beginning of armed conflict in Ukraine should be dated 20 February 2014 (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2015a), when a military operation to seize the Crimean Peninsula by the special forces of the Russian Federation began. From the end of February to the end of March, operations were carried out by Russian servicemen to grasp military units and objects of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Crimea. Also, by the end of March, Russian troops, assisted by the Cossack detachments, seized 41 military bases, 11 warships, 2,363 units of combat equipment, and 6 coastal anti-ship complexes (Harbar et al. 2018).

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1 Members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Radical branch under the leadership of Stepan Bandera.
On 15 March 2014, a so-called referendum was held in Crimea, where it was ‘voted’ for an idea of joining the peninsula to Russia. Three days later, on 18 March, the Kremlin signed a treaty on the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation (Presidential Executive Office of Russia 2014).

At the beginning of April 2014, Russia started implementing the ‘Novorossiya’ plan and destabilizing the situation in eastern Ukraine. A new wave of anti-Ukrainian protests and the seizure of law enforcement administrations and buildings has led to armed protests. On 7 April, the armed bandit formations in the occupied administrative buildings, controlled by the special services of the Russian Federation, declared the creation of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Kharkiv People’s Republic’. The building of the Security Service of Ukraine was usurped in Lugansk. The militia prevented seizure of the Mykolaiv State Region Administration, and the premises of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration were released by special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (V’iatrovych 2019).

On 12 April, an armed detachment of saboteurs of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation under the command of the Colonel of the Russian Federation’s Intelligence Service Ihor Girkin, who participated in two Chechen wars, battles in Bosnia and Transnistria, arrived in Sloviansk from Crimea. Later, on 13 April 2014, a group of armed separatists organized an ambush for the employees of the Security Service of Ukraine and soldiers from the 3rd Company of the 80th Ukrainian Brigade of the Armed Forces, resulting in the death of a Captain of the Security Service of Ukraine. In response to the actions of the separatists, the Acting President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, introduced a regime of anti-terrorist operation in the territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2014).

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine On the Peculiarities of State Policy on Ensuring Ukraine’s State Sovereignty over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, which came into force on 24 February 2018, and states that Russia is recognized as an aggressor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2018a). Thus, Kiev officially recognized Russia as an aggressor and a source of a real threat to Ukraine’s national security.

Violating the rules and principles of international law, bilateral and multilateral agreements, the Russian Federation annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, occupied certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The approximate number of casualties in Ukraine is estimated between 30,000 and 35,000. More than 7,000 of them (civilians and Ukrainian military) were killed. Nearly

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2 The territory of the former Novorossiysk Governorate (province), the Russian Empire.
1,5 million residents of Eastern Ukraine were forced to leave their homes. The infrastructure of the occupied regions was destroyed and 27% of the Donbas industrial potential was illegally transferred to Russia (V’iatrovych 2019).

Simultaneously, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the issue of delimitating of the maritime boundary between the two states emerged on the bilateral relations agenda again, since the Russian Federation has begun to perceive Crimea as its own territory, and inland waters around the peninsula as those under its jurisdiction. It is significant that the Sea of Azov is not only an object of cargo transportation and a trade component for the states, but a source of mineral deposits and an energy factor, which forms a conflict basis between Ukraine and Russia, as well.

The Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch was signed by Putin and Leonid Kuchma in Kerch on 24 December 2003 (ratified in April 2004), following the already mentioned events around the Tuzla Island. The document fixed the historical status of the inland waters of the two countries along the coast, and also confirmed the freedom of navigation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait for their merchant ships and warships. The above agreement contains the phrase that the Sea of Azov is historically the inland sea of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. However, it is stressed that the borders in the Sea of Azov will be defined by a separate treaty.

Since 2014, the negotiation process for resolving the maritime border between Ukraine and Russia has been completely halted and the prospects for its restoration are extremely low (Hudev 2018, 91). After all, the Russian Federation began to perceive the Sea of Azov as its own ‘inland sea’ and built the Kerch Bridge, which created certain restrictions in the tonnage of vessels that can pass in the Sea of Azov (Samus 2018).

On 19 February 2018, Ukraine filed a memorandum in the International Court of Arbitration against the Russian Federation in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which alleges Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s rights in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov, as well as in the Kerch Strait (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2018b).

The resonant event in bilateral Ukrainian-Russian relations on the issue of water demarcation has become the capture by the Russian Federation of Ukrainian sailors, who seemed to have entered the inland waters of the Russian Federation near the Crimean Peninsula at the end of 2018 without warning (“Viina u Kerchenskii Prototsi: Taran, Shturmovyky ta Zakhoplenia Ukrainskykh Korabliv” 2018).

International security structures have shown their unpreparedness for the current developments in Ukraine. Key elements of European and Euro-Atlantic security – NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Or-
organization), the EU, and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) - are seeking urgent responses to regional and global threats, posed by Russia's actions.

One of Ukraine's western neighbours is Moldova, which has its own point of conflict that is a threat to Ukraine's national security and contains a ‘Russian factor’. This problem is embodied by the de facto state of the 'Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic' (Transnistria). Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova were established on 10 March 1992 (Embassy of Ukraine to the Republic of Moldova s.d.). Traditionally, a difficult legacy for the post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine and Moldova, has been a question of arrangement, considering demarcation and delimitation of the state border. The border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova is 1,222-km long; its 270 km pass through the territory of unrecognized Transnistria (Hladchenko 2016, 44). Ukraine has the status of a guarantor of the Transnistrian settlement, since it has been a participant of the Moscow Memorandum in 1997, and a negotiating party of the existing 5+2 format since 2006.

Since the outbreak of the war with Russia, Ukraine's interest in Transnistria has increased significantly. On the one hand, the situation in Transnistria is seen as one of the possible scenarios that Russia can impose in the East of Ukraine. On the other hand, Russian troops stationed in Transnistria are perceived as a potential threat to Ukraine (the task force of Russian troops, illegally deployed in Transnistria, counts 1,600 personnel) (Herasymchuk 2018). Ukraine supports the position of the Government of Moldova on the need to implement the decisions of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, the elimination of weapons stores, and the transformation of a peacekeeping mission into a multinational civilian peacekeeping mission with an international mandate (Hurska 2018).

Thus, Russian aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and the actual occupation of certain areas of the Donbas have started a new era of the stimulated international conflicts, exacerbated the negative factors present in the international security environment, and triggered further destructive tendencies, violating the international legal foundations of the world. Ukraine's position

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3 International sources also mention the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (its territory) in different variations as the self-proclaimed ‘Transnistrian Moldovan Republic’, ‘Transdnestr’, ‘Transnistria’ or ‘Transdniestria’. For example, the discussed names could be found in European Parliament (s.d.).

4 Moldova and Transnistria participated in the Moscow Memorandum as the conflict sides; Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators.

5 The 5+2 negotiating format includes such five participants as the Republic of Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, and two observers – the EU and the USA.
on the world stage has undergone dramatic changes in recent years that requires a reflection and full identification of key foreign policy principles. Ukraine needs a clear foreign policy doctrine, subordinated to the task of preserving sovereignty and strategically aimed at restoring territorial integrity, disrupted as a result of the Crimea annexation, hostilities in the Donbass region, and the potential threat from Transnistria.

4 Analogies between the Influence of Pakistan and Ukraine on the Transformation of the South Asian and the Post-Soviet Regional Security Complexes

Territorial conflicts in the South Asian Triangle (India-Pakistan-Afghanistan) cannot be compared to the existing realities in the post-Soviet Triangle (Russian Federation-Ukraine-Moldova) in historical retrospect. The following analogies will be made using Buzan’s triangles of RSC with an overview of the domestic and interstate political levels of relations in the region.

The problems of Kashmir in relations with India, Pakhtūnistān – with Afghanistan, and the war in the Donbass, the occupation of Crimea by Russia, and the conflict in Transnistria have common consequences for the formation of the foreign policy courses of both countries, their regional positioning, involvement of ‘external’ forces and impact on their ‘native’ RSCs.

In particular, Pakistan is a state that promotes gradual changes in the security environment of the South Asian RSC, and Ukraine in the post-Soviet RSC. Both states have some similarity in the mechanisms of influence on the RSC, given the following determinants:

- the ‘state-state’ format relations in the region that influence the formation of a regional identity (national identity) and the existence of the ‘enemy state’ image;
- changes in the RSC, its expansion and narrowing, in particular under the impact of attraction or interpenetration into the security environment of states from the neighbouring RSC, as well as the influence of the institutional dimension of relations between states in the region.

First of all, it is worth noting the similarity between Pakistan and Ukraine in the geopolitical positioning of the South Asian and post-Soviet RSCs, respectively.

It should be noted that the historical aspects of the independence of Ukraine and Pakistan have a common feature: both states have become subjects of international relations as a result of the imperial-type states dissolutions. Pakistan gained independence after the collapse of the British Raj in 1947 as part of the British Empire,
Ukraine in 1991, after the inevitable crash of the Soviet Union.

Pakistan has no land border with the countries of South Asia except India and Afghanistan, and Ukraine has a land border within the post-Soviet RSC only with Russia, Belarus and Moldova. That is, both Pakistan and Ukraine border only a few states of the RSC they belong to. Note that both states have boundaries with states – Russia and India – which claim leadership in the regions, pursuing a hegemonic policy. Existing Pakistani-Indian and Ukrainian-Russian territorial disputes stimulate a secure environment in the RSC and facilitate the development of a certain line of behaviour of states and their perception of each other in the ‘friend-enemy’ format. It can be argued that security dilemmas exist between Pakistan and India, as well as between Ukraine and Russia.

A stable Pakistan without terrorist threats, but not strong in the format of powers coexistence and the state’s defense capability, is usually in the interest of the Indian side. According to Indian analyst Amarjit Singh (2014), if there is a military confrontation between India and Pakistan in which the Indian side wins, then, geographically, the new administrative-territorial units will be formed on the map of South Asia in place of Pakistan. Thus, Balochistan will gain independence, needing security from the Indian side, Kashmir will return to India, Sindh and Western Punjab will become states under Indian protectorate, and the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtūnkhwa will be transferred under the Pakhtūn control, as well as Pakhtūnistān, which will include southern Afghanistan and Kandahār. It is easy to see that Afghanistan will be fragmented into two parts: the first part for Pakhtūns, and the second part as a new state for Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Khazars. Singh justifies such changes, calling them vital for saving the region of South Asia from the current bloodshed and the export of terrorism (Singh 2014).

A leader of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), Subramanian Swamy, has repeatedly emphasized India’s military actions with Pakistan that should lead India to victory and Pakistan to be divided into four parts:

Let us [India] prepare for the possibility that Pakistan may carry out war by miscalculation. We should be ready to finish Pakistan and break it into four and look for that opportunity. (Outlook Web Bureau 2018)

A similar situation can be traced in Russia’s positioning on Ukraine. Special changes in their bilateral relations took place in 2014 because of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the events in the East of Ukraine. In 2019, Russian politician Vladymyr Zhirinovsky ‘divided’ Ukraine, stressing that “Chernihiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhia – all the mentioned is Russia” and ironically mentioning that “Kyiv, Podil and something else” could be left for Ukraine. Moreover, he highlight-
ed that only the third part of Ukrainian territory in the western direction is ‘Ukraine’, which must be called ‘Galicia’; and the remaining 2/3 of Ukraine’s territory is ‘Southeastern Russia’, which includes ‘Malorosia’ [Little Russia] and ‘Novorosia’ [New Russia] (Ivanovich 2019).

Of course, such statements by Zhirinovsky cannot be called the official position of the Russian Federation, but these ideas are implemented in some way. The same could be asserted about Swamy’s statements, although the rhetoric between India and Pakistan has long been much tougher than between Ukraine and Russia.

Therefore, territorial contradictions between the states existing in the South Asian RSC and the post-Soviet RSC contribute to the internal polarization of the region, which is expressed, accordingly to the theory of regional security complexes, developed by Buzan, in the inter-perception of neighbouring states within the region due to the ‘friend-enemy’ scale.

Russia was recognized by Kiev in the Military Doctrine of Ukraine as a threat to Ukraine’s national security. The Third Edition of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, adopted by the NSDC (National Security and Defense Council) of Ukraine on 2 September and enacted on 24 September 2015, defines the following actual military threats to Ukraine: Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine; the increase of the military power of the Russian Federation in close proximity to the state border, including the ability to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea; activation of the Russian intelligence and subversive activities in Ukraine for destabilizing the internal situation. In particular, attention focusses on Russia’s aggressive actions, carried out for depleting the Ukrainian economy (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2015b).

India is identified by Pakistan as a top security threat. Oddly enough, the Pakistani government is also focussing on the economic factor. In particular, it refers to the military ‘face’ of power in Pakistan, namely the statement of Pakistan’s General, Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Qamar Bajwa that India cannot prosper by weakening Pakistan (Abi-Habib 2018). It is worth emphasizing that both the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, and General Bajwa emphasize the significance of the negotiation process with India on the settlement of the Kashmir issue and the establishment of economic ties between the two states. In particular, Pakistan’s economic security is considered as a component of regional security (Monitor News Bureau 2018).

It should be noted that the existence of the enemy state or the aggressor state became an element of unification of society, creation of a unified identity both in Pakistan and in Ukraine. Pakistan has defined the neighbour-state as the ‘enemy’ more clearly and is adhering to this position more vividly and consistently, regardless of
whether the authority has military or civilian nature. During the years of its independence, Ukraine has been experiencing the polar vectors of governing – the West-oriented and the pro-Russian ones.

Talking about uniting the nation, in particular, appealing to the image of a hostile state, in Pakistan, it appears not only in the military and nuclear counteraction to India, but also on the example of the national sports game of cricket, emphasizing the victories and achievements of Pakistan in the world as opposed to India. In particular, it could be supported by the renewal of the ban on Indian television contents in 2018 with the election of oppositionist Khan as Prime Minister of Pakistan (Indo-Asian News Service 2018). It should be noted that after the Russian aggression, Ukraine also banned the broadcasting of media content from the Russian Federation (“V Ukraini Zaboronyly Transliatsiiu shtye Dev’iaty Rosiiskykh Telekanaliv” 2016) that is a manifestation of the use of common counteraction methods to the aggressor state in Pakistan and Ukraine.

At present, the most effective unifying factor for Pakistanis is the military’s successful counter-terrorism efforts. Therefore, a rational grain in the idea of eradicating terrorism makes sense to strengthen Pakistan as a nation, albeit multinational. The implementation of such a large-scale project in modern conditions is possible with the direct involvement of the army.

The existing ‘nuclear’ and territorial contradictions between Islamabad and New Delhi undoubtedly link Pakistan to the South Asian RSC. Therefore, until the Kashmir issue is not resolved, Pakistan will be a leading country in developing the security environment of the South Asian RSC. Although in religious format, Pakistan also gravitates to the Middle East as a Muslim world, having close relations with Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan’s geographical location is strategic but, to some extent, makes the country vulnerable. Pakistan is located at the crossroads of three ancient civilizations and can serve as a bridge between Central and South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Middle East and South Asia. Potentially, it can become a transit hub for neighbouring countries. However, Pakistan will be able to make full use of such a geopolitical position for its own sake only under a stable domestic political situation, which is not the case at the moment.

India has long been trying to use its own geostrategic position in the centre of the South Asian subcontinent and to dominate the po-

6 Political regime of General Pervez Musharraf.
7 Presidencies of Asif Ali Zardari, Mamnoon Hussain, Arif Alvi.
8 Political courses of such presidents as Viktor Yushchenko, Petro Poroshenko, Volodymyr Zelensky.
9 Political course of Viktor Yanukovych.
Political forces in the region. Therefore, the official New Delhi sees Islamabad as one of the core obstacles to achieving hegemony in the region (Majeed 2013, 221).

In the geopolitical format, Ukraine also has a rather favourable geographical position at the crossroads of trade routes between Europe and Asia. For a while, under Kuchma’s presidency, Ukraine’s foreign policy was dominated by the concept of not only a multi-vector policy, but of being a ‘bridge between the West and the East’. However, as time has shown, it is not justified, because without a definite regional affiliation, i.e. partnerships with the West, which is for Ukraine the European Union and, in some way, the USA, and the East (mostly Russia), Ukraine has become a ‘buffer zone’ and a competition ground for two geopolitical centres: the Euro-Atlantic (the EU and the USA) and the Eurasian (Russia) ones (Chalyi et al. 2004, 9).

The problem of such balancing is also affected by issues of identity, both national (unity of society in its perception) and regional. In particular, there could be mentioned the ideas of Viacheslav Lypynskyi (1933), embodied in the popular scientific essay about the interrelation of religion and the church in Ukrainian history,10 in which Ukraine is described as a territory “between East and West”. According to him:

the essence of Ukraine, its soul, given to it by God in the day of its birth, a historical calling, a symbol and a sign of its national identity. (Lypynskyi 1933, 59)

Moreover, the dual image of Ukraine lies in its history – from the oscillations between Rome and Byzantium in the choice of the Christian rite and to the divergent political and cultural tendencies towards Poland and Moscow – “two different cultures, worldviews, concepts and civilizations” (Lypynskyi 1933, 65-6).

However, Ukraine is related to Europe not only geographically, but also politically, as the current confrontation with Russia further unites Ukraine with Europe and the European Union. Considering the territorial contradictions, which exist between the states in the South Asian RSC and the post-Soviet RSC (bilateral level of interaction), and focussing on Pakistan and Ukraine, it could be stated that a certain modernization in both systems has already taken place in the XXI century.

Afghanistan, according to Buzan’s theory, is a ‘country-insulator’, i.e. one that separates the South Asian RSC from its neighbours. Al-

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10 Relihiia i Tserkva v Istorii Ukrainy Релігія і церква в історії України (Religion and the Church in the History of Ukraine) was written in December 1923 and published in 1925 in Philadelphia. In 1933, it was republished in Lviv.
though, with the entry of Afghanistan into the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) in 2007, the external transformation of the South Asian RSC can be questioned. In turn, Afghanistan is involved in the South Asian RSC through its close ties with Pakistan, in particular the Pakhtūnistān problem, as well as the impact of the illicit drug trafficking on the regional security environment in the format of Afghanistan (narcotics producer) and Pakistan (drug-transit country). Thus, the bilateral level of interaction between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the existing territorial contradictions, as well as the issue of illegal drug trafficking and Afghan refugees, closely link Afghanistan with the South Asian RSC. It should be emphasized that India, which provides assistance to the Afghan authorities, particularly, in the financial sector, is starting to be involved in the Afghan settlement. For instance, Afghanistan participates in the India-Iran agreement on the construction of the Iranian port of Chabahar. (Siddiqui 2019). Therefore, it is possible to assert also a gradual forming of a new stage of internal transformation in the RSC.

With respect to the post-Soviet RSC, it can be argued that its balance of power is more polarized than in the South Asian RSC. We will not take into account all the sub-complexes identified by Buzan in this RSC. It is reasonable to agree that Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are the most substantial for Russia. These three states have a more stable structure than those belonging to the Caucasus and Central Asian sub-complexes (Sarikaya 2017, 35). At the beginning of the XXI century, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have lost their status as a Baltic sub-complex and are not the insulator states that had separated the post-Soviet RSC from the Western European RSC because in 2004 they have become member states of the European Union and NATO. Therefore, these states are already full subjects of the Western European RSC. In turn, the 2014 events in Ukraine marked the beginning of an internal transformation in the post-Soviet RSC.

First of all, the manifestation of a new level of polarization in the RSC between Ukraine and Russia should be considered. Secondly, in 2014 Ukraine has signed an Association Agreement with the EU, thereby confirming its intention to join the European Community and as a result – with its full accession to the EU – Ukraine will belong to the Western European RSC. Also in 2014, Ukraine abolished its non-aligned status and made the NATO accession a priority in its foreign policy. It is worth to emphasize that, in 2019 amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine made accession to the EU and NATO the priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2019). Both the EU and NATO are structures that can be considered ‘opposition’ to Russia. Thirdly, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the events in eastern Ukraine, Kiev started the process of withdrawal from the CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States), which actually ended on 19 May 2018, when the President
of Ukraine signed a decree, terminating Ukraine’s participation in the CIS statutory bodies (“MZS: Ukraina Faktychno Zavershyla Vykhid z SND” 2019). Now, the CIS could be considered as the institutional shell of the post-Soviet RSC, reflecting its external transformation, since Georgia has left the CIS in 2009, and Ukraine did the same in 2018. Both states withdrew from the CIS after the aggravation of their relations with the Russian Federation, namely, its military operations against Georgia and Ukraine.\footnote{As a result of Russian aggression, Georgia lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, and Crimea was annexed from Ukraine in 2014.} It should be emphasized that Ukraine \textit{de jure} was not a member state of the CIS, but had the status of a founding state and a CIS member state, as it did not sign the Charter of the organization, opposing Russia in its proposal to create the unified CIS armed forces.

Russia’s CIS policy can be described as lobbying for its national interests, as well as India’s role in SAARC, in which Islamabad is not sufficiently active and India is trying to ‘disengage’ other South Asian states from cooperating with Pakistan.

However, if Ukraine has confidently self-determined as a European state and has identified integration into the European Union as a priority, then Pakistan has a somewhat branched position on development priorities. In particular, geopolitically, the state belongs to South Asia; however, it actively cooperates with the Middle Eastern states, which are Muslim. Let us mention Pakistan’s close cooperation with Saudi Arabia. By the way, Islamabad is a part of an Islamic military anti-terrorist coalition formed under the auspices of Riyadh, also known as the ‘Muslim NATO’ (Sultan 2018). In its turn, Ukraine is seeking to join the leading military-political bloc, the NATO.

It can be argued that territorial conflicts determine the intensity of transformational changes in the RSC, as well as the level of relations between states on the ‘friend-enemy’ scale. In the Russia-Ukraine-Moldova triangle, Ukraine acquires the same status of the ‘middle state’ as Pakistan in the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangle. Ukraine is threatened by Russia’s military armed intervention, both from the Ukrainian-Russian border and from Transnistria, where Russian military forces are stationed. Such actions, as shown by the events of 2014, violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine at the present stage. Pakistan, in its turn, also faces the threat to its territorial integrity in the context of the hypothetical formation of the ‘Greater Pakhtūnistān’ and the Kashmiris defending the idea of their own identity and the option of holding a plebiscite by which Kashmiris would not accede to Pakistan.

As there are ‘non-traditional’ security threats on the Pakistani-Afghan border – the problem of refugees, illegal drug and arms traf...
ficking (Grare 2006, 19) – thus, the Ukrainian-Moldovan boundary with Transnistria becomes a route for smuggling alcohol, wine and cigarettes (illegally imported from Moldova) into Ukraine, migration of illegal aliens and drug trafficking (mostly psychotropic substances) (Hladchenko 2016, 45).

Russia is directly involved in the Transnistrian issue, and India is joining the Afghan settlement, creating the effect of the dual influence of the RSC central states on national security of both Ukraine and Pakistan.

5 Conclusions

As a result of this research, it becomes possible to identify the core aspects of the impact of Ukraine and Pakistan on the transformation of their respective RSC.

First of all, the level of internal changes and relations with neighbouring states draws analogies between Pakistan and Ukraine in the scopes of forming national and regional identity under the impact of the ‘enemy state’ image, which is embodied by India and Russia respectively.

Secondly, existing territorial issues with neighbouring countries give both Ukraine and Pakistan the ‘middle state’ status, whose territorial integrity is threatened and becomes an object of ‘penetration’ to its ‘domestic’ RSC from neighbouring regions.

Thirdly, talking about the possibility of expanding the external transformation of the South Asian RSC and the post-Soviet RSC, provided by certain states’ leaving them, the following perspectives could be distinguished:

• As long as the unresolved Kashmiri issue with India remains in Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda, the latter will belong to the South Asian RSC.

• Until Ukraine becomes a full member of the EU it will belong to the post-Soviet RSC, that is conditioned by a similar situation with existing contradictions with the Russian Federation.

Finally, it should be noted that, at the institutional level, Pakistan facilitated in a certain way Afghanistan’s accession to the South Asian RSC (enlargement of the SAARC member states number), and Ukraine ‘reduced’ the number of the post-Soviet RSC members with its institutional exit from the CIS.
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