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La natura e gli stati abituali nell’Etica Nicomachea

Analogie e differenze

Flavia Farina    Università degli Studi Roma Tre – Tor Vergata, Italia; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France    



According to Aristotle, virtue does not arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature. ‘Virtue naturalism’, as the possibility to ‘reduce’ virtue and virtues of character to physical or physiological entities and relations, seems consequently impossible. Nature and virtue differ mostly in respect of their relation with contraries. A moral agent can become either virtuous or vicious, while a stone can only move downwards. However moral habits, once acquired by the agent, seem to come close to nature’s uni-directionality.

keywords: Nicomachean Ethics. Habits. Virtue. Naturalism. Nature. Aristotle. Uni-directionality.

Language: it

Submitted: Feb. 5, 2019
Accepted: March 11, 2019
Published: July 27, 2019
permalink: http://doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-325-0/002

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